

# Spatial conflicts resolution in pedestrians: a social choice theory approach

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## Times Square: a great stress zone




# Social Force Model (SFM)



Figure 1: Social Force Model for Pedestrian Dynamics - Helbing, Molnar (1998)

# A little perspective




**Figure 2:** Physics model for crowd study with prediction (dynamics)

Pedestrians in static crowds are not grains, but game players (Bonnemain, Bonnet, Echeverria, Nicolas & al.)

## Our focus

Interest on spatial conflict resolution rather than realistic motion planner while having relevant pedestrian modelling



**Figure 2** Example of interaction-aware navigation of agents on a sidewalk with a static object. Interaction may be a mutual avoidance maneuver. Agents  $A_n$  plan trajectories from an initial state  $x_n^{\text{init}}$  to a goal region  $X_n^{\text{goal}}$  that avoid static objects  $X^{\text{obj}}$

**Figure 3: Realistic local motion planner (game-theory)**

Human-Like Motion Planning Based on Game Theoretic Decision-Making (Turnward & Wollher)

# Motivations

## Pedestrians' motions in complex situation

Pedestrians, and not robots, in complex scenarios present conflicts...

How do we solve them *relevantly*?

Pedestrians  $\neq$  robots  $\implies$  a different approach in modelling



→ Can we try to model and simulate pedestrians in such situations with a cognition process to solve spatial conflicts?

# Pedestrians: an agent-based modelling

## ABM: what are relevant traits to pedestrians?

- **position:** coordinates
- **speed:** a direction vector
- **motivation:** definition of the opposite of fatigue, the will of a pedestrian to adapt translated in motion
- **attention:** which agents does one consider?

# Spatial conflicts


Choice: Everything discrete

- Discrete motion: 8 moves (Moore neighborhood)
- Discrete time: iterations as steps


**Definition: Spatial conflict**

Given a grid and a time step  $t$ , a blocking situation happens between at least two agents where at  $t + 1$  one cannot move to an area because of the other.

## Two cases of spatial conflicts



(a) case 1: virtual obstacle in a desired area



(b) case 2: inter-blocking situation

These conflicts (green stars) are complicated to handle in complex scenarios  
(obstacles and numerous agents)

→ relevant pedestrian simulation with a conflict solver

# Objectives

## Main objective

Proposal of a model (simulation and algorithm) with pedestrians solving spatial conflicts with an **innovative approach**.

## Sub-objectives:

1. Integration with a physics model for realistic motion
2. Application in advanced simulations / real case scenarios
3. Exportation to robots?

# Social choice: an innovative approach?


## Social choice theory

Aggregation of diverse preferences to find a suitable compromise for each:  
maximize global welfare

→ Application in economy (e.g., fair allocation),  
social sciences (e.g., political bargaining, vote), ...

Social force model  $\longleftrightarrow$  Social choice

How do we take inspiration / make use of this for spatial conflicts?



**Figure 5:** A social choice application: negotiations and vote between states among 3 choices

## Setup/Environment

### Map

A map is a given setup with a fixed number of agents, a grid with obstacles and objectives.

An agent  $a_i$  has the following initial traits:

- a 2D **position**  $pos(a_i)$  bounded by the grid's borders
- a **speed** generated at random  $0 \leq v(a_i) \leq 2$  (TBR)
- a **motivation** generated at random  $0 \leq mot(a_i) \leq 1$
- an **attention** generated at random  $0 \leq att(a_i) \leq 1$  (TBR)

**Motion:**  $a_i$  has a **path** computed (**A\*** now) at each iteration towards its objective.

NB: both motivation and attention may later evolve over time automatically. The motivation changes through negotiations otherwise.

## Hypotheses and events

### HYP. 1: Capacities

Agents have sufficient logical capacities to estimate the trajectory of another.

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Agents aim ultimately to reach their objective with no collision.

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### Collision event

During motion, agents anticipate conflict and communicate to avoid it together

→ Self-interest cooperative game

# How do we solve conflicts?

## Inspiration from social choice theory

1. Aggregate agents' preferences  
→ **cost function**
2. Communicate and decide → **vote**
3. Influence others → **negotiate**

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$$C_T(a_i) = \frac{K_1 \cdot \text{size}(T)}{\text{dist}(\text{pos}(a_i), \text{goal}(a_i))} + K_2 \cdot v(a_i) + \frac{K_3}{\text{mot}(a_i)} + \eta$$

Figure 6: A proposal for the cost function

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### Algorithm 4 Global simulation algorithm

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```
1: for  $a_i \in AGENTS\_SCHEDULER$  do
2:    $move(a_i)$            ▷ Agents thought at initialization
3:    $think(a_i)$           ▷ Compute alts, select path and direction
4: end for
5: for  $a_i \in AGENTS\_SCHEDULER$  do
6:    $neighs \leftarrow filter(NOT\_NEGOTIATING,$ 
7:        $neighbors(a_i, \text{DELTA}) + \{a_i\})$ 
8:   if  $\text{len}(neighs) > 1$  then
9:      $VOTE(neighs)$            ▷ Nested scheduler
10:    end if
11: end for
```

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Figure 7: Global simulation dynamic,  
schedulers execute in random order

## Voting algorithm (simplified)

1. Check collisions between voting agents
2. If no collision  $\rightarrow$  vote ends  
(later, negotiations may exist with no collision)
3. For each collision the pair of agents propose their **trajectory** and **negotiate** (random order) mutually.  
Success in negotiation increases motivation of the negotiator.
4. Loop back to 1.  $\Gamma$  times
5. For each remaining collision (unsuccessful negotiation) the most **motivated agent** waits if **imminent collision** (at  $t + 1$ )



Figure 8: A voting situation with 7 at its center and potential collisions

# Negotiation

## Negotiation algorithm (simplified)

1.  $a_2$  computes its best collision-free (CF) trajectory w.r.t.  $a_1$ 's communicated path
2. If not found,  $a_2$  computes one with neighbor obstacles
  - 2.1 If there is no existing CF alternative,  $a_2$  seeks its best alternative with a tolerance matching  $a_1$ 's cost
3. If computed path is already taken, the negotiation ends positively
4. Else,  $a_2$  reconsiders the alternative only if it is worth w.r.t. its motivation
5. If worth, negotiation ends positively, negatively otherwise




Figure 9: A conflict resolution attempt between agents 7 and 6

# EXPERIMENTS

NEGOTIATION VS DISCRETIZED SFM

## A few empirical lessons...

1. Pedestrians can be smarter than expected → simple modelling
2. The freest (flexible) agents are mostly the ones to unblock complex situations → gained insights from model
3. Communication is key: information propagation helps to streamline crowds  
→ refine & study local groups interactions and cost semantics

# Ongoing research and comments

## Ongoing research

1. **Elaborate N-negotiations:** priority - attention, successive/simultaneous negotiations
2. **Updating traits:** attention & motivation change automatically
3. **Negotiation ignorance:** self acclimation, ...
4. **Refined cost function:** inertia & desires combined to reflect with the **right** cost of an agent
5. **Local welfare research:** creation of groups, influence over other groups to reach high welfare (situation propagation: awareness)

## Ongoing research and comments (2)

### Research horizons

7. **Voting objects:** subset of alternatives, other's trajectory offer / negotiation over cell allocation
8. **Refined discrete motion:** freedom enhances possibilities
9. **Refined computed set of alternatives:** sub-objectives for relevant trajectories, ...
10. **Refined pedestrians:** limited waiting, strategies (e.g., lies), speed variation - motivation (energy)
11. **Empirical study & focus on theory**