

Institutional Arrangements and Logrolling: Evidence from the European Union

Deniz Aksoy

This article illustrates how voting rules used to pass a piece of legislation and the structure of the legislation, in terms of whether or not it has single or multiple issue dimensions, influence the frequency and the purpose of position changes in legislative negotiations. Through analysis of data on a set of legislative proposals negotiated in the European Union, I show that position changes are less common under unanimity rule than under majority rule. More importantly, I argue and show that when the negotiated legislation is multidimensional (i.e., contains multiple issues) and the voting rule is unanimity, position changing is a lucrative strategy for legislators. Multidimensional legislation creates opportunities for logrolling, and legislators' veto power under the unanimity rule enables them to exploit these opportunities. Accordingly, under this scenario, legislators often engage in what I call a within-legislation logroll and secure favorable legislative outcomes.

On December 19, 2009, Senator Ben Nelson of Nebraska announced his intention to “vote for health care reform.”¹ The senator, who was the last Democratic holdout on the bill, was changing his position. Only a month earlier, Senator Nelson was opposed to the bill because he did not “... want a big government, Washington-run operation that would undermine the private insurance that 200 million Americans now have.”² In the course of changing his position, Nelson, whose support was critical to stop a Republican filibuster, worked to extract several important concessions. In exchange for a compromise on abortion that allowed the bill to go forward, he received an assurance of massive federal health care aid for his home state.³ In other words, Nelson and the rest of the Democrats created a logroll. Senator Nelson's position changing during the negotiations was not an isolated phenomenon. Several other senators (e.g., Joseph Lieberman) changed their stance on the very same bill.

A wealth of anecdotal evidence and several influential theoretical studies in the literature suggest that legislators often engage in logrolling during legislative negotiations (Carrubba and Volden 2000; Ferejohn 1986; Riker and Brams 1973; Stratmann 1992; Tullock 1959, 1970).⁴ However, despite the fact that logrolling and position changing seems to be quite common in legislatures, the dynamics of such behavior are understudied empirically. The vast majority of empirical research in legislative studies focus on voting records (Binder 1999; Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004; Jones 2003; Martin 2001; Poole and Rosenthal 1999). Undoubtedly, research on voting behavior contains much insight into legislative behavior. However, voting is often the final step of a legislative process, and legislators' behavior *during* the legislative negotiations is at least as interesting as their voting records. During the legislative process, position changing is observed often and has important policy consequences. For example, without Senator Nelson's position change,

Deniz Aksoy is Associate Research Scholar and Lecturer in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of International and Public Affairs, Princeton University, 302 Robertson Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544-1013 (daksoy@princeton.edu).

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¹ “Democrats Clinch Deal for Deciding Vote on Health Bill.” *The New York Times*, December 12, 2009.

² “Centrist Senators Say They Oppose Health Care Bill.” *The New York Times*, November 22, 2009.

³ “Deal on Bill Is Reached.” *Washington Post*, December 20, 2009.

⁴ I use the term “logrolling” in this article to refer to *explicit* logrolling, not *implicit* logrolling. See Tullock (1959) for details.

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Senate Democrats would be unlikely to successfully move the bill forward.

Besides illustrating the importance of position changes in legislatures, the above example points to an important relationship between key legislative institutional arrangements, such as voting rules, and position changes. In the Senate, Democrats needed all of their 60 votes to break a Republican filibuster. They needed to reach a unanimous decision, which gave each Democratic senator effective veto power. Accordingly, unsatisfied Democrats had the opportunity to use their veto power to extract concessions from others in return for changing their positions. In contrast, Democrats in the House of Representatives needed a simple majority of the votes to pass the legislation. Given that the Democrats had 38 members more than a simple majority of the House, unsatisfied members had a harder time extracting concessions from others in return for changing their positions. House Democrats could more easily afford defections, and some of the unsatisfied members could be left out of a winning coalition. This example suggests that we should observe important differences in legislators' position changing behavior in bargaining over legislation subject to different voting rules.

The scarcity of quantitative empirical research on position changes in legislatures is surprising given the prominence of such behavior in legislative politics. Undoubtedly, data limitations are a major reason for the lack of empirical research on the topic. First, obtaining information on legislators' position changes and how such changes relate to their "success" in bargaining is difficult. Second, in many legislatures, voting rules do not vary in a straightforward manner and are endogenous in ways that complicate the analysis.⁵ Thus, there have been several significant barriers to empirical work that explores how institutional arrangements affect position changes and the potential for logrolls among legislators.

I sidestep these difficulties by using a rich dataset containing information on the most preferred policy alternatives of the European Union (EU) member-state representatives before and after legislative negotiations in the European Union's Council of Ministers (Thomson and Stokman 2003). During the EU legislative process,

the member states' government ministers represent their countries in a manner similar to legislators representing different constituents in a national legislature. Thus, understanding the way institutional arrangements shape member-state representatives' position changing behavior can help us understand position changes in national legislatures. Moreover, the EU is a particularly interesting case to study the influence of legislative institutional arrangements as it has multiple voting rules (e.g., qualified majority voting and unanimity) and legislative procedures (e.g., codecision and consultation). Importantly, the procedures employed to pass a particular piece of legislation can be treated as exogenous, as they are explicitly codified in the EU Treaties. Thus, the EU provides us with a unique opportunity to study the influence of different institutional arrangements on legislative behavior. Furthermore, detailed information on legislators' positions during legislative negotiations in the EU's Council of Ministers is available. This information is essential to assess whether legislators changed their positions and what they gained from doing so.

Through statistical analysis of negotiations on a set of EU legislative proposals, I illustrate how voting rules used to pass a piece of legislation, and the structure of the legislation, in terms of whether or not it has single or multiple issue dimensions, influence the frequency and the purpose of position changes during the negotiations on that proposal. Having veto power under the unanimity voting rule empowers legislators and enables them to stand firm during negotiations. Accordingly, on average we observe fewer position changes under the unanimity voting rule than under the majority voting rule. More importantly, I argue and show that the voting rule and the structure of the legislation determine what legislators gain from position changes. When the negotiated piece of legislation is multidimensional and the voting rule is unanimity, legislators have both the opportunity and the power to use position changing as a strategy to obtain a favorable outcome in bargaining over that particular legislation. Under this condition, I show that legislators often engage in what I call a *within-legislation* logroll, which increases their success in obtaining outcomes close to their preferences.

