



Introduction

# Formalizing Intelligence

Introduction to Artificial Intelligence

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- The following is based on material developed by many individuals, including (but not limited to):
  - Sheila McIlraith
  - Bahar Aameri
  - Fahiem Bacchus
  - Sonya Allin

# Defining “Artificial Intelligence”

- Our goal is to develop agents that exhibit “intelligent” behaviour through computational means.
- Some common definitions of “intelligence” include:
  - the ability to optimally deal with new situations
  - the ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills
  - the ability to act like a human
- All of these definitions are too imprecise to build computational algorithms around.
- We seek a formal definition that still captures the core ideas of the colloquial ones.

- Our definition of “intelligence” will be:

the ability to optimally play games,

where by “game” we mean any situation in which:




- the environment can be in a number of different states
- there are multiple players capable of manipulating the state
- each player seeks to alter the state to its own benefit

and by “optimally play”, we mean to alter the state so as to maximize our benefit.

- To define games more formally, we will need to have some understanding of sets.
- A **set**,  $S$ , can be thought of as a list of objects, called its **elements**; we write  $s \in S$  to denote that  $s$  is an element of  $S$ .
- A set,  $S'$ , is a **subset** of  $S$ , denoted  $S' \subseteq S$  if  $S$  contains every element in  $S'$ ; it is a **proper subset**, denoted  $S' \subset S$ , if  $S$  contains at least one element not in  $S'$ .
- The **power-set** of a set,  $S$  denoted  $\mathcal{P}(S)$  is the set of all of  $S$ 's subsets.

# Review of Sets: Operations on Sets

- The **union** of two sets,  $S_1$  and  $S_2$ , denoted  $S_1 \cup S_2$ , is the set of elements in either  $S_1$  or  $S_2$ .
- The **intersection** of two sets,  $S_1$  and  $S_2$ , denoted  $S_1 \cap S_2$ , is the set of elements in both  $S_1$  and  $S_2$ ; if  $S_1 \cap S_2 = \emptyset$ , then  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  are **disjoint**.
- The **difference** of two sets,  $S_1$  and  $S_2$ , denoted  $S_1 \setminus S_2$ , is the set of elements in  $S_1$  but not in  $S_2$ .



- Formally, a **game** consists of:
  - $N$  players, indexed 1 through  $N$
  - a set of states,  $S$ , in which the game could be in
  - a set of terminal states,  $T \subseteq S$  in which the game ends
  - a utility function,  $u_i$  for each player  $i$ , so that  $u_i(s)$  is the benefit of  $s \in T$  to  $i$
  - a set of actions,  $A(s)$  from each state  $s \in S$ ; each action  $a \in A(s)$  is an  $n$ -vector where  $a_i$  denotes  $i$ 's action with  $a_i = \emptyset$  to denote no action.
  - optimally, a cost function,  $c$ , so that  $c(a)_i$  is  $i$ 's cost of playing  $a_i$ .
- Given an  $s_0 \in S$ , the outcome of a game is called a **path** from  $s_0$ ; it is a sequence of actions,  $\langle a^{(1)}, \dots, a^{(n)} \rangle$ , such that  $a^{(i)} \in A(s_i)$ ,  $s_i = a^{(i)}(s_{i-1})$  and  $s_n \in T$ :
  - the utility for  $i$  is  $u_i(s_n)$ .
  - the cost to  $i$  is  $\sum_j c(a^{(j)})_i I(a_i^{(j)} \neq \emptyset)$ , where  $I$  is the indicator function.

- Given some  $s_0 \in S$ , we want to find the cheapest path to some  $s \in T$  that also maximizes our utility.
- This is difficult to do in general because we do not have complete control over the other players' actions, and consequently, the outcome of the game.
- As such, we will start by making several simplifying assumptions.
- Over time, we will relax some of these assumptions.