last time

```
signals versus exceptions
```

hardware runs exception handlers of OS OS runs signal handlers of programs

signals for forwarding exceptions to programs

registering signal handlers

signal unsafety and blocking signals

authorization versus authentication

OS (kernel) tracking user IDs one for each program separate from user names

opening a file?

```
open("/u/creiss/private.txt", O_RDONLY)
say, private file on portal
```

on Linux: makes system call

kernel needs to decide if this should work or not

how does OS decide this?

argument: needs extra metadata

what would be wrong using...

system call arguments?

where the code calling open came from?

authorization v authentication

authentication — who is who

authorization v authentication

authentication — who is who

authorization — who can do what probably need authentication first...

authentication

password

hardware token

•••

user IDs

most common way OSes identify what domain process belongs to:

(unspecified for now) procedure sets user IDs every process has a user ID

user ID used to decide what process is authorized to do

POSIX user IDs

also some other user IDs — we'll talk later

```
uid_t geteuid(); // get current process's "effective" user ID
process's user identified with unique number
kernel typically only knows about number
effective user ID is used for all permission checks
```

POSIX user IDs

```
uid_t geteuid(); // get current process's "effective" user ID
process's user identified with unique number
kernel typically only knows about number
effective user ID is used for all permission checks
```

standard programs/library maintain number to name mapping /etc/passwd on typical single-user systems network database on department machines

also some other user IDs — we'll talk later

POSIX groups

```
gid_t getegid(void);
    // process's"effective" group ID
int getgroups(int size, gid_t list[]);
    // process's extra group IDs
POSIX also has group IDs
like user IDs: kernel only knows numbers
    standard library+databases for mapping to names
also process has some other group IDs — we'll talk later
```

id

```
cr4bd@power4
: /net/zf14/cr4bd ; id
uid=858182(cr4bd) gid=21(csfaculty)
         groups=21(csfaculty),325(instructors),90027(cs4414)
id command displays uid, gid, group list
names looked up in database
    kernel doesn't know about this database
    code in the C standard library
```

groups that don't correspond to users

example: video group for access to monitor

put process in video group when logged in directly don't do it when SSH'd in

groups that don't correspond to users

example: video group for access to monitor

put process in video group when logged in directly don't do it when SSH'd in

...but: user can keep program running with video group in the background after logout?

POSIX file permissions

(see docs for chmod command)

POSIX files have a very restricted access control list

```
one user ID + read/write/execute bits for user "owner" — also can change permissions one group ID + read/write/execute bits for group default setting — read/write/execute
```

POSIX/NTFS ACLs

more flexible access control lists

list of (user or group, read or write or execute or ...)

supported by NTFS (Windows)

a version standardized by POSIX, but usually not supported

POSIX ACL syntax

```
# group students have read+execute permissions
group:students:r-x
# group faculty has read/write/execute permissions
group:faculty:rwx
# user mst3k has read/write/execute permissions
user:mst3k:rwx
# user tj1a has no permissions
user:tj1a:---
# POSIX acl rule:
    # user take precedence over group entries
```

authorization checking on Unix

checked on system call entry no relying on libraries, etc. to do checks

```
files (open, rename, ...) — file/directory permissions processes (kill, ...) — process UID = user\ UID ...
```

keeping permissions?

which of the following would still be secure?

A. setting up a read-only page table entry that allows a process to directly access its user ID from its process control block in user mode

B. performing authorization checks in the standard library in addition to system call handlers

C. performing authorization checks in the standard library instead of system call handlers

D. making the user ID a system call argument rather than storing it in the process control block

superuser

```
user ID 0 is special

superuser or root

(non-Unix) or Administrator or SYSTEM or ...
```

some system calls: only work for uid 0 shutdown, mount new file systems, etc.

automatically passes all (or almost all) permission checks

superuser v kernel mode

superuser : OS :: kernel mode : hardware

programs running as superuser still in user mode just change in how OS acts on system calls, etc.

how does login work?

```
somemachine login: jo
password: ******
io@somemachine$ Is
this is a program which...
checks if the password is correct, and
changes user IDs, and
runs a shell
```

how does login work?

```
somemachine login: jo
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io@somemachine$ Is
this is a program which...
checks if the password is correct, and
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runs a shell
```

Unix password storage

typical single-user system: /etc/shadow only readable by root/superuser

department machines: network service

Kerberos / Active Directory: server takes (encrypted) passwords server gives tokens: "yes, really this user" can cryptographically verify tokens come from server

aside: beyond passwords

```
/bin/login entirely user-space code
only thing special about it: when it's run
could use any criteria to decide, not just passwords
physical tokens
biometrics
...
```

how does login work?

```
somemachine login: jo
password: ******
io@somemachine$ Is
this is a program which...
checks if the password is correct, and
changes user IDs, and
runs a shell
```

changing user IDs

```
int setuid(uid_t uid);
if superuser: sets effective user ID to arbitrary value
     and a "real user ID" and a "saved set-user-ID" (we'll talk later)
```

system starts in/login programs run as superuser voluntarily restrict own access before running shell, etc.

sudo

```
tj1a@somemachine$ sudo restart
Password: *******
sudo: run command with superuser permissions
    started by non-superuser
recall: inherits non-superuser UID
can't just call setuid(0)
```

set-user-ID sudo

extra metadata bit on executables: set-user-ID

if set: exec() syscall changes effective user ID to owner's ID

sudo program: owned by root, marked set-user-ID

marking setuid: chmod u+s

set-user ID gates

set-user ID program: gate to higher privilege

controlled access to extra functionality

make authorization/authentication decisions outside the kernel

way to allow normal users to do *one thing that needs privileges* write program that does that one thing — nothing else! make it owned by user that can do it (e.g. root) mark it set-user-ID

want to allow only some user to do the thing make program check which user ran it

uses for setuid programs

mount USB stick

setuid program controls option to kernel mount syscall make sure user can't replace sensitive directories make sure user can't mess up filesystems on normal hard disks make sure user can't mount new setuid root files

control access to device — printer, monitor, etc. setuid program talks to device + decides who can

write to secure log file setuid program ensures that log is append-only for normal users

bind to a particular port number $<1024\,$ setuid program creates socket, then becomes not root

set-user-ID program v syscalls

hardware decision: some things only for kernel

system calls: controlled access to things kernel can do

decision about how can do it: in the kernel

kernel decision: some things only for root (or other user)

set-user-ID programs: controlled access to things root/... can do

decision about how can do it: made by root/...