The arguments and findings in this article are relevant to the literatures on legislative behavior, EU policymaking, and issue linkages in international negotiations. As I noted above, in the Council member states' ministers represent their countries in a manner similar to the legislators representing different constituents in a national legislature. Thus, studying position changes in the EU can help us understand position changes in national legislatures. Moreover, given that the member states' representatives

⁵ For instance, in the U.S. Senate example, the fact that each Democratic senator had effective veto power was an artifact of the Democratic caucus being composed of exactly 60 members and the fact that any Republican support was exceedingly unlikely. In the U.S. Senate, this dynamic changes both across different legislative sessions and even across bills within each session. Furthermore, in many legislative bodies, voting rules are endogenous in the sense that they are decided by a portion of the membership on a bill-to-bill basis (e.g., the role of the Rules Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives).

are negotiating within the highly institutionalized setting of an international organization, the findings of the article are relevant for the literature on international negotiations which emphasize the prominence of issue linkages and vote trading (Davis 2004; Morgan 1990; Odell 2000; Sebenius 1984; Tollison and Willett 1979).

In the next section, I introduce the dataset on the EU legislative negotiations and briefly discuss the existing studies which study position changes using these data. I follow this section with a presentation of my main argument and hypotheses. In the analysis section, I develop a measure of legislators' *negotiation success* in obtaining outcomes close to their preferences. The measure is novel in that it is proposal specific and takes into account the *multidimensional* structure of each legislation. In the analysis section, I first explore the relationship between voting arrangements and position changes and second, and more importantly, the relationship between position changes and negotiation success. The findings show that voting rules play a central role in determining whether legislators change their positions during negotiations and what they gain from position changing. Finally, I discuss potential objections to the results, discuss some broader implications for the study of legislatures, and conclude.

Position Changes in EU Legislative Negotiations

Legislators' position changing behavior during the legislative process has been relatively unexplored in the literature. This is unfortunate given the wide range of studies that emphasize the prominence of logrolling during legislative negotiations in general (Carrubba and Volden 2000; Riker 1986; Riker and Brams 1973; Stratmann 1992) and position changes and logrolling during EU legislative negotiations in particular (Heisenberg 2005; König and Junge 2009; Matilla and Lane 2001; Stokman and den Bos 1994; Thomson et al. 2006). However, an innovative dataset, Decision Making in the European Union (DEU), makes it possible to systematically study position changes and logrolling.

The DEU dataset was collected through detailed interviews with experts working at the main EU institutions and actively observing legislative negotiations. The dataset contains information on a set of legislative proposals negotiated between January 1999 and December 2000. The proposals differ from each other with respect to the Council voting rule and the legislative procedure they were subject to. Some were decided by unanimity voting and others by qualified majority voting (QMV).

In terms of legislative procedure, they were all subject to one of the two most often employed EU legislative procedures: codecision and consultation.⁶

For each proposal in the dataset, the experts identified the main negotiation *issues*. For example, one of the proposals is on a community action program in education. The experts identify two issues for the proposal. The first issue is about the amount of funding to be allocated for the program. The second issue is whether the wording used to describe the program should be ambitious and emphasize "integration," or be more modest and emphasize "cooperation." The experts describe each issue in terms of a scale ranging between 0 and 100 and locate initial and final positions of each EU member-state representative on the scales for each issue of each proposal.

The initial positions are the policy alternatives the members favored most right after the introduction of the proposal prior to the beginning of negotiations. The initial positions also indicate the outcomes members ideally wanted to obtain in negotiations. In existing research conducted by scholars who collected the DEU data, the concepts "initial position" and "ideal position" are used interchangeably (Bailer 2004; König and Junge 2009). Moreover, in a special issue introducing the dataset, Stokman and Thomson (2004) note that the interviewed experts did not distinguish between the terms "initial position" and "preference," suggesting that the experts do not consider a member's initial position as an indicator of nonsincere position taking, but as an expression of the member's actual preference. Another scholar who was involved in data collection also emphasizes that the experts have detailed insight into members' interests and ideal preferences and that a member's initial position is closer to that member's "preference" than to a "stated position" (Arregui 2008, 872).⁷ The final positions are the policy alternatives the members favored most after the negotiations and right before a decision was adopted (Arregui 2008, 859). Along with the initial and final positions, the experts also estimated the salience of issues for the members. Finally, the dataset contains expert estimates

⁶ The consultation procedure (Article 192 of the EC Treaty) begins with the Commission's introduction of a piece of legislation (i.e., Commission proposal). Under consultation, the European Parliament can only *suggest* amendments. The Council adopts the law via QMV or unanimity depending on the Treaty article. The codecision procedure (Article 251 of the EC Treaty) also begins with the Commission's proposal. Under this procedure, the EP and the Council are co-legislatures as the EP can amend or veto legislation.

⁷ In a study on the EU's conciliation committees, König et al. (2007) compare the expert estimates on seven proposals from the DEU data with data they themselves collected through interviews. They find very high similarity between expert judgments in their data and the DEU data, with respect to the estimates of actors' initial positions.

of the position of the negotiation outcome and the status quo outcome. The negotiation outcome is the policy alternative the actors eventually accepted, while the status quo outcome is the policy alternative that would have prevailed if there were no agreement on the proposal (Thomson et al. 2006, 38).

Several studies utilize the DEU dataset (Aksoy 2010a; Arregui 2008; Arregui and Thomson 2009; Bailer 2004; König and Junge 2009; Pajala and Widgrèn 2004; Schalk et al. 2007; Selck and Steunenberg 2004; Thomson 2008; Thomson and Hosli 2006; Thomson et al. 2006; Warntjen 2008), with the main study being Thomson et al. (2006). However, Arregui, Stokman, and Thomson (2004) and Arregui (2008) are the only studies that specifically study position changes using the dataset. Thus, I focus the remainder of the discussion on these two papers and related work that discusses logrolling in the EU.

The main focus of Arregui, Stokman, and Thomson (2004) is to tie position switching to the key models of decision making discussed in Thomson et al. (2006), among other studies. Importantly, Arregui, Stokman, and Thomson first establish that position changing indeed occurs often. Second, the authors calculate the final positions members should move to given their initial positions and alternative theoretical conceptualizations of the legislative process. For example, one of their models, the “compromise model,” predicts members’ final positions to be the weighted average of all the members’ initial positions. The authors assess the predictive accuracy of alternative models but do not explore the extent to which institutional arrangements in general or voting rules in particular motivate changes.

Arregui (2008) builds upon Arregui, Stokman, and Thomson (2004) and explores how several country-level (e.g., voting power) and proposal-level factors (e.g., type of policy instrument, policy area) influence position changes. The author also uncovers some interesting relationships between position changes, voting rules, and legislative procedures. For example, one of the findings suggests that changes are more common under QMV than unanimity when the legislative procedure is codecision. Thus, the study highlights potential connections between position changes and institutional arrangements. However, it also suggests a need for better understanding of why and how position changes and institutional arrangements are linked. I argue that we can better understand the connections between institutional rules and position changes by theorizing about what legislators can obtain from position changing. Given that legislators ultimately aim to secure favorable legislative outcomes, studying the extent to which position changing helps or hurts them

in this respect under different voting rules is of central importance.

