Doing Violence, Making Race: Southern Lynching and White Racial Group Formation[1]

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This article presents a theoretical framework of how intergroup violence may figure into the activation and maintenance of group categories, boundaries, and identities, as well as the mediating role played by organizations in such processes. The framework's analytical advantages are demonstrated in an application to southern lynchings. Findings from event- and community-level analyses suggest that "public" lynchings, carried out by larger mobs with ceremonial violence, but not "private" ones, perpetrated by smaller bands without public or ceremonial violence, fed off and into the racial group boundaries, categories, and identities promoted by the southern Democratic Party at the turn of the 20th century and on which the emerging Jim Crow system rested. Highlighting that racialized inequalities cannot be properly understood apart from collective processes of racial group boundary and identity making, the article offers clues to the mechanisms by which past racial domination influences contemporary race relations.

INTRODUCTION

The centrality of boundary processes in social life has in recent decades gained renewed appreciation, leading to important theoretical developments and a growing body of empirical research (for reviews, see Lamont and Molnar [2002] and Pachucki, Pendergrass, and Lamont [2007]). Scholarship on race and ethnicity has been particularly central to this literature and provides

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new conceptual tools for analyzing the relational and dynamic processes by which ethnoracial groups define and establish themselves (e.g., Lamont 2000; Brubaker 2004; Alba 2005; McDermott 2006; Bail 2008, 2012; Fox and Guglielmo 2012; Wimmer 2013). Intergroup conflict and violence are in that respect particularly relevant because they reveal in unusually stark fashion the conceptions about racial or ethnic differences and affiliations that form the basis for group formation. In consequence, simply observing that race and ethnicity have different meanings in different times and places does not suffice if we are to take their contested, constructed, and contingent nature seriously. In order to do so, we should consider the configuration and content of actors' conceptions of racial or ethnic differences and similarities as well as the consequences of such conceptions for relations and behaviors among and between racially and ethnically defined groups (cf. Lamont and Molnar 2002; McDermott 2006).

This article advances the study of lynchings of African-Americans in the post-Reconstruction U.S. South and the literature on ethnic and racial boundary formation by analyzing intergroup violence and its role in the construction of racialized group boundaries and identities. I both explain differences in the types of lynchings that took place and link the pattern of lynchings to broader political developments via the consolidation of white unity and power through the Democratic Party and disfranchisement. This topic is particularly suited for the study of how racial categories, boundaries, and identities affect interracial relations for three reasons. First, white-on-black lynchings stand as one of the most complex and disturbing aspects of the long and rich history of racial violence in the United States. Second, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries the South witnessed the rise of Jim Crow, a system of durable racial inequality of remarkable scope. As I document, the co-occurrence of the lynching era with the rise of Jim Crow was no mere coincidence; these developments were symbiotically intertwined. Third, grounded in Blalock's (1967) theory of intergroup relations, the existing sociological literature on lynching emphasizes mainly its role as an instrumental means for social control furthering whites' economic interests (Corzine, Huff-Corzine, and Creech 1988; Beck and Tolnay 1990; Olzak 1992; Soule 1992; Tolnay and Beck 1995; Stovel 2001; Gullickson 2010). Thus

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the processes through which racial group boundaries and identities were culturally encoded and socially enacted in this period have been given insufficient attention. Given that the turn-of-the-20th-century South was intensely preoccupied with the so-called race question, that is, the question of the nature of white-black relations, this arguably neglects something important about the phenomenon we are attempting to describe and explain.

Lynching as an Institutional and Differentiated Phenomenon

This research is not alone in considering the role of lynching in fomenting the Jim Crow racial cast line. Inverarity (1976) approaches lynching as a form of "repressive justice" triggered by the "boundary crisis" in white society caused by Populism in the 1890s. Inverarity's study has, however, been severely and successfully criticized on theoretical as well as methodological grounds (see Bagozzi 1977; Berk 1977; Bohrnstedt 1977; Pope and Ragin 1977; Wasserman 1977; cf. Bailey and Snedker 2011). Tolnay and Beck (1995) recognize lynching as a mechanism for maintaining the color line and cementing white solidarity, but they do not develop this line of argument theoretically or empirically as fully as they do the role of economic forces in understanding lynching.

In a recent study, Bailey and Snedker (2011) apply a "moral solidarity" framework to explore the connection between religion and lynching. One of their key findings is that the higher the local-level heterogeneity among white Protestant denominations, taken as signaling the erosion of white group solidarity, the higher the lynching rate. Bailey and Snedker argue that this demonstrates that mob violence served to uphold white racial solidarity. While the present study confirms Bailey and Snedker's general argument, it throws doubt on their assumption that lynchings were an undifferentiated phenomenon. Bailey and Snedker's argument that religious diversity was conducive to collective violence that enhanced white group solidarity hinges on the positive association between religious diversity and mob violence holding for highly public and ritualized events. However, it is undermined in case the association applied to mob killings carried out by a smaller number of whites. In that case, religious diversity may be seen as reflecting anomic conditions of moral fragmentation inducing wayward white individuals to kill blacks. Regardless of this uncertainty over what their results actually show, Bailey and Snedker suggest important directions for moving the literature forward from its focus on economic conditions in explaining lynchings. The present study may therefore be regarded as an extension and elaboration of their approach.

While lynching is perhaps most strongly associated in the popular as well as scholarly imagination with large-crowd public events coupled with ex-

treme violence, not all lynchings featured broad-based participation, support, or overt brutality. Contrast, for instance, the following two examples.[2]

Hose lynching.—On April 23, 1899, in front of about two thousand people in Coweta County, Georgia, Sam [Hose], a black man alleged to have killed his white employer and raped the employer's wife, was stripped of his clothes and chained to a tree with kerosene-soaked wood stacked high around him. Before Hose was burned at the stake, his ears, fingers, and genitals were cut off and his face skinned. On the trunk of a nearby tree someone hung a sign reading "We Must Protect Our Southern Women."

Welly lynching.—On the night of September 3, 1900, in Thomas County, Georgia, a black man named Grant Welly got into a dispute with a white man who cut Welly badly in the neck. A friend of Welly's, Joe Fleming, took him to a physician and then brought him to his house and put him to bed. Later that same night a group of five or six white men came to and fired into Fleming's house, killing Welly and wounding Fleming. Fleming tried to hide under the house but was pulled out and told by the white men that if he left the house or told anyone about what had happened, they would kill him.

In past research these two events have been treated as part of a unitary phenomenon, lynching. As I show, this approach lacks the complexity to account for qualitative differences among repressive practices and is thus insufficient for disentangling the complex motives that drove white lynch mobs and for explaining the stark contrast between these two events. The apparent violent excesses in the Hose lynching, far beyond necessary for causing the victim's death, suggest that some instances of lynching may have revolved around concerns other than an instrumental move toward material ends. "To kill an economic competitor or make an example of a recalcitrant worker was one thing; to mutilate him . . . appears," as Holt (1995, p. 5) observes, "to be something else altogether." As I shall show, linking lynching to group boundary and identity processes connected to the rise of Jim Crow allows us to account for this "something else" and systematically explain the differences in these two types of intergroup violence.

Additionally I revisit and reconceptualize the relevance of another institutional arena and type of organization in explaining white mob violence against blacks in the post-Reconstruction South—politics and political parties. Previous work has explored to what extent lynching was driven by competitive electoral party politics in the South but has not been able to establish a firm or consistent link between lynching and factors such as the strength of the Populist and Republican parties (Beck, Massey, and Tolnay 1989; Tolnay, Beck, and Massey 1989; Soule 1992; Tolnay and Beck 1995).

[2] The descriptions of the Hose and Welly killings are based on accounts in the *Atlanta Constitution* on April 24, 1899 (p. 1–2) and Sept. 4, 1900 (p. 3), respectively.

Rather than conceiving the connection between politics and lynching solely in terms of electoral competition, this research integrates the boundary-making literature with research on the influence of political, as well as other types of, institutions and organizations on the alignment and mobilization of groups in contention to develop and support the argument that the Democratic Party was crucial in disseminating the symbolic racial boundaries, as well as in building the in-group solidarity, that motivated and enabled whites to come together in collective violence against blacks. In this, the research continues and contributes to a long-standing line of research addressing questions of how political institutions mediate the relations between and among groups and affect the concentrations of coercive power that give rise to contentious collective action, including now-canonical studies by Gamson (1975), Tilly (1978), and McAdam (1982), as well as more recent ones by Redding (2003), McVeigh (2009), and Cunningham (2013).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Social groups are founded on symbolic boundaries with two dimensions: one categorical, separating the in-group from out-groups, and one normative, prescribing and proscribing appropriate intragroup as well as intergroup relations and practices (Lamont and Molnar 2002; Wimmer 2013). Symbolic boundaries are articulated, among other things, through public or collective identity narratives revolving around questions such as Who are we? Who are they? What are our rights? What are their rights? What are our obligations? What are their obligations? What is our fate? What is their fate? (See, e.g., Somers 1994; Tilly 2005.) Grounded in symbols, metaphors, and images that embody the shared meanings people hold regarding what it means to be who they and others are, such narratives are not abstract dogma but ideologies connected with people's expectations and experiences of group life. They exemplify in that regard the kind of cultural knowledge and resources—or "tools" (Swidler 1986)—that actors employ in interpreting and acting on the social world.

Symbolic boundaries and categories hold the potential for group formation to the extent that they evoke feelings of similarity, solidarity, and joint action with those perceived as similar to oneself. Symbolic boundaries further sustain systems of stratification and inequality insofar as they produce hierarchy and exclusion. In that regard, public narratives provide purposes for collective action, which may entail visions of transforming symbolic boundaries into social boundaries through the institutionalization of perceived group differences. A social boundary prevails to the extent that the categorical and behavioral dimensions of symbolic boundaries coincide—"when ways of seeing the world correspond to ways of acting in the world" (Wimmer 2013, p. 9)—with important consequences for re-

source distribution as well as associative patterns among groups (Lamont and Molnar 2002).

