last time

```
make macros/variables (FOO=x)
pattern rules
user IDs, group IDs
chmod-style permissions
    user read/write/execute; group rwx; other rwx
general access control lists
superuser / root
```

quiz demo

superuser

```
user ID 0 is special

superuser or root

(non-Unix) or Administrator or SYSTEM or ...
```

some OS funtionality: only work for uid 0 shutdown, mount new file systems, etc.

automatically passes all (or almost all) permission checks

superuser v kernel mode

```
processor has two modes
kernel mode (what core part of OS uses)
user mode (every thing else)
```

programs running as superuser still in user mode just change in how OS acts when program asks for things

superuser: OS:: kernel mode: hardware

how does login work?

```
somemachine login: jo
password: ******
io@somemachine$ Is
this is a program which...
checks if the password is correct, and
changes user IDs, and
runs a shell
```

how does login work?

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somemachine login: jo
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this is a program which...
checks if the password is correct, and
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```

Unix password storage

typical single-user system: /etc/shadow only readable by root/superuser

department machines: network service

Kerberos / Active Directory: server takes (encrypted) passwords server gives tokens: "yes, really this user" can cryptographically verify tokens come from server

aside: beyond passwords

```
/bin/login entirely user-space code
only thing special about it: when it's run
could use any criteria to decide, not just passwords
physical tokens
biometrics
...
```

how does login work?

```
somemachine login: jo
password: ******
io@somemachine$ Is
this is a program which...
checks if the password is correct, and
changes user IDs, and
runs a shell
```

changing user IDs

```
int setuid(uid_t uid);
if superuser: sets effective user ID to arbitrary value
     and a "real user ID" and a "saved set-user-ID" (we'll talk later)
```

system starts in/login programs run as superuser voluntarily restrict own access before running shell, etc.

sudo

set-user-ID sudo

extra metadata bit on executables: set-user-ID

if set: exec() syscall changes effective user ID to owner's ID "extra" user IDs track what original user was

sudo program: owned by root, marked set-user-ID sudo's code: if (original user allowed) ...; else print error

marking setuid: chmod u+s

uses for setuid programs

mount USB stick

setuid program controls option to kernel mount syscall make sure user can't replace sensitive directories make sure user can't mess up filesystems on normal hard disks make sure user can't mount new setuid root files

control access to device — printer, monitor, etc. setuid program talks to device + decides who can

write to secure log file setuid program ensures that log is append-only for normal users

bind to a particular port number < 1024 setuid program creates socket, then becomes not root

set-user ID programs are very hard to write

```
what if stdin, stdout, stderr start closed?
what if signals setup weirldy?
what if the PATH env. var. set to directory of malicious programs?
what if argc == 0?
what if dynamic linker env. vars are set?
what if some bug allows memory corruption?
```

privilege escalation

privilege escalation — vulnerabilities that allow more privileges

code execution/corruption in utilities that run with high privilege e.g. buffer overflow, command injection

login, sudo, system services, ... bugs in system call implementations

logic errors in checking delegated operations

things programs on portal shouldn't do

read other user's files

modify OS's memory

read other user's data in memory

hang the entire system

things programs on portal shouldn't do

read other user's files

modify OS's memory

read other user's data in memory

hang the entire system

privileged operation: problem

how can hardware (HW) plus operating system (OS) allow: read your own files from hard drive

but disallow:

read others files from hard drive

some ideas

OS tells HW 'okay' parts of hard drive before running program code

complex for hardware and for OS

some ideas

OS tells HW 'okay' parts of hard drive before running program code

complex for hardware and for OS

OS verifies your program's code can't do bad hard drive access no work for HW, but complex for OS may require compiling differently to allow analysis

some ideas

OS tells HW 'okay' parts of hard drive before running program code

complex for hardware and for OS

OS verifies your program's code can't do bad hard drive access no work for HW, but complex for OS may require compiling differently to allow analysis

OS tells HW to only allow OS-written code to access hard drive that code can enforce only 'good' accesses requires program code to call OS routines to access hard drive relatively simple for hardware

kernel mode

extra one-bit register: "are we in *kernel mode*" other names: privileged mode, supervisor mode, ...

