Issue Bricolage: Explaining the Configuration of the Social Movement Sector, 1960–1995¹

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Social movements occupy a shared ideational and resource space, which is often referred to as the social movement sector. This article contributes to the understanding of the relational dynamics of the social movement sector by demonstrating how ideational linkages are formed through protest events. Using a data set of protest events occurring in the United States from 1960 to 1995, the authors model the mechanisms shaping why certain movement issues (e.g., women's and peace or environmental and gay rights) appear together at protest events. They argue that both cultural similarity and status differences between two social movement issues are the underlying mechanisms that shape joint protest and the resultant ideational linkages between issues. Finally, they show that the linking of issues at protest events results in changes in the prominence of a given issue in the social movement sector.

Social movement scholars have long been interested in the interconnectedness of movements (e.g., McCarthy and Zald 1977; Minkoff 1997; Whittier 2004). Movements collaborate and share resources and knowledge in their attempt to create political and social change (Diani and Bison 2004; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010; Wang and Soule 2012), but they also compete

¹This research was supported by grants to the third author from the National Science Foundation (SBR 9709337, SBR 9874000). We thank Doug McAdam, John

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for resources and public attention (e.g., Koopmans 1993; Olzak and Uhrig 2001; Soule and King 2008). To describe the full set of collective actors engaged in social and political change in a given time and place, and the interactions between these actors, McCarthy and Zald (1977) use the term *social movement sector* (hereafter SMS), Curtis and Zurcher (1973) use the term *social movement field* (SMF), and, more recently, Fligstein and McAdam (2011) use the term *strategic action field* (SAF). These concepts encompass both the concrete actors (e.g., people, organizations) initiating and participating in protest and the beliefs, opinions, and issues that movements represent.

While the imagery of the SMS has been useful for conceptualizing this phenomenon, we know little about the mechanisms driving changes in the issues that make up the SMS. Although scholars have examined the interactions and relations between a small number of social movements (e.g., Minkoff 1995, 1997, 1999; Soule and King 2008) or have examined relationships between actors within the SMS (e.g., Garner and Zald 1985; Everett 1992; Bearman and Everett 1993; Osa 2001, 2003; Diani and McAdam 2003; Soule 2009; Ghaziani and Baldassarri 2011; Wang and Soule 2012), we still do not know why different social movement issues have changed in their prominence within the SMS, nor do we understand why certain issues become linked to other issues.

We seek to better understand how the relationships between different movement issues in the SMS evolve over time. We study the SMS of the United States between 1960 and 1995, and we draw on current thinking in field theory (e.g., Martin 2003, 2011). We posit that the relative position of movement issues in the SMS (or field) will shape the propensity for linking of these issues in protest events. We refer to the process whereby movement issues become linked at protest events as *issue bricolage*. Drawing on Lévi-Strauss's (1967) concept of bricolage, we argue that protest events become sites of structural overlap of social and political issues as movement actors engage in either collaboration at joint protest events or frame bridging.⁴

McCarthy, and Susan Olzak for their role in collecting the data used in this article. We also thank Willie Ocasio, Patrick Park, and the *AJS* reviewers for their thoughtful comments. Direct correspondence to Wooseok Jung, Department of Management and Organizations, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, Illinois 60208. E-mail: w-jung@kellogg.northwestern.edu

² In related work, Ennis (1987) talks about "fields of action," which are the relationships between all the tactics in a social movement sector or field.

³ While recognizing the affinity between these terms, for the remainder of this article, we use the term SMS for simplicity.

⁴Clearly, movements do more than just protest; however, protest represents a visible and public activity in which movements make claims, articulate their posi-

Bricolage, we show, subsequently influences the prominence of issues in the larger SMS, serving as the engine that reconfigures the broader field or SMS.

One contribution of this article is to identify two mechanisms that underlie issue bricolage. First, we argue that co-occurrence of issues is more likely to happen between culturally similar movements. We measure cultural similarity by the extent of tactical overlap between pairs of movements, since many scholars have argued that tactics are important dimensions of a movement's identity and cultural repertoire (e.g., Clemens 1993; Tarrow 1994; Williams 1995; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). Second, we argue that issue co-occurrence is also structured by status differences between movement issues, such that lower-status movements wish to ride the coattails of higher-status issues in an effort to draw more attention to their issue, while actors engaged in higher-status issues seek to reestablish authenticity (and defend themselves against claims of "selling out") by associating with lower-status issues. We examine both of these mechanisms—cultural similarity and status difference—across two different forms of activity: collaboration at joint protest events and frame bridging.

A second contribution of this article is that we then examine an important outcome of issue bricolage—how it influences subsequent changes in the overall configuration of the SMS. As an isolated movement issue begins to co-occur regularly with a more central issue at protest events, it becomes more prominent (or central) to the SMS. As this happens, it also receives more media attention. Thus, we show that cultural similarity and status differences between movements condition the extent to which movement actors link issues in the future, creating the path for formerly peripheral issues to become more prominent in the SMS.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND OUR ARGUMENT

As noted above, McCarthy and Zald (1977) refer to the SMS as the configuration of all *social movements* active in a given time and place. To McCarthy and Zald, a social movement is "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population, which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structures and/or reward distribution of a society" (pp. 1217–18). Implicit in this definition is that the social movements are both ideational (in that they represent the opinions and beliefs of some segment of a pop-

tions, and recruit new participants. Our analysis is based on this single activity, although we try to account for other domains of activity as well (i.e., interactions in the policy sphere) in order to isolate the effect of past protest interactions on future issue bricolage.

ulation) and interconnected (in that the SMS represents all movements copresent at a given time, in a given place). Research on the SMS has shown that some movements are more connected than others, either through their collaborative or symbiotic relationships (e.g., Meyer and Whittier 1994; Minkoff 1997; Wang and Soule 2012) or through competition (e.g., Soule and King 2008), but past research has tended to ignore the ideational aspects of the SMS.

Protests are one way in which social movements, and the issues that they articulate, are connected, as many protests articulate more than one issue (Soule and Earl 2005). For example, in 1992, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) and civil rights movement activists teamed up in Oregon for a series of protests against an antigay legislative referendum that they believed sparked violence against gays and lesbians and ultimately led to the murder of an African-American lesbian (Egan 1992). During the protest events, activists voiced grievances about discrimination based on race and sexual orientation, as well as their general concern about the handling of hate crimes by the nation's criminal justice system. Similarly, in 1978, a coalition of environmental groups, members of the Chumash Indian tribe, and administrators from a local marine base united to fight utility companies' plans to unload natural gas in a protected coastal bay in California. The protests drew attention to a number of social movement issues, including environmental degradation, discrimination against Native Americans, and a struggle for local autonomy characteristic of not-in-my-backyard movements (Holles 1978).

Thus, protest events are sites of structural overlap between movement issues, just as they are sites of structural overlap between the organizations and people that they comprise (Wang and Soule 2012). Movement actors may combine issues at protests for a couple of reasons. First, sometimes activists strategically collaborate with other movement activists in order to mobilize support, leading to cosponsorship of protests and to coalitions (e.g., Levi and Murphy 2006; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010; Wang and Soule 2012). *Coalition building*, then, naturally leads activists to incorporate issues from cooperating groups. Second, protesters from one movement may engage in processes of *frame bridging* (Snow et al. 1986) in a strategic attempt to piggyback their issues, without any explicit attempt to collaborate.

Coalition building and frame bridging are thus the primary activities through which ideational linkages, or issue bricolage, between movements occur; however, the mechanisms that facilitate issue bricolage stem from the positional characteristics of the SMS itself. Inasmuch as the SMS is a field characterized by positional differences between movements, we expect that issues' relative positions to one another will shape their propensity for bricolage. That is, how close or distant they are in the SMS space ought

to influence whether movement actors see issues as having potential for combination. Although there are numerous ways to assess positional distance, we focus on two core positional characteristics that trigger issue bricolage: *cultural similarity* and *status differences*.

Cultural Similarity and Issue Bricolage

Social movements actors are likely to find affinity when they are culturally similar to one another. The tactics that movements use are a core component of their culture, so much so that tactics become symbols of the movements themselves (e.g., Wilson 1973; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). For example, in the United States cross burning is deeply associated with the white supremacy movement (and especially the Ku Klux Klan), and spiking trees is linked to radical environmentalism (Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). Creating a shared tactical repertoire helps activists construct and maintain a unique movement culture and identity. By showing that "we are people who do these sorts of things in this particular way," tactical repertoires signify a movement's culture (Clemens 1996, p. 211) and may even "cement . . . a connection" between movements by expressing a shared identity and foster a sense of community (Whittier 2004, p. 540).

Given these arguments, we expect that movements that share many of the same protest tactics will see themselves as more culturally similar and thus will find greater affinity between their issues. To the extent that a movement becomes tightly linked to particular tactics, members from other similar movements will find it easier to engage in joint protests, share knowledge, and come to agreement about how their different issues relate to one another. Activists that use similar tactics will have a deeper cultural affinity, facilitating the likelihood that they will expand their agenda and advocate for both issues in future protests. By contrast, if two social movements have very different tactical repertoires, participants will find less resonance between their particular issues.⁶

⁵ In fact, the tactics can become associated with the identity of a movement even when a given tactic was never even used by that movement. This was the case with "bra burning," which came to be associated with the women's rights movement, even though it was never actually used by that movement (Staggenborg and Taylor 2005).

