

# ORDERED OUTCOME AND BRACKET-VALUED REGRESSOR

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CHANHYUK PARK

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS

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- Political science has long been interested in individual's preferences and opinions
  - Approval ratings (Canes-Wrone and De Marchi, 2002; Kriner and Schwartz, 2009)
  - Redistribution (Alt and Iversen, 2017; Magni, 2021)
  - Immigration policy (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007)
  - Trade policy (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Wu, 2022)
- Usually measured in ordinal scale
  - Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree*
- Often regressed on covariates measured in brackets, such as income, asset, or education
  - Less than \$5,000, \$5,000 – \$10,000, ..., More than \$100,000*

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## COMMON APPROACH

- Ordered Probit / Logit
  - Assume that there is no interpretation problem
  - Assume that the distribution follows normal / logistic
  - Assume that all measures are precise
- However, these assumptions are **strong**, and if not met, may lead to biased results, sometimes even **flip** the sign (Manski, 1988; Greene and Hensher, 2010; Bond and Lang, 2018)

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## EXAMPLE: ORDERED PROBIT

- Assume  $\epsilon \sim F(\cdot)$
- MLE for **Ordered Probit** model:

$$\arg \max_{\beta_1, \beta_2, \alpha} \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \log (\Phi(\alpha_j, \cdot) - \Phi(\alpha_{j-1}, \cdot)) \right]$$

- MLE for the **true** model

$$\arg \max_{\beta_1, \beta_2, \alpha} \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \log (F(\alpha_j, \cdot) - F(\alpha_{j-1}, \cdot)) \right]$$

## EXAMPLE: ORDERED PROBIT

- Increase in sample size does not make the two distributions closer
- The Ordered Probit estimator is biased, but the size and direction of the bias depend on the shape of  $F$
- Imprecise measure of  $v$  may lead to another bias, by affecting the log likelihood function. The size and direction of the bias also depend on the shape of  $F$

## PREVIOUS WORKS

	Interpretation	Distribution	Imprecise
<b>Anchored Vignettes</b> (King et al., 2004; King and Wand, 2007)	✓		
<b>Semiparametric</b> (Lewbel, 2000; Lee, 1992; Liu and Yu, 2024) <b>Sensitivity Analysis</b> (Bloem, 2022)	✓	✓	



## THIS PAPER

	Interpretation	Distribution	Imprecise
Anchored Vignettes	✓		
Semiparametric Sensitivity Analysis	✓	✓	
Semiparametric Partial Identification  Manski and Tamer (2002); Wang and Chen (2022)	✓	✓	✓

## PROBLEM SETTING

True DGP:

$$Y^* = X^T \beta_1 + v^T \beta_2 + \epsilon \quad (1)$$

Observation:

$$Y = \begin{cases} 0 & Y^* \leq 0 \\ 1 & 0 \leq Y^* \leq \alpha_1 \\ \vdots & \\ k & \alpha_{k-1} \leq Y^* \leq \alpha_k \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

Also, we do not observe  $v$  directly, the lower bound of  $v_0$  and the upper bound of  $v_1$

# ASSUMPTIONS

## Assumption (1)

$$Q_{\tau}(\epsilon \mid X, v) = 0$$

## Assumption (2)

$$\mathbb{P}(\epsilon \mid X, v, v_0, v_1) = \mathbb{P}(\epsilon \mid X, v)$$

## Assumption (3)

$$\beta_2 > 0$$

## GMMS ESTIMATOR

Let  $\lambda_{mn}(\cdot) = \mathbb{1}_{\{\mathbb{P}(Y_i > m | X_i, V_{1i}, V_{0i}) > (1-\tau)\}}$

$$\Theta_n = \{b : S_n(b) \geq \max_{c \in \mathcal{B}} S_n(c) - \varepsilon_n\}$$

, where


$$S_n(b^s) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{m=1}^{M-1} \left( \mathbb{P}(Y_i > m \mid X_i, V_{0i}, V_{1i}) - (1 - \tau) \right) \\ \left[ \lambda_{mn}(X_i, V_{0i}, V_{1i}) \cdot \text{sgn}(\tilde{X}_i' b + V_i^1 + b_{1m}) + \right. \\ \left. (1 - \lambda_{mn}(X_i, V_{0i}, V_{1i})) \cdot \text{sgn}(\tilde{X}_i' b + V_{0i} + b_{1m}) \right]$$

, for some  $\varepsilon_n = \frac{\ln(n)}{n} > 0$ .

## SIMULATION

- $X \sim \mathbb{N}(1, 4)$
- $V \sim \mathbb{N}(0, 2)$
- $\epsilon \sim \textit{Weibull}(10, 10)$

# ORDERED PROBIT AND LOGIT



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