not in kernel mode = *user mode*

certain operations only allowed in kernel mode privileged instructions

example: talking to any I/O device

what runs in kernel mode?

system boots in kernel mode


OS switches to user mode to run program code

next topic: when does system switch back to kernel mode? how does OS tell HW where the (trusted) OS code is?

hardware + system call interface

applications + libraries	
user-mode hardware interface (limited)	system call interface
	kernel part of OS that runs in kernel mode
	kernel-mode hardware interface (complete)
hardware	

calling the OS?



controlled entry to kernel mode (1)

```
special instruction: "make system call"
similar idea as call instruction — jump to function elsewhere
(and allow that function to return later)
```

runs OS code in kernel mode at location specified earlier OS sets up at boot

location can't be changed without privilieged instrution


controlled entry to kernel mode (2)

OS needs to make specified location:


```
figure out what operation the program wants calling convention, similar to function arguments + return value
```

```
be "safe" — not allow the program to do 'bad' things example: checks whether current program is allowed to read file before reading it requires exceptional care — program can try weird things
```

system call process



system call process



system call terminology

some inconsistency:

```
system call = event of entering kernel mode on request?
system call = whole porcess from beginning to end?
```

same issue as with 'function call' is it just starting the function, or the whole time the function runs?

Linux x86-64 system calls

special instruction: syscall

runs OS specified code in kernel mode

Linux syscall calling convention

```
before syscall:
%rax — system call number
%rdi, %rsi, %rdx, %r10, %r8, %r9 — args
after syscall:
%rax — return value
```

on error: %rax contains -1 times "error number"

almost the same as normal function calls

Linux x86-64 hello world

```
.globl _start
.data
hello_str: .asciz "Hello, World!\n"
.text
start:
  movg $1, %rax # 1 = "write"
  movq $1, %rdi # file descriptor 1 = stdout
  movq $hello_str, %rsi
  movg $15, %rdx # 15 = strlen("Hello, World!\n")
  syscall
  movq $60, %rax # 60 = exit
  movq $0, %rdi
  syscall
```

approx. system call handler


```
sys call table:
    .quad handle_read_syscall
    .quad handle_write_syscall
    // ...
handle syscall:
    ... // save old PC, etc.
    pushq %rcx // save registers
    pushq %rdi
    call *sys call table(,%rax,8)
    . . .
    popq %rdi
    popq %rcx
    return_from_exception
```


Linux system call examples


```
mmap, brk — allocate memory
fork — create new process
execve — run a program in the current process
_exit — terminate a process
open, read, write — access files
socket, accept, getpeername — socket-related
```


Linux system call examples

```
mmap, brk — allocate memory
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<u>exit</u> — terminate a process
open, read, write — access files
socket, accept, getpeername — socket-related
```









system call wrappers

library functions to not write assembly:

```
open:
    movq $2, %rax // 2 = sys_open
    // 2 arguments happen to use same registers
    syscall
    // return value in %eax
    cmp $0, %rax
    jl has_error
    ret
has_error:
    neg %rax
    movq %rax, errno
    movq $-1, %rax
    ret
```

system call wrappers

library functions to not write assembly:

```
open:
    movq $2, %rax // 2 = sys_open
    // 2 arguments happen to use same registers
    syscall
    // return value in %eax
    cmp $0, %rax
    jl has_error
    ret
has_error:
    neg %rax
    movq %rax, errno
    movq $-1, %rax
    ret
```

system call wrapper: usage

```
/* unistd.h contains definitions of:
    O_RDONLY (integer constant), open() */
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void) {
  int file_descriptor;
  file_descriptor = open("input.txt", O_RDONLY);
  if (file descriptor < 0) {</pre>
      printf("error: \u00ed%s\n", strerror(errno));
      exit(1);
  result = read(file_descriptor, ...);
```

system call wrapper: usage

```
/* unistd.h contains definitions of:
    O_RDONLY (integer constant), open() */
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void) {
  int file_descriptor;
  file_descriptor = open("input.txt", O_RDONLY);
  if (file descriptor < 0) {</pre>
      printf("error: \u00ed%s\n", strerror(errno));
      exit(1);
  result = read(file_descriptor, ...);
```

strace hello_world (1)

strace — Linux tool to trace system calls

strace hello_world (2)