⁶ Even within a social movement, disputes about appropriate tactics can prevent unified actions (see Benford [1993] on debates between radical and less radical organizations in the nuclear disarmament movement and McAdam [1999] on the tensions between the two core civil rights organizations, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee).

However, a pair of movements that is completely matched on tactics will risk redundancy. Movement actors still have a need to learn new skills and knowledge and to expand their claims to capture new audiences (Wang and Soule 2012). Devising creative ways to overcome the liability of powerlessness is a key for social movement success (e.g., McAdam 1983; Ganz 2000). By expanding their horizons and engaging with issues associated with a culturally distant movement, a movement may increase its chances of success by capitalizing on the element of surprise, which may lead to greater public attention. For example, Lichterman (1995) showed that the U.S. green movement sought to build an alliance with "environmental justice" advocates despite strong cultural differences that inhibited interactions between the two movements.

Furthermore, movements may seek to align themselves with other movements that use different tactics because high levels of tactical overlap may increase niche competition with those movements (Olzak and Uhrig 2001). As they rely on similar repertoires, movements should compete for similar resources such as political allies, media attention, and public support. Increasing competition, therefore, may cause social movement actors to see each other as antagonistic; thus they may seek to differentiate themselves from one another rather than affiliate with the same causes (Soule and King 2008).

For these reasons, we expect that issue bricolage will be likely between two or more movements with high degrees of cultural similarity, which we measure as tactical overlap. However, we also expect that if cultural similarity is too high (i.e., tactical repertoires overlap too much), then redundancy and competition will reduce the potential for issue bricolage. Taken together, we hypothesize that cultural similarity between movements will increase the likelihood that their issues will co-occur in future protests, but only up to a certain point, beyond which the likelihood of issue bricolage will decrease.

Hypothesis 1.—There is a curvilinear relationship between cultural similarity (measured by tactical overlap) of movements promoting different issues and the likelihood of issue bricolage between their issues in future events.

Status Difference and Issue Bricolage

Previous studies have shown that securing attention and recognition from the broader public is critical for movement actors to attract and persuade a wide range of public audiences (see the review in Andrews and Caren [2010]). As a social issue generates more public attention, movement organizations advocating for that issue are more likely to survive (Minkoff 1993), influence proximate movements (Minkoff 1994, 1997, 2002), and disrupt their targets (King and Soule 2007). The need to receive public attention motivates movement actors to enhance their issue's salience and visibility.

As an attempt to enhance a social issue's visibility and broaden its appeal to potential audiences, movement actors may affiliate with issues that they perceive as having higher status (cf. Oliver 1990; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996). For example, Vermont's LGBT activists pushed for a lesbian and gay rights bill by associating themselves with broader social justice issues, a cause that had greater prominence in that state at that time (Bernstein 1997).

For activists already engaging with a high-status issue, introducing new social issues that have less status may provide certain advantages as well. As challengers to the established social order, movements need to refresh and update their agenda continuously in order to be seen as cutting-edge, authentic, and relevant. If they fail to innovate their movement agenda and engage with new ideas, a movement can become obsolete and lose touch with its original constituency. For this reason, high-status movements may seek to absorb newly emerging or previously ignored vintage issues. For instance, the highly formalized labor movement sought to recover its former radicalism by introducing new social issues such as minority and immigrant rights (Voss and Sherman 2000) or issues related to "sweatshops" (Van Dyke, Dixon, and Carlon 2007). Through issue bricolage, unions rejuvenated their agenda and launched more organizing campaigns than before.

Although engaging distant social issues provides a potential benefit for movement activists, it also entails certain risks and costs. Since low-status issues are usually of interest only to very specific audiences, these issues might have limited appeal, especially among movement veterans. For example, the environmental movement may seek to expand its agenda by linking its cause with an issue such as animal rights. Although this type of issue bricolage has the potential to breathe new life into the environmental movement, environmental activists that include this new issue in their protests may lose the support of long-time participants (Rootes 2003; Diani 2013).

This scenario may also play out when a movement considers adding a higher-status issue, which may cause it to lose the support of participants who find the narrowness of the cause appealing. These movements may appeal to a particular niche of activists who are uninterested in associating themselves with more general issues. The potential cost of incorporating a new issue into a movement should increase as status dissimilarity increases. That is, the more distinct two movements are in their general ap-

peal and recognition, the greater the costs of linking these two issues together in a protest. Taken together, we hypothesize that status difference between issues will increase the likelihood that the two issues will occur together in future protest, but only up to a certain point.

Hypothesis 2.—There is a curvilinear relationship between the status difference of movements promoting different issues and the likelihood of issue bricolage between their issues in future events.

Outcomes of Issue Bricolage: Changes in the Sector Position

We argued earlier that issue bricolage would affect the overall configuration of the SMS by changing the position of movement issues that are paired at protest events. The primary way in which an issue may change position in a sector is by increasing (or decreasing) in prominence. As more movements find affinity with a given issue, that issue will become a more central node linking other issues in the SMS. As an issue appears at more diverse types of protest events, it gains legitimacy among its movement colleagues.

Certain issues, such as environmentalism and gay and lesbian rights, have changed positions in the SMS significantly over the decades. In the 1960s both were peripheral causes that received little attention from other activists. Over time, the number of protests associated with each issue increased; however, it wasn't until the 1980s and 1990s that other movements began to align their own issues with environmentalism and gay and lesbian rights, which ultimately led both issues to become highly central in the SMS. One reason for the transition from periphery to the center of the SMS is that other highly central issues, such as civil rights or human rights, became associated with both issues. These highly central issues magnified the appeal of environmentalism and gay and lesbian rights issues, which led others to associate with them. Although other factors played a role as well, we suggest that this shift in position was partly due to internal dynamics in the SMS that made both issues viable candidates for issue bricolage.

Hypothesis 3.—Issue bricolage increases a focal issue's prominence in the SMS.

RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA, AND MEASUREMENT

Data Source: The Dynamics of Collective Action, 1960–95

Our data come from observing the dynamics of issue co-occurrence at protest events. We define a *protest event* (or "event") as any type of activity that involves more than one person and is carried out with the explicit purpose of articulating a grievance against (or expressing support for) a target. Data on these events were drawn from daily editions of the *New*

York Times between 1960 and 1995 and come from the Dynamics of Collective Action Project.⁷

For a protest event to be included in the data set, it must have met three basic criteria. First, there must have been more than one participant at the event since the interest is in collective action. Second, participants at an event must have articulated some *issue claim*, whether this is a grievance against or an expression of support for some target. The events in the data set are associated with any claim about an issue area articulated by participants, and we have categorized these into 28 different social movement issue areas (see table 2 below). Also, the event must have happened in the *public sphere* or have been open to the public. Thus, private or closed meetings by social movement actors are not included, but events within organizations (e.g., schools, churches, private organizations) are included if they were open to the public. Finally, coded events occurred all over the United States; that is, the researchers did not code events only in cities or only in certain areas.

These data were collected in two distinct stages. First, researchers read every page of all daily issues of the *Times* from 1960 to 1995 searching for any mention of protest events. By avoiding the use of an index to the *Times*, they were able to find events that were embedded in articles on other (often related) topics. For example, protest events by poor people were found embedded in more general articles on the cost of living, which likely would not be indexed under headings such as "protest" or "demonstration." The second stage of data collection involved the content coding of each event, noting that a single article can discuss multiple events, each of which was coded separately. Project personnel coded information on a variety of different topics, including the claim or issue area articulated at the event, event size and location, the participating group(s), targets of the event, organizational presence, tactical forms employed, and police presence and action taken by these actors at the event. Intercoder reliability estimates for most items on the code sheet were consistently at or above 90% agreement. In all, these data include over 23,000 distinct protest events reported to have occurred in the United States.

⁷ For more in-depth discussions of the data used here, see http://www.dynamics ofcollectiveaction.com.

⁸ Acts of protest carried out by individuals, such as uncoordinated hunger strikes or acts of self-immolation, are therefore not included.

⁹The data cannot speak to changes in protest that takes place outside of the public sphere, such as changes in movements that develop within corporations. Also, the data set does not include organized labor events (e.g., work stoppages and strikes) because the dynamics of labor events are likely different from the rest of the protest sector. Note that if an organized labor event morphed into a public protest event, it would be coded as a distinct event, however.

While newspaper data on protest are widely used, they are not without their critics (see the review in Earl et al. [2004]). The methods used by the Dynamics of Collective Action Project team to reduce potential bias are described in various publications and on the project website referenced in footnote 7.

Dependent Variables

The principal purpose of this study is to understand the dynamics of the SMS. In pursuing this goal, we address two major questions. First, what are the mechanisms driving certain movement issues to come together at protest events? That is, what mechanisms explain issue bricolage? Second, how does issue bricolage influence the subsequent positions of issues in the SMS?

