

Is there a place for sympathy in negotiation? Finding strength in weakness [☆]



Aiwa Shirako ^{a,1}, Gavin J. Kilduff ^{b,*}, Laura J. Kray ^a

^a University of California-Berkeley, United States

^b New York University, United States

ARTICLE INFO

Article history:

Received 8 September 2014

Revised 18 September 2015

Accepted 22 September 2015

Available online 9 November 2015

Keywords:

Sympathy

Negotiation

Emotions

Power

ABSTRACT

Across five studies, we investigate the use of appeals to the moral emotion of sympathy in negotiations. We find that negotiators who actively appeal to the sympathy of their counterparts achieve improved outcomes, both in terms of distributive value claiming as well as integrative value creation. We also compare the effects of sympathy appeals to appeals based on rationality and fairness, and find that sympathy appeals are generally the most effective. These results, then, suggest that negotiators with certain sources of weakness may actually benefit from revealing their weakness, if doing so elicits sympathy in their counterparts. We also explore negotiator power as a possible boundary condition to sympathy appeals. Relative to low power negotiators, we find that high power negotiators' sympathy appeals are seen as more inappropriate and manipulative, and may damage the negotiators' relationship going forward.

© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

"It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest."

[Smith, 1776/1976, p. 18]

"Sympathy will have been increased through natural selection; for those communities, which included the greatest number of the most sympathetic members, would flourish best, and rear the greatest number of offspring."

[Darwin, 1871/2004, p. 130]

1. Introduction

An enduring topic of debate among scholars is what drives and guides human behavior in strategic interactions, rationality or emotionality? On one extreme, decision making has been conceptualized as a cognitive process whereby "homo economicus" carefully weighs the pros and cons of alternatives to arrive at the decision most likely to maximize self-interested outcomes. To the degree that decision makers make suboptimal decisions, it is a result of heuristics and biases that lead them astray

(Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). On the other hand, scholars dating at least as far back as Darwin have recognized the power of emotional appeals to sway choices. The current research speaks to these competing viewpoints via a systematic exploration into sympathy, and the conditions under which this emotion may trump rationality in determining behavior and the allocation of resources in interdependent decision making contexts.

A social functionalist account suggests emotions arise in response to problems in social relations (e.g., how to allocate resources fairly), and help guide interactions so that whatever relational problem has arisen may be resolved (Morris & Keltner, 2000). Moral emotions, or those that have bearing on the well-being and/or interests of others (Haidt, 2003), include sympathy, gratitude, contempt, anger, guilt, disgust, to name a few. Each of these emotions arises in response to a social problem. For example, anger arises when a social norm has been violated or when an injustice occurs. Sympathy is a moral emotion that addresses the social problem of protecting those who are vulnerable, such as children (Haidt, 2003; Morris & Keltner, 2000). When the weak are unable to protect themselves, caretaking by the strong is motivated by their feelings of sympathy.

With this perspective in mind, we explore the role that active sympathy appeals, made from one actor to another, play in negotiations. We propose that by revealing potential sources of vulnerability and need, negotiators can elicit sympathy in their counterparts, and as a consequence, achieve better negotiation

[☆] We thank Adam Galinsky, Barry Staw, Cameron Anderson, and Robert Levenson for their helpful feedback on prior iterations of this work.

* Corresponding author.

E-mail address: gkilduff@stern.nyu.edu (G.J. Kilduff).

¹ The first and second listed authors contributed equally to this work.

outcomes by increasing the concern that their counterpart feels for them. Thus, contrary to classic economic thinking, individuals in difficult or disadvantaged situations may actually benefit from revealing their sources of weakness.

We seek to make several theoretical contributions with this work. First, we build upon existing work that has examined the effects of empathy, guilt, and disappointment in controlled decision-making contexts such as the prisoner's dilemma and ultimatum game (e.g., Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson & Moran, 1999; Handgraaf, Van Dijk, Vermunt, Wilke, & De Dreu, 2008; Ketelaar & Tung Au, 2003; Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Van Kleef, 2013) by exploring the role of sympathy in face-to-face negotiations. Prior work has generally excluded face-to-face interaction and has manipulated emotions externally (for instance, via a reflection task as dictated by the experimenter, e.g., Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008; Ketelaar & Tung Au, 2003) or via a single communication from a simulated counterpart (Lelieveld et al., 2013). We examine whether sympathy can have similar effects when it arises more naturally, via face-to-face communication between pairs of live individuals. Second, we examine whether individuals can actively appeal to the sympathy of their counterparts by revealing information about their sources of vulnerability and need, and by doing so, improve their negotiation outcomes. Thus, we focus on sympathy that arises in response to situational factors – specifically, the information communicated by the counterpart – rather than individuals' long-term dispositions toward feeling sympathy (e.g., Davis, 1983), and investigate an actionable negotiation tactic for negotiators. Third, we directly compare the effectiveness of sympathy appeals to rational appeals. Prior work on the effects of empathy on decision-making has tended to compare it to non-empathy control conditions or to perspective-taking (e.g., Batson et al., 2003; Galinsky et al., 2008); here, we pit sympathy appeals against the kind of rational appeals traditionally prescribed to negotiators (Farmer, Maslyn, Fedor, & Goodman, 1997; Thompson, 2005; Yukl & Tracey, 1992). Further, face-to-face negotiation is an engrossing context that is often perceived as competitive and arouses motivations to outperform the other side (Thompson, 2005). By comparing sympathy appeals to rational appeals in this context, we aim to provide a strong test of sympathy's influence on behavior. Fourth, we examine how sympathy appeals can not only improve the individual outcomes achieved by negotiators who make them, but also how they can increase the size of the negotiation pie for both sides. Fifth, we examine the power of negotiators who make sympathy appeals as a potentially important moderator of their effectiveness, both in terms of short-term negotiation outcomes achieved, as well as longer-term relational outcomes such as trust, liking, and the perception that the other party behaved in an appropriate versus manipulative fashion. Because sympathy is a moral emotion that arises from recognizing another's weakness, appealing to sympathy may backfire when initiated by the strong. Finally, we contribute to a growing literature on the interpersonal nature of emotions (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010) by exploring how individuals can elicit emotions in others.

1.1. The role of emotions in driving negotiation behavior

Emotions are a fundamental part of the human experience, helping individuals organize and prioritize their behavior in order to respond to the complex social environments within which they reside (Frank, 1988; Frijda, 1986; Keltner, Haidt, & Shiota, 2006; Keltner & Kring, 1998; Lazarus, 1991) and a substantial body of research has documented the many ways in which experiencing emotions can affect our behavior (for a brief review of both the intra- and inter-personal effects of emotions within negotiations, see Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2006). For instance, positive emotions increase trust and receptiveness to advice (Dunn &

Schweitzer, 2005; Gino & Schweitzer, 2008), and lead to more cooperative behavior, higher joint gains, and the use of fewer contentious tactics in negotiations (Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Forgas, 1998; Kramer, Newton, & Pommerenke, 1993); whereas negative emotions reduce trust and receptiveness to advice (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Gino & Schweitzer, 2008), and can lead to sub-optimal negotiation agreements (Allred, 1999; Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997). With regard to more specific emotions, angry negotiators tend to be less concerned about their opponents' interests and fail to maximize joint gain (Allred et al., 1997; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004), and feelings of anxiety can reduce outcomes by causing the anxious negotiator to flee the bargaining table (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011).

In addition to this research into the intrapersonal effects of emotional experience, more recent work has explored the interpersonal nature of emotions, or the ways in which individuals are influenced by the emotional expressions of others (Van Kleef et al., 2006, 2010). One way in which this can happen is via emotional contagion, whereby interacting individuals come to experience similar emotions (Anderson, Keltner, & John, 2003; Barsade, 2002; Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994). In addition, emotional expressions are thought to provide information into the thoughts, goals, and likely behavior of the expresser, serving as a communication system that may lead the perceivers of emotional expressions to modify their behavior (Morris & Keltner, 2000; Van Kleef et al., 2010). For example, expressions of anger in negotiations can signal toughness and an unwillingness to back down from high demands and can thus elicit concessions from the other side, leading to better outcomes for the angry negotiator (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004) – although this is only true under certain conditions (Adam, Shirako, & Maddux, 2010; Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Van Kleef, 2012; Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008). This implies that negotiators might actively manage their emotional expressions for strategic purposes (Barry, Fulmer, & Van Kleef, 2004; Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Potworowski & Kopelman, 2008; Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, 1999). Indeed, customer service representatives amplify their displays of positive emotion to elicit positive evaluations from customers (Pugh, 2001), bill collectors strategically express anger to encourage payments (Sutton, 1991), and police interrogators use displays of sympathy and anger to engage in a “good cop, bad cop” technique to elicit confessions (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991).

We build upon this work by examining whether individuals can actively appeal to and elicit sympathy within their interaction partners, and by doing so, improve negotiation outcomes. Researchers studying emotional intelligence have suggested that individuals can indeed strategically “manage” the emotions of others (Kilduff, Chiaburu, & Menges, 2010; Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000), and a recent scale (“managing the emotions of other” or MEOS) has been developed to assess individuals' self-reported tendencies toward eliciting positive and negative emotion in others (e.g., “I sometimes use my knowledge of another person's emotional triggers to make them angry”; Austin & O'Donnell, 2013). Further, in the realm of negotiations, Thompson and colleagues argue that negotiators can engage in *emotional tuning*, tailoring their “message to an audience so as to regulate the other person's emotional reactions” (Thompson et al., 1999, pp. 149–150). Indeed, the effectiveness of anger expressions in negotiations has been linked to the fact that they can evoke fear in one's counterpart (Lelieveld et al., 2012). Further, recent work has shown that expressions of disappointment can elicit cooperative behavior in others, not just because they signal a lack of satisfaction, but because they can evoke feelings of guilt (Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2011; Lelieveld et al., 2012). Here, we look not so much at how the

expression of one emotion by a negotiator may elicit a different emotion in his or her counterpart, but at whether negotiators can more directly appeal to the emotions of their counterparts. One recent study that explored this kind strategic emotion elicitation found that women who are able to improve the mood of their male counterparts in negotiations by use of feminine charm tend to achieve more favorable agreements (Kray, Locke, & Van Zant, 2012). In our case, we explore whether revealing information about one's vulnerability and/or need can improve negotiation outcomes by eliciting sympathy.

1.2. Sympathy

Sympathy has been defined as an emotion that entails “feelings of sorrow or concern for another's welfare” (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987, p. 92), and it is generally expressed toward those who are in a state of need, suffering, or vulnerability (Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010; Haidt, 2003), which is largely out of their control (Feather & Sherman, 2002; Reyna & Weiner, 2001; Weiner, Osborne, & Rudolph, 2011). Sympathy is part of the ‘other-suffering’ group of moral emotions, along with empathy and compassion (Haidt, 2003), which serve to increase helping and pro-social behavior (Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987; Batson et al., 2003; Davis, 1994; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Eisenberg et al., 1989; Keltner et al., 2006). We see compassion as synonymous with sympathy (Haidt, 2003), and empathy as closely-related, yet distinguishable. Historically, empathy has been defined as “the reactions of one individual to the observed experiences of another” (Davis, 1983, p. 113), or as the accurate understanding of another person's point of view (Dymond, 1949; Hogan, 1969). Subsequent research has drawn a distinction between perspective-taking, a cognitive process whereby an individual considers the world from another's viewpoint and imagines the other's thoughts and interests (e.g., Batson et al., 1987; Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006; Galinsky et al., 2008), and a specifically affective form of empathy, which entails imagining and/or feeling the feelings of another person (Batson et al., 1987; Galinsky et al., 2008). A scale commonly used to measure dispositional empathy includes four subscales: perspective-taking, fantasy, person distress, and empathic concern, the last of which most closely matches the definition of sympathy (Davis, 1983).