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main() { puts("Hello, World!"); }
when statically linked:
execve("./hello_world", ["./hello_world"], 0x7ffeb4127f70 /* 28 vars */)
brk(NULL)
                                        = 0x22f8000
brk(0x22f91c0)
                                        = 0x22f91c0
arch_prctl(ARCH_SET_FS, 0x22f8880)
uname({sysname="Linux", nodename="reiss-t3620", ...}) = 0
readlink("/proc/self/exe", "/u/cr4bd/spring2023/cs3130/slide"..., 4096)
                                        = 57
brk(0x231a1c0)
                                        = 0x231a1c0
brk(0x231b000)
                                        = 0x231b000
access("/etc/ld.so.nohwcap", F_OK)
                                        = -1 ENOENT (No such file or
                                                     directory)
fstat(1, {st_mode=S_IFCHR|0620, st_rdev=makedev(136, 4), ...}) = 0
write(1, "Hello, World!\n", 14)
                                        = 14
exit_group(0)
                                        = ?
+++ exited with 0 +++
```

aside: what are those syscalls?

execve: run program

brk: allocate heap space

arch_prctl(ARCH_SET_FS, ...): thread local storage pointer may make more sense when we cover concurrency/parallelism later

uname: get system information

readlink of /proc/self/exe: get name of this program

access: can we access this file [in this case, a config file]?

fstat: get information about open file

exit_group: variant of exit

strace hello_world (2)

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main() { puts("Hello, World!"); }
when dynamically linked:
execve("./hello_world", ["./hello_world"], 0x7ffcfe91d540 /* 28 vars */)
brk(NULL)
                                       = 0x55d6c351b000
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/etc/ld.so.cache", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 3
fstat(3, {st mode=S IFREG|0644, st size=196684, ...}) = 0
mmap(NULL, 196684, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 3, 0) = 0 \times 777a62dd3000
close(3)
access("/etc/ld.so.nohwcap", F OK) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or director
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 3
read(3, "177ELF(2)11300000000000000010000"..., 832) = 832
close(3)
write(1, "Hello, World!\n", 14)
                                       = 14
                                       = ?
exit_group(0)
+++ exited with 0 +++
```

hardware + system call interface

applications + libraries		
user-mode hardware interface (limited)	system call interface	
	kernel part of OS that runs in kernel mode	
	kernel-mode hardware interface (complete)	
hardware		

hardware + system call + library interface

application		
user-mode hardware interface (limited)	library interface	
	system libraries	
	system call interface	
	kernel part of OS that runs in kernel mode	
	kernel-mode	
	hardware interface	
	(complete)	
hardware		

things programs on portal shouldn't do

read other user's files

modify OS's memory

read other user's data in memory

hang the entire system

memory protection

modifying another program's memory?

```
Program A Program B

0x10000: .long 42

// ...

// do work

// ...

movq 0x10000, %rax

Program B

// while A is working:

movq $99, %rax

movq %rax, 0x10000

...
```

memory protection

modifying another program's memory?


```
Program A
                                Program B
0x10000: .long 42
                                // while A is working:
      // ...
                                movq $99, %rax
      // do work
                                movq %rax, 0x10000
      // ...
      movq 0x10000, %rax
result: %rax (in A) is ...
A. 42 B. 99 C. 0x10000
D. 42 or 99 (depending on timing/program layout/etc)
E. 42 or 99 or program might crash (depending on ...)
F. something else
```

shared memory

recall: dynamically linked libraries

would be nice not to duplicate code/data...

we can!