Concerning the first question, the unit of analysis is a yearly "issue dyad" (i.e., we have a row for each dyadic combination of issues for each year of newspaper data). Our dependent variable is the number of protests in which the two issues in a given dyad co-occurred in a given year. For instance, if, during a year in question, there were three events at which both the issues of women's and human rights were articulated, then the value of the dependent variable would be 3 for that year. If during the next year there were no events that articulated both of these issues, then the value of the dependent variable would be 0. The data set includes 13,608 dyadic observations constructed by different combinations of 28 social issues ($^{28}C_2 = 378$ dyadic combinations for each year) and time points (36 years, from 1960 to 1995). The dependent variable ranges from 0 (indicating that in a particular year there were no events articulating a particular issue dyad) to 76 (in 1969, there were 76 events that articulated the issue dyad of "African-American civil rights" and "education").

The second question is addressed with an issue-level analysis. Here, we focus on *degree centrality* to measure whether a focal social issue experienced a change in prominence in the SMS. Network centrality is a frequently used measure of status, inasmuch as it conveys that a node has a lofty position in a prestige hierarchy (e.g., Ibarra 1993; Faris and Felmlee 2011). In the social movement literature, Ghaziani and Baldassarri (2011) used centrality as a measure of the importance of social movement themes. In our context, we consider any issue that co-occurs regularly with other issues to be accorded greater recognition and legitimacy by other activists. The way we estimate degree centrality is explained in detail in the following section because this measure is also one of our key independent variables in the first analysis. Since the value should capture issue-specific information, the data set consists of 1,008 issue-level observations constructed by combinations of 28 social issues and 36-year time points. Among these

issue-year combinations, 37.8% of observations showed an increase in their degree centrality.

Finally, as an alternative measure of change in status or prominence of a given issue, we construct a measure of media attention for each issue. Media attention is measured as the average number of news paragraphs on protests associated with a focal social issue in a given year. For example, if there were 451 events in 1960 in which protesters articulated African-American civil rights issues and the events were covered in the *New York Times* by a total of 533 paragraphs in that year, then the media attention score will be 1.182 (= 533/451) for civil rights for that year.

Independent Variables

Per hypothesis 1, we expect a curvilinear relationship between the level of cultural similarity of two movements and the likelihood of the two issues appearing together at a protest event (i.e., forming an issue dyad or issue bricolage). We define cultural similarity by the extent of tactical overlap between two movements. *Tactical overlap* measures the extent to which movements advocating two joint issues had overlap in the kinds of tactics they used at protest events in the previous year. To compute this measure, we divide the number of tactics two focal movements used in common in a given year by the total number of tactics the two movements used. ¹⁰ This is otherwise known as the Jaccard index of similarity and is represented as

$$\text{Tactical Overlap}_t = \frac{|A \cap B|}{|A \cup B|}.$$

For example, if the women's movement used three tactics (set $A = \{\text{rallies}, \text{marches}, \text{and vigils}\}$) in 1970 and the civil rights movement used five tactics in that same year (set $B = \{\text{rallies}, \text{marches}, \text{pickets}, \text{ceremonies}, \text{and boycotts}\}$), we see that these two movements shared two tactics ($A \cap B = \{\text{rallies}, \text{and marches}\}$). Given that the total number of unique tactics the movements used jointly is six ($A \cup B = \{\text{rallies}, \text{marches}, \text{pickets}, \text{ceremonies}, \text{boycotts}, \text{and vigils}\}$), the tactical overlap measure for these two movement issues for 1970 is .33 (0.33 = 2/6). This measurement follows previous studies of niche overlap (Podolny, Stuart, and Hannan 1996; Olzak and Uhrig 2001; Larson and Soule 2009) but is transformed to reflect symmetric characteristics of the current data set. To investigate our hypothesis about the

¹⁰ See the appendix for a list of all possible tactics.

¹¹In some instances, a lack of protest in either movement issue in the prior year would mean that the estimate of tactical overlap is undefined for that issue dyad.

curvilinear effect of tactical overlap, we include the squared term of the measure with its original form.

Per hypothesis 2, we expect a curvilinear relationship between the status difference of two movement issues and the likelihood that the two issues will appear together at a protest event. Status difference is calculated as the difference between the degree centrality of two issues. 12 To create the centrality measure, we conceive of issues as forming dyads, in which a "tie" between two movements is issue co-occurrence at a protest in the prior year. Since the size of the SMS network (i.e., the number of nodes in the issue network) varies by year, we normalized the degree centrality estimate by following Freeman's (1978) method of normalization. The status of issue A is calculated with the following equation, where PROTEST_i is the number of protests linking movement issue A to the jth movement issue, n is the number of issues that were raised in the SMS at a given year t, and PROTEST_{MAX} indicates the largest number of protests that actually linked different social issues in a given issue network at time point t. According to this equation, the value of an issue's status represents the weighted degree centrality divided by its possible maximum value (Freeman 1978):

$$Status_{At} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n-1} PROTEST_{jt}}{(N-1)PROTEST_{MAXt}} \times 100.$$

For example, in 1987, if the peace issue co-occurred with the civil rights issue at two protest events and with the LGBT issue through one protest, then the weighted degree centrality for the peace issue would be 3 (2 + 1) in that year. However, the meaning of this value is susceptible to the size of the SMS issue network and specifically (1) the number of issues that actually appeared in that year and (2) the maximum number of protests that linked two different issues in that year. In 1987, there were 28 social issues raised in the SMS, and among those issues, movement activists combined the civil rights and education issues at eight different protests. This maximum number of joint protests implies the range of ideational linkages that

For such cases, we coded tactical overlap as zero by assuming that movement activists could not observe tactical choices related to those partner issues. However, sometimes tactical overlap between two movements was indeed zero, even though there were protests related to those issues. To distinguish zero tactical overlap due to nonexistent protest from zero tactical overlap due to nonexistent tactical sharing, we conducted a robustness check after removing all dyads in which one of the issues did not occur in a protest. In this sample, we could safely say that the zero value of tactical overlap is given to issue dyads that did not share any tactical repertoires in actual protest events. In this additional test, we could not find any results substantively different from what we report here.

¹²We also compared our models using eigenvector centrality (Bonacich 1972) and found no substantial change in our results.

any issue could have with others at a given time point. We consider this maximum number $(216 = [28 - 1] \times 8)$ in calculating the degree centrality of the peace issue in 1987 (0.0139 = 3/216). The estimated degree centrality was transformed into the percentage format for ease of interpretation.

To account for skewness in the status difference variable and help ensure that our results are not driven by issue outliers, we calculate the natural log of the absolute difference between two movement issues $(\ln|Status_{SMI1} - Status_{SMI2}|)$. We also include the squared term of the variable to test its curvilinear effect, per our earlier hypothesis.

Finally, hypothesis 3 predicts that an issue will become more prominent in the SMS when it occurs more frequently with other issues in protests in the prior year. To investigate this hypothesis, we measure the number of issues with which a focal issue occurred in the previous year. For instance, in 1988 there were 17 protests advocating LGBT issues. Of these 17, seven events articulated at least one additional issue, for a total of four unique issues to which LGBT was tied in 1988. In this case, we counted four for this estimation.

Control Variables

To consider other factors that potentially influence issue bricolage, we include several control variables. First, since protest is dependent on the availability of resources that can be mobilized (McCarthy and Zald 1977), we consider the level of resources in the environment, with the expectation that social movement activity (including attempts to form coalitions or bridge frames) will flourish in resource-rich environments. Following previous studies (e.g., Soule and King 2008), yearly measures of the personal disposable income (logged) and the business failure rate (logged) are included in our analysis below.

In addition to the level of available resources, the political opportunity structure can play a crucial role in predicting general movement activities (Meyer 2004) as well as decisions about coalitions (Van Dyke 2003; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). To consider this, we include two different measures. First, we include a yearly dummy variable that is coded 1 when the president of the United States was a Democrat. Second, we include a measure of the percentage of the U.S. Congress (both houses) that was from the Democratic Party. We assume that Democrats provide different political opportunities than do Republicans, although we do not specify an expected direction, since recent empirical work has found mixed results for the effect of partisanship on social movement activity and since issues vary in partisanship.

To account for the possibility that different degrees of political attention may be given to issues over time, we include count variables for the *num*-

ber of public laws passed related to each issue. Data on public laws came from the Policy Agendas Project data gathered by Frank Baumgartner and colleagues. To match the social movement issues with the public laws data, we relied on the codebook from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac (CQ Almanac) data set. We coded abstracts from the CQ Almanac and matched the issues in public laws to those in the Dynamics of Collective Action protest data. When the almanac abstracts were too brief to allow precise matching, we used supplementary information about the content of the laws from the Library of Congress. 13 We also used the public laws data to create a variable that denotes the number of issue co-occurred public laws. We include this control variable in the model because it is an indicator of the issue bricolage outside of the SMS. If two issues are already structurally connected in the public's mind, then we reason that this will be reflected in the content of public laws. We counted the number of issues that co-occurred in public laws much in the same way in which we estimated the dependent variable. For instance, if, during a year in question, Congress passed two public laws related to the rights of the disabled and housing issues, then the value of this variable would be 2 for the issue dyad of disabled and housing for that year.