We acknowledge, as prior researchers have done (e.g., Batson et al., 1987), that sympathy and empathy overlap substantially – indeed, one of the items often used to measure empathy is “sympathetic” (e.g., Batson & Ahmad, 2001) – and we draw upon existing work on the effects of empathy in crafting our theory and hypotheses. However, we use the term sympathy to indicate a very specific focus on the experience of concern for another's needs and welfare. For instance, prior manipulations of empathy involve asking participants to “Try to imagine what they are feeling, what emotions they may be experiencing” (Galinsky et al., 2008, p. 381) – this ability to feel what another is feeling is not our primary focus. Indeed, some have questioned whether the ability to feel what another is feeling is an emotion at all (Haidt, 2003). We also examine sympathy as a feature of the situation (Batson et al., 1987) that can be manipulated via negotiator communications, rather than a dispositional trait (Davis, 1983).

1.2.1. Sympathy appeals

In contrast to existing work that measures individuals' long-term dispositions toward feeling sympathy and empathy (e.g., Davis, 1983), or employs external manipulations such as exposing participants to images depicting helplessness, vulnerability, and pain (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1989, 1991, 1994; Oveis, Horberg, & Keltner, 2010), we investigate the extent to which individual negotiators can themselves appeal to the sympathy of their

counterparts as part of the actual negotiation interaction. Thus, we examine a deliberate attempt to elicit emotion from one individual to another. Given that sympathy is generally expressed toward those in a state of need, suffering, or vulnerability that is out of their control (Feather & Sherman, 2002; Goetz et al., 2010; Reyna & Weiner, 2001; Weiner et al., 2011), we define a *sympathy appeal* as the active sharing of information that reveals an individual's need and vulnerability, and lack of control over the situation. For example, a traveler waiting on standby as the result of inclement weather might make a sympathy appeal to an airline employee by sharing personal information such as her distress over possibly missing her son's birthday or that she suffers from a condition that makes travel delays particularly uncomfortable.

1.2.2. Sympathy and negotiation

Rational approaches to the study of negotiations, which long dominated the literature (Bazerman & Neale, 1992; Thompson, 2005), would suggest that sympathy has no place in negotiations and that sympathy appeals will fall on deaf ears, or worse, reveal weakness that may lead to exploitation (e.g., Kray, Kennedy, & Van Zant, 2014; Olekalns & Smith, 2007). However, accumulating evidence for the role of psychological and emotional factors in negotiations (e.g., Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006; Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishi, & O'Brien, 2006; Valley, Neale, & Mannix, 1995; Van Zant & Kray, 2015) and the role of sympathy and other closely-related constructs in motivating prosocial behavior (Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson et al., 1987, 2003; Eisenberg et al., 1989; Haidt, 2003) suggests otherwise. In an early study on the effects of sympathy, participants who viewed an interview of a car-crash victim and her injured children felt greater sympathy, and as a result gave greater offers of help, than participants in a control condition (Eisenberg et al., 1989). Similarly, participants asked to imagine the feelings of a counterpart who was described as struggling with a recently ended romantic relationship exhibited greater cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma context (Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson & Moran, 1999).

Based on this work, we predict that negotiators who feel sympathy toward their counterparts will be more generous, cooperative, and motivated to help – which, as we discuss below, may affect both the individual outcomes achieved by the target of sympathy as well as joint outcomes achieved by the dyad. Most of the work on other-suffering emotions has examined prosocial behavior in the context of one-shot decision-making scenarios such as the prisoner's dilemma, ultimatum game, or a decision about relative payoffs or task assignments (e.g., Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson et al., 2003), leaving somewhat open the question of how these emotions will affect face-to-face negotiations, a context which may arouse stronger competitive motivations (Thompson, 2005). However, there are a few studies on iterative, offer-counteroffer, negotiations that provide indirect evidence for our ideas. One study of empathy in face-to-face negotiations found that negotiators who were asked to “try to understand what [your counterpart is] feeling, what emotions they may be experiencing” yielded more value in the negotiation to their counterparts; similarly, in a second study, negotiators high in dispositional empathy also yielded greater value (Galinsky et al., 2008). Interestingly, the same does not seem to be true of perspective-taking, as imagining the interests and goals of one's counterpart – getting into their heads rather than their hearts – can sometimes actually lead to more selfish or antisocial behavior, particularly in competitive contexts (Epley et al., 2006; Pierce, Kilduff, Galinsky, & Sivanathan, 2013).

Another line of research has examined the consequences of expressed disappointment in computer-simulated iterative negotiations (Lelieveld et al., 2011, 2012, 2013; Van Kleef et al., 2006). This work finds that disappointment can serve a “supplication” function, acting as a call for help, and as a result, generate greater

concessions, primarily by evoking feelings of guilt in the other party (Ketelaar & Tung Au, 2003). This chain of disappointment leading to guilt leading to generosity is somewhat different than sympathy appeals leading to concern leading to generosity, both because disappointment generally occurs as a response to an action or decision that one's counterpart has already made (such as an offer) and because guilt is an inwardly focused emotion whereas sympathy is outwardly focused. That said, it is possible that individuals receiving sympathy appeals from their counterparts may anticipate feeling guilty if they do not help the appealing party and that this may partly drive their prosocial behavior. In a similar vein, if negotiations are public, it is possible that negotiators receiving sympathy appeals might be concerned about how they look to others if they do not behave generously to those in need. These mechanisms would seem to apply primarily to distributive negotiations – where the normative response to sympathy appeals may be to concede value to the other side – and less to integrative negotiations.

There is also some prior work consistent with the idea that revealing weakness may not always harm performance in strategic interactions. In one set of studies involving the ultimatum game, recipients who were powerless actually received higher offers from allocators than did recipients with some degree of power (Handgraaf et al., 2008), because allocators felt a degree of social responsibility toward those with a complete lack of power. The research on expressions of disappointment in negotiations makes a similar point. Disappointment is often thought to signal weakness and might thus be expected to lead to exploitation; however, its expression can actually lead to more generous offers from counterparts because it serves as a call for help (Lelieveld et al., 2011, 2012, 2013), much as an appeal to sympathy is apt to.

Building upon all of this existing work, we explore the role of sympathy appeals in negotiations, examining their effects on both distributive and integrative outcomes. Distributive negotiations refer to contexts in which negotiators' interests are directly opposed – one side's loss is the other's gain – such as a negotiation over sale price, and distributive value refers to the proportion of total possible value within the negotiation that is claimed by each negotiator. Based upon the wealth of prior research linking sympathy and related constructs to prosocial, generous, and cooperative behavior, we predict that negotiators who actively appeal to the sympathy of their counterparts will improve their own distributive outcomes. Sympathy appeals will motivate their counterparts to help alleviate their suffering (e.g. Batson et al., 1987; Davis, 1994; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Eisenberg et al., 1989), by providing concessions and desired resources. Further, vulnerable parties in need of help may evoke feelings of social responsibility from their counterparts, which also have been linked to greater generosity (Van Dijk et al., 2008). Lastly, this prediction follows from classic work in justice on different norms of fairness (Deutsch, 1975) – sympathy is likely to activate a “need” based norm for distribution, leading negotiators experiencing sympathy to allocate greater resources to their counterparts than the power of their negotiating positions or rational arguments might dictate.

That all said, rational models of decision-making in mixed-motive contexts would generally lead to the opposite prediction: that revealing one's vulnerability and needs makes one more likely to be taken advantage of and earned reduced outcomes. Indeed, recent research finds that negotiators perceived as benevolent and trustworthy are more likely to be taken advantage of and deceived (Olekalns & Smith, 2007). Similarly, female negotiators are perceived to be more vulnerable to deception, and as a result, attract greater deception from their counterparts (Kray et al., 2014). Further, negotiators with heightened aspirations as a result of outside options have been shown to exhibit greater opportunism (Malhotra & Gino, 2012), consistent with the idea that revealing

weakness could backfire if it leads the other side to believe they can achieve higher outcomes. Importantly, however, none of this work examined or manipulated emotions, and thus negotiators were likely operating under the kind of deliberative, analytical mindsets that have been found to increase deception and decrease altruism as compared to intuitive mindsets (Zhong, 2011). By contrast, we expect that sympathy appeals will activate the moral intuition system (Haidt, 2001, 2003) and override the tendency to take advantage of another's vulnerability, instead leading to more prosocial behavior.

In addition, although there is less precedent for this in the literature, we believe that sympathy may also play a role in facilitating integrative negotiation agreements. Integrative negotiations are those involving multiple issues of differing importance to negotiators. Consequently, negotiators who concede on issues that are less important to them in exchange for concessions on high priority issues increase joint gain, or the size of the overall pie of resources (Froman & Cohen, 1970). Research suggests that concern for the other party – a definitional component of sympathy – increases joint gain, as concerned negotiators are motivated to reach agreements that benefit not only themselves, but their counterparts as well (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). More generally, cooperative orientations are predictive of integrative outcomes (Carnevale & Lawler, 1986; De Dreu, Giebels, & Van de Vliert, 1998). At extreme levels, concern for the other side can actually decrease joint gain (Amanatullah, Morris, & Curhan, 2008; Fry, Firestone, & Williams, 1983; Valley et al., 1995), suggesting a potential ceiling to the positive effects of sympathy: if negotiators feel such a level of sympathy for their counterparts that they are no longer concerned with their own outcomes, they may make concessions without any resistance and without asking critical questions of the other side, thus failing to realize integrative gains. However, across most negotiation settings, we expect that moderate amounts of felt sympathy will have a positive effect on integrative outcomes. Further, the harmful effects of extreme concern for others seem to derive mainly from the conflict avoidance that can result from being overly concerned about being liked, a concern that is less likely to interfere with acting to alleviate another's suffering. Thus, on average we predict increased integrative outcomes for pairs of negotiators in which one side appeals to the sympathy of the other.

2. Overview of studies

We examined the effects of sympathy and sympathy appeals in negotiations across five studies, each of which involved a different negotiation exercise or scenario, and the first three of which involved actual face-to-face negotiations. Studies 1–4 examined negotiation situations in which one party was in a potentially vulnerable position, thus providing a critical antecedent to sympathy (Goetz et al., 2010). In Study 5, we varied this factor to explore a potential boundary condition to the use of sympathy appeals. Specifically, we examined whether the power level of the party making the appeal moderated its effectiveness, both for economic and relational outcomes. Studies 2–5 compared the use of sympathy appeals to rational arguments, thus extending prior work and providing a strong test of their effectiveness.

3. Study 1

Study 1 sought to establish a basic finding underlying our theoretical logic – that momentary feelings of sympathy correspond with increased generosity in negotiations. Specifically, we examined whether negotiators achieved better distributive outcomes when their counterparts felt sympathy toward them. We also

examined whether the negotiating dyad as a whole was more likely to form an integrative agreement when one side feels sympathy toward the other. In this study, we measured naturally occurring feelings of sympathy; the rest of our studies all examined active sympathy appeals from one side to the other. We also tried to rule out one potential alternative explanation for any observed correlation between felt sympathy and negotiation outcomes by collecting individual difference measures of relational and instrumental dispositions in negotiations. These dispositions might be correlated with both tendencies toward experiencing sympathy and with the extent to which negotiators might seek to help versus exploit counterparts in vulnerable positions (Amanatullah et al., 2008; Curhan, Neale, Ross, & Rosencranz-Engelmann, 2008; Fry et al., 1983; Gelfand et al., 2006).

