Solution to Final Exam Foundations of Cryptography 89-856-01

Dr. Yehuda Lindell

2nd Semester, Moed ℵ 29th June, 2005

Instructions:

- 1. The exam is open book. You are allowed to use any material that you wish.
- 2. Length of the exam: 3 hours.
- 3. Answer both questions.
- 4. Your answers should be as detailed and formal as possible. Of course, most points will be awarded for presenting a correct construction together with the main idea behind the proof that it is correct (I stress, the idea behind the *proof* and not just the intuition about why it is secure). However, you should aim to give full and detailed proofs.
- 5. You may rely on any theorem that was stated in class.
- 6. Good luck!

Question 1: Let f be a length-preserving one-way function (i.e. |f(x)| = |x|). For each of the following, state if g is necessarily a one-way function. If yes, prove it. If not, present a counter-example (i.e., a one-way function f with the property that g is not one-way). Note that the counter-example also requires a proof (i.e., that the function f being used is one-way, while g is not).

- 1. g(x) = f(f(x))
- 2. q(x) = f(xx)
- 3. g(x) = f(x), f(f(x))

Solution 1:

1. The function g is not necessarily one-way: Let h be a length-preserving one-way function and define f(x) as follows: If $x_{n/2+1}\cdots x_n=0^{n/2}$, then $f(x)=0^{|x|}$. Else, $f(x)=h(x_1\cdots x_{n/2})0^{n/2}$. Clearly, f is length preserving. We now show that it is one-way. Intuitively, any adversary inverting f can be used to invert h. Formally, assume that there exists a PPT adversary $\mathcal A$ and a polynomial p such that for infinitely many n's

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(f(U_n)) \in f^{-1}(f(U_n))] \ge \frac{1}{p(n)}$$

Then, let \mathcal{A}' be an adversary who receives a value $y \in \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ and attempts to find a value $x \in h^{-1}(y)$. The adversary \mathcal{A}' just invokes \mathcal{A} upon input $y0^{n/2}$ and outputs the first n/2 bits of \mathcal{A} 's output. We now analyze the success probability of \mathcal{A}' . First, denote $S_n = \{x \mid x_{n/2+1} \cdots x_n = 0^{n/2}\}$ and note that $\Pr[U_n \in S_n] = 2^{-n/2}$. Next, note that

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}'(h(U_{n/2})) \in h^{-1}(h(U_{n/2}))] = \Pr[\mathcal{A}(f(U_n)) \in f^{-1}(f(U_n)) \mid U_n \notin S_n]$$

Now.

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(f(U_n)) \in f^{-1}(f(U_n))] = \Pr[\mathcal{A}(f(U_n)) \in f^{-1}(f(U_n)) \mid U_n \in S_n] \cdot \Pr[U_n \in S_n] \\
+ \Pr[\mathcal{A}(f(U_n)) \in f^{-1}(f(U_n)) \mid U_n \notin S_n] \cdot \Pr[U_n \notin S_n] \\
\leq \Pr[U_n \in S_n] + \Pr[\mathcal{A}(f(U_n)) \in f^{-1}(f(U_n)) \mid U_n \notin S_n] \\
= \Pr[U_n \in S_n] + \Pr[\mathcal{A}'(h(U_{n/2})) \in h^{-1}(h(U_{n/2}))] \\
= \frac{1}{2^{n/2}} + \Pr[\mathcal{A}'(h(U_{n/2})) \in h^{-1}(h(U_{n/2}))]$$

We therefore have that

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}'(h(U_{n/2})) \in h^{-1}(h(U_{n/2}))] \geq \Pr[\mathcal{A}(f(U_n)) \in f^{-1}(f(U_n))] - \frac{1}{2^{n/2}}$$
$$\geq \frac{1}{p(n)} - \frac{1}{2^{n/2}} \geq \frac{1}{q(n)}$$

for some polynomial q. Since \mathcal{A}' is PPT, this contradicts the assumption that h is a one-way function. We therefore conclude that f is one-way.

