Making National Identity Salient: Impact on Attitudes Toward Immigration and Multiculturalism*

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Abstract

Does national identity necessarily have exclusionary effects when it comes to immigration attitudes or is it possible that some national identities act as inclusive forces? While research in Europe and in the U.S. points to the former, one of the long-standing explanations for Canada's success with immigration has been the central place played by immigration and multiculturalism in its national identity. Using the Canadian case, this research tests the possibility that some national identities might represent an inclusive force. It does so through a nationally representative survey experiment (N=1500) where respondents' national identity was primed before answering questions on immigration and multiculturalism. The analysis shows that contrary to previous results obtained in the Netherlands, priming Canadian identity does not increase anti-immigration attitudes. A new prime designed to isolate the effect of national identity even decreased these exclusionary attitudes.

Keywords: national identity, immigration, priming, Canada

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Are national identities inherently exclusionary or is it possible that some national identities act as encompassing forces that include newcomers? On the one hand research in Europe and in the U.S. seem to point to the former: people who care about their national identity and people who identify more with their nationality are more likely to have restrictive attitudes towards immigrants (e.g. Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004; Theiss-Morse, 2009; Wong, 2010). On the other hand, the long-standing explanation for Canada's success with immigration has been the central place played by immigration and multiculturalism in its national identity, making Canadian national identity an inclusive force. Although never tested empirically, this explanation seems to be vindicated by recent research showing that Canadians exhibit a different relationship between pride in their country and attitudes towards immigration (Citrin, Johnston and Wright, 2012).

The starting point of this research is that all national identities do not have the same normative content and that, consequently, the effect of a given national identity on attitudes should be conditional on the norms associated with it. Echoing Citrin, Johnston and Wright (2012) on the outcome of patriotism and chauvinism, national identity in itself should not be conceived as having a restrictive impact on attitudes towards immigration (see also Pehrson, Vignoles and Brown, 2009). Canada represents an ideal case to test these propositions because of the link that has been made between its national identity, multiculturalism, and immigration (Bloemraad, 2006; Joppke, 2004; Kymlicka, 2003). From a comparative point of view, if Canadian identity cannot have this inclusive effect, the prospects for other national identities playing such a role are dire. From a Canadian perspective, if raising the salience of national identity has exclusionary effects on attitudes toward newcomers, this would represent a challenge to the long-standing view of Canada as a success story of host society-immigrant relations.

Here, I test the possibility that some national identities might represent an inclusive force by building on a previous survey experiment done in the Netherlands (Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004; Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007) and applying a modified version in Canada. This new survey experiment uses a randomly selected and nationally representative sample (N=1500), combining the internal validity advantage of the experimental method with the external validity of this type of sample. It also represents a hard test of the inclusiveness potential of Canadian national identity by using a priming strategy that does not assign a given normative content to the

identity in question.

In what follows, I first clarify the different definitions and dimensions of national identity and how they relate to attitudes towards newcomers, emphasizing the importance of the normative content of national identity. I then derive hypotheses from the literature on national identity, social identity theory and from previous research on the Canadian case. Once this has been clarified, I describe the design of the survey experiment and then present and discuss the results. Comparing two different primes, this research demonstrates that making Canadian identity salient does not increase anti-immigration attitudes even when the prime used as treatment strongly reinforces boundaries between groups. A subtler prime, one that makes national identity salient without attaching any meaning to it, made respondents more inclusive in some instances. In addition to directly testing the effect of a salient national identity on attitudes toward immigrant and multiculturalism, this research demonstrates the need to pay attention to the content of national identity across contexts and opens up new directions for future research by offering a framework that can be replicated in other settings.

National identity, social identity theory and restrictive attitudes

National identity can be a slippery concept and a useful starting point in making sense of it is the important distinction proposed by Citrin, Wong and Duff (2001) between three dimensions of national identity. Their argument is that national identity consists of a cognitive dimension (identification *as*), an affective dimension (identification *with*) and a normative dimension. The latter refers to "the particular set of ideas about what makes the nation distinctive ideas about its members, its core values and goals, the territory it ought to occupy, and its relation to other nations" (Citrin, Wong and Duff, 2001, 75-76). When looking at citizens' attitudes towards immigration, a measure of citizens' identification with their country (affective) or as a member of their country (cognitive) is not enough. After all, strength of attachment or pride, in themselves, have nothing to do with attitudes toward immigration. The effect of attachment and pride will be a function of what this national identity means for respondents. We thus need to pay attention to the normative dimension of national identity. It is this

normative content that will determine how an immigrant can fit in and that will draw a boundary determining where the immigrant finds herself vis-à-vis her new society.[1] This attention to the content of identity is also central to viewing national identities as social identities.

National Identity as a Social Identity

Most of the literature that identifies the restrictive impact of national identity is rooted in social identity theory (see for example Citrin et al., 2001; Crepaz, 2008; De Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003; Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004; Theiss-Morse, 2009; Wong, 2010). Social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel and Turner, 1986) contends that individuals' sense of who they are is based on the groups they think they belong to and that identification with these groups will have consequences for individual behaviors. For example, members will make theirs the concerns and goals of the group and will behave in order to increase the well-being of that group (Brewer, 2001). In addition, because their sense of self is linked to the group, members will tend to evaluate the group favorably to increase their self-esteem. Attachment to the group is also central because the effect of group membership and the internalization of group norms will depend on the strength of identification (for a review see Huddy, 2001). Viewing national identities as social identities is now common in political science (e.g. Huddy and Khatib, 2007; Schildkraut, 2011; Theiss-Morse, 2009).

