

DOTA2024:5

Defense of the Ancients

Fifth topic - IP networks

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IP networks...



Outline

1 Networks (Warning - no mathematics inside)

- Sources of insecurity - complex computer systems
- Basics of Internet traffic

2 Attacks and defences

- Exploration
- SSL/TLS



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
- Exploration
- SSL/TLS



Internet history

Moments in time...

Top significant moments from the Internet history



Legend:

A In the beginning

B Wiring the web

C All about email

D Welcome to the social

E Online media

F Web property

G Web 1.0

H Web 2.0

I Law and order

J Most epic fails

Objects in space...


The first network, the first router, the first message...



- The original network diagramming tool was a pencil, and the first network had four routers (originally called IMPs), and four nodes (At UCSB, UCLA, SRI and University of Utah).
- The first successful transmission was from UCLA to SRI in September 1969, and was recorded in the UCLA logbook.


Structure of networks now...

Trees and lattices...




The **topology** of the Internet, particularly nearer the 'edge' of the Internet, appears more like a **tree** than a **lattice**, and we use the **routers** to **control** access to and from the smaller local networks.

When a router is protecting you...




Firewalls are brick walls often found in wooden buildings and are supposed to prevent the spread of fire. In networking we use the same idea - the **firewall is a router**, which limits access to and from the Internet. We normally imagine that the fire is on the Internet side :)

We all trust the Internet, but who manages it again?



New topic: Systems, networks...

Consider the Internet - lots of room for damage



Internet attack possibilities

One of, or some combination of...

Close to you...

- ➊ Your WiFi link(s)
- ➋ Your PCs
- ➌ Servers local to your organization (file, name servers, etc)
- ➍ Your router(s)

But far away too...

- ➊ Routers on the Internet
- ➋ Remote servers that you trust: For example:
- ➌ DNS for names like gmail.com
- ➍ ebay, Amazon, Sony PSN, your bank's web site...

Who does all of this? Anonymous people with (a) a computer, and (b) an Internet connection. Not too hard.


Internet hacking scenario #1

A server you trust lies to you...

You connect to dbs.com.sg to do some banking.

But... A local DNS (Domain name system) server lies to your computer, and connects you to hackers.r.us who have put up a spoof version of the bank's web site.

The spoof version collects your password and login information and proceeds to empty your account.




Internet hacking scenario #2

A server you trust lies to you...

A web site fastdownloads.org.uk says it will **improve your Internet experience by 225%**! You say **yes**, and it installs a *useful* bit of software.

Actually - it installs something which sends every key you type to hackers.r.us, and/or allows someone in Guatemala to control your machine...




Internet hacking scenario #3

You overestimate how safe your home is...

Your next door neighbour observes your wifi network.

Your neighbour hacks your network authentication password, and from then on, uses your Internet link, and monitors your traffic to and from the Internet, retrieving your passwords etc...




Internet hacking scenario #4

You overestimate how safe Starbucks is...

You look at [facebook](#) to see what's happening.

A cluster of 12 yr-olds there are using firesheep, and steal a cookie and take over your facebook session, posting all sorts of "funny" stuff^a.




^aThis led to facebook changing to https-by-default two years ago

Internet hacking scenario #5

You overestimate how safe Starbucks is...

Back at the coffee house, you look at gmail.

Over the next three days, a bunch of your friends and family wire large amounts of money to an account in the Cayman Islands, to “help you out”. The money goes to fund someone’s next holiday (in the Cayman Islands! Spooky eh?)



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
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Internet basics: routing and packets...


Internet traffic sent in packets...



Lots of opportunity to modify routing information, spoof etc

Looking at computer communication

The OSI reference model: levels of interest...



Looking at computer communication

The OSI reference model: levels of interest...

This model provides a **framework** to hang your understanding of computer networking on.

The protocol specifies how **communication** is performed with the **layer at the same level** in the other computer. This does not for instance mean that the network layer directly communicates with the network layer in the other computer, instead each layer **uses the services** provided by the layer below it, and **provides services** to the layer above it.

The definition of services between adjacent layers is called an **interface**.

What are the **advantages** of the layered structure?

- ① We can **change layers** as needed, the interface remains constant.
- ② The networking software is easier to write, as it has been **modularized**
- ③ The client software is **simpler**, as it only needs to know the interface.

Note that a **protocol** specifies the **interaction between peer layers**. An **interface** specifies the **interactions between adjacent layers**.