memory protection

modifying another program's memory?

```
Program A
                                          Program B
0x10000: .long 42
                                          // while A is working:
      // ...
                                          movq $99, %rax
      // do work
                                          movq %rax, 0x10000
      // ...
      movq 0x10000, %rax
 result: %rax (in A) is 42
                                           result: might crash
 (always with 'normal' multiuser OSes)
               C. 0x10000
A. 42 B. 99
D. 42 or 99 (depending on timing/program layout/etc)
E. 42 or 99 or program might crash (depending on ...)
F. something else
```

program crashing?

what happens on processor when program crashes?

other program informed of crash to display message use processor to run some other program

program crashing?

what happens on processor when program crashes?

other program informed of crash to display message use processor to run some other program

how does hardware do this?

would be complicated to tell about other programs, etc.

instead: hardware runs designated OS routine

exceptions

recall: system calls — software asks OS for help

also cases where hardware asks OS for help

different triggers than system calls

but same mechanism as system calls:

switch to kernel mode (if not already) call OS-designated function

exceptions

recall: system calls — software asks OS for help

also cases where hardware asks OS for help different triggers than system calls

but same mechanism as system calls:

switch to kernel mode (if not already) call OS-designated function

```
system calls
     intentional — ask OS to do something
errors/events in programs
     memory not in address space ("Segmentation fault")
     privileged instruction
     divide by zero, invalid instruction
(and more we'll talk about later)
```

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(and more we'll talk about later)
```

synchronous triggered by

triggered by current program

things programs on portal shouldn't do

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read other user's data in memory


hang the entire system

```
system calls
      intentional — ask OS to do something
      rs/events in programs
memory not in address space ("Segmentation fault")
privileged instruction


synchronous
triggered by
current program
errors/events in programs
      privileged instruction
      divide by zero, invalid instruction
external — I/O, etc.
```

timer — configured by OS to run OS at certain time asynchronous I/O devices — key presses, hard drives, networks, ... not triggered by running program

exceptions [Venn diagram]




general exception process




time multiplexing





time multiplexing



switching programs

OS starts running somehow some sort of exception


saves old registers + program counter + address mapping (optimization: could omit when program crashing/exiting)

sets new registers + address mapping, jumps to new program counter

called context switch
saved information called context


contexts (A running)

in Memory



contexts (B running)

in Memory



threads

thread = illusion of own processor

own register values

own program counter value

threads

thread = illusion of own processor

own register values

own program counter value

actual implementation: many threads sharing one processor

problem: where are register/program counter values when thread not active on processor?

types of exceptions

```
system calls
      intentional — ask OS to do something
     rs/events in programs
memory not in address space ("Segmentation fault")
privileged instruction

synchronous
triggered by
current program
errors/events in programs
      privileged instruction
      divide by zero, invalid instruction
external — I/O, etc.
      timer — configured by OS to run OS at certain time asynchronous
      I/O devices — key presses, hard drives, networks, ...
                                                                    not triggered by running program
      hardware is broken (e.g. memory parity error)
```

exception patterns with I/O(1)

input — available now:

exception: device says "I have input now"

handler: OS stores input for later

exception (syscall): program says "I want to read input"

handler: OS returns that input

input — not available now:

exception (syscall): program says "I want to read input"

handler: OS runs other things (context switch)

exception: device says "I have input now"

handler: OS retrieves input

handler: (possibly) OS switches back to program that wanted it

exception patterns with I/O (2)

output — ready now:


exception (syscall): program says "I want to output this' handler: OS sends output to device

output — not ready now

exception (syscall): program says "I want to output" handler: OS realizes device can't accept output yet (other things happen) exception: device says "I'm ready for output now"

handler: OS sends output requested earlier

keyboard input timeline



review: definitions

exception: hardware calls OS specified routine

many possible reasons

system calls: type of exception

context switch: OS switches to another thread by saving old register values + loading new ones part of OS routine run by exception

which of these require exceptions? context switches?

- A. program calls a function in the standard library
- B. program writes a file to disk
- C. program A goes to sleep, letting program B run
- D. program exits
- E. program returns from one function to another function
- F. program pops a value from the stack

terms for exceptions

terms for exceptions aren't standardized

```
our readings use one set of terms
interrupts = externally-triggered
faults = error/event in program
trap = intentionally triggered
all these terms appear differently elsewhere
```

The Process

