

THE GEOGRAPHIC CONTEXT OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES AMONG MIGRANT-ORIGIN INDIVIDUALS IN EUROPE

By RAHSAAN MAXWELL*

POLITICAL trust and government satisfaction are valuable resources. When citizens have high levels of trust and satisfaction they are more likely to support and cooperate with their elected representatives. In comparison, when citizens are distrustful and unsatisfied, they are more likely to protest and disrupt the basic functions of government.¹ Admittedly some cynicism and skepticism can be useful (when combined with patriotism and a commitment to the national community) for stimulating citizens to monitor their elected representatives and participate actively in politics.² Yet governments all over the world fear citizens who are so unhappy with the political status quo that they might turn to violent revolution.

In contemporary Europe, migrants and their descendants are the focus of such fears about dissatisfied citizens and the potential for revolt. For example, high-profile terrorist activity committed by migrant-origin individuals has led some natives to view some migrants as security threats.³ Riots among migrant-origin communities across

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¹ Hetherington 1998.

² Citrin 1974.

³ Prominent examples include the bombing of trains in Madrid in 2004 and in the London transport system in 2005, but the fear of attacks from extremist sleeper cells has spread across Europe.

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the Continent have contributed to tense atmospheres in many urban areas.⁴ Furthermore, there have been numerous conflicts over whether Muslim religious practices and values are compatible with contemporary European secularism.⁵ Underlying all of these issues are concerns that migrant-origin individuals are segregated from native-origin Europeans and are not committed to mainstream politics. I address these concerns in this article by analyzing political attitudes among migrant-origin individuals in contemporary Europe.

The two attitudes I examine are political trust and government satisfaction. These allow me to explore whether migrant-origin individuals approve of European political systems, which is especially relevant because migrant-origin individuals are often considered out of sync with mainstream politics. To obtain a general overview of political attitudes I use data from across eight years and four rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS). These data allow me to examine political attitudes among a wide range of migrant-origin individuals in twenty-two European countries. This research design is well-suited to a general overview of how integration is proceeding in Europe.⁶

The argument presented here focuses on subnational geographic contexts. I claim that the best way of understanding political trust and government satisfaction among migrant-origin individuals in Europe is through the strong positive correlation with trust and satisfaction among native-origin individuals in the same subnational region. This proposition breaks away from the conventional debate about how individual-level integration outcomes like assimilation or socioeconomic status shape political attitudes. My argument builds on the literature about how contexts of reception shape migrant integration. Yet to the extent the existing literature analyzes natives' attitudes, it primarily focuses on variation in levels of xenophobia to explain why some contexts of reception are more hospitable than others. My focus on the strong positive correlation between native- and migrant-origin individuals' attitudes offers a new way of understanding the role native-origin individuals' attitudes play in migrant integration. It is important to note that I do not claim migrant- and native-origin individuals have the exact same levels of trust and satisfaction in every subnational region.

⁴ Garton Ash 2005; Joly 2007; *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 2009b.

⁵ Buruma 2006; Caldwell 2009; *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 2009a.

⁶ Existing literature has numerous definitions of migrant integration. For the purposes of this article, the term is used very broadly to refer to the general and complex economic, cultural, social, and political process of becoming part of the host society.

However, a major implication of my argument is that migrant-origin individuals' trust and satisfaction are closer to native-origin individuals living in the same subnational region than to migrants living elsewhere in Europe. This shifts the integration debate away from whether or not migrants have positive attitudes about European society. The fact that migrant- and native-origin individuals have similar levels of trust and satisfaction suggests successful attitudinal integration—irrespective of whether those attitudes are positive or negative.

The next section reviews the existing literature on migrant integration and the formation of political attitudes. I then present my argument about how attitudes of migrant-origin individuals reflect those of native-origin individuals in the same subnational region. The third section discusses the data and measures used in the rest of the article. I present results on political attitudes among migrant-origin individuals in Europe, compare the significance of numerous independent variables, and demonstrate the importance of correlations between migrant- and native-origin individuals in the same geographic context in the fourth section. The fifth section discusses a series of robustness checks and the sixth examines potential mechanisms behind the dynamic of subnational attitudinal correlations. I present my conclusions in the final section.

EXISTING LITERATURE: THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RAMIFICATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL INTEGRATION

Much of the existing literature on migrant political attitudes debates the ramifications of individual-level integration indicators. The two most relevant types of individual-level indicators are assimilation (language use, country of birth, cultural distance, or citizenship, for example) and socioeconomic status (education and occupation).

One traditional perspective has been that positive assimilation and socioeconomic outcomes are associated with more positive political attitudes while negative outcomes are associated with more negative attitudes.⁷ The logic is that migrants who are better assimilated have spent more time in the host society and share more cultural practices with natives so they will be more comfortable and more likely to express positive sentiments about the society. Migrants with better socioeconomic outcomes should be proud of their material success and be more capable of effectively interacting with the host country's political system,

⁷ Dahl 1961; Gordon 1964; Moynihan and Glazer 1963; Tribalat 1995; Tribalat 1996.

which should boost political trust and government satisfaction. In comparison, migrants who are less assimilated will be more likely to be in conflict with host society norms and have difficult interactions with native-origin individuals, which should make them less sanguine about their place in the broader society.⁸ In addition, when migrant-origin individuals suffer poorer socioeconomic outcomes they should be less content with their achievements and likely to express negative attitudes about the host society.

Another approach claims that limited assimilation may boost positive political attitudes while successful assimilation may depress those attitudes. This research primarily focuses on how assimilation shapes attitudes among first-generation migrants and across generations. According to this literature, newly arrived migrants are more likely than natives to be optimistic because they left home to improve their lives and have incentives to view the host society as a positive environment. In addition, many migrants left societies with significant economic problems and weak democratic institutions. These migrants are more likely to look favorably upon the relative economic prosperity and democratic stability in Europe (or North America) than natives who are more sensitive to the shortcomings of their societies. Over time and across generations these dynamics are likely to fade and migrants who have spent more time in the host country and are more assimilated will be less likely to have such positive political attitudes.⁹ While this literature predicts less positive political attitudes among second-generation, as opposed to first-generation, migrant-origin individuals, it does not generate specific hypotheses about the relationship between attitudes among second-generation and native-origin individuals.

AN ALTERNATE PERSPECTIVE: THE IMPORTANCE OF SUBNATIONAL CONTEXTS

The argument in this article largely sidesteps the debate about how individual-level integration outcomes shape migrant political attitudes. My results provide some support for each perspective in the existing literature. I find that better socioeconomic outcomes for the first and second generations and better assimilation outcomes among the second

⁸ Caldwell 2009; Huntington 2004. In recent years these arguments have been particularly focused on Muslim migrants as one of the most unassimilated and anti-mainstream groups in Europe. Joppke 2009; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007.

⁹ de la Garza, Falcon, and Garcia 1996; Dinesen forthcoming; Kao and Tienda 1995; Maxwell 2010a; Maxwell 2010b; Maxwell 2008; Michelson 2003; Röder and Mühlau 2011; Röder and Mühlau 2012.

generation are both associated with more positive political attitudes. I also find that better assimilation among the first generation is associated with more negative political attitudes and first-generation migrant-origin individuals tend to have more positive attitudes than the second generation. However, my framework extends beyond individual-level determinants and argues that the most important predictors of political attitudes among migrant-origin individuals are the attitudes of native-origin individuals living in the same subnational region. In subnational regions where natives have more positive/negative political attitudes, migrant-origin individuals also have more positive/negative attitudes. To account for this dynamic I highlight two mechanisms. The first is structural. I claim that migrants and natives in the same subnational region will be exposed to similar political stimuli, events, and issues and that these should differ from those experienced by residents (migrant or native origin) of other regions. The second mechanism is interpersonal. I claim that political attitudes are formed through social interactions and migrant-origin individuals are most likely to interact with fellow residents of the same subnational region.

My claim about the structural mechanism builds on two strands of existing research. The first examines the ways in which political, economic, cultural, and demographic aspects of local environments shape attitudes.¹⁰ The logic is that individuals develop political attitudes based on the political issues and dynamics that are most relevant to their lives, which is partially a function of their local environment. However, to the extent that this literature compares groups, it often focuses on the ways in which majority and minority groups have different attitude-formation dynamics, even in the same local environment.¹¹ My argument departs from this literature because although I acknowledge some differences between migrant- and native-origin individuals, I claim that attitudinal variation between migrant- and native-origin individuals is smaller than the attitudinal variation within each group across subnational regions.¹²

The second strand of research about structural mechanisms that influences my argument is more directly focused on migrant integration. This literature explicitly analyzes contextual factors—citizenship laws,

¹⁰ Blalock 1967; Gay 2004; Hopkins 2011; Hopkins 2010; Hopkins 2009; Huckfeldt 1986; Welch et al. 2001.