It is not surprising that most of the research that has emerged from this literature points to the restrictive impact of national identity since social identity theory offers clear hypotheses as to the effects of social identities on intergroup relations. For example, social identity theory suggests that the in-group favoritism associated with a social identity will lead to out-group hostility when one's group's identity is considered to be under threat (Brewer, 2001; Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers, 2008; Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004). Viewing national identity as a social identity also means that the content associated with this national identity and attachment to it will be important factors in determining attitudes towards outsiders (Schildkraut, 2011).

[1]Huddy and Khatib write that "consistent with a distinction in social identity theory between identity and its meaning, national identity is less ideological than symbolic, constructive, or uncritical patriotism" (Huddy and Khatib, 2007, 70). It is not clear why *meaning* needs to be synonymous with *ideology*. I see meaning of national identity as similar to "constitutive norms" (Abdelal et al., 2008, 19) and "identity content" (Schildkraut, 2011, 6), which are central concepts in understanding national identities as social identities.

First, national identities will always exclude some and not others; not everyone can be American or French and being American is seen as different from being French. The content of a particular national identity will set boundaries between the in-group and the out-group and these boundaries will have clear implications at the individual level. For example, Wong (2010, 137) finds that respondents with a more restricted vision of who is part of the American community are more likely to be harsher on who qualifies for citizenship benefits. There is also evidence that hosts will evaluate newcomers based on their adherence to norms associated with this particular national identity (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2012; Schildkraut, 2011). Making national identity salient should reinforce these boundaries.

One of the best demonstrations of the effect of this normative content on attitudes towards immigration comes from a survey experiment conducted by Sniderman et al. in the Netherlands (2004; 2007). In this study, one group of respondents had their Dutch identity primed resulting in what these authors have called a mobilization phenomenon (2004: 44): people who usually did not oppose immigration were more likely to do so after having received the treatment. Bringing national identity considerations to the fore reinforced the boundaries between groups and had an exclusionary effect on attitudes towards the outgroup, in this case immigrants.

It is important to emphasize that in this case it was Dutch identity that was primed. We should expect the treatment effect to be context dependent and vary depending on the norms associated with a given national identity. In other words, the prime brings an image of "Dutchness" in the respondents' mind, it is directly connected to, as Anderson (1983) would put it, the imagined boundaries of the Dutch people, one where immigrants seem to be left out of the inner circle.

Although most of the research rooted in social identity theory concludes that national identity represents a restrictive force, viewing national identity as a social identity does not make it automatically restrictive. In fact, social identity theory does offer potential mechanisms through which (or instances where) national identity may act as an inclusive force.

National identity as an inclusive force

Following Theiss-Morse (2009), there are at least two ways in which national identity may play an inclusive role and they are both related to its normative content.[2] The first one is derived from the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000) and is applied to the question of national identity by Transue (2007). The idea behind this model is that people can shift from an "us" vs. "them" dynamic by focusing on a superordinate identity that encompasses a more general "We". Transue observes in a US metropolitan sample, that priming national identity among white respondents increases support for a tax raise directed at educational opportunities for minorities. He concludes that his results support "research from social psychology that shows that attachment to broader identities reduces intergroup bias rather than with theories that predict that raising salience of national identity would lead to hostility toward outgroups" (2007: 89). It is important here to pau attention to the identity of the outgroup. The design used by Transue does not bring immigrants to the respondent's mind but rather African-American, more likely to be seen as part of the American society. Contrary to Transue's argument, we cannot assume that every national identity has the potential to act as a superordinate identity that brings every ethnic group inside the "Circle of We" to use the words of Hollinger (1995). For example, Wright and Citrin (2011) tested if the Common Ingroup Identity Model could be applied to white Americans' attitudes towards immigrants' protest. A protest where immigrants were waving American flags (as opposed to Mexican flags) lessened the degree to which people said they were bothered by the protest but this small effect did not translate in any changes in opinion for specific immigration policies. It is possible that some national identities may act as superordinate for some groups but it will depend on the normative content associated with it: the normative content of American national identity seems to include African-Americans and the normative content of Dutch national identity clearly does not include immigrants.[3]

This leads to the second way in which national identity might a play an inclusive

[2]For more on what could potentially make American national identity inclusive, see Theiss-Morse (2009, 175-185).

