

# The Index $j$ in RC4 is not Pseudo-random

**Abstract.** In this paper we provide several theoretical evidences that the pseudo-random index  $j$  of RC4 is indeed not pseudo-random. First we show that in long term  $\Pr(j = i + 1) = \frac{1}{N} - \frac{1}{N^2}$ , instead of the random association  $\frac{1}{N}$  and this happens for the non-existence of the condition  $S[i] = 1$  and  $j = i + 1$  that is mandatory for the non-existence of the Finney cycle. Further we also identify several results on non-existence of certain sequences of  $j$ .

**Keywords:** RC4, Non-randomness, Pseudo-random Index, Stream Cipher, Cryptography.

## 1 Introduction

As we all know, there are many results related to non-randomness of RC4 that received the attention in flagship level cryptology conferences and journals (see for example [3–5] and the references therein). Even after intense research for more than three decades on a few lines of RC4 algorithm, we are still amazed with new discoveries in this area of research. As we are presenting a short note, we assume that the reader is aware of RC4 algorithm. Still let us present the algorithm briefly.

In RC4, there is a  $N = 256$  length array of 8-bit integers 0 to  $N - 1$ , that works as a permutation. There is also an  $l$  length array of bytes  $K$ , where  $l$  may vary from 5 to 32, depending on the key length. There are also two bytes  $i, j$ , where  $i$  is the deterministic index that increases by 1 in each step and  $j$  is updated in a manner so that it behaves pseudo-randomly. The Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA) of RC4 is as follows:

- $j = 0$ ; for  $i = 0$  to  $N - 1$ :  $S[i] = i$ ;
- for  $i = 0$  to  $N - 1$ :  
     $j = j + S[i] + K[i \bmod l]$ ; swap( $S[i], S[j]$ );

Next the pseudo-random bytes  $z$  are generated during the Pseudo Random Generator Algorithm (PRGA) as follows:

- $i = j = 0$ ;
- for  $i = 0$  to  $N - 1$ :  
     $i = i + 1$ ;  $j = j + S[i]$ ; swap( $S[i], S[j]$ );  $z = S[S[i] + S[j]]$ ;

Note that all the additions here are modulo  $N$ .

## 2 Non-Randomness due to non-existence of Finney cycle

While there is long term suspicion that there could be problems with the pseudo-randomness of  $j$ , till very recently it could not be observed or reported. In fact, in [4, Section 3.4], non-randomness of  $j$  has been studied for initial rounds and it has been commented that the distribution of  $j$  is almost uniform for higher rounds. Thus, to date, no long term pseudo-randomness of the index  $j$  has been reported.

It has been observed by Finney [1] that if  $S[i] = 1$  and  $j = i + 1$ , then RC4 lands into a short cycle of length  $N(N - 1)$ . Fortunately (or knowing this very well), the design of RC4 by Rivest considers the initialization of RC4 PRGA as  $i = j = 0$ . Thus, during RC4 PRGA, the Finney cycle cannot occur, i.e., if  $\Pr(S[i] = 1)$ , then  $\Pr(j = i + 1) = 0$ . This provides the non-randomness in  $j$ .

**Theorem 1.** *During RC4 PRGA,  $\Pr(j = i + 1) = \frac{1}{N} - \frac{1}{N^2}$ , under certain usual assumptions.*

*Proof.* We have

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr(j = i + 1) &= \Pr(j = i + 1, S[i] = 1) + \Pr(j = i + 1, S[i] \neq 1) \\ &= 0 + \Pr(j = i + 1 | S[i] \neq 1) \cdot \Pr(S[i] \neq 1) \\ &= \frac{1}{N} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) = \frac{1}{N} - \frac{1}{N^2}.\end{aligned}$$

Here we consider  $\Pr(j = i + 1 | S[i] \neq 1) = \frac{1}{N}$  under usual randomness assumption (it has been checked by experiments too). Further, considering  $S$  as a random permutation, we get  $\Pr(S[i] \neq 1) = 1 - \frac{1}{N}$ .  $\square$

In fact, one can sharpen this result slightly by using Glimpse theorem as follows. Though it happens generally once out of  $N$  rounds during the PRGA.

**Corollary 1.** *During RC4 PRGA,  $\Pr(j = i + 1 | i = z + 1) = \frac{1}{N} - \frac{2}{N^2} + \frac{1}{N^3}$ .*

*Proof.* We refer to Glimpse theorem [2] that says,  $\Pr(S[j] = i - z) = \frac{2}{N} - \frac{1}{N^2}$  after the swap of  $S[i]$  and  $S[j]$ . Consider the situation when  $S[i] = 1$  before the swap. That means  $S[j] = 1$  after the swap. Thus,  $\Pr(S[i] = 1 | i = z + 1) = \frac{2}{N} - \frac{1}{N^2}$ . Hence, we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr(j = i + 1 | i = z + 1) &= \Pr(j = i + 1, S[i] = 1 | i = z + 1) \\ &\quad + \Pr(j = i + 1, S[i] \neq 1 | i = z + 1) \\ &= 0 \\ &\quad + \Pr(j = i + 1 | S[i] \neq 1, i = z + 1) \\ &\quad \cdot \Pr(S[i] \neq 1 | i = z + 1) \\ &= \frac{1}{N} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{N} + \frac{1}{N^2}\right) = \frac{1}{N} - \frac{2}{N^2} + \frac{1}{N^3}.\end{aligned}$$

We consider the usual assumptions as in Theorem 1.  $\square$

Since we make a few assumptions, it is important to validate the results and the experimental data indeed supports the theoretical claims mentioned above.

### 3 Non-existent sequences of $j$ over several rounds

### 4 Conclusion

Rewrite

The pseudo-randomness of the index  $j$  in RC4 has been an open question for quite some time. In this note we show that  $j$  is indeed not pseudo-random in long term evolution of RC4 PRGA where we consider  $S$  as a pseudo-random permutation. To the best of our knowledge, this result has not been noted earlier. The implication of this result could be interesting to obtain further non-randomness in the evolution of RC4. Moreover, the result may be utilized to obtain additional biases at the initial stage of RC4 PRGA where the permutation  $S$  has certain non-randomness.

### References

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