¹¹ Sigelman and Niemi 2001; Welch et al. 2001; Wong 2007.

¹² The notion that two groups can have some unique attitudinal dynamics yet primarily be shaped by similar learning processes builds on research from the United States about parallel publics. See Page and Shapiro 1992.

social welfare regimes, local labor market structures, migrant residential concentration, or natives' xenophobia, for example—that shape migrant integration.¹³ My argument shares the main insight from this literature, which is that migrants' integration is profoundly shaped by specific economic and political factors in their local environment. However, the extent to which this literature considers natives' attitudes is primarily whether they are more or less xenophobic and whether they make local contexts more or less hospitable to migrant integration. I pursue a different approach by examining the ways in which migrant- and native-origin individuals in the same geographic context have similar trust and satisfaction dynamics, irrespective of natives' xenophobia.

The second mechanism focuses on interpersonal dynamics and builds on a range of research that examines the ways in which people are influenced by those with whom they regularly interact.¹⁴ For example, people may be persuaded by the particular political perspectives of others in their daily lives, they may choose to become more like certain individuals in their environments, or they may converge with others in their environment as they share attitudes and behaviors. One of the contributions of my argument is the suggestion that these dynamics may exist between migrant- and native-origin individuals in the same subnational region. To the extent that the existing literature deals with interactions between diverse racial, ethnic, or national-origin groups in the same geographic context, it often frames the debate as whether interpersonal contact will lead to cooperation or conflict among groups that are fundamentally different.¹⁵ My argument is agnostic about the extent to which interpersonal contact leads migrant-origin individuals to like or dislike native-origin individuals. I focus instead on the extent to which migrant- and native-origin individuals share fundamental similarities in political attitude formation.

Another approach from the existing literature on segmented assimilation is more flexible and conceptualizes multiple ways in which migrant-origin individuals may adopt natives' attitudes. However, the core of this literature connects those attitudinal adoption pathways to assimilation and socioeconomic outcomes.¹⁶ My argument is that

¹³ Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Brubaker 1992; Garbaye 2005; Ireland 2008; Ireland 1994; Koopmans et al. 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Safran 1997; Soysal 1994; Waters 1999.

¹⁴ Blalock 1967; Christakis and Fowler 2009; Huckfeldt 1986; Welch et al. 2001.

¹⁵ McClain et al. 2006; Rudolph and Popp 2010.

¹⁶ Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Rumbaut 2006.

migrant-origin individuals share similar political attitudes with native-origin individuals irrespective of assimilation or socioeconomic outcomes.

DATA AND MEASURES

The data in this study come from the European Social Survey. I pool data from ESS round 1 (2002–3), round 2 (2004–5), round 3 (2006–7), and round 4 (2008–9). The specific countries in the ESS changed across rounds, however, so I selected the twenty-two countries that were included in at least three of the four rounds.¹⁷

One of the main advantages of the ESS is the combination of detailed questions on political attitudes and large samples of foreign-born respondents across a wide range of European countries. To identify first-generation migrants, I selected respondents who were born abroad and whose parents were also both born abroad. By selecting foreign-born respondents with parents born abroad I omit European respondents who were born abroad in European colonies, European respondents who were born abroad during travel or short-term relocation by their parents, as well as “ethnic natives” who were born abroad due to wars, forced population movements, and border realignments. To identify second-generation migrant-origin individuals, I selected respondents who were born in the country of residence with at least one parent born abroad. Natives are identified as respondents born in the country of residence with both parents born in the country as well. These definitions produce pooled samples of 10,042 first-generation migrants, 11,636 second-generation migrants, and 134,271 native-origin individuals.

Despite these large migrant-origin sample sizes, one of the drawbacks of using the ESS to study migrant integration is its practice of conducting interviews only in the official language of the host country. Doing so creates two potential sources of sample bias relevant to this study. One, it is possible that the sample overrepresents native-origin individuals and underrepresents migrant-origin individuals. Two, it is possible that among migrant-origin individuals the sample overrepresents migrants who are well-integrated (that is, those who are comfortable using the host country language).

¹⁷ The twenty-two countries are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the Ukraine.

Table A1 of the appendix addresses the first of these concerns by presenting data on the size of the first-generation migrant ESS sample as well as the actual size of the migrant population in each country. For most countries, the difference between the ESS migrant sample and the actual migrant population percentage is remarkably small (fewer than three percentage points). The only exceptions to this are Austria (where the ESS sample is 7.8 percent and the actual number is 14 percent) and Germany (where the ESS sample is 8 percent and the actual number is 12.9 percent). Nonetheless, the substantive results are the same whether Austria and Germany are excluded from or included in the analysis.

The second source of potential bias is more difficult to address as there is reason to believe that the ESS includes a sample of migrants that is less well-integrated than the actual migrant population in Europe. For example, the percentage of migrants with host-country citizenship in the ESS sample is higher than in the actual population.¹⁸ In addition, the ESS sample undercounts certain national-origin groups that are often considered particularly difficult to integrate.¹⁹ This observation is especially relevant for my argument because it suggests that the positive attitudinal correlation among migrant- and native-origin individuals may be stronger in the ESS sample than in the actual population where there are more poorly integrated migrants. As such, my results should be interpreted with caution and not extended to the entire migrant-origin population in Europe, especially to hard-to-reach and undocumented migrants. Nonetheless, there is a wide range of migrants in the ESS sample with different socioeconomic outcomes, cultural practices, and national backgrounds, which increases the reliability of my results. Moreover, one of the key points in my argument is that subnational correlations between natives and migrants are strong irrespective of the individual-level integration outcomes. Finally, to ensure that my results in the overall sample are not driven by an overrepresentation of respondents from national-origin groups that face fewer integration difficulties, I analyze the data among different subsamples: Western-origin versus non-Western-origin respondents or European-

¹⁸ Aleksynska 2008.

¹⁹ For example, the 2004 French census finds that first-generation Turkish migrants are approximately 0.3 percent of the overall French population and approximately 5 percent of the first-generation immigrant population. In the pooled ESS sample, first-generation Turkish respondents are 0.1 percent of the overall French sample and 1.6 percent of the first-generation immigrant sample in France. Similarly, the 2009 Dutch census finds that first- and second-generation Turkish-origin individuals are approximately 2.3 percent of the Netherlands' population. In the pooled ESS sample, first- and second-generation Turkish-origin respondents are 1 percent of the overall Dutch sample.

origin versus Maghrebian, sub-Saharan African, and Turkish-origin respondents.

The ESS includes eight items that measure political trust and government satisfaction. Factor analysis suggests that there are three underlying dimensions to these items, which I use to generate three latent variables. Table 1 presents the scoring coefficients and lists the items used for each latent variable. Political trust is constructed from items about trust in the national parliament, trust in the legal system, and trust in the police. Macro government satisfaction gauges broad opinions about the host society and is constructed from items about satisfaction with the national government, the way democracy works in the country, and the economy. Satisfaction with government services measures attitudes about specific programs and is derived from questions about satisfaction with the state of education and the state of health services. Each latent variable is scaled from 0 (negative) to 1 (positive).

To test the correlation between political attitudes of migrant- and native-origin individuals living in the same subnational region, I construct a measure of the mean political attitude score among native-origin individuals in each subnational region for each of the three latent variables. Subnational coding in the ESS uses the Nomenclature of the Statistical Territorial Units (NUTS), but unfortunately not all countries are coded at the same level of specificity. To retain the maximum amount of information I use the most fine-grained classification available for each country. Additional analysis in which each country was coded up to the most general level (NUTS-1) produced similar results, although the effects were weaker because the regions were much larger. Full details on the subnational regions are shown in appendix Table A2.

To evaluate the literature on individual-level assimilation, I include variables on length of time in the host country, whether or not respondents have host-country citizenship, whether or not respondents primarily speak the host country language at home, and whether respondents are of Western or non-Western origin.²⁰ To evaluate the literature on individual-level socioeconomic status, I include dummy variables for educational and occupational outcomes. More details on coding can be found in the appendix.

