# opening a file?

```
open("/u/creiss/private.txt", 0_RDONLY)
say, private file on portal
```

on Linux: makes system call

kernel needs to decide if this should work or not

#### how does OS decide this?

argument: needs extra metadata

what would be wrong using...

system call arguments?

where the code calling open came from?

#### authorization v authentication

authentication — who is who

#### authorization v authentication

authentication — who is who

authorization — who can do what probably need authentication first...

### authentication

password

hardware token

---

#### user IDs

most common way OSes identify what domain process belongs to:

(unspecified for now) procedure sets user IDs every process has a user ID

user ID used to decide what process is authorized to do

#### **POSIX** user IDs

also some other user IDs — we'll talk later

```
uid_t geteuid(); // get current process's "effective" user ID
process's user identified with unique number
kernel typically only knows about number
effective user ID is used for all permission checks
```

#### **POSIX** user IDs

```
uid_t geteuid(); // get current process's "effective" user ID
process's user identified with unique number
kernel typically only knows about number
effective user ID is used for all permission checks
```

standard programs/library maintain number to name mapping /etc/passwd on typical single-user systems network database on department machines

also some other user IDs — we'll talk later

# **POSIX** groups

```
gid_t getegid(void);
    // process's"effective" group ID
int getgroups(int size, gid_t list[]);
    // process's extra group IDs
POSIX also has group IDs
like user IDs: kernel only knows numbers
    standard library+databases for mapping to names
also process has some other group IDs — we'll talk later
```

#### id

```
cr4bd@power4
: /net/zf14/cr4bd ; id
uid=858182(cr4bd) gid=21(csfaculty)
         groups=21(csfaculty),325(instructors),90027(cs4414)
id command displays uid, gid, group list
names looked up in database
    kernel doesn't know about this database
    code in the C standard library
```

# groups that don't correspond to users

example: video group for access to monitor

put process in video group when logged in directly don't do it when SSH'd in

# groups that don't correspond to users

example: video group for access to monitor

put process in video group when logged in directly don't do it when SSH'd in

...but: user can keep program running with video group in the background after logout?

# **POSIX** file permissions

(see docs for chmod command)

POSIX files have a very restricted access control list

```
one user ID + read/write/execute bits for user "owner" — also can change permissions one group ID + read/write/execute bits for group default setting — read/write/execute
```

# POSIX/NTFS ACLs

more flexible access control lists

list of (user or group, read or write or execute or ...)

supported by NTFS (Windows)

a version standardized by POSIX, but usually not supported

# **POSIX ACL** syntax

```
# group students have read+execute permissions
group:students:r-x
# group faculty has read/write/execute permissions
group:faculty:rwx
# user mst3k has read/write/execute permissions
user:mst3k:rwx
# user tj1a has no permissions
user:tj1a:---
# POSIX acl rule:
    # user take precedence over group entries
```

# authorization checking on Unix

checked on system call entry no relying on libraries, etc. to do checks

```
files (open, rename, ...) — file/directory permissions processes (kill, ...) — process UID = user UID ...
```

# keeping permissions?

which of the following would still be secure?

A. setting up a read-only page table entry that allows a process to directly access its user ID from its process control block in user mode

B. performing authorization checks in the standard library in addition to system call handlers

C. performing authorization checks in the standard library instead of system call handlers

D. making the user ID a system call argument rather than storing it in the process control block

#### superuser

```
user ID 0 is special

superuser or root

(non-Unix) or Administrator or SYSTEM or ...
```

some system calls: only work for uid 0 shutdown, mount new file systems, etc.

automatically passes all (or almost all) permission checks

### superuser v kernel mode

superuser : OS :: kernel mode : hardware

programs running as superuser still in user mode just change in how OS acts on system calls, etc.

# how does login work?

```
somemachine login: jo
password: ******
io@somemachine$ Is
this is a program which...
checks if the password is correct, and
changes user IDs, and
runs a shell
```

# how does login work?

```
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```

# Unix password storage

typical single-user system: /etc/shadow only readable by root/superuser

department machines: network service

Kerberos / Active Directory: server takes (encrypted) passwords server gives tokens: "yes, really this user" can cryptographically verify tokens come from server

# aside: beyond passwords

```
/bin/login entirely user-space code
only thing special about it: when it's run
could use any criteria to decide, not just passwords
physical tokens
biometrics
...
```

# how does login work?