Looking at computer communication

The OSI reference model: levels/layers of interest...

Application layer: The application layer provides the user interface to the network wide services provided. For example mail.

Presentation layer: Preserve meaning: endianness of numbers.

Session layer: manage a continuous connection.

Transport layer: ensures a network independent interface for the session layer. Five "Classes of service".

Network layer: Network routing and addressing.

Datalink layer: constructs frames, checks/retransmits on error.


Physical layer: connectors, cables, voltage levels etc.

The Internet does not use the layered model. It only has four layers:

- ① IP *application* layer: the presentation, session and application layers.
- ② IP *transport* layer: the transport and session layers.
- ③ IP *network* layer: the same role as in the OSIRM.
- ④ IP *network-access* or *link* layer: the datalink and physical layers.


Looking at computer communication

The OSI reference model and the IP reference model...




Packet (detail) on the Internet

Each layer encapsulates the previous one...



The ethernet frame

Layer 2 header and footer (detail)...




The preamble is needed so that receivers can synchronize.

The addresses are needed so machines on a shared network can respond to their own address.

The length is needed so we know how much data to expect. Note that the FCS at the end is a CRC!

Looking at a packet

The IP header (detail)...



The header has its own length, and the length of the whole packet.

Other fields are type identifiers, fragment ID of a fragmented packet, time-to-live, protocol, checksum, and source and destination “IP” (32 bit) addresses.

Looking at a packet

The TCP layer (detail)...

bit	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31															
Source Port																Destination Port																															
Sequence Number																																															
Acknowledgement Number																																															
HLEN	Reserved		U R G	A C K	P S H	R S T	S Y N	F I N	Window										Urgent Pointer																												
Checksum																Options (if any)																Padding															
Data																...																															


In the TCP layer, each packet has port addresses, and sequence numbers, various type identifiers, and a header (ones-complement) checksum

It just got so much worse...

Communication between computers comes in many flavours of *protocol*, and at different levels.

Not only multiple machines that could cause problems, but also multiple protocols at multiple levels.

No administrative centre, just general agreement to use the RFCs, not much in the way of police!



It seems like we cannot
trust the protocols or
the machines!



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Looking at a packet

Wireshark displaying an ethernet frame...

The screenshot shows the Wireshark interface with the following details:

- File menu:** File, Edit, View, Go, Capture, Analyze, Statistics, Telephony, Tools, Help.
- Toolbar:** Standard file operations (New, Open, Save, Print, Copy, Paste, Find, Replace, etc.) and analysis tools (Protocol tree, List, Bytes, Hex, Statistics, etc.).
- Filter bar:** A search bar with a dropdown menu for "Expression..." and buttons for "Clear" and "Apply".
- Table view:** A list of network frames. The first frame (Frame 4) is highlighted in green. The last three frames (5125, 51252, 512525) are highlighted in red. The columns are Source, Destination, Protocol, and Info.

	Source	Destination	Protocol	Info
000	192.168.1.4	192.168.1.20	TCP	51525 > http [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=3 TSV=1577929
001	192.168.1.20	192.168.1.4	TCP	http > 51525 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5792 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_Pkts=1 TSV=157792992 TSER=15
025	192.168.1.4	192.168.1.20	TCP	51525 > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=524280 Len=0 TSV=157792992 TSER=15
221	192.168.1.4	192.168.1.20	TCP	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
244	192.168.1.4	192.168.1.20	HTTP	POST /eng/admin/recorder.cgi HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
679	192.168.1.20	192.168.1.4	TCP	http > 51525 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=572 Win=6852 Len=0 TSV=145947 TSER=15
681	192.168.1.20	192.168.1.4	TCP	http > 51525 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=955 Win=7994 Len=0 TSV=145947 TSER=15

- Frame details:** Frame 4: 637 bytes on wire (5096 bits), 637 bytes captured (5096 bits).
 - Ethernet II, Src: Apple_F7:d4:7e (d4:9a:20:f7:d4:7e), Dst: D-Link_07:34:9c (00:26:5a:07:34:9c)
 - Internet Protocol, Src: 192.168.1.4 (192.168.1.4), Dst: 192.168.1.20 (192.168.1.20)
 - Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 51525 (51525), Dst Port: http (80), Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 571
- Hex dump:** A detailed hex dump of the selected frame (Frame 4). The bytes are grouped by 16 bytes each, with ASCII and decimal representations.
- Status bar:** File: "/Users/hugh/comm... | Packets: 157 Displayed: 157 Marked: 0 Load time: 0:00.234 | Profile: Default


“Trust” when using our computer

Not an exhaustive list by any stretch...