privilege escalation

privilege escalation — vulnerabilities that allow more privileges

code execution/corruption in utilities that run with high privilege e.g. buffer overflow, command injection

login, sudo, system services, ... bugs in system call implementations

logic errors in checking delegated operations

a broken setuid program: setup

suppose I have a directory all-grades on shared server in it I have a folder for each assignment and within that a text file for each user's grade + other info say I don't have flexible ACLs and want to give each user access

a broken setuid program: setup

suppose I have a directory all-grades on shared server in it I have a folder for each assignment and within that a text file for each user's grade + other info say I don't have flexible ACLs and want to give each user access one (bad?) idea: setuid program to read grade for assignment ./print_grade assignment outputs grade from all-grades/assignment/USER.txt

a very broken setuid program

```
print grade.c:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    char filename[500];
    sprintf(filename, "all-grades/%s/%s.txt",
            argv[1], getenv("USER"));
    int fd = open(filename, 0 RDWR);
    char buffer[1024];
    read(fd, buffer, 1024);
    printf("%s: %s\n", argv[1], buffer);
HUGE amount of stuff can go wrong
examples?
```

another very broken setuid program (setup)

allow users to print files, but only if less than 1KB

another very broken setuid program

```
print short file.c:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    struct stat st;
    if (stat(argv[1], \&st) == -1) abort();
    // make sure argv[1] is owned by user running this
    if (st.st_uid != getuid()) abort();
    // and that it's less than 1 KB
    if (st.st_size >= 1024) abort();
    char command[1024];
    sprintf(command, "print %1000s", argv[1]);
    system(command);
    return EXIT_SUCCESS;
```

set-user ID programs are very hard to write

```
what if stdin, stdout, stderr start closed?
what if signals setup weirldy?
what if the PATH env. var. set to directory of malicious programs?
what if argc == 0?
what if dynamic linker env. vars are set?
what if some bug allows memory corruption?
```

some security tasks (1)

helping students collaborate in ad-hoc small groups on shared server?

Q1: what to allow/prevent?

Q2: how to use POSIX mechanisms to do this?

some security tasks (2)

letting students assignment files to faculty on shared server?

Q1: what to allow/prevent?

Q2: how to use POSIX mechanisms to do this?

some security tasks (3)

running untrusted game program from Internet?

Q1: what to allow/prevent?

Q2: how to use POSIX mechanisms to do this?

backup slides

a delegation problem

consider printing program marked setuid to access printer decision: no accessing printer directly printing program enforces page limits, etc.

command line: file to print

can printing program just call open()?

a broken solution

```
if (original user can read file from argument) {
    open(file from argument);
    read contents of file;
    write contents of file to printer
    close(file from argument);
}
hope: this prevents users from printing files than can't read
problem: race condition!
```

a broken solution / why

•	
setuid program	other user program
	create normal file toprint.txt
check: can user access? (yes)	_
	unlink("toprint.txt")
	<pre>link("/secret", "toprint.txt"</pre>
open("toprint.txt")	_
read	_

link: create new directory entry for file another option: rename, symlink ("symbolic link" — alias for file/directory) another possibility: run a program that creates secret file (e.g. temporary file used by password-changing program)

time-to-check-to-time-of-use vulnerability

TOCTTOU solution

temporarily 'become' original user

then open

then turn back into set-uid user

this is why POSIX processes have multiple user IDs can swap out effective user ID temporarily

practical TOCTTOU races?

```
can use symlinks maze to make check slower symlink toprint.txt \to a/b/c/d/e/f/g/normal.txt symlink a/b \to ../a symlink a/c \to ../a ...
```

lots of time spent following symbolic links when program opening toprint.txt

gives more time to sneak in unlink/link or (more likely) rename

exercise

which (if any) of the following would fix for a TOCTTOU vulnerability in our setuid printing application? (assume the Unix-permissions without ACLs are in use)

[A] **both before and after** opening the path passed in for reading, check that the path is accessible to the user who ran our application

[B] after opening the path passed in for reading, using fstat with the file descriptor opened to check the permissions on the file

[C] before opening the path, verify that the user controls the file referred to by the path **and** the directory containing it

program memory


Used by OS
Stack
Heap / other dynamic
Writable data
Code + Constants

0xFFFF FFFF FFFF
0xFFFF 8000 0000 0000
0x7F...

0x0000 0000 0040 0000

address spaces


illuision of dedicated memory





address spaces

illuision of dedicated memory













program addresses are 'virtual' real addresses are 'physical' can be different sizes!











divide memory into pages (2^8 bytes in this case) "virtual" = addresses the program sees



page number is upper bits of address (because page size is power of two)



rest of address is called page offset

toy physical memory

program memory virtual addresses

11	0000	0000	to
11	1111	1111	
10	0000	0000	to
10	1111	1111	
01	0000	0000	to
01	1111	1111	
00	0000	0000	to
00	1111	1111	

real memory physical addresses

1	.11	0000	0000	to
1	.11	1111	1111	
0	01	0000	0000	to
0	01	1111	1111	
0	000	0000	0000	to
0	00	1111	1111	


toy physical memory


program memory virtual addresses


11	0000	0000	to
11	1111	1111	
10	0000	0000	to
10	1111	1111	
01	0000	0000	to
01	1111	1111	
00	0000	0000	to
00	1111	1111	

real memory physical addresses


111 0000 0000 to 111 1111 1111	physical page 7
001 0000 0000 to	physical page 1
001 1111 1111	pilysical page 1
000 0000 0000 to	physical page 0
000 1111 1111	physical page o









```
virtual page # valid? physical page # 00 1 010 (2, code) 01 1 111 (7, data) 10 0 ??? (ignored) 11 1 000 (0, stack)
```






t "virtual page number" | ookup 1101 0010 — address from CPU virtual page # valid? physical page #010 (2, code) 00 (7, data) 01 (ignored) 10 000 (0, stack) 11 1101 0010 to memory

trigger exception if 0?



toy pag "page offset" ookup



part of context switch is changing the page table

extra privileged instructions

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extra privileged instructions

where in memory is the code that does this switching?

part of context switch is changing the page table

extra privileged instructions

where in memory is the code that does this switching? probably have a page table entry pointing to it hopefully marked kernel-mode-only

part of context switch is changing the page table extra privileged instructions

where in memory is the code that does this switching? probably have a page table entry pointing to it hopefully marked kernel-mode-only


code better not be modified by user program otherwise: uncontrolled way to "escape" user mode

emacs (two copies)

Emacs (run by user mst3k)

Used by OS
Stack
Heap / other dynamic
Writable data
${\sf emacs.exe} \; \big({\sf Code} + {\sf Constants} \big)$

Emacs (run by user xyz4w)



emacs (two copies)

Emacs (run by user mst3k)	Emacs (run by user xyz4w)		
Used by OS	Used by OS		
Stack	C+a-d		
Stack	Stack		
Heap / other dynamic	Heap / other dynamic		
Writable data	Writable data		
$emacs.exe\; \big(Code + Constants\big)$	emacs.exe (Code $+$ Constants)		

same data?

two copies of program

would like to only have one copy of program

what if mst3k's emacs tries to modify its code?

would break process abstraction:

"illusion of own memory"

typical page table entries

solution: same idea as kernel-only bit

page table entry will have more permissions bits

can read? can write? can execute?

checked by MMU like valid/kernel bit

page table (logically)

virtual page #	valid?	kernel?	write?	exec?	physical page #
0000 0000	0	0	0	0	00 0000 0000
0000 0001	1	0	1	0	10 0010 0110
0000 0010	1	0	1	0	00 0000 1100
0000 0011	1	0	0	1	11 0000 0011
•••					
1111 1111[1	0	1	0	00 1110 1000

on virtual address sizes

virtual address size = size of pointer?