Social group boundaries may be "bright" or "blurred." The former are widely recognized and institutionalized and significantly influence the access to economic, political, and social resources of as well as the social distance between groups, whereas the latter are less recognized and institutionalized and do not direct the access to resources or create social distance to the same extent (Alba 2005; Fox and Guglielmo 2012; Saperstein and Gullickson 2013). Bright social boundaries may give rise to durable group inequalities wherein unequal intergroup relations and interactions are institutionalized such that social, economic, and political advantages stably and continually accumulate to members of one rather than another group. Such categorical inequality does not emerge arbitrarily but depends on extensive collective mobilization and organization (Tilly 1998).

Group Boundaries, Identities, and Violence

Analyses of how actors use symbolic categories to grasp, create, and maintain interactions and relationships within and between groups can be usefully figured through an "eventful" approach (Brubaker 2004), because events are main markers of the social actions through which the formation and transformation of social structures transpire (Abrams 1982; Moore 2011). Furthermore, if cultural forms are tools in construing meaningful action in different settings and situations, then events give us empirical access to them, particularly revealing the symbolic and social group boundaries and identifications that matter to actors (Geertz 1973; cf. Weber 1978). In such events, participants deploy the cultural resources provided by group ideologies, for example, symbolic boundaries and categories, and concretize themes interpretable within the emplotment of particular collective narratives in ways accounting for "what is going on in a way that makes an evolving identity part of the explanation" (Polletta 1998, p. 141). Such events thus not only are made possible and comprehensible by their framing within collective identity narratives but are integral in realizing the visions of such narratives and, thereby, the production and reproduction of group boundaries, identities, and, as it may apply, inequalities.

The perhaps most powerful and consequential events are in that regard dramatic ones involving conflict in general and violence in particular (Collins 2004), and intergroup violence may be understood as enacting symbolic group boundaries, categories, and identities. Since the meaning of performances turns on their dramaturgical character, we can specify ideal-typical models of the interactional structure of intergroup violence—that is, the patterns of the violent communicative transaction relating perpetrators, victims, and their respective peer groups—according to what message is sent, by

whom it is sent, on whose behalf it is sent, to whom it is sent, and what is socially constructed in the process. Figure 1 displays models of what I call collective identity-building intergroup violence, social identity-building intergroup violence, and intergroup violence as social control.

In the model of collective identity-building intergroup violence, the perpetrators and the intended audience converge, involving the in-group as performer as well as spectator, whereas these roles are separated or absent in the other two models. This highlights that this type of violence is a performance that the group stages for itself on the basis of its identity narratives. Its effectiveness in generating shared social experiences and understandings depends on drawing participants into a strong mutual focus of attention and high levels of emotional energy, commonly achieved by various ceremonial elements, for example, defilement and desecration of



FIG. 1.—Ideal-typical models of intergroup violence

bodies—torture, mutilation, burning, decapitation, and flogging (Collins 1974, 2004). Collective identity-building violence is enacted to uphold the integrity and sovereignty of the group as a whole by dramatizing symbolic boundaries and the extent of the group's mutual loyalties. Such violence defines the relationship among and between perpetrators (including adherents) and victims in terms of, on the one side, similarity, solidarity, and power, and, on the other, otherness, exclusion, and powerlessness. Thus, it may be not only expressive but also generative of the very social boundaries and collective identities that it invokes.

As models for sociocultural understanding, experience, and action, identity narratives affect the formation of social identities—conceptions of self that derive from membership in particular categories or groups (Burke and Stets 2009). Since group inclusion is contingent on acceptance by relevant others, social identity-building violence is a performance for peers to gain their approval and the group membership implied thereby. This type of violence is thus not perpetrated to uphold the sanctity of the group itself, but on behalf of would-be individual group members. It is therefore less dependent on generating high levels of collective mutual focus or emotional energy and less likely to involve broad-based participation or ceremonial brutality than collective identity-building intergroup violence (cf. Collins 2004).

Abstracting away cultural meanings related to group boundaries, categories, and identities, the ideal-typical model of intergroup violence as social control represents violence as an instrumental means for immobilizing adversaries—for example, by generating fear among them—in order to enforce their submission and compliance. Its interactional structure, therefore, in contrast to the previous two, does not feature the perpetrators' in-group at all but only the victims and their peer group. In emphasizing instrumental concerns, this model remains agnostic on the character of violence and effectively views differences therein as a matter of degree rather than kind. The Hose and Welly killings described above would thus be considered qualitatively similar but quantitatively different: the former sending African-Americans a stronger message than the latter of their vulnerability and the price for crossing whites' interests. As noted earlier, the social control conceptualization of lynching dominates the extant sociological literature. Below I discuss how lynchings may be conceptualized in terms of collective identity- and social identity-building intergroup violence.

Lynching as social identity- and collective identity-building intergroup violence.—In order to gain conceptual purchase on the complexity of the lynching phenomenon, I distinguish between "private" and "public" lynchings, the former representing social identity-building and the latter collective identity-building intergroup violence. This distinction draws on the lynch mob typology developed by Brundage (1993) consisting of private, terrorist, posse, and mass mobs, with "private" lynchings making up the former

two and "public" the latter two types. The reason for collapsing the fourfold typology into a twofold one is that significant overlap in size, composition, and behavior makes it difficult to differentiate private from terrorist mobs on the one hand and posses from mass mobs on the other either conceptually or empirically (for similar arguments, see Brundage [1993], Hale [1998], and Pfeifer [2004]).

Private lynch mobs were typically small-scale furtive affairs, concerned more with "secrecy than ceremony" (Brundage 1993, p. 30), perpetrated by people united by bonds of kinship or friendship to pay retribution for (alleged) harm done to self, family, or friends. The lynching of Grant Welly exemplifies this type of lynching. This was not a communal collective identity-building event: the victim was killed in a rather straightforward manner, apparently in order to settle the score once and for all on his earlier altercation with a white man. While mobs of this type claimed from time to time to defend or "regulate" community morals by responding to blacks' (purported) violations of standards of proper interracial conduct, they, like mobs openly motivated by personal grievances, were commonly disguised and carried out their deeds at night or in secluded places; they comprised family and friends of an offended white party, and they were often the culmination of interpersonal conflicts. Such vigilante groups, called "terrorist" mobs in Brundage's typology, thus shared important similarities with mobs admittedly meting out personal vengeance (Ayers 1984; Brundage 1993; Pfeifer 2004).

Public lynchings represented communal efforts and signify collective identity-building intergroup violence. While the legitimacy of private mobs could be publicly questioned, public mobs, marshaling broad-based participation and support and often led by the community's "best citizens," were hardly ever challenged. As Wood (2009, p. 43) observes, this attests to their power to collectively unite whites: "Making a lynching public and spectacular rendered it more legitimate than an act of vigilante violence performed secretly." The "spectacular" character of public lynchings refers to their occasional ceremonial elements like the ones displayed in the conspicuously excessive brutality of the Hose lynching. These elements worked to generate a strong mutual focus of attention and shared emotional arousal between the lynchers and their adherent audience, bonding them inside the event in the way implied by the convergence of perpetrators and spectators in the interactional model of collective identity-building intergroup violence. Furthermore, groups of white men ("posses") that in their search for suspected black criminals ended up killing rather than apprehending the suspects were similarly a highly emotionally charged form of interracial violence enjoying wide communal participation and approval among whites. Although lacking ceremonial elements, these killings resembled "ritual warhunts" (Collins 1974) that brought perpetrators together in prekilling frenzies and the fellowship of the hunt, as well as fusing them with their communities in col-

lective postkilling celebrations that glorified their civic heroism and contribution to the greater good (Brundage 1993).

Note that the separation of perpetrator(s), audience(s), and victim(s) and their stipulated relations in each ideal-typical model of intergroup violence refers to analytical elements: real-world violence may very well involve multiple perpetrators, multiple audiences, multiple victims, and not only unilateral violence. The matter in the present case is thus not whether, say, public lynchings were about imposing control on and suppressing blacks or expressing a collective identity among whites. It is safe to assume that public lynchings sent one message of fear and vulnerability to African-Americans and a different message of solidarity and empowerment to white perpetrators and sympathetic spectators (cf. Blee 2005). Further, while the ideal-types of collective and social identity-building intergroup violence offer conceptual traction to capture, compare, and contrast lynch mobs, typification is not explanation. Ideal-types define what is to be explained, whereas explanation requires accounting for why and providing evidence demonstrating that the phenomena occur to lesser or greater extent in one form or the other in certain contexts rather than others.

Organizations and Collective Mobilization

One such relevant context is the collective processes taking place within and through formal organizations. A large literature on social movements shows that organizations are essential vehicles for mobilizing people in collective action (e.g., McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Gould 1995; Redding 2003; McVeigh 2009; Cunningham 2013). But what makes organizations such powerful mobilizing contexts? One, collective action does not arise automatically from the aggregation of individual perceptions or interests, but emerges from intersubjective perceptions among people of a shared commonality and purpose relative to others, that is, a collective identity. And organizational actors are important for conveying the symbolic boundaries and categories of public identity narratives, as well as for encoding, or "framing," them in ways that transform and align individual perceptions and interests with a collective identity that motivate people to act in the name of and for the sake of the collectivity (Snow and Benford 1988; Brubaker 2004; McVeigh 2009; Cunningham 2013). Two, the relevance of identity narratives and the categories and boundaries they invoke in their calls for collective unity and action are contingent on people being able to consider their own situation as homologous to that of others and thereby see themselves and others as being part of a group. As associational settings that bring people together in repeated interaction, organizations foster interpersonal ties that let people share experiences, beliefs,

and values with others beyond what ties established through the routines of everyday life alone can sustain, making identity narratives more salient and convincing to their intended constituencies and potential participants in collective action (Gould 1995; Redding 2003; McVeigh 2009; Cunningham 2013).

In these respects, organizations play important roles in intergroup conflicts. In order to prevail in conflicts with other groups, a group cannot doubt its strength and cohesion, which depends on generating and displaying group solidarity inhering in its collective identity. But the solidarity of a group is observable only in collective action, and unless such action is forthcoming, there will always be some uncertainty about its solidarity. By accumulating and coordinating resources as well as mediating frame alignment and social tie formation processes, organizations enable the mobilization of collective identities and actions in ways that allow people to understand and represent themselves as a solidary group (Gould 1995, 2003; Brubaker 2004). Various types of organizations, for example, political parties, may thus be the most consequential actors in promoting and shaping intergroup conflicts, and below I explore how the postbellum southern racial conflict played out through the southern party system. In particular, I explore how the Democratic Party served, for one thing, as a conduit for the ideologically-narratively embedded symbolic boundaries and categories whites used to define and distinguish themselves from blacks and, for another, to provide associative networks that enabled whites to come together against blacks in collective violence.