We also control for the extent of strategic overlap between two movements using similarity in targets as the indicator of overlap. Movement actors often strategically target multiple entities, sometimes simultaneously, and sometimes sequentially, including the federal government, state agencies, or for-profit companies (see Soule [2009] for more discussion). To compute this measure, we divide the number of targets two focal movements used in common in a given year by the total number of targets the two movements used. This is represented as

Strategic Overlap_t =
$$\frac{|A \cap B|}{|A \cup B|}$$
.

For example, if the women's movement targeted three different entities in 1970 (set $A = \{\text{government, university, medical facility}\}$) and the civil rights movement targeted two (set $B = \{\text{government, university}\}$), we see that these two movements shared two common targets. In this case, then, the strategic overlap between these two movement issues would be 0.67 = 2/3 in 1970. We include the squared term of the variable with its original form to test for curvilinearity.

¹³ Data on public laws can be found at http://www.policyagendas.org/page/datasets -codebooks#public_laws. The *CQ Almanac* abstracts can be found at http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/toc.php?mode=cqalmanac-appendix&level=2&values =Public+Laws.

Because co-occurrence patterns of two issues should be influenced by the frequency of protest events related to each of the two issues in an issue dyad (because there are simply more events at which co-occurrence could potentially happen), we include counts of the number of events mentioning each of the two issues in a given issue dyad. For example, for the dyad of environmental and women's rights, we include one measure of the number of protest events that mention the environment (event counts 1) and a second measure for the number of protests that mention women's rights (event counts 2). We also include the squared terms for each of these two variables. To rule out the possibility that the results are due to outlier issues, we also included dummy variables for four highly prominent issues (civil rights, peace, hate/bias, and education).

Finally, we also include a lagged dependent variable as a control, under the assumption that issue co-occurrence patterns will be path dependent; in other words, once two issues have co-occurred, the likelihood of the two issues co-occurring in the future is greater. We note that the lagged dependent variable also allows us to control for specific complementarities (or dissimilarities) that would otherwise keep the two issues from being linked in protest. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis.

Modeling Strategy

Our approach involves three different sets of analyses. First, we use network analysis to descriptively show how the SMS of the United States evolved over the time period in question (1960–95). These results are presented below in table 2.

Following this analysis, we use multiple regression analyses to test our hypotheses about how the SMS evolved. First, we analyze the mechanisms leading different movement issues to co-occur, or issue bricolage (table 3). Because our analysis includes several lagged variables, we lose a number of observations. After removing one year of observations (378 issue dyads), our data contain 13,230 observations. In addition, we also exclude all the dyads in which one of the issues does not appear in a single protest in a given year. If an issue was not introduced in any protest events in a given year, the propensity of its co-occurrence with other social issues automatically becomes zero. To avoid the potential bias by assuming an equal chance of appearance to some dyads that have zero possibility of co-occurrence in reality, we analyzed only a pool of issues that actually occurred in a protest in a given year. This truncation reduces our sample size from 13,230 to

¹⁴ The correlation coefficient between two event counts is -.0034 (*P*-value =.689).

TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Variable	Mean	SD
Issue-to-issue level (dyad):		
Issue co-occurred event counts (DV)	.231	1.523
Tactical overlap $(t-1)$.238	.210
Status difference (logged, $t-1$)	.993	.720
Strategic overlap $(t-1)$.413	.324
Original event counts of issue 1	25.100	49.197
Original event counts of issue 2	18.677	36.785
Media coverage difference $(t-1)$	7.103	6.723
N passed public laws related to issue 1 $(t-1)$	1.835	2.639
N passed public laws related to issue 2 $(t-1)$	2.314	3.534
N issue co-occurred public laws $(t-1)$.033	.218
Issue level (node):		
Degree centrality (DV1)	1.711	2.562
Media coverage (DV2)	11.750	8.163
N co-occurred issues $(t-1)$	1.880	2.270
Linked with central issues $(t-1)$.467	.499
Proportional reliance on central issues $(t-1)$.322	.392
Protest event counts	17.607	44.030
Controls:		
Business failure rate (logged)	4.092	.481
Personal disposable income (logged)	9.831	.212
Democratic regime	.374	.484
Proportion of Democratic congresspeople	.594	.038

9,496. Among the 9,496 dyadic combinations, only 9.59% (911 dyadic combinations) exhibit protest co-occurrence.

We use a negative binomial regression to estimate our results because our dependent variable is a count that is overdispersed (mean = 0.231; SD = 1.523). Although we truncated dyadic combinations that have zero possibility of issue co-occurrence, the constructed sample contains a heavy zero count. Furthermore, some movement issues are systematically less likely to co-occur because there were less frequent protests claiming those issues. The zero-inflated model is recommended as a better approach in such cases (Long and Freese 2006) because it estimates the effect of independent variables on the nonzero count while considering the likelihood of a zero value simultaneously. For this reason, we also estimated the results using a zero inflated standard negative binomial regression, and we report these results as well in table 3. 15

¹⁵Although we use time lags to specify the temporal ordering of causality, endogeneity may still be a problem if past values of the dependent variable determine past values of our independent variables. We did not have strong instruments to completely rule out the possibility of endogeneity, but in a sensitivity analysis we deleted all observations in which the prior year's number of protests with issue co-

Once we have investigated the mechanisms driving issue bricolage, we examine whether or not these vary across two primary forms of activity: coalition building and frame bridging (table 4). Here, we replicate the analysis in table 3, but on two subgroups of events: those events with only one organization present and those with two or more organizations present (events with no organizations present were removed from the analysis). The logic in table 4 is that if there is only one organization at an event with multiple issues, then activists are engaging in frame bridging; however, if there are two or more organizations present, then the multiple issues are a function of coalition building on the part of the activists.

Finally, using a growth model, we also analyze an outcome of issue bricolage: how it affects subsequent positioning of issues in the SMS (table 5). Growth models predict the value of a continuous dependent variable (e.g., company sales volume) at time t holding constant the value of the dependent variable at t-1 while also including fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity (e.g., Stuart 2000; Florin, Lubatkin, and Schulze 2003). By including the lagged dependent variable and fixed effects, the model allows us to assess those factors that explain a particular issue's change in field position. In our growth model of centrality, we include the lagged value of degree centrality to account for changes in centrality over time. We interpret the coefficients for the other independent variables in the model as the effect of x_1 on within-issue degree centrality, net of past levels of centrality. Because the growth model includes a number of lagged independent variables, we lose one year of observations (28 observations), leaving us with 980 observations.

We obtained robust standard errors by clustering the observations by year and issue to account for the lack of independence of movement issues across time. We also tested for the possibility of multicollinearity and found that the variance inflation factor scores were reasonably low (i.e., none of them exceeded 7).

RESULTS

The Issue Co-occurrence Network

Before testing our hypotheses, we demonstrate how movement issues cooccurred at protest events in the 1960–95 period by providing a map of the configuration and reconfiguration of the SMS during this period. As we describe in the previous section, we conceive of movement issues as being embedded in a network linked by the articulation of these issues at protest

occurrences was zero. Consistency between this model and the models shown in our tables is evidence that the effects of our independent variables are not driven by a prior lack of ideational linkages.

events. We use a measure of network centrality of these issues to show the extent to which each issue was connected to the rest of the SMS during increments of five years. Table 2 shows the normalized centrality scores for each of 28 issues articulated at protest events reported in the *New York Times* from 1960 to 1995.

From table 2, we see that the SMS has revolved around three main issues over the time period in question: human rights, African-American civil rights, and education. ¹⁶ That is, these three issues were the three most central in nearly the entire period in question. At least three interrelated factors played critical roles in making these issues so central to the United States social movement ideational space in this period. First, the civil rights movement was a pioneering movement (or "early riser"), which helped to set the 1960s protest cycle in motion (e.g., Tarrow 1994; McAdam 1999). Second, the civil rights "master frame" became one that was deeply resonant with American citizens because of its connection to deeply held beliefs about the fundamental rights of Americans, setting in motion a host of other rights-related movements. Finally, all three of these issues are applicable and generalizable to many other movements and are thus modular (Tarrow 1994). For example, many different constituencies can demand human rights, education, or civil rights.

An inspection of table 2 also shows that it is sometimes—but not always—the case that the most central issues are those that appear most frequently in protests. In the 1960–65 period, clearly African-American civil rights appeared most frequently at protest events, and it was the most central issue (i.e., these protest events were those that other issues also appeared at). The same is true of this issue in other periods as well. But the peace issue was also articulated frequently, but not apparently in combination with other issues, as the peace issue had a high frequency but was not especially central to the network in this period. Similarly, in the 1966–70 period, there were a lot of protest events in which welfare, poverty, and housing issues appeared. These protest events apparently did not connect to other issues; thus they were not as central to the network as others. These issues are just a few of several examples of issues that activists frequently used, but not enough in combination with other issues to increase their centrality in the social movement ideational space.

It is worth noting some interesting and significant changes in the SMS as it evolved and reconfigured over this time period, which are also reflected in table 2. As we note above, during the 1960s, civil rights, human rights, and education were highly central to the SMS, but this changed in the 1970s.