```
somemachine login: jo
password: ******
io@somemachine$ Is
this is a program which...
checks if the password is correct, and
changes user IDs, and
runs a shell
```

### changing user IDs

```
int setuid(uid_t uid);
if superuser: sets effective user ID to arbitrary value
     and a "real user ID" and a "saved set-user-ID" (we'll talk later)
```

system starts in/login programs run as superuser voluntarily restrict own access before running shell, etc.

#### sudo

```
tjla@somemachine$ sudo restart
Password: *******
sudo: run command with superuser permissions
    started by non-superuser
```

recall: inherits non-superuser UID

can't just call setuid(0)

#### set-user-ID sudo

extra metadata bit on executables: set-user-ID

if set: exec() syscall changes effective user ID to owner's ID

sudo program: owned by root, marked set-user-ID

marking setuid: chmod u+s

#### set-user ID gates

set-user ID program: gate to higher privilege

controlled access to extra functionality

make authorization/authentication decisions outside the kernel

way to allow normal users to do *one thing that needs privileges* write program that does that one thing — nothing else! make it owned by user that can do it (e.g. root) mark it set-user-ID

want to allow only some user to do the thing make program check which user ran it

# uses for setuid programs

#### mount USB stick

setuid program controls option to kernel mount syscall make sure user can't replace sensitive directories make sure user can't mess up filesystems on normal hard disks make sure user can't mount new setuid root files

control access to device — printer, monitor, etc. setuid program talks to device + decides who can

write to secure log file setuid program ensures that log is append-only for normal users

bind to a particular port number  $<1024\,$  setuid program creates socket, then becomes not root

### set-user-ID program v syscalls

hardware decision: some things only for kernel

system calls: controlled access to things kernel can do

decision about how can do it: in the kernel

kernel decision: some things only for root (or other user) set-user-ID programs: controlled access to things root/... can do

decision about how can do it: made by root/...

### privilege escalation

privilege escalation — vulnerabilities that allow more privileges

code execution/corruption in utilities that run with high privilege e.g. buffer overflow, command injection

login, sudo, system services, ... bugs in system call implementations

logic errors in checking delegated operations

# a broken setuid program: setup

suppose I have a directory all-grades on shared server in it I have a folder for each assignment and within that a text file for each user's grade + other info say I don't have flexible ACLs and want to give each user access

# a broken setuid program: setup

suppose I have a directory all-grades on shared server in it I have a folder for each assignment and within that a text file for each user's grade + other info say I don't have flexible ACLs and want to give each user access one (bad?) idea: setuid program to read grade for assignment ./print\_grade assignment outputs grade from all-grades/assignment/USER.txt

# a very broken setuid program

```
print grade.c:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    char filename[500];
    sprintf(filename, "all-grades/%s/%s.txt",
            argv[1], getenv("USER"));
    int fd = open(filename, 0 RDWR);
    char buffer[1024];
    read(fd, buffer, 1024);
    printf("%s: %s\n", argv[1], buffer);
HUGE amount of stuff can go wrong
examples?
```

# another very broken setuid program (setup)

allow users to print files, but only if less than 1KB

### another very broken setuid program

```
print short file.c:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    struct stat st;
    if (stat(argv[1], \&st) == -1) abort();
    // make sure argv[1] is owned by user running this
    if (st.st_uid != getuid()) abort();
    // and that it's less than 1 KB
    if (st.st_size >= 1024) abort();
    char command[1024];
    sprintf(command, "print %1000s", argv[1]);
    system(command);
    return EXIT_SUCCESS;
```

#### set-user ID programs are very hard to write

```
what if stdin, stdout, stderr start closed?
what if signals setup weirldy?
what if the PATH env. var. set to directory of malicious programs?
what if argc == 0?
what if dynamic linker env. vars are set?
what if some bug allows memory corruption?
```

## some security tasks (1)

helping students collaborate in ad-hoc small groups on shared server?

Q1: what to allow/prevent?

Q2: how to use POSIX mechanisms to do this?

## some security tasks (2)

letting students assignment files to faculty on shared server?

Q1: what to allow/prevent?

Q2: how to use POSIX mechanisms to do this?

## some security tasks (3)

running untrusted game program from Internet?

Q1: what to allow/prevent?

Q2: how to use POSIX mechanisms to do this?

## backup slides

#### a delegation problem

consider printing program marked setuid to access printer decision: no accessing printer directly printing program enforces page limits, etc.

command line: file to print

can printing program just call open()?

#### a broken solution

