

last time

private keys (never shared)

public keys (known to all, derived from private keys)

public-key encryption (encrypt w/ public, decrypt w/ private)

digital signatures (verify w/ public, sign w/ private)

certificate idea:

“X’s public key is ...” message + signature

signature from trusted ‘certificate authority’

chains of certificates

encryption/authentication

common to see symmetric “authenticated encryption”

usually combines *malleable* encryption (confidentiality) and MAC (authenticity)

sometimes this is just called “encryption”
(but often encryption is missing authenticity)

if you take crypto theory course,
more mathematically definite ideas than
confidentiality/authenticity...

(e.g. ‘indistinguishably under chosen plaintext attack’)
(and some definitions overlap confidentiality/authenticity ideas)

exercise

exercise: how should website certificates verify identity?

how do certificate authorities verify

for web sites, set by CA/Browser Forum

organization of:

- everyone who ships code with list of valid certificate authorities

 - Apple, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla, Opera, Cisco, Qihoo 360, Brave, ...

- certificate authorities

decide on rules (“baseline requirements”) for what CAs do

BR domain name identity validation

options involve CA choosing random value and:

sending it to domain contact (with domain registrar) and receive response with it, or

observing it placed in DNS or website or sent from server in other specific way

exercise: problems this doesn't deal with?

some other things public CAs do

- keep their private keys in tamper-resistant hardware

- maintain publicly-accessible database of *revoked* certificates
 - some browsers check these, sometimes

- certificate transparency

 - public logs of every certificate issued

 - some browsers reject non-logged certificates

 - so you can tell if bad certificate exists for your website

- 'CAA' records in the domain name system

 - can indicate which CAs are allowed to issue certificates in DNS

 - (but CAs apparently not required to use DNSSEC (certificate infrastructure for signing domain name records) when looking this up)

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additional crypto tools

cryptographic hash functions (summarize data)

'secure' random numbers

key agreement

motivation: summary for signature

digital signatures typically have size limit

...but we want to sign very large messages

solution: get secure “summary” of message

cryptographic hash

$$\text{hash}(M) = X$$

given X :

hard to find message other than by guessing

given X , M :

hard to find second message so that $\text{hash}(\text{second message}) = X$

example uses:

substitute for original message in digital signature

building message authentication codes

password hashing

cryptographic hash functions need (basically) guessing to 'reverse'

idea: store cryptographic hash of password instead of password

attacker who gets hash doesn't get password
but can still check entered password is correct

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fix: special slow/resource-intensive cryptograph hash functions

Argon2i

scrypt

PBKDF2

random numbers

need a lot of keys that no one else knows

common task: choose a *random* number

question: what does *random* mean here?

cryptographically secure random numbers

security properties we might want for random numbers:

attacker cannot guess (part of) number better than chance

knowing prior 'random' numbers shouldn't help predict next 'random' numbers

compromising machine now shouldn't reveal older random numbers

exercise: how to generate?

/dev/urandom

Linux kernel random number generator

collects “entropy” from hard-to-predict events

- e.g. exact timing of I/O interrupts

- e.g. some processor's built-in random number circuit

turned into as many random bytes as you want

turning 'entropy' into random bytes

lots of ways to do this; one (rough/incomplete) idea:

internal variable *state*

to add 'entropy'

$\text{state} \leftarrow \text{SecureHash}(\text{state} + \text{entropy})$

to extract value:

$\text{random bytes} \leftarrow \text{SecureHash}(1 + \text{state})$

give bytes that can't be reversed to compute state

$\text{state} \leftarrow \text{SecureHash}(2 + \text{state})$

change state so attacker can't take us back to old state if compromised

just asymmetric?

given public-key encryption + digital signatures...

why bother with the symmetric stuff?

symmetric stuff much faster

symmetric stuff much better at supporting larger messages

key agreement

problem: A has B's public encryption key
wants to choose shared secret

some ideas:

- A chooses a key, sends it encrypted to B

- A sends a public key encrypted B, B chooses a key and sends it back

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alternate model:

- both sides generate random values

- derive public-key like "key shares" from values

- use math to combine "key shares"

- kinda like A + B both sending each other public encryption keys

Diffie-Hellman key agreement (1)

A and B want to agree on shared secret

A chooses random value Y

A sends public value derived from Y (“key share”)

B chooses random value Z

B sends public value derived from Z (“key share”)

A combines Y with public value from B to get number

B combines Z with public value from A to get number
and b/c of math chosen, both get same number

Diffie-Hellman key agreement (2)

math requirement:

some f , so $f(f(X, Y), Z) = f(f(X, Z), Y)$
(that's hard to invert, etc.)

choose X in advance and:

A randomly chooses Y	B randomly chooses Z
A sends $f(X, Y)$ to B	B sends $f(X, Z)$ to A
A computes $f(f(X, Z), Y)$	B computes $f(f(X, Y), Z)$

Diffie-Hellman key agreement (2)

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choose X in advance and:

A randomly chooses Y

A sends $f(X, Y)$ to B

A computes $f(f(X, Z), Y)$

B randomly chooses Z


B sends $f(X, Z)$ to A

B computes $f(f(X, Y), Z)$


example

$$f(a, b) = a^b \pmod{p}$$


typical TLS handshake



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
typical TLS handshake




typical TLS handshake



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typical TLS handshake



TLS: after handshake

use key shares results to get **several** keys

take $\text{hash}(\text{something} + \text{shared secret})$ to derive each key

separate keys for each direction (server \rightarrow client and vice-versa)

often separate keys for encryption and MAC

later messages use encryption + MAC + nonces

things modern TLS usually does

(not all these properties provided by all TLS versions and modes)

confidentiality/authenticity

- server = one ID'd by certificate

- client = same throughout whole connection

forward secrecy

- can't decrypt old conversations (data for KeyShares is temporary)

fast

- most communication done with more efficient symmetric ciphers

- 1 set of messages back and forth to setup connection

network security summary (1)

communicating securely with math

- secret value (shared key, public key) that attacker can't have

- symmetric: shared keys used for (de)encryption + auth/verify; fast

- asymmetric: public key used by any for encrypt + verify; slower

- asymmetric: private key used by holder for decrypt + sign; slower

protocol attacks — repurposing encrypt/signed/etc. messages

certificates — verifiable forwarded public keys

key agreement — for generated shared-secret “in public”

- publish key shares from private data

- combine private data with key share for shared secret

network security summary (2)


TLS: combine all cryptography stuff to make “secure channel”

(things we probably didn't get to:)


denial-of-service — attacker just disrupts/overloads (not subtle)

firewalls

simple CPU




running instructions



```
0x100: addq %r8, %r9
0x108: movq 0x1234(%r10), %r11
```

```
...
%r8: 0x800
%r9: 0x900
%r10: 0x1000
%r11: 0x1100
...
```



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
running instructions





```
0x100: addq %r8, %r9
0x108: movq 0x1234(%r10), %r11
```

```
...
%r8: 0x800
%r9: 0x1100
%r10: 0x1000
%r11: M[0x2234]
...
```


Human pipeline: laundry




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
Waste (1)




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
Waste (2)




Latency — Time for One




Latency — Time for One




Latency — Time for One



Throughput — Rate of Many




Throughput — Rate of Many




$$\frac{1 \text{ load}}{0.83\text{h}} = 1.2 \text{ loads/h}$$

Throughput — Rate of Many




$$\frac{1 \text{ load}}{0.83\text{h}} = 1.2 \text{ loads/h}$$

adding stages (one way)




divide running instruction into steps
one way: fetch / decode / execute / memory / writeback

adding stages (one way)




add 'pipeline registers' to hold values from instruction


running some instructions




running some instructions



running some instructions




running some instructions




`0x100: add %r8, %r9`

`0x108: mov 0x1234(%r10), %r11`


`0x110: xor %r12, %r13`



running some instructions



running some instructions



	cycle #	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
0x100: add %r8, %r9		F	D	E	M	W				
0x108: mov 0x1234(%r10), %r11			F	D	E	M	W			
0x110: xor %r12, %r13				F	D	E	M	W		

why registers?