Several other studies in the literature also emphasize the importance of logrolling and position changing in the EU. Scholars suggest that the EU’s institutional setting facilitates logrolling (Heisenberg 2005) and that logrolling can provide an explanation for the large number of consensual EU decisions (König and Junge 2009; Matilla and Lane 2001). In an interesting study, König and Junge (2009) argue that logrolling can happen across proposals negotiated within similar time periods or within similar issue areas. While this is an intriguing argument and seems to be consistent with general patterns in the data, it is difficult to actually marshal direct evidence of logrolling across proposals. Furthermore, I argue that scholars have overlooked a type of logrolling, within-legislation, that is more plausible in the EU and can be more directly analyzed. Overall, the emphasis that research on the EU generally places on logrolling suggests that more direct evidence of logrolling is much needed. Exploring the connections between legislators’ position changing behavior and their negotiation success on each legislative proposal will bring us closer to providing more direct evidence for logrolling.

Argument: Dimensions, Voting Rules, Position Changes

Voting rules in large part determine the extent to which the members of a decision-making body can be influential and the alternative negotiation strategies available to them.⁸ For instance, voting rules are a significant reason why minority party members in the U.S. Senate have a lot more influence than minority party members in the U.S. House of Representatives (e.g., cloture rule or unanimous consent in the Senate). In the EU’s Council of Ministers, representatives decide by either unanimity or qualified majority voting. Under qualified majority rule, representatives’ voting weights are proportional to their country’s population, and a qualified majority of the votes is reached when a specific threshold of votes is in favor of

⁸ A large number of theoretical studies show the importance of key legislative institutional arrangements such as voting and proposal-making rules (Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Kalandrakis 2006; Romer and Rosenthal 1978) and the vote of confidence procedures in legislatures (Baron 1998; Diermeier and Feddersen 1998). While a full review of this literature is beyond the scope of this article, this literature strongly suggests that legislative institutional arrangements shape both legislators’ behavior and legislative outcomes in profound ways.

the legislation.⁹ Under unanimity rule, all members have effective veto power. I argue that voting rules significantly influence both the frequency and consequences of position changes by legislators. My argument unfolds in two main parts. First, I discuss how I expect voting rules to affect position-changing behavior in general. Second, I discuss how voting rules and the structure of legislation, i.e., the number of issue dimensions, interact to determine what legislators can gain from position changing.

In general, I expect legislators to be less likely to move away from their preferred position when they have the power and influence to obtain what they ideally want. Accordingly, I argue that whether or not a legislator has veto power is a key factor that influences his or her propensity to change positions. I expect that having veto power under the unanimity rule will make it easier for a legislator to stand firm (Arregui 2008, 857). Consequently, we should observe fewer position changes on proposals subject to unanimity voting relative to those subject to qualified majority voting. To assess the empirical veracity of this idea, I test the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: Under the unanimity voting rule, legislators change their positions less often than they do under the qualified majority voting rule.

Despite their veto powers under the unanimity rule, some members will still be willing to change positions. Legislators often change their positions if they obtain satisfactory concessions from their colleagues in return, meaning they engage in a logroll (Carrubba and Volden 2000; Riker and Brams 1973; Stratmann 1992). There are two potential ways in which legislators can benefit from position changing. First, they can change their positions on some of the issues negotiated within a piece of legislation in return for concessions on other issues within the same piece of legislation. Second, they can change their positions on a piece of legislation in return for concessions on another, otherwise unrelated, piece of legislation. Thus, position changes might be motivated by what I call, first, *within-legislation* logrolling, or second, *cross-legislation* logrolling. I focus on within-legislation logrolling in this article because it is more substantively plausible and much easier to identify empirically.

While cross-legislation logrolling is a theoretically appealing idea, it is harder to engage in cross-legislation logrolling than within-legislation logrolling in the EU's Council of Ministers relative to many national legislatures. In the Council, the proposals within each policy area are negotiated by a different set of member-state

representatives. For instance, agriculture proposals are negotiated by the agriculture ministers, while justice and home affairs proposals are negotiated by the justice and home affairs ministers. However, in national legislatures the same set of legislators negotiate on all the bills. Even though an EU member state's minister of agriculture and minister of home affairs can presumably share information, it is difficult for them to be fully informed about the status of everyday negotiations in Council meetings other than their own. Thus, I argue that cross-legislation logrolling is generally more difficult to accomplish than within-legislation logrolling in the EU.¹⁰

Although cross-legislation logrolling is more plausible within a given policy area, a point nicely made by König and Junge (2009), I argue that cross-legislation logrolls are still difficult relative to within-legislation logrolls. Ferejohn (1986) argues that theoretically, cross-legislation logrolling is difficult to sustain because it is relatively hard for legislators to commit to hold together any given logroll across different pieces of legislation. He uses an example from the U.S. Congress to show that bundling issues together, i.e., producing a within-legislation logroll, leads to a much more stable logroll (Ferejohn 1986).

Additionally, cross-legislation logrolling is very difficult to observe empirically as we need to know whether two or more separate pieces of seemingly unrelated legislation are linked during negotiations.¹¹ In contrast, within-legislation logrolling is easier to identify as it can only occur when legislation is multidimensional and connections across issues are obvious. The fact that I have data that are much better suited to the identification of within-legislation logrolling is further justification for making that my focus in this article.

¹⁰ An anonymous reviewer pointed out that the difficulty of establishing cross-legislation versus within-legislation logrolls might be influenced by the committees responsible for preparing the Council's work, COREPER I and II. COREPER II consists of member states' ambassadors to the EU and deals with political, commercial, economic, or institutional matters while COREPER I consists of deputy ambassadors to the EU and deals with technical matters (http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/coreper_en.htm). It is plausible that cross-legislation logrolling opportunities emerge often for COREPER II legislation. However, I do not have data to distinguish the proposals prepared by COREPER I or II. Most importantly, regardless of the involvement of the preparatory committees, eventually the proposals within each policy area are negotiated by a different set of member-state representatives in the Council (e.g., agriculture ministers, finance ministers, or justice and home affairs ministers). Thus, overall it is easier to establish within-legislation logrolls than cross-legislation logrolls in the EU compared to in national legislatures.

¹¹ For an international relations example, see Davis (2004). Unfortunately, there are no data comparable to that used in Davis (2004) for the EU or another legislature.

⁹ The threshold has changed over time with the signing of different treaties between the member states.