```
if (original user can read file from argument) {
    open(file from argument);
    read contents of file;
    write contents of file to printer
    close(file from argument);
}
hope: this prevents users from printing files than can't read
problem: race condition!
```

## a broken solution / why

•	
setuid program	other user program
	create normal file toprint.txt
check: can user access? (yes)	<u> </u>
	<pre>unlink("toprint.txt")</pre>
	<pre>unlink("toprint.txt") link("/secret", "toprint.txt"</pre>
open("toprint.txt")	_
read	<u> </u>
	•

link: create new directory entry for file another option: rename, symlink ("symbolic link" — alias for file/directory) another possibility: run a program that creates secret file (e.g. temporary file used by password-changing program)

time-to-check-to-time-of-use vulnerability

#### **TOCTTOU** solution

temporarily 'become' original user

then open

then turn back into set-uid user

this is why POSIX processes have multiple user IDs can swap out effective user ID temporarily

### practical TOCTTOU races?

```
can use symlinks maze to make check slower symlink toprint.txt \to a/b/c/d/e/f/g/normal.txt symlink a/b \to ../a symlink a/c \to ../a ...
```

lots of time spent following symbolic links when program opening toprint.txt

gives more time to sneak in unlink/link or (more likely) rename

#### exercise

which (if any) of the following would fix for a TOCTTOU vulnerability in our setuid printing application? (assume the Unix-permissions without ACLs are in use)

[A] **both before and after** opening the path passed in for reading, check that the path is accessible to the user who ran our application

[B] after opening the path passed in for reading, using fstat with the file descriptor opened to check the permissions on the file

[C] before opening the path, verify that the user controls the file referred to by the path **and** the directory containing it

#### program memory

Used by OS		
Stack		
Heap / other dynamic		
Writable data		
Code + Constants		

0xFFFF FFFF FFFF
0xFFFF 8000 0000 0000
0x7F...

0x0000 0000 0040 0000


#### address spaces


illuision of dedicated memory





#### address spaces

#### illuision of dedicated memory













program addresses are 'virtual' real addresses are 'physical' can be different sizes!











divide memory into pages ( $2^8$  bytes in this case) "virtual" = addresses the program sees



page number is upper bits of address (because page size is power of two)



rest of address is called page offset

## toy physical memory

## program memory virtual addresses

11	0000	0000	to
11	1111	1111	
10	0000	0000	to
10	1111	1111	
01	0000	0000	to
01	1111	1111	
00	0000	0000	to
00	1111	1111	

# real memory physical addresses


, ,			
111	0000	0000	to
111	1111	1111	
			·
			·
			·
001	0000	0000	to
001	1111	1111	
000	0000	0000	to
000	1111	1111	


#### toy physical memory


## program memory virtual addresses


11	0000	0000	to
11	1111	1111	
10	0000	0000	to
10	1111	1111	
01	0000	0000	to
01	1111	1111	
00	0000	0000	to
0.0	1111	1111	

# real memory physical addresses