often, but — sometimes part of pointer not used

example: typical x86-64 only use 48 bits rest of bits have fixed value

virtual address size is amount used for mapping

address space sizes

amount of stuff that can be addressed = address space size based on number of unique addresses

e.g. 32-bit virtual address = 2^{32} byte virtual address space

e.g. 20-bit physical addresss = 2^{20} byte physical address space

address space sizes

- amount of stuff that can be addressed = address space size based on number of unique addresses
- e.g. 32-bit virtual address = 2^{32} byte virtual address space
- e.g. 20-bit physical addresss = 2^{20} byte physical address space
- what if my machine has 3GB of memory (not power of two)?

 not all addresses in physical address space are useful
 most common situation (since CPUs support having a lot of memory)

exercise: page counting

suppose 32-bit virtual (program) addresses

and each page is 4096 bytes (2^{12} bytes)

how many virtual pages?

exercise: page counting

suppose 32-bit virtual (program) addresses

and each page is 4096 bytes (2^{12} bytes)

how many virtual pages?

exercise: page table size

```
suppose 32-bit virtual (program) addresses suppose 30-bit physical (hardware) addresses each page is 4096 bytes (2^{12} bytes) pgae table entries have physical page \#, valid bit, kernel-mode bit
```

how big is the page table (if laid out like ones we've seen)?

exercise: page table size

```
suppose 32-bit virtual (program) addresses suppose 30-bit physical (hardware) addresses each page is 4096 bytes (2^{12} bytes) pgae table entries have physical page \#, valid bit, kernel-mode bit
```

how big is the page table (if laid out like ones we've seen)?

issue: where can we store that?

exercise: address splitting

and each page is 4096 bytes (2^{12} bytes)

split the address 0x12345678 into page number and page offset:

exercise: address splitting

and each page is 4096 bytes (2^{12} bytes)

split the address 0x12345678 into page number and page offset:

where can processor store megabytes of page tables? in memory

page table entry layout


valid (bit 15) kernel (bit 14) physical page # (bits 4–13) unused (bit 0-3)


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
page table entry layout

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
page table base register











page t	able entry layout
valid (bit 15) kernel (bit 14) phy	vsical page $\#$ (bits 4–13) unused (bit 0-3)
naga tabla basa yagistay	physical memory
page table base register	addresses bytes
0×00010000	0×00000000-1 <u>00000000 00000000</u>
'	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$
	0x00010002-5 10100010 01100000 0x00010004-5 10000010 11000000
	0×00010006-7 <u>10110000 00110000</u>
	0×000101FE-F <u>10001110 10000000</u>
	0x00010200-1 10100010 00111010















virtual address


11 0101 01 00 1101 1111

















exercise setup

5-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical addresses, 8-byte pages

page table

virtual	valid?	physical
page #	valid!	page #
00	1	010
01	1	111
10	0	000
11	1	000

physical addresses	byte	es		
addresses				
0x00-3	00	11	22	33
0x04-7	44	55	66	77
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A
0×14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C

physical addresses	byte	es		
0x20-3	D0	D1	D2	D3
0x24-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x28-B				
0x2C-F				
0x30-3	ВА	0Α	ВА	0A
0x34-7	СВ	0B	СВ	0B
0x38-B				
0x3C-F	EC	0C	EC	0C


exercise setup

5-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical addresses, 8-byte pages

page table

virtual	valid?	physical
page #	valid!	page #
00	1	010
01	1	111
10	0	000
11	1	000

physical addresses	byt	es		
0x00-3			22	33
0x04-7	44	55	66	77
0x08-B	88	99	ΑА	ВВ
0x0C-F				
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A
0x14-7	1В	2B	3B	4B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C



5-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical addresses, 8-byte pages

(virtual addresses) 0x18 = ????; 0x03 = ????; 0x0A = ????; 0x13 = ??? page table

virtual page # valid? physical page # 00 1 010 011 111 10 0 000 11 1 1 1000

physical addresses	byt	es		
0x00-3	00	11		
0x04-7	44	55	66	77
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ
0x0C-F				
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C.

physical bytes addresses 0x20-3 D0 D1 D2 D3 0x24-7 D4 D5 D6 D7 0x28-B|89 9A AB BC 0x2C-FCD DE EF F0 0x30-3|BA 0A BA 0A 0x34-7 CB 0B CB 0B 0x38-BDC 0C DC 0C 0x3C-FEC 0C EC 0C

5-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical addresses, 8-byte pages

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(virtual addresses) 0x18 = ; 0x03 = ???; 0x0A = ???; 0x13 = ???
```

page table

virtual	valid?	physical
page #	valid!	page #
00	1	010
01	1	111
10	0	000
11	1	000

physical addresses	bytes
	00 11 22 33
0x04-7	44 55 66 77
0x08-B	88 99 AA BB
0x0C-F	CC DD EE FF
0x10-3	1A 2A 3A 4A
0x14-7	1B 2B 3B 4B
0x18-B	1C 2C 3C 4C
0x1C-F	1C 2C 3C 4C

physical addresses	byt	es		
0x20-3			D2	D3
0x24-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x28-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x2C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x30-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0Α
0x34-7	СВ	0B	СВ	0B
0x38-B	DC	0C	DC	0C
0x3C-F	EC	0C	EC	0C

5-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical addresses, 8-byte pages

```
(virtual addresses) 0x18 = ; 0x03 = ; 0x0A = ???; 0x13 = ??? page table
```

physical addresses	byte	es		
0x00-3	00	11	22	33
0x04-7	44	55	66	77
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C

physical addresses	byt	es		
0x20-3	D0	D1	D2	D3
0x24-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x28-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x2C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x30-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0A
0x34-7	СВ	0B	СВ	0B
0x38-B	DC	0C	DC	0C
0x3C-F	EC	0C	EC	0C

5-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical addresses, 8-byte pages

```
(virtual addresses) 0x18 = ; 0x03 = ; 0x0A = ; 0x13 = ??? page table
```

physical addresses	bytes
	00 11 22 33
0x04-7	44 55 66 77
0x08-B	88 99 AA BB
0x0C-F	CC DD EE FF
0x10-3	1A 2A 3A 4A
0x14-7	1B 2B 3B 4B
0x18-B	1C 2C 3C 4C
0x1C-F	1C 2C 3C 4C

physical addresses	byte	es		
0x20-3	D0	D1	D2	D3
0x24-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x28-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x2C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x30-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0Α
0x34-7	СВ	0B	СВ	0B
0x38-B	DC	0C	DC	0C
0x3C-F	EC	0C	EC	0C

5-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical addresses, 8-byte pages

(virtual addresses)
$$0x18 = ; 0x03 = ; 0x0A = ; 0x13 =$$
page table

physical addresses	bytes
0x00-3	00 11 22 33
0x04-7	44 55 66 77
0x08-B	88 99 AA BB
0x0C-F	CC DD EE FF
0x10-3	1A 2A 3A 4A
0x14-7	1B 2B 3B 4B
0x18-B	1C 2C 3C 4C
0x1C-F	1C 2C 3C 4C

physical bytes addresses 0x20-3 D0 D1 D2 D3 0x24-7 D4 D5 D6 D7 0x28-B|89 9A AB BC 0x2C-FCD DE EF F0 0x30-3|BA 0A BA 0A 0x34-7 CB 0B CB 0B 0x38-BDC 0C DC 0C 0x3C-FEC 0C EC 0C

6-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 8 byte pages, 1 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 3 bit PPN (MSB), 1 valid bit, 4 other bits;

physical addresses	byte	es			phys addres	ical	byt	es		
0x00-3			22	33	0x20				D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x24	<u>-7</u>	F4	F5	F6	F7
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ	0x28	3-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x20	-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	3A	4A	0x30)-3	ВА	0Α	ВА	0Α
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x34	⊦ −7	СВ	0B	СВ	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x38	3-B	DC	0C	DC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x30	-F	EC	0C	EC	0C

6-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 8 byte pages, 1 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 3 bit PPN (MSB), 1 valid bit, 4 other bits;