[3]The question of whether all national identities can be made to be superordinate by insisting on the importance of immigration in their formation is a different but related question. In an experimental research with students, Esses et al. (2006) found that reinforcing the immigrant component of the Canadian and German identity had a positive effect on attitude towards immigrants for Canadians with a high score on a social dominance scale but a negative effect for Germans.

role: if the norms associated with it are themselves inclusive (Guimond et al., 2013; Pehrson, Vignoles and Brown, 2009; Theiss-Morse, 2009). Identification with one's national identity means following and internalizing the norms associated with it and as Theiss-Morse writes, "inclusiveness and appreciation of diversity can have significant effects on people's willingness to accept marginalized group members as full members of the group" (2009: 183). These two mechanisms through which national identity can be inclusive are interrelated. For a national identity to act as a superordinate identity a degree of inclusiveness as a norm has to be associated with it. The Canadian "exceptionalism" idea supposes that the norm of inclusiveness of newcomers is associated with the Canadian national identity and that as such, it has the potential to act as a superordinate identity that includes immigrants. Making Canadian national identity salient should therefore also raise the salience of the norm associated with it and influence attitudes toward newcomers. The goal here is to investigate this possibility experimentally, where salience of national identity is manipulated.

The Canadian Case

One of the main hypotheses to explain why Canada has been impervious to the backlash against multiculturalism is that the Canadian national identity is linked with multiculturalism and immigration.[4] For instance, Will Kymlicka writes: "While the actual practices of accommodation in Canada are not unique, Canada is unusual in the extent to which it has built these practices into its symbols and narratives of nationhood" (2003: 375). Others have made a similar point (Bloemraad, 2006; Joppke, 2004). So far, the evidence presented to support this hypothesis has been based on observational data. According to many studies, support for multiculturalism in Canada is always high compared to other countries (Adams, 2007; Berry and Kalin, 1995; Kymlicka, 2008; Parkin and Mendelsohn, 2003). These results are presented as a proof that multiculturalism and immigration hold a central position in the Canadian national identity. However, the wording of this type of questions often makes them problematic. For example, questions that directly asked about support for multiculturalism might

[4]Another possible explanation for Canada's successes is that the country has a highly selective immigration system that puts the emphasis on the economic potential of immigrants and deals with a comparatively low level of illegal immigration (see Harell et al., 2012). This explanation and the one proposed here are not mutually exclusive and are potentially both at play.

be subject to social desirability bias or respondents might not know what the term multiculturalism signifies (see Breton et al., 2014). Even respondents who know what multiculturalism means might not understand the concept the same way. Some may interpret the question as being about multicultural policies and others may interpret it as being about the fact that Canada is diverse, that it is multi-cultural.

In fact, when we look at questions from the International Social Survey Programme that do not mention multiculturalism, we see that in 2003 only 29 per cent of Canadian respondents thought that ethnic minorities should maintain their distinct customs and traditions. On government giving assistance to ethnic minorities, 66 per cent of respondents disagreed or disagreed strongly. In other words, if we only use support for multiculturalism policies or for its principle, we do not see a distinctive Canadian position. Figure 1 places Canada in a comparative perspective based on these two questions. It clearly shows that if there is a Canadian exceptionalism, it is not on support for multiculturalism policies or for its principle.

Figure 1: Canada in Comparative Perspective



These bar graphs show country level means. Horizontal lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Source ISSP 2003.

Two recent studies make an important step in testing the proposition that there is

something different about Canadian national identity. First, Johnston et al. (2010) find that Canadian national identity is associated with pro-immigrants attitudes and that this identity also mitigates the negative effect that anti-immigration attitudes might otherwise have on support for the welfare state.[5] These results lead the authors to conclude that "the very self-conception of the country has come to embrace the idea of a multicultural society which successive waves of immigrants have helped build"(369). Citrin, Johnston and Wright (2012) followed with a study using observational data from the ISSP to compare the effect of national pride in the US and Canada. They find that in Canada, pride is positively related to support for multiculturalism but that this relationship is the opposite in the US. However, when the authors look directly at attitudes toward immigration and multiculturalism, Canadians are not more inclusive than Americans but rather less inclusive. This seemingly contradictory finding leads them to conclude that: "Canadian identity may foster an inclusive orientation but in doing so it starts from a less inclusive base"(2012: 547). The authors also look at the relationship between the same pride index and anti-immigration sentiment. Again, Canada differs from the U.S. and exhibits a negative relationship. Canada, however, is not the only country exhibiting this relationship between pride in the country and immigration attitudes. The same data show that it is also true for France, Portugal and New Zealand.[6]

In addition to this link between pride and more inclusive attitudes exposed by Citrin, Johnston and Wright (2012), Guimond et al. (2013) show that Canada also differs in the perceived importance of the multicultural norm. Multiculturalism is perceived by Canadian respondents as a norm endorsed by the population. The proportion seeing multiculturalism as a norm is larger in Canada than in the U.S., the U.K., and Germany. Again, however Canadians' attitudes themselves are not that different from the attitudes of other Western countries. What seem to be different is the normative dimension of Canadian national identity and the inclusiveness that it promotes. It is this possibility that is tested experimentally in the following.

[5]It is important to note that Johnston et al. only use two questions to measure immigration attitudes: one about preferred level of immigration and one about whether the respondent feels like immigrants do not want to fit in Canadian society.

[6]This is based on a replication of the Citrin et al. study but including all Western countries in the ISSP data. See Figure A1 in Appendix.

Hypotheses

Based on the "national identities as social identities" literature and on the Canadian case, we can derive expectations about the effect of raising the salience of Canadian national identity on respondents' attitudes toward immigration and multiculturalism.

