

JOES

Watch Out! And just skip the packer

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da view-a 💌 🖸 hex view-1 🗶 structures 🗶 Enums 🗶 🏗 import

Down the rabbit hole

```
jnz short near ptr loc_402E5A+1
jz short near ptr loc_402E5A+1
sahf
```

loc 402E5A:

TOC_402E3A.

Let's think about the following scenario.


```
or cl, ah
```

You are required to analyze a suspicious file recently found in one of your assets. Your team wants to understand the type of threat it represents to the organization, and the corresponding actions to mitigate it and prevent future intrusions.

0402F67 db 8Δh

What could you do now?

```
confidence
```






```
jnz short near ptr loc_402E5A+1
jz short near ptr loc_402E5A+1
sahf
```

```
loc_402E5A:
```

- Use a sandbox (public or private) and gather information via OSINT, but...
- 2 Do some memory forensics, but...
- Dig deeper into the logs, but...
- Do some manual malware analysis!

```
text:00402E6A
text:00402E6B
```



```
jz short loc_402E75
jnz short loc_402E75
shr dword ptr [edx-2Ch], cl
jg short loc_402E35
```




```
jnz short near ptr loc_402E5A+1

jz short near ptr loc_402E5A+1

sahf
```

```
arpl [ebx-15h], bx
```

If you really want to understand the attackers' weapons, malware analysis is the way to go.





```
call $+5
jnz short near ptr loc_402E5A+1
jz short near ptr loc_402E5A+1
sahf
```

loc_402E5A:

```
arpl [ebx-15h], bx
```


However, if you stumble onto a **packer**, this task won't be rainbows and butterflies...

```
.text:00402E67 db 8Ah

text:00402E6B;

jmp short loc_402E5F

text:00402E6A db 0CCh
.text:00402E6B db 8Ah
```






```
call $+5
jnz short near ptr loc_402E5A+1
jz short near ptr loc_402E5A+1
sahf

; CODE XREF: .text:00402E551j
; .text:00402E571j
```

And that is why you are here! Let's see how we can deal with **packers** without losing our minds.





da view-a 💌 🔘 hex view-1 🗶 structures 🗶 Enums 🗶 🏗 import


What is a packer?

```
jnz short near ptr loc_402E5A+;
jz short near ptr loc_402E5A+;
sahf
```

Tool used by software developers (malicious or not) to shield programs against reverse engineering. They provide different protections including but not limited to:

- 1 Anti-analysis validations
- Polymorphism to avoid detection
- 3 Code obfuscation/encryption





```
jz short loc_402E75
jnz short loc_402E75
shr dword ptr [edx-2Ch], cl
jg short loc_402E35
```




How to deal with packers?


```
call $+5
jnz short near ptr loc_402E5A+;
jz short near ptr loc_402E5A+;
sahf
```

loc_402E5A:

```
arpl [ebx-15h], bx
```

The art of unpacking malware is just to be good at finding the **Tail Jump**!








What about the Tail Jump?

Instruction in which the execution of the packer ends, and the control flow is redirected to the entry point of the original unpacked sample. This jump can be implemented in several different ways, including but not limited to:

- JMP OEP_ADDRESS
- CALL OEP_ADDRESS
- PUSH OEP_ADDRESS -> RET 402E5F 3






Types of packers


```
jnz short near ptr loc_402E5A+1
jz short near ptr loc_402E5A+1
sahf
```

According to their behavior, packers can be classified into the following categories:

- Code substitution packers
- Code injection packers
- 3 Hybrid packers
- Code virtualization packers 10c 402E5F

```
text:00402E6A db 0CCh
text:00402E6B db 8Ah
```








Code substitution packers


Replace some parts of the original executable mapped into memory by the OS loader. PE Header PE Header Tail Jump **Empty Section** OEP **Encrypted Encrypted** Payload **Payload** Packer Stub Packer Stub Start End






Code injection packers - Self injection


Allocate new memory sections in the same process and writes shellcode or complete PE files to execute. PE Header PE Header **New Section** OEP (New Section) **Encrypted** short lo: 402E6C Payload **Encrypted Payload** Packer Stub **Packer Stub** Tail Jump End Start





Code injection packers - Process injection








Hybrid packers - Injection & Substitution


Allocate new memory sections in the same process and writes shellcode or complete PE files to execute. PE Header PE Header **New Section Encrypted New Section** Payload OEP Tail Jump Packer Stub Start End





Code virtualization packers

```
Contains a virtual machine and a copy of the program ported to a custom set of
instructions (only known by the VM) that are interpreted in run-time.
                                    PE Header
                                  App ported to
                                     custom
                                  instruction set
                                     VM core
```






Hints

If you are dealing with code substitution, self injection or hybrid packers, you should start monitoring the following Windows APIs:

- VirtualProtect: It changes the protection on a region of committed pages in the virtual address space of the calling process. Usually, it is found close to the **Tail Jump**.
- *VirtualAlloc:* Reserves, commits, or changes the state of a region of pages in the virtual address space of the calling process. Memory allocated by this function is automatically initialized to zero.
- LocalAlloc and GlobalAlloc: Allocates the specified number of bytes from the heap.







Hints

```
call $+5
```


```
jnz short near ptr loc_402E5A+1
jz short near ptr loc_402E5A+1
```


If you are dealing with process injection packers, Windows API calls such as CreateProcessA, WriteProcessMemory, VirtualAllocEx and ResumeThread are just the tip of the iceberg.

Study the interaction of each API with the OS for each type of injection is important if you want to master this. 402E60


References:


- Ten process injection techniques by <u>elastic</u>.
- ATT&CK Technique T1055 by MITRE.
















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Thank you!

We are always looking for more talent, if you think you have the skills to join the team, feel free to contact me.

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