Position changes can only be motivated by within-legislation logrolling when the legislation under consideration contains multiple issue dimensions. Specifically, legislators can use position changing as a lucrative strategy to gain a better negotiation outcome on a piece of legislation by changing their positions on issues they do not care much about in return for a better bargaining outcome on issues they greatly care about.¹² However, I argue that voting arrangements play an important modifying role on legislators' ability to exploit within-legislation logrolling opportunities. Under unanimity rule, legislators can strongly press for concessions by threatening to veto legislation. In contrast, under qualified majority rule it is harder for legislators to push for concessions, as a winning coalition excluding some legislators can be formed. Accordingly, I expect legislators to be more successful at exploiting within-legislation logrolling opportunities when the voting rule is unanimity. Thus, position changes on multidimensional legislation will have a positive effect on members' negotiation success when the voting rule is unanimity. To explore this possibility, I test the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Position changers will obtain higher levels of negotiation success on a particular piece of legislation when (1) the negotiated piece of legislation is multidimensional rather than single-dimensional, and (2) the voting rule is unanimity rather than qualified majority voting.

In sum, I expect that legislators will be less likely to change their position when they have veto powers. However, they will be willing to do so if they are engaged in a logroll and are able to get something in return. Multidimensional legislation creates opportunities for within-legislation logrolling, and having veto power enables legislators to capitalize on such opportunities. Accordingly, position changes in negotiations over multidimensional legislation under the unanimity voting rule are likely to be motivated by within-legislation logrolling. If this is true, we will find that position changes bring legislators higher levels of negotiation success under this particular scenario.

Data and the Main Variables

I use information available in the DEU dataset for my empirical analysis. For the DEU dataset, information on members' final positions was collected only for a subset of

randomly selected proposals. I am able to use information on 33 different legislative proposals.¹³ Eleven of the proposals were subject to unanimity rule, while 22 of them were subject to qualified majority rule. The proposals also vary in terms of the number of issues they contain. The majority of them are multidimensional, and the median proposal contains three issues.

I construct several variables essential to testing my arguments. First, to indicate whether a legislator moved away from his or her initial position on a proposal, I code a variable, "Position Change." For each proposal and legislator "Position Change" is coded 1 if the legislator moved away from his or her initial position on at least one of the issues within that proposal. Second, I construct another variable, "Negotiation Success," measuring the extent to which a legislator obtained a policy outcome close to his or her ideal policy preference in bargaining over a proposal. A meaningful measure of success in bargaining over a proposal must take into account the position of the status quo outcome, the importance of the issues under the proposal for the member whose success we are measuring, and the multidimensional structure of the proposal. I briefly elaborate on these points below.

Ignoring the position of the status quo would lead us to erroneously conclude that a member is successful if the outcome is close to the member's ideal policy, even if the status quo policy was exactly what the member wanted. Let us assume that the ideal policies of members A and B on a single-dimensional proposal are 20 and 100, respectively, the outcome of the negotiations is 60, and the status quo is 20. Without taking the status quo into account, we would conclude that both members are equally successful since they are equally distant from the outcome. However, note that A would be much better off if the status quo had prevailed after the negotiations and the outcome of the negotiations put A in a worse situation than it was in before the negotiations. However, B considerably improved its situation after the negotiations. Thus, it is essential to take into account the position of the status quo outcome to measure success.

The measure of success must also account for the salience of each issue under the proposal for the member whose success we are measuring. Consider the following

¹² See the following section for a precise definition of negotiation success under multiple dimensions.

¹³ The subset of DEU dataset I use contains all the proposals that were included in the previous studies which employ the same dataset to study position changes except the ones for which either the status quo outcome or the ideal positions of the EP, the Commission, or some of the members are missing. My subset of the data includes several proposals that are excluded in previous studies despite the fact that relevant information is available in the DEU data. If I only use the 28 proposals which were used in the previous studies of position changes, my results remain completely robust. Results are in the online appendix.

scenario. Assume that B's ideal policies on two different proposals are 20 and 30 and the bargaining outcomes are 80 and 90, respectively. Assume that the first proposal is very important for B, while the second one is not. The simple distance between the outcome and B's ideal policy on each proposal is 60. Based on this calculation, we would conclude that B is equally successful on these proposals. However, this conclusion is not substantively meaningful as it suggests that a member who secures an outcome close to his ideal position on a salient proposal is less successful than a member who got exactly what he wanted from negotiations on a proposal he does not even care about.

Finally, to properly assess legislators' negotiation success in bargaining over a proposal, I need to take into account the connections between the issues within that proposal. Correctly dealing with the multidimensional structure of proposals is essential to the investigation of within-legislation logrolling. Furthermore, treating the issues negotiated under a proposal separately would be essentially analogous to breaking up a piece of legislation voted on as a whole by the U.S. Congress into separate issues and assuming that they are independent of one another. This assumption would be problematic as the issues under a proposal are closely linked and the legislators decide on the fate of the proposal as a whole. In sum, I measure legislators' success in bargaining over each proposal, taking into account the multidimensional structure of the proposals, the position of the status quo outcomes, and the salience of the issues under the proposals.

Consider a set of legislators $N = \{1, \dots, 15\}$ negotiating on a proposal, t , in a three-dimensional policy space.¹⁴ Each member is denoted by i . Let $X \subset \mathbb{R}^3$ denote the policy space. Every $x \in X$ is a policy vector, and $x = \{x_1, x_2, x_3\}$. Let $o \in X$, $o = \{o_1, o_2, o_3\}$ denote the negotiation outcome and $sq \in X$, $sq = \{sq_1, sq_2, sq_3\}$ denote the status quo. Each member $i \in N$ has an initial and final position in the policy space. Let $p^i \in X$, $p^i = \{p_1^i, p_2^i, p_3^i\}$ denote i 's initial position. p_1^i is the initial position of i on the first issue in the policy space, p_2^i is i 's initial position on the second issue, etc. Each member i also attaches some salience to each of the issues.¹⁵ Let s^i , $s^i = \{s_1^i, s_2^i, s_3^i\}$, denote vector of salience scores for i . To measure i 's negotiation success, I first calculate the weighted distance between the outcome (o) and i 's ideal policy (p^i), where the weights are the salience of the issues

under the proposal for member i .

$$|p^i - o| = \sqrt{(p_1^i - o_1)^2 * s_1^i + (p_2^i - o_2)^2 * s_2^i + (p_3^i - o_3)^2 * s_3^i}, \quad (1)$$

This calculation guarantees that the distance between i 's ideal policy and the outcome on an issue important to i will exert more influence in determining the distance between p^i and o . Second, I calculate the *weighted* distance between sq^i and p^i as follows:

$$|p^i - sq| = \sqrt{(p_1^i - sq_1)^2 * s_1^i + (p_2^i - sq_2)^2 * s_2^i + (p_3^i - sq_3)^2 * s_3^i}. \quad (2)$$

Legislator i 's negotiation success is measured by dividing equation (1) by equation (2). To facilitate comparability of the measure across proposals with a different number of dimensions, I normalize the measure. Normalization also guarantees that the measure is well defined (i.e., the denominator is never 0). Let us denote the maximum possible distance between two points on a proposal t as Max_t . Negotiation success for i in proposal t is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Negotiation Success} = \frac{Max_t - |p^i - o| + 1}{Max_t - |p^i - sq| + 1}. \quad (3)$$

For a proposal and a legislator, an increase in the value of the variable indicates an increase in the negotiation success level of the legislator in bargaining over that proposal.