Social identity theory is clear on the effect of threat for out-group hostility. Accordingly, even if the normative content of Canadian national identity acts as an inclusive force, we should expect *respondents who feel like their national identity is threatened to be more opposed to immigration and multiculturalism (H1).* The meaning of Canadian national identity should come in play however in the priming effect. Making respondents' national identity salient before asking them questions on immigration should remind them of the norms associated with such an identity. This means that *Canadian respondents who receive the primes should not be more opposed to immigration and multiculturalism. In fact, one would expect them to become more supportive of both (H2).* There is also the possibility that the priming effect will depend on some of the respondents' characteristics. For example, respondents for whom national identity is important will have internalized its norms more thoroughly and the strength of attachment to the Canadian national identity should interact with the prime. Thus, *strong identifiers, those for whom Canadian identity is more important, should be more supportive of immigration and multiculturalism and we should see a more important treatment effect among them (H3).*

Finally, the prime should not produce the "mobilization effect" found by Sniderman et al. in the Netherlands. The Dutch results showed heterogeneity in the treatment effect: it was people who did not feel like the Dutch identity was threatened that became more opposed to immigration. In the Canadian setting, the expectation is that the prime will not have a negative effect and this should be true at all levels of "cultural threat". However, this cultural threat may diminish the effect of the norms associated with Canadian national identity. This means that *priming Canadian national identity should not have a negative impact on attitudes toward immigration and this should be true at all levels of cultural threat. The primes should have a stronger inclusive effect at lower levels of threat (H4).* The logic here is not one of a ceiling effect—respondents having such a high level of opposition that they cannot be more opposed—at higher levels of threat since we expect the prime to have an inclusive effect. Rather, the priming effect might not be strong enough to counterbalance the

effect of feeling of threat. Thus, the effect will be more important at low level of cultural threat. In order to test these hypotheses, the following section presents a survey experiment that builds on prior work by Sniderman et al. in the Netherlands (2004; Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007).

Experimental design

One of the important objectives of the design is to prime respondents' national identity without attaching meaning to it, to make respondents think about their national identity while letting them decide what this national identity means. In order to do so, the survey experiment unfolds in three steps: a pre-treatment question, a priming treatment, and a series of questions on immigration and multiculturalism (see Figure 2 for the complete design).

The first element of the design is a question that asks respondents if they feel like Canadian values are threatened. This question serves two purposes: it measures feeling of threat but also enables to control for a pre-existing bias against immigration without actually mentioning identity or immigration (Sniderman et al., 2004; 2007). The treatment is then block-randomized on answers to this question. The logic behind this manipulation is that Sniderman et al. found that it is the people who do not usually see immigration as a problem that are most influenced by the prime. This manipulation controls for a "feeling of threat", an obvious confounder of the effect of priming national identity.[7] One could argue that this question in itself represents a prime of the respondent's national identity but this pre-treatment question and the prime were separated by 30 unrelated questions. This pre-treatment question also voluntarily leaves open the source of the threat in order to not create or prime the association between threat and immigrants in the respondents' mind. For some respondents this feeling of threat might arguably be caused by factors other than immigration and diversity, such as current federal policies or the growing acceptance of more liberal lifestyles. However, if this pre-treatment question is associated with more exclusionary attitudes, it increases the confidence that it can be used as a proxy for preexisting anti-immigration attitudes.[8]

[7]Randomization would potentially distribute this covariate equally among treatment group, but this was taken as a precaution. For more on the usefulness of blocking in experiments see Moore (2012) and Moore and Moore (2013).

[8]See Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior (2004) for a detailed analysis of this question and of its

Figure 2: Experimental Design and Question Wording



The treatment then takes two forms (plus a control group): one group receives a vignette replicating Sniderman et al.'s study and another receives a question-as-treatment designed to prime the respondent's national identity and to measure the strength of attachment to this identity.[9] Using two different primes also allows for methodological advancement by testing the effect of different "strengths" of priming strategy. The vignette used by Sniderman et al. to prime national identity represents a strong prime that may be responsible for their results. Although their formulation mimics more closely what an anti-immigration politician might say, I argue that this prime is not a weak intervention or a "mere mention of consideration of collective identity" as they suggest (Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007: 119). Telling respondents that each nation is different and reinforcing the importance of this difference sharpens the boundaries between groups. It is not isolating the effect of national identity but lumping it with the effect of strong and exclusionary wording. Respondents in the question-as-treatment condition are asked how important their national identity is to them. I contend thay this represents a mere mention of national identity, one that is stripped of any normative content. A design that compares primes of different strengths makes it possible to test if indeed, a mere mention of national identity induces restrictive attitudes, or if these attitudes are only caused by the wording of a restrictive prime.

Once respondents have received the treatment, they are asked to answer four questions on immigration and multiculturalism. The first three of these questions come from Sniderman et al. and the fourth comes from the International Social Survey Programme (National identity module). The first question is a direct measure of support for immigration while the other three measure different aspects of support for ethnic minorities and multiculturalism as a policy.[10] These questions take two

coupled version, i.e. a version where ethnic minorities are specified as the threat.