```
\begin{aligned} & process = thread(s) + address \; space \\ & illusion \; of \; \frac{dedicated \; machine:}{thread = illusion \; of \; own \; CPU} \\ & (process \; could \; have \; multiple \; threads -- \; with \; independent \; registers) \\ & address \; space = illusion \; of \; own \; memory \end{aligned}
```

backup slides

authorization v authentication

authentication — who is who

authorization v authentication

authentication — who is who

authorization — who can do what probably need authentication first...

authentication

password

hardware token

...

some security tasks (1)

helping students collaborate in ad-hoc small groups on shared server?

Q1: what to allow/prevent?

Q2: how to use POSIX mechanisms to do this?

some security tasks (2)

letting students assignment files to faculty on shared server?

Q1: what to allow/prevent?

Q2: how to use POSIX mechanisms to do this?

some security tasks (3)

running untrusted game program from Internet?

Q1: what to allow/prevent?

Q2: how to use POSIX mechanisms to do this?

set-user ID gates

set-user ID program: gate to higher privilege

controlled access to extra functionality

make authorization/authentication decisions outside the kernel

way to allow normal users to do *one thing that needs privileges* write program that does that one thing — nothing else! make it owned by user that can do it (e.g. root) mark it set-user-ID

want to allow only some user to do the thing make program check which user ran it

set-user-ID program v syscalls

hardware decision: some things only for kernel

system calls: controlled access to things kernel can do

decision about how can do it: in the kernel

kernel decision: some things only for root (or other user) set-user-ID programs: controlled access to things root/... can do decision about how can do it: made by root/...

a broken setuid program: setup

suppose I have a directory all-grades on shared server in it I have a folder for each assignment and within that a text file for each user's grade + other info say I don't have flexible ACLs and want to give each user access

a broken setuid program: setup

suppose I have a directory all-grades on shared server in it I have a folder for each assignment and within that a text file for each user's grade + other info say I don't have flexible ACLs and want to give each user access one (bad?) idea: setuid program to read grade for assignment ./print_grade assignment outputs grade from all-grades/assignment/USER.txt

a very broken setuid program

```
print grade.c:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    char filename[500];
    sprintf(filename, "all-grades/%s/%s.txt",
            argv[1], getenv("USER"));
    int fd = open(filename, 0 RDWR);
    char buffer[1024];
    read(fd, buffer, 1024);
    printf("%s:_\%s\n", argv[1], buffer);
HUGE amount of stuff can go wrong
examples?
```

other privileged escalation issues

sudo problem: trusted code that's supposed to enforce restriction can be fooled into not really enforcing it

also can occur in other contexts:

```
system call letting program access things it shouldn't?
browser letting web page javascript access things it shouldn't?
web application giving users access to files they shouldn't have?
mobile phone OS allowing location access without location
permission?
```

•••

another very broken setuid program (setup)

allow users to print files, but only if less than 1KB

another very broken setuid program

```
print short file.c:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    struct stat st;
    if (stat(argv[1], &st) == -1) abort();
    // make sure argv[1] is owned by user running this
    if (st.st_uid != getuid()) abort();
    // and that it's less than 1 KB
    if (st.st size >= 1024) abort();
    char command[1024];
    sprintf(command, "print_%1000s", argv[1]);
    system(command);
    return EXIT_SUCCESS;
```

a delegation problem

consider printing program marked setuid to access printer decision: no accessing printer directly printing program enforces page limits, etc.

command line: file to print

can printing program just call open()?

a broken solution

```
if (original user can read file from argument) {
    open(file from argument);
    read contents of file;
    write contents of file to printer
    close(file from argument);
}
hope: this prevents users from printing files than can't read
problem: race condition!
```

a broken solution / why

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
setuid program	other user program
	create normal file toprint.txt
check: can user access? (yes)	_
	unlink("toprint.txt")
	link("/secret", "toprint.txt"
open("toprint.txt")	
read	_

link: create new directory entry for file another option: rename, symlink ("symbolic link" — alias for file/directory) another possibility: run a program that creates secret file (e.g. temporary file used by password-changing program)

time-to-check-to-time-of-use vulnerability

TOCTTOU solution

temporarily 'become' original user

then open

then turn back into set-uid user

this is why POSIX processes have multiple user IDs can swap out effective user ID temporarily

practical TOCTTOU races?