```
virtual page # valid? physical page # 00 1 010 (2, code) 01 1 111 (7, data) 10 0 ??? (ignored) 11 1 000 (0, stack)
```






#### t "virtual page number" | ookup 1101 0010 — address from CPU virtual page # valid? physical page #010 (2, code) 00 (7, data) 01 10 (ignored) 000 (0, stack) 11 1101 0010 to memory

trigger exception if 0?



#### toy pag "page offset" ookup



#### switching page tables

part of context switch is changing the page table

extra privileged instructions

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where in memory is the code that does this switching?

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#### switching page tables

part of context switch is changing the page table extra privileged instructions

where in memory is the code that does this switching? probably have a page table entry pointing to it hopefully marked kernel-mode-only

code better not be modified by user program otherwise: uncontrolled way to "escape" user mode

# emacs (two copies)

Emacs (run by user mst3k)

Used by OS
Stack
Heap / other dynamic
Writable data
${\sf emacs.exe} \; \big( {\sf Code} + {\sf Constants} \big)$

Emacs (run by user xyz4w)

	·
U	sed by OS
	Stack
Heap /	other dynamic
W	ritable data
emacs.exe	(Code + Constants)

# emacs (two copies)

Emacs (run by user mst3k)	Emacs (run by user xyz4w)		
Used by OS	Used by OS		
Stack	Stack		
Heap / other dynamic	Heap / other dynamic		
Writable data	Writable data		
$emacs.exe\;(Code + Constants)$	$emacs.exe\; (Code + Constants)$		

same data?

#### two copies of program

would like to only have one copy of program

what if mst3k's emacs tries to modify its code?

would break process abstraction:

"illusion of own memory"

### typical page table entries

solution: same idea as kernel-only bit

page table entry will have more permissions bits

can read? can write? can execute?

checked by MMU like valid/kernel bit

page table (logically)

virtual page #	valid?	kernel?	write?	exec?	physical page #
0000 0000	0	0	0	0	00 0000 0000
0000 0001	1	0	1	0	10 0010 0110
0000 0010	1	0	1	0	00 0000 1100
0000 0011	1	0	0	1	11 0000 0011
•••					
1111 1111[	1	0	1	0	00 1110 1000

#### on virtual address sizes

virtual address size = size of pointer?

often, but — sometimes part of pointer not used

example: typical x86-64 only use 48 bits rest of bits have fixed value

virtual address size is amount used for mapping

#### address space sizes

amount of stuff that can be addressed = address space size based on number of unique addresses

e.g. 32-bit virtual address =  $2^{32}$  byte virtual address space

e.g. 20-bit physical addresss =  $2^{20}$  byte physical address space

#### address space sizes

- amount of stuff that can be addressed = address space size based on number of unique addresses
- e.g. 32-bit virtual address =  $2^{32}$  byte virtual address space
- e.g. 20-bit physical addresss =  $2^{20}$  byte physical address space
- what if my machine has 3GB of memory (not power of two)?

  not all addresses in physical address space are useful
  most common situation (since CPUs support having a lot of memory)

### exercise: page counting

suppose 32-bit virtual (program) addresses

and each page is 4096 bytes ( $2^{12}$  bytes)

how many virtual pages?

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#### exercise: page table size

```
suppose 32-bit virtual (program) addresses suppose 30-bit physical (hardware) addresses each page is 4096 bytes (2^{12} bytes) pgae table entries have physical page \#, valid bit, kernel-mode bit
```

how big is the page table (if laid out like ones we've seen)?

#### exercise: page table size

suppose 32-bit virtual (program) addresses suppose 30-bit physical (hardware) addresses each page is 4096 bytes ( $2^{12}$  bytes) pgae table entries have physical page #, valid bit, kernel-mode bit

how big is the page table (if laid out like ones we've seen)?

issue: where can we store that?

#### exercise: address splitting

and each page is 4096 bytes ( $2^{12}$  bytes)

split the address 0x12345678 into page number and page offset:

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and each page is 4096 bytes ( $2^{12}$  bytes)

split the address 0x12345678 into page number and page offset:

where can processor store megabytes of page tables? in memory

page table entry layout

valid (bit 15) kernel (bit 14) physical page # (bits 4–13) unused (bit 0-3)

where can processor store megabytes of page tables? in memory


page table entry layout


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
page table base register





page table e	entry layout
valid (bit 15) kernel (bit 14) physical	page $\#$ (bits 4–13) unused (bit 0-3)
nomo toblo boso vonistov	physical memory
page table base register	addressesbytes
0x00010000	0x00000000-1 <u>00000000 00000000</u>
<u> </u>	× 0x00010000-1 00000000 00000000
	0x00010002-3 10100010 01100000
	0x00010004-5 10000010 11000000
	0x00010006-7 <u>10110000 00110000</u>
	0x000101FE-F 10001110 10000000
	0x00010200-1 10100010 00111010





















virtual address


11 0101 01 00 1101 1111

















# exercise setup

5-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical addresses, 8-byte pages

page table

virtual	physical	
page #	valid?	page #
00	1	010
01	1	111
10	0	000
11	1	000

physical addresses	byt	es		
0x00-3				
0x04-7	44	55	66	77
0x08-B	88	99	AΑ	ВВ
0x0C-F	C	DD	EE	FF
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A
0x14-7	1В	2B	3B	4B
0x18-B				
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C

physical bytes addresses_
0x20-3 D0 D1 D2 D3
0x24-7 D4 D5 D6 D7
0x28-B89 9A AB BC
0x2C-FCD DE EF F0
0x30-3BA 0A BA 0A
0x34-7 CB 0B CB 0B
0x38-BDC 0C DC 0C
0x3C-FEC 0C EC 0C


#### exercise setup

5-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical addresses, 8-byte pages

page table

virtual	valid?	physical
page #	valid!	page #
00	1	010
01	1	111
10	0	000
11	1	000

physical addresses	bvte	es		
0x00-3	00	11	22	33
0x04-7	44	55	66	77
0x08-B	88	99	ΑА	ВВ
0x0C-F				
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A
0x14-7				
0x18-B				
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C



5-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical addresses, 8-byte pages

(virtual addresses) 0x18 = ????; 0x03 = ????; 0x0A = ????; 0x13 = ??? page table

virtual physical page # valid? page # 00 1 010 011 111 10 0 000 11 1 1 1000

physical addresses	byt	es		
0x00-3		11	22	33
0x04-7	44	55	66	77
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C.

physical addresses	byt	es		
0x20-3	D0	D1	D2	D3
0x24-7		_	D6	
0x28-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x2C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x30-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0A
0x34-7	СВ	0B	СВ	0B
0x38-B	DC	0C	DC	0C
0x3C-F	EC	0C	EC	0C

5-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical addresses, 8-byte pages