[9]Not surprisingly given the sample size, balance checks done on the distribution of covariates between the three groups confirmed that randomization produced balanced groups. Missing values were also balanced across treatment groups. Results are available upon request.

[10]As stated before, the term multiculturalism has taken on different related meanings. It has been used to refer to a normative political theory on how societies should deal with ethnic diversity (e.g. Taylor et al., 1994; Kymlicka, 1995), a personal attitude of acceptance toward diversity (e.g. Van de Vijver, Breugelmans and Schalk-Soekar, 2008), a sociological fact (e.g. a multi-cultural country), and finally a set of government policies. In the context of the present study, Question 2 and 4 are more closely related to support for multiculturalism as a set of governmental policies aimed at recognizing and accommodating cultural diversity, while Question 3 is more closely related to multiculturalism as a personal attitude.

forms depending on the respondent being in either of the treatment groups or in the control group: a treated respondent is asked for her answer "as a Canadian". In other words, the treatment can be conceived as consisting in a prime (a preamble or a question-as-treatment) plus a repetition of "as a Canadian" in following questions.[11]

The survey experiment was conducted over the phone and administered to 1500 Canadian respondents by the polling firm Research House between June 12th and June 23rd 2012 as part of an omnibus survey. Respondents were selected through a random digit dialing sampling technique and they all reside in English Canada.[12] The following analysis is based on the full sample, which means that it is not solely composed of white English-Canadians. An analysis was also done with a restricted sample (N= 1283), where I excluded respondents whose first language learnt and still spoken was not English and gave similar results.[13]

Results

Looking at the distribution of answers on the four questions on immigration and multiculturalism, we see that on two of them a "consensus" emerges whereas on the other two, Canadians appear to be far more polarized. Figure 3 shows the distribution of preferences on these four questions in the full sample.

Surprisingly, the two questions on which there is a consensus point in different directions. 83 per cent of the respondents agree (strongly or somewhat) that ethnic minorities living in Canada should have the same political rights than other Canadians. On the contrary, 74 per cent disagree (strongly or somewhat) that ethnic minorities should receive government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions. It

[11]For the sake of comparison, I have kept the question wording used by Sniderman et al. and by the ISSP even if these questions may raise the issue of the context dependence of terms such as ethnic minorities (see Crepaz 2008). The issue is that questions relating to "ethnic minorities" might not necessarily be interpreted as being about immigrants by every respondent in every country. However, because the first question measuring the dependant variable is about immigration, it is fair to assume that respondents will still be thinking about immigrants when they answer the following questions.

[12]All regions are represented except Quebec because it requires a different design. I discuss this in more details in the conclusion.The following results are based on unweighted data.

[13]In fact, these 199 respondents whose first language was not English cannot be distinguished from their English-speaking peers when looking at their distribution on the different questions. These results deserve more attention but are outside the scope of this paper. However, they are, to some extent, in line with what Bilodeau, White and Nevitte (2010) have found looking at Canadian immigrants' regional loyalties.

FIGURE 3: ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURALISM



Figure 3 shows full sample distributions on the four dependent variables.

could be argued that the way this question is framed raises more opposition because it mentions government assistance. Some respondents may oppose it not because they do not want ethnic minorities to preserve their customs and traditions but because they do not want to see an increase in public spending. Nonetheless, a basic idea of multiculturalism as an integration policy is that the government should at least fund ethnic groups organizations to support cultural activities, bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction (Banting and Kymlicka, 2006, 56-57). Here, the opposition to government assistance is more important than in the 2003 ISSP sample where 66 per cent of respondents disagreed or disagreed strongly with the same statement (see Figure 1). Respondents are more divided on the other two questions where 41 per cent believe that the different ethnic cultures present in Canada are a threat to Canadian values and 54 per cent believe that immigration to Canada should be made more difficult than it is now. Based on these results, one could argue that Canadians are not overwhelmingly welcoming of immigrants and that they definitely do not support a basic tenet of multiculturalism—government financially supporting ethnic minorities.

These results are in line with what Citrin et al. have found using data from the ISSP, which led them to conclude that if there was a Canadian "exceptionalism" it was clearly not on basic attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism (Citrin, Johnston and Wright, 2012).

Threat

For a country that has often been labeled as one of the most successful in dealing with ethnic diversity, it is quite striking to see the proportion of Canadians who feel like their values are threatened. Almost 70 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement that these days, Canadian values were threatened. Although fifteen years separate this research and Sniderman et al.'s, it is interesting to note that in the Netherlands it was 51 per cent who somewhat agreed or agreed strongly with a similar statement. Even more striking is the 33 per cent in the Netherlands who strongly disagreed with the statement compared to 9 per cent in Canada. Arguably, these respondents may feel that their values are threatened by something other than immigration but the relationship between feeling of threat and anti-immigrant sentiment is strong. Figure 4 plots the mean response for the four questions on immigration at each level of threat.[14]