²⁰ The measure of Western/non-Western origins is intended as a crude proxy for cultural distance. Respondents are coded as having non-Western origins if they were born in or have at least one parent who was born in Africa, Asia, or Central or South America. The terminology 'Western' is admittedly loose, as migrants from Jamaica are coded as non-Western while migrants from Australia are coded as Western. The intention is to identify non-Western respondents as people less likely to have European origins. I also conduct supplementary analysis with more precise countries of origin.

TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF LATENT VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION

<i>Survey Item</i>	<i>Scoring Coefficient</i>	<i>Latent Variable</i>
Trust in Country's Parliament	.214	political trust
Trust in the Legal System	.483	
Trust in Country's Police	.321	
Satisfied with Democracy	.239	macro government satisfaction
Satisfied with National Government	.417	
Satisfied with Economy	.265	government services satisfaction
Satisfied with State of Education	.368	
Satisfied with State of Health Services	.353	

RESULTS: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND SUBNATIONAL CORRELATIONS

Figure 1 provides an overview of the mean political attitude scores among migrant- and native-origin individuals in Europe. For each indicator of trust or satisfaction, first-generation migrants have the most positive attitudes followed by native-origin and then second-generation migrant-origin individuals. This supports literature claiming that assimilation across generations leads to more negative political attitudes. However, although the attitudinal gaps between each of the groups is statistically significant at $p < .001$, the substantive differences are rather small: 0.01 to 0.03 points on a scale of 0 to 1. This suggests that generational issues alone are a limited explanation of political attitudes among migrant-origin individuals To explore the determinants of political trust and government satisfaction more closely, Tables 2 and 3 present results from a series of multilevel mixed-effects maximum likelihood models with respondents clustered by country and region.²¹

The models in Table 2 are for the full sample of first- and second-generation migrant-origin individuals. The results support my argument as they suggest that migrant-origin individuals who live in sub-national regions where natives have more positive political attitudes are more likely to have positive political attitudes themselves. The results also support the literature that claims assimilation leads to more negative political attitudes, as being born in the host country, having Western origins, primarily speaking the host-country language at home, and

²¹ All controls were estimated as fixed effects with country and regional intercepts set as random effects using the xtmixed command in Stata 11. Dummy variables for survey waves are included to control for time and survey-specific effects.




FIGURE 1
MEAN VALUES FOR POLITICAL TRUST AND GOVERNMENT
SATISFACTION IN EUROPE^a

SOURCE: ESS rounds 1, 2, 3, 4, weighted means.

^a Each variable is coded on a scale of 0 (most negative) to 1 (most positive). The differences between the mean scores for first-generation migrants and native-origin individuals and between the mean scores for the first generation and the second generation are each statistically significant at $p < .001$. The differences in political trust and macro satisfaction between second generation migrant-origin individuals and native-origin individuals are significant at $p < .001$, the difference in satisfaction in government services between second generation and native-origin individuals is significant at $p < .01$, 95 percent confidence intervals are all within 0.004 points of the mean score.

possessing host-country citizenship are associated with more negative attitudes for each dependent variable. Socioeconomic status has mixed results: better socioeconomic outcomes are associated with more positive political trust and macro government satisfaction but with less satisfaction in government services. Table 3 provides results for the first and second generations analyzed separately to explore whether the independent variables operate differently across generations. The most notable difference in this table is that better assimilation is associated with more negative political attitudes among the first generation but more positive political attitudes among the second generation. Otherwise, better socioeconomic outcomes and more positive attitudes among natives in the same subnational region are both associated with

TABLE 2
MULTILEVEL MIXED-EFFECTS MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF
POLITICAL ATTITUDES AMONG FIRST- AND SECOND-GENERATION
MIGRANT-ORIGIN INDIVIDUALS

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Political Trust</i>	<i>Macro Government Satisfaction</i>	<i>Satisfaction in Government Services</i>
Native Regional Attitude Mean	.856*** (.044)	.837*** (.054)	.873*** (.045)
Born in Host Country	-.005 (.003)	-.021*** (.003)	-.015*** (.002)
Non-Western	.003 (.003)	.010*** (.003)	.019*** (.013)
Foreign Language	.011** (.003)	.016*** (.003)	.009** (.003)
Citizen	-.004 (.003)	-.010** (.003)	-.024*** (.003)
Higher Education	.023*** (.003)	.009*** (.003)	-.019*** (.002)
No Secondary Education	.006 (.004)	.002 (.004)	.019*** (.004)
Professional	.013** (.004)	.015*** (.004)	.004 (.004)
ESS Round 2	-.011** (.003)	.002 (.003)	.013*** (.003)
ESS Round 3	-.004 (.004)	.019*** (.003)	.015*** (.003)
ESS Round 4	.000 (.003)	-.018*** (.003)	.022*** (.003)
Constant	.072 (.023)	.094 (.025)	.090 (.024)
Std. Dev. Country Intercept	.015 (.003)	.016 (.003)	.015 (.003)
Std. Dev. Regional Intercept	.011 (.002)	.014 (.002)	.010 (.002)
Std. Dev. of Residuals	.147 (.001)	.132 (.001)	.128 (.001)
Observations	16,623	16,623	16,623
Countries	22	22	22
Regions	235	235	235
Wald χ^2 (df)	567.20(11)	732.16(11)	890.50(11)

p<.01, * p<.001; estimated coefficients with standard errors in parentheses

SOURCE: ESS rounds 1, 2, 3, and 4.

TABLE 3
MULTILEVEL MIXED-EFFECTS MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES
AMONG FIRST- AND SECOND-GENERATION MIGRANT-ORIGIN INDIVIDUALS

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Political Trust</i>		<i>Macro Government Satisfaction</i>		<i>Satisfaction in Government Services</i>	
	<i>First Generation</i>	<i>Second Generation</i>	<i>First Generation</i>	<i>Second Generation</i>	<i>First Generation</i>	<i>Second Generation</i>
Native Regional Attitude Mean	.783*** (.066)	.936*** (.033)	.792*** (.076)	.906*** (.043)	.819*** (.064)	.966*** (.036)
Time in Host Country	-.009*** (.002)		-.017*** (.012)		-.009*** (.002)	
Non-Western	.003 (.004)	.001 (.004)	.010** (.004)	.004 (.004)	.024*** (.004)	.011** (.004)
Foreign Language	.012** (.004)	-.000 (.006)	.011** (.004)	.005 (.006)	.011** (.004)	-.007 (.005)
Citizen	.001 (.004)	.016* (.007)	.004 (.004)	.003 (.007)	-.019*** (.004)	-.011 (.006)
Higher Education	.015*** (.004)	.028*** (.024)	.001 (.004)	.013*** (.003)	-.024*** (.004)	-.016*** (.003)
No Secondary Education	.009 (.006)	.003 (.006)	.006 (.005)	.001 (.005)	.012* (.005)	.028*** (.005)
Professional	.017*** (.007)	.011 (.006)	.008 (.006)	.020*** (.005)	-.002 (.006)	.010* (.005)
ESS Round 2	-.013* (.005)	-.011* (.004)	.002 (.005)	.001 (.004)	.014** (.005)	.010** (.004)
ESS Round 3	.001 (.005)	-.009 (.005)	.023*** (.005)	.015*** (.004)	.014** (.005)	.015*** (.004)
ESS Round 4	.004 (.005)	-.004 (.005)	-.017*** (.005)	-.019*** (.004)	.026*** (.005)	.017*** (.004)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Political Trust</i>		<i>Macro Government Satisfaction</i>		<i>Satisfaction in Government Services</i>	
	<i>First Generation</i>	<i>Second Generation</i>	<i>First Generation</i>	<i>Second Generation</i>	<i>First Generation</i>	<i>Second Generation</i>
Constant	.132 (.036)	.008 (.019)	.159 (.036)	.031 (.021)	.143 (.035)	.015 (.021)
Std. Dev. Country Intercept	.024 (.005)	.006 (.004)	.023 (.004)	.009 (.003)	.022 (.004)	.007 (.003)
Std. Dev. Regional Intercept	.009 (.004)	.014 (.003)	.014 (.003)	.013 (.002)	.010 (.003)	.011 (.002)
Std. Dev. of Residuals	.147 (.001)	.147 (.001)	.129 (.001)	.133 (.001)	.129 (.001)	.127 (.001)
Observations	7,350	9,273	7,350	9,273	7,350	9,273
Countries	22	22	22	22	22	22
Regions	230	232	230	232	230	232
Wald χ^2 (df)	254.60(11)	905.36(10)	382.42(11)	568.41(10)	445.33(11)	791.10(10)

*p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.00; estimated coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
SOURCE: ESS rounds 1, 2, 3, and 4.

more positive political attitudes among first- and second-generation migrant-origin respondents.