example: fetch/decode

need to store current instruction somewhere ...while fetching next one

exercise: throughput/latency (1)

	cycle #	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
0x100: add %r8, %r9		F	D	E	M	W				
0x108: mov 0x1234(%r10), %r11			F	D	E	M	W			
0x110:					

suppose cycle time is 500 ps

exercise: latency of one instruction?

- A. 100 ps B. 500 ps C. 2000 ps D. 2500 ps E. something else


exercise: throughput/latency (1)

0x100: add %r8, %r9

0x108: mov 0x1234(%r10), %r11

0x110: ...

cycle # 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8



...

suppose cycle time is 500 ps

exercise: latency of one instruction?

A. 100 ps B. 500 ps C. 2000 ps D. 2500 ps E. something else

exercise: throughput overall?

A. 1 instr/100 ps B. 1 instr/500 ps C. 1 instr/2000ps D. 1 instr/2500 ps
E. something else

exercise: throughput/latency (2)

0x100: add %r8, %r9
0x108: mov 0x1234(%r10), %r11
0x110: ...

cycle #	0	1	2	3	4
	F	D	E	M	W
		F	D	E	M
				...	


0x100: add %r8, %r9
0x108: mov 0x1234(%r10), %r11
0x110: ...

cycle #	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	F1	F2	D1	D2	E1	E2	M1	M2	W1
		F1	F2	D1	D2	E1	E2	M1	M2
				...					


double number of pipeline stages (to 10) + decrease cycle time from 500 ps to 250 ps — throughput?

- A. 1 instr/100 ps B. 1 instr/250 ps C. 1 instr/1000ps D. 1 instr/5000 ps
E. something else


diminishing returns: register delays




diminishing returns: register delays




diminishing returns: register delays




diminishing returns: register delays



diminishing returns: register delays




diminishing returns: register delays



diminishing returns: uneven split

Can we split up some logic (e.g. adder) arbitrarily?


Probably not...



diminishing returns: uneven split

Can we split up some logic (e.g. adder) arbitrarily?


Probably not...



diminishing returns: uneven split


Can we split up some logic (e.g. adder) arbitrarily?

Probably not...



a data hazard


```
// initially %r8 = 800,
//                %r9 = 900, etc.
addq %r8, %r9    // R8 + R9 -> R9
addq %r9, %r8    // R9 + R8 -> R9
addq ...
addq ...
```



	fetch	fetch/decode		decode/execute			execute/memory		memory/writeback	
cycle	PC	rA	rB	R[rB]	R[rB]	rB	sum	rB	sum	rB
0	0x0									
1	0x2	8	9							
2		9	8	800	900	9				
3				900	800	8	1700	9		
4							1700	8	1700	9
5									1700	8

a data hazard

```
// initially %r8 = 800,
//                %r9 = 900, etc.
addq %r8, %r9    // R8 + R9 -> R9
addq %r9, %r8    // R9 + R8 -> R9
addq ...
addq ...
```



	fetch	fetch/decode		decode/execute			execute/memory		memory/writeback	
cycle	PC	rA	rB	R[rB]	R[rB]	rB	sum	rB	sum	rB
0	0x0									
1	0x2	8	9							
2		9	8	800	900	9				
3				900	800	8	1700	9		
4							1700	8	1700	9
5									1700	8

should be 1700

data hazard

addq %r8, %r9 // (1)

addq %r9, %r8 // (2)

step#	pipeline implementation	ISA specification
1	read r8, r9 for (1)	read r8, r9 for (1)
2	read r9, r8 for (2)	write r9 for (1)
3	write r9 for (1)	read r9, r8 for (2)
4	write r8 for (2)	write r8 for (2)

pipeline reads **older value**...