During the course of intergroup conflict, what social movement scholars call "critical events" may affect the dynamics of collective action (Staggenborg 1993; Gould 1995). Although critical events can take many forms, policy outcomes are of particular interest here because governments are powerful actors that serve as arbitrators recognizing and validating some but not other collective actors, for example, organizations, in the polity. Policy outcomes result from contentious processes in which various contenders in the polity vie for primacy in defining the "criteria for acceptable political organization, membership, identity, activity, and claim making" (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, p. 146). By accentuating certain group boundaries, categories, and identities, the adoption of policies that affirm the beliefs, claims, and practices of organizational polity actors and their constituencies may therefore provide occasion for further advancing collective purposes through collective action. The enactment of public policy thus does not necessarily represent the end of contentious episodes, but a stage therein dynamically affecting the conditions of contention as it unfolds (McVeigh, Welch, and Bjarnason 2003). Following this line of argument, I argue and document below that disfranchisement was a critical policy event that validated the racial group categories, boundaries, and identities channeled

through the Democratic Party in the post-Reconstruction South, with consequences for collective white violence against blacks.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The end of Reconstruction in the late 1870s put control of southern state governments back into the hands of southern whites. The return of "home rule" was, however, not followed by any immediate or drastic changes in white-black relations, including the civil rights granted African-Americans in the wake of the Civil War by the passing of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. This lack of change can be explained by the "conservative" white supremacist ideology of the "Redeemers," that is, the region's Democratic Party leadership coalition of elite planters, merchants, and industrialists that defeated Reconstruction. Conservative white supremacy was a genteel form of racism that in many respects carried on antebellum slaveholder paternalism and imagined blacks as good-natured but simple-minded and dependent on the benevolence and forbearance of intellectually and morally superior whites. While depicting blacks as inferior to whites, this ideology thus did not posit any natural interracial antipathies but considered blacks integral to southern society. Taking the dependent nature of blacks for granted, it was assumed by southern elite and nonelite whites alike in the late 1870s and early 1880s that left without protection or resources from the federal government, the black masses were helpless and without much difficulty would soon be resubordinated (Fredrickson 1971; Williamson 1984).

Public concern about the race question consequently remained for a time relatively low but soared as the ambiguity of conservative white supremacy became all but apparent. In short, while slavery lay destroyed in the past, centuries of racialized bondage had left a powerful legacy by enduringly connecting, in the mind of whites, whiteness with superiority and privilege on the one hand and blackness with inferiority and subjugation on the other (Desmond and Emirbayer 2009). But without social boundaries institutionalizing the symbolic categories of white superiority as (white) freedom and (black) bondage had done during slavery, paternalist white supremacy for a number of reasons could not meaningfully set the lot of whites apart from or above blacks in the early post-Reconstruction years. For one, the right to consider oneself an independent and honorable citizen, with, in the case of men, the right to vote, was no longer an exclusive white privilege. For another, blacks were, naturally, less than willing to surrender to white authority, and the contrast between blacks asserting their autonomy from notions of their dependency and docility was galling to whites. Moreover, developments in the southern agricultural economy—increasing landlessness, plummeting cotton prices, an appreciating dollar, and grinding crop

lien debt—exacerbated many whites' precarious position in society in general and relative to blacks in particular. To find themselves competing with blacks at the bottom rung of society for farm tenancy and laborer opportunities without a clear edge not only meant material deprivation but also put serious strain on whites' efforts to uphold a superior social standing above blacks. Finally, the rising middle-class blacks taking advantage of the economic, educational, and political opportunities available during Reconstruction and the early years thereafter proved false the notions of black intellectual-moral inferiority and were a powerful source of aggravation among plain whites (Ayers 1992; Litwack 1998; Dailey 2000).

Thus, although whites had regained control of southern state governments, interracial interactions and relations in the early post-Reconstruction years were not as scripted or constrained as they had been in the slavery past or would become in the imminent Jim Crow future. In these circumstances, where the symbolic racial boundaries and categories of paternalist white supremacy did not map onto whites' expectations or experiences and where interracial social boundaries where blurred, the meaning and worth—in other words, the economic, political, social, and psychological "wages" (Du Bois 1935)—of whiteness remained uncertain and elusive (Ayers 1992; Dailey 2000).

The widespread dissatisfaction among whites with the absence of symbolic and social boundaries clearly defining and firmly realizing their racial superiority and privilege toward the second half of the 1880s found expression in radical (or extremist or militant) white supremacy. Informed by social Darwinism and scientific racism, the core assumption of extremist white supremacy was that blacks were innately and hereditarily inferior to whites and that, without the civilizing influence of slavery, they were in a process of evolutionary "retrogression." In viewing blacks as set apart from and beneath humanity, it rejected notions of blacks as useful members of society and instead painted a picture of an apocalyptic Manichean racial struggle that portrayed blacks as imminently endangering whites and their communities. The notion of black racial degeneration, most powerfully captured in the image of the "black beast rapist," was in that respect particularly consequential. As a result of their supposed degeneration, blacks were represented as increasingly driven by primordial animalistic instincts toward sexual gratification, leading to uncontrollable passions—purportedly resulting in an epidemic of sexual assaults on white women by black men. This attribution of collective threat to African-Americans in the myth of the black rapist invested the interracial sexual boundary with a previously unknown salience because neither the strong taboo on interracial sexual contacts nor acute white concern with black-on-white rape had characterized antebellum times, but emerged as fundamental to white group ideology in the late 19th century (e.g., Williamson 1984; Sommerville 2004).

This symbolic alignment of racial and sexual boundaries in the radical racist narrative (from the vantage point of whites), then, had homogenizing effects on both sides of the color line. First, it indiscriminately cast all blacks, with little consideration for factors such as education, occupation, or income, into the category of primal fiends. Second, resonating with traditional cultural values attached to the family and the glorification of white womanhood, it fostered a sense of commonality and solidarity, that is to say, a collective identity, among whites transcending class lines by placing them all in the same position of being besieged by perceived predatory black men lurking for their mothers, sisters, wives, and daughters. The rhetoric of radical white supremacy was accordingly filled with metaphors of whites as forming an extended family and white women as the keepers of the communal home and hearth. In this, extremist white supremacy bestowed calls for white unity, superiority, and domination with a credibility, focus, and reason lacking in conservative racial paternalism (Litwack 1998; Kantrowitz 2000; Downs 2011).

With the Democrats well established as the "white man's party," the radical white supremacists, unlike the Populist movement, did not create a new party but appropriated, in sharp contention with the incumbent Redeemer conservatives, the Democratic Party as their primary organizational base and vehicle for engaging collective white racial commitments and identifications. The convergence of racial and partisan communities invested the act of voting with meaning beyond electing public officials or influencing public policies and turned elections into communal rituals generating and affirming racial group commitments and solidarities. In these circumstances, intensive in-group partisanship policing and sanctioning were important means of achieving collective racial identity and cohesion among whites (cf. Brubaker 2004). Whites voting against the Democratic ticket were seen as racial traitors and risked ostracism within their communities (Kantrowitz 2000; Redding 2003; Downs 2011).

An important associative setting for communal engagement, the Democratic Party not only disseminated a racial narrative rooted in a particular white supremacist ideology but also provided contact opportunities between southern whites, bringing and binding together whites of different socioeconomic standings and forging race- rather than class-based collective interests, identities, and solidarities. The rhetoric of extremist white supremacy, furthermore, converged seamlessly with that of the Lost Cause. The sine qua non of extremist white supremacy as well as the Lost Cause was the solidarity of all southern whites, and their clear affinities were no coincidence: they both grew out of the social dislocations of the late 1880s and early 1890s, and the rise of one provided fertile ground for the other. The Democratic Party so became "a political church with sacred commitments

to white supremacy . . . and holy symbolism spiritualizing the Lost Cause" (Bartley 1990, p. 97; see also Gaines 1987).

As their ideology eclipsed conservative white supremacy and they wrestled control of the Democratic Party from the Redeemers in the late 1880s and early 1890s, the racial extremists led the South down a path of rigid, exclusionary, and oppressive racial relations leading to the system of Jim Crow—"the highest stage of white supremacy" (Cell 1982)—including its pillar institutions of disfranchisement and legal segregation. If this outcome seems inevitable from our vantage point, it was anything but from the perspective of contemporaries, because it was one thing to rhetorically posit white supremacy and a very different thing to transform it from slogan into social fact. Thus, while whites' racist impulses may have arisen unbidden, in themselves they did not provide the basis for the type of collective identity and action necessary for turning the visions of radical white supremacy into reality. As the architects and advocates of radical white supremacy recognized, transforming its symbolic boundaries into institutionalized social boundaries of racial domination required that they enjoy widespread recognition and legitimacy, which could be achieved only through considerable agitation and mobilization uniting whites around a shared understanding of the "true" nature and stakes of the race question. That the rise of radical white supremacy, the move to disfranchise blacks, the onset of legal segregation, and an increase in both frequency and barbarity of racial mob violence against blacks co-occurred in the decades straddling the turn of the 20th century was no coincidence but reflected different aspects of the same process of realizing the radical white supremacy imperative of reestablishing the connection between race and domination in all aspects of southern society that slavery had provided but emancipation disrupted. This involved transforming the symbolic racial boundaries inherent in radical white supremacy into bright social boundaries as well as mobilizing the collective white identity envisioned by extremist white supremacists in collective action against blacks.

EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS

Event-Level Hypotheses

To the extent that lethal mob violence played into the activation and maintenance of the symbolic and social racial group boundaries at the foundation of the Jim Crow system, we should expect systematic associations between the situational triggers of lynchings and their violent form—not in every case, of course, but consistently enough to reveal meaningful patterns. As per our theoretical framework, perceived black transgressions threatening the integrity and sovereignty of whites as a group rather than injuring par-

ticular whites should have been followed by collective identity-building violence in the form of public lynchings. In particular, lynchings following on (real or imagined) black sexual assaults (or attempts thereof) against white women should more commonly have been public rather than private lynchings. This prediction, however, needs further elaboration. As the fearsome "black rapist" moniker did not become a crucial symbolic racial boundary marker until the rise of radical white supremacy in the years around 1890, the hypothesized association between black-on-white sexual assaults and lynching should hold to a greater extent for the period after than before then. We should, furthermore, not expect to observe this pattern in white-on-white lynchings, because their significance should not have lain in enacting and constructing symbolic or social racial boundaries. This leads to the following hypotheses.

