Minorities and the Clandestine Collective Action Dilemma: The Secret Protection of Jews during the Holocaust[1]

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This article argues that local minority groups are better able to initiate and sustain underground movements because members form isolated hubs of commitment that are able to overcome the clandestine collective action dilemma, that is, the dual challenge of secrecy and mobilization. The author substantiates this claim with a case study of resistance against the Holocaust. He combines a unique and underutilized collection of postwar testimonies gathered in light of an honorary pension program with postwar trials of pro-Nazi collaborators and literature on nonrescuers, to trace both successful and failed rescue attempts. In line with the theory, the analysis reveals that Catholic rescue groups were more successful in Protestant regions and vice versa because their minority position facilitated mobilization while reducing exposure. Statistical analyses of postwar testimonies and arrest records confirm this picture, demonstrating that it is the distinctive local position of groups that enables the production of underground movements.

INTRODUCTION

Clandestine movements have played a crucial role in the instigation of revolutions (Lenin 1970; Gould 1995), resistance movements (Finkel 2015),

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guerrilla groups (Viterna 2006), terrorism (Sageman 2011; Shapiro 2013), rescue operations for victims of mass persecution (Foner 2015), and transformative collective action more broadly (Smelser 1962). When talking about revolutions, Lenin, one of the more influential movement organizers in world history, identified secrecy as the most important condition for success (Lenin [1902]1970; Erickson 1981). Despite the importance of clandestine collective action, we lack a complete understanding of why some communities are able to produce and sustain underground operations while others are not. In addition to obvious data collection problems, this is—at least according to some—due to a scholarly focus on public claim making in the collective action literature (Zwerman, Steinhoff, and della Porta 2000).

Existing explanations of clandestine collective action focus on how national factors, such as levels of repression, leadership, and the nature of protest waves (Fein 1979; Zwerman et al. 2000; della Porta 2013), or individual attributes, such as adventurousness, moral outrage, ideology, values, and biographical availability, push and pull nascent rebels into clandestine operations (London 1970; Viterna 2006). Recognizing that these approaches fail to account for differential mobilization within countries, more recent research has tried to explore interactions between individual motives and national forces (Viterna 2006; della Porta 2013). Inspired by scholarship of other types of high-risk collective action, this mesolevel approach has shown how recruitment through dense networks connects individuals to broader macroenvironments, enabling underground mobilization from the ground up (Morris 1981; McAdam 1986; Gould 1995; della Porta 2013). Although this focus on network density has significantly enhanced our understanding of secretive movements, it fails to explain why some communities are able to produce social relationships that allow for careful clandestine recruitment while others are not.

This article sheds light on the local challenges of clandestine collective action, to explain where clandestine recruitment is more successful. In particular, I draw on the sociology of secrecy (Simmel 1906; Erickson 1981; Herdt 1990; Fine and Holyfield 1996) and covert social networks (Raab and Milward 2003; Morselli, Giguère, and Petit 2007; Sageman 2011; Crossley et al. 2012), to show that clandestine mobilization is a distinctive form of high-risk collective action (McAdam 1986; Loveman 1998) that, in addition to

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the more commonly studied high-risk collective action problem, involves an extra trade-off because the network density, coordination, and communication required for mobilization automatically reduce secrecy on a local level (Goffman 1970; Baker and Faulkner 1993; Shapiro 2013).

The central hypothesis of this article is that local minority communities are better able to solve the clandestine collective action dilemma because minority isolation simultaneously increases (*a*) group commitment (Coleman 1988) and (*b*) decreases the flow of information to undedicated outsiders in the immediate environment (Granovetter 1995; Portes 1995), producing hubs of commitment that exploit the advantages of dense networks while reducing exposure by embedding them in isolated structures. As a result, clandestine collective action often remains rare and confined to limited sets of local communities.

Clandestinity poses enormous obstacles for empirical investigation. Gaining direct access to contemporary clandestine cells is next to impossible exactly because these cells need to reduce exposure in order to survive. Archival work on historical cases can alleviate this challenge because it allows us to study groups that are no longer under immediate threat, reducing the urgency of secrecy (Crossley et al. 2012). Moreover, when political structures open and regimes change, former clandestine networks sometimes go public in order to gain recognition for their activities against past foes. This often opens up a wide array of archives and testimonies. Instead of focusing on contemporary cases, this study therefore focuses on a historical episode of clandestine collective action: the secret protection of Jews during the Holocaust.

I zero in on Twente, an economically and socially integrated region in the Netherlands located across the Catholic-Protestant fault line that divides Western Europe. As a result, important economic and social factors, including top-down enforcement by elites, national norms, levels of threat, scrutiny, repression and ideology, can be kept constant when comparing Protestant and Catholic groups in minority and majority contexts. The extraordinary availability of unused archival sources presented by the Holocaust in Twente enables me to study clandestine collective action in a detailed fashion. I deploy two unique and underutilized collections of postwar testimonies. The first collection consists of research done in light of an honors pension program and contains information about people who either protected Jews themselves or lost family members who did so. The second body of documents is collected in light of postwar trials against collaborators and provides information about the detection of Jews in hiding. In combination with existing work on the mentality of nonrescuers (Hilbrink 1989; Van Der Boom 2012; Demant 2015), these sources provide an unusual opportunity to trace the evolution of successful and unsuccessful clandestine rescue operations (i.e., networks that were detected and dismantled by security forces).

In support of the minority thesis, the data reveal that (*a*) minority leaders were able to exploit the mobilizing capacity of committed members, (*b*) majority rescue operations were more likely to get denounced early on, (*c*) religious mixing undermined the minority advantage by undercutting isolation, and, as a result, (*d*) insulated pockets of Protestants were more successful in protecting Jews in Catholic regions while the same was true for Catholic enclaves in Protestant areas. A quantitative analysis of commemoration books and postwar testimonies of rescuers throughout the Netherlands backs up these findings from Twente. In addition, the case study helps me link deeply structural factors to actual outcomes, by suggesting three feedback mechanisms that translate the (somewhat) abstract minority advantage into actual higher levels of clandestine mobilization: group isolation assures organizers that mobilization is possible (Elster 1989), it helps organizers to recruit the right operatives (Marwell and Oliver 1993), and it improves the selective retention of resistance by reducing infiltration from outsiders (Aldrich 1999).

This article extends my earlier research on the religious rescue of Jews in the Netherlands, which used a statistical analysis of geocoded evasion data, to show that Jews living in the vicinity of minority church buildings were more likely to survive the war (Braun 2016). This earlier research assumes, but never proves, that this was the case because minority congregations were both more motivated and better able to protect. Here, I zero in on the ability to protect and identify several mechanisms underlying the statistical patterns in Braun (2016), using detailed case studies of rescue operations. Taken together the two articles use different methods to illuminate different steps in the causal chain that link minority status to resistance against genocide.[2]

In addition, this article makes six distinct but interrelated contributions to scholarship on collective action, political violence, social movements, and humanitarian protection. First and foremost, this article suggests that we should study the interaction between individual factors, mesolevel networks, and national-level processes if we really want to understand where and why clandestine resistance against genocide emerges (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008). The potential of this multilevel framework is detailed in the conclusion.

Second, this article sheds light on the root causes of clandestine mobilization. Existing work has shown that dense and spatially clustered networks embedded in formal organizations provide the relational base for secret mobilization (Gould 1995). Yet, strong organizational networks and personal ties abound, while clandestine mobilization is rare. This article shows that

[2] For now, I shy away from assessing the relative importance of ability and motivation, as the two often reinforce each other (Joas 1993). I further explore this issue in my book (Braun, in press).

dense networks need to be structured in a particular way to facilitate underground collective action, qualifying the relationship between networks and coordinated opposition.

Third, I contribute to debates on the secrecy-efficiency trade-off in the study of covert networks. Advocates of this trade-off argue that clandestine networks need to be sparse and decentralized to remain covert and are, as a consequence, inefficient in solving complex collective action problems (Raab and Milward 2003; Enders and Su 2007). Opponents have suggested that efficiency and secrecy actually reinforce each other because density and centralization improve secrecy by facilitating coordination, careful recruitment, and internal solidarity (Simmel 1906; Erickson 1981). The current analysis suggests that insights from both camps should be combined, as isolated hubs of commitment conducive to secret mobilization are locally dense but globally sparse (Sageman 2011; Crossley et al. 2012), specifying a nonlinear relationship between network structure and mobilization (Gould 1993). In so doing, this finding contradicts theories suggesting that covert operations are aided by a group's weak ties, which can improve access to resources, enhance cohesion through the collection of information about threatening outsiders (della Porta 2013), and facilitate the diffusion of resistance (Gould 1995).

Fourth, this article strengthens links between the literatures on social movements and political violence by investigating how outcomes of mass killing are contingent on localized forms of clandestine mobilization by bystanders. Scholars of political violence traditionally depict civilians as powerless pawns in the hands of warring parties who either support rebels or are coerced to provide local intelligence (Kalyvas 2006). More recently, scholars of social movements have looked at the mobilization of killers (Su 2011) and victims (Einwohner and Maher 2011). This article demonstrates how and where empathetic or adventurous bystanders can mobilize in secret to condition the local impact of political violence.