instead of value ISA says was just written

data hazard compiler solution

```
addq %r8, %r9  
nop  
nop  
addq %r9, %r8
```

one solution: **change the ISA**

all addqs take effect **three instructions later**

(assuming can read register value while it is being written back)

make it **compiler's job**

problem: recompile everytime processor changes?

data hazard compiler solution

```
addq %r8, %r9  
nop  
nop  
addq %r9, %r8
```

one solution: **change the ISA**


all addqs take effect **three instructions later**
(**assuming can read register value while it is being written back**)

make it **compiler's job**

problem: recompile everytime processor changes?

stalling/nop pipeline diagram (1)

add %r8, %r9
nop
nop
addq %r9, %r8




stalling/nop pipeline diagram (1)

add %r8, %r9

nop

nop

addq %r9, %r8




assumption:

if writing register value


register file will return that value for reads

not actually way register file worked in single-cycle CPU
(e.g. can read old %r9 while writing new %r9)

stalling/nop pipeline diagram (2)



stalling/nop pipeline diagram (2)



if we didn't modify the register file, we'd need an extra cycle

data hazard hardware solution

```
addq %r8, %r9  
// hardware inserts: nop  
// hardware inserts: nop  
addq %r9, %r8
```

how about hardware add nops?

called **stalling**

extra logic:

- sometimes don't change PC

- sometimes put do-nothing values in pipeline registers

opportunity

```
// initially %r8 = 800,  
//                %r9 = 900, etc.
```

```
0x0: addq %r8, %r9
```


```
0x2: addq %r9, %r8
```

...


	fetch	fetch/decode		decode/execute			execute/memory		memory/writeback	
cycle	PC	rA	rB	R[rB]	R[rB]	rB	sum	rB	sum	rB
0	0x0									
1	0x2	8	9							
2		9	8	800	900	9				
3				900	800	8	1700	9		
4							1700	8	1700	9
5									1700	8

should be 1700

exploiting the opportunity



exploiting the opportunity



opportunity 2

```
// initially %r8 = 800,  
//                %r9 = 900, etc.
```

```
0x0: addq %r8, %r9
```

```
0x2: nop
```


```
0x3: addq %r9, %r8
```

...

	fetch	fetch/decode		decode/execute			execute/memory		memory/writeback	
cycle	PC	rA	rB	R[rB]	R[rB]	rB	sum	rB	sum	rB
0	0x0									
1	0x2	8	9							
2	0x3	---	---	800	900	9				
3		9	8	---	---	---	1700	9		
4				900	800	8	---	---	1700	9
5							1700	9	---	---
6									1700	9

should be 1700

exploiting the opportunity



exercise: forwarding paths

cycle # 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

addq %r8, %r9

subq %r8, %r10

xorq %r8, %r9

andq %r9, %r8

F	D	E	M	W				
	F	D	E	M	W			
		F	D	E	M	W		
			F	D	E	M	W	

in subq, %r8 is _____ addq.

in xorq, %r9 is _____ addq.


in andq, %r9 is _____ addq.

in andq, %r9 is _____ xorq.

A: not forwarded from

B-D: forwarded to decode from {execute,memory,writeback} stage of


unsolved problem



combine stalling and forwarding to resolve hazard

assumption in diagram: hazard detected in subq's decode stage
(since easier than detecting it in fetch stage)

unsolved problem




combine stalling and forwarding to resolve hazard

assumption in diagram: hazard detected in subq's decode stage
(since easier than detecting it in fetch stage)

solveable problem


	cycle #	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
movq 0(%rax), %rbx		F	D	E	M	W				
movq %rbx, 0(%rcx)			F	D	E	M	W			

why can't we...



clock cycle needs to be long enough
to go through data cache AND
to go through math circuits!
(which we were trying to avoid by putting them in separate stages)

why can't we...



clock cycle needs to be long enough
to go through data cache AND
to go through math circuits!
(which we were trying to avoid by putting them in separate stages)

hazards versus dependencies

dependency — X needs result of instruction Y?