Analysis

I expect voting rules to be an important determinant of positionchanging behavior and the consequences of position changes for legislators' negotiation success. First, I assess the relationship between the frequency of position changing behavior and voting rules, i.e., Hypothesis 1, using cross-tabulations.¹⁶ Second, I assess the relationship between position changing and negotiation success, i.e., Hypothesis 2, with a multivariate model. Finally, I discuss

¹⁴ We assume t is three-dimensional for the sake of illustration. In the DEU dataset there are proposals with as many as six dimensions.

¹⁵ The values of salience in the data range from 0 to 100, and higher values indicate that the issue is very important. I scale this variable to range between 0 and 1.

¹⁶ I also estimate a multivariate model of position changes and find the same results. I controlled for the influence of other factors that were found to influence position changes in the previous studies, specifically legislative procedure, position extremity, policy area, policy instrument, duration of negotiations (Arregui 2008). The results show that under qualified majority rule, changes occur less often than under unanimity rule. Given that the finding is identical using the more complicated model, I report the cross-tabulations here in the interest of both space and ease of exposition. Please see the online appendix for details.

TABLE 1 Position Changes and Voting Type

| | Position Change=1 | Position Change=0 | Row Sum |
|--------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|------------|
| Qualified Majority | 234 (214.9) | 58 (77.1) | 292 |
| Unanimity | 92 (111.1) | 59 (39.9) | 151 |
| Column Sum | 326 | 117 | 443 |

Note: Observed values in bold, expected values in parentheses. Pearson chi-square = 18.9 with 1 d.f.; p-value = 0.01.

the limitations of this study and the possibility that something other than within-legislation logrolling explains the findings.

Recall that Hypothesis 1 states that under unanimity, changes will occur less often than under qualified majority rule. Table 1 illustrates the frequency of changes across proposals subject to different voting rules. The bold numbers are the observed number of observations in each category, while the numbers in parentheses are the expected number of observations under the assumption that position changing and the voting rule are independent. In 326 out of 443 observations (73%) we observe position changes.¹⁷ There is a clear difference in position changing behavior across voting rules. While changes occur in 80% of the proposals under the qualified majority voting rule, they occur in around 60% of the proposals under the unanimity rule. Furthermore, the numbers in parentheses suggest that we should observe less position changing under the qualified majority rule and more under the unanimity rule if voting type and position changing are indeed independent. I conducted a chi-square test of independence to assess whether voting rule and position changing are independent from each other. The Pearson chi-square test value is 18.9 with one degree of freedom and is statistically significant at any conventional level (i.e., p-value < 0.01). This suggests that position changing is not independent of voting rule.

Even though members can veto legislation under unanimity, this does not mean that they will never change positions. Specifically, when legislation is multidimensional, legislators might be willing to change positions on

¹⁷ It was not possible to identify whether a member state changed its position under two scenarios: first, for a set of one-dimensional proposals where final position for a member state was missing; second, for a set of multidimensional proposals where final position was known only for a subset of the issues and the known final positions were equal to the known initial positions. Under the latter case, we do not know whether there was a position shift because we do not know whether for the issues with unknown final positions there was a position shift.

TABLE 2 Unanimity: Dimensionality and Position Changes

| | Position Change=1 | Position Change=0 | Row Sum |
|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------|
| Single-dimensional | 31 (42.6) | 39 (27.4) | 70 |
| Multidimensional | 61 (49.4) | 20 (31.6) | 81 |
| Column Sum | 92 | 59 | 151 |

Note: Observed values in bold, expected values in parentheses. Pearson chi-square = 15.2 with 1 d.f.; p-value < 0.01.

some issues of the proposal if they extract concessions on other issues. I argue that the availability of multiple issues on the bargaining table combined with members' potential veto power create opportunities for within-legislation logrolling. Accordingly, Hypothesis 2 posits that under unanimity rule, position changers on multidimensional legislation will obtain increased levels of negotiation success. Before moving to a test of Hypothesis 2, I assess a simple corollary that provides a link between Hypotheses 1 and 2.

The corollary to Hypothesis 2 is that since members can logroll within legislation and extract concessions using their veto powers, position changing should be more common on multidimensional unanimity proposals than single-dimensional unanimity proposals. Table 1 demonstrates that position switching is less common under unanimity when we examine all proposals, single dimensional and multidimensional. However, if legislators are able to extract concessions when negotiating on multidimensional proposals under unanimity, we should see more position switching when unanimity proposals are multidimensional relative to single dimensional. Table 2 shows the frequency of position changes across multidimensional and single-dimensional proposals under unanimity rule. The frequencies of observed changes are in bold, and the frequencies of expected changes assuming independence are in parentheses. Consistent with expectations, members only change positions around 44% (i.e., 31 times out of 70) of the time in negotiations on single-dimensional proposals and 75% of the time on multidimensional proposals. The Pearson test of independence suggests that under the unanimity rule, position changing is significantly related to the dimensionality of the proposals (i.e., chi-square value = 15.2, p-value < 0.01).

To systematically examine the relationship between position changes and negotiation success, i.e., Hypothesis 2, I conduct multivariate regression analysis. The dependent variable is "Negotiation Success," and

the main independent variable is “Position Change.” Before presenting the findings, I discuss the control variables included in the analysis.

I include several variables that are found to determine members’ success in EU legislative negotiations in the existing literature (Arregui and Thomson 2009; Bailer 2004). First of all, many influential accounts of the EU legislative process emphasize that along with the representatives negotiating in the Council, the two supranational EU bodies, the European Parliament (EP) and the Commission, have important legislative roles (Hix 1999; Nugent 2006). Thus, the Council members may have extra leverage in negotiations when they have the support of the EP and the Commission (Arregui and Thomson 2009; Bailer 2004). However, the support of the EP should matter most under the codecision procedure when the EP and the Council co-legislate, while under consultation the Council is the only legislature with real power (Bailer 2004, 104). The Commission initiates the proposals and often acts as a mediator between the EP and the Council (Dinan 2005; Hix 1999). Some scholars posit that due to the Commission’s proposal initiation power, members who share the Commission’s preferences can succeed in negotiations (Bailer 2004, 103), while others find that the Commission’s support only matters under consultation (Arregui and Thomson 2009, 660). In my analysis, “Closeness to Commission” and “Closeness to EP” control for the EP and the Commission’s potential influence. DEU data have information on ideal positions of the EP and the Commission and issue salience scores for these two institutions. For each member and proposal, I calculate the multidimensional distance between the member’s and the EP and between the member’s and the Commission’s ideal positions.¹⁸ The higher values of these two variables occur the closer the member to the EP and the Commission.