```
(virtual addresses) 0x18 = ; 0x03 = ???; 0x0A = ???; 0x13 = ??? page table
```

virtual page # valid? physical page # 00 1 010 011 111 10 0 000 11 1 1 1000

physical addresses	byt	es		
0x00-3			22	33
0x04-7	44	55	66	77
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C
0×1C-F	10	20	30	<u>4</u> C

physical bytes addresses 0x20-3 D0 D1 D2 D3 0x24-7 D4 D5 D6 D7 0x28-B|89 9A AB BC 0x2C-FCD DE EF F0 0x30-3|BA 0A BA 0A 0x34-7 CB 0B CB 0B 0x38-BDC 0C DC 0C 0x3C-FEC 0C EC 0C

5-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical addresses, 8-byte pages

```
(virtual addresses) 0x18 = ; 0x03 = ; 0x0A = ???; 0x13 = ??? page table
```

```
virtual valid? physical page # 00 1 010 011 111 10 0 000 11 1 1 1 000
```

physical addresses	bytes
	00 11 22 33
0x04-7	44 55 66 77
0x08-B	88 99 AA BB
0x0C-F	CC DD EE FF
0x10-3	1A 2A 3A 4A
0x14-7	1B 2B 3B 4B
0x18-B	1C 2C 3C 4C
0x1C-F	1C 2C 3C 4C

physical addresses	byt	es		
0x20-3	D0	D1	D2	D3
0x24-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x28-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x2C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x30-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0Α
0x34-7	СВ	0B	СВ	0B
0x38-B	DC	0C	DC	0C
0x3C-F	EC	0C	EC	0C

5-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical addresses, 8-byte pages

```
(virtual addresses) 0x18 = ; 0x03 = ; 0x0A = ; 0x13 = ??? page table
```

physical addresses	byt	es		
0x00-3	00	11	22	33
0x04-7	44	55	66	77
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	30	4C

physical bytes addresses 0x20-3 D0 D1 D2 D3 0x24-7 D4 D5 D6 D7 0x28-B|89 9A AB BC 0x2C-FCD DE EF F0 0x30-3|BA 0A BA 0A 0x34-7 CB 0B CB 0B 0x38-BDC 0C DC 0C 0x3C-FEC 0C EC 0C

5-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical addresses, 8-byte pages

```
(virtual addresses) 0x18 = ; 0x03 = ; 0x0A = ; 0x13 = page table
```

virtual page # valid? page # 00 1 010 000 11 111 10 0 000 11 1 10 000

physical addresses	bytes
	00 11 22 33
0x04-7	44 55 66 77
0x08-B	88 99 AA BB
0x0C-F	CC DD EE FF
0x10-3	1A 2A 3A 4A
0x14-7	1B 2B 3B 4B
0x18-B	1C 2C 3C 4C
0x1C-F	10.20.30.40

physical bytes addresses 0x20-3 D0 D1 D2 D3 0x24-7 D4 D5 D6 D7 0x28-B|89 9A AB BC 0x2C-FCD DE EF F0 0x30-3|BA 0A BA 0A 0x34-7 CB 0B CB 0B 0x38-BDC 0C DC 0C 0x3C-FEC 0C EC 0C

6-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 8 byte pages, 1 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 3 bit PPN (MSB), 1 valid bit, 4 other bits;

physical					phv	sical				
physical addresses	byte	es			phys addre	sses	byt	es		
0x00-3			22	33	0x20				D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x24	4-7	F4	F5	F6	F7
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ	0x28	8-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x20	C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A	0x30	9-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0Α
0x14-7	1В	2B	3B	4B	0x34	4-7	СВ	0B	СВ	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x38	8-B	DC	0C	DC	оC
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x30	C-F	EC	0C	EC	0C

6-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 8 byte pages, 1 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 3 bit PPN (MSB), 1 valid bit, 4 other bits;