- ➊ Open the laptop: Computer uses various remote services to configure itself to work (DHCP, DNS, ARP, NTP), possibly via routers
- ➋ Start a browser with a particular URL: Computer uses various remote services (DNS, ARP) possibly via routers
- ➌ Request a web page: Computer uses various remote services (HTTP, ARP), and sends info via routers
- ➍ Automatic updates: Computer uses various remote services (DNS, ARP, HTTPS) via routers
- ➎ PKI certificates: If they are signed they must be good right?

In general we trust each one of these remote services and routers to do what we want.

MAC address for point-to-point communication...



MAC address for point-to-point communication...



ARP poisoning

Mechanism can be used to subvert any traffic...

ARP is a local network number to MAC address mapping service, with caches for efficiency.


If an ARP cache is **poisoned**, the machine using that cache may send information to the wrong machine

Example: your ARP cache has been **poisoned** convincing you that your local router **192.168.100.1** is at MAC address **f8:1e:df:e2:b4:63**. This happens to be a hacking machine on your network. You send your packets addressed to that machine (which responds to convince you it is **192.168.100.1**).

Example: your router's ARP cache has been **poisoned** to convince it to reply to the hacking machine instead of your PC.

Open the laptop: DHCP

Before you do anything...



Open the laptop: DHCP


Before you do anything...

Your computer, when it wakes up, may try to configure itself by using **DHCP** (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol). **DHCP** on your computer expects to find a **DHCP server** somewhere. Your computer does not know its own network (IP) address, and does not know the server's IP address , so it...

- ➊ broadcasts a **DHCPODISCOVER** packet to IP broadcast address **255.255.255.255**.
- ➋ The (local) **DHCP** server(s) respond(s) with **DHCPOFFER** (offers of information) such as your new **IP address**, **network mask**, and local **router** and a **DNS** (Domain name server) your machine can use.
- ➌ Your computer accepts one of the offers with a **DHCPREQUEST**
- ➍ The server acknowledges your acceptance **DHCPPACK**

Open the laptop: DHCP

Sounds easy, what can go wrong?



Sounds easy, what can go wrong?

Well - there is no security at all in the process, so maybe some other malicious DHCP server can respond with bad information.

Example: malicious DHCP server tells you a **bad router**: from then on you send all your network traffic via this router, and a “**man-in-the-middle**” reads/processes/modifies all your Internet traffic.

Example: malicious DHCP tells you a bad **DNS server**: from then on you send all your DNS requests to this server, and our mapping for **dbs.com.sg** is given as **91.207.5.138** (in Russia) instead of **203.127.2.6** (in Singapore).


A surprising amount of trust

Lets start with the assumption that our personal computer is safe, no virus, worm, bad software on it.

When we use our computers, we (or our computers) trust all sorts of things we interact with to **act honestly**.

Each thing we trust may be something that could be used to attack us. There are multiple machines we rely on, and also multiple protocols. With more complex systems, there are **more avenues for attacks/insecurity**

Messin' with addressin'



- **Application layer:** Various (higher level) protocols, and names (`dbs.com.sg`) rather than IP addresses
- **Transport layer:** your PC will use specific ports, with specific (transport-layer) protocols such as TCP or UDP. (`TCP,IP,PORT`).
- **Network layer:** your PC will acquire an IP address(es) (`203.127.2.6`) to identify your machine to others.
- **Link layer:** network hardware in your PC comes with a factory built-in world-wide media access control (MAC) address. For ethernet `f8:1e:df:e2:b4:63`. It is easy to forge MAC addresses.

In summary - each layer has its own mode of addressing, and we have automatic translations from MAC to network addresses (`ARP`), and from names to IP addresses (`DNS`).

Which ports? What services?

```
Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned  
# sshnuke 10.2.2.2 -rootpw="210HB101"  
Connecting to 10.2.2.2:ssh ... successful.  
Attempting to exploit SSHv1 CRC32 ... successful.  
Resetting root password to "210HB101".  
System open: Access Level <9>  
# ssh 10.2.2.2 -l root  
root@10.2.2.2's password: [REDACTED]
```




It is just a movie, but you should be paranoid...