Members with extreme or outlier preferences have been found to be less successful in EU legislative negotiations (Arregui and Thomson 2009; Bailer 2004). Thus, I use a control variable, “Distance to Mean,” to assess the extent to which a member has an outlier position on a proposal. “Distance to Mean” is the distance between a member’s ideal position on a proposal and the mean ideal position of all the members on the proposal. The higher

a member’s “Distance to Mean” score for a proposal, the more extreme that member’s preference.¹⁹

The models also include variables controlling for individual characteristics of the legislators’ country of origin. Some representatives can be more influential because of their country’s economic power and size (Bailer 2004), individual voting power in the Council (Bailer 2004; Carrubba 1997; Rodden 2002), or position as the Council President at the time of negotiations (Aksoy 2010b; Schalk et al. 2007; Thomson 2008; Warntjen 2008). Thus, I control for GDP and population size. “SSI” (Shapley-Shubik Index) controls for members’ individual voting power.²⁰ “Presidency” is a dummy variable coded 1 for the legislator whose country held the Presidency when the decision on the proposal was reached. Several studies find that representatives of the country holding the Presidency in the final adoption stage of a proposal secure favorable outcomes (Schalk et al. 2007; Thomson 2008; Warntjen 2008), while others do not corroborate this evidence (Arregui and Thomson 2009).

Finally, for each proposal and legislator I control for “Proposal Salience” and “Duration of Negotiations.” “Proposal Salience” is the salience of the proposal for the legislator. It is calculated by finding the mean salience score of each issue under the proposal for a legislator. A member who finds a proposal important is more likely to spend time and effort to succeed in negotiations. Thus, I expect “Proposal Salience” to have a positive influence on “Negotiation Success.” “Duration of Negotiations” is the number of months between the introduction of the proposal and the date on which a decision was reached.

Table 3 presents the results from three different random effects models, with proposal-specific random effects.²¹ The models differ from each other in terms of

¹⁸ If the Commission’s ideal policy on proposal t is p^{com} , I find the distance between the Commission and the member i on proposal t as follows:

$$|p^i - p^{\text{com}}| = \left(\frac{\text{Max}_t - |p^i - p^{\text{com}}| + 1}{\text{Max}_t + 1} \right). \quad (4)$$

¹⁹ For a single-dimensional proposal, the mean ideal position is the simple average of 15 numbers, each of which is the ideal position of a legislator. For multidimensional proposals, I find the simple average of members’ ideal positions on each dimension of the proposal. The mean ideal position for a multidimensional proposal is a point on a multidimensional space. Each coordinate of this point is the average of members’ ideal positions on one of the issues of the proposal. Similar to the other variables in the analysis, “Distance to Mean” is normalized to ensure that the values are comparable across proposals with a different number of dimensions.

²⁰ Calculations of voting power indices like Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices are based on finding how pivotal a member is in turning a losing coalition into a winning one by joining it or in turning a winning coalition into a losing one by leaving it. For a discussion of power indices, see Garrett and Tsebelis (1996). The source of this variable is also the DEU dataset.

²¹ I tested for country- and proposal-specific effects with F-tests. I also tested for random effects using the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier tests. The results suggest that there are individual effects for each proposal but not for each country. Hausman specification

TABLE 3 The Impact of Position Changes on Negotiation Success

| | Model I | Model II | Model III |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Position Change | .68 (.52) | .68 (.54) | .69 (.52) |
| QMV | 1.79*** (.35) | 1.88*** (.41) | 1.79*** (.48) |
| Multidimensional | .042 (.08) | .057 (.10) | .20 (.20) |
| Position Change × QMV | −1.76*** (.64) | −1.75*** (.66) | −1.67*** (.66) |
| Position Change × Multidimensional | −.40 (.56) | −.43 (.57) | −.45 (.53) |
| Multidimensional × QMV | −1.57*** (.39) | −1.60*** (.42) | −1.68*** (.52) |
| Position Change × Multidimensional × QMV | 1.60*** (.73) | 1.62*** (.76) | 1.59*** (.80) |
| Proposal Salience | .011*** (.003) | .013*** (.004) | .013*** (.003) |
| Population (log) | | −.17 (.17) | −.17 (.17) |
| GDP (log) | | .079 (.13) | .064 (.12) |
| SSI | | 2.62 (5.55) | 3.73 (5.19) |
| Closeness to Commission | | | −.43 (.45) |
| Closeness to Commission × Codecision | | | 1.83*** (.55) |
| Closeness to EP | | | −.063 (.57) |
| Closeness to EP × Codecision | | | .10 (.74) |
| Codecision | | | −1.14 (.60) |
| President | | | .28 (.33) |
| Distance to Mean | | | .09 (.25) |
| Duration of Negotiations | | | .0003 (.004) |
| Constant | .44 (.20) | 1.18 (1.97) | 1.54 (1.60) |

Note: ** significant at 5%, *** 1% levels.

Models are random effects GLS models. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Number of observations is 410 and number of proposals is 31.

TABLE 4 Marginal Coefficients of “Position Change” Across Voting Rules and Dimension

| | Coefficient | Standard Error |
|-------------------------------|-------------|----------------|
| Multidimensional, Unanimity | .25*** | .14 |
| Single-dimensional, Unanimity | .68 | .53 |
| Multidimensional, QMV | .12 | .20 |
| Single-dimensional, QMV | −1.07*** | .36 |

Note: Coefficient and standard error calculations are based on the estimation of Model II. Calculations based on the estimation of Models I and III produce very similar results.

the included control variables. All the models include interactive terms between “Position Change,” “Multidimensional” and “QMV,” since I expect the influence of position changes to be conditional on voting rules and the proposal structure. “Multidimensional” is a dummy variable coded 1 for proposals with more than one issue. “QMV” is a dummy variable coded 1 when the voting rule is qualified majority. Since the models include three interacted variables, I add interactions between every possible pair of the three variables (Braumoeller 2004). Model I is the base model, with only my main independent variables and the control for proposal salience. Model II includes controls for essential country-specific characteristics. Model III includes all the other control variables. In Model III, “Closeness to EP” and “Closeness to Commission” are interacted with “Codecision,” a dummy variable indicating when the procedure is codecision, as the influence of these two variables should vary across legislative procedures.²²

To facilitate easier interpretation, I present the marginal coefficients and standard errors of “Position Change” in Table 4. The second column shows the coefficient of “Position Change” conditional on the values of the variables with which it is interacted (i.e., “Multidimensional,” “QMV”) and the third column lists the standard errors.

test results also suggest that the individual effects of each proposal are uncorrelated with the other variables in the models. Thus, the random effects model is a better alternative as it offers flexibility in the inclusion of variables that do not vary across proposals. See Greene (2000, 577) and Johnston and DiNardo (1997, 404) for more information on the Hausman test and Greene (2000, 509–10) for more information on the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test.