The results in Tables 2 and 3 support both perspectives from the literature referred to above on individual-level integration and migrant political attitudes. The results also support my argument about the importance of subnational attitudinal correlations between migrant- and native-origin individuals. To get a better sense of which arguments have larger substantive implications, Figure 2 presents the effects of independent variables moving from their minimum to their maximum values on predicted political attitude scores.

The results in Figure 2 are calculated from the models in Table 3. They plot the change in the predicted political attitude score across different values of the assimilation variables, the socioeconomic variables, and the mean score for natives' political attitudes at the subnational level, while all other variables are held constant at their means (or set to zero for dummy variables).²² The plots suggest that natives' political attitudes have a stronger relationship with migrant-origin political attitudes among both generations and across each dependent variable than assimilation or socioeconomic status. For example, different socioeconomic outcomes are associated with changes of 0.01 to 0.05 points in political attitudes among migrant-origin individuals. Moving across the assimilation values is associated with changes of 0.08 to 0.09 points in political attitude scores among first-generation migration-origin individuals and of 0.01 points or less among second-generation individuals. In comparison, in subnational regions with the most positive native-origin individuals, migrant-origin individuals have predicted political attitude scores 0.15 to 0.20 points higher than those in subnational regions with the most negative native-origin individuals.

These results suggest that spatial variation in migrant political attitudes is greater than attitudinal variation across assimilation and socioeconomic outcomes, but it is important to note that this does not necessarily mean that spatial variation is greater than all individual-level variation. A series of models with respondents clustered by country and by region and with no covariates yields intraclass correlations (ICCs) of roughly 0.20 for each dependent variable and each generation.²³

²² For dummy variables, minimum is calculated as zero and maximum is calculated as one. For the mean political attitude score among natives and time spent in the host country, minimum is calculated for the bottom 15th percentile and maximum is calculated for the top 15th percentile.

²³ Among first-generation migrants, the ICC for political trust is 0.21 and the ICCs for macro satisfaction and services satisfaction are both 0.20. For second-generation migrant-origin individuals, the ICCs for political trust and services satisfaction are both 0.20 and for macro satisfaction the ICC is 0.17.




FIGURE 2
EFFECTS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES MOVING FROM MINIMUM TO MAXIMUM
VALUES ON PREDICTED POLITICAL ATTITUDE SCORES^a

^a Results are calculated from models in Table 3. There is no change in the predicted macro government satisfaction score calculated to two decimal places (that is, 0.45) among second-generation respondents across different assimilation values.

This suggests that spatial variation accounts for roughly 20 percent of the variation in migrant political attitudes. This is a substantial but not overwhelming percentage. However, when a control variable is added for native-origin individuals' mean political attitudes at the subnational level, the ICCs mostly drop to below 0.05.²⁴ This suggests that the positive attitudinal correlation between migrants and natives living in the same subnational region accounts for most of the spatial variation in attitudes.²⁵

²⁴ Among first-generation migrants, the ICC for political trust is 0.03, for macro satisfaction it is 0.06, and for services satisfaction it is 0.05. For second-generation migrant-origin individuals, the ICCs are all 0.01 with the inclusion of a control variable for natives' mean attitude score.

²⁵ It is worth noting that most of the spatial variation in migrant attitudes is at the national, as opposed to the subnational, level. This article focuses on subnational variation because it allows for a finer grain of detail and is the level at which migrant and native attitudes are more strongly correlated. However, one can imagine that if even more fine-grained data were available (at the city or neighborhood level, for example) the spatial variation in subnational attitudes would be greater. Future work should explore migrant political attitudes across multiple levels of spatial variation in more detail.

The results thus far highlight the strong positive political-attitude correlations at the subnational level between migrant- and native-origin individuals. Yet as seen in Figure 1, this does not mean that migrant- and native-origin individuals have the same levels of political trust and satisfaction. In fact, the results also support the existing literature claiming that migration-specific dynamics lead to particularly high trust and satisfaction among the first generation. Nonetheless, I claim that migrant-origin individuals' trust and satisfaction scores are closer to those of native-origin individuals in the same subnational region than they are to migrant-origin individuals elsewhere in Europe.

To depict the close relationship between migrant- and native-origin attitudes across the range of values, Figure 3 plots native-origin individuals' mean political attitude scores on the x-axis with the corresponding score of migrant-origin individuals in the same subnational region on the y-axis. The thin black reference lines in each graph indicate the points where migrant and native-origin political attitude scores are exactly the same and most of the plots are extremely close to that line.²⁶ This is further evidence of the strong positive correlation between migrant- and native-origin political attitudes at the subnational level.²⁷ In addition, evidence suggests that the statistical dispersion for migrant-origin individuals' mean political attitude scores across subnational regions is greater than it is for the subnational gap between migrant and native-origin individuals' attitudes.²⁸

In summary, this section presented evidence that the political attitudes of native-origin individuals in the same subnational region provide more leverage than individual-level assimilation or socioeconomic outcomes for predicting migrant political trust and government satisfaction.

²⁶ The mean gap at the subnational level between political trust among native-origin individuals and the first generation is 0.004 points, for native-origin individuals and the second generation it is -0.007 points. The mean gap at the subnational level between macro government satisfaction among native-origin individuals and the first generation is 0.03 points, for native-origin individuals and the second generation it is -0.005 points. Finally, the mean gap at the subnational level between government services satisfaction among native-origin individuals and the first generation is 0.03 points, for native-origin individuals and the second generation it is -0.001 points.

²⁷ For native-origin and first-generation respondents the Pearson's correlation coefficient for political trust is 0.78, for macro government satisfaction it is 0.72, and for government services satisfaction it is 0.77. For native-origin and second-generation respondents the Pearson's correlation coefficient for political trust is 0.91, for macro government satisfaction it is 0.91, and for government services satisfaction it is 0.90.

²⁸ Among first-generation respondents, the standard deviation for the mean political trust scores is 0.09 compared to 0.05 for the mean subnational gap with native-origin individuals. For macro government satisfaction the standard deviations are 0.08 and 0.06. For government services satisfaction the standard deviations are 0.07 and 0.05. Among second-generation respondents, the standard deviation for the mean political trust scores is 0.08, compared to 0.03 for the mean subnational gap with native-origin individuals. For macro government satisfaction the standard deviations are 0.07 and 0.03. For government services satisfaction the standard deviations are 0.07 and 0.03.




FIGURE 3
PREDICTED POLITICAL ATTITUDE SCORES AMONG MIGRANT-ORIGIN
INDIVIDUALS ACCORDING TO SUBNATIONAL VARIATION IN NATIVE-ORIGIN
POLITICAL ATTITUDES^a

^a Results are calculated from models in Table 3. Lines for first- and second-generation migrants are surrounded by 95 percent confidence intervals.

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

There are several reasons to suspect that the story of political trust and government satisfaction among migrant-origin individuals in Europe may be more complicated than what I have presented thus far. The first potential issue is that I have analyzed a heterogeneous group of migrant-origin individuals. It is possible that the strong positive subnational correlation with native-origin individuals' political attitudes is stronger for certain migrant-origin individuals and weaker for others. For example, much of the debate around migrant integration in Europe is focused on migrants with non-Western origins because they are assumed to have fewer cultural similarities and more difficulty relating to natives than migrants from neighboring European countries. Most migrants in Europe have Western origins (in the ESS sample 65 percent of first-generation migrants and 82 percent of second-generation migrants

have Western origins) so it is possible that my results are being driven by these respondents. In addition, it is possible that the subnational attitudinal correlation with native-origin individuals does not even exist among non-Western-origin migrants.