¹⁶ In contrast to these three issues, issues related to other specific ethnic and professional groups (i.e., farmers, Native Americans, Mexicans, and Asian Americans) have always been relatively isolated from other issues.

ISSUE CENTRALITY OF 28 SOCIAL MOVEMENT INDUSTRIES, 1960-95 TABLE 2

	1960–65	-65	1966–70	-70	1971–75	-7.5	1976–80	-80	1981–85	-85	1986-	06-	1991–95	-95
SOCIAL ISSUE	Score	N	Score	N	Score	N	Score	N	Score	N	Score N	N	Score	N
Anti-nuclear power	.022	2		1	.071	12	1.434	186	1.926	78	.871	26	.247	4
Anti-immigrant	0	0		2		7	.836	16	.148	3	.218	9	.741	7
Small/family farmers	0	0		4		11	.119	53	0	18	0	0	.741	4
Anti-transnational union	.449	34		0		9	.358	3	0	0	0	1	.494	7
Women's rights	.045	w		38		172	4.898	178	2.37	116	5.229	96	5.926	71
Peace	1.01	366		406		471	4.54	130	2.519	233	1.525	96	886.	20
Human rights, international	3.636*	321		226		165	8.363*	297	3.852*	294	10.675*	268	11.111*	119
Environmental	.337	34		75		66	3.345	125	2.667	86	6.1	101	5.432	84
African-American civil rights	7.744*	2,535		1,242		405	9.797*	316	7.852*	233	11.329*	256	15.309*	239
Gay/lesbian rights	0	0		11		55	1.314	64	1.037	52	5.664	114	5.432	149
Native American rights	.112	12		19		62	.478	62	0	21	.436	32	1.235	23
Mexican American rights	0	0		10		17	1.314	18	444	3	.654	6	2.222	11
Asian American rights	0	0		1		10	0	w	0	6	.436	10	1.235	11
Pan Latino rights	.875	105		75		82	2.748	83	4.148*	47	2.179	34	6.914	72
Disabled rights	0	3		1		30	.597	38	.296	14	1.089	35	1.728	26
Farmworker	.045	3		14		9	.717	16	0	Ŋ	.218	-	0	2
Minority group rights	.471	77		100		205	4.779	74	1.481	40	3.704	20	4.444	36
Abortion	0	0		6		20	1.195	29	688.	45	2.832	59	1.975	62
Hate/bias crimes	1.212	462		290		168	.717	194	.148	133	2.179	221	4.444	194
Animal rights	.022	3		w		13	.119	2.1	.148	45	.871	42	.741	24
Senior citizen rights	.022	3		3		27	1.075	15	.296	10	.654	10	.741	12
Consumer	60.	11		35		51	1.314	46	.296	31	.654	28	.741	23
Education	5.544*	395		901		424	11.708*	271	2.963	140	8.932*	133	7.901*	155
Welfare	.224	16		117		48	1.673	40	.296	42	4.793	73	3.457	51
Housing	808.	108		148		190	3.345	105	1.926	51	6.754	82	2.222	22
NIMBY	.359	34		18		11	4.062	28	3.556	99	8.061	80	4.198	44
Religion	.988	65		25		w	3.704	97	1.333	26	6.972	28	4.938	35
Public safety	.045	6	.382	61		65	1.195	38	688.	26	3.704	57	4.198	27
Mean	.859	164		155		101	2.705	91.3	1.481	67.1	3.455	9.02	3.563	56.9
N issue co-occurred protests		536		2 80		337		317		140		222		166

Note.—Entries in the N columns are the number of protest events engaged in the focal social issue. * Top three social issues in a given period.

Women's, peace, environmental, and antinuclear issues became more central. In the 1980s, the environmental and antinuclear issues became even more central, as did issues loosely grouped under the category of "not in my backyard" (NIMBY). Finally, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, gay and lesbian rights became a much more central issue in the sector. Prior to this, the gay and lesbian rights issue was largely isolated from other issues. In the instances in which it did co-occur with other issues, it tended to be with other peripheral issues. However, since the late 1980s, this issue began to co-occur with other, more central, issues, such as human rights and education.

This descriptive account of the evolution of the issue co-occurrence network is illuminating in that it shows us how the SMS of the United States evolved over this 36-year period. We turn now to our analysis of how this happened, that is, to our regression analysis of the process of issue bricolage. Following this, we look at the question of the consequences of associating with a central issue.

Mechanisms of Issue Bricolage

Table 3 presents the results of our negative binomial regression analysis predicting the yearly count of protest events in which a given issue dyad appeared, with the final model in this table corresponding to the zero-inflated negative binomial model.

Model 1 contains only the control variables. In models 2, 4, and 5, we include the tactical overlap variable to test hypothesis 1. The models support our argument that tactical overlap increases the chances that two issues will co-occur at protest events in the subsequent year. However, this happens only up to a point beyond which the count decreases. Figure 1 graphically displays this relationship and indicates that when the tactical overlap between two issues is at about 61%, the effect of tactical overlap on the count of protests articulating both issues begins to decline (on the basis of the coefficients in model 5).

It appears, then, that issues sponsored by movements that have similar tactical repertoires are more likely to occur together at protest events. The

¹⁷However, the reason is not necessarily that these issues' events increased in frequency (although they did). As a counterexample, notice that in the 1980–95 period, the women's issue increased in centrality while the frequency of its events decreased.

¹⁸Note that these models also include the control variables; thus this effect is not driven solely by path dependence with respect to tactics used by protesters espousing pairs of issues.

reason, we argue, is that tactics (and, as a result, the issues movements are associated with) are deeply tied to their identity. However, when tactical overlap is too high, there is redundancy; thus we see that the effect begins to decline (at about 61% overlap, as we mention above).

Hypothesis 2 was about the effect of the status difference (measured by centrality of both issues) between two issues. In model 3 we find that as the status difference between two issues increases, they are more likely to co-occur at protest events in the subsequent year. The finding provides support for the idea that movements have an affinity for linking high- and low-status issues. However, we find that beyond a point (specifically, around a logged difference of 0.77, or the original difference of 2.16, as shown in fig. 2), the direction of this effect switches. In model 4, when we control for tactical overlap, the effects of tactical overlap and status difference remain significant. In model 5, in which we estimate the results using zero-inflated negative binomial regression, the coefficients are in the same direction, and although the main effect of status difference is no longer significant, the squared term remains negative and significant, confirming our hypothesis that the effect of status difference is curvilinear.¹⁹

Figure 2 (which is based on the coefficients in model 5) shows a rather precipitous decline in the count of protest events articulating a given issue dyad at moderate levels of status difference. This indicates that at relatively low levels of status difference, those two issues are likely to co-occur; however, when there is high-status difference, the count of issue co-occurrence drops off rather steeply. This indicates to us that issues of radically different status are highly unlikely to co-occur at protest events. Stated differently, there appears to be some status homophily preference (with respect to issues) among actors organizing protest events. Substantively, this means that we would be unlikely to find many protest events in the 1960s articulating both an African-American civil rights issue (highest centrality) and an antinucelar, senior citizen rights, or animal rights issue (all quite low on the centrality measure, as shown in table 2).

¹⁹Although we estimated status by observing how frequently an individual issue was referred to by other social movement actors, status is also conferred by third parties. As an issue garners more attention from third parties such as public media, the issue can become more publicly visible and, thus, more prominent in the field. Considering this point, we conducted a separate analysis as a robustness check by regarding the amount of media attention as a pseudoestimate of status. We counted the average number of news paragraphs on protests associated with a focal social issue in a given year and constructed the difference measurement in the same way we do with the degree centrality. In this analysis, we also found the same curvilinear relationship between media coverage difference and issue co-occurrence propensity (P < .05, with a robust SE).

TABLE 3 Negative Binomial Regression Coefficients of Issue Co-occurrence in Protests, 1960–95

		NEGATIVE BINOMIAL	BINOMIAL		ZERO-INFLATED
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Independent variables: Tactical overlap $(t-1)$		2.387***		2.336***	2.954***
		(.574)		(.570)	(2691)
Tactical overlap $(t-1, squared) \dots \dots$		-1.777**		-1.715**	-2.412**
		(.637)	*	(.632)	(.767)
Status unterence (r = 1, loggeu)			(.175)	(.176)	(.201)
Status difference $(t-1, squared)$			177*	176*	185*
Control variables:			(.071)	(.072)	(.083)
Original event counts 1	.011***	.010***	.011***	.010***	.013***
	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.001)	(.002)
Original event counts 1 (squared)	***000'-	***000'-	***000'-	***000'-	***000'-
	(.000)	(000)	(000)	(000)	(.000)
Original event counts 2	.017***	.015***	.016***	.013***	.006***
Original event counts 2 (squared)	***000.—	***000	***000.—	***000.—	**000
	(000.)	(000)	(0000)	(000)	(000.)
Issue co-occurred protests $(t-1)$	200.	.007	900.	900.	.112***
	(.004)	(.005)	(.004)	(.005)	(.033)
Strategic overlap $(t-1)$	1.203**	.256	1.200**	.291	260.
	(.393)	(.443)	(.393)	(.442)	(.543)
Strategic overlap $(t-1, squared)$	449	.148	453	.119	.265
	(.333)	(.359)	(.333)	(.358)	(.444)

