

Spatial conflicts resolution in pedestrians: a social choice theory approach

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Times Square: a great stress zone



Social Force Model (SFM)



Figure 1: Social Force Model for Pedestrian Dynamics - Helbing, Molnar (1998)

A little perspective




Figure 2: Physics model for crowd study with prediction (dynamics)

Pedestrians in static crowds are not grains, but game players (Bonnemain, Bonnet, Echeverria, Nicolas & al.)

Our focus

Interest on spatial conflict resolution rather than realistic motion planner while having relevant pedestrian modelling




Figure 2 Example of interaction-aware navigation of agents on a sidewalk with a static object. Interaction may be a mutual avoidance maneuver. Agents A_n plan trajectories from an initial state x_n^{init} to a goal region X_n^{goal} that avoid static objects X^{obj}

Figure 3: Realistic local motion planner (game-theory)

Human-Like Motion Planning Based on Game Theoretic Decision-Making (Turnward & Wollher)


Motivations

Pedestrians' motions in complex situation

Pedestrians, and not robots, in complex scenarios present conflicts...

How do we solve them *relevantly*?

Pedestrians \neq robots \implies a different approach in modelling



→ Can we try to model and simulate pedestrians in such situations with a cognition process to solve spatial conflicts?

Pedestrians: an agent-based modelling

ABM: what are relevant traits to pedestrians?

- **position:** coordinates
- **speed:** a direction vector
- **motivation:** definition of the opposite of fatigue, the will of a pedestrian to adapt translated in motion
- **attention:** which agents does one consider?

Spatial conflicts


Choice: Everything discrete

- Discrete motion: 8 moves (Moore neighborhood)
- Discrete time: iterations as steps


Definition: Spatial conflict

Given a grid and a time step t , a blocking situation happens between at least two agents where at $t + 1$ one cannot move to an area because of the other.

Two cases of spatial conflicts



(a) case 1: virtual obstacle in a desired area



(b) case 2: inter-blocking situation

These conflicts (green stars) are complicated to handle in complex scenarios
(obstacles and numerous agents)

→ relevant pedestrian simulation with a conflict solver

Objectives

Main objective

Proposal of a model (simulation and algorithm) with pedestrians solving spatial conflicts with an **innovative approach**.

Sub-objectives:

1. Integration with a physics model for realistic motion
2. Application in advanced simulations / real case scenarios
3. Exportation to robots?

Social choice: an innovative approach?

Social choice theory

Aggregation of diverse preferences to find a suitable compromise for each:
maximize global welfare

→ Application in economy (e.g., fair allocation),
social sciences (e.g., political bargaining, vote), ...

Social force model \longleftrightarrow Social choice

How do we take inspiration / make use of this for spatial conflicts?




Figure 5: A social choice application: negotiations and vote between states among 3 choices

Setup/Environment

Map

A map is a given setup with a fixed number of agents, a grid with obstacles and objectives.

An agent a_i has the following initial traits:

- a 2D **position** $pos(a_i)$ bounded by the grid's borders
- a **speed** generated at random $0 \leq v(a_i) \leq 2$ (TBR)
- a **motivation** generated at random $0 \leq mot(a_i) \leq 1$
- an **attention** generated at random $0 \leq att(a_i) \leq 1$ (TBR)

Motion: a_i has a **path** computed (**A*** now) at each iteration towards its objective.

NB: both motivation and attention may later evolve over time automatically. The motivation changes through negotiations otherwise.

Hypotheses and events

HYP. 1: Capacities

Agents have sufficient logical capacities to estimate the trajectory of another.

HYP. 2: Communication

Agents have the capacities to communicate with others to exchange information.

HYP. 3: Collision

Agents aim ultimately to reach their objective with no collision.

HYP. 4: Sympathy

Agents can adapt their trajectory with a certain tolerance to the profit of another.

Collision event

During motion, agents anticipate conflict and communicate to avoid it together

→ Self-interest cooperative game

How do we solve conflicts?

Inspiration from social choice theory

1. Aggregate agents' preferences
→ **cost function**
2. Influence others → **negotiate**
3. Communicate and decide → **vote**

$$C_T(a_i) = \frac{K_1 \cdot \text{size}(T)}{\text{dist}(\text{pos}(a_i), \text{goal}(a_i))} + K_2 \cdot v(a_i) + \frac{K_3}{\text{mot}(a_i)} + \eta$$

Figure 6: A proposal for the cost function

Algorithm 4 Global simulation algorithm

```
1: for  $a_i \in AGENTS\_SCHEDULER$  do
2:    $move(a_i)$            ▷ Agents thought at initialization
3:    $think(a_i)$           ▷ Compute alts, select path and direction
4: end for
5: for  $a_i \in AGENTS\_SCHEDULER$  do
6:    $neighs \leftarrow filter(NOT\_NEGOTIATING,$ 
7:        $neighbors(a_i, \text{DELTA}) + \{a_i\})$ 
8:   if  $\text{len}(neighs) > 1$  then
9:      $VOTE(neighs)$            ▷ Nested scheduler
10:    end if
11: end for
```

Figure 7: Global simulation dynamic,
schedulers execute in random order

Voting algorithm (simplified)

1. Check collisions between voting agents (honest vote)
2. If no collision \rightarrow vote ends
(later, negotiations may exist with no collision)
3. For each collision the pair of agents propose their **trajectory** and **negotiate** (random order) mutually.
Success in negotiation increases motivation of the negotiator.
4. Loop back to 1. Γ times
5. For each remaining collision (unsuccessful negotiation) the most motivated agent waits if imminent collision (at $t + 1$)



Figure 8: A voting situation with 7 at its center and potential collisions

Negotiation

Negotiation algorithm (simplified)

1. a_2 computes its best collision-free (CF) trajectory w.r.t. a_1 's communicated path
2. If not found, a_2 computes one with neighbor obstacles
 - 2.1 If there is no existing CF alternative, a_2 seeks its best alternative with a tolerance matching a_1 's cost
3. If computed path is already taken, the negotiation ends positively
4. Else, a_2 reconsiders the alternative only if it is worth w.r.t. its motivation
5. If worth, negotiation ends positively, negatively otherwise




Figure 9: A conflict resolution attempt between agents 7 and 6

Experiments

Cf. experiments on maps.

Comparison

Cf. discretized SFM vs maps.

Ongoing research and comments

Ongoing research

1. **Elaborate N-negotiations:** priority - attention, successive/simultaneous negotiations
2. **Updating traits:** attention & motivation change automatically
3. **Negotiation ignorance:** self acclimation, ...
4. **Refined cost function:** inertia & desires combined to reflect with the **right** cost of an agent
5. **Local welfare research:** creation of groups, influence over other groups to reach high welfare (situation propagation: awareness)

Ongoing research and comments (2)

Research horizons

7. **Voting objects:** subset of alternatives, other's trajectory offer / negotiation over cell allocation
8. **Refined discrete motion:** freedom enhances possibilities
9. **Refined computed set of alternatives:** sub-objectives for relevant trajectories, ...
10. **Refined pedestrians:** limited waiting, strategies (e.g., lies), speed variation - motivation (energy)
11. **Empirical study & focus on theory**