HYPOTHESIS 1.—*Lynchings of blacks triggered by alleged sexual assaults on white women were more commonly public lynchings in the period 1890–1915 compared to the period 1882–89.*

HYPOTHESIS 2.—*In the period 1890–1915, lynchings of whites triggered by alleged sexual assaults on white women were not predominantly public lynchings.*

In addition to these main event-level hypotheses, two subsidiary hypotheses follow from present theoretical and historical considerations. At all times whites perceived lethal or potentially lethal black-on-white attacks as seriously challenging their communal integrity and supremacy over blacks, whereas, conversely, they did not consider nonsexual and nonmurderous incidents, for example, black violations of informal interracial etiquette rules or property offenses, to carry implications for their communities as a whole but rather as affronts to particular whites (Brundage 1993). My third and fourth hypotheses are thus as follows:

HYPOTHESIS 3.—*Lynchings triggered by alleged lethal or potentially lethal black attacks on whites were more commonly public than private lynchings.*

HYPOTHESIS 4.—*Lynchings triggered by alleged nonsexual and nonmurderous black transgressions against whites were more commonly private than public lynchings.*

Community-Level Hypotheses

As Bailey and Snedker (2011) do not argue that southern Protestant churches as such orchestrated mob violence against blacks, I do not argue that the Democratic Party as such carried out lynchings. The focus here is to what extent and how white collective identity and solidarity mediated by the Democratic Party shaped the landscape of interracial relations and thus were conducive and responsive to the prevalence and form of white lethal mob violence against blacks. Hypotheses about these matters should

take into account that during the years 1890–1915, intergroup relations between southern whites and blacks moved toward the reimposition of institutionalized black subordination. Among the many aspects of the Jim Crow order emerging in this period, I will attend here particularly to the disfranchisement of blacks for two reasons. First, suffrage restrictions were contentious events that took place within a relatively short period of time with clear beginnings and ends in each southern state, making it apparent when they were happening and when they were concluded. Second, the franchise was the primary marker of citizenship and polity membership at large. The significance of suffrage thus extended beyond electoral politics to collectively endow blacks with a claim to power and equality with whites. In the minds of militant white supremacists, true white unity and supremacy could therefore occur only once the taint of blacks had been eliminated from the southern body politic. Disfranchisement therefore was not only about electoral politics but was a critical event affecting interracial group relations at large. We may therefore expect that the association between white collective identifications forged through the Democratic Party and lynchings in the pre-disfranchisement period was different than in the post-disfranchisement period.

What local group-level dynamics should, then, have led whites to enact their collective identity and solidarity in violent public display in the pre-disfranchisement period? Given the role of collective identifications and solidarities in intergroup conflict and given that they are unambiguously established only in observable action, white communities characterized by fragile or ambiguous cohesion should have been more likely than ones characterized by high levels of cohesion to stage collective violent performances in order to achieve a sense of unity and empowerment. Thus, before disfranchisement, conditions of low and intermediate collective white racial identity should have increased the likelihood of public lynching.[3] To the extent that political organization produced collective identity and solidarity among southern whites, the relative strength of the Democratic Party should have influenced the incidence of collective identity-building violence in the form of public lynching; we can formulate the following hypothesis:

HYPOTHESIS 5.—*The incidence of public lynchings before the implementation of disfranchisement was higher in localities with lower and intermediate levels of Democratic Party support than in localities with high levels of Democratic Party support.*

If disfranchisement and lynchings are viewed as part of the competitive electoral party politics of the post-Reconstruction South, then we would expect the implementation of the former to have reduced the latter because

[3] The operationalization of "low," "intermediate," and "high" levels of Democratic Party support is given below.

once blacks were politically neutralized, racial mob violence should have become an unnecessary form of repression (cf. Beck et al. 1989; Tolnay and Beck 1995). However, a broader perspective of post-Reconstruction politics as revolving around the alignment of racial groups leads to different expectations about the association between disfranchisement and lynching. The reason is that disfranchisement served not only to eliminate blacks' influence on southern politics but also to increase the salience of collective white racial identifications by, for one, legitimizing the beliefs, claims, and practices of extremist white supremacists and, for another, muting divisions among whites that could have jeopardized their unity and, in turn, their domination over blacks (Woodward 1951; Kousser 1974; Perman 2001; Redding 2003). To the extent that disfranchisement represented a critical event boosting race-based collective identification and mobilization among whites, the following hypothesis should hold true:

HYPOTHESIS 6.—*The incidence of public lynching was higher in places with than without disfranchisement.*

Similarly, if the enactment of disfranchisement affirmed the collective white beliefs, claims, and practices promoted by the Democratic Party by exercising the specter of "Negro domination" from southern life, whites would no longer have been compelled to come together in collective identity-building violence to dispel doubts about their cohesion. Rather, they would have used it as a vehicle for further expressing and entrenching their solidarity and power by demonstrating to themselves, as well as to blacks, their unity and "the ferocity of [their] determination to dominate" (Perman 2001, p. 269). Accordingly, we can formulate the following hypothesis:

HYPOTHESIS 7.—*The incidence of public lynchings after the implementation of disfranchisement was higher in localities with higher levels of Democratic Party support than in localities with lower and intermediate levels of Democratic Party support.*

With the institutionalization of white domination throughout the South, including the implementation of disfranchisement and legal segregation throughout the region, the race question had, for all intents and purposes, been solved by the mid-1910s. Furthermore, with the onset of the Great Migration, support for the most extreme practices of racial domination began to wane among southern whites (Tolnay and Beck 1995). Thus, to the extent that public lynchings figured into the rise of Jim Crow, they should have done so during its most formative years of 1890–1915, which leads to the following hypothesis:

HYPOTHESIS 8.—*The incidence of public lynchings in the period 1916–30 was unaffected by the strength of the Democratic Party.*[4]

[4] I am indebted to one of the *AJS* reviewers for suggesting that I pursue this line of analysis.

Assuming that collective identity is a group-level property that does not emerge from nor influence individual actors in automatic ways and that disfranchisement affected intergroup rather than interpersonal white-black relations leads to the following conjectures:

HYPOTHESIS 9.—*The incidence of private lynchings was not affected by the implementation of disfranchisement or associated with the strength of the Democratic Party either before or after the implementation of disfranchisement.*

Finally, the theoretical and substantive arguments developed here charge that public lynchings not only derived from but also forged the white collective identifications that lynchers invoked in their violent practices during the coming of Jim Crow. However, owing to their supposed social rather than collective identity-building character, private lynchings should not have had such group-level reverberations. Assuming that Democratic Party support mirrored collective white identity and solidarity, these arguments hold if we observe the following association:

HYPOTHESIS 10.—*Public but not private lynchings in the period 1888–1916 were followed by increasing support for the Democratic Party.*

DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODS

Setting

This study covers the southern states Georgia and Louisiana for the period 1882–1930. They were chosen because the available data on lynchings in these states are sufficiently detailed to allow moving beyond a unidimensional lynching concept. The online, full-text ProQuest Historical Newspapers database offers easy access to contemporary newspaper reports on lynchings in the *Atlanta Constitution*—the most important and widely read newspaper in Georgia at the time. Pfeifer's *Rough Justice: Lynching and American Society, 1874–1947* (2004) lists lynchings in Louisiana according to the same lynch mob typology on which the present coding of Georgia lynchings at root rests.[5] The geographical scope of the study is also justified on substantive grounds. While no one state can be seen as representative of the South as a whole, Georgia is "an obvious choice for a study of lynching: the character and harshness of white domination . . . became the measure of race relations in the Deep South. . . . The sheer scale of mob violence in Georgia alone commands attention" (Brundage 1993, pp. 15–16). Moreover, as Du Bois pointed out in the early 1900s, "not only is Georgia . . . the

[5] To achieve sampling consistency and data comparability across states, the few discrepancies between the Tolnay-Beck inventory and Pfeifer's listing were resolved in favor of the former.

geographical focus of our Negro population, but in many other respects, both now and yesterday, the Negro problems [i.e., the race question] have seemed to be centered in this State" (2003, p. 112). What is more, Georgia and Louisiana spanned all the major subregions of the South at the time in terms of demographic, economic, historical, and physiographic characteristics (Ayers 1992), which is methodologically important because as race relations varied across subregions, a study that does not include them all is liable to misleading results. There is thus little reason to suppose that the geographical scope of the study drives its results.

Lynching Data

This article draws on primary and secondary data augmenting parts of the comprehensive lynching inventory constructed by Tolnay and Beck (1995).[6] First, they include 39 white-on-black lynchings and 3 white-on-white lynchings in Georgia confirmed or discovered (as far as lynching inventories go) by either myself or E. M. Beck subsequent to the construction of the original inventory. I have also disconfirmed a couple of events that in light of newly discovered information should not be considered lynchings.[7] Second, each event is coded either as a "public" or "private" lynching. While relying on Pfeifer's (2004) classification of Louisiana lynchings, I coded all Georgia lynchings in the inventory on the basis of contemporary newspaper reports in the *Atlanta Constitution*.[8]

In view of the conceptual discussion above, all mobs reported as composed of more than 50 participants were coded as public lynchings.[9] So were mobs drawing participants from beyond the family and friends of the victim of the (real or imagined) precipitating black offense, indicated by descriptors of the mob as composed of the "community," "citizens," or "people" of a locality. Public lynchings also include incidents that involved ceremonial and ritualistic elements such as torture, mutilation, burning, collective shooting, or signs left near the site. Events in which the lynch

[6] In addition to Georgia and Louisiana, the Tolnay-Beck inventory includes Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee.

[7] A lynching is defined as an extralegal killing of at least one person by a mob of at least three people.