```
physical bytes
                                          0x31 = 11 0001
addresses
                                          PTE addr:
                      0x20-3|D0 D1 D2 D3
0x00-3|00 11 22 33
                                          0x20 + 6 \times 1 = 0x26
0x04-7|44 55 66 77
                      0x24-7|F4 F5 F6 F7 |
                      0x28-B|89 9A AB BC
0x08-B|88 99 AA BB
                                          PTF value
0x0C-FCC DD EE FF
                      0x2C-FCD DE EF F0
                                          0xF6 = 1111 0110
0x10-3|1A 2A 3A 4A
                      0x30-3|BA 0A BA 0A
                                          PPN 111, valid 1
0x14-7|1B 2B 3B 4B
                      0x34-7|CB 0B CB 0B
                                          M[111 \ 001] = M[0x39]
                      0x38-BDC 0C DC 0C
0x18-B|1C 2C 3C 4C
                                          \rightarrow 0x0C
0x1C-F|1C 2C 3C 4C
                      0x3C-FEC 0C EC 0C
```

6-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 8 byte pages, 1 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 3 bit PPN (MSB), 1 valid bit, 4 other bits;

```
physical bytes
                                            0x31 = 11 0001
addresses
                                            PTE addr:
                      0x20-3|D0 D1 D2 D3
0x00-3|00 11 22 33
                                           0x20 + 6 \times 1 = 0x26
0x04-7|44 55 66 77
                      0x24-7|F4 F5 F6 F7 |
                      0x28-B|89 9A AB BC
0x08-B|88 99 AA BB
                                           PTE value:
0x0C-FCC DD EE FF
                      0x2C-FCD DE EF F0
                                           0 \times F6 = 1111 \quad 0110
0x10-3|1A 2A 3A 4A
                      0x30-3|BA 0A BA 0A
                                           PPN 111, valid 1
0x14-7|1B 2B 3B 4B
                      0x34-7|CB 0B CB 0B
                                           M[111 \ 001] = M[0x39]
                      0x38-BDC 0C DC 0C
0x18-B|1C 2C 3C 4C
                                           \rightarrow 0x0C
0x1C-F|1C 2C 3C 4C
                      0x3C-FEC 0C EC 0C
```

6-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 8 byte pages, 1 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 3 bit PPN (MSB), 1 valid bit, 4 other bits;

```
physical bytes
                                           0x31 = 11 \ 0001
addresses
                                           PTE addr:
                      0x20-3|D0 D1 D2 D3
0x00-3|00 11 22 33
                                           0x20 + 6 \times 1 = 0x26
0x04-7|44 55 66 77
                      0x24-7|F4 F5 F6 F7 |
                      0x28-B|89 9A AB BC
0x08-B|88 99 AA BB
                                           PTE value:
0x0C-FCC DD EE FF
                      0x2C-FCD DE EF F0
                                           0 \times F6 = 1111 \ 0110
0x10-3|1A 2A 3A 4A
                      0x30-3|BA 0A BA 0A
                                           PPN 111, valid 1
0x14-7|1B 2B 3B 4B
                      0x34-7|CB 0B CB 0B
                                           M[111 \ 001] = M[0x39]
                      0x38-BDC 0C DC 0C
0x18-B|1C 2C 3C 4C
                                           \rightarrow 0x0C
0x1C-F|1C 2C 3C 4C
                      0x3C-FEC 0C EC 0C
```

6-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 8 byte pages, 1 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 3 bit PPN (MSB), 1 valid bit, 4 other bits;

physical bytes addresses					physical bytes addresses					
0x00-3			22	33		0x20-			D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77		0x24-	7 F 4	F5	F6	F7
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ		0x28-	B89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF		0x2C-	FCD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	3A	4A		0x30-	ЗВА	0A	ВА	0Α
0x14-7	1В	2B	3B	4B		0x34-	7CB	0B	СВ	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C		0x38-	BDC	0C	DC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C		0x3C-	FEC	0C	EC	0C

6-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 8 byte pages, 1 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 3 bit PPN (MSB), 1 valid bit, 4 other bits;

```
physical bytes
                                           0x12 = 01 0010
addresses
                                           PTE addr:
                      0x20-3|D0 D1 D2 D3
0x00-3|00 11 22 33
                                           0x20 + 2 \times 1 = 0x22
0x04-7|44 55 66 77
                      0x24-7|F4 F5 F6 F7 |
                      0x28-B|89 9A AB BC
0x08-B|88 99 AA BB
                                          PTE value:
0x0C-FCC DD EE FF
                      0x2C-FCD DE EF F0
                                           0 \times D2 = 1101 \ 0010
0x10-3|1A 2A 3A 4A
                      0x30-3|BA 0A BA 0A
                                           PPN 110, valid 1
0x14-7|1B 2B 3B 4B
                      0x34-7|CB 0B CB 0B
                                           M[110 \ 010] = M[0x32]
                      0x38-BDC 0C DC 0C
0x18-B|1C 2C 3C 4C
                                           \rightarrow 0xBA
0x1C-F|1C 2C 3C 4C
                      0x3C-FEC 0C EC 0C
```

6-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 8 byte pages, 1 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 3 bit PPN (MSB), 1 valid bit, 4 other bits;

```
physical bytes
                                          0x12 = 01 0010
addresses
                                          PTE addr:
                      0x20-3|D0 D1 D2 D3
0x00-3|00 11 22 33
                                          0x20 + 2 \times 1 = 0x22
0x04-7|44 55 66 77
                      0x24-7|F4 F5 F6 F7
                      0x28-B|89 9A AB BC
0x08-B|88 99 AA BB
                                         PTE value:
0x0C-FCC DD EE FF
                      0x2C-FCD DE EF F0
                                          0xD2 = 1101 0010
0x10-3|1A 2A 3A 4A
                      0x30-3|BA 0A BA 0A
                                          PPN 110, valid 1
0x14-7|1B 2B 3B 4B
                      0x34-7|CB 0B CB 0B
                                          M[110 \ 010] = M[0x32]
                      0x38-BDC 0C DC 0C
0x18-B|1C 2C 3C 4C
                                          \rightarrow 0xBA
0x1C-F|1C 2C 3C 4C
                      0x3C-FEC 0C EC 0C
```

6-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 8 byte pages, 1 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 3 bit PPN (MSB), 1 valid bit, 4 other bits;