```
physical bytes
                                          0x31 = 11 0001
addresses
                                          PTE addr:
                      0x20-3|D0 D1 D2 D3
0x00-3|00 11 22 33
                                          0x20 + 6 \times 1 = 0x26
0x04-7|44 55 66 77
                      0x24-7|F4 F5 F6 F7 |
                      0x28-B|89 9A AB BC
0x08-B|88 99 AA BB
                                          PTF value
0x0C-FCC DD EE FF
                      0x2C-FCD DE EF F0
                                          0xF6 = 1111 0110
0x10-3|1A 2A 3A 4A
                      0x30-3|BA 0A BA 0A
                                          PPN 111, valid 1
                      0x34-7 CB 0B CB 0B
0x14-7|1B 2B 3B 4B
                                          M[111 \ 001] = M[0x39]
                      0x38-BDC 0C DC 0C
0x18-B|1C 2C 3C 4C
                                          \rightarrow 0x0C
0x1C-F|1C 2C 3C 4C
                      0x3C-FEC 0C EC 0C
```

6-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 8 byte pages, 1 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 3 bit PPN (MSB), 1 valid bit, 4 other bits;

```
physical bytes
                                            0x31 = 11 0001
addresses
                                            PTE addr:
                      0x20-3|D0 D1 D2 D3
0x00-3|00 11 22 33
                                           0x20 + 6 \times 1 = 0x26
0x04-7|44 55 66 77
                      0x24-7|F4 F5 F6 F7 |
                      0x28-B|89 9A AB BC
0x08-B|88 99 AA BB
                                           PTE value:
0x0C-FCC DD EE FF
                      0x2C-FCD DE EF F0
                                           0 \times F6 = 1111 \quad 0110
0x10-3|1A 2A 3A 4A
                      0x30-3|BA 0A BA 0A
                                           PPN 111, valid 1
0x14-7|1B 2B 3B 4B
                      0x34-7|CB 0B CB 0B
                                           M[111 \ 001] = M[0x39]
                      0x38-BDC 0C DC 0C
0x18-B|1C 2C 3C 4C
                                           \rightarrow 0x0C
0x1C-F|1C 2C 3C 4C
                      0x3C-FEC 0C EC 0C
```

6-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 8 byte pages, 1 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 3 bit PPN (MSB), 1 valid bit, 4 other bits;

```
physical bytes
                                           0x31 = 11 \ 0001
addresses
                                           PTE addr:
                      0x20-3|D0 D1 D2 D3
0x00-3|00 11 22 33
                                           0x20 + 6 \times 1 = 0x26
0x04-7|44 55 66 77
                      0x24-7|F4 F5 F6 F7 |
                      0x28-B|89 9A AB BC
0x08-B|88 99 AA BB
                                           PTE value:
0x0C-FCC DD EE FF
                      0x2C-FCD DE EF F0
                                           0 \times F6 = 1111 \ 0110
0x10-3|1A 2A 3A 4A
                      0x30-3|BA 0A BA 0A
                                           PPN 111, valid 1
0x14-7|1B 2B 3B 4B
                      0x34-7|CB 0B CB 0B
                                           M[111 \ 001] = M[0x39]
                      0x38-BDC 0C DC 0C
0x18-B|1C 2C 3C 4C
                                           \rightarrow 0x0C
0x1C-F|1C 2C 3C 4C
                      0x3C-FEC 0C EC 0C
```

6-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 8 byte pages, 1 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 3 bit PPN (MSB), 1 valid bit, 4 other bits;

physical addresses	bvt	es			physicaddress	cal	bvt	es		
addresses	- , -				address	ses	- , -			
0x00-3	00	11	22	33	0x20	-3	D0	D1	D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x24	-7	F4	F5	F6	F7
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ	0x28	-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	C	DD	EE	FF	0x2C	-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A	0x30	-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0A
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x34	-7	СВ	0B	СВ	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x38	-B	DC	0C	DC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3C	-F	EC	0C	EC	0C

6-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 8 byte pages, 1 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 3 bit PPN (MSB), 1 valid bit, 4 other bits;