Having established that f is one-way, it remains to show that g is not one-way. In order to see this, note that for every x, $f(f(x)) = 0^{|x|}$ (this is because the last n/2 bits of f(x) equal zero, and so f(f(x)) equals $0^{|x|}$). Noting that it is easy to find a preimage of $0^{|x|}$ under g (just take $0^{|x|}$), we have that g(x) = f(f(x)) is not one-way.

2. The function g is not necessarily one-way: Let h be any one-way function, and define f as follows. Let S_n be the set of n-bit strings of the form xx where $x \in \{0,1\}^{n/2}$. Then, define f(xy) = h(xy) for $x \neq y$, and f(xx) = xx otherwise. In order to show that f is one-way, we rely on the one-wayness of h. That is, assume that there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{A} and a polynomial p such that for infinitely many n's

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(f(U_n)) \in f^{-1}(f(U_n))] \ge \frac{1}{p(n)}$$

Then, let \mathcal{A}' be an adversary who receives a value $y \in \{0,1\}^n$ and attempts to find a value $x \in h^{-1}(y)$. The adversary \mathcal{A}' just invokes \mathcal{A} upon input y and outputs whatever \mathcal{A} outputs. We now analyze the success probability of \mathcal{A}' . First, note that S_n as defined above contains only $2^{n/2}$ different strings. Therefore, $\Pr[U_n \in S_n] = 2^{-n/2}$. Next, note that

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}'(h(U_n)) \in h^{-1}(h(U_n)) \mid U_n \notin S_n] = \Pr[\mathcal{A}(f(U_n)) \in f^{-1}(f(U_n)) \mid U_n \notin S_n]$$

Using the same analysis as in the previous solution (and not really worth repeating), we have that

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(f(U_n)) \in f^{-1}(f(U_n))] \le \frac{1}{2^{n/2}} + \Pr[\mathcal{A}'(h(U_n)) \in h^{-1}(h(U_n)) \mid U_n \notin S_n]$$

and so

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}'(h(U_n)) \in h^{-1}(h(U_n)) \mid U_n \notin S_n] \ge \frac{1}{p(n)} - \frac{1}{2^{n/2}} \ge \frac{1}{q(n)}$$

for some polynomial q. We conclude by noting that

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(h(U_{n})) \in h^{-1}(h(U_{n}))] = \Pr[\mathcal{A}(h(U_{n})) \in h^{-1}(h(U_{n})) \mid U_{n} \in S_{n}] \cdot \Pr[U_{n} \in S_{n}]$$

$$+ \Pr[\mathcal{A}(h(U_{n})) \in h^{-1}(h(U_{n})) \mid U_{n} \notin S_{n}] \cdot \Pr[U_{n} \notin S_{n}]$$

$$\geq \Pr[\mathcal{A}(h(U_{n})) \in h^{-1}(h(U_{n})) \mid U_{n} \notin S_{n}] \cdot \Pr[U_{n} \notin S_{n}]$$

$$\geq \frac{1}{q(n)} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{1}{2^{n/2}}\right) \geq \frac{1}{2q(n)}$$

Since \mathcal{A}' is PPT, this contradicts the assumption that h is a one-way function. We therefore conclude that f is one-way.

It remains to show that g is not one-way. However, this follows by the fact that for every x it holds that g(x) = xx, and so g is easily invertible.

3. The function g is necessarily one-way: Assume by contradiction that there exists a PPT adversary A and a polynomial p such that for infinitely many n's

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(g(U_n)) \in g^{-1}(g(U_n))] \ge \frac{1}{p(n)}$$

We construct a PPT \mathcal{A}' who inverts f. Namely, \mathcal{A}' receives for input y = f(x) for $x \in_R \{0, 1\}^n$, computes z = f(y) and invokes \mathcal{A} upon input (y, z). Adversary \mathcal{A}' then outputs whatever \mathcal{A} outputs. Clearly,

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}'(f(U_n)) \in f^{-1}(f(U_n))] = \Pr[\mathcal{A}(g(U_n)) \in g^{-1}(g(U_n))]$$

Therefore, for infinitely many n's, adversary \mathcal{A}' inverts f with probability at least 1/p(n). This contradicts the one-wayness of f.