```
physical bytes
                                          0x12 = 01 \ 0010
addresses
                                          PTE addr:
                      0x20-3|D0 D1 D2 D3
0x00-3|00 11 22 33
                                          0x20 + 2 \times 1 = 0x22
0x04-7|44 55 66 77
                      0x24-7|F4 F5 F6 F7
                      0x28-B|89 9A AB BC
0x08-B|88 99 AA BB
                                          PTE value:
0x0C-FCC DD EE FF
                      0x2C-FCD DE EF F0
                                          0xD2 = 1101 0010
0x10-3|1A 2A 3A 4A
                      0x30-3|BA 0A BA 0A
                                          PPN 110, valid 1
0x14-7|1B 2B 3B 4B
                      0x34-7|CB 0B CB 0B
                                          M[110 \ 010] = M[0x32]
                      0x38-BDC 0C DC 0C
0x18-B|1C 2C 3C 4C
                                          \rightarrow 0xBA
0x1C-F|1C 2C 3C 4C
                      0x3C-FEC 0C EC 0C
```

my desktop: 39-bit physical addresses; 48-bit virtual addresses

4096 byte pages

my desktop: 39-bit physical addresses; 48-bit virtual addresses

4096 byte pages

top 16 bits of 64-bit addresses not used for translation

my desktop: 39-bit physical addresses; 48-bit virtual addresses

4096 byte pages

exercise: how many page table entries? (assuming page table like shown before)

exercise: how large are physical page numbers?

my desktop: 39-bit physical addresses; 48-bit virtual addresses

4096 byte pages

exercise: how many page table entries? (assuming page table like shown before)

exercise: how large are physical page numbers?

```
my desktop: 39-bit physical addresses; 48-bit virtual addresses
```

4096 byte pages

exercise: how many page table entries? (assuming page table like shown before)

exercise: how large are physical page numbers?

page table entries are 8 bytes (room for expansion, metadata) trick: power of two size makes table lookup faster

would take up 2^{39} bytes?? (512GB??)


huge page tables

huge virtual address spaces!

impossible to store PTE for every page

how can we save space?

holes



most pages are invalid

saving space

basic idea: don't store (most) invalid page table entries use a data structure other than a flat array want a map — lookup key (virtual page number), get value (PTE) options?

saving space

```
basic idea: don't store (most) invalid page table entries
use a data structure other than a flat array
    want a map — lookup key (virtual page number), get value (PTE)
options?
```

hashtable

actually used by some historical processors but never common

saving space

