Introduction to Financial Models Lecture 02: Surprises & Paradoxes II


Coin Rotation Paradox

2 Braess Paradox

3 The Social Cost of Traffic at Equilibrium


Coin Rotation Paradox


The 1982 SAT Question Everyone Got Wrong





The radius of circle A is $\frac{1}{3}$ of the radius of circle B. Circle A rolls around circle B one trip back to its starting point. How many times will circle A revolve in total?


- (a) $\frac{3}{2}$ (b) 3 (c) 6 (d) $\frac{9}{2}$ (e) 9


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Braess Paradox







ullet A highway network, with each edge labeled by its travel time (in minutes) when there are x cars using it




- A highway network, with each edge labeled by its travel time (in minutes) when there are x cars using it
- Suppose there are 4000 cars need to get from A to B




- A highway network, with each edge labeled by its travel time (in minutes) when there are x cars using it
- Suppose there are 4000 cars need to get from A to B
- They divide evenly over the two routes at equilibrium; the travel time is 45 + 2000/100 = 65 mins






• Now a very fast edge is added from C to D to the previous highway network




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- At equilibrium, every user uses the route through C and D




- Now a very fast edge is added from C to D to the previous highway network
- At equilibrium, every user uses the route through C and D
- As a result, the travel time is 4000/10 + 0 + 4000/100 = 80 mins!

[Braess et al., 2005] Example




[Braess et al., 2005] Example



• Assume a flow of 6 units (e.g., 6000 vehicles) must travel from 1 to 4

[Braess et al., 2005] Example



- Assume a flow of 6 units (e.g., 6000 vehicles) must travel from 1 to 4
- Three paths exist: $B_1 = 124$, $B_2 = 1324$, $B_3 = 134$

• Case 1: All Paths Open. Split the flow equally (2 units each):

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$$b_{12} = 2$$
, $b_{24} = 4$, $b_{34} = 2$, $b_{13} = 4$, $b_{32} = 2$
 $d_{12} = 52$, $d_{24} = 40$, $d_{34} = 52$, $d_{13} = 40$, $d_{32} = 12$
 $L(B_1) = L(B_2) = L(B_3) = 92$

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All paths are critical (maximal length). This distribution is stable: Switching paths increases load and travel time beyond 92.

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• Case 2: Ban Edge k_{32} . Split flow equally between B_1 and B_3 (3 units each):

$$b_{12} = b_{24} = b_{13} = b_{34} = 3$$

 $d_{12} = 53, \ d_{24} = 30, \ d_{13} = 30, \ d_{34} = 53$
 $L(B_1) = L(B_3) = 83$

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
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
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
 $d_{12} = 53, d_{24} = 30, d_{13} = 30, d_{34} = 53$
 $L(B_1) = L(B_3) = 83$

Despite losing a connection, all paths are shorter!







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- Recall that $B_1 = 124$, $B_2 = 1324$, $B_3 = 134$
- A single vehicle ignoring the ban on k_{32} (where $d_{32}=10$) takes B_2 with $L(B_2)=70$, gaining an advantage.




- Recall that $B_1 = 124$, $B_2 = 1324$, $B_3 = 134$
- A single vehicle ignoring the ban on k_{32} (where $d_{32} = 10$) takes B_2 with $L(B_2) = 70$, gaining an advantage.
- If the ban is lifted, many use B_2 , reverting to the original state.



- Recall that $B_1 = 124$, $B_2 = 1324$, $B_3 = 134$
- A single vehicle ignoring the ban on k_{32} (where $d_{32} = 10$) takes B_2 with $L(B_2) = 70$, gaining an advantage.
- If the ban is lifted, many use B_2 , reverting to the original state.
- Consider an intermediate step: 5 units on B_1 and B_3 , 1 on B_2 , then $L(B_1) = L(B_3) = 87.5$, $L(B_2) = 82.5$.


[Braess et al., 2005] Example: Selfish Deviation



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- B_2 users clog k_{13} and k_{24} (factor 10 in load-time relation), worsening times for B_1 and B_3 beyond 83; Yet B_2 remains shortest, attracting more traffic and degrading the system for all.


• The mechanical analogy: the spring paradox

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 - Replaced a six lane highway with a five mile long park, traffic flow improved

The Social Cost of Traffic at Equilibrium

A traffic network is a directed graph with

• Nodes: Start and destination points for drivers.


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
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
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- Nash Equilibrium: No driver can reduce their travel time by switching paths, given others' choices.



(a) The social optimum.





(a) The social optimum.

(b) The Nash equilibrium.




Figure: A version of Braess's Paradox: In the socially optimal traffic pattern, the social cost is 28, while in the unique Nash equilibrium, the social cost is 32.

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
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
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
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
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- Social cost can increase or decrease with best-response steps (e.g., from 28 to 32 in the Braess example), but potential energy strictly decreases, serving as a progress measure. $\frac{16}{21}$












Figure: Steps of best-response dynamics with potential energy changes.

For any edge e,

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Proof:

$$\frac{a_e x(x+1)}{2} + b_e x \geqslant \frac{1}{2} (a_e x^2 + b_e x)$$
 and $\leqslant a_e x^2 + b_e x$

• For a pattern Z,

$$\frac{1}{2}$$
 · Social-Cost(Z) \leq Energy(Z) \leq Social-Cost(Z)

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- Implications: Network design and tolls can mitigate inefficiencies.

References

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