Figure 4 explores this possibility by presenting the difference in predicted attitude scores among Western- and non-Western-origin migrant individuals for the most positive 15th percentile and the most negative 15th percentile of native-origin subnational attitude scores.²⁹ The results indicate that for all three dependent variables and for each generation, the predicted effects of native-origin attitudes among Western- and non-Western-origin migrants are within 0.03 points of each other. This suggests that the strong relationship with native-origin individuals' political attitudes operates similarly for Western- and non-Western-origin migrants. Given the concerns mentioned above about the ESS under sampling hard-to-integrate migrants, I conducted a more fine-grained analysis for specific countries of origin. I estimated the models in Table 2 with dummy variables for European, Maghreb-ian, sub-Saharan African, and Turkish origins.³⁰ Figure 5 then presents predicted attitude scores for the specific national-origin groups according to the same procedures used in Figure 4. For Maghrebians, the difference in predicted scores between the most positive 15th percentile and the most negative 15th percentile of native-origin subnational attitude scores was equal to or slightly larger than the difference in the scores among European-origin migrant individuals. Among sub-Saharan Africans, the differences across all attitude scores were slightly smaller than those of European-origin migrants, and among Turkish-origin respondents, while the differences were also slightly smaller than those of European migrants regarding political trust, they were slightly larger than those of the Europeans regarding the two government satisfaction variables.³¹ In short, these additional calculations provided no

²⁹ These numbers are calculated using the same criteria as in Figure 2: by subtracting the predicted migrant political attitude score in the bottom 15th percentile of subnational regions according to natives' attitudes from the predicted migrant attitude score in the top 15th percentile of regions. These calculations are limited to ESS rounds 2, 3, and 4 because ESS round 1 only asks about the continent and not the country of birth of respondents' parents.

³⁰ Maghreb-ian, sub-Saharan African, and Turkish-origin migrants are three of the main national-origin groups considered difficult to integrate in Europe. More detailed country-specific calculations within the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa were less reliable because of small sample sizes. European-origin migrants are included as a comparison group for the migrants considered easiest to integrate. I used the models from Table 2 as opposed to Table 3 as a baseline because sample sizes for calculating predicted scores among specific national-origin groups were too small to separate the first and second generations.

³¹ The change in the predicted political trust score between the most positive 15th percentile and the most negative 15th percentile of native-origin subnational attitude scores was 0.21 points for European-




FIGURE 4
PREDICTED POLITICAL ATTITUDE SCORES AMONG WESTERN- AND
NON-WESTERN-ORIGIN MIGRANT INDIVIDUALS FOR THE MOST POSITIVE
15TH PERCENTILE AS OPPOSED TO THE MOST NEGATIVE 15TH PERCENTILE OF
NATIVE-ORIGIN SUBNATIONAL ATTITUDE SCORES ^a

^a Results are calculated from models in Table 3. For all results, the higher predicted political attitude score corresponds to the most positive 15th percentile of subnational regions and the lower predicted attitude score corresponds to the most negative 15th percentile.

evidence that my argument should be limited to Western- or Euro-
pean-origin migrant individuals.

Another potentially relevant form of heterogeneity among migrant-
origin individuals is religious diversity. Some of the tensest debates in
recent years have focused on Muslims as the most difficult category of
migrants in Europe to integrate.³² It is possible that Muslim migrants
are less likely than non-Muslim migrants to share political attitude dy-
namics with the (largely Christian in heritage) native-origin individuals
living in the same subnational region. To test this possibility, I estimated
the models in Table 3 with additional controls for Muslim and Chris-
tian religious affiliation. I then compared predicted political attitude
scores for first- and second-generation Muslims, Christians, and re-
spondents who were neither Muslim nor Christian, across the most

origin migrants, 0.21 for Maghrebians, 0.17 for sub-Saharan Africans, and 0.13 for Turks. The change
in macro government satisfaction was 0.17 points for European-origin migrants, 0.18 for Maghre-
bians, 0.15 for sub-Saharan Africans, and 0.19 for Turks. Finally, the change in government services
satisfaction was 0.19 points for Europeans and Maghrebians, 0.18 for Africans, and 0.20 for Turks.

³² Caldwell 2009; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007.




FIGURE 5

PREDICTED POLITICAL ATTITUDE SCORES AMONG MIGRANT-ORIGIN INDIVIDUALS WITH DIFFERENT NATIONAL ORIGINS FOR THE MOST POSITIVE 15TH PERCENTILE AS OPPOSED TO THE MOST NEGATIVE 15TH PERCENTILE OF NATIVE-ORIGIN SUBNATIONAL ATTITUDE SCORES^a

^a "Euro" denotes European migrants, "Mag" denotes Maghrebians migrants, "Afr" denotes sub-Saharan African migrants, and "Turk" denotes Turkish migrants.

positive and negative 15th percentiles of subnational regions according to native-origin attitude scores. For all three dependent variables and for each generation, the predicted effects of native-origin attitudes among the three religious affiliation groups were within 0.05 points of each other. In addition, the two largest gaps across religious affiliation groups occurred when Muslims had larger predicted effects than the other groups.³³ This suggests that Muslim migrants are just as likely as

³³ The change in the predicted political trust score between the most positive 15th percentile and the most negative 15th percentile of native-origin subnational attitude scores was 0.24 points for second-generation Muslims, compared to 0.21 for Christians and 0.19 for migrant-origin individuals who were neither Muslim nor Christian. The change in the predicted macro government satisfaction score was 0.19 points for Muslims, compared to 0.15 points for Christians and migrant-origin individuals who were neither Muslim nor Christian. For second-generation predicted government satisfaction scores and for all three attitude scores among the first generation, the differences across the three groups in the amount of change were all within 0.02 points.

or perhaps even slightly more likely than other migrant-origin individuals to have similar political attitude scores as native-origin individuals in the same subnational region.

The ESS sample combines West European countries that have longer migration experiences with Central and East European countries that have only recently begun to receive large numbers of international migrants. Given these historical differences, it is possible that the dynamic of subnational positive attitudinal correlations among migrant- and native-origin individuals is stronger in Western Europe. In addition, since the data are primarily composed of Western European countries (74 percent of respondents), it is possible that the correlation between the attitudes of migrants and natives presented above is driven by Western European respondents and that there is no correlation between migrant and native attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, assimilation and socioeconomic status may also have different effects on migrant political attitudes in the two regions. Figures 6 and 7 explore these possibilities by presenting the difference in predicted political attitude scores across different values of the independent variables among migrant-origin individuals in Western and Central/Eastern Europe.³⁴ The results indicate similar relationships between the political attitudes of migrant and native-origin individuals at the subnational level in Western and Central/Eastern Europe. In addition, there are larger changes in migrant-origin individuals' predicted attitude scores associated with native-origin attitudes as opposed to scores associated with assimilation or socioeconomic status. The biggest difference across regions is that among first-generation respondents, assimilation is associated with larger predicted attitude score changes in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. Nonetheless, data in Figures 6 and 7 suggest that my argument is applicable in Western and Central/Eastern Europe.

To further check the robustness of the results, I included a range of additional controls that have been shown to affect political trust and government satisfaction. One is that lower levels of democracy in the home country may be associated with more positive political trust and satisfaction in the host country.³⁵ In addition, general political behavior

³⁴ These calculations are based on the most positive and negative 15th percentiles of natives' attitudes within Western and Central/Eastern Europe respectively. Separate calculations were made for the different regions because Central and East Europeans tend to have less political trust and government satisfaction than Western Europeans due to legacies of the Communist period. See Mishler and Rose 2001.

³⁵ Level of democracy in the home country was measured two ways. One used the Freedom House score at the time of migration and the other used the Freedom House score at the time of the survey.




FIGURE 6

EFFECTS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES MOVING FROM MINIMUM TO MAXIMUM VALUES ON PREDICTED ATTITUDE SCORES AMONG FIRST-GENERATION MIGRANT-ORIGIN INDIVIDUALS IN WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE^a

^a Results are calculated from models based on those in Table 3 with an additional dummy variable for Eastern European host societies.

literature finds that people with more social capital, a higher sense of efficacy, the same partisan affiliation as their elected officials, and who live in places that are more prosperous and better governed, should be more likely to have positive political attitudes.³⁶ These controls were added to the basic models in Table 3; the results were consistent with

³⁶ Citrin and Green 1986; Keele 2007; Lawrence 1987; Mishler and Rose 2001. For social capital I included responses to questions about whether or not people can be trusted, whether or not people try to take advantage of you or try to be fair, and whether or not people are helpful or looking out for themselves. For political efficacy I included responses to questions about whether politics are too complicated to understand and whether respondents can easily make up their minds about political issues. Partisan preferences were measured by placement on a left-right scale as well as by answers to questions about specific party affiliations, voting behavior, and membership. Measures for the percentage of cabinet members from left- and right-wing parties and a five-point scale on whether government was controlled by the left or right wing came from Comparative Political Data Sets Measures for the percentage of parliamentary seats for left-wing and right-wing parties were compiled by the author. To measure government performance I included an index of the Kaufmann measures of government effectiveness, government regulatory quality, rule of law, corruption, voice and accountability,




FIGURE 7
EFFECTS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES MOVING FROM MINIMUM TO MAXIMUM
VALUES ON PREDICTED ATTITUDE SCORES AMONG SECOND-GENERATION
MIGRANT-ORIGIN INDIVIDUALS IN WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE^a

^a Results are calculated from models based on those in Table 3 with an additional dummy variable for Eastern European host societies. There is no change in the predicted government services satisfaction score calculated to two decimal places (that is, 0.54) across different assimilation and socioeconomic outcomes among respondents in Western Europe.

expectations from the existing literature. Yet the effects of these additional variables on migrant-origin individuals' political attitudes were mostly minor in comparison to my key measure of the subnational correlation with native-origin individuals' attitudes.³⁷ The exception was social capital, whose effects were close to, although still smaller than, those of natives' political attitudes at the subnational level. Despite adding all of the additional controls that have been shown to affect political trust and government satisfaction, subnational variation in

annual per capita GDP growth, and measures of central government expenditures as a percentage of GDP, which were obtained from the Democracy Indicators Cross-National Time-Series Data Set.