has potential for being messed up by pipeline
(since part of X may run before Y finishes)

hazard — will it not work in some pipeline?

before extra work is done to “resolve” hazards
multiple kinds: so far, *data hazards*

ex.: dependencies and hazards (1)

addq **%rax,** **%rbx**

subq **%rax,** **%rcx**

movq **\$100,** **%rcx**

addq **%rcx,** **%r10**

addq **%rbx,** **%r10**


where are dependencies?

which are hazards in our pipeline?

which are resolved with forwarding?

ex.: dependencies and hazards (1)

addq	%rax,	%rbx
subq	%rax,	%rcx
movq	\$100,	%rcx
addq	%rcx,	%r10
addq	%rbx,	%r10




where are dependencies?

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ex.: dependencies and hazards (1)

addq	%rax,	%rbx
subq	%rax,	%rcx
movq	\$100,	%rcx
addq	%rcx,	%r10
addq	%rbx,	%r10



where are dependencies?

which are hazards in our pipeline?

which are resolved with forwarding?

ex.: dependencies and hazards (1)

addq	%rax,	%rbx
subq	%rax,	%rcx
movq	\$100,	%rcx
addq	%rcx,	%r10
addq	%rbx,	%r10

```
graph TD; I1[addq %rax, %rbx] -- blue --> I4[addq %rcx, %r10]; I3[movq $100, %rcx] -- red --> I4; I4 -- red --> I5[addq %rbx, %r10];
```

where are dependencies?

which are hazards in our pipeline?

which are resolved with forwarding?

pipeline with different hazards

example: 4-stage pipeline:

fetch/decode/execute+memory/writeback

	<i>// 4 stage</i>	<i>// 5 stage</i>
addq %rax, %r8	<i>//</i>	<i>// W</i>
subq %rax, %r9	<i>// W</i>	<i>// M</i>
xorq %rax, %r10	<i>// EM</i>	<i>// E</i>
andq %r8, %r11	<i>// D</i>	<i>// D</i>

pipeline with different hazards

example: 4-stage pipeline:

fetch/decode/execute+memory/writeback

	<i>// 4 stage</i>	<i>// 5 stage</i>
<code>addq %rax, %r8</code>	<i>//</i>	<i>// W</i>
<code>subq %rax, %r9</code>	<i>// W</i>	<i>// M</i>
<code>xorq %rax, %r10</code>	<i>// EM</i>	<i>// E</i>
<code>andq %r8, %r11</code>	<i>// D</i>	<i>// D</i>

`addq/andq` is hazard with 5-stage pipeline

`addq/andq` is **not** a hazard with 4-stage pipeline

pipeline with different hazards

example: 4-stage pipeline:

fetch/decode/execute+memory/writeback

	<i>// 4 stage</i>	<i>// 5 stage</i>
<code>addq %rax, %r8</code>	<i>//</i>	<i>// W</i>
<code>subq %rax, %r9</code>	<i>// W</i>	<i>// M</i>
<code>xorq %rax, %r10</code>	<i>// EM</i>	<i>// E</i>
<code>andq %r8, %r11</code>	<i>// D</i>	<i>// D</i>

more hazards with more pipeline stages

exercise: different pipeline

split execute into two stages: F/D/E1/E2/M/W

result only available near end of second execute stage

where does forwarding, stalls occur?