As predicted by Hypothesis 1, the more respondents' feel like their values are threatened the more they are opposed to immigration and to multiculturalism. This is especially true for Question 1 and 3 where respondents at low level of threat and those at high level of threat find themselves on opposite sides of the mid-point in the 0 to 1 scale (the difference between agreeing and disagreeing with the statement). In the case of Question 1 for instance, it means that people who feel like Canadian values are threatened are more likely to think that immigration to Canada should be made more difficult than it is now. It is worth noting that the two questions where threat is having less of an impact are the ones for which respondents are either overwhelmingly inclusive towards immigrants (Question 2 on political rights) or exclusionary (Question 4 on government assistance). Even after controlling for known predictors of opposition to immigration (e.g. education), the "threat" measure remains a statistically significant predictor of restrictive attitudes. Consequently, we can be confident that this pre-treatment question represents a useful proxy for measuring

[14]Following Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior (2004), level of threat represents the answer to: "These days, I afraid that Canadian values are threatened". Disagree strongly = low, Disagree somewhat = medium-low, Agree somewhat = medium-high, Agree strongly = high.

FIGURE 4: THREAT AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURALISM



This figure shows the means on each question at each level of cultural threat. Answers have been rescaled from 0 to 1, where 1 represents the most restrictive position. Vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals about the mean.

preexisting anti-immigration attitudes and that it can be use to look at heterogeneity in treatment effects at different levels of threat.

IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

The question-as-treatment (QAT) prime was designed to test for heterogeneity in treatment effect at different levels of importance of Canadian national identity. Unfortunately, the distribution of answers to this question-as-treatment turned out to have little variance and makes it impossible to test Hypothesis 3. Only 18 respondents out of the 538 in this treatment condition answered that their Canadian identity was not very important or not important at all. We can assume however that people for whom

FIGURE 5: THE EFFECT OF PRIMING ON ANTI-IMMIGRANT ATTITUDES



This figure shows the means on each question by treatment condition. Answers have been rescaled from 0 to 1, where 1 represents the most restrictive position. Vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals about the mean.

national identity was important have received the treatment. Consequently, I dropped the 18 respondents for whom Canadian identity was not important from subsequent analysis.[15]

PRIMING

The main expectation is that because the norm of inclusiveness is an important feature of Canadian identity, making this identity salient should increase inclusive attitudes. Looking at Figure 5, one can see that it is not the case for question 1, 3 and 4.[16]

Importantly, we do not observe an exclusionary effect either: the control group and the two groups who have received a prime do not differ. When the means differ, they do so slightly and the differences are far from being statistically significant.

[15]For a discussion on the different impact of embracing and rejecting an identity and how it relates to the Common Ingroup Identity Model, see Transue 2007, 83-84.

[16]Treatment effects were also assessed when questions related to multiculturalism (questions 2, 3, and 4) are combined in an index. Given the poor reliability (Cronbach's alpha =.55), results are not shown but were consistent with those displayed.

Priming Canadian identity had an inclusive effect in one instance. When asking whether minorities should have the same political rights than the Canadians people, respondents in the QAT condition were more likely to agree than people in the Sniderman treatment and in the control group. Both differences are statistically significant (two-tailed p = .046 and .016) but the difference between the Sniderman condition and the control group is not (two-tailed p = .64). This means that compared to the control group, asking respondents how important their Canadian identity was to them made them more inclusive but that reading them a preamble emphasizing the importance of belonging to the Canadian nation did not have an effect important enough to be detected with a sample of this size.

It is interesting to notice that the Sniderman et al. design replicated in part here had one peculiarity: it asked respondents if they felt like the Dutch culture was threatened before the treatment and asked them after the treatment if they felt like all the cultures present in the Netherlands were threatening the Dutch culture. In Canada, as reported earlier, many respondents felt like Canadian values were threatened. If Canadian national identity played a truly inclusive role, we should see the prime having an effect on the second question. In other words, priming a Canadian respondent's national identity should remind him of how this identity is built around immigration and multiculturalism and make him see all those cultures present in Canada as less of a threat. But here again, the hypothesis of no effect cannot be rejected: the effects are small and not statistically significant. One element that should be emphasized however is that adding "different cultures" as the threat to Canadian values shifts respondents to a more inclusive position: 31 per cent disagreed with the original threat statement compared to 58 per cent when "different cultures" are added as the threat. This result is likely due, at least partially, to a social desirability bias.

More importantly, Sniderman et al. (Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004; Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007) found that priming national identity had an effect for people who did not feel like the Dutch culture was threatened a priori, creating what they called the mobilization phenomenon. The prime made them more likely to agree that immigration should be made more difficult. Contrary to the Netherlands, and as expected, the prime increases the proportion of Canadians who strongly disagree with the statement. However, the hypothesis of no effect cannot be rejected. Here, the means for the two treatment groups are lower than the mean for the control group (.34 and .35 compared to .38) but these differences are far from being significant

(two-tailed p>.6 for all differences). The effect size is also small compared to the results in the Netherlands.[17] The Canadian sample only has 76 respondents at a low level of threat. With the effect size found in Canada, a sample of 7698 respondents would be necessary to reach p<.05. Thus, both the sample size at low level of threat and the small effect size in Canada compared to the Netherlands are responsible for this statistically non-significant result.

Figure 6 plots the means on the four dependent variables by levels of threat for each condition.