Business failure rate (logged)	294**	263*	326**	292**	.010
,	(.106)	(.106)	(.107)	(.107)	(.134)
rersonal disposable income (10gged)	(578)	(.580)	(.580)	450 (.582)	(708)
Democratic regime (vs. Republican regime)	078	790'-	077	065	.068
	(.085)	(.084)	(.084)	(.084)	(.107)
Proportion of Democratic Congress	1.782	1.826	1.921*	1.955*	2.145
	(696.)	(.957)	(.963)	(.949)	(1.308)
N passed public laws related to issue 1 $(t-1)$.018	.016	.018	.017	.017
	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)	(.014)	(.013)
N passed public laws related to issue 2 $(t-1)$.016	.014	.016	.013	002
	(.013)	(.013)	(.013)	(.013)	(.012)
N issue co-occurred public laws $(t-1)$.084	.104	860.	.111	.205
	(.133)	(.132)	(.132)	(.131)	(.149)
African-American civil rights (vs. others)	088	067	.073	.133	.290*
	(.196)	(.201)	(.221)	(.225)	(.123)
Peace (vs. others)	***688.—	***068	864***	875***	360*
	(.218)	(.218)	(.219)	(.220)	(.153)
Hate/bias crimes (vs. others)	856**	831**	839**	822**	931***
	(.266)	(.267)	(.266)	(.266)	(.191)
Education (vs. others)	.039	.005	.091	.047	.149
	(.192)	(.191)	(.194)	(.193)	(.104)
Constant	1.078	3.759	543	2.375	2.650
	(5.613)	(5.623)	(5.618)	(5.623)	(6.720)
Decade fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log pseudo-likelihood	-3,243	-3,229	-3,239	-3,226	-3,366
Wald χ^2	739.06***	778.00***	766.14***	813.91***	381.14***

Note.—N=9,496; N years = 35. Numbers in parentheses are robust SEs. * P<.05. ** P<.01. *** P<.001.




Fig. 1.—Tactical overlap and predicted issue co-occurred protests

Issue Bricolage in Two Different Movement Activities

As we said above, there are two primary activities through which issue bricolage occurs: frame bridging and coalition building. In additional regression analyses, we sought to uncover how these two activities might be differently influenced by cultural similarity and status differences. In table 4, we run separate regressions for different types of protest in which issues co-occurred. In model 1, our dependent variable is the count of only those protests in which a single group (e.g., a specific organization) is mentioned in the newspaper article. In model 2, our dependent variable is the count of those protests in which at least two different groups are mentioned. In the former model, the initiating group joins together two issues through simply extending their collective action frame to include another issue. In the latter model, issue bricolage is the product of collaboration between multiple distinct groups.

The results show that tactical overlap has a similar effect across both forms of activity. Tactical overlap influences issue bricolage through both frame bridging and coalition building. However, it appears that tactical overlap has a stronger curvilinear impact on issue bricolage occurring through




Fig. 2.—Status difference and predicted issue co-occurred protests

coalition building than it does for bricolage occurring through frame bridging. Figure 3 graphically displays the effects of tactical overlap on issue bricolage for these two different activities. Tactical overlap has a stronger curvilinear effect on issue bricolage in coalition building. The reason for this may be that organizations that are too tactically similar to one another may simply find fewer functional reasons to collaborate than those with only moderate levels of similarity. Redundancy at very high levels, then, among groups' tactics may be a disincentive to collaborate, as Wang and Soule (2012) also show in a tactical diffusion process. However, the current finding suggests that cultural affinity plays a crucial role in intergroup collaboration also by restricting the opportunity of ideational linkages between movement topics. This same impediment to issue bricolage is present when a single group engages in frame bridging, but the decreasing effect is less steep.

Surprisingly, the curvilinear effect of status difference is statistically significant only when looking at the rate of issue co-occurrence in coalition-building protests. Figure 4 graphically displays the distinctive effects of status difference on issue bricolage occurring through single groups and multiple groups. This suggests that differences in status are not as great a

TABLE 4
ISSUE CO-OCCURRENCE IN TWO FORMS OF ACTIVITY:
ZERO-INFLATED NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSIONS

$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		Model 1 With Single Group (Frame Bridging)	Model 2 With Multiple Groups (Coalition Building)
Tactical overlap $(t-1)$	Independent variables:		
		2.697***	3.737***
Tactical overlap $(t-1, {\rm squared})$ — 2.060* — 3.352** (.850) (1.225) Status difference $(t-1, \log {\rm ped})$			
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Tactical overlap $(t-1, squared) \dots$		
$ \begin{array}{c} \text{Status difference } (t-1, \text{squared}) &170 &304* \\170 &304* \\ (.087) & (.124) \\ \text{Control variables:} \\ \text{Original event counts } 1 & .013*** & .011**** \\ (.002) & (.002) & (.002) \\ \text{Original event counts } 1 & .000*** &000**** \\ (.000) & (.000) & (.000) \\ \text{Original event counts } 2 & .005** & .005* \\ (.002) & (.002) & (.002) \\ \text{Original event counts } 2 & .005** & .005* \\ (.002) & (.002) & (.002) \\ \text{Original event counts } 2 & .000** & .000 \\ \text{Original event counts } 2 & .000** & .000 \\ \text{Original event counts } 2 & .000** & .000 \\ \text{Original event counts } 2 & .000** & .000 \\ (.000) & (.000) & (.000) \\ \text{Issue co-occurred protests by a singular group } t-1) & .119** & .045 \\ \text{(0.36)} & (.033) \\ \text{Issue co-occurred protests by multiple groups } t-1) & .020 & .038 \\ \text{Strategic overlap } t-1) & .185 & .141 \\ (.056) & (.054) & (.050) \\ \text{Strategic overlap } t-1, \text{ squared}) & .185 & .195 \\ (.565) & (.790) \\ \text{Strategic overlap } t-1, \text{ squared}) & .185 & .195 \\ (.521) & (.652) \\ \text{Business failure rate } (\log \log d) & .210 & .492 \\ (.580) & (.308) \\ \text{Personal disposable income } (\log \log d) & .270 & .492 \\ (.580) & (.8859) \\ \text{Democratic regime } (vs. \text{ Republican regime}) & .276* & .157 \\ (.124) & (.173) & .036 \\ (.1324) & (.173) & .049 \\ \text{V passed public laws related to issue } 1 (t-1) & .023 & .015 \\ (.013) & (.025) \\ N \text{ passed public laws related to issue } 2 (t-1) & .009 & .030 \\ (.013) & (.0025) \\ N \text{ passed public laws related to issue } 2 (t-1) & .009 & .030 \\ (.013) & (.017) \\ N \text{ issue co-occurred public laws} \\ (t-1) & .023 & .354* \\ (.182) & (.1718) \\ \text{African-American civil rights} \\ (vs. \text{ others}) & .018 & .994*** \\ (.140) & (.162) \\ \text{Peace } (vs. \text{ others}) &795*** & -1.085*** \\ \end{array}$		(.850)	(1.225)
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Status difference $(t-1, logged) \dots$		
		· /	
Control variables: Original event counts 1	Status difference $(t-1, squared) \dots$		
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0 1 11	(.087)	(.124)
Original event counts 1 (squared)		012***	011***
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Proportion of Democratic Congress 3.523^{**} $.049$ (1.324) (1.942) N passed public laws related to issue $1 (t-1)$ $.023$ $.015$ N passed public laws related to issue $2 (t-1)$ 009 $.030$ N issue co-occurred public laws $(t-1)$ $.203$ $.354^*$ African-American civil rights $(vs. others)$ $.018$ $.994^{***}$ (140) $(.162)$ Peace $(vs. others)$ 351^* 321 $(.171)$ $(.201)$ Hate/bias crimes $(vs. others)$ 795^{***} -1.085^{***}		.276*	.157
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$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	issue 1 $(t-1)$		
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	37 1 13 1 1 1 1	(.013)	(.025)
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	N issue co-occurred public laws	(.013)	(.017)
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(vs. others) .018 .994*** (.140) (.162) Peace (vs. others) 351* 321 (.171) (.201) Hate/bias crimes (vs. others) 795*** -1.085***	African-American civil rights	()	()
Peace (vs. others)		.018	.994***
Peace (vs. others)		(.140)	(.162)
(.171) (.201) Hate/bias crimes (vs. others)	Peace (vs. others)	351*	321
(.216) $(.271)$	Hate/bias crimes (vs. others)		
		(.216)	(.271)

TABLE 4 (Continued)

	Model 1 With Single Group (Frame Bridging)	Model 2 With Multiple Groups (Coalition Building)
Education (vs. others)	.250*	.113
	(.120)	(.158)
Constant	-3.253	-10.354
	(5.659)	(8.961)
Decade fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Log pseudo-likelihood	-2,785	-1,376
Wald χ^2	358.71***	335.94***

Note.—N = 9,496; N years = 35. Numbers in parentheses are robust SEs.

concern for social movement actors that bring together issues through frame bridging alone but that they are very important for actors that are engaging in collaboration. Differently put, whereas movement actors tend to rely on similarly prominent issues in extending their own frames, activists are likely to explore more diverse and distant issues at least to a certain point when they




Fig. 3.—Different tactical overlap effects according to initiating groups

^{*} P < .05.