[8] Beck and Tolnay have generously shared their original research notes with me, and I have occasionally used them to complement the newspaper information. Lynching events with insufficient information for classification as either public or private were assigned to a third category of "unknown" and were not included in the analyses. This category includes 52 (<9%) of the total 598 white-on-black and 36 white-on-white lynchings taking place during the time covered by the analyses in this article.

[9] The lower limit of 50 participants was chosen to assure consistency with Brundage's (1993) operationalization. Using 30 participants as a cutoff does not affect the results reported here.

victim was brought to and killed at the scene of his alleged crime, brought before the victim of his alleged crime for public identification, or given the opportunity to publicly confess his alleged crime before being killed were likewise coded as public lynchings. Events involving white bands (posses) pursuing and killing blacks accused of serious crimes against whites were designated public lynchings. Events for which the newspaper information suggests that black victims were killed by smaller white parties in or near the victims' homes or other nonpublic settings, for example, forests or swamps, were coded as private lynchings. Killings of blacks by similarly sized mobs in more public places but without indication of the kind of ceremonial or ritualistic elements described above were considered private lynchings as well.

After transforming the listing and classification of Georgia lynchings in Brundage (1993) and Louisiana lynchings in Pfeifer (2004) into the present twofold lynching typology, I assessed the reliability of the coding procedure by calculating Cohen's kappa (κ) measure of intercoder reliability. The kappa for Georgia lynchings classified by both me and Brundage ($N = 250$) is $\kappa = .89$ ($P > .00$). On the basis of newspaper articles in the *Times-Picayune* (collected through the database Early American Newspapers, Series III) I coded 146 Louisiana lynchings also classified by Pfeifer, yielding a kappa score of $\kappa = .84$ ($P > .00$). These kappa levels represent in terms of conventional standards almost perfect intercoder agreement (Landis and Koch 1977).

Measurements

Collective white identity.—The Democratic Party was the organizational backbone of white supremacy at the time, and the community-level salience of collective white racial identifications is measured here in terms of the percentage of votes cast in a county in favor of the Democratic candidate in presidential elections (cf. Raper 1933; Pope and Ragin 1977; Tolnay and Beck 1995; Hagen, Makovi, and Bearman 2013).[10] Values for interelection years were calculated by linear interpolation. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the county-level percentage of Democratic votes in presidential elections from 1888 to 1928. The table shows that the Democratic Party generally enjoyed high levels of support in these elections; at no time did it receive less than an average of 60% of the votes. But it also shows that its support varied considerably across counties in a given election as well as across elections. The county-level correlation between Democratic returns in a given election and the immediately preceding elec-

[10] This measure draws on information in the data set "Electoral Data for Counties in the United States: Presidential and Congressional Races, 1840–1972" (Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale 2006).

TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics for County-Level Democratic Vote Returns in Presidential Elections, 1888–1928

Election Year	Mean	SD	Correlation[a]
1888	74.54	18.30	.66
1892	63.13	19.50	.30
1896	64.22	19.67	.57
1900	71.70	16.62	.66
1904	71.75	18.81	.81
1908	63.10	20.11	.92
1912	77.74	14.42	.46
1916	82.82	14.18	.75
1920	74.48	18.70	.82
1924	78.20	13.31	.74
1928	66.82	17.75	.48

[a] Reports correlation with preceding election.

tion particularly illustrates the local-level volatility in Democratic support in the South in this period. Thus, although fairly stable at high levels in the aggregate, the Democratic vote displays sufficiently broad local-level variation within as well as across elections to be a sociologically meaningful indicator as well as to avert concerns regarding adequate model parameter identification.

As discussed above, disfranchisement was meant not only to eliminate African-Americans from the polls but also to promote white group identity and solidarity. In order to assess whether its introduction affected the dynamics between collective white racial identity, as measured by the Democratic Party vote share, and lynching, I apply a strategy for specifying statistical models with interaction terms with a categorical modifying variable proposed by Brambor, Clark, and Goldner (2006). The modifying variable of interest here is disfranchisement, which was implemented in Louisiana in 1898 and in Georgia in 1908,[11] and assuming a one-year delay in its potential effect (Tolnay and Beck 1995), I created pre-disfranchisement and post-disfranchisement period dummy variables for each state. The pre-disfranchisement dummy takes the value one in 1890–1908 and zero in 1909–15 for Georgia observations and the value one in 1890–98 and zero in 1899–1915 for Louisiana observations. The post-disfranchisement dummy conversely takes the value zero in 1890–1908 and one in 1909–15 for Georgia

[11] Determining the year of disfranchisement in Louisiana is straightforward because the state passed a poll tax, a literacy test, and a property test in the same year. Determining the year of disfranchisement in Georgia is somewhat less clear-cut because it introduced a poll tax already in 1877, whereas a literacy test, a property test, an understanding clause, and a grandfather clause were introduced in 1908. Following previous work (Beck et al. 1989; Tolnay and Beck 1995; cf. Kousser 1974), I find it most reasonable to consider 1908 the year of disfranchisement in Georgia.

observations and the value zero in 1890–98 and one in 1899–1915 for Louisiana observations. I thereafter generated interaction terms by multiplying the pre- and post-disfranchisement dummies with the linear and quadratic collective white identity measures.

Two things should be noted. First, a model including these four interaction terms along with the post-disfranchisement dummy is analogous to a model including the linear and quadratic measures of white racial identity, their (in total two) interaction terms with the post-disfranchisement dummy, and the post-disfranchisement dummy. The advantage of the present model specification is that directly estimating linear and quadratic coefficients for collective white racial identity in the pre- as well as post-disfranchisement period simplifies the calculation of marginal effects of collective white racial identity on lynchings in each period. Second, as voting laws were implemented at the state level, the pre- and post-disfranchisement dummy variables do not vary across counties within the same state. There is consequently no variation in these variables before Louisiana implemented disfranchisement in 1898 or after Georgia did so in 1908; their only variation is found in the period 1899–1908. The inclusion of the disfranchisement dummy variable in model estimations thus does not capture temporal but spatial lynching patterns, that is, whether lynching was more or less likely in places with than without voting restrictions.

Control variables.—The multivariate analyses (described in more detail below) include a number of variables controlling for economic and demographic conditions that may have influenced white mob violence against blacks: linear and quadratic terms of black population concentration (in percentage), the natural logarithm of absolute black population size (in 1,000s), average farm size (in acres), percentage of improved farmland devoted to cotton production, and percentage of farm ownership (values in intercensal years for all continuous control variables were calculated by linear interpolation).[12] The analyses also include the cumulative number of previous lynchings of opposite type to gauge whether different forms of interracial violence affected one another. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for all control variables in 1890–1915 and 1916–30.

Statistical Methods

Event-history analysis.—The first set of analyses uses simple contingency tables to assess event-level associations between precipitating situational triggers of lynchings and the character of the ensuing mob violence. The second set employs Cox event-history models to ascertain the associ-

[12] These variables are based on information in Haines (2006) and U.S. Bureau of the Census (1913, 1922).

TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables in 1890–1915 and 1916–30

	Mean	SD
1890–1915:		
% black	45.68	21.80
Ln black population (1,000s)	1.50	1.20
Average farm size	130.27	77.72
% farms owned	44.14	19.83
% farmland devoted to cotton	29.19	15.87
No. prior private lynchings	.74	1.08
No. prior public lynchings	.81	1.08
1916–30:		
% black	40.70	20.10
Ln black population (1,000s)	1.62	1.24
Average farm size	96.38	51.04
% farms owned	40.06	19.07
% farmland devoted to cotton	26.52	15.60
No. prior private lynchings	1.24	1.41

ation between the local permeability of white racial collective identity and different lynching types. On the basis of partial likelihood methods, Cox models require no assumptions regarding the underlying distribution of time durations until event occurrence. By leaving the particular distributional form of duration times unspecified, Cox models impose fewer restrictions on model specification and estimation and are therefore preferable to alternative parametric event-history models, which require that assumptions, which are often of secondary or no substantive importance to the relationship between the predictors and outcome variables under consideration, about the nature of duration times be made (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).

Cox models furthermore allow for model diagnostics currently unavailable for parametric models regarding identifying and accommodating violations of the "proportional hazards" assumption, which requires that covariate effects remain constant relative to time. A violation of this assumption means that the effect of a covariate differs between time points, and models incorrectly fitted under conditions of nonproportionality are liable to misspecification and biased estimates. All models in this study were therefore tested for violations of the proportional hazards assumption and evidence thereof remedied by estimation of a subsequent expanded model including an interaction term between the offending covariate(s) and the natural logarithm of time elapsed from the beginning of the study period (further technical details are given in Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn [2002]).

Another advantage of the Cox modeling approach for present purposes is offering a strategy for dealing with unobserved heterogeneity arising from

counties experiencing multiple lynchings of a particular type during the study period. The problem of unobserved heterogeneity due to event reoccurrence is akin to autocorrelation in traditional regression analysis by overestimating the amount of information in the data, leading to possibly biased estimates and incorrect inferences. Cox models can adjust for this problem by stratifying estimations according to event sequence rank—that is, first lynching, second lynching, and so on—and using robust variance estimation of standard errors by clustering estimations on the county units of analysis (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002). Without taking into account the actual order of multiple events within a county in such a fashion, model estimations, furthermore, proceed as if a county could have experienced all lynchings in its sequence at all times. That is, a model that ignores the order of lynchings is estimated as if later events could have happened before earlier events, whereas estimation by rank-order stratification preserves the actual event sequence.

Cox models leverage temporal dynamics by including time-varying covariates whose values change during the span of the investigation. As is conventional and as this study specifies event times in terms of dates, the lynching event data were "split" to generate one observation per county for each date a lynching of a particular type took place. As the values of covariates are measured on a yearly basis, each observation was then assigned the covariate values of its associated county in the year the lynching occurred. In other words, the analyses reported below are based on multiple data sets—one for each lynching type and time period—with multiple observations per county containing relevant covariate information, as well as a binary (outcome) variable indicating whether or not it was the county in which the lynching actually took place. Table 3 gives a sense of the data structure and includes a portion of the data used in model 3 predicting

TABLE 3
Data Excerpt for Clay County, Georgia, 1908–9

	Previous Lynchings		
Date	Public	Private	Event Indicator
2/26/1908 . . .	2	1	0
7/26/1908 . . .	2	1	0
8/9/1908	2	1	0
8/25/1908 . . .	2	1	0
9/22/1908 . . .	2	1	1
10/11/1908 . . .	2	2	0
4/9/1909	2	2	0
6/19/1909 . . .	2	2	0
6/24/1909 . . .	2	2	0
7/2/1909	2	2	0
7/30/1909 . . .	2	2	0

private lynching from 1890 to 1915. The table displays selected data for Clay County, Georgia, for 1908 and 1909, and, comprising 11 observations, it shows that private lynchings took place in either Georgia or Louisiana on 11 different days in that two-year period. As the event indicator as well as the value for "previous private lynchings" for the observation of September 22, 1908, is one, it shows that a private lynching took place in Clay that day and that the county had experienced one private lynching before then. At the time of this lynching, Clay County was therefore in the second rank-order stratum for private lynchings and after that accordingly placed in the third stratum.