```
basic idea: don't store (most) invalid page table entries
use a data structure other than a flat array
want a map — lookup key (virtual page number), get value (PTE)
options?
```

hashtable

actually used by some historical processors but never common

tree data structure

but not quite a search tree

search tree tradeoffs

lookup usually implemented in hardware


lookup should be simple solution: lookup splits up address bits (no complex calculations)


lookup should not involve many memory accesses


doing two memory accesses is already very slow solution: tree with many children from each node (far from binary tree's left/right child)


two-level page tables for 65536 pages (16-bit VPN; 256 entries/table) second-level page tables actual data for p for VPN 0x00 (if PTE valid) first-level page table for VPN $0 \times 0 - 0 \times FF$ for VPN 0x100-0x1FF PTE for VPN 0xFF VPN 0x200-0x2FF VPN 0x300 for VPN 0x300-0x300 for VPN 0xFF00-0xFFFF TE for VPN 0x302 TE for VPN 0x303

for VPN 0x3FF











two-level page tables for 65536 pages (16-bit VPN: 256 entries/table)



two-level page tables for 65536 pages (16-bit VPN: 256 entries/table)



two-level page tables for 65536 pages (16-bit VPN; 256 entries/table) second-level page tables actual data for p for VPN 0x00 (if PTE valid) first-level page table for VPN $0 \times 0 - 0 \times FF$ tor VPN $0 \times 100 - 0 \times 1$ FF IPTE for VPN 0xFF VPN 0x200-0x2FF VPN 0x300 for VPN 0x300-0x300 for VPN 0xFF00-0xFFFF VPN 0x302 TE for VPN 0x303 for VPN 0x3FF

two-level page table lookup


virtual address

11 0101 01 00 1011 00 00 1101 1111


VPN — split into two parts (one per level)


this example: parts equal sized — common, but not required


two-level page table lookup





two-level page table lookup



























another view



multi-level page tables

VPN split into pieces for each level of page table

top levels: page table entries point to next page table usually using physical page number of next page table

bottom level: page table entry points to destination page

validity and permission checks at each level

x86-64 page table splitting

48-bit virtual address

12-bit page offset (4KB pages)

36-bit virtual page number, split into four 9-bit parts

page tables at each level: 2^9 entries, 8 bytes/entry deliberate choice: each page table is one page

note on VPN splitting

textbook labels it 'VPN 1' and 'VPN 2' and so on

these are parts of the virtual page number (there are not multiple VPNs)

physical addresses	byte	es			physiaddress	cal ses	byt	es		
0x00-3	00	11	22	33	0x20				D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x24	-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ	0x28	-B	89	9A	AB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2C	-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A	0x30	-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0A
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x34	-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x38	-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3C	-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

physical addresses	byte	es			physic address	cal ses	byt	es		
0x00-3			22	33	0x20				D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x24	-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AΑ	ВВ	0x28	-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2C	-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	3A	4A	0x30	-3	ВА	0Α	ВА	0A
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x34	-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x38	-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3C	-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

physical addresses	byte	es			physical addresses	byt	es		
0x00-3			22	33	0x20-3			D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x24-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AΑ	ВВ	0x28-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	3A	4A	0x30-3	ВА	0Α	ВА	0Α
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x34-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x38-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3C-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

physical addresses	byte	es			physic address	cal ses	byte	es		
0x00-3			22	33	0x20-				D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x24-	-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AΑ	ВВ	0x28-	-в	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2C-	-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	3A	4A	0x30-	-3	ВА	0Α	ВА	0Α
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x34-	-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x38-	-В	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2 C	3C	4C	0x3C-	-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

physical addresses	byte	es			physic address	cal ses	byte	es		
0x00-3			22	33	0x20-				D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x24-	-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AΑ	ВВ	0x28-	-в	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2C-	-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	3A	4A	0x30-	-3	ВА	0Α	ВА	0Α
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x34-	-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x38-	-В	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2 C	3C	4C	0x3C-	-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

physical addresses	byte	es			phy addr	/sical esses	byt	es		
0x00-3			22	33		20-3			D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x2	24-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ	0x2	28-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2	C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A	0x3	80-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0Α
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x3	84-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3	88-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3	C-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

2-level splitting

- 9-bit virtual address
- 6-bit physical address
- 8-byte pages \rightarrow 3-bit page offset (bottom bits)
- 9-bit VA: 6 bit VPN + 3 bit PO
- 6-bit PA: 3 bit PPN + 3 bit PO

- 8 entry page tables \rightarrow 3-bit VPN parts
- 9-bit VA: 3 bit VPN part 1; 3 bit VPN part 2

physical addresses	byt	es			á	physical addresses	byt	es		
0x00-3	00	11	22	33		0x20-3			D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77		0x24-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AΑ	ВВ		0x28-B	89	9Α	AB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF		0x2C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A		0x30-3	ВА	0Α	ВА	0Α
0x14-7	1В	2B	3B	4B		0x34-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C		0x38-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C		0x3C-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

physical addresses	byt	es			. 6	physical addresses	byt	es		
0x00-3	00	11	22	33		0x20-3			D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77		0x24-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ		0x28-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF		0x2C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A		0x30-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0A
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B		0x34-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C		0x38-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C		0x3C-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

physical addresses	byte	es		
0x00-3	00	11	22	33
0x04-7	44	55	66	77
0x08-B	88	99	AΑ	ВВ
0x0C-F	CC	DD	ΕE	FF
0x10-3	1A	2A	3A	4A
0x14-7	1В	2B	3B	4B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C

physical addresses	byt	es		
0x20-3	D0	D1	D2	D3
0x24-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x28-B				
0x2C-F				
0x30-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0A
0x34-7	DΒ	0B	DB	0B
0x38-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x3C-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

9-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 8 byte pages, 1 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 3 bit PPN (MSB), 1 valid bit, 4 unused; page table base register 0x08; translate virtual address 0x0FB

physical addresses	byt	es			physical addresses	byt	es		
0x00-3	00	11	22	33	0x20-3			D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x24-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AΑ	ВВ	0x28-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A	0x30-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0Α
0x14-7	1В	2B	3B	4B	0x34-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x38-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3C-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

physical addresses	byt	es			phy addr	ysical esses	byt	es		
0x00-3			22	33		20-3			D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x2	24-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ	0x2	28-B	89	9A	AB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	ΕE	FF	0x2	2C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A	0x3	30-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0A
0x14-7	1В	2B	3B	4B	0x3	34-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3	88-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3	BC-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

physical addresses	byt	es			physical addresses	byt	es		
0x00-3			22	33	0x20-3			D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x24-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AΑ	ВВ	0x28-B	89	9A	AB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	5A	4A	0x30-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0A
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x34-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	10	2C	3C	4C	0x38-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	10	2C	3C	4C	0x3C-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

9-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 8 byte pages, 1 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 3 bit PPN (MSB), 1 valid bit, 4 unused page table base register 0×08 ; translate virtual address $0 \times 00B$

physical addresses	byte	es			physical addresses	byt	es		
0x00-3			22	33	0x20-3			D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x24-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	ΑA	ВВ	0x28-B	89	9A	AB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A	0x30-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0Α
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x34-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x38-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3C-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

physical addresses	byt	es			physical addresses	byt	es		
0x00-3			22	33	0x20-3	D0	D1	D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x24-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ	0x28-B	89	9A	AB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A	0x30-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0A