²² As a robustness check, I estimated the models with policy area fixed effects, since some procedures and voting rules are more commonly used in some policy areas than others. The results are robust, and the models are in the online appendix.

The results provide considerable support for Hypothesis 2. The first two rows of Table 4 present the coefficients and standard errors for the main independent variable, "Position Change," under unanimity. Specifically, the first row shows that the marginal coefficient for multidimensional unanimity proposals is positive and statistically significant. Thus, on average, position changing is affiliated with an increased level of negotiation success. Under this scenario, position changers are able to secure concessions. Two main theoretical points explain this pattern. First, multiple issues on the negotiation table create opportunities for within-legislation logrolling. Second, members successfully exploit these opportunities using their veto powers. This finding is in line with the expectations and supports Hypothesis 2. In contrast, position changers do not systematically benefit on single-dimensional unanimity proposals, as the coefficient is positive and statistically insignificant (Table 4, second row). As argued above, single-dimensional proposals do not lend themselves to within-legislation logrolling. Thus, I did not expect to find any evidence that position changers on single-dimensional proposals systematically extract a better overall outcome on that proposal.

The findings for qualified majority voting proposals are also consistent with Hypothesis 2. "Position Change" has a negative and significant impact on "Negotiation Success" for single-dimensional proposals subject to qualified majority voting (Table 4, fourth row). All else equal, a change in position is affiliated with an average of a 1.07 unit decrease in success. Since the success measure is an index, it is difficult to gauge the substantive meaning of this coefficient. However, we can illustrate with a simple example. The average level of success score in the dataset is 1.51. For a single-dimensional proposal for which the status quo outcome is 0, a member's score of 1.51 would correspond to a situation as follows. The member's ideal position is approximately at 40.7, while the outcome is approximately at 50.7, and the member attaches the highest level of salience to the proposal (i.e., salience score = 1). In this scenario, if we observed a change in the member's position we would observe that its success score on average drops to .44. This means that all else equal the negotiation outcome would be around 74.5, quite far from the member's ideal position. This finding that position changers experience less negotiation success under single-dimensional qualified majority proposals accords with expectations. While bargaining on single-dimensional proposals, position changers cannot be compensated for concessions on one issue with concessions on other issues within the same proposal.

For multidimensional proposals subject to qualified majority voting, the marginal coefficient of "Position

Change" is positive and statistically insignificant (Table 4, third row). Within-legislative logrolling opportunities are available for multidimensional proposals regardless of voting rule. However, the availability of such opportunities is not a guarantee that the members will be able to exploit them. The ability of legislators to extract concessions through within-legislation logrolls is limited under qualified majority voting relative to under unanimity voting. Thus, even though the structure of the proposals creates opportunities for logrolling, we find no evidence that members are able to extract concessions from others in return for a position change under qualified majority voting. In sum, the results of Table 4 are all consistent with Hypothesis 2.

Among the control variables, "Proposal Salience" has a statistically significance impact in all the three models. As the importance of a proposal for a member increases, the member's negotiation success on that proposal also increases. It is likely that legislators spend more resources to secure favorable outcomes on legislation that is particularly important. Moreover, when a proposal is salient for a member, others might be more inclined to make concessions.²³ Additionally, this finding provides some preliminary evidence suggesting that there might be cross-legislation logrolling. Legislators give in on negotiations on less salient legislation and obtain lower success scores, while they succeed in negotiations on highly salient legislation.

The variables controlling for the SSI scores, economic power, size of legislators' country of origin, and the Presidency do not have statistically significant influence.²⁴ This set of findings is in line with some of the existing studies which suggest that exogenous sources of power hardly help member-state representatives (Bailer 2004, 114) and that holding the Presidency has only a modest impact under limited conditions (Arregui and Thomson 2009).

Regarding the supranational EU institutions, I find that having the EP's support has no statistically significant influence while the Commission's support does only

²³ This would be in line with the arguments in the literature which highlight the prominence of cooperative forms of decision making in the EU (Achen 2006).

²⁴ I examined the bivariate correlations between the independent variables and checked for collinearity using the variance inflation factor (VIF) diagnostic statistic. Overall, the multicollinearity diagnostics (e.g., variance inflation factor) suggest high correlation between GDP and population. However, if I drop these variables completely, or include only either one of them, the results regarding the main variables of interest remain robust. Even though SSI and population also seem like likely collinear variables, their correlation coefficient is only .54. Only for proposals subject to QMV, the correlation between SSI and population is high since voting weights are proportional to population size. The correlation is very low under unanimity rule.

under codecision. This finding is partly in line with Bailer (2004), which shows that being close to the Commission is a negotiating advantage, but being close to the EP is not. The relative unimportance of the EP's influence is also evident in Arregui and Thomson (2009) who find a relatively weak evidence that being close to the EP under codecision helps.²⁵ Finally, while some studies (Arregui and Thomson 2009; Bailer 2004) show that having an extreme position is on average detrimental when success is measured at the issue level, I do not find that this is the case at the proposal level.

Cross-Legislation Logrolling

Before discussing the broader implications of this article, I would like to address a potential limitation: the focus on within-legislation logrolling rather than cross-legislation logrolling. It is possible that some of the position changes in the data are driven by cross-legislation logrolling. For example, under unanimity position changes are observed in 31 of the 70 single-dimensional proposals (Table 2, first row). In this set of cases, members changed their positions despite the fact that they had veto powers and could not possibly obtain any within-legislation favors. At least some of these changes could be driven by cross-legislation logrolls: legislators changing positions and gaining concessions on other proposals. I argued above that cross-legislation logrolling is theoretically less plausible relative to within-legislation logrolling, a point that Ferejohn (1986) makes in the context of the U.S. Congress. Here I argue that even if cross-legislation logrolling sometimes occurs, it does not pose a problem for my analysis.