3.1. Method

3.1.1. Participants

Participants were 106 Masters of Business Administration (MBA) students (30% female) enrolled in a negotiation course at a U.S. business school based in a large, west coast public university. The negotiations took place as part of the course. Three dyads (6 participants) failed to complete one or more of the measures and were therefore dropped from the analysis. Because negotiation results were publically debriefed after the conclusion of each negotiation – such that students got to see how everyone performed relatively to everyone else – participants were highly motivated to perform well (for similar methodology, see Anderson & Shirako, 2008; Galinsky et al., 2008; Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2002).

3.1.2. Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to their role and negotiation counterpart, and were given one week to prepare for the dyadic negotiation, “Viking Investments.” The negotiation dealt with a contract of carpentry services between a contractor and a real estate developer (Greenlaugh, 1993). The developer had contracted for woodwork in an apartment complex, and the negotiators were tasked with resolving a dispute about cost overruns for the job. The developer had the legal right to refuse additional payment; however, the contractor was in a vulnerable position because he could lose his house and/or be forced into bankruptcy should the contract fall through. In addition to the primary issue of payment for the carpentry services, from which our measure of distributive value was formed, the negotiation included a number of other issues that provided the opportunity for integrative agreements. These included (1) the fact that the real estate developer had loaned the contractor money some years ago, and would now like to call the loan; however, the only way the contractor can pay off the loan is by selling his own house at a loss, and (2) the fact that the contractor was leasing a building for his business from the developer, but two months ago exercised an option to terminate the lease because he had found a building with a cheaper rent. Since then, that alternative building has become unavailable, and the contractor would like to renew the lease with the developer.

3.2. Measures

3.2.1. Contractor distributive outcomes

We measured distributive value as the dollar amount claimed by negotiators in the contractor role, such that higher numbers indicated better outcomes relative to negotiators in the developer role (Howard, Gardner, & Thompson, 2007; $M = \$112,372$, $SD = \$101,563$). Again, as this was a purely distributive issue, higher outcomes for one side inherently mean lower outcomes for the other.

3.2.2. Dyad integrative agreements

Based upon prior research employing this same exercise (Anderson & Shirako, 2008), integrative agreements were coded by counting the number of integrative components within deals, which ranged from zero to three ($M = 1.64$, $SD = .66$). Negotiating dyads received one point for agreeing to each of the following: (1) The developer and contractor renew the lease for the rental building; (2) The developer agrees to hire the contractor for future work; (3) If the contractor decides to sell the house to pay off the loan, then the developer offers the contractor housing or, if the contractor keeps the house, then the developer becomes an investor in it.

3.2.3. Developer sympathy experienced

Because the contractor in this negotiation is the party in a vulnerable situation, we examined sympathy experienced by the real-estate developer with two items. Negotiators in this role reported the degree to which they felt sympathy, and the degree to which they felt concern for their counterpart (from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*very much*), $\alpha = 0.83$, $M = 5.20$, $SD = 1.34$).

3.2.4. Dispositional orientations as control variables

As control variables, we assessed the relational and instrumental dispositions of negotiators in the real-estate developer role. As part of a broader class survey one month prior to the negotiation, participants completed single-item measures adapted from prior research (Kray & Gelfand, 2009): “When negotiating, the relationship with my counterpart comes first” ($M = 4.20$, $SD = 1.40$) and “When negotiating, the concrete issues on the table come first.” ($M = 4.54$, $SD = 1.62$).

3.3. Results and discussion

Consistent with our prediction, developer sympathy for the contractor positively predicted the contractor's distributive performance. $\beta = .31$, $t(48) = 2.25$, $p = .03$ (all reported tests are two-tailed; see Table 1, Model 1). In other words, the greater the developer reported feeling sympathy for the contractor's vulnerable situation, the greater the contractor's distributive outcomes (and thus, the lower the developer's outcomes). This finding was also robust to controlling for the developer's relational and instrumental concerns (Table 1, Model 2). Furthermore, developer sympathy was positively associated with the integrative performance of the dyad, $\beta = .27$, $t(48) = 1.91$, $p = .06$ (see Table 2, Model 1). This relationship also remained when controlling for the developer's instrumental and relational concerns (Table 2, Model 2).

Thus, negotiators who felt sympathy toward counterparts in a vulnerable situation both conceded more distributive value to them and enabled greater integrative value to be created by the negotiating pair.

4. Study 2

Study 2 extends the previous study in two primary ways. First, we measured the use of sympathy-eliciting appeals, rather than felt sympathy, to assess whether negotiators in vulnerable situations could indeed actively appeal to the sympathy of their counterparts as a way of improving negotiation outcomes. Second, we compared the effectiveness of sympathy appeals to rational arguments based on merit and to interest-based information sharing, both suggested by prior research to be vital to negotiation success. Our dependent measure in this study was whether dyads formed an integrative deal in a negotiation that contained a negative bargaining zone.

Table 1

Study 1: linear regression table: distributive value claimed by the vulnerable contractor.

Model	1	2
Developer sympathy	0.31 [†] (2.25)	0.28 [*] (2.13)
Controls		
Developer relational goals		0.41 ^{**} (3.11)
Developer instrumental goals		0.02 (0.18)
R ²	0.10	0.25
Observations	50	50

t statistics in parentheses, coefficients are standardized.

[†] $p < .10$ (two-tailed).^{*} $p \leq .05$ (two-tailed).^{**} $p \leq .01$ (two-tailed).

4.1. Method

4.1.1. Participants

Participants were 112 (29% female) MBA students enrolled in a course on negotiation and conflict resolution at a U.S. business school based in a large, west coast public university. The negotiations took place as part of the course. There was no overlap between the samples in Studies 1 and 2.

4.1.2. Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to both role (service station owner or oil executive) and negotiation partner, and completed the “Texoil” dyadic negotiation that revolved around the sale of a service station owner’s gas station to an executive’s oil company (Goldberg, 1997). This negotiation is notable in that it has a negative bargaining zone, that is, the service station owner requires more money to cover his expenses than the oil executive is authorized to spend. On the surface, therefore, a workable agreement that can satisfy both parties seems out of reach. However, through a discussion of interests, negotiators can discover an opportunity for joint gain: the service station owner is planning an around-the-world sailboat trip and requires employment upon return, and the oil executive needs skilled managers. Thus, negotiators can achieve a mutually-agreeable deal if the oil executive offers the service station owner a job upon return from the trip. The sharing of this interest-related information between the negotiation parties is therefore vital to ‘solving’ this negotiation (Goldberg, 1997). In addition, negotiators in the service station owner role were provided information about some personal challenges facing them, which could potentially be used to elicit sympathy from oil company executives. The station owner’s

spouse was described as nearing a nervous breakdown from overwork, thus necessitating the sale of the station. We examined whether revealing this information affected the likelihood that dyads achieved integrative agreements.

We predicted that dyads in which the station owner appealed to the sympathy of the oil executive by revealing information about the station owner’s vulnerable situation would be more likely to reach an integrative agreement. This follows again from the fact that sympathy promotes concern and a desire to help (e.g. Batson et al., 1987; Davis, 1994; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Eisenberg et al., 1989), and concern for others in negotiations facilitates integrative agreements (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; De Dreu et al., 2000). It is worth noting, however, that existing negotiations research and practical prescription would *not* generally lead to this prediction; indeed, it might suggest that the station owner should conceal his/her vulnerability (Thompson, 2005).

4.2. Measures

4.2.1. Station owner rational arguments, information sharing, and sympathy appeals

As part of the post-negotiation survey, participants in the role of service station owner reported the arguments they made during the negotiation. They were presented with fourteen pieces of information from the negotiation instructions and were asked to indicate which of these they shared with the other side. These pieces of information were separated into three categories of appeals: economic or rational appeals that specifically addressed the economic value of the station (8 items: e.g. “I have a loyal customer base” and “I estimate it would cost Texoil at least \$650,000 to buy land and build a comparable station”); interest-based appeals that included the sharing of information relevant to finding a mutual-agreeable solution (3 arguments: e.g. “I must have \$75,000 in savings for living expenses upon my return,” and “I have made a down payment on a boat and plan to take a 2 year trip”); and sympathy-based appeals, which included information that could potentially elicit the sympathy of the station owner, but did *not* address the economic value of the station (3 arguments: e.g. “my spouse is about to suffer a nervous breakdown,” and “my spouse and I have been working 18 h days for 5 years”). We then summed across each type of appeal: (rational: $M = 3.74$, $SD = 1.73$; interest-based: $M = 0.53$, $SD = 0.90$; sympathy: $M = 1.12$, $SD = 0.86$). Use of rational appeals was significantly negatively correlated with use of interest-based appeals, $r(51) = -.31$, $p = .03$; none of the other pairwise correlations were significant. Prior research has pointed to rational arguments as an effective method of influence in negotiations (e.g. Farmer et al., 1997; Yukl & Tracey, 1992), and to interest-based information sharing as a critical antecedent of integrative value creation in negotiations (Thompson, 1991, 2005). We sought to compare the relative effects of sympathy appeals to these more established negotiation strategies.

4.2.2. Dyadic-level integrative negotiation performance

The primary performance measure was whether an integrative deal was reached, that is one that allowed both the buyer and seller to satisfy their interests. Due to the nature of the negotiation, this required that negotiators agree on additional terms beyond sale price. For example, one negotiating pair settled on a sales price of \$405,000, in addition to \$75,000 in consulting fees, and a job at \$75,000 per year upon return from the trip. This deal satisfied both the seller’s needs for immediate and long-term capital, and the buyer’s goal of finding good managers. Non-integrative agreements were those that only included a sale price of the station, given that the negotiation had a negative bargaining zone. In total, 21 dyads (37.5%) reached an integrative agreement, 5 dyads (8.9%)

Table 2

Study 1: linear regression table: integrative value created by the dyad.

Model	1	2
Developer sympathy	0.27 [†] (1.91)	0.28 [*] (1.99)
Controls		
Developer relational goals		−0.17 (−1.16)
Developer Instrumental Goals		0.01 (0.04)
R ²	0.07	0.10
Observations	50	50

t statistics in parentheses, coefficients are standardized.

[†] $p < .10$ (two-tailed).^{*} $p \leq .05$ (two-tailed).

reached a non-integrative agreement, and 30 dyads (53.6%) reached an impasse. All analyses were conducted comparing integrative deals (coded “1”) to a combination of both non-integrative deals and impasses (coded “0”).²

4.3. Results and discussion

Five participants in the service-station owner role neglected to complete the items related to what pieces of information they shared and thus these dyads had to be excluded from analysis (leaving 51 dyads).