```
can use symlinks maze to make check slower symlink toprint.txt \to a/b/c/d/e/f/g/normal.txt symlink a/b \to ../a symlink a/c \to ../a ...
```

lots of time spent following symbolic links when program opening toprint.txt

gives more time to sneak in unlink/link or (more likely) rename

exercise

which (if any) of the following would fix for a TOCTTOU vulnerability in our setuid printing application? (assume the Unix-permissions without ACLs are in use)

[A] **both before and after** opening the path passed in for reading, check that the path is accessible to the user who ran our application

[B] after opening the path passed in for reading, using fstat with the file descriptor opened to check the permissions on the file

[C] before opening the path, verify that the user controls the file referred to by the path **and** the directory containing it

keeping permissions?

which of the following would still be secure?

- A. performing authorization checks in the standard library in addition to system call handlers
- B. performing authorization checks in the standard library instead of system call handlers
- C. making the user ID a system call argument rather than storing it persistently in the OS's memory

program memory (two programs)

Program A

Used by OS

Stack

Heap / other dynamic

Writable data

Code + Constants

Program B

Used by OS

Stack

Heap / other dynamic


Writable data

Code + Constants


address space

programs have illusion of own memory

called a program's address space




program memory (two programs)



address space

programs have illusion of own memory

called a program's address space



address space mechanisms

topic after exceptions

called virtual memory

mapping called page tables

mapping part of what is changed in context switch

one way to set shared memory on Linux

```
/* regular file, OR: */
int fd = open("/tmp/somefile.dat", O_RDWR);
/* special in-memory file */
int fd = shm_open("/name", O_RDWR);
/* make file's data accessible as memory */
void *memory = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
                    MAP SHARED, fd, 0);
mmap: "map" a file's data into your memory
will discuss a bit more when we talk about virtual memory
part of how Linux loads dynamically linked libraries
```


an infinite loop

```
int main(void) {
    while (1) {
        /* waste CPU time */
    }
}
If I run this on a shared department machine, can you still use it?
...if the machine only has one core?
```


timing nothing

```
long times[NUM TIMINGS];
int main(void) {
    for (int i = 0; i < N; ++i) {
        long start, end;
        start = get_time();
        /* do nothing */
        end = get_time();
        times[i] = end - start;
    output timings(times);
same instructions — same difference each time?
```

doing nothing on a busy system



doing nothing on a busy system



time multiplexing




time multiplexing


processor: loop.exe time loop: ... jmp loop loop: ... million cycle delay jmp loop loop:

oop.exe


time multiplexing




crash timeline timeline



locating exception handlers (one strategy)



keyboard input timeline



```
handle_timer_interrupt:
    save_old_pc save_pc
    movq %r15, save_r15
    /* key press here */
    movq %r14, save_r14
    ...
```

```
handle timer interrupt:
  save_old_pc save_pc
  movq %r15, save r15
 /* key press here */
  movq %r14, save_r14
                    handle_keyboard_interrupt:
                      save_old_pc save_pc
                      movq %r15, save r15
                      movq %r14, save_r14
                      movq %r13, save r13
```

```
handle timer interrupt:
         save_old_pc save_pc
         movq %r15, save r15
        /* key press here */
         movq %r14, save_r14
                           handle keyboard interrupt:
                             save_old_pc save_pc
                             movq %r15, save_r15
oops, overwrote saved values?
                             movq %r14, save_r14
                             movq %r13, save r13
```

interrupt disabling

CPU supports disabling (most) interrupts

interrupts will wait until it is reenabled

CPU has extra state:

are interrupts enabled? is keyboard interrupt pending? is timer interrupt pending?