Almost all of the differences in means for individual questions are not statistically significant. The only exceptions are the differences between the QAT condition and the Sniderman condition on question 2 (political rights) for high and low levels of threat. Both at low level and at high level of threat, respondents in the Sniderman condition were more opposed to ethnic minorities getting the same political rights than other Canadians compared to those in the QAT condition (High threat: QAT = .23, Sniderman = .32, two-tailed p = .04; Low threat: QAT = .07, Sniderman = .19, p = .05). In both cases, the control group finds itself in the middle but without any statistically significant difference to the treatment groups. This makes it difficult to evaluate if this result is due to the QAT treatment having an inclusive effect, the Sniderman treatment having an exclusionary effect or both.

So far, results have been presented in a straightforward manner, in the form of "difference-in-means". When analyzing experimental data, simple procedures are often preferable to more complex models that require assumptions (Dunning, 2010), but it can be useful to include covariates as control in a multivariate regression framework when these pre-treatment covariates strongly predict the outcome (Freedman, 2008; Green, 2009). The addition of these covariates improves efficiency and removes the variability of treatment effects estimators (Dunning, 2010; Green, 2009).

Table 1 shows the results for these multivariate regressions. After controlling for important covariates, the treatment effects remain small and far from being statistically significant with one exception.

For the multiculturalism policy question (Question 4), being in the QAT condition decreases the likelihood of strongly disagreeing with the statement that ethnic minori-

[17]For illustration purposes, one could use Cohen's d to look at these differences in effect sizes. The effect size found here is really small (d= .075) whereas Sniderman et al. found a medium effect size (d= .48) (see Cohen (1988).

FIGURE 6: PRIMING, THREAT AND ANTI-IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES



This figure shows the means on each question by level of threat for the two treatment conditions and the control group. Answers have been rescaled from 0 to 1, where 1 represents the most restrictive position. Vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals about the mean.

Table 1: Treatment Effects in a Multivariate Context

	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
	Immigration levels	Political rights	Threat to values	Gvt. assistance
Snid.	0.019	0.049	0.113	−0.002
	(0.083)	(0.090)	(0.084)	(0.085)
QAT	−0.039	−0.164*	0.009	−0.204**
	(0.082)	(0.090)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Threat	0.261***	0.133***	0.335***	0.148***
	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.036)
Education	0.034	−0.230*	−0.240*	0.093
(HS)	(0.135)	(0.136)	(0.131)	(0.138)
Education	−0.261**	−0.254**	−0.408***	−0.067
(Tech.)	(0.125)	(0.126)	(0.122)	(0.127)
Education	−0.775***	−0.555***	−0.824***	−0.335***
(Univ.)	(0.124)	(0.126)	(0.122)	(0.126)
Age	0.004	0.001	0.006***	0.013***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Income	0.004	−0.011	0.011*	0.025***
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Urban	0.264**	−0.034	0.079	0.097
(25,000-100,000)	(0.113)	(0.120)	(0.111)	(0.113)
Urban	−0.013	−0.209***	−0.057	−0.086
(100,000 +)	(0.074)	(0.080)	(0.074)	(0.076)
N	1,073	1,035	1,092	1,090

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

This table shows multivariate regressions for all four dependent variables. Given that all four questions are four-category Likert scales, coefficient estimates (and standard errors) are from an ordered probit regression. Reference categories for explanatory variables are: only elementary schooling for Education and rural community for Size of Community. Treatment conditions are compared to the control group.

ties should receive government assistance by 8 per cent and increases the likelihood of being in the somewhat agree and strongly agree categories by 4 per cent and 2.5 per cent respectively. Even though this is the only result that reaches the usual threshold of statistical significance, it is important to note that specifying multivariate models for the different dependent variables results in negative effects for the QAT treatment (more inclusive attitudes) and positive effects for the Sniderman treatment (more exclusive attitudes) for three out of the four questions. When compared to the Sniderman prime, the QAT condition also has a statistically significant effect on both Question 2 on political rights and Question 4. The main point remains however, that even after controlling for covariates the hypothesis of no effect cannot be rejected in most cases.

To summarize, in most cases, priming national identity did not have a statistically significant effect on attitudes toward immigration and multiculturalism. The effect sizes were small and were far from the conventional threshold for statistical significance making it impossible to reject the hypothesis of no effect. However, when the QAT prime had an effect, it made respondents more inclusive and inversely, when the Sniderman prime had an effect it was an exclusionary one. The difference in the direction of the effect for the two primes is interesting and represents an important contribution. It shows that contrary to Sniderman and Hagendoorn's argument, their prime does not represent a mere mention of consideration of collective identity (2007: 119) but rather reinforces boundaries. This is potentially due to the fact that the preamble reminds the respondent that nations are different and that this difference is a crucial component of national identity. However, it is important to note that in many instances even this highly restrictive prime was not enough to move Canadians in an exclusionary direction. On the other hand, a true mere mention of national identity - asking the respondent how important his national identity is to him when it had an impact, made the respondent more inclusive. The analysis also shows that priming the respondents' national identity as Canadian either through the Sniderman prime or the QAT prime did not completely offset the exclusionary effect of feeling of threat on attitudes. The more people feel like their values are threatened the more they show exclusionary attitudes.