4.3.1. Dyadic-level integrative performance

A simultaneous logistic regression analysis found that station owners' sympathy appeals were positively related to dyads reaching an integrative agreement ($b = .96$, $Wald = 5.01$, $p = .025$). The odds ratio was equal to 2.61, indicating that for each additional sympathy appeal made by the station owner, the odds of the negotiating pair finding an integrative agreement was more than two and a half times as high. Interest-based appeals also had a significant and positive effect on integrative deal-making ($b = .90$, $Wald = 4.75$, $p = .029$, odds ratio = 2.46), consistent with previous research (e.g. Goldberg, 1997; Thompson, 1991, 2005). Rational appeals were not a significant predictor of deal making ($b = -0.22$, $SE = 0.22$, $Wald = 1.14$, $p = .29$).

4.3.2. Discussion

Study 2 supported the idea that sympathy appeals made by negotiators in a vulnerable situation can increase dyads' integrative outcomes, in this case, overcoming a negative bargaining zone and finding a mutually-beneficial agreement. Again, this result contrasts with prior work advising negotiators to conceal, rather than reveal, any sources of weakness (Thompson, 2005).

5. Study 3

In Study 3, we experimentally manipulated sympathy appeals, which allowed us to better test their causal effects on negotiation outcomes. Further, we examined performance in a mixed-motive negotiation, which provided measures of integrative value creation and distributive value claiming along the same continuous points dimension. Lastly, in addition to examining the effects of sympathy appeals on objective negotiation outcomes, we also examined how they affected relational outcomes as compared to rational appeals. Although sympathy appeals appear to be effective at increasing outcomes in the short-term, it is possible they might come off as manipulative or inappropriate and thus damage the relationship between the negotiators going forward. Indeed, researching studying supplication emotions such as disappointment have observed that although the expressers of such emotions tend to receive greater help, they may leave their interaction partners with a less favorable impression (Van Kleef et al., 2006).

5.1. Method

5.1.1. Participants

Ninety-eight undergraduate business students (49 dyads; 63% female) from a large, west coast public university completed Study 3 for partial fulfillment of course credit. Two dyads (one from each

condition) were unable to come to an agreement within the allotted 25 min, and were dropped from the analyses.

5.1.2. Procedure and role information

Participants completed the “New Recruit” job offer negotiation simulation (Neale, 1997), in which they were randomly assigned to play the role of either recruiter or candidate. They were given up to 25 min to negotiate the terms of eight different pre-selected issues, including salary, health benefits, moving expense coverage, and job location. Various point totals were ascribed to the issues to indicate their relative importance to the negotiators. Distributive issues were those in which the recruiter and candidate had diametrically opposed preferences, and were equally important to both negotiators (e.g., salary). Integrative issues were those in which the recruiter and candidate had opposing preferences, but differed in terms of the importance placed on each issue, thus allowing negotiators to create value by ‘logrolling’ across multiple integrative issues. For example, it was very important to recruiters that vacation time was minimized, but the issue of starting bonus was less important. The candidates on the other hand prioritized starting bonus over vacation time. Thus, value could be created if the recruiter agreed to a large bonus and the candidate agreed to a small amount of vacation time. Finally, compatible issues were those in which candidates and recruiters had the same preferences.

For this study, we focused on participants in the candidate role as their job seeking status generally renders them more vulnerable than the recruiter (cf. Anderson & Thompson, 2004). We also increased the vulnerability of their situation via the background information provided to them, which included material for both rational arguments and sympathy appeals:

You are a recent graduate of a top university, and have had several years of summer internship experience. You achieved good grades in your university courses, and are confident in the quality of your reference letters. This job would be a very good fit for you, and you think you are a strong applicant, given your qualifications, not to mention your strong work ethic. However, you are also worried given that this is currently your only prospect for a job, and you have considerable student loans to pay off. In addition, your mother was recently diagnosed with a life-threatening illness, and your family is struggling to keep up with the hospital bills. Getting a good deal on the terms of employment is therefore very important to you.

5.1.3. Experimental manipulation

Participants in the role of candidate were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, *sympathy*, and *rational*. In line with previously utilized experimental manipulations (e.g. Adam & Shirako, 2013; Kray et al., 2012; Maddux, Mullen, & Galinsky, 2008), participants in the sympathy condition were instructed to appeal to the sympathy of their counterpart, in the following manner:

In this negotiation, you must follow the negotiation strategy recommended by negotiation experts. Both negotiation scholars and experienced negotiators agree that gaining the other person's sympathy is a good way to succeed in a negotiation. Thus, in this study you should attempt to elicit the other person's sympathy for your position... It is very important that you appeal to their feelings of sympathy convincingly. People do not like to feel like they are being manipulated. Rather than try to manipulate them, you are simply honestly explaining your negotiation situation (your mother is ill, you have a lot of college loans etc.), and appealing to their sense of sympathy.

² Previous research utilizes variations of our coding scheme, most notably by coding impasses “0,” non-integrative agreements “1,” and integrative agreements “2” (Anderson & Thompson, 2004). Our data do not provide sufficient non-integrative deals to allow for meaningful comparisons to integrative deals. However a comparison of integrative agreements to “no deal” (excluding non-integrative deals) does not change the significance of our results.

Participants in the rational condition were told the following:

In this negotiation, you must follow the negotiation strategy recommended by negotiation experts. Both negotiation scholars and experienced negotiators agree that remaining professional, and making rational arguments is a good way to succeed in a negotiation. Thus, in this study you should stick to the facts, and use rational arguments to explain your position. . . It is very important that you make your rational arguments convincingly. People do not like to feel like they are being manipulated. Rather than try to manipulate them, you are simply making rational reference to the facts at hand (you want the job, you are a quality candidate).

5.1.4. Negotiation instructions

After the negotiation, negotiators reported what, if any, instructions they received (use sympathy arguments/use rational arguments/did not receive instructions), and whether they followed the instructions (yes/no). In total, nine participants (four from the sympathy appeal condition and five from the rational appeal condition) provided incorrect responses and these dyads were dropped from analyses, leaving a final sample of 38 dyads (20 in the sympathy appeal condition, 18 in the rational appeal condition). Inclusion of these participants does not change the pattern of significance in the results.

5.2. Measures

5.2.1. Manipulation checks

Candidates were asked to report which (if any) of three sympathy-eliciting arguments they shared with the recruiter (mother is in the hospital; school loans; family struggling with hospital bills), and were asked “to what degree did you try to appeal to the sympathy of your counterpart” (1 – *not at all* to 7 – *very much*; $M = 4.57$, $SD = 1.63$). Recruiters reported which of the three sympathy-eliciting arguments the candidates shared with them and rated their felt sympathy (2 items; e.g., “How much sympathy did you have for the other person’s situation?” (1 – *not at all* to 7 – *very much*; $M = 3.71$, $SD = 1.09$).

5.2.2. Integrative value

As in past research, integrative value was measured by the sum of points earned by the recruiter and the candidate (e.g. Allred et al., 1997; Anderson & Thompson, 2004; Thompson, 1991; $M = 10,074$, $SD = 2032$).

5.2.3. Distributive value

Distributive value claiming was calculated as the proportion of points gained by the candidate out of the total points scored by the dyad, in order to unconfound value claiming from integrative value creation (Adam & Shirako, 2013; Anderson & Thompson, 2004; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). Higher numbers indicated greater distributive value claiming by the vulnerable candidate ($M = 0.48$, $SD = 0.21$).

5.2.4. Relational outcomes

Both participants completed the 16-item Subjective Value Inventory (SVI; Curhan et al., 2006), which assesses negotiators’ feelings about their instrumental outcomes (e.g., “How satisfied are you with the balance between your own outcome and your counterpart (s)’s outcome(s)?”; $M = 4.25$, $SD = .82$; all items measured on a 1–7 scale, see Curhan et al., 2006 for all items and anchors), themselves (e.g., “Did this negotiation make you feel more or less competent as a negotiator?”; $M = 4.15$, $SD = .69$), the negotiation process (e.g., “Would you characterize the negotiation process as fair?”; $M = 3.61$, $SD = .84$) and their relationship with their

counterpart (e.g., “How satisfied are you with your relationship with your counterpart (s) as a result of this negotiation?”; $M = 3.42$, $SD = .81$). Further, they rated the extent to which they experienced “friendship,” “liking,” and “closeness” during the negotiation ($\alpha = .83$; 1 – *not at all* to 5 – *very much*; $M = 2.67$, $SD = .90$).

5.3. Results

5.3.1. Manipulation check

Participants in the sympathy appeal condition reported using more sympathy arguments ($M = 2.65$, $SD = 0.75$) than those in the rational appeal condition ($M = 1.35$, $SD = 1.67$, $t(35) = 4.00$, $p < .001$), and reported appealing to their counterparts’ sympathy significantly more ($M = 5.05$, $SD = 1.28$ vs. $M = 4.00$, $SD = 1.83$, $t(35) = 2.04$, $p = .05$). Similarly, recruiters in the sympathy appeal condition reported receiving more sympathy arguments ($M = 2.25$, $SD = 0.97$) than those in the rational appeal condition ($M = 1.39$, $SD = 1.29$, $t(36) = 2.34$, $p = .025$; this measure was correlated $r = .85$ with candidates’ reporting of use of sympathy appeals), and reported feeling greater sympathy ($M = 4.18$, $SD = .98$ vs. $M = 3.19$, $SD = 1.00$, $t(36) = 3.05$, $p = .004$).

5.3.2. Integrative value

Dyads in the sympathy condition achieved significantly higher joint gain than dyads in the rational appeal condition, $M = 10,650$ vs. $M = 9433$, $t(36) = 2.26$, $p = .03$.

5.3.3. Distributive value

Candidates in the sympathy condition claimed a significantly higher proportion of the value created in the negotiation than candidates in the rational appeal condition ($M = 0.56$, $SD = 0.13$ vs. $M = 0.40$, $SD = 0.25$, $t(36) = 2.53$, $p = .02$). Candidates in the sympathy appeal condition also achieved significantly more value than their recruiter counterparts ($M = 0.56$, vs. $M = 0.44$, $SD = 0.13$, $t(19) = 2.10$; $p = .05$), whereas candidates in the rational appeal condition non-significantly underperformed their recruiter counterparts ($M = 0.40$ vs. $M = 0.60$, $SD = 0.25$, $t(17) = 1.70$, $p = .11$).

5.3.4. Total points earned

Combining the aggregate effects – value creation and claiming – of using sympathy appeals on absolute negotiation outcomes, candidates in the sympathy appeal condition outperformed candidates in the rational appeal condition by a substantial amount ($M = 5870$, $SD = 1222$ vs. $M = 3700$, $SD = 2351$, $t(36) = 3.62$, $p = .001$, $d = 1.16$). Total points earned by the recruiters did not differ significantly across the sympathy and rational conditions ($M = 4780$, $SD = 1821$ vs. $M = 5733$, $SD = 2605$, $t(36) = 1.32$, $p = .20$).

5.3.5. Relational outcomes

Candidates reported greater satisfaction with their instrumental outcomes in the sympathy appeal condition, ($M = 4.34$, $SD = .60$) than in the rational appeal condition ($M = 3.78$, $SD = .94$, $t(36) = 2.21$, $p = .034$). This is consistent with the fact that they earned better outcomes. No significant differences were observed along any of the other dimensions of the SVI for either candidates or recruiters (all p -values $> .24$). Further, no significant differences existed between condition along our measure of liking, friendship, and closeness, although there were non-significant trends toward greater positive feelings in the sympathy appeal condition for candidates ($M = 2.75$ vs. $M = 2.44$, $t(36) = 1.07$, $p = .29$) and recruiters ($M = 2.93$ vs. $M = 2.52$, $t(36) = 1.39$, $p = .17$).