³⁷ In the new expanded models, these additional control variables were associated with changes of less than 0.1 point in the predicted political attitudes of migrant-origin individuals (compared to 0.15 to 0.25 for changes in natives' attitudes at the subnational level).

native-origin individuals' attitudes remains the strongest predictor of migrant-origin individuals' attitudes.

The previous models assume that the relationship between migrant-origin and native-origin individuals' attitudes is fixed across subnational regions, but it is possible that this relationship changes from region to region. In particular, given the existing literature on the role of natives in shaping contexts of reception, one might imagine that migrant-origin attitudes are less closely aligned with those of native-origin individuals in subnational regions where there are high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment among natives. A common strategy for relaxing the assumption that an independent variable has fixed effects across clustered units is to model it as a random effect and examine how the slope of the independent variable changes across units. Such an approach would be inappropriate here because my key independent variable of interest (political attitudes among native-origin individuals) is calculated at the subnational level and does not vary within subnational units. Instead, descriptive statistics suggest that the range of the subnational gaps between migrant- and native-origin individuals is fairly small.³⁸ Moreover, these gaps are consistent irrespective of subnational variation in anti-immigrant sentiment among natives.³⁹ This finding may seem surprising given the likely salience of anti-immigrant sentiments for migrant-origin individuals' experiences in the host society. However trust and satisfaction with the government can be similar among respondents who disagree on more specific issues (immigration policy, for example) because these general attitudes tap into broader evaluations of society.

I estimated the models from Tables 2 and 3 with alternate specifications for assimilation and socioeconomic status but there was no difference in the substantive results.⁴⁰ The substantive results are also similar when the eight items used to construct the three latent dependent variables are analyzed separately. Finally, results are similar to the models in Tables 2 and 3 when weighted data are used to estimate

³⁸ These statistics are cited in the last paragraph of the previous section.

³⁹ I used two measures of anti-immigrant sentiment among native-origin individuals. One is an index of three questions that ask whether respondents would support increased immigration. The second is an index of three questions that ask whether immigrants help or harm the host country. For both measures, the difference in the gap with native-origin political attitude scores in the most and least anti-immigrant regions is less than 0.04 points for the first generation and less than 0.008 points for the second generation.

⁴⁰ As alternate indicators of assimilation I used self-reported measures of being an ethnic minority and being subject to discrimination in the country of residence. For socioeconomic status I included measures of financial comfort and of employment status when restricting the sample to economically active respondents.

ordinary least squares regressions with standard errors clustered at the subnational regional level.⁴¹

THE MECHANISMS THAT LINK MIGRANT AND NATIVE-ORIGIN INDIVIDUALS' ATTITUDES

This section explores two key mechanisms that drive the subnational correlation between migrant- and native-origin individuals. First, I claim that migrants and natives in the same subnational region will be exposed to similar political stimuli, events, and issues that should shape their political attitudes in similar ways. Second, I claim that interaction with native-origin individuals in the same subnational region promotes similar political attitudes.

The first claim is based on the logic that individuals form political attitudes and opinions based on events and issues that vary across geographic contexts. One way of evaluating this is to examine the effects of media consumption on political attitudes. If my argument is correct, migrants who consume more media should be more aware of political affairs in the host country, more likely to form political attitudes based on the same information as natives, and more likely to have political attitudes close to those of native-origin individuals in the same subnational region.⁴² Figure 8 presents data to explore this claim. The x-axis is a latent variable measuring media consumption derived from three measures of time spent consuming news, politics, or current affairs media (television, radio, and newspaper) during the average weekday.⁴³ The y-axis plots the gap between migrant attitudes and the mean native-origin attitude score at the subnational level. Positive scores indicate that migrants are more positive than natives in the same subnational region, and zero indicates that migrants' political attitudes are the same as those of the mean native-origin score for the same subnational region.

⁴¹ The advantage to ordinary least squares is that it allows weighted data whereas, at the time of writing, Stata did not support weighted data with the multilevel mixed-effects models presented in this article. The disadvantage to ordinary least squares is that it cannot capture multiple levels of clustering (for example, ESS respondents are nested within countries and regions).

⁴² A more precise evaluation of my claim would be to track exposure to salient political events among migrant and native-origin individuals across subnational contexts and measure the attitudinal correlations across different levels of exposure. Unfortunately the ESS does not offer such detailed data.

⁴³ As an alternate measure I constructed an index that added up the time spent consuming these three forms of media on an average weekday. The results were almost exactly the same as those presented in Figure 8. It is important to note that the ESS does not specify which newspaper or television or radio program the respondent consumes. It is likely that some media consumed by migrants are focused on home-country as opposed to host-country affairs.




FIGURE 8
FIRST-GENERATION MEDIA CONSUMPTION AND ATTITUDE GAPS WITH
NATIVE-ORIGIN INDIVIDUALS^a

SOURCE: ESS rounds 1, 2, 3, and 4.

^a The x-axis measures migrant media consumption (television, radio, newspaper). The y-axis measures the gap between migrant-origin individuals' political attitudes and the mean native-origin political attitudes at the subnational level. Positive scores indicate that migrants are more positive than natives. Lines are surrounded by 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure 8a indicates that first-generation migrants with low levels of media consumption have higher levels of government satisfaction than native-origin individuals in the same subnational region.⁴⁴ As migrants consume more media, the gaps with native-origin individuals' attitudes diminish and approach zero. This dynamic is most evident for macro government satisfaction, as migrants with the highest levels of media consumption have slightly more negative satisfaction-in-government-services scores than native-origin individuals in the same subnational region. Figure 8b presents results for the three individual indicators of political trust. These items are presented separately because they function somewhat differently. "Trust in parliament" and "trust in the legal system" support my claim because when migrants consume more media, their gaps with native-origin individuals' attitudes approach zero. For "trust in the police," the gaps increase and migrant-origin individuals become more negative as they consume more media. This may reflect migrants being socialized into the tense relationships that exist between many migrant-origin communities and the police.

⁴⁴ This finding may be because migrants with less media exposure are less socialized into host-society norms and more likely to retain their home-country frame of reference. It supports existing literature that accounts for positive political attitudes among the first generation by emphasizing their low expectations for institutional performance as a result of weak political institutions at home. Dinesen forthcoming; Röder and Mühlau 2012.

Figure 8 only presents data for first-generation migrants because the gap between political attitudes among native-origin and second-generation migrant-origin individuals is consistent across levels of media exposure. This result is most likely because second-generation and native-origin individuals are both raised in similar host country environments. In comparison, the results in Figure 8 suggest that as first-generation migrants consume more media (and theoretically become more aware of local events) they are more likely to have the same levels of political trust and satisfaction as the native-origin individuals in their subnational region.

The second mechanism focuses on socialization patterns and applies to both first- and second-generation migrant-origin individuals. The logic is that individuals primarily socialize with fellow residents of their subnational region and people who socialize together are likely to shape each other's political attitudes. An ideal test of this claim would include data on migrant-origin individuals' friends' national origins, place of residence, and levels of political trust and government satisfaction. Unfortunately, these data are not available in the ESS. Therefore, in Figure 9, I examine the gaps in political attitudes between native-origin individuals and migrant-origin individuals who have no immigrant friends and those who have several immigrant friends.⁴⁵ These data address my claims because migrant-origin individuals who have more immigrant social contacts may be less likely to have native-origin social contacts and less likely to have strong political attitude correlations with natives. Admittedly, this does not directly measure the extent to which migrant-origin individuals have native-origin friends but unfortunately the ESS only provides information about immigrant friends.⁴⁶ To address this concern and the fact that migrant-origin individuals with many immigrant friends may just be very social individuals and also have many native-origin friends, the data in Figure 9 are based on regressions that include a control variable for overall level of socializing.