	<i>cycle #</i>	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
(1) <code>addq %rcx, %r9</code>		F	D	E1	E2	M	W			
(2) <code>addq %r9, %rbx</code>										
(3) <code>addq %rax, %r9</code>										
(4) <code>movq %r9, (%rbx)</code>										
(5) <code>movq %rcx, %r9</code>										

exercise: different pipeline

split execute into two stages: F/D/E1/E2/M/W

	<i>cycle #</i>	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
<code>addq %rcx, %r9</code>		F	D	E1	E2	M	W			
<code>addq %r9, %rbx</code>										
<code>addq %rax, %r9</code>										
<code>movq %r9, (%rbx)</code>										

exercise: different pipeline

split execute into two stages: F/D/E1/E2/M/W

	<i>cycle #</i>	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
<code>addq %rcx, %r9</code>		F	D	E1	E2	M	W			
<code>addq %r9, %rbx</code>			F	D	E1	E2	M	W		
<code>addq %rax, %r9</code>				F	D	E1	E2	M	W	
<code>movq %r9, (%rbx)</code>					F	D	E1	E2	M	W

exercise: different pipeline

split execute into two stages: F/D/E1/E2/M/W

	<i>cycle #</i>	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
addq %rcx, %r9		F	D	E1	E2	M	W				
addq %r9, %rbx			F	D	E1	E2	M	W			
addq %r9, %rbx			F	D	D	E1	E2	M	W		
addq %rax, %r9				F	D	E1	E2	M	W		
addq %rax, %r9				F	F	D	E1	E2	M	W	
movq %r9, (%rbx)					F	D	E1	E2	M	W	
movq %r9, (%rbx)						F	D	E1	E2	M	W

exercise: different pipeline

split execute into two stages: F/D/E1/E2/M/W

	<i>cycle #</i>	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
addq %rcx, %r9		F	D	E1	E2	M	W				
addq %r9, %rbx			F	D	E1	E2	M	W			
addq %r9, %rbx			F	D	D	E1	E2	M	W		
addq %rax, %r9				F	D	E1	E2	M	W		
addq %rax, %r9				F	F	D	E1	E2	M	W	
movq %r9, (%rbx)					F	D	E1	E2	M	W	
movq %r9, (%rbx)						F	D	E1	E2	M	W

exercise: different pipeline

split execute into two stages: F/D/E1/E2/M/W

	<i>cycle #</i>	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8		
addq %rcx, %r9		F	D	E1	E2	M	W					
addq %r9, %rbx			F	D	E1	E2	M	W				
addq %r9, %rbx			F	D	D	E1	E2	M	W			
addq %rax, %r9				F	D	E1	E2	M	W			
addq %rax, %r9				F	F	D	E1	E2	M	W		
movq %r9, (%rbx)					F	D	E1	E2	M	W		
movq %r9, (%rbx)						F	D	E1	E2	M	W	
movq %rcx, %r9							F	D	E1	E2	M	W

control hazard

0x00: cmpq %r8, %r9

0x08: je 0xFFFF

0x10: addq %r10, %r11

	fetch	fetch→decode		decode→execute		execute→write	execute→writeback		...
cycle	PC	rA	rB	R[rA]	R[rB]	result
0	0x0								
1	0x8	8	9						
2	???	---	---	800	900				
3	???	---	---	---	---	less than			

control hazard

0x00: cmpq %r8, %r9

0x08: je 0xFFFF

0x10: addq %r10, %r11

	fetch	fetch→decode		decode→execute		execute→write	execute→writeback		...
cycle	PC	rA	rB	R[rA]	R[rB]	result
0	0x0								
1	0x8	8	9						
2	???	---	---	800	900				
3	???	---	---	---	---	less than			


0xFFFF if $R[8] = R[9]$; 0x10 otherwise

jXX: stalling?

```
cmpq %r8, %r9
jne LABEL          // not taken
xorq %r10, %r11
movq %r11, 0(%r12)
```

```
...
cmpq %r8, %r9
jne LABEL
(do nothing)
(do nothing)
xorq %r10, %r11
movq %r11, 0(%r12)
...
```


cycle # 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8



jXX: stalling?

```
cmpq %r8, %r9
jne LABEL      // not taken
xorq %r10, %r11
movq %r11, 0(%r12)
```

```
...
cmpq %r8, %r9
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(do nothing)
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xorq %r10, %r11
movq %r11, 0(%r12)
...
```