^{**} P < .01.

^{***} P < .001.




Fig. 4.—Different status difference effects according to initiating groups

search for collaboration partners. Thus, the curvilinear pathway through which status difference drives issue bricolage is primarily decisions about building coalitions with other groups. Issue bricolage in some cases is a byproduct of movement groups seeking to engage with other groups associated with issues of higher or lower status.

The Outcomes of Issue Bricolage

Table 5 reports the results of models designed to get at how issue bricolage leads to a reconfiguration of the SMS (per hypotheses 3). Model 1 shows our explanatory variables regressed on the growth rate of the issue's degree centrality. We find support for our argument that past issue bricolage enhances the prominence of a focal issue in the SMS. As a focal issue partners with an additional issue, its prominence increases by 0.235 (degree centrality; table 5, model 1).

We ran some additional analyses to verify the robustness of this finding. First, we wanted to rule out the possibility that the effect of issue bricolage on changes in degree centrality was not entirely caused by linking to highly central movement issues (e.g., African-American civil rights). In model 2,

OUTCOMES OF ISSUE BRICOLAGE: INCREASES IN PROMINENCE IN THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT SECTOR AND IN MEDIA COVERAGE TABLE 5

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 3		DEG	DEGREE CENTRALITY	TY	M	Media Coverage	E
tependent variables:	•	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Linked with central issues (vs. linked with none or other issues, $t-1$) (.048) (.051) (.048) (.222) Proportional reliance on central issues $(t-1)$ 2.39 2.27+ (.155) Proportional reliance on central issues $(t-1)$ 2.30 2.24 2.19 1.034 Business failure rate (logged) 1.762*** 1.770**** 9.048*** Personal disposable income (logged) 1.762*** 1.754*** 1.770**** 9.048*** Personal disposable income (logged) 1.762*** 1.754*** 1.770**** 9.048**** Personal disposable income (logged) 1.764*** 1.774** 1.171 1.181* Personal disposable income (logged) 1.754*** 1.177 1.181* Democratic regime (vs. Republican regime) 1.754** 1.177 1.117 1.181* Proportion of Democratic Congress 7.346*** 7.346*** 1.540* 1.540* Protest event counts $(t-1)$ 1.940*** 1.540* 1.540* 1.540* Protest event counts $(t-1)$ 1.940*** 1.040** 1.040* 1.040* 1.040* Occasional disposable income (t-1) 1.940* 1.940*	Independent variables: N co-occurred issues $(t-1)$.235***	.209***	.228***	.516*	.310	.463*
Proportional reliance on central issues $(t-1)$ (1.147) (1.155) (1.155) (1.155) (1.155) (1.155) (1.157) (1.157) (1.137) (1.154*** 1.170***** 1.170***** 1.170***** 1.00*** 1.	(vs. linked with none or other issues, t	(.048)	(.051)	(.048)	(.222)	(.232) 1.905**	(.221)
Business failure rate (logged) .230 .224 .219 1.034 Business failure rate (logged) (.137) (.137) (.631) Personal disposable income (logged) 1.762*** 1.754*** 1.770*** 9.048**** Democratic regime (vs. Republican regime) (.275) (.275) (1.267) Democratic regime (vs. Republican regime) (.117) (.117) (.117) (.117) Proportion of Democratic Congress (.177) (.117) (.117) (.117) (.138** Protest event counts $(t-1)$ (.174) (.177) (.174) (.134*) (.002) (.002) (.009) Protest event counts $(t-1)$ squared (.002)	Proportional reliance on central issues $(t-1)$		(.147)	.274+		(.675)	2.093**
Personal disposable income (logged), $(.137)$ (.137) (.137) (.137) (.631) $(.275)$ (.275) (.275) (.275) (.275) (.275) (.267) (.275) (.279) (.273	Control variables: Business failure rate (logged)	.230	.224	.219	1.034	066	.952
Democratic regime (vs. Republican regime) (.275) (_	(.137)	(.137)	(.137)	(.631)	(.629)	(.629)
Proportion of Democratic Congress	D	(.275)	(.275)	(.275)	(1.267)	(1.263)	(1.262)
Proportion of Democratic Congress	Democratic regime (vs. Nepuddican regime)	(.117)	(.117)	(.117)	-1.181° (.539)	(.538)	(.538)
Protest event counts $(t-1)$		7.489***	7.346***	7.385***	11.194	10.060	10.404
Coots event counts $(t-1)$ squared (.002) (.002) (.002) (.000) Coots event counts $(t-1)$ (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) Degree centrality $(t-1)$ (.112*** .109*** .112** .109*** .112** Media coverage $(t-1)$ (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) Instant (.2803) (2.801) (2.799) (12.910)	Protest event counts $(t-1)$	(1.595) $.005**$	(1.596) $.005**$	(1.594) .005*	(7.348)	(7.332) .003	(7.323) .001
Degree centrality $(t-1)$ $(.000)$ $(.000)$ $(.000)$ $(.000)$ $(.000)$ $(.000)$ $(.000)$ $(.001)$ $(.042)$	_	(.002)	(.002)	(.002)	(600.)	(000.)	(600.)
Degree centrality (t - 1)	_	(000)	(000.)	(000)	(0000)	(0000)	(000)
Media coverage $(t-1)$	Degree centrality $(t-1)$.112**	.109**	.109**	124	153	148
nstant	Media coverage $(t-1)$.000	(.042) 001	(.042) 001	.046	.036	.035
(2.803) (2.801) (2.799) (12.910)	Constant	(.007)	(.007)	(.007)	(.032)	(.033)	(.033)
		(2.803)	(2.801)	(2.799)	(12.910)	(12.868)	(12.858)
	R^2	.201	.204	.204	.129	.136	.137

Note.—Growth model, issue-level fixed-effects generalized least squares regression. N = 980; N years = 35. Numbers in parentheses are SEs. $^{+}$ P < 1. * P < .05. ** P < .01. *** P < .001.

we include a variable, ties to central issues, that is a dummy variable that measures whether or not a focal issue was tied to at least one central issue in the previous year. Second, in model 3 we include a measure of the proportional reliance on central issues measuring the proportion of a focal movement's partner issues that are central in the prior year. Since those two estimates are highly correlated (correlation coefficient = .876, P < .001), we include these measures in the models separately.

In addition to these models, we also conducted a separate analysis predicting the amount of media coverage an issue obtains. If issue bricolage affects an issue's future position in the SMS, this positional mobility can be observed through the lens of third parties. Journalists, for example, may have been more likely to pay attention to formerly peripheral movements as they became linked to other movements or more established causes. To test this, we examine the growth rate of an issue's media coverage in models 4, 5, and 6. These additional analyses show that issue bricolage also increases the prominence of an issue in the eyes of the media. Thus, our results show that issue bricolage affects two different types of change in prominence or status of an issue: an increase in centrality in the SMS and an increase in the external prominence of the issue as measured by media attention.

The results of the additional analyses show that the effect of the extent of issue bricolage on issue prominence within the SMS is independent of ties to highly central issues. As shown in models 2 and 3, the variables measuring ties to highly central issues are not statistically significant. Being linked to highly central issues does not explain the effect of issue bricolage on prominence within the SMS. Turning to the effects of issue bricolage on media attention, we find that linking with an additional issue increases the amount of media attention a focal issue gets by about one-half of a paragraph per protest event ($\beta = 0.516$, model 4). However, when we control for the effect of being linked to a central issue, the effect of co-occurrence on media attention loses significance. This suggests that the effect of co-occurrence on media attention occurs primarily through association with high-status issues. Those issues that were paired with highly central issues enjoyed substantial increases in media coverage, at roughly two additional

²⁰ For example, in 1988, among four issues with which the LGBT movement issue was linked through coprotest, the human rights and education issues had the second-and third-highest levels of degree centrality (this is reflected in table 2, which shows the values for the five-year block 1986–90). In this case, the variable *ties with central issues* would be coded 1 because the LGBT movement was connected with one or more central issues in that year, and the variable *proportional reliance on central issues* would be 0.5 (two central issues out of four partnered issues). In both measures, central issues indicate social issues positioned within the top three ranks in the degree centrality measure (see table 2).

paragraphs per protest event (β = 1.905, model 5). Thus, it appears that being paired with a highly central issue draws more outside attention to an issue, but it does not necessarily help improve the esteem of the issue within the SMS.²¹