Systems are dangerously easy to subvert. And look! nmap!

Start a browser with URL: DNS

What can go wrong?




Sounds easy, what can go wrong?

- Well - there is little security in the process, so maybe
 - Your own **cache** could have been **poisoned**
 - Your local **server's cache** could have been **poisoned**
 - A server **upstream** of your DNS could be **poisoned**
 - An **ARP cache** is **poisoned** somewhere (next slide)
- Example: a machine on your local network sees your DNS request for dbs.com.sg and responds quickly with corrupt information (91.207.5.138):
 - from then on your computer send all your network traffic to the corrupt address; your cache is poisoned.
- Example: a machine on an upstream network sees your DNS server's request for dbs.com.sg and responds quickly with corrupt information (91.207.5.138):
 - from then on your computer send all your network traffic to the corrupt address; DNS server's cache is poisoned.


Ettercap - spoofing and logging

In this case, DHCP



Layer 4 attacks (From Sam Browne)

Mastercard Outage




3,000 to 30,000 attackers working together ↗



Looking at connections


Starting and terminating a TCP connection...



To start a connection there is a 3-way handshake. During this time, initial sequence numbers are exchanged - a different number used in each direction. To end a connection, there is just a 2-way handshake.

SYN flood attack

Attack the connection setup




Attacker sends lots of requests, and does not complete the connection.

The receiver allocates resources for each connection (Ports, tables etc), until no more resources are left.

When Alice tries to connect, she is unable to.

SYN flood attack

Protecting the server




Server returns a specially constructed sequence number, which encodes the resources for the connection (TCB).

TCB only allocated when ACK is returned.

TCP sequence prediction attack

Attack/takeover an existing connection...




Sequence numbers allow re-ordering of packets.

If an attacker can predict the correct sequence number for a response, and get in before the server sends its response (perhaps by SYN-flooding the server), attacker can start pretending to be the server. (Even without being able to see the packets).

TCP sequence prediction attack

Check other layers, disallow prediction...



Use unpredictable sequence numbers.

Checking other layers for evidence of spoofing (such as source IP address) can help minimize success of this attack.

Layer 7 attacks (From Sam Browne)

SlowLoris

- Send incomplete GET requests
- Freezes Apache with one packet per second

The screenshot shows a web-based configuration interface for the SlowLoris attack. It includes fields for 'Attack type' (set to 'Slow headers'), 'URL' (http://192.168.6.177), and 'Proxy'. Under 'General parameters', there are fields for 'Connections' (400), 'Connection rate' (50), 'Timeout (s)' (100.0), and 'User agent' (Mozilla/4.0 (compatible;)). Under 'Attack-specific parameters', there is a checkbox for 'Use POST (instead of GET)'. At the bottom, there is a large blue button labeled 'PROACTIVE SLOW'.

The screenshot shows a Mozilla Firefox browser displaying the 'Apache Status' page. The title bar says 'Apache Status - Mozilla Firefox'. The page content shows the 'Apache Server Status' section with the following information:
Server Version: Apache/2.2.14 (Ubuntu)
Server Built: Nov 18 2010 21:19:34

Current Time: Saturday, 12-Mar-2011 07:06:11
Restart Time: Saturday, 12-Mar-2011 06:50:12
Parent Server Generation: 0
Server uptime: 15 minutes 59 seconds
150 requests currently being processed, 0 idle workers

A large red 'DEFCON DEFCON' watermark is overlaid at the bottom right of the browser window.



Another vector: the routers to (re) direct traffic

And they are computers...

Since the Internet **topology/connectivity** can **change**, the routers continually exchange “routing information”.

This is in line with the original goals of a system which can survive nuclear attacks on parts of the network.

Routing information is communicated using routing protocols, for example:

RIP: (Routing Information Protocol) an older protocol for exchanging routing information. Your PC understands RIP, but most routers ignore it these days. Not all.

IGRP: (Interior Gateway Routing Protocol) is a proprietary (CISCO) protocol, created to overcome limitations of RIP for large networks.

BGP: (Border Gateway Protocol) makes most routing decisions on the Internet.

These **protocols update tables/caches** in each connected router to allow it to make decisions where to send IP traffic.

Sounds easy, what can go wrong?

Two general attack vectors:

- ➊ Hack directly into specific routers and re-configure them to behave differently.

Note that many routers allow FTP/telnet/HTTP access to control them - we have already seen how [FTP passwords](#) can be observed. Routers are just computers - typical [home routers](#) often run some cut down variant of [linux](#).