5.4. Discussion

These findings replicate and extend the results from Studies 1 and 2 in several important ways. Rather than relying on naturally

occurring sympathy or sympathy appeals, in Study 3 we experimentally manipulated the use of sympathy appeals. We found that the use of sympathy appeals by job candidates in a vulnerable position both caused the dyad to create more value in the negotiation, and allowed the job candidate to claim a greater proportion of the value created, as compared to the use of more rational arguments. Further, we found no evidence that the use of sympathy appeals erodes the relationship between negotiators going forward.

6. Study 4

Across Studies 1–3, we observed that both felt sympathy and sympathy appeals can have important consequences in face-to-face negotiations, facilitating the construction of integrative agreements for negotiation dyads, and value claiming for negotiators who make sympathy appeals. Showing these effects in actual dyads interacting face-to-face is a key strength of the previous studies. However, because of the interactive effects of face-to-face negotiations, it is difficult to completely rule out the possibility that spurious variables are at play. Thus, we aimed to further elucidate the impact of sympathy appeals on negotiation processes with a pair of more controlled scenario studies – Studies 4 and 5 – that allowed us to fully isolate the effects of sympathy appeals. In these studies, we held constant the sympathy appeals that were made, and looked at one specific decision by the party being appealed to concerning how much, if any, to concede to the request.

Further, in Study 4, in addition to comparing the effects of sympathy appeals to rational arguments, we also examined fairness appeals. Norms of fairness have been found to be both pervasive and powerful (e.g. Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997); thus, fairness was included in this study to provide an additional point of comparison in assessing the power of sympathy appeals. Lastly, Study 4 used both an undergraduate business student sample and a national sample of adults with managerial experience. This allowed us to examine whether sympathy appeals have similar effects across different populations, including individuals who are apt to have significant experience with negotiations and decision-making in real-world contexts.

6.1. Method

6.1.1. Participants

Participants were recruited from two sample populations. First, 60 undergraduate business students (51% female) from a large, west coast university participated for course credit. Second, we recruited 140 adult participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk). mTurk recruits anonymous participants from a pre-existing pool of “workers” registered through Amazon’s data collection system (see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011 for more detail on this service as well as analyses that confirm the quality of responses). Potential participants completed a pre-screening measure asking them to rate the extent of their management experience on a scale of 1 (no management experience) to 7 (extensive management experience). Only those who recorded a 4 or greater on this question were allowed to complete the main survey ($N = 96$; 60% female, $M_{Age} = 37.0$, $SD = 11.84$), thus providing us with a sample of relatively experienced managers, at least according to their self-reports.

6.1.2. Procedure

Participants were asked to take the role of a supervisor making a decision regarding an employee’s request for a raise. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three appeal conditions (sympathy, fairness & rational). The text of the vignette was identical

across conditions except for the sympathy, rational, and fairness appeals, reported below. Building on the previous studies, the sympathy appeal drew on needs that were unrelated to the workplace context, rational appeals involved merit based arguments, and the fairness appeal was constructed to invoke equality and consistency concerns, central to judgments of fairness (Deutsch, 1975; Wagstaff, 1994). Participants were instructed to imagine that they had asked the employee requesting the raise to include a note in their application detailing the reason for their request. The manipulation for each condition read as follows:

“...I am also faced with extenuating circumstances—my mother is in the hospital with a terminal illness, and I am struggling to pay the bills.” (Sympathy condition)

“...I have overseen the success of many of our most profitable deals over the past few months.” (Rational condition)

“...employees with records similar to mine have been granted raises as recently as last month.” (Fairness condition)

6.1.3. Dependent variable

After reading the scenario, participants recommended a raise on a scale of 0–6% ($M_{Students} = 3.48$, $SD_{Students} = 1.$; $M_{Managers} = 3.26$, $SD_{Managers} = 1.45$).

6.2. Pre-test

To ensure that the appeal manipulations each tapped into the constructs that they were intended to, we conducted a pretest. Participants were a national sample of 29 adults (59% female, average age 31) recruited over mTurk. The pre-test utilized a within-subjects design, whereby participants were asked “how much does each statement rely on rational arguments?” “how much does each statement rely on a fairness argument?” and “how much sympathy do you feel for each employee?” (1 – *not at all* to 7 – *very much*). A series of repeated measures *t*-tests revealed that participants experienced more sympathy for the employee making the sympathy argument ($M = 5.59$, $SD = 1.59$), than for the employee making the rational argument ($M = 3.17$, $SD = 1.87$, $t(28) = -5.29$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.39$) or the fairness argument ($M = 3.07$, $SD = 1.58$, $t(28) = 7.13$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.58$). Similarly, the rational argument was judged as more rational ($M = 6.14$, $SD = 0.99$) than the sympathy argument ($M = 4.00$, $SD = 1.95$, $t(28) = 4.65$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.38$), or the fairness argument ($M = 4.31$, $SD = 1.54$, $t(28) = 5.31$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.41$). Lastly, the fairness argument was seen as relying more upon fairness ($M = 5.62$, $SD = 1.43$), than the rational argument ($M = 4.55$, $SD = 1.90$, $t(28) = -2.32$, $p = .03$, $d = 0.64$), or the sympathy argument ($M = 3.48$, $SD = 1.83$, $t(28) = -3.99$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.30$).

6.3. Results

6.3.1. Raise granted

First using the sample of students, an ANOVA revealed a main effect for appeal condition on raise granted ($F(2,57) = 5.28$, $p = .01$). Planned comparisons showed that participants exposed to sympathy-based appeals awarded greater raises than participants exposed to rational arguments ($M = 4.05$ vs. $M = 2.89$, $t(38) = 3.22$, $p = .003$, $d = 1.01$) and fairness appeals ($M = 3.45$, $t(39) = 1.84$, $p = .07$, $d = 0.58$), which were not significantly different from each other ($t(37) = 1.45$, $p = .16$).

We next analyzed the sample of adults with management experience. An ANOVA revealed significant differences in the size of raise granted across conditions ($F(2,93) = 3.57$, $p = .03$). Planned contrasts indicated that participants who received sympathy appeals granted significantly higher raises than did participants

who received rational arguments ($M = 4.75$ vs. $M = 3.82$, $t(63) = 2.78$, $p = .01$, $d = .69$); however the difference between the sympathy and fairness conditions, although in the expected direction, did not achieve significance ($M = 4.75$ vs. $M = 4.23$, $t(61) = 1.38$, $p = .17$).

Given the similar pattern of results across the two samples, we then ran analyses on the combined sample of participants. The ANOVA was again significant ($F(2, 153) = 8.15$, $p < .001$), as were planned comparisons between the sympathy and rational conditions ($M = 3.87$ vs. $M = 2.85$, $t(103) = 4.14$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.81$) and the sympathy and fairness conditions ($M = 3.87$ vs. $M = 3.31$, $t(102) = 2.19$, $p = .04$, $d = 0.42$) (see Fig. 1).

6.4. Comparing the strength of arguments

One possible alternative explanation for the observed effects might be that the raise requests across the three conditions varied not only in their content, but also in the strength of the argument.³ To address this, we conducted a brief follow-up experiment via Amazon Mechanical Turk ($N = 100$; 56% male, $M_{Age} = 31.5$ years). Participants read the same vignette and were randomly assigned to one of same three conditions. Instead of indicating what size raise they would provide, they rated their “perceptions of the quality and strength of the rationale this employee has provided for their request” using six items ($\alpha = .92$; e.g., “They have put forth a high quality argument to accompany their request,” “They have legitimate grounds to ask for a raise,” “They have put forth a sensible and reasonable rationale for their request”). No significant differences existed in the perceived strength of arguments across conditions ($F(2, 105) = 1.29$, $p = .28$; $M_{Sympathy} = 5.33$, $M_{Rational} = 5.52$, $M_{Sympathy} = 5.05$). Thus it is unlikely that the sympathy argument elicited greater concessions because it was a stronger argument.

6.5. Discussion

Study 4 examined a controlled decision context, in which one party independently decided how large of a raise to give to the other. The only factor that varied across conditions was the content of the verbal appeal made by the person requesting the raise, allowing us to isolate the effect of sympathy appeals. Consistent with the results from Studies 1 and 3, we found that sympathy appeals improved outcomes for those making the appeals. Indeed, sympathy appeals were more effective than either rational arguments, or appeals to fairness. It is also notable that sympathy appeals affected the decisions of participants who reported having managerial experience and are thus likely to have made similar decisions in the real world, as well as undergraduate students.

7. Study 5

Study 5 sought to extend Studies 1–4 in two main ways. First, we sought to somewhat temper the content of the sympathy appeal used. The sympathy appeals examined in Studies 2–4 centered on the ill health of family members. Although these situations fit perfectly with the definition of sympathy appeals, they do involve fairly unusual and emotionally-laden circumstances, which might not arise on a regular basis within negotiations. In Study 5 therefore, we sought to examine the effectiveness of a more general appeal to sympathy, void of any mentions of health problems.

Second, we explored a potentially important boundary condition to the use of sympathy appeals. Specifically, appealing to one's counterpart's sympathy in a negotiation might only be effective for




Fig. 1. Raise granted by condition in Study 4.

certain individuals. As discussed, sympathy is generally reserved for individuals in a state of need, suffering, or vulnerability (Goetz et al., 2010), which is largely out of their control (Feather & Sherman, 2002; Reyna & Weiner, 2001; Weiner et al., 2011). Therefore, sympathy appeals may be less effective if used by individuals who are not perceived as vulnerable or lacking control. As Studies 1–4 examined sympathy appeals made by relatively weak and vulnerable negotiators and sympathy felt by relatively secure negotiators, it leaves open the question of whether the effects generalize when high power negotiators attempt to elicit sympathy. Power, or control over valued resources, is central to social interaction, particularly in organizational settings (Emerson, 1962; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008, chap. 8). Being high in power is, by definition, antithetical to being weak, vulnerable and lacking control; thus, sympathy appeals from these individuals might fail to elicit sympathy and thus fail to improve negotiated outcomes, and they might come across as especially inappropriate or manipulative, thus hurting the negotiators' relationship. Further, there is precedent for power serving to moderate the interpersonal effects of emotions: work on anger in negotiations has shown how it can backfire when expressed by those low in power (Van Dijk et al., 2008). Here, we would expect the opposite to be true – that sympathy appeals are more effective for those low in power. To explore these ideas, we manipulated the level of power held by the party making the sympathy appeal. As in Study 3, we assessed relational as well as objective outcomes.

7.1. Method

7.1.1. Participants

284 participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk. 49.6% were male and they were 34.3 years old on average ($SD = 11.56$).

7.1.2. Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (power level: high vs. low) \times 2 (appeal type: sympathy vs. rational) design. All participants read a scenario in which they were asked to imagine that they were the founder and CEO of a mid-sized digital marketing company. They were told that “One of the companies that you provide services to has just asked to renegotiate the terms of their agreement with you. Specifically, they are asking for a 10% discount to the previously agreed upon price for a marketing campaign that you are spearheading.” They were further told that they were not contractually obliged to provide any discount, and that,

³ We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.

over the past few years, this company had provided them with approximately 5% of their business.

Participants in the high power condition read that “This company, which produces clothing lines for the young professionals market, is a large and powerful one within their industry. They employ several hundred people and enjoy a significant portion of the market share.” By contrast, participants in the low power condition read that the company was “... a small and relatively powerless one within their industry. They employ a handful of people and occupy a small portion of the market share.”