These effects are best illustrated by a concrete example from our data. In 1987, environmental claims appeared at protest events alongside human rights issues. In that year, human rights had the highest degree centrality score in the SMS (7.9), while the centrality of the environmental issue was much lower (2.3). In 1988, the environmental issue dramatically increased in centrality (6.7), becoming the fourth most prominent movement issue that year, despite not being connected to the human rights issue in that year. The environmental movement increased its prominence through issue bricolage, but not necessarily through issue bricolage with the higheststatus member in the SMS (human rights). This story also demonstrates the effect of proportional reliance on central issues. As a movement issue becomes more associated with highly central issues, the issue is more likely to achieve a higher position in degree centrality and more media attention (models 3 and 6). Environmentalism used highly central issues, such as human rights, to springboard itself to greater prominence in following years, at which point it became less reliant on that issue as a legitimacy enhancer and began to stand on its own.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The concept of the SMS captures the idea that social movements inhabit a common ideological space or field, engage in related struggles, and interact and form relationships. Despite the importance of the SMS to our conception of resource mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1977) and despite ongoing efforts to theorize relational fields (e.g., Martin 2003; Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 2012), our understanding of the dynamics that shape relationships between ideas or issues in the SMS has not been well developed (see Diani [2013] for a similar criticism). We contribute to both social movement theory and field theory by proposing an explanation for changes in the ideational linkages of the SMS. In particular, we conceptualize the SMS as an ever-evolving configuration of relationships among movement issues that are expressed in protests and other activities. And we propose two mech-

²¹As a robustness check, we first ran a generalized least squares regression model, using issue fixed effects, in which the dependent variable is the amount of change in prominence of the issue between t and t-1. We then ran a fixed-effects logistic regression in which the dependent variable is a dummy indicating that the issue increased in prominence. The results of these analyses confirm those of the growth model.

anisms by which changes in the SMS happen. Specifically, we show that two mechanisms, cultural similarity and status difference, explain how the relationships between movement issues in the SMS evolve. Movements form closer relationships with other movements that are similar to them culturally, while at the same time they also form relationships with movements of different status positions. These findings highlight an underlying tension in movement dynamics. On the one hand, social movement actors have a need for belonging and togetherness, as reflected in the tendency for movements to form ideational linkages with other movements that are tactically similar. On the other hand, movement actors seek to differentiate and extend themselves, as reflected in the pattern of movements aligning themselves with issues that have status positions different from their own.

The motivation to bond with others who are culturally similar is well noted in the social movement literature, especially work on coalition and collaboration (see contributions in Van Dyke and McCammon [2010]). Movements have shared identities that form the cultural backbone of collective action and orient them to other actors in their relational space. These shared identities denote not only beliefs about who we are but also beliefs about who we are not. Inasmuch as movement actors seek to form closure around identity and assimilate those who are like them while distancing themselves from actors who are not like them, identity, as expressed by tactical similarity, drives the formation of ideational linkages in the SMS. But more surprising to scholars of social movements is the pattern of relationship forming based on status difference. Inasmuch as movement actors seek to innovate and expand their issue repertoire, potentially appealing to new audiences and building a more robust constituency, they are motivated to connect with other movements that are somewhat distant (although not too distant) from them in ideational space.

Importantly, each of these mechanisms is, itself, constrained by internal pressures to avoid redundancy and to minimize the risks of expanding too broadly. These internal constraints may explain why movements are able to maintain a semblance of continuity and distinctiveness over time. If movements had no constraints on forming linkages, issue bricolage would occur unabated and movement differences would dissipate. However, our results confirm that the curvilinear effects of tactical similarity and status difference impede movements from excessively assimilating similar others or expanding beyond recognition.

A primary contribution of this article is to demonstrate how the SMS evolves over time. Issue bricolage influences which issues become prominent in the SMS in future years, giving opportunities to actors and ideas that were previously ignored. These findings have implications, more generally, for the study of fields (Martin 2003). Although the field concept is relevant for a number of sociological research areas that are interested in

the interactions between individuals, organizations, or other social actors (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Fligstein and McAdam 2011), our understanding of how the ideational linkages between actors in fields evolve over time has not been well understood. Our findings point to the importance of general mechanisms—the need for cultural similarity and status difference—that promote changes in field position.

One of the key tenets of field theory is that the position of actors and objects shapes future actions; however, as of yet this thinking has not been applied to relations between movements' ideas or issues. By demonstrating that the relative position of movement issues shapes their future interaction, we are able to explain how "locally variable" positions within a field shape the "global organization" of the field (Martin 2011, p. 270). Specifically, we show that the local dynamics of status difference and cultural similarity of movement issues explain global patterns in the SMS. Thus, we point to the importance of status difference and cultural similarity as field dynamics that might explain the structuration of fields in other settings beyond the movement sector. More generally, we demonstrate the utility of a field perspective to explaining the evolution of the SMS, a concept that has long been underexamined in the literature (Diani 2013).

Relatedly, this article also contributes to our understanding of protest waves and cycles. Protest cycles or waves are associated with periods of intense interaction among movement actors. Whereas most past studies of protest cycles focus on the determinants of protest activity in a single movement, we examine the extent to which waves of protest circulate between movements and the consequences of protests for changing the alignment between various social movements. While the tendency of protest waves may be to augment existing structural differences between movements, we also suggest mechanisms that may cause isolated movements to move closer to the center of the SMS. Movements that were once structurally isolated, and perhaps not very active, suddenly become more central as higher-status movements seek to affiliate with a burgeoning new cause, creating opportunities for interaction with other movement causes and actors. Additionally, as new movements accumulate more tools in their tactical repertoire, they create opportunities for potential interaction with other movements that use similar tactics. Tactical overlap, in this sense, creates a pathway for new movements to establish themselves in the SMS.

Our conception of social movements as embedded in a network of ideational linkages builds on past research on social movements and networks (e.g., Diani and McAdam 2003) and extends this work by demonstrating how network models of protest may explain fluctuation in the structural location of various issues in the SMS. By examining the entire SMS, we also overcome an inherent bias in much social movement research—the tendency to focus on a single movement population or social issue. By mod-

eling the interactive dynamics between various movements, we follow Koopman's urging to "move beyond single movements and consider dynamic interactions among a multitude of contenders" (2004, p. 21), and we speak directly to Diani's (2013) assertion that the "configuration of networks is at least as important, and at times more important, than properties of actors, be they individuals or organizations" (p. 148).

Related to these observations, our article also has important implications for the growing body of research on social movement coalitions (e.g., Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). Our first finding (i.e., that cultural similarity leads to movement issue co-occurrence) resonates with research on coalitions that finds that cultural affinity structures coalition formation (e.g., McCammon and Campbell 2002). But, our second finding (i.e., that status differences also lead to movement issue co-occurrence) has not yet been examined in this body of work. The idea that lower-status (or less central) movements might attempt to collaborate with higher-status movements to ride their coattails, at the same time higher-status (or more central) movements might attempt to collaborate with lower-status movements in an attempt to reestablish authenticity (or fend off claims of "selling out"), makes intuitive sense. Thus, our findings provide an intriguing, yet hitherto unexamined, dynamic about how status may drive coalition formation. Our results also suggest that frame bridging is another path through which issue bricolage occurs and that this path is also influenced by the cultural similarity of movements. Status difference, however, does not have the same effect on frame bridging as it does on coalition building. Thus, another key insight of the analysis is to demonstrate that issue bricolage occurs through distinct activities of social movements.

Of course, we recognize that our study is limited in certain ways. In particular, our study focuses on a particular dimension of the SMS, namely, the ideational; however, we recognize that the SMS also has material, organizational, and human dimensions. Although a complete view of the structure of the SMS would demonstrate linkages between nodes of each type, we have chosen to limit our analysis to the ideational space of the SMS, in part because movements are usually recognized through their association with particular issues, making movement issues a key organizing ingredient of this field, but also because past research has largely ignored the structure of movement issues. Future research ought to examine in more detail how individuals' and organizations' networks are structured ideationally.

Another limitation is that our article attempts to model relationships among movements by assessing protest dynamics; however, this does not capture the myriad other ways that activists might engage with one another outside the sphere of protests and politics. For example, consider how the feminist movement sought to ground social change through more intimate means in the politics of everyday life (Taylor and Whittier 1995). These

types of tactics might not be manifest in the types of public protest we observe in our data. One implication of this is that we may underestimate the significance of other types of cultural similarity that drive issue bricolage. Future research ought to consider the various expressions of cultural similarity and assess their influence on SMS dynamics. Taking into account the full range of tactics that are not limited to public protest might actually lead us to conclude that we have severely underestimated the effect of cultural similarity on issue bricolage. Nevertheless, despite the limited nature of our observations, we believe that this study creates a precedent for future research about the SMS and encourages future research to consider the variety of ways in which movements interrelate, form cultural bonds, strive to enhance their status, and create ideational linkages.

APPENDIX

Lists of Tactics and Targets Coded in Protest Events

Tactics coded in protest events:

- 1. rally, demonstration
- 2. march
- 3. vigil
- 4. picket
- 5. civil disobedience
- 6. ceremony
- 7. dramaturgical demonstration
- 8. motorcade
- 9. information distribution
- 10. symbolic display
- 11. attack, by instigators
- 12. riot, melee, mob violence
- 13. strike/slowdown/sick-in
- 14. boycott
- 15. press conference
- 16. organization formation announcement or meeting
- 17. conflict, attack or clash, no instigator
- 18. lawsuit, legal maneuver

Targets coded in protest events:

- 1. government/state
- 2. private/business
- 3. university/school
- 4. foreign government/state
- 5. medical facility/organization

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