- ➋ Corrupt routers caches/routing tables without hacking

Various attacks have been done using the BGP, IGRP and RIP protocols.

On April the 8th, 2010, a significant amount of [American Internet traffic](#) was [re-routed through China](#) for 18 minutes after 40,000 peculiar routes were injected into the core Internet routers by a Chinese ISP. This was most likely an accident, but interesting nevertheless.

Many opportunities for manipulation:

- ① Your configuration information could be altered (your PC gets bad IP addresses, DNS servers, routers)
- ② Your PC can be convinced to send your traffic via a hacker's computer for man-in-the-middle attacks
- ③ Your ability to map names to IP addresses, and IP addresses to hardware MAC addresses can be manipulated (DNS and ARP poisoning)
- ④ Resources on a server can be exhausted to do DoS.
- ⑤ Ongoing sessions you have initiated (for example to get a web page) can be hijacked midway through.

Outline

1 Networks (Warning - no mathematics inside)


- Sources of insecurity - complex computer systems
- Basics of Internet traffic

2 Attacks and defences

- Exploration
- SSL/TLS



A transport Layer security service



Transport Layer security service


Originally, SSL was developed by Netscape in 1995. TLS is an IETF standard: <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246>

Public key cryptography is used to exchange **session keys**, for ordinary symmetric key communication, with new session keys for each connection. **Symmetric encryption** schemes used include IDEA, DES, 3DES...

There is an SSL handshake (initialization) protocol, to **authenticate**, and negotiate **encryption** and **MAC** algorithms, and to **exchange session keys**.

SSL handshake

Simplified view



Simplified view

- 1 Browser sends the (encryption) algorithms the browser will support and a nonce (one time value)
- 2 Server responds with a nonce, certificate and which algorithms to use.
- 3 Browser verifies the certificate, and extracts Server public key. Encrypts a pre-master session key with the public key.
- 4 Server decrypts using it's private key (Both compute session key from pre-master and nonces)

Session switches to the correct algorithm with the calculated key. The protocol sends a few more packets, authenticating the previous messages.

Summary/key points...

Standard protocols (HTTP, SMTP ...) are “tunneled” through the SSL layer. PKI,PK are used for authentication, and to exchange session keys. Symmetric protocols (such as 3DES) are used for encryption.

The protocol includes an idea of not just public/private keys, but public keys authenticated by a certifying authority.

SSL has problems too

Web no longer secure, civilization will soon collapse...

Unfortunately, in 2009, various attacks on SSL/TLS were discovered, from **loopholes in the protocol**. An attacker is able to **execute any HTTP transaction**, authenticated by a legitimate user

You can read about it here <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg03928.html>.

It allows a man-in-the-middle to inject a **chosen plaintext prefix** into the encrypted data stream. An “authentication gap” exists during a renegotiation process during which **separate SSL/TLS connections** can be put together. Fixes were done in early 2010, but **many servers and browsers** still not fixed.

IPsec is a set of standards:

Intended to support communication security between networked computers, particularly in the newer IPv6 (IP Next-Generation) network.

IPsec software is available in Windows, Linux, and on routers on the Internet.

<http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc4301.html>

IPsec may be used in a range of ways.


Why VPN when we already have SSL and SSH...

- With SSL/SSH we set up individual encrypted links for each application
- We may want end-to-end encryption, where all traffic is encrypted (not just the https traffic)
- The model is that a tunnel is set up between a host and a network and all traffic through that tunnel is encrypted.
- With VPN, we take care and use (high end) cryptography to set up the tunnel

Note that again there can be problems...


IPsec VPN (Virtual Private Network)

Provides secure connection so machine appears on remote network




IPsec point-to-point

Or secure communication from one PC to another



IPsec network-to-network

Or from one network to another



The IP headers contain the extra information needed

There are two types of header, one used for **authentication**, and the other used for **encryption**:

- ① **AH** - the **Authentication Header** for data integrity, anti-replay and authentication
- ② **ESP** - the **Encapsulating Security Payload** header, for confidentiality. ESP can also provide AH services.

Communicating parties agree on a **Security Association** (SA), one SA for each direction, and one SA for each type of communication.


Modes of operation

An end-to-end SA - Transport mode:



Modes of operation

An SA between security gateways - Tunnel mode



SAs form a kind of distributed database.