Finally, participants were given a brief explanation from the other company for their request. In the sympathy condition, this read: “Thank you for considering our request. As you know, economic times have been very tough, leaving us struggling to make ends meet and feeling very vulnerable. We ask for your sympathy in considering our request for a discount.” In the rational condition the request read: “Thank you for considering our request. We have decided against launching one of the products that was to be featured in your campaign, which means that we will not require as much work from you as we originally planned. We ask you to think about what is rational in considering our request for a discount.”

7.1.3. Attention check

Due to the fact that studies of online, unmonitored participants can suffer from concerns over whether people are paying attention and reading instructions, in Study 5 we included a basic ‘Instructional Manipulation Check’ (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). 53 participants (18.7%) failed to pass this attention check and were thus excluded from further analyses, as inclusion of participants who fail to read instructions increases noise and decreases the validity of data (Oppenheimer et al., 2009).⁴

7.1.4. Manipulation checks

Participants rated their agreement with the statements “The other company is high in power” ($M = 3.29$, $SD = 1.85$) and “I feel sympathy for the other company” ($M = 4.18$, $SD = 1.75$).

7.1.5. Dependent variables

To measure relational outcomes, participants rated their level of trust (2 items; e.g., “I trust the other company,”; “1-Not at all” to “7-Very much”) and liking (2 items; e.g., “I like the other company,”) of the other party, as well as the extent to which they thought the other party was being manipulative (2 items; e.g., “I feel that the other company is being manipulative,”) and acting inappropriately and unprofessionally (2 items; e.g., “I feel that the other company is acting unprofessionally”). After reverse-scoring the manipulative and unprofessional items, the eight relational items correlated with one another highly ($\alpha = .95$) and a factor analysis indicated a strong first unrotated factor that accounted for 73.5% of the variance, upon which each item loaded at .82 or higher. Thus, we combined them into an overall aggregate measure of relational outcomes ($M = 4.40$, $SD = 1.50$). Then, participants indicated how much of a discount they would be willing to provide, from 0% to 10% ($M = 6.26$, $SD = 2.92$), which served as our measure of objective outcomes achieved.

7.2. Results

Manipulation checks indicated that participants saw the other company as more powerful in the high power condition than in the low power condition ($M = 4.34$ vs. 2.18 , $t(282) = 12.17$, $p < .001$), and that they felt more sympathy in the sympathy

condition than in the rational condition ($M = 4.77$ vs. 3.51 , $t(282) = 6.49$, $p < .001$).

7.2.1. Discount granted

A 2-factor ANOVA of discount granted revealed a main effect for appeal condition ($F(1, 227) = 3.84$, $p = .05$), but no main effect of power ($F(1, 227) = .037$, $p = .85$) or interaction between the two ($F(1, 227) = .36$, $p = .55$). Participants who received a sympathy appeal provided a greater discount than participants who received a rational appeal ($M = 6.59\%$ vs. $M = 5.84\%$), and this occurred regardless of the power level of the appealing party.

7.2.2. Relational outcomes

An ANOVA of relational outcomes revealed main effects for type of appeal ($F(1, 227) = 17.89$, $p < .001$) and power level ($F(1, 227) = 4.62$, $p = .033$), which were qualified by a significant interaction between the two ($F(1, 227) = 6.03$, $p = .015$).⁵ As shown in Fig. 2, when participants received a rational appeal along with the request for a discount, the power level of the applier did not significantly affect relational outcomes ($M_{Hi} = 3.99$ vs. $M_{Lo} = 3.93$, $t(227) = .20$, $p = .84$). However, when participants received an appeal to their sympathy, they rated relational outcomes significantly lower for high power appliers than low power appliers ($M_{Hi} = 4.32$ vs. $M_{Lo} = 5.19$, $t(227) = 3.46$, $p = .001$). Thus, high power negotiators who made a sympathy appeal achieved lower relational outcomes than low power negotiators making the same sympathy appeal, in terms of trust, liking, and being seen as manipulative and unprofessional. It is also worth noting that the imagined low power appliers achieved better relational outcomes by employing a sympathy appeal in their request for a discount rather than a rational argument ($t(227) = 4.58$, $p < .001$).

7.2.3. Strength of arguments

Lastly, we again collected additional MTurk data to address the possibility that our effects were driven by differences in the quality of arguments ($N = 100$; 60% male, $M_{Age} = 33.0$ years). There was no significant difference between conditions in perceived quality, using the same items as in Study 4 ($M_{Sympathy} = 4.28$ vs. $M_{Rational} = 4.23$, $t(100) = .19$, $p = .85$).

7.3. Discussion

Study 5 provided additional evidence for the role of sympathy appeals in negotiations, and extended our understanding of them in several ways. First, we observed that more general sympathy appeals can be effective for achieving distributive outcomes even in the absence of extreme circumstances such as the ill health of a relative, thus increasing the generalizability of our findings. Second, we found that the perceived power level of the party making the sympathy appeals did *not* change their effectiveness in terms of objective outcomes achieved. Participants who received sympathy appeals from counterparts described as high in power gave significantly greater discounts to an agreed upon contract, just like participants who received sympathy appeals from low power counterparts. Future research should continue to explore this potential boundary condition, for instance, looking to see if different types of power (e.g., a powerful bargaining position due to a high alternative offer, or the ability to control another's outcomes like in forms of the ultimatum game) may interact differently with sympathy appeals. This finding is interesting, however, in that it somewhat contradicts the notion that individuals must be

⁴ Previous studies incorporating similar attention checks have found failure rates of 46% and 35% (Oppenheimer et al., 2009).

⁵ This same significant interaction was observed in separate analyses of each of the four relational variables: trust, liking, perceptions of the applier as manipulative, and perceptions of the applier as acting unprofessionally.




Fig. 2. Relational outcomes by condition (Appeal type \times Power level of appealer) in Study 5.

vulnerable and lacking control in order to successfully appeal to the sympathy of others.

For relational outcomes, however, the effect of sympathy appeals did depend on the appealer's power level. High power individuals who made sympathy appeals were trusted and liked less than low power individuals making the exact same appeals, and these appeals were seen as more manipulative and unprofessional when coming from a high power party. These findings suggest that while high power individuals may achieve the same short-term objective benefits from asking for their counterparts' sympathy as more vulnerable individuals, this may come at a greater cost to relational outcomes, which can affect objective outcomes down the road (Curhan et al., 2006). Asking for another's sympathy is perceived as more appropriate and less manipulative when it comes from those low, rather than high, in power, and it does less to erode subsequent trust and liking when coming from low power individuals.

8. General discussion

Across five studies, we found that negotiators benefited by eliciting sympathy in their counterparts. Across several different exercises and scenarios, negotiators making sympathy appeals were more successful than those focusing on rational arguments, both in terms of claiming value in distributive negotiations, and creating value in integrative negotiations. It seems that by triggering a moral focus on reducing the suffering of others, sympathy appeals can cause their targets to relinquish desired resources and work to find mutually-beneficial negotiation agreements.

This research makes several important contributions, to the literatures on sympathy and other-suffering moral emotions, negotiation, and most broadly, the interpersonal nature of emotions. First, it builds upon existing work on other-suffering emotions in exploring the effects of sympathy in the negotiation context, and in comparing sympathy appeals to rational arguments. Studies 1–3 in particular examine face-to-face negotiation, a highly complex and interactive context in which competitiveness is prevalent and rationality has traditionally been thought to prevail (e.g., Thompson, 2005). By showing that sympathy and sympathy appeals can significantly affect outcomes within such negotiations, to an even greater degree that rational appeals, we provide strong evidence for the power of other-suffering emotions to influence behavior and decisions, which also suggests that they warrant additional study within business and organizational contexts (e.g., Melwani, Mueller, & Overbeck, 2012). We also extend prior work that has focused on external manipulations of sympathy and empathy (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1989; Galinsky et al., 2008; Oveis et al., 2010) by examining active sympathy appeals

that one party can make toward another within the normal back-and-forth of negotiation. Lastly, we identified power as a potential moderator of the effects of sympathy appeals – not, interestingly, in terms of the help or tangible outcomes received, but in terms relational outcomes such as trust and liking.

Second, this work contributes to our understanding of negotiations. Prior work on empathy and expressions of disappointment in simulated negotiations provided some precedent for the link between sympathy and distributive outcomes; however, we are among the first to show how such emotions can also facilitate integrative agreements, growing the size of the pie for both sides. This work thus adds to the growing body of evidence for the importance of psychological and emotional processes in what was once considered the domain of pure rationality. Our work also points to sympathy appeals as a potential tactic that can be used by negotiators to claim desired resources as well as facilitate mutually-beneficial agreements. We hesitate to recommend widespread use of sympathy appeals until more work has been done to assess the long-term relational consequences; however, our results offer at least an initial suggestion that if negotiators find themselves in genuine positions of weakness or vulnerability, they may consider revealing this information rather than hiding it, as doing so is apt to arouse the helpful concern of their negotiation counterpart.

Third, our work adds to just a handful of studies that have examined the strategic elicitation of emotions in others (e.g., Kray et al., 2012; Lelieveld et al., 2013). While existing research on emotions has primarily focused on experienced emotions and emotional expressions, this paper is one of the first to show that individuals can use emotional appeals to manage others' emotions and thereby influence their decision making.

8.1. Limitations and future directions

Although the studies presented here were designed in part to complement each other's shortcomings, there are some important limitations to this research as a whole that should be addressed in future work. First, while the negotiation simulations we used in this paper are frequently utilized in studies of negotiation (e.g., Anderson & Shirako, 2008; Anderson & Thompson, 2004; Galinsky et al., 2008; Howard et al., 2007; Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001; Kray et al., 2002), they are still simulations of actual negotiations. If possible, future research would do well to study the prevalence and effectiveness of sympathy appeals in real-world negotiation situations. For example, Gino and Pierce (2010) tested the idea that feelings of empathy motivate decision makers to provide illicit help to low status others using an archival dataset on vehicle emissions testing, and Curhan, Elfenbein, and Kilduff (2009) examined employees' reactions to actual job-offer negotiations and found that subjective outcomes, to a greater extent than objective outcomes, predicted job attitudes one year later.

Second, the studies reported in this paper examine dyadic situations in which negotiators were presented with a single counterpart, in isolation. It is possible that negotiators and decision-makers would be less susceptible to sympathy appeals in situations where they have multiple potential counterparts to choose from, some of who are making sympathy appeals and some of who are not. Differences in preference have been observed when multiple distinct options are viewed jointly, as opposed to being evaluated one at a time (e.g., Bazerman, Moore, Tenbrunsel, Wade-Benzoni, & Blount, 1999), and joint evaluations may be less likely to be affected by emotional experience (Ritov & Baron, 2011). Thus, it is possible that if the target of a sympathy appeal has multiple options to choose from—for example if multiple employees are requesting a raise for various reasons—sympathy appeals may be

less effective. Future work should examine this potential boundary condition.