Conclusion

This paper investigates the relationship between national identity and exclusionary attitudes towards immigration in a Canadian context. The "real-world" importance of this question lies in the fact that the restrictive impact of national identity is what makes possible the "flash politics" surrounding immigration issues (Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007). Anti-immigration politicians use national identity as a mobilization tool to gather supporters and gain votes. One mechanism through which this chauvinistic discourse has an impact on attitudes is that it primes national identity among the population and moves or makes salient the imagined boundary of the nation. Results obtained by Sniderman and his colleagues in the Netherlands showed that this was particularly the case for people who were usually not opposed to immigration: priming their identity as Dutch made them more opposed to immigration. Replicating this experiment in Canada did not produce the same results. Although Canadians are not as welcoming of immigrants as would be expected from a country that prides itself on its successes with immigration, priming Canadians' identity did not make them more opposed to immigration. However, in most cases, the prime did not make them more welcoming either.

This is surprising when considering recent studies showing that pride in Canada is positively related to support for multiculturalism (Citrin, Johnston and Wright, 2012) and that multiculturalism is also perceived as the accepted norm in the country (Guimond et al., 2013). It is important to note however that the design used here represents a hard test of the inclusive potential of Canadian national identity. The objective of this study was to see the picture that emerged when no content was attached to a national identity made salient other than the normative content attached by the respondents themselves. An easier test would have been to prime the inclusiveness itself or insist on immigration as a foundation of Canadian identity (see for example Esses et al., 2006). In addition, by letting respondents decide what it means to be Canadian we might be priming different conceptions of this identity. In most countries "multiple traditions" (Schildkraut, 2011) or different constitutive norms will coexist and priming national identity will have a different impact depending on which of these competing norms the respondent adheres to when thinking about immigration issues. It is highly possible that there is heterogeneity in what Canadians see as the normative content of national identity when it comes to the role of immigrants and

that these different conceptions are cancelling each other. This, in itself, presents a more complex vision of Canadian national identity then one that places immigration and multiculturalism as defining features. Future research could prime respondents' national identity by asking them to list a series of keywords that they associate with this identity, making it possible to measure the content and pay attention to these "multiple traditions".

Another possible explanation for the absence of more important treatment effects is that perhaps priming national identity has an asymmetrical impact on attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism: priming a restrictive national identity has a negative impact on attitudes but priming an inclusive national identity does not make these attitudes more inclusive. This idea of asymmetry in the effect of national identity is in line with what Citrin and Wright found in the U.S. (Wright and Citrin, 2011).

Small treatment effects aside, this research represents an important step in trying to make sense of how national identity and its normative content relate to attitudes towards immigration in a comparative perspective. Although it presents evidence for a single country, its aim is to highlight the need for more comparative work on the effect of national identity on attitudes (Pehrson, Vignoles and Brown, 2009; Wright, 2011).The results presented here show that national identities that have been able to include immigration as one of their defining aspects might not have the same effect on immigration attitudes. The role played by the normative content of a given national identity is somewhat in the background when looking at determinants of anti-immigrant attitudes in a given country and comparative work brings it to the forefront. The next step would be to extend the framework and apply it to other countries of immigration. The province of Quebec represents another interesting case because its citizens can identify both as Canadians and as Quebeckers. Quebec has also seen far more heated debates around immigration and integration than the rest of Canada. The province does not build its identity around immigration and multiculturalism but rather around the French language and interculturalism (Bouchard and Taylor, 2008, 18). These differences would make it possible to prime respondents' identity as Canadians —hypothesized as being more inclusive— and as Quebeckers —hypothesized as being more exclusionary— and compare their effect on immigration attitudes.

Finally, this research also adds to the literature linking cultural threat with

exclusionary attitudes toward newcomers. Surprisingly, for a country that has presented diversity as one of its defining features, the number of Canadians respondents who feel like Canadian values are threatened is considerable. Not only are people agreeing with the threat statement when the source of this threat is left open (69 per cent) but an important proportion of respondents (41 per cent) are willing to admit to the interviewer that they feel like Canada's values are threatened by the different cultures represented in the country. These results also demonstrate that priming Canadian national identity does not damper the effect of cultural threat. The strong relationship between this feeling and anti-immigration views is unequivocal and begs more research on the determinants of emotions such as feeling of threat and anxiety (Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008). This should give pause to Canadian triumphalism regarding its success with immigration and multiculturalism. One of the established findings in the literature on attitudes toward immigration is that cultural threat is one of the most important driving forces of anti-immigration attitudes. Consequently, Canadians' attitudes toward immigration may not be as firmly and unequivocally welcoming as we might think. What the results presented here show however is that even with an important perception of cultural threat among the Canadian population, Canadian national identity does not have the exclusionary potential of many of its European counterparts. ■

Appendix

Figure A1: National Pride and Anti-Immigration Attitudes



The countries shown in this figure have a statistically significant negative relationship bewteen "Pride in Country" and index of anti-immigration measures. The US and the Netherlands are added as a comparative and do not have a statistically significant relationship between these two variables. For details on the measure see Citrin, Johnston and Wright (2012). Data source: ISSP 2003.

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