```
physical bytes
                                           0x12 = 01 0010
addresses
                                           PTE addr:
                      0x20-3|D0 D1 D2 D3
0x00-3|00 11 22 33
                                           0x20 + 2 \times 1 = 0x22
0x04-7|44 55 66 77
                      0x24-7|F4 F5 F6 F7 |
                      0x28-B|89 9A AB BC
0x08-B|88 99 AA BB
                                          PTE value:
0x0C-FCC DD EE FF
                      0x2C-FCD DE EF F0
                                           0 \times D2 = 1101 \ 0010
0x10-3|1A 2A 3A 4A
                      0x30-3|BA 0A BA 0A
                                           PPN 110, valid 1
0x14-7|1B 2B 3B 4B
                      0x34-7|CB 0B CB 0B
                                           M[110 \ 010] = M[0x32]
                      0x38-BDC 0C DC 0C
0x18-B|1C 2C 3C 4C
                                           \rightarrow 0xBA
0x1C-F|1C 2C 3C 4C
                      0x3C-FEC 0C EC 0C
```

6-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 8 byte pages, 1 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 3 bit PPN (MSB), 1 valid bit, 4 other bits;

```
physical bytes
                                          0x12 = 01 0010
addresses
                                          PTE addr:
                      0x20-3|D0 D1 D2 D3
0x00-3|00 11 22 33
                                          0x20 + 2 \times 1 = 0x22
0x04-7|44 55 66 77
                      0x24-7|F4 F5 F6 F7
                      0x28-B|89 9A AB BC
0x08-B|88 99 AA BB
                                         PTE value:
0x0C-FCC DD EE FF
                      0x2C-FCD DE EF F0
                                          0xD2 = 1101 0010
0x10-3|1A 2A 3A 4A
                      0x30-3|BA 0A BA 0A
                                          PPN 110, valid 1
0x14-7|1B 2B 3B 4B
                      0x34-7|CB 0B CB 0B
                                          M[110 \ 010] = M[0x32]
                      0x38-BDC 0C DC 0C
0x18-B|1C 2C 3C 4C
                                          \rightarrow 0xBA
0x1C-F|1C 2C 3C 4C
                      0x3C-FEC 0C EC 0C
                                                                  65
```

6-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 8 byte pages, 1 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 3 bit PPN (MSB), 1 valid bit, 4 other bits;

```
physical bytes
                                          0x12 = 01 \ 0010
addresses
                                          PTE addr:
                      0x20-3|D0 D1 D2 D3
0x00-3|00 11 22 33
                                          0x20 + 2 \times 1 = 0x22
0x04-7|44 55 66 77
                      0x24-7|F4 F5 F6 F7
                      0x28-B|89 9A AB BC
0x08-B|88 99 AA BB
                                          PTE value:
0x0C-FCC DD EE FF
                      0x2C-FCD DE EF F0
                                          0xD2 = 1101 0010
0x10-3|1A 2A 3A 4A
                      0x30-3|BA 0A BA 0A
                                          PPN 110, valid 1
0x14-7|1B 2B 3B 4B
                      0x34-7|CB 0B CB 0B
                                          M[110 \ 010] = M[0x32]
                      0x38-BDC 0C DC 0C
0x18-B|1C 2C 3C 4C
                                          \rightarrow 0xBA
0x1C-F|1C 2C 3C 4C
                      0x3C-FEC 0C EC 0C
```

my desktop: 39-bit physical addresses; 48-bit virtual addresses

4096 byte pages

my desktop: 39-bit physical addresses; 48-bit virtual addresses

4096 byte pages

top 16 bits of 64-bit addresses not used for translation

my desktop: 39-bit physical addresses; 48-bit virtual addresses

4096 byte pages

exercise: how many page table entries? (assuming page table like shown before)

exercise: how large are physical page numbers?

my desktop: 39-bit physical addresses; 48-bit virtual addresses

4096 byte pages

exercise: how many page table entries? (assuming page table like shown before)

exercise: how large are physical page numbers?