The dynamism of Cox models, furthermore, allows for incorporating new units into the analysis as they are created. For while most counties enter into model estimations at the beginning of each study period, some counties were created at later points and therefore not included until their creation. This way of handling new counties is preferable to the typical procedure in longitudinal county-level studies of using "county cluster" composed of all counties involved in the formation of a particular new county. This is so because southern life during this period was highly localistic. Accordingly, there is widespread agreement that counties represent meaningful sociospatial units whereas county clusters do not and that using geographical units larger than necessary should be avoided (cf. Hagen et al. 2013).

Model estimations use one-year lagged rather than current-year covariate values in order to avoid simultaneity problems between event occurrences and temporal changes in independent variables (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). The covariate values of new counties were accordingly calculated by initially assigning a newly created county the average value of each covariate across its counties of origin in the year before creation. Values in years between the year before creation and the next census were then approximated by linear interpolation. The one exception to this procedure is absolute black population size, which was calculated by dividing the total black population in counties of origin by the number of counties of origin plus one. The addition is necessary as the total black population in relevant counties after the creation of the new county otherwise would exceed the total before its creation. In order to preserve the historicity of the data, a new county was similarly assigned a value indicating the number of private and public lynchings it had experienced at the time of its creation, as it were, by averaging the total number of each type (rounded to the next integer) that had taken place up until then within the counties from which it was created.

Dynamic panel data analysis.—In order to investigate to what extent different lynching types affected levels of collective white racial identity during the rise of Jim Crow, I fit a number of dynamic panel data models using

county-election-year observations for the period 1888–1916. The dependent variable in these models is white racial collective identity as measured by the Democratic vote percentage in election years, and the key predictors are the number of public and private lynchings within certain time intervals before elections. The reason for using dynamic rather than static panel data models is that the argument under consideration concerns changes in more than levels of white collective identity as a result of racial mob violence (cf. Koçak and Carroll 2008). Furthermore, as indicated in table 1, it is not unreasonable to assume that the Democratic vote percentage was subjected to an autoregressive process in the sense that the outcome in one election to a certain extent was influenced by the outcome in the previous election. In addition to contemporaneous (election) year values of the economic and demographic control variables described earlier, a state dummy variable, and election year dummy variables, these models accordingly include the first lag of the dependent variable as a covariate. And to assess whether the impact of racial mob violence varied across levels of collective white racial identity, the models include interaction terms between the number of public and private lynchings, respectively, and the first lag of the dependent variable.

The inclusion of lagged values of the outcome variable as a covariate for the purpose of accounting for autoregressive processes makes ordinary least squares estimates biased and inconsistent because lagged dependent variable values are correlated with the error term. This correlation can be purged by exploiting the panel structure of the data to obtain instrumental variables. Present models employ the system generalized method of moments (GMM) instrumental variable panel estimator, which is more efficient than the two-stage least-squares estimator (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998; the advantages of the GMM estimator over other estimators are discussed in Wawro [2002]), as well as the Arellano-Bond variance estimator, which is robust to cross-section heteroscedasticity (Arellano and Bond 1991). The models presented below use the following instruments: all first-difference lags for all independent variables, all lags beyond the first lag of the dependent variable, and all lagged differences of the dependent variable. The systems GMM estimator requires that there is no serial correlation in first-differenced errors at the second and higher orders, and diagnostics using the Arellano-Bond test of autocorrelation in first-differenced errors did not indicate violations of this assumption for any model presented here.

LYNCHING AND THE COLOR LINE

Table 4 cross-classifies lynchings according to situational precipitants and mob types in 1882–89 and 1890–1915 and shows in line with our expectations in hypotheses 3 and 4 that lethal mob violence following on mur-

TABLE 4
LYNCHINGS OF BLACKS BY TYPE AND ALLEGED OFFENSE, 1882–89 AND 1890–1915

	1882–89			1890–1915		
ALLEGED OFFENSE	Private (%)	Public (%)	Total (%)	Private (%)	Public (%)	Total (%)
Sexual assault	49	51	100	34	66	100
	(20)	(21)	(41)	(49)	(95)	(144)
Murder and attempted murder	33	67	100	33	67	100
	(4)	(8)	(12)	(51)	(105)	(156)
Other	86	14	100	76	24	100
	(18)	(3)	(21)	(51)	(16)	(67)
Total	57	43	100	41	59	100
	(42)	(32)	(74)	(151)	(216)	(367)
Pearson χ^2		10.92**			41.46**	
df		2			2	

NOTE.—Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of observations.
$P < .05$ (two-tailed test).
$P < .01$.

ders and attempted murders was more likely public than private lynchings, whereas the opposite holds for nonsexual and nonlethal assaults, in both periods. More importantly, the data bear out the prediction of hypothesis 1 that patterns of lethal mob violence responding to black men (allegedly) sexually assaulting white females in the period before 1890 diverged from patterns in the period after.[13]

As displayed more clearly in table 5, lethal mob violence following on such allegations in the latter period was significantly more likely to take the form of public than private lynchings, whereas in the earlier period it was as likely to take either form. Even though lynchings related to interracial sex surely occurred before 1890, whites thus did not demonstrate the same kind of public concern about them before the rise of extremist white supremacy. Public white understanding of lynching in the latter period was so heavily centered on the rape of white women by black men that it mattered little that lethal mob violence against blacks associated with alleged sexual assaults was as common as, or even slightly less common than, violence associated with murderous assaults.

While based on a comparatively small sample of events, table 6 confirms hypothesis 2 that white-on-white lynchings in the period 1890–1915 did not exhibit the same patterns as white-on-black lynchings but were predominantly private affairs even when related to sexual assaults, or murderous assaults for that matter. That a white mob killing a white person accused of sexually assaulting a white woman was more typically composed

[13] These results are not sensitive to alternative temporal cutoff points. Using 1888 or 1892 as a cut point instead of 1890 yields substantively similar results.

TABLE 5
PUBLIC LYNCHINGS OF BLACKS PRECIPITATED BY ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT, BY TIME PERIOD

	Lynching Type		
Time Period	Private (%)	Public (%)	Total (%)
1882–89	49	51	100
	(20)	(21)	(41)
1890–1915	34	66	100
	(49)	(95)	(144)
Total	37	63	100
	(69)	(116)	(185)
Pearson χ^2	2.97**		
df	1		

NOTE.—Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of observations.
$P < .05$ (two-tailed test).
$P < .01$.

of her kin and kith than the broader white community reflects that such a mob was driven by different concerns than mobs lynching black men similarly accused.

Always a powerful mechanism for establishing intergroup social boundaries, the regulation of intergroup sexuality takes on further significance in cases in which races are understood as discrete groups rooted in biology so as to safeguard racial purity. Indeed, the implementation and maintenance of sexual boundaries and practices in such circumstances are, to a certain extent, what makes a racial group a racial group (Jacobson 1998). These event-level analyses reveal in that regard how whites' conceptions of and actions toward blacks changed toward the end of the 19th century as symbolic racial boundaries and categories contrasting the purity and innocence of white female sexuality with the impurity and menace of black male sexuality took

TABLE 6
LYNCHINGS OF WHITES BY TYPE AND ALLEGED OFFENSE, 1890–1915

	Lynching Type		
Alleged Offense	Private (%)	Public (%)	Total (%)
Sexual assault	83	17	100
	(5)	(1)	(6)
Murder and attempted murder	67	33	100
	(12)	(6)	(18)
Other	100	0	100
	(7)	(0)	(7)
Total	77	23	100
	(24)	(7)	(31)

NOTE.—Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of observations. Fisher's exact test = 0.221.

hold. A rally point for collectively upholding the sanctity of white womanhood, public lynchings thus brought whites together unlike anything else, and its brute materiality—leaving tortured, burned, mutilated, or otherwise destroyed black bodies in their wake—forcefully aligned whites' ways of seeing with their ways of acting. The hunting down, capturing, and killing of black men accused of sexually assaulting white females served to palpably stigmatize blacks, thereby turning symbolic representations of African-Americans into a social boundary fundamentally shaping racial inequality in following decades. "Sex," as Myrdal notes in *An American Dilemma*, "[is] . . . the principle around which the whole structure of segregation . . . — down to disfranchisement and denial of equal opportunities on the labor market—is organized. . . . Sexual segregation is the most pervasive form of segregation, and the concern about 'race purity' is, in a sense, basic" (1944, pp. 587, 606).

LYNCHING AND COLLECTIVE WHITE RACIAL IDENTITY

Lynching from Collective White Identity

Table 7 presents a number of Cox models assessing the association between conditions of collective white racial identity proxied by Democratic Party support and different lynching types.[14] Model 1 evaluates whether, as hypothesized above, the impact of collective white racial identity on public lynching was shaped by larger institutional developments in the emerging Jim Crow order and varied between the pre- and post-disfranchisement periods. Model 1, at first glance, does not give much reason to think that collective white racial identity had any impact on public lynchings in the earlier period as both the linear and quadratic effect coefficients are statistically insignificant, whereas they are statistically significant in the later period. This inference is, however, premature because the size and statistical significance of linear and quadratic coefficients cannot be interpreted separately as unconditional effects but must be evaluated jointly at relevant values of the covariate in question (Brambor et al. 2006). Figure 2 therefore graphically displays marginal effects of low (one SD below its mean), in-

[14] In supplementary analyses, I assessed whether different lynch mob types may have been driven by the pool of potential white participants rather than collective white racial identity. I did so by substituting absolute white population size for absolute black population size in model estimations. The analyses did not produce results substantively different from what is presented here. Drawing on information in Haines (2006), at the suggestion of one *AJS* reviewer, I also assessed to what extent past racial oppression was predictive of different lynching types by estimating models including the percentage of slaves of the total population in 1860. These analyses did not yield substantively or statistically significant results (the results of these supplementary analyses are available on request).