Fifth, this article reveals the Reformation's lasting impact on clandestine resistance to political violence centuries later. As such, I join a small body of work that reveals how protective mobilization not only affects victimization directly but is itself shaped by historical legacies of long-gone political movements. These legacies of contention introduce a new set of historical variables understudied by social movement scholars and highlight the importance of embedding the study of both political violence and collective action in the broader historical context of contentious politics (Clemens 2007).

Sixth, although the article focuses on minorities in general it also sheds light on the role of religion and collective action. Traditionally, European social theorists have portrayed religious hierarchies as agents of passivity that hamper mobilization, while scholars on the other side of the ocean depicted them as actors that inspired transformative waves of collective action

(Morris 1981). This article suggests that whether church communities produce resistance is dependent on how they are embedded in the local community.

In the following section, I introduce the clandestine collective action dilemma, explaining how and why minorities are better able to produce and sustain secretive mobilization in defense of threatened neighbors. I then introduce the region of Twente and describe the developments that led to its religious split. The following section describes the archival materials that allow me to interrogate the roots of clandestine protection. The qualitative analysis is presented in the subsequent section. I then use a subset of commemoration books and postwar testimonies to assess whether the minority hypothesis travels beyond its borders. In the conclusion, I explore the scope conditions of my theory and provide building blocks for a multilevel theory of clandestine collective action that combines national context, individual motivation, and community capacity.

THEORY

The Clandestine Collective Action Dilemma

Underground mobilization poses two interrelated challenges that together constitute what I call the clandestine collective action dilemma. First, one needs to mobilize. This involves the well-studied high-risk collective action problem. A secret organization requires the establishment of communication lines, safe houses, forged documents, and the collection of sufficient food for its members (Finkel 2015). This is too much work for one person or family alone, necessitating cooperation beyond the household. Individuals are reluctant to take part in these activities because both the costs and risks of participation are extremely high. However, numerous scholars have shown that dense or centralized interpersonal networks (McAdam 1986; Marwell and Oliver 1993), often embedded in associations (Morris 1981; Gould 1995), allow movements to overcome high-risk collective action problems by enabling recruitment and coordination (McAdam 1986; Sageman 2011; della Porta 2013), as well as producing solidarity through social sanctioning (Coleman 1988).

Second, in addition to solving the high-risk collective action problem, resistance networks need to be sustained. This requires secrecy because movement organizers cannot exclude oppressors from the areas in which they operate (Shapiro 2013). Becoming known to the persecuting power not only leads to operational failure but also results in compounding security threats as perpetrators try to arrest associates of captured individuals (Sullivan 2016). The secrecy challenge is related to the high-risk collective action problem because heightened secrecy reduces the odds of getting caught, making

participation more attractive for forward-looking actors. However, underground mobilization faces a unique trade-off that distinguishes it from other forms of high-risk collective action: mobilization requires dense and centralized networks for recruitment, sanctioning, coordination, and communication, all of which increase the chances of detection and a group being compromised (Goffman 1970; Raab and Milward 2003; Enders and Su 2007).

Hence, the tools needed to increase the collective capacity of a group are the very tools that put these groups at risk (Shapiro 2013), a dilemma that network analysts commonly refer to as the secrecy-efficiency trade-off (Morselli et al. 2007; Crossley et al. 2012). Advocates of this trade-off assume that covert networks necessarily sacrifice collective capacity for secrecy and consequently are characterized by low density, the exact reverse of a network structure conducive to high-risk mobilization (Raab and Milward 2003; Enders and Su 2007; Crossley et al. 2012). Studies of criminal networks have challenged this assumption, revealing that underground organizations do sometimes rely on dense networks for complex tasks because denser networks increase solidarity and facilitate careful recruitment and coordination, thereby reducing the risk of exposure by enhancing the quality of mobilization (Baker and Faulkner 1993; Morselli et al. 2007; Crossley et al. 2012).

The sociology of secrecy suggests that dense networks need to be structured in a distinct way in order to facilitate clandestinity. More specifically, covert networks need to be both dense and isolated. On the one hand, secrecy—just like high-risk mobilization—requires strong group commitment, cohesion, and dense internal networks (Fine and Holyfield 1996). On the other hand, underground groups need to exclude uncommitted outsiders (Herdt 1990) in order to create barriers that prevent the leakage of secrets to the outside world (Gibson 2014). Whereas the classic collective action problem requires creating a core of committed followers who are willing to mobilize, the secrecy challenge necessitates that information actually stays within this core and does not spread to undedicated outsiders who could potentially reveal clandestine activities (Herdt 1990).

Overcoming both challenges at once requires isolated hubs of commitment without weak ties that could potentially transmit secrets to the uncommitted (Herdt 1990). The same process that makes weak ties strong when looking for jobs (i.e., the flow of new information) turns them into a liability for clandestine collective action (Granovetter 1995) and explains why covert organizations often emerge within segregated groups of like-minded individuals (Raab and Milward 2003). This notion combines insights from scholars arguing both in favor of and against the secrecy-efficiency trade-off, as isolated hubs of commitment are locally dense clusters located in a broader network that is sparse (Crossley et al. 2012), revealing a nonlinear relationship between network density and clandestine collective action in

general (Gould 1993). Isolated hubs of commitment evoke the structure of many 21st-century terrorist organizations that consist of small and "leaderless" cells (Raab and Milward 2003) operating largely independently in pursuit of a common cause (Sageman 2011).

The Minority Advantage

The high premium on commitment and secrecy restricts recruitment. Because it is easier to generate group commitment between similar actors already engaged in frequent interactions, recruitment into illicit collective action often proceeds through existing bonds of trust, typically resting on kinship ties or other strong relationships. As a result, clandestine collective action in times of upheaval often inherits group structures present in uneventful times (Erickson 1981); put otherwise, preexisting group relationships create the confines within which clandestine mobilization emerges in times of crisis.

Given the distinct challenges of clandestine mobilization, some groups are better equipped for its challenges than others because of the way in which they are locally embedded. The main hypothesis of this article is that minority groups have a natural advantage in producing and sustaining clandestine networks because they are anchored in isolated hubs of commitment that provide relatively safe places for illicit mobilization.

At least four reinforcing processes increase isolation and commitment of minorities: distinctive identification, exclusionary pressures, social closure, and, in some cases, membership screening. According to the distinctiveness postulate, people rely on perceptual selectivity to make sense of who they are and what groups they are willing to commit to. Individuals tend to commit most to characteristics that are relatively rare in their social environments because rare traits provide the most information about who you are. In line with the distinctiveness postulate, social psychologists studying collective action have demonstrated that minority groups, those organized around relatively rare traits, display strong group identification and are more likely to invest in within-group networks. These network choices and levels of identification in turn increase internal cohesion, compliance with group norms, overall loyalty, and voluntary self-sacrifice among members, as well as social isolation (Brewer and Silver 2000).

Needless to say, isolation is not always driven by the behavior of the minority itself. Dominant groups see the practices and beliefs of minorities as strange and deviant, producing perceptions of threat and prejudicial attitudes, which in turn results in avoidance. Exclusion by the majority reinforces isolation from mainstream society, while at the same time increasing the importance of cohesion and internal networks (Coser 1956).

In cases in which membership is voluntary, exclusion also creates isolated hubs of commitment and trust by changing the membership profile of minority groups. Whenever social life is segregated by group membership, a minority position acts as a natural screening device because it imposes unproductive costs on members by inhibiting participation in dominant political, economic, and social networks. If one is not allowed to interact with out-group members in a region where everyone belongs to one's community, membership costs are marginal. However, if on a local level one's group decreases in size relative to another community, prohibitions start to matter, and the costs of limited interaction become enormous for minority members. At the same time, these costs subsequently screen out potential free riders and increase the importance of the collectivity for everyone (Iannaccone 1994; Berman 2011).

Finally, the combination of strong internal networks and exclusion also enhances social closure, providing opportunities to sanction members who decide to betray their fellows (Coleman 1988). Taken together, distinctive identification, exclusion, membership screening, and social closure turn minorities into dense networks of committed individuals (Coleman 1988) that are insulated from undedicated outsiders (Granovetter 1995; Portes 1995). These isolated hubs of commitment in turn create an opportunity to overcome the dual challenge of high-risk collective action and secrecy.

From Isolated Commitment to Clandestine Mobilization

As outcomes cannot be explained by their consequences, the minority advantage in clandestine capacity does not manifest itself automatically (Elster 1989). Reliable and committed volunteers who happen to be embedded in isolated networks cannot simply walk to a recruiting office, nor do all organizers automatically possess the cognitive skills and information to seize the opportunity provided by social enclaves. This study exposes three feedback mechanisms that translate the abstract minority advantage into higher levels of clandestine mobilization among minority enclaves: selective retention, organizer's assurance, and organizer's selectivity.

First, selective retention refers to the process through which entities with favorable traits perpetuate themselves because they are more likely to survive their environmental conditions (Aldrich 1999). Selective pressures for resistance groups are severe, as repressive authorities have consistent strategies to detect, infiltrate, and uproot clandestine networks (Sullivan 2016). These strategies depend on intelligence about where illicit activities take place. Given their isolated nature, minority groups are less likely to reveal this information than majority groups and are consequently less likely to see their mission interrupted by intelligence agents. Selective retention also amplifies the overall segregation of clandestine organizations. Expansion of re-

cruitment outside the confines of an existing group is appealing to some because it can enlarge an organization's impact and scope, but networks that scale outward often create internal differences in ideology, strategy, or style in the process, triggering innate strife and increasing the demand for coordination. Consequently, expansion reduces the likelihood that a rescue organization can keep intelligence out of the hands of its much stronger opponent.