jXX: stalling?

```
cmpq %r8, %r9
jne LABEL      // not taken
xorq %r10, %r11
movq %r11, 0(%r12)
```

```
...
```

```
cmpq %r8, %r9
```

```
jne LABEL
```


```
(do nothing)
```

```
(do nothing)
```

```
xorq %r10, %r11
```

```
movq %r11, 0(%r12)
```

```
...
```




jXX: stalling?

```
cmpq %r8, %r9
jne LABEL      // not taken
xorq %r10, %r11
movq %r11, 0(%r12)
```

```
...
cmpq %r8, %r9
jne LABEL
(do nothing)
(do nothing)
xorq %r10, %r11
movq %r11, 0(%r12)
...
```

cycle # 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8



use computed result

making guesses

```
    cmpq %r8, %r9
    jne LABEL
    xorq %r10, %r11
    movq %r11, 0(%r12)
    ...
```

```
LABEL:  addq %r8, %r9
        imul %r13, %r14
        ...
```

speculate (guess): **jne** won't go to LABEL


right: 2 cycles faster!; wrong: undo guess before too late

jXX: speculating right (1)


```
cmpq %r8, %r9
jne LABEL
xorq %r10, %r11
movq %r11, 0(%r12)
...
```

```
LABEL:  addq %r8, %r9
        imul %r13, %r14
        ...
```


```
cmpq %r8, %r9
jne LABEL
xorq %r10, %r11
movq %r11, 0(%r12)
...
```



jXX: speculating wrong



jXX: speculating wrong



“squashed” instructions

on misprediction need to undo partially executed instructions

mostly: remove from pipeline registers

more complicated pipelines: replace written values in
cache/registers/etc.

performance

hypothetical instruction mix

kind	portion	cycles (predict not-taken)	cycles (stall)
taken jXX	3%	3	3
non-taken jXX	5%	1	3
others	92%	1*	1*

performance

hypothetical instruction mix

kind	portion	cycles (predict not-taken)	cycles (stall)
taken jXX	3%	3	3
non-taken jXX	5%	1	3
others	92%	1*	1*

backup slides

denial of service (1)

so far: worried about network attacker disrupting confidentiality/authenticity

what if we're just worried about just breaking things

well, if they control network, nothing we can do...

but often worried about less

denial of service (2)

if you just want to inconvenience...

attacker just sends lots of stuff to my server

my server becomes overloaded?

my network becomes overloaded?

but: doesn't this require a lot of work for attacker?

exercise: why is this often not a big obstacle

denial of service: asymmetry

work for attacker $>$ work for defender

how much computation per message?

- complex search query?

- something that needs tons of memory?

- something that needs to read tons from disk?

how much sent back per message?

resources for attacker $>$ resources of defender

how many machines can attacker use?

denial of service: reflection/amplification

instead of sending messages directly...attacker can send messages
“from” you to third-party

third-party sends back replies that overwhelm network

example: short DNS query with lots of things in response

“amplification” =

third-party inadvertently turns small attack into big one

firewalls

don't want to expose network service to everyone?

solutions:

- service picky about who it accepts connections from
- filters in OS on machine with services
- filters on router

later two called “firewalls”

firewall rules examples?

ALLOW tcp port 443 (https) FROM everyone

ALLOW tcp port 22 (ssh) FROM my desktop's IP address

BLOCK tcp port 22 (ssh) FROM everyone else

ALLOW from address X to address Y

...

getting public keys?

browser talking to websites
needs public keys of every single website?

not really feasible, but...

certificate idea

let's say A has B's public key already.

if C wants B's public key and knows A's already:

A can generate "certificate" for B:

 "B's public key is XXX" AND

 Sign(A's private key, "B's public key is XXX")

B send copy of their "certificate" to C (most common idea)

if C trusts A, now C has B's public key

 if C does not trust A, well, can't trust this either

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certificate authorities

websites (and others) go to *certificates authorities* (CA) with their public key

certificate authorities sign messages like:
“The public key for foo.com is XXX.”

signed message called *certificate*

send certificates to browsers to verify identity

website can forward certificate instead of browser contacting CA directly

certificate authorities

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“The public key for foo.com is XXX.”