A key argument of this article is that by studying the relationship between position changes and negotiation success at the proposal level we can determine whether or not changes are driven by within-legislation logrolling. The changes that are driven by within-legislation logrolling will systematically influence negotiation success scores. However, I do not expect any changes that are driven by cross-legislation logrolling to systematically influence success scores. Legislators link separate proposals to each other while cross-legislation logrolling. They give in on one or more issues within a proposal in return for concessions on issues within a separate proposal. Accordingly, in bargaining over the proposals on which they are giving concessions, legislators can change their positions in a manner that hurts their negotiation success scores. However, in bargaining over the proposals on which they are gaining concessions,

they can change their positions in a way that helps further increase their success scores. The direction of the relationship between position switching and negotiation success will be negative for proposals on which a legislator is giving concessions and positive for proposals on which the legislator is extracting concessions. Consequently, changes driven by cross-legislation logrolling will not systematically increase or decrease negotiation success scores at the *proposal level*.

In contrast, position changes driven by within-legislation logrolling systematically occur only in individual multidimensional proposals. Moreover, they will be systematically affiliated with higher levels of success whenever legislators are able to successfully engage in a within-legislation logroll. I show that the proposals that are most likely candidates for successful within-legislation logrolling are multidimensional proposals subject to unanimity voting rule and find evidence for within-legislation logrolling where it is the most plausible.

Compromise, Logrolling, and the EU

One possible objection to my argument is that agreement occurs in the EU due to compromises rather than within-legislation logrolls. Some members just change their positions to compromise to other members. However, this objection needs to be more precise, as a logroll is a type of compromise. A within-legislation logroll is a compromise in which a legislator agrees to give up his or her preferred position on one issue in exchange for a concession on another. Although all logrolls are a form of compromise, not all forms of compromise are consistent with logrolling. For instance, if legislators change their position on only one issue of a multidimensional legislation, it is not possible for explicit within-legislation logrolling to occur. If within-legislation logrolling is taking place, legislators should be changing their positions across different issues of a proposal. To ensure that my results actually capture within-legislation logrolling rather than compromises on a single issue, I explored whether it is common for position changing to occur on only one dimension of a multidimensional proposal. I find that changes on only one dimension rarely occur and have no effect on my main results.

There are 24 multidimensional proposals in the data. Only in four of them, two subject to unanimity and two subject to qualified majority voting, position changes are observed on only a single dimension. Thus, in 83% of multidimensional proposals, position changers moved on more than one dimension, which is a pattern consistent with the logic of within-legislation logrolling. Furthermore, if I drop the four proposals in which changes occur

²⁵ The relevant coefficient is significant only at the 10% level and its significance changes across different specifications.

only on a single dimension and re-estimate my models, the results remain completely robust.²⁶ Thus, I find that position changes on only one dimension of multidimensional proposals rarely happen and do not have an effect on my main results. My findings are driven by cases in which exchange of positions was possible.

While it is clear that position changes on a single dimension are not common and do not affect the results, it is worth discussing why we see such behavior. Under unanimity, changes observed only on a single dimension of a multidimensional proposal can be an indicator of a compromise given to the steadfast members to ensure that they do not veto legislation. Moreover, if position changers change their position on an issue that is not salient for them and ensure that the proposal passes, they still can obtain a relatively high level of negotiation success. In fact, for the two multidimensional unanimity proposals with position changes observed only on a single issue, position changers changed their position on the issue which was the least salient for them. In such cases, changes can still be affiliated with high negotiation success (especially when the status quo is undesirable), even though these cases do not exhibit within-legislation logrolling.

Broader Implications

The arguments and findings of this article have several interesting implications for decision-making institutions and legislatures more generally. I continue with the example of the American Congress since it was discussed in the introduction. Long-time Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn of Texas famously stated that “[i]f you want to get along, go along.” He was referring to the need for legislators to be flexible on some issues to win on others. This article provides insight into when legislators change their positions and exploit possible logrolling opportunities.

First, I show evidence that when a negotiated piece of legislation is multidimensional and institutional rules provide legislators with veto power, legislators change positions to engage in logrolling. The findings suggest that logrolling should be more prominent in the U.S. Senate than the House for this reason. Second, the presence of institutional rules that make logrolling necessary and attractive explains why incredibly complex “omnibus” legislation is so common in the U.S. Congress (Davidson and Oleszek 2006, 297–99). The findings suggest that when legislators have veto power, bargaining on a complex piece of legislation with multiple issues increases the chances

that a logroll can be found. Thus, in a body like the U.S. Senate, it may just be necessary to produce “omnibus” legislation, even if such legislation is less “transparent” to the public and harder for analysts to understand.

Conclusion

Even though legislators change their positions often during legislative negotiations, there is very little empirical work that explains when and why position changes occur. Position changing can be a lucrative strategy for legislators if they are able to gain significant concessions in return for changing their positions. Legislators can receive such concessions through within-legislation or cross-legislation logrolling. Voting rules used to pass a piece of legislation, and the structure of the legislation, in terms of whether or not it has single or multiple issue dimensions, play an important role in determining the availability of these logrolling opportunities and the ability of the legislators to exploit these opportunities.

Multidimensional pieces of legislation provide legislators with many opportunities for within-legislation logrolling which are absent in negotiations over single-dimensional legislation. Legislators can potentially exploit such opportunities by changing their positions on some of the issues of the legislation in return for concessions on others. Unanimity voting rule helps legislators to successfully exploit such opportunities by empowering them with veto powers. Thus, when a negotiated piece of legislation is multidimensional and the voting rule is unanimity, legislators successfully use position changing as a lucrative strategy to create within-legislation logrolls. Using available information on a set of multidimensional legislation negotiated in the EU’s Council of Ministers, I test the validity of my main argument.

This article fills an important gap in the legislative studies literature. Students of legislative institutions acknowledge the importance of logrolling and position changing in legislative bargaining. However, systematic empirical exploration of whether and how such behaviors relate to legislative outcomes has been lacking. I fill this gap through an analysis of the extent to which position changes assist legislators in securing favorable outcomes. The article also takes us a step further in our attempts to understand the connections between legislative institutional arrangements and legislative behavior as empirical exploration of legislators’ nonvoting behavior is lacking in the literature. The findings illustrate the important impact of a particular set of institutional arrangements (i.e., voting rules) on a particular nonvoting behavior (i.e., position changing) during the legislative process. Finally, the

²⁶ See the online appendix for results.

article provides further insight into how decision making in the EU has managed to remain rather consensual across time. Within-legislation logrolling on multidimensional proposals is a mechanism that can help explain how this consensus has been maintained as the Council deals with ever more complex issues. The evidence that position changing is beneficial under unanimity suggests that within-legislation logrolling also plays an important role in EU decision making.

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Supporting Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article:

Table A1: The Impact of Voting Rule on Position Changes

Table A2: Alternative Results

Table A3: Models in Table 3 of the Article with Policy Area Fixed Effects

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