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x34-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x38-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3C-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

physical addresses	byt	es		
0x00-3	00	11	22	33
0x04-7	44	55	66	77
0x08-B				
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF
0x10-3	1A	2A	3A	4A
0x14-7				
0x18-B				
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C

physical addresses	byt	es		
0x20-3	D0	D1	D2	D3
0x24-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x28-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x2C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x30-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0A
0x34-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x38-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x3C-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

physical _k addresses_	oytes			physical bytes addresses
0x00-3		22	33	
0x04-7	44 55	66	77	0x24-7 D4 D5 D6 D
0x08-B	88 99	AΑ	ВВ	0x28-B89 9A AB B
0x0C-F	CC DD	ΕE	FF	0x2C-FCD DE EF F
0x10-3	1A 2A	3A	4A	0x30-3BA 0A BA 0A
0x14-7	1B 2B	3B	4B	0x34-7 DB 0B DB 0I
0x18-B	1C 2C	3C	4C	0x38-BEC 0C EC 00
0x1C-F	1C 2C	3C	4C	0x3C-FFC 0C FC 00

10-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 16 byte pages, 2 byte PTE

page tables 1 page; PTE: 2 bit PPN (MSB of first byte), 1 valid bit, rest unused

physical addresses	byt	20		,	phy addre	, sical	by+	05		
addresses	Dy t				addre	esses	Dyt			
0x00-3	00	11	22	33	0x2	0-3	D0	E1	D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x2	4-7	D4	E5	D6	E7
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ	0x2	8-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2	C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	3A	4A	0x3	0-3	ВА	0Α	ВА	0Α
0x14-7	1В	2B	3B	4B	0x3	4-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3	8-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	AC	ВС	DC	EC	0x3	C-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

10-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 16 byte pages, 2 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 2 bit PPN (MSB of first byte), 1 valid bit, rest unused

			,			,				
hvte	S				physic	cal	byt	eς		
					address	ses	Dy c			
		22	33						D2	D3
44 5	55	66	77		0x24-	-7	D4	E5	D6	E7
88 9	99	AA	ВВ		0x28-	-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
CC I	DD	EE	FF		0x2C-	-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
1A 2	2A	ЗА	4A		0x30-	-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0Α
1B 2	2B	3B	4B		0x34-	-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
1C 2	2C	3C	4C		0x38-	-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
AC I	ВС	DC	EC		0x3C-	-F	FC	0C	FC	0C
	00 : 44 : 88 : CC : 1A : 1B :	44 55 88 99 CC DD 1A 2A 1B 2B 1C 2C	00 11 22 44 55 66 88 99 AA CC DD EE 1A 2A 3A 1B 2B 3B 1C 2C 3C	bytes 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF 1A 2A 3A 4A 1B 2B 3B 4B 1C 2C 3C 4C AC BC DC EC	00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF 1A 2A 3A 4A 1B 2B 3B 4B 1C 2C 3C 4C	00 11 22 33 0x20- 44 55 66 77 0x24- 88 99 AA BB 0x28- CC DD EE FF 0x2C- 1A 2A 3A 4A 0x30- 1B 2B 3B 4B 0x34- 1C 2C 3C 4C 0x38-	00 11 22 33 0x20-3 44 55 66 77 0x24-7 88 99 AA BB 0x28-B CC DD EE FF 0x2C-F 1A 2A 3A 4A 0x30-3 1B 2B 3B 4B 0x34-7 1C 2C 3C 4C 0x38-B	00 11 22 33 0x20-3 D0 44 55 66 77 0x24-7 D4 88 99 AA BB 0x28-B 89 CC DD EE FF 0x2C-F CD 1A 2A 3A 4A 0x30-3 BA 1B 2B 3B 4B 0x34-7 DB 1C 2C 3C 4C 0x38-B EC	00 11 22 33 0x20-3 D0 E1 44 55 66 77 0x24-7 D4 E5 88 99 AA BB 0x28-B 89 9A CC DD EE FF 0x2C-F CD DE 1A 2A 3A 4A 0x30-3 BA 0A 1B 2B 3B 4B 0x34-7 DB 0B 1C 2C 3C 4C 0x38-B EC 0C	00 11 22 33 0x20-3 D0 E1 D2 44 55 66 77 0x24-7 D4 E5 D6 88 99 AA BB 0x28-B 89 9A AB CC DD EE FF 0x2C-F CD DE EF 1A 2A 3A 4A 0x30-3 BA 0A BA 1B 2B 3B 4B 0x34-7 DB 0B DB 1C 2C 3C 4C 0x38-B EC 0C EC

10-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 16 byte pages, 2 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 2 bit PPN (MSB of first byte), 1 valid bit, rest unused

			,			,				
hvte	S				physic	cal	byt	eς		
					address	ses	Dy c			
		22	33						D2	D3
44 5	55	66	77		0x24-	-7	D4	E5	D6	E7
88 9	99	AA	ВВ		0x28-	-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
CC I	DD	EE	FF		0x2C-	-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
1A 2	2A	ЗА	4A		0x30-	-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0Α
1B 2	2B	3B	4B		0x34-	-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
1C 2	2C	3C	4C		0x38-	-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
AC I	ВС	DC	EC		0x3C-	-F	FC	0C	FC	0C
	00 : 44 : 88 : CC : 1A : 1B :	44 55 88 99 CC DD 1A 2A 1B 2B 1C 2C	00 11 22 44 55 66 88 99 AA CC DD EE 1A 2A 3A 1B 2B 3B 1C 2C 3C	bytes 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF 1A 2A 3A 4A 1B 2B 3B 4B 1C 2C 3C 4C AC BC DC EC	00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF 1A 2A 3A 4A 1B 2B 3B 4B 1C 2C 3C 4C	00 11 22 33 0x20- 44 55 66 77 0x24- 88 99 AA BB 0x28- CC DD EE FF 0x2C- 1A 2A 3A 4A 0x30- 1B 2B 3B 4B 0x34- 1C 2C 3C 4C 0x38-	00 11 22 33 0x20-3 44 55 66 77 0x24-7 88 99 AA BB 0x28-B CC DD EE FF 0x2C-F 1A 2A 3A 4A 0x30-3 1B 2B 3B 4B 0x34-7 1C 2C 3C 4C 0x38-B	00 11 22 33 0x20-3 D0 44 55 66 77 0x24-7 D4 88 99 AA BB 0x28-B 89 CC DD EE FF 0x2C-F CD 1A 2A 3A 4A 0x30-3 BA 1B 2B 3B 4B 0x34-7 DB 1C 2C 3C 4C 0x38-B EC	00 11 22 33 0x20-3 D0 E1 44 55 66 77 0x24-7 D4 E5 88 99 AA BB 0x28-B 89 9A CC DD EE FF 0x2C-F CD DE 1A 2A 3A 4A 0x30-3 BA 0A 1B 2B 3B 4B 0x34-7 DB 0B 1C 2C 3C 4C 0x38-B EC 0C	00 11 22 33 0x20-3 D0 E1 D2 44 55 66 77 0x24-7 D4 E5 D6 88 99 AA BB 0x28-B 89 9A AB CC DD EE FF 0x2C-F CD DE EF 1A 2A 3A 4A 0x30-3 BA 0A BA 1B 2B 3B 4B 0x34-7 DB 0B DB 1C 2C 3C 4C 0x38-B EC 0C EC

10-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 16 byte pages, 2 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 2 bit PPN (MSB of first byte), 1 valid bit, rest unused

_		_	=	
physical addresses	hytes		physical addresses	hytes
0x00-3	00 11	22 33	0x20-3	D0 E1 D2 D3
0x04-7	44 55	66 77	0x24-7	D4 E5 D6 E7
0x08-B	88 99	AA BB	0x28-B	89 9A AB BC
0x0C-F	CC DD	EE FF	0x2C-F	CD DE EF F0
0x10-3	1A 2A	3A 4A	0x30-3	BA 0A BA 0A
0x14-7	1B 2B	3B 4B	0x34-7	DB 0B DB 0B
0x18-B	1C 2C	3C 4C	0x38-B	EC 0C EC 0C
0x1C-F	AC BC	DC EC	0x3C-F	FC 0C FC 0C
0x18-B	1C 2C	3C 4C	0x38-B	EC 0C EC 0C

10-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 16 byte pages, 2 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 2 bit PPN (MSB of first byte), 1 valid bit, rest unused

_		_	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				
physical addresses	hytes		physical addresses	byt	es		
addresses			addresses	Dy c			
0x00-3		22 33	0x20-3			D2	D3
0x04-7	44 55	66 77	0x24-7	D4	E5	D6	E7
0x08-B	88 99	AA BB	0x28-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC DD	EE FF	0x2C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A 2A	3A 4A	0x30-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0Α
0x14-7	1B 2B	3B 4B	0x34-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C 2C	3C 4C	0x38-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	AC BC	DC EC	0x3C-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

10-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 16 byte pages, 2 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 2 bit PPN (MSB of first byte), 1 valid bit, rest unused

physical addresses	byt	20		,	phy: addre	sical	byt.	05		
addresses	—				addre	esses	Dy t	<u></u>		
0x00-3	00	11	22	33	0x2	0-3	D0	E1	D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x2	4-7	D4	E5	D6	E7
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ	0x2	8-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2	C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A	0x3	0-3	ВА	0Α	ВА	0Α
0x14-7	1В	2B	3B	4B	0x3	4-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3	8-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	AC	ВС	DC	EC	0x3	C-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

2-level exercise (5)

10-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 16 byte pages, 2 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 2 bit PPN (MSB of first byte), 1 valid bit, rest unused

page table base register 0x10; translate virtual address 0x376

			,			,				
hvte	S				physic	cal	byt	eς		
					address	ses	Dy c			
		22	33						D2	D3
44 5	55	66	77		0x24-	-7	D4	E5	D6	E7
88 9	99	AA	ВВ		0x28-	-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
CC I	DD	EE	FF		0x2C-	-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
1A 2	2A	ЗА	4A		0x30-	-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0Α
1B 2	2B	3B	4B		0x34-	-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
1C 2	2C	3C	4C		0x38-	-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
AC I	ВС	DC	EC		0x3C-	-F	FC	0C	FC	0C
	00 : 44 : 88 : CC : 1A : 1B :	44 55 88 99 CC DD 1A 2A 1B 2B 1C 2C	00 11 22 44 55 66 88 99 AA CC DD EE 1A 2A 3A 1B 2B 3B 1C 2C 3C	bytes 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF 1A 2A 3A 4A 1B 2B 3B 4B 1C 2C 3C 4C AC BC DC EC	00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC DD EE FF 1A 2A 3A 4A 1B 2B 3B 4B 1C 2C 3C 4C	00 11 22 33 0x20- 44 55 66 77 0x24- 88 99 AA BB 0x28- CC DD EE FF 0x2C- 1A 2A 3A 4A 0x30- 1B 2B 3B 4B 0x34- 1C 2C 3C 4C 0x38-	00 11 22 33 0x20-3 44 55 66 77 0x24-7 88 99 AA BB 0x28-B CC DD EE FF 0x2C-F 1A 2A 3A 4A 0x30-3 1B 2B 3B 4B 0x34-7 1C 2C 3C 4C 0x38-B	00 11 22 33 0x20-3 D0 44 55 66 77 0x24-7 D4 88 99 AA BB 0x28-B 89 CC DD EE FF 0x2C-F CD 1A 2A 3A 4A 0x30-3 BA 1B 2B 3B 4B 0x34-7 DB 1C 2C 3C 4C 0x38-B EC	00 11 22 33 0x20-3 D0 E1 44 55 66 77 0x24-7 D4 E5 88 99 AA BB 0x28-B 89 9A CC DD EE FF 0x2C-F CD DE 1A 2A 3A 4A 0x30-3 BA 0A 1B 2B 3B 4B 0x34-7 DB 0B 1C 2C 3C 4C 0x38-B EC 0C	00 11 22 33 0x20-3 D0 E1 D2 44 55 66 77 0x24-7 D4 E5 D6 88 99 AA BB 0x28-B 89 9A AB CC DD EE FF 0x2C-F CD DE EF 1A 2A 3A 4A 0x30-3 BA 0A BA 1B 2B 3B 4B 0x34-7 DB 0B DB 1C 2C 3C 4C 0x38-B EC 0C EC

2-level exercise (5)


10-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 16 byte pages, 2 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 2 bit PPN (MSB of first byte), 1 valid bit, rest unused

page table base register 0x10; translate virtual address 0x376

O			,	,		,				
physical addresses	byt	2م				physical iddresses	byt	eς		
addresses					a	ddresses				
0x00-3			22	33		0x20-3			D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77		0x24-7	D4	E5	D6	E7
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ	(0x28-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	(0x2C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A		0x30-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0Α
0x14-7	1В	2B	3B	4B		0x34-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C		0x38-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	AC	ВС	DC	EC		0x3C-F	FC	0C	FC	0C


space on demand

Program Memory




space on demand

Program Memory



space on demand

Program Memory



%rsp = 0x7FFFC000