The results in Figure 9 generally support my claim about the importance of friendship patterns for migrant-origin individuals' political attitudes. The gaps with native-origin individuals among those with no im-

⁴⁵ Questions about immigrant friends were only posed in a special module of the ESS Round 1. As a result, the data in Figure 9 are presented for first- and second-generation migrants together in order to maximize sample size.

⁴⁶ In addition, cross-sectional ESS data cannot address the direction of any influence among social networks. It is not possible to determine the extent to which the strong positive subnational attitudinal correlations are the result of migrant-origin individuals being influenced by natives, natives being influenced by migrants, or some combination of the two trends.




FIGURE 9
POLITICAL ATTITUDE GAPS BETWEEN MIGRANT- AND NATIVE-ORIGIN
INDIVIDUALS IN THE SAME SUBNATIONAL REGION ACCORDING TO
MIGRANT-ORIGIN INDIVIDUALS' FRIENDSHIP PATTERNS^a

SOURCE: ESS Round 1.

^a The data are derived from multilevel mixed-effects regressions predicting migrant-origin individuals' attitude gaps from the mean political attitude score for native-origin individuals in the same subnational region, with covariates for number of immigrant friends and amount of overall socializing.

migrant friends tend to be closer to zero than the gaps among those with several immigrant friends. As in the media exposure analysis, results are presented for macro government satisfaction, government services satisfaction, and the three individual political trust items. Once again, trust in the police appears to operate differently from trust in parliament or in the legal system. For each item, the gap with native-origin individuals' attitudes is larger among those with several immigrant friends. Yet for trust in parliament and in the legal system, migrant-origin individuals with several immigrant friends are more positive than native-origin individuals, while for trust in the police they are more negative than native-origin individuals. This too may reflect tensions between migrant-origin communities and the police, which are stronger among those more deeply embedded in migrant-origin communities.

My overall argument is that subnational variation in geographic context is more important than individual-level assimilation or socioeconomic status for migrant-origin individuals' political trust and government satisfaction. Yet to a certain extent, friendship patterns are an indicator of individual-level assimilation. In the ESS data, migrant-origin individuals with non-Western origins who are not citizens and do not primarily speak the host-country language are more likely to have several immigrant friends than migrant-origin individuals with Western origins who are citizens and who primarily speak the host-country language. Existing literature, however, highlights individual-level assimilation as a predictor of more positive attitudes. My argument takes a different approach as the data in Figure 9 suggest that the less-segregated friendship pattern is associated with smaller attitudinal gaps with native-origin individuals and that the attitudes could be more positive or negative depending on the subnational context. In fact, when the variable for the amount of immigrant friends is added to the models in Table 2, it is not a statistically significant (at $p < .05$) predictor of political trust or satisfaction in government services and has only a modest positive relationship with macro government satisfaction.⁴⁷

Another mechanism that could account for the subnational attitudinal correlations between migrants and natives is selection effects. It is possible that migrants choose the regions in which they want to live because they are attracted to the local cultural and political climate. If this were true it would lead to very different conclusions than my argument

⁴⁷ The predicted macro government satisfaction score for migrant-origin individuals with no immigrant friends is 0.46, compared to 0.50 among those with several immigrant friends. These models do not include dummy variables for ESS rounds as all analyses of friendship patterns are restricted to the first ESS round.

about migrant adaptation to the host society through structural and interpersonal mechanisms. The best way of identifying selection effects is longitudinal data that track individual migrants' political attitudes over time to determine whether environmental factors change those attitudes. Unfortunately the ESS only offers cross-sectional data, but examining whether time spent in the host country has an effect on first-generation migrants' attitudinal correlations with natives is an indication of whether selection effects may be present. Figure 10 plots these relationships and shows that for each political attitude the migrants who have been in the host country for a longer period of time have smaller gaps with the native-origin individuals living in the same subnational region. One possible concern with the data presented in Figure 10 is that migrants who have been in the host country for a longer period of time are also more likely to be older and therefore that their smaller gaps with native-origin individuals reflect an age-related pattern. However, although not presented here in the interest of parsimony, when the plots in Figure 10 are calculated separately for migrants 30 years old or younger, between 30 and 60 years old, and 60 years or older, the results are similar to those presented in Figure 10. Admittedly the cross-sectional ESS data cannot address whether migrants who have been in the host country for longer periods of time are different in ways not related to age but that shape their political attitudes (for example, those who have been in the host country for longer may have had more or less control over where they settled due to variation over time in immigration policies, visa availability, or macroeconomic dynamics). Nonetheless, the results in Figure 10 do not suggest strong selection effects.

CONCLUSION

In this article I have argued that political trust and government satisfaction among migrant-origin individuals are best understood through strong positive correlations with the attitudes of native-origin individuals living in the same subnational region. I highlighted two mechanisms to account for this similarity at the subnational level: exposure to similar structural stimuli and interpersonal contact. Within the migrant integration literature, my main intervention is to offer a way out of the debate over whether individual-level integration outcomes have positive or negative ramifications for political attitude formation. My argument suggests that individual-level integration is less important for understanding whether migrants will feel trust and satisfaction than




FIGURE 10
FIRST-GENERATION TIME IN HOST COUNTRY AND ATTITUDE GAPS WITH
NATIVE-ORIGIN INDIVIDUALS^a

SOURCE: ESS rounds 1, 2, 3, and 4.

^a The x-axis measures time spent in the host country (ranging from less than 1 year to more than 20 years). The y-axis measures the gap between migrant-origin individuals' political attitudes and the mean native-origin political attitudes at the subnational level. Positive scores indicate that migrants are more positive than natives. Lines are surrounded by 95 percent confidence intervals.

the local dynamics that shape political attitudes among migrant- and native-origin individuals more generally. This argument builds on research about how integration varies across local contexts but, unlike the existing literature, I claim that migrant- and native-origin attitudes are similar across those contexts.

To develop my argument I traced the broad contours of migrant-native political attitude dynamics across twenty-two European countries and over 230 subnational regions. Future research should look more closely at how these mechanisms operate, particularly with more detail on the geographic specification. The regions examined in this article are fairly large and there is likely to be considerable political variation within them. In particular, one might imagine that migrant-origin individuals

are less likely to have strong positive correlations with native-origin individuals who are xenophobic or anti-immigrant. As mentioned above, the ESS data suggest that migrant-native gaps are not very different across subnational regions where native-origin individuals are more or less xenophobic, in part because migrants and natives may share general evaluations of the government while differing on more specific issues. However, natives' anti-immigrant sentiments may be more salient for migrant-origin individuals if one analyzes more fine-grained local data or different attitudinal measures.

Finally, my argument has implications for policy debates around migrant integration in Europe. All countries want to develop positive political attitudes among migrants and in recent years those efforts have focused on promoting cultural assimilation and encouraging migrants to reduce their homeland connections and cultural practices.⁴⁸ Unfortunately, the ESS has few questions about cultural assimilation and the data do not permit detailed analysis of the extent to which migrant-origin individuals retain homeland connections and cultural practices when their political attitudes are similar to those of native-origin individuals.⁴⁹ Nonetheless, I can control for several key aspects of cultural assimilation and suggest that assimilation may be over-emphasized in the larger migrant integration debate. My findings suggest that to the extent migrant and native attitudes are correlated at the subnational level, successful attitudinal integration has already occurred. This builds on the broader tradition of examining how integration improves over time as native and migrant-origin individuals converge in multiple ways as a result of shared experiences.⁵⁰ Therefore, if governments want to promote positive political attitudes, it might be more useful to concentrate on effective governance and better outcomes for the entire population instead of worrying about the durability of minority linguistic and religious practices.

⁴⁸ See Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009; Joppke 2007a; Joppke 2007b; Koopmans et al. 2005.

⁴⁹ The one question that could address maintenance of homeland cultural practices is whether or not respondents primarily speak the host-country language at home. Among the first and second generation, individuals who primarily speak the host-country language have smaller attitude gaps with natives in the same subnational region than individuals who do not primarily speak the host-country language. For the first generation, those who do not primarily speak the host-country language are more positive than native-origin individuals while for the second generation those who do not primarily speak the host-country language are more negative than native-origin individuals. This is further evidence that assimilation is associated with smaller attitudinal gaps with native-origin individuals but that its effects on whether political attitudes are positive or negative depend on the subnational context.