Question 2: Let G be a pseudorandom generator with l(n) = n + 1, and let p(n) be a polynomial. Show that the function $G'(s) = G^{p(|s|)}(s)$, where G is applied iteratively p(|s|) times, is a pseudorandom generator with l(n) = n + p(n). (Formally, define $G^0(s) = s$, and for every i > 0 define $G^i(s) = G(G^{i-1}(s))$.) Notice that G is applied to seeds of increasingly growing lengths.

Hint: In order to prove this, you may rely on a game in which a PPT distinguisher receives input 1^n and returns a value 1^ℓ where $\ell \geq n$. Then, D receives a string R which is either sampled according to $G(U_\ell)$ or according to $U_{\ell+1}$. For your proof, you can take it as a fact (that follows from the pseudorandomness of G) that for every PPT D, the probability that D outputs 1 when receiving $G(U_\ell)$ is negligibly close to the probability that it outputs 1 when receiving $U_{\ell+1}$. Note, that this just gives you flexibility to request the length of the string that you want to distinguish.

Solution 2: We prove the claim using a hybrid argument. Assume, by contradiction, that there exists a PPT distinguisher D and a polynomial q such that for infinitely many n's

$$\left| \Pr[D(G'(U_n)) = 1] - \Pr[D(U_{n+p(n)}) = 1] \right| \ge \frac{1}{q(n)}$$

We define the hybrid distribution $H_n^i = G^{p(n)-i}(U_{n+i})$. Observe that on the one hand $H_n^0 = G^{p(n)}(U_n) = G'(U_n)$, and on the other hand, $H_n^{p(n)} = G^0(U_{n+p(n)}) = U_{n+p(n)}$. Therefore, by the contradicting assumption, for infinitely many n's it holds that

$$\Delta(n) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left| \Pr[D(H_n^0) = 1] - \Pr[D(H_n^{p(n)}) = 1] \right| \ge \frac{1}{q(n)}$$

Now, using a telescopic sum and the triangle inequality, we have that

$$\Delta(n) \le \sum_{i=0}^{p(n)-1} \left| \Pr[D(H_n^i) = 1] - \Pr[D(H_n^{i+1}) = 1] \right|$$

Therefore, there exists a j for which

$$\left| \Pr[D(H_n^j) = 1] - \Pr[D(H_n^{j+1}) = 1] \right| \ge \frac{1}{p(n)q(n)}$$

A distinguisher D' for G works as follows. Upon input 1^n , distinguisher D' chooses a random index $i \in_R \{0, \ldots, p(n) - 1\}$, outputs 1^{n+i} and receives back a string $r \in \{0, 1\}^{n+i+1}$ (as in the game defined in the hint above). Distinguisher D' then computes $R = G^{p(n)-i-1}(r)$, hands it to D, and outputs whatever D does. Notice the following:

- If D' receives U_{n+i+1} , then R is distributed according to H_n^{i+1} . In order to see this, recall that $H_n^{i+1} = G^{p(n)-i-1}(U_{n+i+1})$ which is exactly what D' computes.
- If D' receives $G(U_{n+i})$, then R is distributed according to H_n^i . In order to see this, note that $H_n^i = G^{p(n)-i}(U_{n+i}) = G^{p(n)-i-1}(G(U_{n+i}))$ which is exactly what D' computes.

Since i = j with probability 1/p(n), we have that for infinitely many n's, D' distinguishes between the case that it receives U_{n+i+1} from the case that it receives $G(U_{n+i})$ with probability at least $1/p^2(n)q(n)$, in contradiction to the assumption regarding the pseudorandomness of G (and its ramification in the above game).