Second, the importance of a minority position for clandestine collective action reveals itself to forward-looking organizers and recruits via an assurance mechanism. As followers embedded in minority groups are more willing to take on risks for group and leadership, rescuers recognize that clandestine coordination is possible within the confines of their enclave, something that is reinforced by the segregated structures that were already in place before the war. The mere assurance that fellows would cooperate in this way increases the overall motivation among group members to set up and engage in clandestine missions (Elster 1989).

Third, selectivity denotes the organizers' ability to distinguish individuals who are valuable for complex collective action from those who are not (Marwell and Oliver 1993). It is easier for minority organizers to acquire this internal intelligence. In part, this ability derives from deep inside knowledge of the community. Because of the isolated nature of enclaves, minority organizers have larger networks that allow them to better tap into information flows, increasing the number of available signals with which they can recognize the preferences, trustworthiness, and capacities of fellow group members. Networks in which close primary relationships are provided in this way not only assure organizers about the feasibility of mobilization, they also produce an inventory of the different skills and resources available within the group, all of which could be accessed without having to leave the enclave of trust. The network closure of minorities, as a result, cuts across individuals with different skill sets, allowing for coordinated action among trustworthy actors.

Leadership plays a central role in two of the three mechanisms because it is centralized organizers who are ensured that mobilization is possible and identify the best recruits. This does not imply, however, that the mechanisms are conditional on the existence of strong authority structures or formal hierarchies. All that is necessary for these mechanisms to operate is the presence of one or two individuals who are willing to take the first step in the mobilization process. A large body of scholarship suggests that such organizers exist even in the most egalitarian and antiauthoritarian communities (Swidler 1979). I return to this question in the conclusion, where I discuss several examples that indicate that the minority mechanisms also operate in organizations without authority. This point is further reinforced by the following case studies that reveal how nonformal authorities often were the first movers in mobilizing communities.

TWENTE

Twente was established as a unified political entity when the Netherlands became part of the Holy Roman Empire in 804. With an eye to existing tribal boundaries, Charles the Great turned the region into a separate shire that much later became part of the Episcopal principality of Utrecht. Under the rule of the bishop, the region became completely Catholic, staying this way after the Burgundian and Hapsburg emperors took over. This changed when a coalition of Dutch merchants and Calvinists staged a revolt against the Catholic king of Spain in 1555. The local elite in Twente reluctantly joined the Dutch revolt in order to maintain local privileges. Although, the whole of Twente became part of the Dutch republic in 1597, a new wave of violence in 1605 split the region, which had been unified for more than 600 years. For a little more than 20 years, Twente's northwest remained Dutch, while the region's southeast fell under Spanish rule, until Field Marshal Casimir rejoined both parts within the Dutch Republic (Klokhuis 1982).

This brief 20-year political split had a resounding and long-term impact on the religious composition of Twente, amplified by the ongoing Reformation and Counter-Reformation. While the northwest came to be dominated by Protestants, the southeast remained a Catholic stronghold (fig. 1). Minority church communities were able to maintain themselves on both sides of



FIG. 1.—Twente, 1940

the divide: in the Catholic south, Protestants were able to penetrate with help from the federal government, while in the Protestant north, Catholic enclaves survived with help from coreligionists living in nearby Germany. Under the influence of religious developments in nearby Germany, the region also became a hotbed of Orthodox Protestant movements, attracting followers dissatisfied with modernism in the mainstream Protestant church throughout the 19th and 20th centuries (Demant 2015).

The consequences of this religious history were still visible at the onset of the Holocaust. Figure 2 shows the distribution of Catholicism, Protestantism, and Orthodoxy in Twente in 1942.[3] As one can see, Catholics were still dominant in the southeast, Protestants dominated the northwest, and minority enclaves of Protestants and Catholics existed on either side of the religious fault line. Figure 2*b* reveals that both Catholic and Protestant parts of Twente were home to numerous smaller Orthodox Protestant communities. Figure 2*c* shows that in 1942, right before the deportations began, almost 3,000 Jews were living across Twente. Because Jews resided in both Catholic and Protestant parts of Twente, it is possible to compare rescue in both parts of the region.[4]

Twente is unique for a second reason: with the exception of the 20 years of the Counter-Reformation, it has always been a unified administrative territory. Religious differences notwithstanding, the region integrated economically and politically under Dutch rule. Because it was relatively isolated from the rest of the country, it independently developed a textile industry by relying on extensive cottage industry. In 1830, the Dutch government designated Twente as the country's textile center, reinforcing unity even more (Klokhuis 1982).

The major religious divergence aside, this level of economic integration guaranteed that the region's economic and political homogeneity was sustained. This enables me to keep other factors that could potentially explain minority mobilization constant. Figure 3 compares newly digitalized census data for different religious groups living in the Protestant and Catholic parts of Twente in 1947 (the year closest to World War II for which subgroup-level data are available) and Jewish census data from early 1942, right before the deportations started. The figure presents difference-in-means tests and accompanying *P*-values for Jews, Protestants, Orthodox Protestants, and Catholics living in Catholic and Protestant counties for a range of socioeconomic variables. The low differences between the regions indicate that Jews, Prot-

[3] Data on religious composition come from the Central Bureau for Statistics 1931 census. Information on churches is obtained from the Dutch inventory for church buildings (Inventaris Kerkgebouwen in Nederland) compiled by Sonneveld and maintained by the Free University in Amsterdam.

[4] Geocoded data on Jews are missing for the town of Groenlo.

estants, or Catholics residing in the northwest of Twente were indeed roughly comparable to their counterparts in the southeast in terms of age, economic activity, and levels of integration. Statistical analysis elsewhere has revealed that Jews and minorities were not more likely to live in proximity of each other, nor were they better integrated (Braun 2016).[5]

The subnational focus on Twente has a third advantage in that it controls for potentially macrolevel confounding variables. Crucially, top-down enforcement of mobilization between congregations is largely kept constant as Protestant and Catholic leaders in the Netherlands protested anti-Semitic legislation collaboratively, repeatedly, and consistently at the national level, providing all Christians, regardless of congregation or social position (minority/majority), with the same moral message of how German persecutions went against the tenets of their faiths (Croes and Tammes 2004). In addition, minority and majority congregations in Protestant and Catholic parts of Twente were exposed to the same occupation regime and as a result faced similar levels of threat and repression.[6]

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

Data

Although studying clandestine behavior is hard, Twente offers a rich body of archival material with which to compare between (1) clandestine collective action and nonmobilization and (2) successful and failed clandestine networks. This allows us to assess overall differences in the mobilization capacity of minority and majority groups.

Hilbrink (1989) provides a comprehensive list of all recognized resistance fighters in the region. Using this list, it is possible to access a unique and underutilized collection of postwar testimonies that sheds light on successful resistance against genocide. The collection consists of research done by Foundation 40/45 in light of an honorary pension program. After the war, Dutch citizens could request an additional state stipend if they could prove that they or a deceased immediate family member had extra expenses or suffered injury because of resistance activities. Sheltering Jews was one of the activities that qualified as costly resistance. After someone had filed a request, Foundation 40/45 would start an investigation. Interviews with neighbors, reliable policemen, mayors, surviving Jews, and other members of the resistance were conducted to assess the trustworthiness of the claimant (Cammaert 1994).

[5] Given the low number of observations, the *P*-values should be taken with a grain of salt.

[6] Nazi reports also reveal that minority and majority groups were not scrutinized more or less by security agencies (Braun, in press).

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

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



FIG. 2.—Religious minorities in Twente, 1942: *a*, Catholic and Protestant minorities; *b*, minority Protestants; *c*, Jews.

Testimonies from other resistance fighters prove particularly useful in reconstructing the social structure of clandestine organization, as almost all interviews started with a brief description of how the testifier and the claimant had come into contact with each other. The files are stored by the Social Insurance Bank and can be consulted in Winschoten, a city in the north of the Netherlands. In total, I consulted 207 files that provided information on 53 rescue networks active in 21 of all 26 counties. In total, eight of these 21 counties were Catholic. Religious organization plays an important role in 42 out of the 53 identified networks. Because these files are based on testimonies of survivors, they mostly provide information on successful networks.[7]

To compare successful and unsuccessful mobilization (networks that are detected and completely dismantled by security forces), I combine the files from the Social Insurance Bank with postwar trials of collaborators who

[7] I redid all the analyses, relying only on testimonies provided by surviving Jews, to make sure that my data generation process was not driven by stronger minority networks. I also redid all the analysis, relying only on testimonies from rescuers, to make sure that selective memory of deviant traits by outsiders was not driving the results. In both cases outcomes were in line with those presented below.



FIG. 3.—Comparison of Catholic and Protestant counties in Twente, Jews (1942) and Catholics and Protests (1947)

were active in Twente. Denouncing and arresting innocent Jews is, of course, unconstitutional and was heavily persecuted after the war. These were also crimes that were relatively easy to prove, as the Nazis kept records of how they deployed Dutch collaborators. As a result, trials often provide information on Jews that were arrested in hiding, enabling us to get information on failed resistance. The trial documents also provide information on how the Nazis tried to detect associates of captured individuals, granting some insight into how and why some networks failed. These trial documents are stored in the National Archives in The Hague.