Third, in Study 5 we only scratched the surface on the potential moderators of sympathy appeals. Research on expressions of disappointment finds that they are less effective at eliciting prosocial concessions when expressed toward counterparts who are low in dispositional trust (Van Kleef et al., 2006) and when the expresser is seen as an outgroup member (Lelieveld et al., 2013) – similarly, these factors might moderate the effectiveness of sympathy appeals. Further, expressing disappointment appears to be less effective when the counterpart is negotiating on behalf of third parties rather than him/herself (Lelieveld et al., 2013). This is consistent with the broader finding that accountability in negotiations tends to increase competitiveness and concern for one's own outcomes (for a brief review, see O'Connor, 1997). Thus, sympathy appeals may lose their effectiveness if one's counterpart is responsible to a third party or otherwise held accountable for the negotiation outcomes. It might also be interesting to explore what happens when the sympathy appeal itself is made on behalf of another (that is, not by the negotiator him/herself) – in such a situation, the third-party might serve as a buffer that increases the social distance between the vulnerable party and the receiver, thus reduced the effectiveness of the sympathy appeal. Going back to the idea that extreme levels of sympathy may interfere with the discovery of integrative agreements, one could also investigate dispositional concern for others (e.g., Davis, 1983) within receivers of sympathy appeals as another possible moderator. Researchers could also continue to explore which emotional expressions and appeals are most effective for which negotiators. Our work, considered in tandem with work on the moderating effects of power on expressions of anger (Van Dijk et al., 2008), paints a picture whereby high power negotiators may benefit from expressing anger and avoiding sympathy appeals, whereas low power negotiators should do the opposite.

Fourth, although our work suggests that sympathy appeals can be effective in one-shot negotiation scenarios, it remains to be seen what the long-term consequences are for negotiators' relationships, reputations, and future outcomes. Related questions include to what extent can sympathy appeals be used repeatedly, and what happens if sympathy appeals are found to be disingenuous. Thus, future work should continue to explore the conditions under which sympathy appeals are, and are not, effective – for both economic and relational outcomes. In a somewhat related vein, it would also be interesting to explore the role of other types of weakness in negotiations. Weakness may stem from factors such as a lack of bargaining power, a bad reputation, or one's own previous risky or hubristic behavior, in addition to the state of vulnerability and need that we focused on here, and revealing it under such circumstances may indeed backfire, perhaps eliciting something more akin to contempt than sympathy.

Another intriguing future avenue of research would be to examine the relational consequences of *expressing* sympathy. As we have shown, acting on sympathy can decrease the value that one claims in a negotiation. However, it is possible that sympathetic negotiators may gain relational capital that may build future opportunities and beneficial long-term relationships. This would be consistent with recent research that reveals that individuals who behave compassionately are more likely to be seen as leaders (Melwani et al., 2012), results which mirror the link between pro-social behavior and status conferral (e.g. Flynn, 2003; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Ridgeway, 1982; Willer, 2009). Indeed, some of this existing work suggests that the potential benefits to sympathizing with those in need may spread beyond just the sympathizer's relationship with the target of sympathy to third party observers, thus offering further support for Darwin's assertion that sympathy is beneficial at the community-level. Finally, it seems possible that

sympathy may itself involve more affective (caring) and more cognitive (concern or interest in the specifics of the situation) components; future research might seek to disentangle these. Perhaps the affective component of sympathy is primarily responsible for the effects of sympathy appeals on distributive outcomes, and the interest or curiosity component for the effects of sympathy appeals on integrative outcomes.

9. Conclusion

As negotiation scholars have moved beyond a strictly rational perspective on bargaining to a more emotionally-driven perspective (cf. Van Zant & Kray, 2015), attitudes about revealing information and potential vulnerability in negotiations have shifted. As Kopelman (2014) notes, "People often assume being a strategic negotiator implies calculated self-interest with a dose of inauthenticity, or walling off vulnerable parts of ourselves. Our fear of being taken advantage of and our desire to excel drive inauthentic behavior" (p. 13). Here we find that, by evoking the powerful emotion of sympathy, revealing vulnerability rather than concealing it can produce better economic returns, grow the joint pie, and possibly even strengthen relationships.

References

- Adam, H., & Shirako, A. (2013). Not all anger is created equal: The impact of the expresser's culture on the social effects of anger in negotiations. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 98, 785–798.
- Adam, H., Shirako, A., & Maddux, W. W. (2010). Cultural variance in the interpersonal effects of anger in negotiations. *Psychological Science*, 21, 882–889.
- Allred, K. G. (1999). Anger and retaliation: Toward and understanding of impassioned conflict in organizations. In R. J. Bies, R. J. Lewicki, & B. H. Sheppard (Eds.), *Research on negotiation in organizations* (Vol. 7, pp. 27–58). Stamford, CT: JAI Press.
- Allred, K. G., Mallozzi, J. S., Matsui, F., & Raia, C. P. (1997). The influence of anger and compassion on negotiation performance. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 70, 175–187.
- Amanatullah, E. T., Morris, M. W., & Curhan, J. R. (2008). Negotiators who give too much: Unmitigated communion, relational anxieties, and economic costs in distributive and integrative bargaining. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 95, 723–738.
- Anderson, C., Keltner, D., & John, O. P. (2003). Emotional convergence between people over time. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 84, 1054–1068.
- Anderson, C., & Shirako, A. (2008). Are individuals' reputations related to their history of behavior? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 94, 320–333.
- Anderson, C., & Thompson, L. L. (2004). Affect from the top down: How powerful individuals' positive affect shapes negotiations. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 95, 125–139.
- Austin, E. J., & O'Donnell, M. M. (2013). Development and preliminary validation of a scale to assess managing the emotions of others. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 55(7), 834–839.
- Barry, B., Fulmer, I. S., & Van Kleef, G. (2004). I laughed, I cried, I settled: The role of emotion in negotiation. In M. J. Gelfand & J. M. Brett (Eds.), *The handbook of negotiation and culture* (pp. 71–94). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Barsade, S. G. (2002). The ripple effect: Emotional contagion and its influence on group behavior. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 47, 644–675.
- Batson, C. D., & Ahmad, N. (2001). Empathy-induced altruism in a prisoner's dilemma II: What if the target of empathy has defected? *Journal of European Social Psychology*, 31, 25–36.
- Batson, C. D., Fultz, J., & Schoenrade, P. A. (1987). Distress and empathy: Two qualitatively distinct vicarious emotions with different motivational consequences. *Journal of Personality*, 55, 19–39.
- Batson, C. D., Lishner, D. A., Carpenter, A., Dulin, L., Harjusola-Webb, S., Stocks, E. L., ... Sampat, B. (2003). As you would have them do unto you: Does imagining yourself in the other's place stimulate moral action? *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 29(9), 1190–1201.
- Batson, C. D., & Moran, T. (1999). Empathy-induced altruism in a prisoner's dilemma. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 29, 909–924.
- Bazerman, M. H., Moore, D. A., Tenbrunsel, A. E., Wade-Benzoni, K. A., & Blount, S. (1999). Explaining how preferences change across joint versus separate evaluation. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 39, 41–58.
- Bazerman, M. H., & Neale, M. A. (1992). *Negotiating rationally*. New York, NY: Free Press.
- Brooks, A. W., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2011). Can Nervous Nelly negotiate? How anxiety causes negotiators to make low first offers, exit early, and earn less profit. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 115(1), 43–54.

- Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Mechanical Turk: A new source of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 6, 3–5.
- Carnevale, P. J. D., & Isen, A. M. (1986). The influence of positive affect and visual access on the discovery of integrative solutions in bilateral negotiation. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 37, 1–13.
- Carnevale, P. J. D., & Lawler, E. J. (1986). Time pressure and the development of integrative agreements in bilateral negotiation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 30, 636–659.
- Carnevale, P. J., & Pruitt, D. G. (1992). Negotiation and mediation. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 43, 531–582.
- Curhan, J. R., Elfenbein, H. A., & Kilduff, G. J. (2009). Getting off on the right foot: Subjective value versus economic value in predicting longitudinal job outcomes from job offer negotiations. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 94, 524–534.
- Curhan, J. R., Elfenbein, H. A., & Xu, H. (2006). What do people value when they negotiate? Mapping the domain of subjective value in negotiation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 91, 493–512.
- Curhan, J. R., Neale, M. A., Ross, L., & Rosencranz-Engelmann, J. (2008). Relational accommodation in negotiation: Effects of egalitarianism and gender on economic efficiency and relational capital. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 107, 192–205.
- Darwin, C. (1871/2004). *The descent of man*. Digireads.com Publishing.
- Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a multidimensional approach. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 44, 113–126.
- Davis, M. H. (1994). *Empathy: A social psychological approach*. Madison, WI: Brown and Benchmark.
- De Dreu, C. K. W., Giebels, E., & Van de Vliert, E. (1998). Social motives and trust in integrative negotiation: The disruptive effects of punitive capability. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 83, 408–422.
- De Dreu, C. K. W., Weingart, L. R., & Kwon, S. (2000). Influence of social motives on integrative negotiation: A meta-analytic review and test of two theories. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 78, 889–905.
- Deutsch, M. (1975). Equity, equality, and need: What determines which value will be used as the basis of distributive justice? *Journal of Social Issues*, 31, 137–139.
- Dunn, J. R., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2005). Feeling and believing: The influence of emotion on trust. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 88, 736–748.
- Dymond, R. F. (1949). A scale for the measurement of empathic ability. *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, 13, 127–133.
- Eisenberg, N., Fabes, R. A., Miller, P. A., Fultz, J., Shell, R., Mathy, R. M., & Reno, R. R. (1989). Relation of sympathy and personal distress to prosocial behavior: A multimethod study. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 57, 55–66.
- Eisenberg, N., Fabes, R. A., Murphy, B., Karbon, M., Maszk, P., Smith, M., ... Suh, K. (1994). The relations of emotionality and regulation to dispositional and situational empathy-related responding. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 66, 776–797.
- Eisenberg, N., Fabes, R. A., Schaller, M., Miller, P. A., Carlo, G., Poulin, R., ... Shell, R. (1991). Personality and socialization correlates of vicarious emotional responding. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 61, 459–470.
- Eisenberg, N., & Miller, P. A. (1987). The relation of empathy to prosocial and related behaviors. *Psychological Bulletin*, 101, 91–119.
- Emerson, R. M. (1962). Power-dependence relations. *American Sociological Review*, 27, 31–40.
- Epley, N., Caruso, E., & Bazerman, M. H. (2006). When perspective taking increases taking: Reactive egoism in social interaction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 91, 872–889.
- Farmer, S. M., Maslyn, J. M., Fedor, D. B., & Goodman, J. S. (1997). Putting upward influence strategies in context. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 18, 17–42.
- Feather, N. T., & Sherman, R. (2002). Envy, resentment, schadenfreude, and sympathy: Reactions to deserved and undeserved achievement and subsequent failure. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 28, 953–961.
- Flynn, F. J. (2003). How much should I give and how often? The effects of generosity and frequency of favor exchange on social status and productivity. *Academy of Management Journal*, 46, 539–553.
- Forgas, J. P. (1998). On feeling good and getting your way: Mood effects on negotiator cognition and bargaining strategies. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 74, 565–577.
- Frank, R. H. (1988). *Passions within reason: The strategic role of the emotions*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Frijda, N. H. (1986). *The emotions*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Froman, L. A., Jr., & Cohen, M. D. (1970). Compromise and logroll: Comparing the efficiency of two bargaining processes. *Behavioral Science*, 15, 180–183.
- Fry, W. R., Firestone, I. J., & Williams, D. L. (1983). Negotiation process and outcome of stranger dyads and dating couples: Do lovers lose? *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 4, 1–16.
- Galinsky, A. D., Maddux, W. W., Gilin, D., & White, J. B. (2008). Why it pays to get inside the head of your opponent: The differential effects of perspective-taking and empathy in strategic interactions. *Psychological Science*, 19, 378–384.
- Gelfand, M. J., Major, V. S., Raver, J. L., Nishi, L. H., & O'Brien, K. (2006). Negotiating relationally: The dynamics of the relational self in negotiations. *Academy of Management Review*, 31, 427–451.
- Gino, F., & Pierce, L. (2010). Robin Hood under the hood: Wealth-based discrimination in illicit customer help. *Organization Science*, 21, 1176–1194.
- Gino, F., & Schweitzer, M. (2008). Blinded by anger or feeling the love: How emotions influence advice taking. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 93, 1165–1173.
- Goetz, J. L., Keltner, D., & Simon-Thomas, E. (2010). Compassion: An evolutionary analysis and empirical review. *Psychological Bulletin*, 136, 351–374.
- Goldberg, S. (1997). *Texoil*. In J. M. Brett (Ed.), *Teaching materials for negotiations and decision making*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, Dispute Resolution Research Center.
- Greenlaugh, L. (1993). *Viking*. In J. M. Brett (Ed.), *Teaching materials for negotiations and decision making*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, Dispute Resolution Research Center.
- Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. *Psychological Review*, 108, 814–834.
- Haidt, J. (2003). The moral emotions. In R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), *Handbook of affective sciences* (pp. 852–870). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Handgraaf, M. J., Van Dijk, E., Vermunt, R. C., Wilke, H. A., & De Dreu, C. K. (2008). Less power or powerless? Egocentric empathy gaps and the irony of having little versus no power in social decision making. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 95(5), 1136.
- Hardy, C., & Van Vugt, M. (2006). Nice guys finish first: The competitive altruism hypothesis. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 32, 1402–1413.
- Hatfield, E., Cacioppo, J. T., & Rapson, R. L. (1994). *Emotional contagion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hogan, R. (1969). Development of an empathy scale. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, 33, 307–313.
- Howard, E. S., Gardner, W. L., & Thompson, L. (2007). The role of the self-concept and the social context in determining the behavior of power holders: Self-construal in intergroup versus dyadic dispute resolution negotiations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 93, 614–631.
- Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Anderson, C. (2003). Power, approach, and inhibition. *Psychological Review*, 110, 265–284.
- Keltner, D., Haidt, J., & Shiota, M. N. (2006). Social functionalism and the evolution of emotions. In M. Schaller, J. A. Simpson, & D. T. Kenrick (Eds.), *Evolution and social psychology* (pp. 115–142). New York, NY: Psychology Press.
- Keltner, D., & Kring, A. (1998). Emotion, social function, and psychopathology. *Review of General Psychology*, 2, 320–342.
- Ketelaar, T., & Tung Au, W. (2003). The effects of feelings of guilt on the behaviour of uncooperative individuals in repeated social bargaining games: An affect-as-information interpretation of the role of emotion in social interaction. *Cognition & Emotion*, 17(3), 429–453.
- Kilduff, M., Chiaburu, D. S., & Menges, J. I. (2010). Strategic use of emotional intelligence in organizational settings: Exploring the dark side. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 30, 129–152.
- Kopelman, S. (2014). Being genuine in business: Wearing one hat. In *Negotiating genuinely: Being yourself in business*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- Kopelman, S., Rosette, A. S., & Thompson, L. (2006). The three faces of Eve: An examination of strategic positive, negative, and neutral emotion in negotiations. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 99, 81–101.
- Kramer, R. M., Newton, E., & Pommerenke, P. L. (1993). Self-enhancement biases and negotiator judgment – Effects of self-esteem and mood. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 56, 110–133.
- Kray, L. J., Galinsky, A. D., & Thompson, L. (2002). Reversing the gender gap in negotiations: An exploration of stereotype regeneration. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 87, 386–410.
- Kray, L. J., & Gelfand, M. J. (2009). Relief versus regret: The effect of gender and negotiating norm ambiguity on reactions to having one's first offer accepted. *Social Cognition*, 27, 418–436.
- Kray, L. J., Kennedy, J. A., & Van Zant, A. B. (2014). Not competent enough to know the difference? Gender stereotypes about women's ease of being misled predict negotiator deception. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 125, 61–72.
- Kray, L. J., Locke, C. C., & Van Zant, A. B. (2012). Feminine charm: An experimental analysis of its costs and benefits in negotiation. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 30, 1343–1357.
- Kray, L. J., Thompson, L., & Galinsky, A. D. (2001). Battle of the sexes: Gender stereotype confirmation and reactance in negotiations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 80, 942–958.
- Lazarus, R. S. (1991). *Emotion and adaptation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lelieveld, G., Van Dijk, E., Van Beest, I., Steinel, W., & Van Kleef, G. (2011). Disappointed in you, angry about your offer: Distinct negative emotions induce concessions via different mechanisms. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 47, 635–641.
- Lelieveld, G., Van Dijk, E., Van Beest, I., & Van Kleef, G. (2012). Why anger and disappointment affect bargaining behavior differently: The moderating role of power and the mediating role of reciprocal and complementary emotions. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 38, 1209–1221.
- Lelieveld, G. J., Van Dijk, E., Van Beest, I., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2013). Does communicating disappointment in negotiations help or hurt? Solving an apparent inconsistency in the social-functional approach to emotions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 105, 605–630.
- Maddux, M. M., Mullen, E., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Chameleons bake bigger pies and take bigger pieces: Strategic behavioral mimicry facilitates negotiation outcomes. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 44, 461–468.
- Magee, J. C., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Social hierarchy: The self-reinforcing nature of power and status. *The Academy of Management Annals*, 2, 351–398.
- Malhotra, D., & Bazerman, M. (2007). *Negotiation genius*. New York, NY: Random House Inc.

- Malhotra, D., & Gino, F. (2012). The pursuit of power corrupts: How investing in outside options motivates opportunism in relationships. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 56, 559–592.
- Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., & Caruso, D. R. (2000). Models of emotional intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), *Handbook of intelligence* (pp. 396–420). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mayer, J. D., & Salovey, P. (1997). What is emotional intelligence? In P. Salovey & D. J. Sluyter (Eds.), *Emotional development and emotional intelligence: Educational implications* (pp. 3–34). New York: Basic Books.
- Melwani, S., Mueller, J. S., & Overbeck, J. (2012). Looking down: The influence of contempt and compassion on emergent leadership categorizations. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 79, 1171–1185.
- Morris, M. W., & Keltner, D. (2000). How emotions work: An analysis of the social functions of emotional expressions in negotiations. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 22, 1–50.
- Neale, M. A. (1997). New recruit. In J. M. Brett (Ed.), *Teaching materials for negotiations and decision making*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, Dispute Resolution Research Center.
- O'Connor, K. M. (1997). Groups and solos in context: The effects of accountability on team negotiation. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 72, 384–407.
- Olekalns, M., & Smith, P. (2007). Loose with the truth: Predicting deception in negotiation. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 76, 225–238.
- Oppenheimer, D. M., Meyvis, T., & Davidenko, N. (2009). Instructional manipulation checks: Detecting satisficing to increase statistical power. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 45, 867–872.
- Oveis, C., Horberg, E. J., & Keltner, D. (2010). Compassion, pride and social intuitions of self-other similarity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 98, 618–630.
- Pierce, J. R., Kilduff, G. J., Galinsky, A. D., & Sivanathan, N. (2013). From glue to gasoline: How competition turns perspective takers unethical. *Psychological Science*, 24, 1986–1994.
- Potworowski, G., & Kopelman, S. (2008). Strategic display and response to emotions: Developing evidence-based negotiation expertise in emotion management (NEEM). *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research*, 1, 333–352.
- Pruitt, D. G., & Rubin, J. Z. (1986). *Social conflict: Escalation, stalemate and settlement*. New York: Random House.
- Pugh, S. D. (2001). Service with a smile: Emotional contagion in the service encounter. *Academy of Management Journal*, 44, 1018–1027.
- Rafaeli, A., & Sutton, R. I. (1991). Emotional contrast strategies as means of social influence: Lessons from criminal interrogators and bill collectors. *Academy of Management Journal*, 34, 749–775.
- Reyna, C., & Weiner, B. (2001). Justice and utility in the classroom: An attributional analysis of the goals of teachers' punishment and intervention strategies. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 93, 309–319.
- Ridgeway, C. L. (1982). Status in groups: The importance of motivation. *American Sociological Review*, 47, 76–88.
- Ritov, I., & Baron, J. (2011). Joint presentation reduces the effect of emotion on evaluation of public actions. *Cognition and Emotion*, 25, 657–675.
- Sinaceur, M., & Tiedens, L. Z. (2006). Get mad and get more than even: The benefits of anger expressions in negotiations. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 42, 314–322.
- Smith, A. (1976). *An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (Original work published 1776).
- Sutton, R. I. (1991). Maintaining norms about expressed emotions – The case of bill collectors. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 36, 245–268.
- Thompson, L. (1991). Information exchange in negotiation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 27, 61–179.
- Thompson, L. (2005). *The mind and heart of the negotiator* (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Thompson, L., Nadler, J., & Kim, P. H. (1999). Some like it hot: The case for the emotional negotiator. In L. L. Thompson, J. M. Levine, & D. M. Messick (Eds.), *Shared cognition in organizations: The management of knowledge* (pp. 139–161). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. *Science*, 185, 1124–1131.
- Tyler, T. R., Boeckmann, R. J., Smith, H. J., & Huo, Y. J. (1997). *Social justice in a diverse society*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Valley, K. L., Neale, M. A., & Mannix, F. A. (1995). Friends, lovers, colleagues, strangers: The effects of relationships on the process and outcome of dyadic negotiations. In R. J. Bies, R. Lewicki, & B. Sheppard (Eds.), *Research on negotiation in organizations* (pp. 65–93). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Van Dijk, E., Van Kleef, G. A., Steinel, W., & Van Beest, I. (2008). Emotions in bargaining: When communicating anger pays and when it backfires. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 94, 600–614.
- Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2004). The interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 86, 57–76.
- Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K., & Manstead, A. S. (2006). Supplication and appeasement in conflict and negotiation: The interpersonal effects of disappointment, worry, guilt, and regret. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 91, 124–142.
- Van Kleef, G. A., De Dreu, C. K. W., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2010). An interpersonal approach to emotion in social decision making: The emotions as social information model. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 42, 45–96.
- Van Zant, A., & Kray, L. J. (2015). Negotiation and conflict resolution: A behavioral decision research perspective. In G. Wu & G. Keren (Eds.), *Wiley-Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision making* (pp. 828–848). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
- Wagstaff, G. F. (1994). Equity, equality, and need: Three principles of justice or one? An analysis of 'equity as desert'. *Current Psychology*, 13, 138–153.
- Weiner, B., Osborne, E., & Rudolph, U. (2011). An attributional analysis of reactions to poverty: The political ideology of the giver and the perceived morality of the receiver. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 15, 199–213.
- Willer, R. (2009). Groups reward individual sacrifice: The status solution to the collective action problem. *American Sociological Review*, 74, 23–43.
- Yukl, G., & Tracey, B. (1992). Consequences of influence tactics used with subordinates, peers, and the boss. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 77, 525–535.
- Zhong, C. B. (2011). The ethical dangers of deliberative decision making. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 56, 1–25.