```
handle timer interrupt:
 /* interrupts automatically disabled here */
 movq %rsp, save_rsp
  save_old_pc save_pc
 /* key press here */
  impIfFromKernelMode skip_exception_stack
 movq current_exception_stack, %rsp
skip set kernel stack:
  pushq save_rsp
  pushq save pc
  enable intterupts2
  pushq %r15
  /* interrupt happens here! */
```

```
handle timer interrupt:
 /* interrupts automatically disabled here */
 movq %rsp, save_rsp
  save_old_pc save_pc
 /* key press here */
  impIfFromKernelMode skip_exception_stack
 movq current_exception_stack, %rsp
skip set kernel stack:
  pushq save_rsp
  pushq save pc
  enable intterupts2
  pushq %r15
  /* interrupt happens here! */
```

```
handle timer interrupt:
 /* interrupts automatically disabled here */
 movq %rsp, save rsp
  save_old_pc save_pc
 /* key press here */
  impIfFromKernelMode skip_exception_stack
 movq current_exception_stack, %rsp
skip set kernel stack:
  pushq save_rsp
  pushq save_pc
  enable intterupts2
  pushq %r15
 /* interrupt happens here! */
```

handle_keyboard_interrupt:

disabling interrupts

```
automatically disabled when exception handler starts
also can be done with privileged instruction:
change keyboard parameters:
  disable interrupts
  /* change things used by
     handle_keyboard_interrupt here */
  enable_interrupts
```

exception implementation

detect condition (program error or external event)
save current value of PC somewhere
jump to exception handler (part of OS)
jump done without program instruction to do so

exception implementation: notes

I describe a simplified version

real x86/x86-64 is a bit more complicated (mostly for historical reasons)

context


context switch pseudocode

```
context_switch(last, next):
   copy_preexception_pc last->pc
   mov rax,last->rax
   mov rcx, last->rcx
   mov rdx, last->rdx
   ...
   mov next->rdx, rdx
   mov next->rcx, rcx
   mov next->rax, rax
   jmp next->pc
```

applications								
	standard library functions / shell commands							
	standard libraries and libc (C standard library) utility programs login					the shell login		
	system call interface							
		kernel	CPU sched virtual med pipes		filesystems device drivers swapping		working nals	
hardware interface								
hardware	me	emory m	anagement	unit	device controlle	ers		

applications								
		rd library functions / shell commands						
star	ndar	d librar	ries and		(C standard libra	ary)	the shell	
util		orogran		login			login	
		system	call inter	face				
user-mode hardware interface (limited)		kernel virtual memory		filesystems device drivers swapping	networking ers signals 			
(mmcca)		kernel-mode hardware interface (complete)						
hardware	m	emory m	anagement	unit	device controlle	ers		

applications							
standard library functions / shell commands							
	ard libraries and libc (C standard library) programs login	the shell login					
user-mode	system call interface						
hardware interface (limited)	CPU scheduler filesystems networkernel virtual memory device drivers sign pipes swapping	working ials					
(kernel-mode hardware interface (complete)						
hardware ⁿ	nemory management unit device controllers						



the OS?

applications								
standard library functions / shell commands								
	d libraries and rograms	libc logir	(C standard libr า	ary)	the shell login			
usor mode	system call in	terface						
user-mode hardware interface (limited)		rnel virtual memory device drivers sig		netv sign 	working als			
(mmesa)	kernel-mode hardware interface (complete)							
hardware ^m	mory manageme	ent unit	device controlle	ers .				

the OS?

aside: is the OS the kernel?

OS = stuff that runs in kernel mode?

OS = stuff that runs in kernel mode + libraries to use it?

OS = stuff that runs in kernel mode + libraries + utility programs (e.g. shell, finder)?

OS = everything that comes with machine?

no consensus on where the line is

each piece can be replaced separately...

exception implementation

detect condition (program error or external event)
save current value of PC somewhere
jump to exception handler (part of OS)
jump done without program instruction to do so

exception implementation: notes

I describe a simplified version

real x86/x86-64 is a bit more complicated (mostly for historical reasons)

running the exception handler

hardware saves the old program counter (and maybe more)

identifies location of exception handler via table

then jumps to that location

OS code can save anything else it wants to , etc.