In order to compare successful mobilization with nonmobilization, I complement the two bodies of testimonies with diaries and existing interviews of people who decided not to save Jews (Hilbrink 1989; Van Der Boom 2012; Demant 2015). These accounts shed light on obstacles to mobilization, which minority groups, according to the central hypothesis of this article, are better positioned to overcome.

The next section discusses the qualitative analysis. I first detail the dilemma that clandestine organization posed for Gentiles who sympathized with Jews. I then give a bird's-eye view of all religious rescue operations in Twente before providing more detailed cases of successful and unsuccessful mobilization for both Protestant and Catholic parts of Twente. These sections are organized around the three mechanisms of selective retention, organizer's assurance, and organizer's selectivity. Finally, the last subsection highlights the importance of religious segregation for minority organizers and points out how religious mixing undermined the minority advantage by reducing isolation.

The Clandestine Collective Action Dilemma

The Wehrmacht invaded the Low Countries in 1940. During its first two years, the occupation regime slowly marginalized Jews, before beginning deportations to the infamous extermination camps in Eastern Europe (Croes and Tammes 2004). How did individual Christians respond to the Jewish persecutions? If nascent resistance fighters were indeed facing a clandestine collective action dilemma, we would expect that a lot of people willing to rescue refrained from doing so out of fear. Indeed, diaries paint such a picture. Partly under the influence of religious leaders who repeatedly protested the Nazis, the overall attitude of Christians in Twente was pro-Jewish and anti-German. Sjouke Wynia from Denekamp remembered his father being furious when their Jewish neighbors had to leave their house (Demant 2015, p. 139). Willem Dingelheim, also from Denekamp, wrote in his diary that "everyone was heartbroken" because of the "undefinable suffering of the Jews." Several high school headmasters in the Twente area were seen crying when explaining to their pupils that their Jewish classmates and teacher were no

longer allowed to attend their institution. The diary of the head of the Jewish Council of Enschede confirms that the general population resented the deportations (Demant 2015, p. 139).

Postwar interviews with both Jews and Gentiles in Twente indicate that sympathy had translated into small-scale help for Jews before the roundups started. When Jews were no longer allowed to buy groceries in regular stores, a shop owner in Haaksbergen provided food to former Jewish customers for free under the counter. In Enschede, Gentiles secretly bought groceries for Jews living in their street (Demant 2015, p. 134). Other neighbors helped to soften financial strain by lending money or providing employment (Geritz-Koster 1999). It has been argued that in Enschede Jews and Gentiles grew closer to each other than ever before during the early years of the war (Demant 2015). On occasion, Gentiles even displayed public support for their persecuted neighbors. In both Almelo as Enschede, groups of Gentiles actively protested the introduction of the Jewish star by wearing one themselves. This open form of resistance was short-lived, however, and ended when the police started arresting participants (Demant 2015).

These relatively low-risk activities notwithstanding, large-scale clandestine protection of Jews was rare. Risk perceptions formed an important impediment to this form of resistance. After observing Jewish mothers asking Gentiles to save their children, a bystander wrote in her diary: "Who has the courage to do that? It is not allowed. You will undergo the same fate." The clandestine nature of the operation was deemed particularly challenging: "How on earth could you hide five grown-ups, three children," a woman wrote after hearing about the arrest of a Jewish family that had gone into hiding to avoid deportation (Van Der Boom 2012, p. 244). Gentiles, although outraged by what happened to the Jews, also recognized that protecting Jews was difficult and risky. When responding to the question whether he ever considered sheltering Jews, Benno van Delden from Enschede said: "No never. . . . The SS, the camps, firing squads, torture and all that misery. You had to be very strong to shelter someone" (Demant 2015, p. 141).

Fear and uncertainty resulted in an overall feeling of helplessness. One diary, for instance, characterized the first roundups as "systematic elimination against which we could not do anything." Trying to capture the overall mental state of bystanders, a female witness to an early roundup wrote: "Everyone was deeply moved. Outraged out of pure powerlessness" (Van Der Boom 2012, p. 244). That the risks involved made it hard for people to imagine any form of organized solidarity with Jews is revealed in the following statement by a nonrescuer: "I am willing to go to jail for my convictions. It would have an enormous impact if everyone was willing to do this, but this is not the case. . . . It is hard to know what to do" (p. 244). Another diary similarly shows that the prospect of punishment created passivity among Dutch citizens: "We poor Christians could not do anything but fol-

low Lukas 22:53. Follow from afar that is our fate and cross. Let's hope our sympathy can revitalize Jews" (p. 244).

It is of course possible that Gentiles were trying to find easy excuses to legitimate their passive behavior. However, testimonies from Twente's Jewish population suggest that the feelings of powerlessness were justifiable. In interviews conducted by social scientist Demant during the early 2000s, several survivors asked themselves what they would they have done as Gentiles and concluded that passivity was a normal response in times of hardship and threat (2015, p. 183).

After studying testimonies of successful protection networks, it is not hard to understand where feelings of powerlessness among Gentiles came from. Successful rescue organizations had to supply Jews with fake identifications papers, rationing cards, produce, clothes, information about upcoming roundups, medical care, funeral services, marriage counseling, psychological treatment, safe houses, ability to travel, communication lines, and, most important, numerous hiding places, as few rescuers were able to provide shelter for a long period of time.[8] Even though most Christians were outraged by anti-Jewish legislation, they recognized that they could not simply engage in clandestine collective action because it was too dangerous. Yet, as I will show in the next section, being embedded in a minority congregation increased the impact an outraged citizen could have on evasion by reducing both the actual and perceived danger.

The Minority Advantage

The central hypothesis of this article is that minority groups are better able to overcome the clandestine collective action dilemma outlined in the previous section. To assess this systematically, I have coded all rescue groups active in Twente that could be found in the files of Foundation 40/45. I marked all groups that sheltered at least one Jew who survived World War II as successful and groups that mobilized but were not able to successfully shelter a single Jew as unsuccessful and dismantled.[9] I code a network as religious if it was set up by a religious leader such as a reverend, priest, chaplain, re-

[8] On funeral services and marriage counseling, respectively, see Sociale Verzekeringsbank (SVB) file 23 and SVB file 8, Docdirect, Winschoten; psychological treatment, Yad Vashem file L. Gerritsen in Michman et al. (2004); and communication lines, Dagboek Douwes, Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD) 244 1065, Amsterdam.

[9] This is a crude operationalization strategy that does not allow me to capture partial dismantling of networks. As I have no exact information on the number of sheltered Jews who survived and got arrested per network, more fine-grained measurement is impossible. However, the following case studies and quantitative analysis suggest that minority status affects infiltration and dismantling more broadly.

ligious schoolteacher, or politician active in a religious party. Using the denomination of the religious leaders active in the organization, I determined the denominational color of the organization. If the minority hypothesis holds, we would expect Protestant networks to be most successful in the Catholic southeast, Catholic networks to be most successful in the Protestant northwest, and Orthodox Protestant groups to be successful throughout Twente.

Successful networks are depicted in figure 4 and are largely in line with the minority hypothesis. All but two of the eight Protestant rescue organizations were active in areas dominated by Catholics. When we look at Catholic networks, we see a similar picture with only two of the 15 successful movements operating in Catholic territory.[10] Orthodox Protestant protection of Jews emerged in both Catholic and mainstream Protestant areas. This is in line with our theory, as the Orthodox formed minority communities everywhere.

Figure 4*c* displays the five unsuccessful networks that could be found in the files. As we can see, all of these networks are connected to majority congregations.[11] Overall, this spatial pattern suggests that minority networks were better able to produce and sustain successful rescue operations, while attempts of majority groups were more likely to fail.

Assurance

Why were minorities better at producing clandestine collective action? In a postwar interview, Catholic Chaplain Visser, who was active in the predominantly Protestant town of Wierden, explicitly talks about the importance of minority isolation in assuring him that mobilization was possible. Acting out of sympathy for those in need, he knew he could always rely on specific local Catholic farmers to help with providing food and shelter. In turn, farmers blindly trusted their Catholic front man and were suspicious of everyone outside of their religious enclave. Religious segregations were so strong that Catholics even went to the chaplain and local Catholic headmaster for medical advice because they refused to listen to the local doctor, who happened to be Protestant. Exploiting the commitment of his followers, Visser purposively created an isolated organization to reduce exposure. He built his rescue network around people he could trust and ignored contacts outside of his own congregation: "I always wanted to stay independent. No-

[10] These four majority networks emerged in tiny villages or were inspired by interregional movement entrepreneurs, suggesting that geographical isolation and external efforts can compensate for a lack of minority secrecy (Gould 1995).

[11] Because of the lenient criterion for success (one Jewish survivor), only five networks failed according to my coding. Relaxing this criterion is hard to do with the current data. However, the case studies below reveal that selective retention played an important role in producing resistance within isolated hubs of commitment.

body outside my parish knew what I was doing. . . . My own people knew but they kept quiet" (Hilbrink 1989, p. 323).