```
...
// requires more stack space
A: pushq %rbx

B: movq 8(%rcx), %rbx
C: addq %rbx, %rax
...
```

VPN	valid?	physical
VIIN	valiu:	page
•••	•••	•••
0x7FFFB	0	
0x7FFFC	1	0x200DF
0x7FFFD	1	0x12340
0x7FFFE	1	0x12347
0x7FFFF	1	0x12345
•••	•••	•••

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%rsp = 0x7FFC000

```
// requires more stack space
A: pushq %rbx
page fault!
B: movq 8(%rcx), %rbx
C: addq %rbx, %rax
...
```

VPN	valid?	physical
VEIN	valiu!	physical page
•••	•••	•••
0x7FFFB	0	
0x7FFFC	1	0x200DF
0x7FFFD	1	0x12340
0x7FFFE	1	0x12347
0x7FFFF	1	0x12345
•••	•••	•••

pushq triggers exception hardware says "accessing address 0x7FFBFF8" OS looks up what's should be there — "stack"

%rsp = 0x7FFFC000

```
// requires more stack space
A: pushq %rbx restarted

B: movq 8(%rcx), %rbx
C: addq %rbx, %rax
...
```

VPN	valid?	physical page
VIIN	valiu:	page
•••	•••	•••
0x7FFFB	1	0x200D8
0x7FFFC	1	0x200DF
0x7FFFD	1	0x12340
0x7FFFE	1	0x12347
0x7FFFF	1	0x12345
•••	•••	•••

in exception handler, OS allocates more stack space OS updates the page table then returns to retry the instruction

note: the space doesn't have to be initially empty

only change: load from file, etc. instead of allocating empty page

loading program can be merely creating empty page table everything else can be handled in response to page faults no time/space spent loading/allocating unneeded space

mmap

```
Linux/Unix has a function to "map" a file to memory
int file = open("somefile.dat", O_RDWR);
    // data is region of memory that represents file
char *data = mmap(..., file, 0);
   // read byte 6 from somefile.dat
char seventh_char = data[6];
   // modifies byte 100 of somefile.dat
data[100] = 'x';
    // can continue to use 'data' like an array
```

swapping almost mmap

```
access mapped file for first time, read from disk (like swapping when memory was swapped out)
```

```
write "mapped" memory, write to disk eventually (like writeback policy in swapping) use "dirty" bit
```

extra detail: other processes should see changes all accesses to file use same physical memory

Linux maps: list of maps

```
$ cat /proc/self/maps
00400000-0040b000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 48328831
                                                        /bin/cat
0060a000-0060b000 r-p 0000a000 08:01
                                                        /bin/cat
0060b000-0060c000 rw-p 0000b000 08:01 48328831
                                                         /bin/cat
01974000 - 01995000 \text{ rw-p} 00000000 00:00 0
                                                        [heap]
7f60c718b000_7f60c7490000
                                                         /usr/lih/locale/locale—archive
7f60c749 PCB contains list of struct vm_area_struct with:
                                                                           u/libc-2.1
7f60c764
                                                                            u/libc-2.1
        (shown in this output):
7f60c784
                                                                            u/libc-2.1
7f60c785
                                                                            u/libc-2.1
           virtual address start, end
7f60c785
7f60c785
                                                                            u/ld-2.19.s
           permissions
7f60c7a3
7f60c7a7
           offset in backing file (if any)
7f60c7a7
                                                                            u/ld-2.19.s
           pointer to backing file (if any)
                                                                            u/ld-2.19.s
7f60c7a7
7f60c7a7
7ffc5d2b
7ffc5d3t
        (not shown):
7ffc5d3t
ffffffff
           info about sharing of non-file data
```

swapping

early motivation for virtual memory: swapping

using disk (or SSD, ...) as the next level of the memory hierarchy how our textbook and many other sources presents virtual memory

OS allocates program space on disk own mapping of virtual addresses to location on disk

DRAM is a cache for disk

swapping

early motivation for virtual memory: swapping

using disk (or SSD, ...) as the next level of the memory hierarchy how our textbook and many other sources presents virtual memory

OS allocates program space on disk own mapping of virtual addresses to location on disk

DRAM is a cache for disk

swapping versus caching

"cache block" pprox physical page

fully associative

every virtual page can be stored in any physical page

replacement/cache misses managed by the OS

normal cache hits happen in hardware

hardware's page table lookup

common case that needs to be very fast

swapping components


```
"swap in" a page — exactly like allocating on demand!
    OS gets page fault — invalid in page table
    check where page actually is (from virtual address)
    read from disk
    eventually restart process
"swap out" a page
    OS marks as invalid in the page table(s)
    copy to disk (if modified)
```


HDD reads and writes: milliseconds to tens of milliseconds minimum size: 512 bytes writing tens of kilobytes basically as fast as writing 512 bytes


HDD reads and writes: milliseconds to tens of milliseconds minimum size: 512 bytes writing tens of kilobytes basically as fast as writing 512 bytes


HDD reads and writes: milliseconds to tens of milliseconds minimum size: 512 bytes writing tens of kilobytes basically as fast as writing 512 bytes


HDD reads and writes: milliseconds to tens of milliseconds minimum size: 512 bytes writing tens of kilobytes basically as fast as writing 512 bytes














page tricks generally

deliberately make program trigger page/protection fault

but don't assume page/protection fault is an error

have seperate data structures represent logically allocated memory e.g. "addresses 0x7FFF8000 to 0x7FFFFFFFF are the stack" might talk about Linux data structures later (book section 9.7)

page table is for the hardware and not the OS

hardware help for page table tricks

information about the address causing the fault
e.g. special register with memory address accessed
harder alternative: OS disassembles instruction, look at registers

(by default) rerun faulting instruction when returning from exception

precise exceptions: no side effects from faulting instruction or after e.g. pushq that caused did not change %rsp before fault e.g. instructions reordered after faulting instruction not visible

backup slides