⁵⁰ See Alba and Nee 2003; Bloemraad 2011; Gordon 1964; Vigdor 2011.

APPENDIX
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS

“Trust in country’s parliament,” “Trust in the police,” “Trust in the legal system”
—Each coded on a scale from 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust)

“How satisfied with national government,” “How satisfied with the way democracy works in the country,” “How satisfied with present state of economy in country”
—Each coded on a scale from 0 (extremely dissatisfied) to 10 (extremely satisfied)

“State of education in country nowadays,” “State of health services in country nowadays”
—Each coded on a scale from 0 (extremely bad) to 10 (extremely good)

Duration: “How long ago did you first come to live in [country]?”
—0 (within last year); 1 (1–5 years ago); 2 (6–10 years ago); 3 (11–20 years ago); 4 (more than 20 years ago); 5 (born in country).

Citizenship
—0, not a citizen; 1, citizen

Language
—0, primarily speak the host country language at home; 1, primarily speak other language at home

Western
—0, either born in Africa, Asia, Central or South America or with at least one parent born in Africa, Asia, Central or South America; 1, either born in Europe, North America, Australia, or New Zealand or with both parents born in Europe, North America, Australia, or New Zealand

Higher education
—0, no higher education degree; 1, has a higher education degree

No secondary education
—0, at least a secondary degree; 1, no secondary degree

Professional occupation
—0, not employed in a professional/managerial occupation; 1, employed in a professional/managerial occupation

TABLE A1
FIRST-GENERATION MIGRANT SAMPLE^a

<i>Countries</i>	<i>ESS Rounds</i>	<i>% of Migrants in ESS</i>	<i>% of Migrants Actual</i>
Austria	1,2,3	7.8	14.0
Belgium	1,2,3,4	8.9	8.5
Czech Republic	1,2,4	3.1	4.4
Denmark	1,2,3,4	5.6	7.8

TABLE A1 (*cont.*)

<i>Countries</i>	<i>ESS Rounds</i>	<i>% of Migrants in ESS</i>	<i>% of Migrants Actual</i>
Estonia	2,3,4	19.5	15.0
Finland	1,2,3,4	2.7	3.3
France	1,2,3,4	8.7	10.6
Germany	1,2,3,4	8.0	12.9
Greece	1,2,4	8.6	8.8
Hungary	1,2,3,4	2.2	3.3
Ireland	1,2,3,4	10.3	14.8
Netherlands	1,2,3,4	8.4	10.6
Norway	1,2,3,4	7.3	8.0
Poland	1,2,3,4	1.3	2.2
Portugal	1,2,3,4	5.8	7.2
Slovakia	2,3,4	2.9	2.3
Slovenia	1,2,3,4	8.0	8.4
Spain	1,2,3,4	7.3	10.7
Sweden	1,2,3,4	10.7	12.3
Switzerland	1,2,3,4	19.3	22.3
Ukraine	2,3,4	11.7	11.5
United Kingdom	1,2,3,4	9.7	9.7

^aData for percent of actual migrants are for 2005 and come from United Nations Development Programme 2009. The definition of migrant for both calculations is someone not born in the country of residence.

TABLE A2
SUBNATIONAL REGIONS IN THE ESS^a

<i>Country</i>	<i>Regions</i>
Austria	Burgenland, Kärnten, Niederösterreich, Oberösterreich, Salzburg, Steiermark, Tirol, Vorarlberg, Wien
Belgium	Flanders, Brussels, Wallonia
Czech Republic	Praha, Stredny Checy, Jihozapad, Severozapad, Severovychod, Jihovychod, Stredni Morava, Moravskoslezsko
Denmark	Hovedstaden, Sjælland, Syddanmark, Midjylland, Nordjylland
Estonia	Põhja-Eesti, Lääne-Eesti, Kesk-Eesti, Kirde-Eesti, Lõuna-Eesti
Finland	Southern Finland and Åland, Western Finland, Eastern Finland, Northern Finland
France	Région Parisienne, Bassin Parisien Est, Bassin Parisien Ouest, Nord, Est, Ouest, Sud Ouest, Sud Est, Méditerranée
Germany	Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Niedersachsen, Bremen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Baden-Württemberg, Bayern, Saarland, Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, Thüringen

<i>Country</i>	<i>Regions</i>
Greece	Attiki, Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki, Kentriki Makedonia, Dytiki Makedonia, Thessalia, Ipeiros, Ionia Nissia, Dytiki Ellada, Sterea Ellada, Peloponnisos, Voreio Agaio, Notio Agaio, Kriti
Hungary	Central Region, Middle Transdanubia, West Transdanubia, South Transdanubia, North Region, North Plain, South Plain
Ireland	Dublin; Border; Midlands and Western; Southern and Eastern, excl. Dublin
Netherlands	Oost-Groningen, Delfzijl en Omgeving, Overig Groningen, Noord-Friesland, Zuidwest-Friesland, Zuidoost-Friesland, Noord-Drenthe, Zuidoost-Drenthe, Zuidwest-Drenthe, Noord-Overijssel, Zuidwest-Overijssel, Twente, Veluwe, Achterhoek, Arnhem\Nijmegen, Zuidwest-Gelderland, Flevoland, Utrecht, Kop van Noord-Holland, Alkmaar en Omgeving, IJmond, Agglomeratie Haarlem, Zaanstreek, Groot-Amsterdam, Het Gooi en Vechtstreek, Agglomeratie Leiden en Bollenstreek, Agglomeratie S-Gravenhage, Delft en Westland, Oost-Zuid-Holland, Groot-Rijnmond, Zuidoost-Zuid-Holland, Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen, Overig Zeeland, West-Noord-Brabant, Midden-Noord-Brabant, Noordoost-Noord-Brabant, Zuidoost-Noord-Brabant, Noord-Limburg, Midden-Limburg, Zuid-Limburg
Norway	Oslo and Akershus, Hedmark and Oppland, South Eastern Norway, Agder and Rogaland, Western Norway, Trondelag, Northern Norway
Poland	Dolnoslaskie, Kujawsko-pomorskie, Lubelskie, Lubuskie, Lodzkie, Malopolskie, Mazowieckie, Opolskie, Podkarpackie, Podlaskie, Pomorskie, Slaskie, Swietokrzyskie, Warminsko-mazurskie, Wielkopolskie, Zachodniopomorskie
Portugal	Norte, Centro, Lisboa e Vale do Tejo, Alentejo, Algarve
Slovakia	Bratislava Region, Trnava Region, Trencin Region, Nitra Region, Zilina Region, Banska Bystrica Region, Presov Region, Kosice Region.
Slovenia	Gorenjska, Goriska, Jugovzhodna Slovenija, Koroska, Notranjsko-kraska, Obalno-kraska, Osrednjeslovenska, Podravska, Pomurska, Savinjska, Spodnjeposavska, Zasavska
Spain	Galicia, Principado de Asturias, Cantabria, País Vasco, Comunidad Foral de Navarra, La Rioja, Aragón, Comunidad de Madrid, Castilla y León, Castilla la Mancha, Extremadura, Cataluña, Comunidad Valenciana, Illes Balears, Andalucía, Región de Murcia, Ceuta y Melilla, Canarias

TABLE A2 (*cont.*)

Country	Regions
Sweden	Stockholm, Östra Mellansverige, Sydsverige, Norra Mellansverige, Mellemsta Norrland, Övre Norrland, Småland och Öarna, Västsverige
Switzerland	Genferseeregion, Zentrales Mittelland, Nordschweiz, Zentralschweiz, Ostschweiz, Tessin
Ukraine	Crimea, Autonomy Republic, Vynnytska Oblast, Volynska Oblast, Dnipropetrovska Oblast, Donetsk Oblast, Zhytomyrska Oblast, Zakarpatska Oblast, Zaporizska Oblast, Ivano-Frankivska Oblast, Kyivska Oblast, Kirovogradska Oblast, Luganska Oblast, Lvivska Oblast, Mykolaivska Oblast, Odesska Oblast, Poltavska Oblast, Rivenska Oblast, Sumska Oblast, Ternopil'ska Oblast, Kharkivska Oblast, Khersonska Oblast, Khmel'nitska Oblast, Cherkasska Oblast, Chernovytska Oblast, Chernigivska Oblast, Kyiv City
United Kingdom	North East, North West, Yorkshire and the Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands, South West, East of England, London, South East, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland

^aRegional names listed as cited in the ESS.

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