In Protestant Enschede, chaplain Van Der Brink told a similar story of how minority isolation enabled clandestine mobilization by assuring both secrecy and commitment. Already before the war, Van Der Brink's church had successfully summoned Catholics to leave the Dutch Nazi Party. When the deportations started, he convinced Catholic police officers to refuse cooperation with anti-Semitic legislation. Inspired by his brother, who provided him with illegal newspapers, fake identity papers, and food vouchers, he set up an underground network with the help of parish members and police officers. He was able to find several shelters for Jews among members of his community after temporarily hiding them in presbyteries. Catholic boy scouts were used as couriers, while funding for his organization was obtained from businessmen in the parish. In advance of roundups, a local police officer would post a warning note on the doors of the Catholic church (Bekkenkamp 2000). All contacts ran via the presbyteries to maintain the exclusively Catholic character of the operation. Similar to what we saw in Wierden, the chaplain of Enschede never forayed outside his parish in order to reduce exposure, noting "Within your own parish you knew whom to approach for help. Those people will not let you down."[12]

Selective Retention

Compared to their counterparts in minority enclaves, majority leaders were less successful in creating and sustaining clandestine organizations. Their attempts to set up coordinated resistance along lines of trust often got disrupted because of early denunciations by uncommitted parish members. As a result, retention of their rescue organizations was less likely (Aldrich 1999). This reinforced the minority advantage in clandestine collective action.

To illustrate, it is instructive to compare the trajectory of Enschede reverends Leendert Overduin and Nanne Zwiep. Until 1926 their careers followed a similar path. Both men received their religious education at elite universities and aimed to become ministers in the mainstream Dutch Reformed Church. But whereas Zwiep had led Dutch Reformed congregations in northern parts of the country before coming to Enschede, Overduin had decided to switch to the minuscule and more orthodox Reformed Church in Restored Dependency that was founded in 1926 after an intense scriptural debate about whether Adam was able to hear the snake in the Garden of Eden talk.

Their doctrinal differences notwithstanding, the two men came together with other religious leaders in September 1941 to file a complaint against early

[12] Interview, kapelaan Van Der Brink, NIOD.

a



b





FIG. 4.—Rescue networks in Twente: *a*, Roman Catholic and Protestant networks; *b*, Orthodox Protestant networks; *c*, failed networks.

deportations of Jews with the local authorities. On multiple occasions Zwiep and Overduin gave anti-Nazi sermons in which they denounced anti-Jewish legislation and tried to convince people to resist (Bekkenkamp 2000). But despite these similar actions, their fates diverged dramatically on April 20, 1941. Whereas Zwiep was arrested and died in Dachau, Overduin became the organizer of one of the most successful rescue networks in the country.

What explains this difference? Overduin's congregation consisted of fewer than 50 souls, all of whom he knew personally. His sermons were only heard by loyal people he could trust. Zwiep, however, lectured in the main church of Enschede and sometimes drew crowds of around 500 people, some of whom had never seen each other. Zwiep was cautioned numerous times and asked to tone it down: "Reverend watch out, they are watching you! Your enemies do not sleep. They will be in the church this very morning" (De Wolf 1947, p .7). His sacristan told him he had seen the organist, whose son was a Nazi, take notes while Zwiep was preaching (Bekkenkamp 2000).

While an undedicated member of his congregation denounced Zwiep, Overduin was able to exploit the dense networks of his community to save over 700 Jews. His organization could grow rapidly, as his followers "always said yes" and he knew exactly whom to trust. Much like Zwiep, his followers

were often driven by "the desire to help those in danger" and the commandment to love thy neighbor.[13] Dressed up as a baker or chimney sweeper, he traveled between different members of his organization hiding secret documents in his umbrella (Weustink 1985). The core of this organization consisted of 20 operatives, most of whom were recruited from the tiny Reformed Church in Restored Dependency.[14]

From within his parish, Overduin was able to recruit helpers with diverse skill sets. One of his main assistants, the head of the church's council of aldermen, was employed in a wood factory and could therefore provide both the resources and skills to build secret hideouts and storage rooms in homes. Other members of his parish were painters who helped to camouflage shelters, typographers who delivered paperwork, and a graphic specialist who forged documents.[15]

Contrary to Overduin and in a similar vein as mainstream Protestant Zwiep, the Dutch majority Reverends Van Gelder from Steenwijk, Van Staaij from Wierden, Le Roy from Almelo, and De Geus from Almelo were all arrested early on while mobilizing their congregations because their activities became exposed by disloyal adherents (Hovingh 2015).

De Geus illustrates the dangers a religious leader faced when moving from a minority to majority community, revealing that the selective retention mechanism was more important than individual organizing skills. Before coming to Almelo, De Geus was at the helm of a small Dutch Reformed congregation in the Catholic town of Beuningen, near Nijmegen. Within this enclave he forcefully and freely preached against the Nazis without any repercussions. Despite numerous warnings from within his congregation, he continued his anti-Nazi tirades when he was transferred to Protestant Almelo in 1940. "If Church and Christ no longer tell the truth no one will" (Touw 1946, p. 620) was De Geus's response when his closest followers tried to caution him. In line with the fears of congregation members, De Geus was apprehended by the Nazi security police when they found out he had distributed pro-Jewish texts among his followers in January 1942 (Touw 1946).

Selective retention also operated in the Catholic southeast. Before the German invasion, Pastor Stokman from Oldenzaal worked with the Catholic mayor to help Jewish refugees from Germany. He called on his followers to open their houses for those fleeing anti-Semitic legislation and convinced both the local Franciscan monastery and Parish house to set up emergency kitch-

[13] Yad Vashem file A. Ten Tije in Michman et al. (2004); SVB file 55, Docdirect, Winschoten.

[14] SVB file 23, Docdirect, Winschoten.

[15] SVB files 23 and 51, Docdirect, Winschoten; Yad Vashem file J. Hofstra in Michman et al. (2004).

ens. Numerous followers answered his requests. A Roman Catholic cinema owner even made one of his theater rooms available as a shelter.

Of course, Stokman had to abandon his open help to Jewish refugees when the Germans took over the country. Instead, he shifted his focus to a more covert operation. He tried to mobilize people he knew from the Catholic labor union to help Jews and to distribute anti-Nazi pamphlets. Unfortunately, he failed miserably, as his activities became known to the Nazis within weeks. One of his followers had leaked information. Already in 1940, two years before the major deportations started, he had to flee Oldenzaal. His partner, the mayor, was imprisoned. Despite the revealed preference for resistance, no Catholic rescue network filled the void left by Stokman's departure (Weustink 1985).

Organizer's Selectivity

Close inspection of rescue operations a few miles outside of Twente suggests that a minority shell also made it easier for religious leaders to recognize and recruit committed members. The Roukema family was part of the tightly knit Vrijgemaakten church, within which there "were no social boundaries." Although they were not particularly interested in politics, they listened to the sermons of the militant Reverend Klaas Schilder who called on true believers to step up against anti-Jewish policies during the early years of the war. The oldest Roukema son, Gijs, was motivated by Schilder's words: "He encouraged us to stop talking and resist forcefully. Out of the emergency shelter, into your uniform" (Hilbrink 1998, 96–98).

The leadership of the Vrijgemaakten church was soon made aware of Gijs's attitudes toward the Germans. A local pastor happened to be in the Roukema residence when Gijs openly expressed how excited he was about the foresight of resistance. Not much later, another reverend visited the family. He knew the family because Roukema senior had been his schoolteacher, and he had heard about Gijs's defiance toward the Germans. The pastor approached Gijs to become his assistant in an illegal rescue organization that helped hundreds of Jews by the end of the war.

Not far from where the Roukemas lived, youngster Spanhaak also got inspired by one of his religious leaders: Horreeus de Haas. In debates with National Socialist leader Anton Mussert, De Haas attacked the anti-Semitic foundations of the Dutch Nazi Party. When he lost his job, Spanhaak was committed to do something about German policies. As a mainstream Protestant, however, he was unaware of the activities being undertaken by the nearby minority enclave of the Vrijgemaakten church until much later. Although willing to participate, he always remained "an outsider" to the better organized clandestine resistance networks of the small Orthodox community

a few blocks away and, as a result, was never able to fully engage in organized resistance (Hilbrink 1998).

As the comparison between Gijs Roukema and Spanhaak illustrates, being a member of a minority congregation conditioned the impact that a motivated rescuer could have on the fate of Jews because individuals were dependent on leadership and organization to make a difference. Compared to their majority counterparts, minority leaders had the advantage of organizer's selectivity; that is, they were more likely to recognize committed recruits and incorporate them in rescue operations (Marwell and Oliver 1993).

