
Problem Set 4

Due: Wednesday February 18, 2009, in class.

See course information section (on course web page) for instructions and rules on working on problem sets and turning them in.

Problem 1. [30 points] Define the family of functions $H: \{0,1\}^{64} \times \{0,1\}^{192} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{128}$ as follows:

function $H_K(x)$ // $|K| = 64$ and $|x| = 192$
 Let a be the first 64 bits of x and b the rest // $|a| = 64$ and $|b| = 128$
 $y \leftarrow \text{AES}_{K \parallel a}(b)$ // Apply AES with 128-bit key $K \parallel a$ and input b to get output y
 return y

Show that H is not collision-resistant by presenting a practical adversary A such that $\text{Adv}_H^{\text{cr2-kk}}(A)$ is close to one. (The better the attack, the more points you get.)

Problem 2. [40 points] Let $h: \mathcal{K} \times \{0,1\}^{2b} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^b$ be a compression function. Define $H: \mathcal{K} \times \{0,1\}^{4b} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^b$ as follows:

function $H(K, M)$
 Break M into $2b$ -bit blocks, $M = M_1 \parallel M_2$
 $V_1 \leftarrow h(K, M_1)$; $V_2 \leftarrow h(K, M_2)$
 $V \leftarrow h(K, V_1 \parallel V_2)$
 return V

Show that if h is collision-resistant then so is H . Do this by stating and proving an analogue of Theorem 6.8 in the course notes.

Problem 3. [50 points] Let $\text{sha1}: \{0,1\}^{672} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{160}$ be the compression function underlying the SHA1 hash function. We define a message authentication scheme $\Pi = (\mathcal{K}, \text{MAC}, \text{VF})$ as follows. The key generation algorithm returns a random 160 bit string as the key K , and the tagging and verifying algorithms are:

Algorithm $\text{MAC}_K(M)$

Divide M into 512 bit blocks, $M = M[1] \dots M[n]$

$C[0] \leftarrow K$

For $i = 1, \dots, n$ do

$C[i] \leftarrow \text{sha1}(C[i-1] \parallel M[i])$

EndFor

Return $C[n]$

Algorithm $\text{VF}_K(M, \sigma)$

If $\sigma = \text{MAC}_K(M)$ then return 1

Else return 0

The message space is the set of all strings whose length is a positive multiple of 512.

Present a practical chosen-message attack that succeeds in forgery using one query to the tagging oracle.