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send certificates to browsers to verify identity

website can forward certificate instead of browser contacting CA directly

example web certificate (1)

Version: 3 (0x2)

Serial Number: 7b:df:f6:ae:2e:d7:db:74:d3:c5:77:ac:bc:44:bf:1b

Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption

Issuer:

countryName	= US
stateOrProvinceName	= MI
localityName	= Ann Arbor
organizationName	= Internet2
organizationalUnitName	= InCommon
commonName	= InCommon RSA Server CA

Validity

Not Before: Apr 25 00:00:00 2023 GMT

Not After : Apr 24 23:59:59 2024 GMT

Subject:

countryName	= US
stateOrProvinceName	= Virginia
organizationName	= University of Virginia
commonName	= canvas.its.virginia.edu

....

X509v3 extensions:

....

X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: DNS:canvas.its.virginia.edu

example web certificate (2)

```
....
  Subject Public Key Info:
    Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
      RSA Public-Key: (2048 bit)
        Modulus:
          00:a2:fb:5a:fb:2d:d2:a7:75:7e:eb:f4:e4:d4:6c:
          94:be:91:a8:6a:21:43:b2:d5:9a:48:b0:64:d9:f7:
          f1:88:fa:50:cf:d0:f3:3d:8b:cc:95:f6:46:4b:42:
        .....
```

```
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Signature Value:
  24:3a:67:c8:0d:ef:eb:8c:eb:ba:8f:d5:11:d2:1e:ea:44:eb:
  fe:af:93:7d:d9:4a:2b:44:a3:7f:47:50:aa:d1:b3:9c:a8:a8:
  ....
```

certificate chains

That certificate signed by “InCommon RSA Server CA”

CA = certificate authority

so their public key, comes with my OS/browser?



not exactly...

they have their own certificate signed by “USERTrust RSA Certification Authority”


and their public key comes with your OS/browser?

(but both CAs now operated by UK-based Sectigo)

certificate hierarchy



certificate hierarchy



how many trust anchors?

Mozilla Firefox (as of 27 Feb 2023)

- 155 trust anchors

- operated by 55 distinct entities

Microsoft Windows (as of 27 Feb 2023)

- 237 trust anchors

- operated by 86 distinct entities

public-key infrastructure

ecosystem with certificate authorities
and certificates for everyone

called “public-key infrastructure”

several of these:

- for verifying identity of websites

- for verifying origin of domain name records (kind-of)

- for verifying origin of applications in some OSes/app stores/etc.

- for encrypted email in some organizations

- ...

key agreement and asym. encryption

can construct public-key encryption from key agreement

private key: generated random value Y

public key: key share generated from that Y

key agreement and asym. encryption

can construct public-key encryption from key agreement

private key: generated random value Y

public key: key share generated from that Y

$PE(\text{public key, message}) =$

- generate random value Z

- combine with public key to get shared secret

- use symmetric encryption + MAC using shared secret as keys

- output: (key share generated from Z) (sym. encrypted data) (mac tag)

key agreement and asym. encryption

can construct public-key encryption from key agreement

private key: generated random value Y

public key: key share generated from that Y

$PE(\text{public key, message}) =$
generate random value Z
combine with public key to get shared secret
use symmetric encryption + MAC using shared secret as keys
output: (key share generated from Z) (sym. encrypted data) (mac tag)

$PD(\text{private key, message}) =$
extract (key share generated from Z)
combine with private key to get shared secret, ...

exercise: forwarding paths (2)

cycle # 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

addq %r8, %r9

subq %r8, %r9

ret (goes to andq)

andq %r10, %r9

in subq, %r8 is _____ addq.

in subq, %r9 is _____ addq.

in andq, %r9 is _____ subq.

in andq, %r9 is _____ addq.

A: not forwarded from

B-D: forwarded to decode from {execute,memory,writeback} stage of