The reverse also happened. Sometimes minority leaders could exploit their local intelligence to determine who was not suited for clandestine work. In Goor, for instance, church chaplains refused to include one of their parishioners into their rescue operations. As it turns out, this was a wise idea. The devote Catholic was somewhat delusional, thinking he could single-handedly win the war by physically besieging city hall.[16]

Not being embedded in a community of dedicated fellows not only hampered secrecy; it also made it hard to solve complex problems, such as finding enough financial resources. The nervous diary entry of Jewish Theresa Wertheim, who decided to go underground in Enschede but was not helped by a minority congregation, is emblematic: "When does the misery finally stop? Two or three months at most and our money will be gone. . . . We are starting to get worried. Soon we will run out of money. Then what will happen?"[17]

Minorities, however, were able to find financial resources because leaders had enough intelligence to selectively recruit actors with a wide range of skills who were willing to support their cause. When discussing the rescue activities of Catholic Chaplain Van Der Brink, we already saw that minority leaders were able to mobilize funds from rich and committed parish members to overcome the problem that Theresa Wertheim was facing. Sometimes, however, the coordination of different skill sets was so strong that it simply solved financial problems by turning a rescue operation into little autarchic firms in which Jewish fugitives provided labor. In Nijverdal, an Orthodox reverend brought together the owner of a fabric store, a baker, and a group of farmers, some of whom already knew each other from the Orthodox school, the church, or choir.[18] The baker provided food for Jews, who in turn made bags out of straw provided by the farmers. The straw bags were then sold by the shopkeeper who used the money to pay for food. As a result, 90 Jews were rescued without outside money.[19]

[16] SVB file 40, Docdirect, Winschoten.

[17] Diary of Theresa Wertheim, http://www.joodscheraadenschede.nl.

[18] Archive Flim NIOD 471 13 D.

[19] SVB file 8, Docdirect, Winschoten.

Minority networks in which close social relationships abound, thus, not only embed rescue organizers in hubs of commitment but also create an inventory of different skills and resources available within the confines of trusted enclaves. In this way, the network closure of minorities cut across individuals with different skill sets, allowing for coordinated solutions to complex problems while minimizing risks of defection.

Segregation and Mixing

One striking feature of both Catholic and Protestant rescue operations was that they tended to be completely segregated by denomination. Despite cooperation among religious leaders at the national level, local clandestine networks simply reproduced the structure of Dutch society. As prewar religious networks were completely separated at a local level, recruitment of participants was almost automatically contained within one congregation. A baker's son from Nijverdal who mobilized rescuers explains this general pattern quite straightforwardly: "We were Orthodox, hence so were our friends and customers. So these were the people where you brought [Jewish] children. . . . This way I placed ten Jews."[20]

Mutual distrust and ignorance between different religious groups reinforced network segregation. Protestants either did not know or refused to accept that Catholics were effective organizers of rescue operations. Despite the fact that the aforementioned Catholic Chaplain Van Der Brink from Enschede was able to run a rescue operation that sheltered almost 500 individuals, some Protestants still considered him a sloppy and indiscrete daredevil who lacked organizational skills. The leader of a Protestant group in Hengelo even claimed that Catholics in general were nothing more than passive bystanders who were either cowards or pro-German.[21] Few were as extreme as Orthodox leader Johannes ter Horst, who repeatedly expressed his contempt for people from different backgrounds. He went as far as to say he would shoot members of another denomination if he would run into them during a secret operation (Hilbrink 1989, p. 78).

Stereotypes also permeated Catholic society. Members of Catholic networks in Twente used the pejorative term "reverend's clique" to allude to the passiveness and insolence of Orthodox Protestants. Mutual disrespect was equally widespread. On the rare occasion that actors from different denominations did come together, Catholics got annoyed by the fact that Protestants always had to start every communication with prayer (Hilbrink 1989).

[20] Interview Flim, Archive Flim NIOD 471 13C.

[21] SVB file 22, Docdirect, Winschoten; Archive NIOD 251a 61.

Inherited mistrust could even trump proven dedication to the illegal cause. In Catholic Borne, a member of the majority church volunteered to join a Protestant resistance organization after he had helped one of its leaders escape from a German security official. Despite the risks the boy had taken to save the life of one of its core members, the Protestant organization refused his further services because he was considered "too loose" by the Protestant community. Ironically, his reputation was partly created by his mother, who spread negative rumors about him because she wanted to sabotage his relationship with a Protestant girl he had recently started dating. As a good Catholic, she could not approve of this relationship.[22]

Actors aiming to bridge social divides were seen as intruders by other resistance fighters. In Almelo, a social democrat decided to join an Orthodox group in 1943. Despite the fact that he had already proven to be a dedicated resistance worker on his own, it did not work at all. Other Orthodox Protestants found it difficult to cooperate with him and looked at the outsider with contempt. On more than one occasion they tried to get rid of him early on by providing misinformation about future meetings and activities. A year after he joined the organization, he was arrested.[23]

As emerged out of the stories of Chaplains Van Der Brink and Visser, religious leaders often actively guarded the boundaries of their group. In a similar vein, Leendert Overduin, the reverend of the tiny Reformed Church in Restored Dependency in Enschede, also made sure his networks did not interfere with the activities of other groups beyond what was strictly necessary. Overduin was infuriated when he found out that one of the families in his network had recently started to house a resistance fighter and member of a different network who was on a mission to kill a local collaborator. Overduin did everything in his power to prevent the murder from happening and had the resistance member removed from the household (Weustink 1985).

Repeatedly, Overduin had arguments with secular rescuer Tusveld about who should take care of specific Jews. Overduin did not trust Tusveld, and the men refused to cooperate with each other, despite the fact that they were sheltering members of the same family (Bekkenkamp 2000).[24] One of Overduin's closest accomplices commented that "you got reprimanded" by Overduin if a rescuer engaged in other resistance activities and networks.[25]

In an extreme case, arguments over segregation even created a rupture within organizations. In Catholic Oldenzaal, a Protestant rescue mission led by political party leaders Van Der V. and P. operated at the margins be-

[22] SVB file 52, Docdirect, Winschoten.
[23] SVB file 41, Docdirect, Winschoten.
[24] SVB files 28 and 13, Docdirect, Winschoten.
[25] SVB file 14, Docdirect, Winschoten.

cause it could not recruit widely. Van Der V. tried to circumvent this problem by coopting a few Catholic helpers from outside his trusted circle in the organization. P. was outraged when he found out about this and immediately decided to split off from the already minuscule organization. After the war, it was discovered that the two Catholic recruits were actually traitors.[26]

Several other cases reveal that minority leaders had good reason to be concerned about religious mixing, as it often undermined their clandestine mobilization advantage by increasing exposure. When information left the confines of the minority enclave, coordination problems emerged and denunciation became more likely. For example, when a rescue network emerged within the confines of a Catholic minority community in Almelo, it expanded outward quite suddenly. This turned out to have dramatic consequences for the movement.

Take, for example, the Catholic boy scout leader Van Hessen who initiated the movement; secrecy was of the utmost importance. He even refused to tell his own brother the exact details of his activities. After a while, however, his friend Buiter became less careful and started to recruit outside of Van Hessen's network, feeling that the Catholic enclave was too small for his ambitions. The resulting inclusion of people from different backgrounds caused internal conflict about what strategy to pursue and, eventually, became Buiter's downfall, at least according to Van Hessen: "In the beginning, he [Buiter] relied heavily on my contacts to build up a resistance network. Soon, however he seemed to know more people than I did. He even forged a link between our group and the LO [Protestant]. Soon after, the network was betrayed and infiltrated by a V-Man [Nazi spy]."[27] Together with Protestant organizers, several members of the originally Catholic movement, including Buiter, were arrested. Before the arrest, numerous people had already warned Buiter that the movement was becoming too visible (Hilbrink 1989). After this partial dismantling of the network, Van Hessen moved back to a more segregated setup, which in his own view was safer: "We decided to go fully underground again. Shield the organization from the outside world to make it harder to penetrate by outsiders. Create a more camouflaged and fragmented organization."[28]

The story of Buiter and Van Hessen is emblematic of numerous cases in which crossing religious boundaries resulted in operational failure of whole rescue missions. Mixing, however, could also affect the success rate within the same rescue operation. In Catholic Borne, an anonymous Protestant minister encouraged at least two families within his parish to shelter Jews.[29]

[26] SVB files 50 and 33, Docdirect, Winschoten.

[27] SVB file 47, Docdirect, Winschoten.

[28] SVB file 47, Docdirect, Winschoten.

[29] SVB file 51, Docdirect, Winschoten.

Whereas the first worked in isolation and was able to keep Jews underground despite several searches, the second failed to do so.[30] The head of the second household was arrested during a meeting with socialist and Catholic resistance workers. The meeting was set up to resolve disagreements about the distribution of food coupons between different factions within the network.[31] All but one of the attendees was arrested (Hilbrink 1989).

All these examples reveal how selective retention amplifies the overall segregation of clandestine organizations. Expansion of recruitment outside the confines of existing groups was appealing to some, as it could enlarge an organizations' impact and scope. Unfortunately, networks that scaled outward often created internal differences in ideology, strategy, or style. This triggered innate strife and, in turn, increased the demand for coordination, reducing the likelihood that a rescue organization could keep intelligence out of the hands of its much stronger opponent.

Whereas assurance and organizer's selectivity both enhance minorities' capacity to produce clandestine networks, the selective retention mechanism guarantees that minorities are also better at preventing detection. On the basis of this, we can derive two hypotheses that will be tested with quantitative data in the next section:

HYPOTHESIS 1.—*Minority communities are more likely to produce rescue operations for Jews*.