TABLE 7
Cox Models for Public and Private Lynchings of Blacks

	Model 1: Public Lynchings, 1890–1915	Model 2: Public Lynchings, 1916–30	Model 3: Private Lynchings, 1890–1915
Collective white racial identity		.022	
		(.015)	
Collective white racial identity, pre-disfranchisement	.040		.010
	(.040)		(.013)
Collective white racial identity squared, pre-disfranchisement	−.001		
	(.000)		
Collective white racial identity, post-disfranchisement	−.101*		.013
	(.043)		(.022)
Collective white racial identity squared, post-disfranchisement	.001*		
	(.000)		
Disfranchisement dummy	4.91**		−1.74
	(1.76)		(1.18)
% black	.039+	.136*	.008
	(.024)	(.065)	(.032)
% black squared	−.001+	−.001*	−.000
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
ln black population (1,000s)	.386**	.277	.414**
	(.145)	(.192)	(.143)
Average farm size	.000	−.011*	.003**
	(.001)	(.005)	(.001)
% farms owned	.011	.025+	−.004
	(.008)	(.015)	(.010)
% cotton farmland	.017*	−.002	.007
	(.008)	(.016)	(.010)
No. prior opposite type lynchings	−.049	.097	.130+
	(.080)	(.099)	(.074)
% black × ln(t)			.034**
			(.011)
% black^2 × ln(t)			−.000+
			(.000)

Note.—Numbers in parentheses are robust SEs clustered on county. Models include an unreported state dummy variable.
+ $P < .10$, two-tailed tests.
* $P < .05$.
** $P < .01$.

termediate (its mean), and high (one SD above its mean) levels of Democratic Party strength on public lynchings in the pre- and post-disfranchisement periods.[15]

[15] Figure 2 applies one-tailed statistical tests of significance as the direction of the marginal effect of collective white racial identity on public lynchings is predicted to be positive.



FIG. 2.—Marginal effects of white collective identity on public lynchings at high (solid line), intermediate (dashed line), and low (square dotted line) levels of white collective identity in the pre-Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction periods.

From figure 2 we see that the marginal effect of collective white racial identity was strongest (and statistically significant) at lower and intermediate levels in the pre-disfranchisement period and at higher levels in the post-disfranchisement period. These results are consistent with our expectations considering the importance of group solidarity in intergroup conflict. As discussed earlier, in order for one group to dominate another, it cannot doubt its own cohesion and strength, which are most unequivocally established in observable collective group action (Gould 2003; Collins 2004). Insofar, the results support the fifth hypothesis that in the pre-disfranchisement South where white domination had not yet been firmly reestablished, conditions of ambiguous collective white racial identity, captured by low and intermediate levels of Democratic vote share, influenced whites to enact community solidarity and empowerment through public lynchings, whereas whites in settings with a comparatively entrenched collective racial identity, captured by high levels of Democratic vote share, were not similarly compelled to assert racial solidarity and power in public lynchings. These

Using the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles instead of the mean and values one standard deviation above and one standard deviation below the mean of Democratic vote share does not produce results substantively different from the one presented in fig. 2.

results conform to Bailey and Snedker's (2011) argument that contexts in which the collective cohesion among whites was threatened were conducive to mob violence and suggest that the force of public lynchings in southern race relations partly lay in agitating a collective racial identity that let whites create a sense of certainty and power out of perceived uncertainty and powerlessness before the institutionalization of Jim Crow (cf. Garland 2005).

If public lynching had been directly related to competitive electoral politics, it should arguably have been more common in the absence, not in the presence, of disfranchisement. In light of the broader view of politics taken here as involving the alignment of groups in contention and the coercive power relationships between them, the positive and significant coefficient for the post-disfranchisement dummy variable, showing that public lynchings were more likely in places with than without formal suffrage restrictions, confirms the expectation of hypothesis 6 that disfranchisement was a "critical event" brightening the interracial social boundary and collective white racial identity on which Jim Crow rested and altering the circumstances of collective white mobilization against blacks. That disfranchisement promoted race-based solidarity and mobilization among whites is further emphasized by the finding that higher levels of collective white racial identity, as embodied in higher levels of Democratic Party vote share, had larger (and statistically significant) marginal effects on public lynching in the post-disfranchisement period. Confirming hypothesis 7, this finding is in line with arguments that the implementation of disfranchisement by southern governments legitimized the beliefs, claims, and practices of extremist white supremacy, particularly reinforcing racial social boundaries and muting divisions among whites that could otherwise have put their racial unity and domination at risk (Woodward 1951; Kousser 1974; Perman 2001; Redding 2003). Thus, rather than functional substitutes, formal measures of racial domination such as disfranchisement and informal ones such as public lynchings complemented each other in enacting and promoting white group solidarity and power by pressing blacks "into service as a sectional scapegoat in the reconciliation of estranged white classes and the reunion of the Solid South" (Woodward 1974, p. 82; cf. Garland 2005). That model 2 does not indicate any association between the collective white racial identity channeled through the Democratic Party and public lynching in the period 1916–30 confirms the expectation formulated in hypothesis 8 that public lynchings figured into the activation and maintenance of racial group boundaries and identities most conspicuously during the rise of Jim Crow in the period 1890–1915 (as preliminary exploratory analyses showed no indication of a nonlinear association between the focal independent variable and the outcome variable, the model includes the former only as a linear pre-

dictor). Thus, as both Jim Crow and public lynching served to symbolize as well as substantialize white domination in the solid South, once the foundational racial categories, boundaries, and identities of the former were firmly established by the mid-1910s, it was no longer necessary for southern whites to enact community solidarity and empowerment in communal violence against a marginalized black population.

That private lynchings bore no statistically discernible association with the strength of the Democratic Party in the pre-disfranchisement or the post-disfranchisement period is consistent with hypothesis 9 and the view that collective identity is a group-level phenomenon that does not affect individuals or interpersonal dynamics in direct mechanical ways (again, as preliminary exploratory analyses showed no signs of nonlinearity in the association between the focal independent variable and the outcome, the model includes the former only as a linear predictor). As such, that private lynchings were unaffected by the implementation of voting restrictions confirms that disfranchisement primarily disempowered blacks as a group and empowered whites as a group (Perman 2001) and did not represent the type of cue whites could use to get an edge on blacks on the interpersonal level (cf. Gould 2003).

Model 3 provides evidence that a "spillover effect" was in effect from one type of lethal mob violence to the other in that the number of previous public lynchings positively and significantly predicted private lynchings in 1890–1915, but not, as indicated by model 1, vice versa. This result is best viewed in light of the fact that public lynching was the form of violence that above and beyond everything else caught the attention of white and black southerners alike. Private lynchings in contrast neither were clearly set apart from other more mundane forms of interracial violence at the time nor always met with white community approval. This indicates that public lynchings created an atmosphere in which whites felt authorized to seek resolution to primarily personal or familial conflicts with blacks by lethal interpersonal violence (cf. Brundage 1993; Garland 2005).

Finally, the results for the control variables are consistent with earlier studies. The rate of public as well as private lynchings was positively and nonlinearly associated with relative black population size, an association showing signs of nonproportionality in the case of private lynchings. (As this association is of secondary importance here, it will not be discussed further; but for the reader's information, its temporal development is detailed in table A1 in the appendix.) The likelihood of both lynching types furthermore increased with larger absolute black populations, whereas overall local farm ownership conditions were not predictive of either type in the period 1890–1915, but positively associated with public lynchings in the period 1916–30. The models reveal some noteworthy differences across lynching types. First, in the period 1890–1915, private lynching grew more likely as

average farm size increased, indicating the presence of wealthier planters with larger landholdings, while public lynchings seem insensitive to such conditions. This suggests that private lynchings to a greater extent than public lynchings directly served as a means of black rural labor force control. This impression is further strengthened by model 3, showing that public lynchings grew less likely with increasing average farm sizes in the period 1916–30, because the agricultural labor shortages resulting from the Great Migration prompted southern planters, as well as other civic leaders, for example, journalists, politicians, and industrialists, to publicly speak out against the most extreme forms of interracial violence. Second, the more cotton farming dominated the local agricultural economy in the period 1890–1915, the more common public but not private lynching. This result resonates with the argument above, as well as that of previous research, that blacks were particularly vulnerable to interracial mob violence where an interclass community of interest prevailed among whites. And the more dominant cotton production, the more white landlords needed to exercise labor control and the stronger the competition on landless whites from blacks for land and agricultural employment opportunities. Thus, common material stakes in suppressing rural blacks served as a social resource for whites to mobilize in collective violence against blacks. That cotton farming was no longer associated with public lynching after 1915 is therefore unsurprising considering its diminishing role in southern agriculture as well as the above-mentioned waning support for mob violence against blacks (Tolnay and Beck 1995).

Collective White Identity from Lynching

In order to bring the analyses full circle and explore to what extent lethal mob violence against blacks forged collective racial identifications, I fit dynamic panel data models assessing the impact of public and private lynchings, respectively, on local white collective racial identifications measured as the percentage of Democratic votes in presidential elections of 1888–1916. As discussed earlier, these models include in addition to election year dummy variables the same control variables as the event-history models above. However, as the purpose of these models is to investigate whether collective white racial identity was responsive to different lynching types, which does not necessitate detailed analyses of the controls, in the interest of economizing on space, only the estimates for focal independent variables are reported here (full model results are available on request). If we turn to table 8, in line with our expectations, as formulated in hypothesis 10, we find evidence that the number of public lynchings increased collective white racial identity; it has a positive and statistically significant effect on Democratic Party share of votes across all time intervals, an effect that, as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient for its interaction with

TABLE 8
Dynamic Panel Data Models Estimates of the Effect of Public and Private Lynchings on Collective White Racial Identity, 1888–1916

	Time Interval		
	Four Years	Two Years	One Year
No. public lynchings	30.56**	32.15**	41.21**
	(5.47)	(9.76)	(12.10)
No. public lynchings × collective white racial identity$_{t-1}$	−.36**	−.39**	−.53**
	(.07)	(.13)	(.17)
No. private lynchings	−3.50	5.92	5.39
	(10.19)	(12.38)	(17.78)
No. private lynchings × collective white racial identity$_{t-1}$	.04	−.08	−.14
	(.12)	(.15)	(.21)

Note.—Nos. in parentheses are robust SEs clustered on county.
+ $P < .10$, two-tailed tests.
* $P < .05$.
** $P < .01$.

lagged values of the dependent variable, grew weaker at comparatively higher levels of extant collective white racial identity.