HYPOTHESIS 2.—*Once mobilized, minority communities are less likely to suffer from arrests*.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

To establish whether the minority advantage also operates outside of the borders of Twente, I use data on the location, religion, and detention of 1,013 Dutch rescuers throughout the Netherlands provided by Yad Vashem (Michman et al. 2004) to statistically analyze whether minority groups were indeed both more likely to mobilize and less likely to get arrested when they did. Although these data are less refined and less complete than the data presented in the previous section, they do allow us to assess whether the lessons drawn from the Twente case travel beyond its borders. As a first cut at the data, I divided the Netherlands into municipalities dominated by Protestants and those dominated by Catholics. I then counted the number of Dutch Reformed rescuers in the latter half as well as the number of Catholic rescuers in the former half and added the number of rescuers belonging to

[30] SVB file 30, Docdirect, Winschoten.

[31] SVB file 51, Docdirect, Winschoten.

Orthodox Protestant denominations. This sum was then divided by the total number of rescuers for whom their religion was known. The results are presented in figure 5. According to this coding scheme, 26.6% of the general population would belong to a minority congregation. Overall, postwar testimonies seem to confirm that minority groups were more likely to rescue Jews. Of all the rescuers commemorated by Yad Vashem (Michman et al. 2004), 62% belonged to a minority church. The data have serious limitations, as Yad Vashem only recognizes altruistic rescue and ignores rescue provided out of financial or personal motives. Therefore, I conducted a similar analysis using survey data collected among Jewish survivors (Evers-Emden and Flim 1996). A similar picture emerges: of the 226 rescuers whose religion is known, 61% adhered to a minority religion. As we can see, the percentage of minority rescuers is very close in both data sets, giving us some confidence that measurement is valid.

It is of course possible that geographical difference and other omitted variables might be driving this result. In particular, it is plausible that instead of the minority status that is based on relative size, it is absolute group size that causes mobilization. Smaller groups have an advantage in mobilization because contributions are more likely to make a difference, and they are easier to monitor (Olson 1965). Therefore, I also analyzed the Yad Vashem data in a multivariate framework keeping geographical factors and absolute size constant.[32] I matched Yad Vashem–recognized rescuers to all Catholic, mainstream Protestant, and Orthodox Protestant communities that existed in the Netherlands in 1930 (Central Bureau for Statistics 1931 census). This results in a database of 2,883 religious communities nested in 1,027 counties for which we know how many rescues took place according to Yad Vashem. If the minority hypothesis holds, we would expect Catholic communities to be more likely to produce rescuers in Protestant parts of the country, Protestant communities to produce more rescuers in Catholic parts of the country, and Orthodox communities to be more likely to rescue everywhere. To capture this minority effect, I interact whether a community is Catholic with the percentage of Catholic Christians in a municipality. The logic behind this is that Catholics should be more likely to rescue in areas where relatively few Catholics live but less likely to rescue in areas where Catholicism is widespread because they are no longer a minority.[33] I control for logged group size to disentangle the minority effect from small

[32] I prefer to use the Yad Vashem files over the survey data, as the former have a broader coverage providing more opportunities to keep geographical factors constant. Analysis based on the survey data is consistent with the results presented below.

[33] This strategy tests the minority argument for Catholics and mainstream Protestants in one model, as Catholics are not mainstream Protestants and vice versa.



FIG. 5.—Minority rescue according to postwar testimonies

group effects. Results of the analyses, with municipality clustered standard errors and population weights, are presented in table 1.

Model 1 looks at the percentage of rescuers for each religious community, while model 2 looks at whether at least one rescuer was active in a community. In line with the minority hypothesis, the effect of Catholicism on rescue is conditional on the overall strength of Catholicism in the region, regardless of what outcome variable is chosen. Since interaction effects are somewhat hard to interpret, the model is visualized in figure 6. As we can see in figure 6*b*, Catholics are 50% more likely to produce networks of assistance to Jews in Protestant areas, while the same is true for Protestants in Catholic areas (see also fig. 7). Figure 8 reveals that Orthodox groups, the smallest congregation everywhere, are about 12% more likely to stage rescue operations. The third model shows that the results are robust to the inclusion of municipality-level fixed effects, suggesting that the minority effects are not driven by local-level omitted-variable bias.

The case study of Twente shows that minority networks were also less likely to be exposed and uprooted. Using Yad Vashem files, it is possible to retrieve whether rescuers were arrested, which can be used as a proxy for exposure. Again, the effect of Catholicism on getting arrested is conditional on

TABLE 1
RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES AND RESCUE OF JEWS, 1940–45

	% RESCUE	RESCUE YES/NO	% RESCUE
	Model 1: OLS	Model 2: Logit	Model 3: OLS
Catholic community	.01***	.51***	.02***
	(.00)	(.13)	(.01)
Catholic strength	.02**	.72***	
	(.01)	(.18)	
Catholic community × Catholic strength	−.03**	−1.16***	−.06**
	(.010)	(.32)	(.02)
Orthodox community	.013***	.12***	.01**
	(.00)	(.04)	(.00)
Constant	.00*	.23***	−.01***
	(.00)	(.05)	(.00)
Municipality fixed effects	No	No	Yes
Size control	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	2,883	2,883	2,883
Municipalities	1,027	1,027	1,027
Log likelihood	4,191.96	−1,972.33	4,544.08

NOTE.—Models 1 and 3 entries are regression coefficients; model 2 entries are logistic regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are municipality clustered SEs.

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.



FIG. 6.—Effect of Catholic community with 90% confidence intervals conditional on Catholic strength in region, part 1: *a*, model 1, rescuers per 1,000 members; *b*, model 2, rescue, yes/no; *c*, model 3, rescuers per 1,000 members (fixed effects).



FIG. 7.—Effect of Catholic community with 90% confidence intervals conditional on Catholic strength in region, part 2: *a*, model 4, arrest yes/no; *b*, model 5, arrest (fixed effects); *c*, model 6, arrest cleric yes/no.



FIG. 8.—Effect of Orthodox Protestantism on occurrence of rescue activities (model 2) and arrests (models 4–6) with 90% confidence intervals.

the overall religious environment. As we can see in figure 7*b*, Catholics engaged in rescue operations in Protestant parts of the Netherlands were more than 20% less likely to get arrested than their Protestant counterparts. This effect reverses in areas dominated by Catholics, where mainstream Protestant clerics were almost 10% less likely to get arrested. Figure 8 reveals that Orthodox Protestant clerics were about 8% less likely to get arrested overall. The effects become more pronounced when municipality-level fixed effects are included, suggesting that the minority argument is not likely to be confounded by local geographical factors (see table 2).

Yad Vashem files are based on testimonies of Jewish survivors and are therefore likely to capture successful mobilization missing large numbers of exposed networks. This truncates the sample and could potentially bias the results. Retrieving religious information from all arrested rescuers in the country is probably impossible. As another test, I focus on a important subset of rescuers for which denominational information is easy to obtain: clerics. The case study above revealed that clerics frequently played a role in rescue operations. It is therefore reasonable to assume that arrests of clerics provide some insight into the overall exposure rate of religious groups. I

TABLE 2
ARRESTS OF RESCUERS, 1940–45

	ARREST LAY YES/NO		ARREST CLERICS YES/NO
	Model 4: Logit	Model 5: OLS	Model 6: Logit
Catholic community	−1.78**	−.30**	−4.18**
	(.066)	(.13)	(1.74)
Catholic strength	−1.23*		−.91
	(.57)		(.58)
Catholic community × Catholic strength	2.70***	.50**	5.70**
	(.86)	(.17)	(2.00)
Orthodox community	−.75**	−.09*	−.87*
	(.31)	(.05)	(.43)
Constant	−1.25***	.30**	−.46*
	(.34)	(.13)	(.20)
Size control	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipality fixed effects	No	Yes	No
Observations	985	985	405
Municipalities	205	205	200
Log likelihood	−345.21	−54.76	−240.16

NOTE.—Models 4 and 6 entries are logistic regression coefficients; model 5 entries are regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are municipality clustered SEs.

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.

have constructed a database of 405 clerics from 200 municipalities who engaged in rescue operations throughout the county, by combining information on successful attempts culled from the already used Yad Vashem files (Michman et al. 2004), with unsuccessful attempts obtained from religious commemoration books (Hamans 2008; Hovingh 2015). This allows me to compare arrests rates between majority and majority clerics. Figure 7*c* visualizes the results.

In line with what we saw for rescuers in the Yad Vashem files alone, Roman Catholic clerics active in Protestant areas were more than 60% less likely to get apprehended by security forces, while Protestants were 26% less likely to be exposed in Catholic areas. Orthodox Protestants were 17% less likely to be arrested throughout the country. Focusing on clerics reduces the number of observations and, as a result, variation within municipalities. This makes it impossible to include fine-grained fixed effects. Nevertheless, taken together these analyses provide compelling support for the minority analysis in suggesting that in the Protestant parts of the Netherlands, Catholics were more likely to produce successful rescue operations that were less likely to be exposed, while the same is true for Protestant communities in Catholic parts of the country.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This article shows that local minority groups are better at producing and sustaining clandestine operations. Because they form isolated hubs of commitment, minority enclaves can mobilize while reducing exposure to uncommitted outsiders, thereby overcoming the clandestine collective action dilemma. Studying the protection of Jews in the Netherlands provides a unique opportunity to substantiate this thesis. Still, it is plausible that the clandestine capacity of minorities is conditional on the associational segmentation, overall levels of opposition to foreign occupation, pluralism, open and cooperative protests by national elites, or the highly centralized nature of religious communities that characterized Dutch society during the war.

To explore whether these conditions somehow delimit the importance of minority mobilization, making my finding unique to the Netherlands, I turn to Yad Vashem testimonies of 6,407 religious rescuers during the Holocaust living in 20 countries with different political and religious traditions. I divide the share of minority rescuers in the body of testimonies by the percentage of minority believers in a particular country, to assess whether religious minorities were under- or overrepresented among rescuers. An overview of these ratios is presented in figure 9. As we can see, religious minorities are overrepresented among clandestine rescuers in both majority Catholic and Protestant countries, including countries with limited religious segmentation (e.g., France), where resistance was rare (e.g., Italy), where national leaders did



FIG. 9.—Over- and underrepresentation of religious minorities among rescuers in other Nazi-occupied countries.

not protest (e.g., Belgium), and that were not occupied (i.e., Germany). Moreover, minority mobilization not only emerged in more formally centralized Protestant and Catholic congregations but also within communities that lack formal hierarchies such as the Quakers in Germany and France, Seventh Day Adventists in the Ukraine, or Pentecostals in Russia, suggesting that minority capacity accommodates different forms of formal authority.

Although minorities are overrepresented among clandestine rescuers almost everywhere, the theory does not seem to travel to places where rescue missions were highly individualized, such as Poland and Lithuania, or where the persecuting regime permitted national elites to openly cooperate with leaders of majority congregations to resist the Nazi occupation in general, such as in Denmark. In other words, the theory does not work in cases in which rescue was neither collective nor clandestine (Braun, in press).

The overall prevalence of religious minority mobilization throughout Europe forces us to rethink the relationship between religion and the Holocaust, which often gets analyzed as a function of doctrine. For Catholics, it has been argued that their religion reduced solidarity with Jews because of its reactionary tendencies and the traditional Jewish-Christian schism. Orthodox Protestantism has been linked to fascism, as it hinges on biblical racism, while others claim that Orthodox Protestants were willing to defy German authorities because of their individualistic traditions and emphasis on the Old Testament, in which the Jews were depicted as the chosen people. The opposite has been said about Lutherans who, the conventional wisdom goes, blindly accepted any form of secular political authority in line with their religion (Moore 2010). This analysis reveals that it is not doctrine, dogma, or religious identity that drives religious resistance. Instead, I draw attention to the social position of religious communities and its subsequent network effects.

This in turn raises the question whether we are observing a distinctively religious phenomenon. It is possible that religious minority status during World War II in the Netherlands provided a concrete research site through which the relationship between organized minority status and clandestine mobilization could be studied (Guhin 2014). But, religion's strong organizational infrastructure and defining powers might make it more robust in the creation of underground movements than other social categories (Brubaker 2015). The Twente data speak directly to this question. Although 49 out of the 58 rescue networks could be classified as religious, secular networks did also play an important role. With the exception of a network run by a nobleman who housed Jews on his estate and another for which the actual organizational base could not be identified, secular groups protecting Jews in Twente all had a radical left profile. As in most of Western Europe, communists and radical left-wing organizations in the Netherlands were political outcasts. Much like members of minority congregations, several prominent communist resistance workers active in Twente were therefore expelled from

mainstream organizations and had to pay the costs for their revolutionary ideals and formed isolated hubs.[34] These extreme-left hubs translated into rescue organizations in Vriezenveen, Almelo, Hengelo, and Enschede (Hilbrink 1989). Outside of the Netherlands, ethnic minorities played an important role in clandestine protection to Jews. Most notably, Poles, often lamented for not doing enough for the Jews in their own country, came to the rescue of Jews in the Ukraine where they formed an ethnic enclave (Arad 2009), again confirming the notion that a formal (church) hierarchy was not necessary to activate minority mechanisms.

Moving beyond protection networks for Jews, an abundance of anecdotal evidence suggests that minorities provide the clandestine backbone for revolutions and insurgencies across time and space. For centuries, rebellions and revolutions in China have been facilitated by Buddhist groups, such as the White Lotus Society (Perry 1976), while Lollard enclaves, Millenarian sects, and ethnic communes have played the same role in Western Europe as well as in Latin America (Engels 1967; Hobsbawm 1971). Together, this supports Smelser's (1962) claim that minority groups often form the secretive linchpin of major social transformations. The importance of Quakers, Methodists, and immigrant groups for the Underground Railroad (Foner 2015), ethnic minorities' role in criminal networks (Light 1977), and the overrepresentation of sects and immigrants among terrorist groups (Berman 2011; Sageman 2011) all draw attention to the fact that extremely centralized and "leaderless" minorities alike have an advantage in maintaining clandestine operations.

This does not imply that my theory travels everywhere. It is important to note that pure minority isolation can only operate in the presence of mass media, such as the radio or telephone during World War II or the Internet more recently, which can transmit information about movement goals without relying on face-to-face interaction. In the absence of such communication lines, weak ties and central leadership structures are likely to become more important for overcoming the clandestine collective action dilemma (Sageman 2011).

This article makes a call for a multilevel perspective on clandestinity that interrogates the interactions between microlevel factors, local community structures, and national processes to better understand how, when, and where social relations can be translated into covert resistance against genocide (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008). The data presented above illustrate the usefulness of such an approach. First, they provide powerful evidence that the influence of microlevel factors, such as biographical availability, motivation, and adventurousness, is conditional on minority capacity. My analysis, for instance, shows that adventurous individuals in minority communities

[34] SVB file 48, Docdirect, Winschoten.

were able to join successful clandestine operations and rescue hundreds of Jews, while individuals with the same traits in majority congregations failed to have a similar impact. It also reveals that moral outrage was not sufficient for clandestine collective action. Many individuals were shocked by anti-Jewish legislation but refrained from clandestine collective action because they were not assured that the production of rescue networks was feasible. Only outraged individuals embedded in minority groups had the ability to translate their sentiments into underground networks. In addition, altruistic religious majority leaders who mobilized on behalf of Jewish refugees before the war were not able to continue their activities illegally once the occupation began because their networks were immediately exposed or because they could not recruit the right people. Hence, whether adventurous, available, and outraged individuals with strong identities and values are able to mobilize in secret is dependent on the local-level structures in which they are embedded.

Second, national forces affect clandestine mobilization differently, depending on whether communities form minority enclaves. Several testimonies reveal that national church leaders played an important role in motivating Christians to engage in rescue. Others believed that the persecution of Jews did not belong in a plural society. However, most of these people were not able to translate their motivations into action because they considered the risks too high. Gentiles who did try saw their attempts thwarted by the Nazi security apparatus early on. It was citizens embedded in minority enclaves who could not only see an opportunity to act on national norms and obey their national leaders but who could also circumvent the challenges of a wartime repressive context. As with microlevel factors, the impact of national leadership, pluralistic norms, and repressive contexts was conditioned by the availability of distinct local networks. This article thus suggests that if we want to better understand clandestine operations in times of mass repression, we need to take into consideration the local challenges of clandestine collective action in addition to micromotives and national conditions, and in turn we need to explain when, where, and how social networks can be appropriated for underground mobilization.

Although this article compellingly shows the usefulness of a multilevel perspective for explaining the initial production of clandestine mobilization, it also has its shortcomings. Most important, it fails to shed light on how hubs of commitment can come together to produce social transformation. Minority isolation facilitates secrecy, but at the same time, it limits the carrying capacity of rescue networks that hardly ever spread beyond the narrow confines of small enclaves, preventing the emergence of concerted challenges to authority. This highlights both the potential and the inefficiencies of minority groups that, much like tight-knit neighborhood movements, require interregional ties to transform society (Gould 1995). In short, the mi-

nority thesis explains not only clandestine mobilization but also its fragmented nature. However, we know from successful insurgencies and revolutions that secret cells do sometimes come together to transform society. Therefore, future studies should try explain why some disjointed covert activities percolate upward and forge these connections while others do not, exploring interactions with broader political opportunities, broader institutional coalitions, or broader issue networks (Loveman 1998).

APPENDIX

Primary Source
Archive Flim NIOD 471 13 D
Archive NIOD 251a 61
Dagbook Douwes, NIOD 244 1065
Diary of Theresa Wertheim, http://www.joodscheraadenschede.nl
Interview Flim, Archive Flim NIOD 471 13C
Interview kapelaan Van Der Brink, NIOD
SVB file 8, Docdirect, Winschoten
SVB file 13, Docdirect, Winschoten
SVB file 14, Docdirect, Winschoten
SVB file 22, Docdirect, Winschoten
SVB file 23, Docdirect, Winschoten
SVB file 28, Docdirect, Winschoten
SVB file 30, Docdirect, Winschoten
SVB file 33, Docdirect, Winschoten
SVB file 40, Docdirect, Winschoten
SVB file 41, Docdirect, Winschoten
SVB file 47, Docdirect, Winschoten
SVB file 48, Docdirect, Winschoten
SVB file 50, Docdirect, Winschoten
SVB file 51, Docdirect, Winschoten
SVB file 52, Docdirect, Winschoten
SVB file 55, Docdirect, Winschoten
Yad Vashem file A. Ten Tije in Michman et al. (2004)
Yad Vashem file J. Hofstra in Michman et al. (2004)
Yad Vashem file L. Gerritsen in Michman et al. (2004)

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