As the size and statistical significance of linear and quadratic coefficients of a covariate cannot be treated as unconditional effects but need to be treated as conditional effects and evaluated jointly at relevant values of the covariate, the constitutive terms of interaction terms do not capture the unconditional effect of each term (Brambor et al. 2006). In order to properly gauge the effect of the number of public lynchings in the dynamic panel data models presented in table 8, we must calculate its marginal effects conditional on different one-period-lagged values of collective white racial identity. Using the same cutoff points to determine low, intermediate, and high levels of collective white racial identity as in figure 2, figure 3*A* graphically displays these marginal effects and shows that the effect of public lynchings was significantly positive at comparatively lower and intermediate, but not higher, lagged levels of collective white racial identity across all time intervals. In other words, these results show that public lynchings enhanced white group solidarity and cohesion in contexts in which collective white identifications were emerging but less so where they were more well entrenched. This partly confirms our expectations in hypothesis 10 and thus suggests that public lynchings not only expressed collective white identifications but also forged them by shaping understandings and experiences of the "true" nature of race relations and of "what it meant and how it felt to be a white Southerner" (Garland 2005, p. 821). Taken together with above-reported findings regarding under which conditions of white collective identity



FIG. 3.—Marginal effects of number of public and private lynchings on white racial collective identity, 1888–1916, at high (solid line), intermediate (dashed line), and low (square dotted line) one-period-lagged levels of white collective identity.

public lynchings were most common, the following observation by Hale certainly rings true: "[Public lynching was] a ritual that both *brought out* and *created* the white community" (1998, p. 211; emphasis added).

Going back to table 8, the results from the models of the effect of private lynchings on white collective racial identity appear consistent with expectations that this type of intergroup violence was not conducive to collective white identity; the terms for its linear coefficient and its interaction with lagged levels of collective white racial identity do not in any case approach statistical significance. In fact, as figure 3*B* shows, the marginal effect of the number of lynchings occurring in the one-year interval before measure points is statistically significant and negative at high levels of collective white racial identity. As I have noted, the Democratic Party was an important arena for in-group policing, and not all white violence against blacks met with community approval but occasionally aroused the ire of other whites. These findings indicate that private lynchings in some instances made simmering intrawhite tensions manifest, leading to decreasing levels of racial cohesion in ways registered by the current measure of collective white identity. Insofar, the results further reflect the Democratic Party as a central context wherein and wherethrough the norms of the white community were established and enforced.

CONCLUDING DISCUSSION

The title of this article, referring to "making race" by "doing violence," intends to direct attention to how interracial violence can feed off as well as into the articulation of symbolic boundaries representing the meanings of categories such as "white" and "black," the creation of social boundaries establishing how those signified by such categories relate and behave toward each other, and the formation of solidary race-based collectives with common purposes and the capacity for concerted action. The article establishes in that regard, for one thing, that as dominant white conceptions of race took an extremist turn around 1890, mob violence linked to interracial sexuality increasingly took the form of public lynchings, serving to violently construct and police the color line by transforming symbolic representations of blacks into a social boundary of stigma and exclusion. For another, public lynchings but not private lynchings were expressive as well as generative of the collective white racial identity mobilized through the discursive and relational context provided by the Democratic Party.

These findings have a number of implications. First, they establish that the term "lynching" subsumes different forms of intergroup violence into an undifferentiated concept obscuring the heterogeneity of racial violence in the post-Reconstruction South. They accordingly strengthen the case for conceptual disaggregation in the study of racial (as well as ethnic and na-

tionalist) violence, that is to say, to treat such violence as reflecting qualitatively different processes of genesis and consequence, not as something varying in degrees alone (Brubaker and Laitin 1998). Second, the article marks insofar an important step forward in lynching scholarship because as foreseen by Creech, Corzine, and Huff-Corzine, "Until more precise distinctions between lynchings can be made on a systematic basis, the conclusions reached by researchers are tentative at best" (1989, p. 630). By elevating Brundage's descriptive lynch mob typology into a heuristic device for yielding generalizable theoretical and statistical findings as well as confirming the main conclusions of previous scholarship, the charge of this study therefore decidedly has not been to refute previous research but to suggest lines of analysis entertaining the role of sociocultural as well as material factors in developing a synthesis of the lynching phenomenon. To that end, lynching can be viewed as one aspect of the developments leading up to the system of Jim Crow, which, in turn, can be understood as a system of durable racial inequality founded on black economic dispossession, political disempowerment, and social degradation. Jim Crow society was based on reestablishing the unequal categorical pair of "white" and "black," as well as forging common racial understandings and commitments among whites. And as we have seen, public lynchings were expressive of as well as conducive to such understandings and commitments. With their self-conscious communality, ritualism, and symbolism, enacted not for particular individuals but for, as well as by, whites as a group, public lynchings gave authority to a particular racial ideology and imprinted onto the social order the symbolic racial boundaries, categories, and identities that were to govern southern white-black relations for decades to come.

Like all systems of durable inequality, Jim Crow did not rest solely on hierarchical categorical distinctions but also on the stable unequal allocation of material resources and opportunities along categorical lines (Tilly 1998; Massey 2007). Recalling that intergroup violence allows for multiple interpretations across audiences, the social control function at the heart of accounts of lynching emphasizing its role in economically oppressing rural blacks may thus be specified in terms of the durable inequality engendering mechanisms of exploitation and opportunity hoarding. On the one hand, lynching played into exploitation processes by disciplining the large black labor force within the southern agricultural system wherein rent-based economic advantage obtained monumentally to white landlords, planters, and merchants at the expense of impoverished black farm tenants and sharecroppers. On the other, it served purposes of opportunity hoarding by reducing competition from rural blacks to lower-to-middling-class whites by intimidating them to surrender land and tenancy opportunities (Tolnay and Beck 1995).

Third, and finally, by establishing how political institutional conditions and developments interacted with public lynchings to transform the visions of extremist white supremacy promoted by the Democratic Party into social reality in the form of Jim Crow, the article provides insights into the dynamics of what McVeigh has called "right-wing" mobilization. That is, the mobilization of "relatively advantaged groups with the goal of preserving, restoring, and expanding [their] rights and privileges . . . [and] deny[ing] similar rights and privileges to other groups in society" (2009, p. 32). This work thereby not only sheds further light on a particular aspect of the violent history of U.S. race relations but adds to a growing body of research emphasizing how racial inequalities, whether in the past or present, cannot be properly understood apart from processes of racial category, boundary, and identity formation (for a review of this literature, see McDermott and Samson [2005]). In doing so, it offers clues to the results of a number of recent studies documenting an empirical link between patterns of lynching in the decades around 1900 and current oppressive racial practices on the local (county) level. These studies include investigations into white supremacist hate groups (Durso and Jacobs 2013; see also Cunningham and Phillips 2007), interracial homicide (Messner, Baller, and Zevenbergen 2005), and resistance to the implementation of federal hate crime legislation (King, Messner, and Baller 2009; see also Jacobs, Carmichael, and Kent 2005). What this link represents is, however, not very well understood, but glossed with statements that past racial violence has created an "enduring repressive tradition" (Durso and Jacobs 2013, p. 129; Jacobs et al. 2005, p. 657) or that "racial antagonism dies hard" (King et al. 2009, p. 292). Given the centrality of local settings in the formation and transformation of exclusion and stratification (Tilly 1998), these traces of lynching in the present arguably reflect less the effects of the violence itself than the racial group boundaries and identities that it helped cement (cf. Cunningham and Phillips 2007).

In a similar vein, if we consider issues of race and criminal justice in broader perspective, the present analysis suggests how, when, and why African-Americans through what Muhammad (2010) calls "the condemnation of blackness" were assigned a stigmatized group identity that in part persists into the present with far-reaching consequences. These consequences include important white-black differentials in criminal justice system outcomes such as death sentences (Jacobs and Carmichael 2002), imprisonment rates (Jacobs and Carmichael 2001; Western 2006; Muller 2012), and felon disfranchisement (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza 2003). There are insofar striking similarities between the post-Reconstruction image of the "black beast rapist" and the contemporary "criminal black man" stereotype that portrays young black men as inherently more sinister, dangerous, and prone to violence and criminality than white men (Russell 1998). "The wide

diffusion of bestial metaphors in the journalistic and political field (where mentions of 'superpredators', 'wolf-packs', 'animals' and the like are commonplace)" supplies, as Wacquant (2001, pp. 117–18) points out, "a powerful common-sense warrant for . . . . the conflation of blackness and crime in collective representation and government policy." It is thus not unreasonable to argue that today's carceral institutions to a certain extent carry on the coercive race-making practices of yesteryears. And by proposing that and how the violent practices of past racial domination impart directionality to the beliefs and practices through which contemporary racial conflicts are understood and played out on the local as well as national level, this article gives truth to the observation that "the past can never be erased and the ugliest human actions cast the longest shadows" (McFeely 1997, p. 318).

APPENDIX

TABLE A1
TIME-VARYING EFFECTS OF BLACK AND BLACK SQUARED IN MODEL 3, TABLE 7

	YEAR					
	1890 (t = .5)	1895 (t = 5.5)	1900 (t = 10.5)	1905 (t = 15.5)	1910 (t = 20.5)	1915 (t = 25.5)
% black	−.015	.067*	.089**	.103**	.112**	.120**
	(.037)	(.027)	(.028)	(.030)	(.032)	(.033)
% black squared . . .	.000	−.001**	−.001**	−.001**	−.001**	−.001**
	(.001)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)

NOTE.—Nos. in parentheses are robust SEs clustered on county.
+ $P < .10$, two-tailed tests.
* $P < .05$.
** $P < .01$.

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