```
my desktop: 39-bit physical addresses; 48-bit virtual addresses
```

4096 byte pages

exercise: how many page table entries? (assuming page table like shown before)

exercise: how large are physical page numbers?

page table entries are 8 bytes (room for expansion, metadata) trick: power of two size makes table lookup faster

would take up  $2^{39}$  bytes?? (512GB??)


# huge page tables

huge virtual address spaces!

impossible to store PTE for every page

how can we save space?

## holes



most pages are invalid

## saving space

basic idea: don't store (most) invalid page table entries
use a data structure other than a flat array
 want a map — lookup key (virtual page number), get value (PTE)
options?

## saving space

```
basic idea: don't store (most) invalid page table entries
use a data structure other than a flat array
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options?
```

#### hashtable

actually used by some historical processors but never common

## saving space

```
basic idea: don't store (most) invalid page table entries
use a data structure other than a flat array
    want a map — lookup key (virtual page number), get value (PTE)
options?
```

#### hashtable

actually used by some historical processors but never common

#### tree data structure

but not quite a search tree

## search tree tradeoffs

lookup usually implemented in hardware


lookup should be simple solution: lookup splits up address bits (no complex calculations)


lookup should not involve many memory accesses


doing two memory accesses is already very slow solution: tree with many children from each node (far from binary tree's left/right child)


two-level page tables for 65536 pages (16-bit VPN; 256 entries/table) second-level page tables actual data for p for VPN 0x00 (if PTE valid) first-level page table for VPN  $0 \times 0 - 0 \times FF$ for VPN 0x100-0x1FF PTE for VPN 0xFF VPN 0x200-0x2FF VPN 0x300 for VPN 0x300-0x300 for VPN 0xFF00-0xFFFF ΓE for VPN 0x302 TE for VPN 0x303

for VPN 0x3FF











two-level page tables for 65536 pages (16-bit VPN: 256 entries/table)



two-level page tables for 65536 pages (16-bit VPN: 256 entries/table)



two-level page tables for 65536 pages (16-bit VPN; 256 entries/table) second-level page tables actual data for p for VPN 0x00 (if PTE valid) first-level page table for VPN  $0 \times 0 - 0 \times FF$ tor VPN  $0 \times 100 - 0 \times 1$  FF IPTE for VPN 0xFF VPN 0x200-0x2FF VPN 0x300 for VPN 0x300-0x300 for VPN 0xFF00-0xFFFF VPN 0x302 TE for VPN 0x303


for VPN 0x3FF


virtual address


11 0101 01 00 1011 00 00 1101 1111


VPN — split into two parts (one per level)


this example: parts equal sized — common, but not required






























#### another view



#### multi-level page tables

VPN split into pieces for each level of page table

top levels: page table entries point to next page table usually using physical page number of next page table

bottom level: page table entry points to destination page

validity and permission checks at each level

### x86-64 page table splitting

48-bit virtual address

12-bit page offset (4KB pages)

36-bit virtual page number, split into four 9-bit parts

page tables at each level:  $2^9$  entries, 8 bytes/entry deliberate choice: each page table is one page

#### note on VPN splitting

textbook labels it 'VPN 1' and 'VPN 2' and so on

these are parts of the virtual page number (there are not multiple VPNs)

physical addresses	byte	es			phy addr	/sical esses	byt	es		
0x00-3			22	33		20-3			D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x2	4-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ	0x2	8-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2	C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A	0x3	80-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0A
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x3	4-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3	8-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3	C-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

physical addresses	byte	es			physical bytes addresses_
0x00-3			22	33	
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x24-7 <mark>D4</mark> D5 D6 D7
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ	0x28-B89 9A AB BC
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2C-FCD DE EF F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A	0x30-3 BA 0A BA 0A
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x34-7 DB 0B DB 0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x38-BEC 0C EC 0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3C-FFC 0C FC 0C

physical addresses	byte	es			physical addresses	byt	es		
0x00-3			22	33	0x20-3			D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x24-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AΑ	ВВ	0x28-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	3A	4A	0x30-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0Α
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x34-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x38-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3C-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

physical addresses	byte	es			physicaddress	cal ses	byt	es		
0x00-3			22	33	0x20				D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x24	-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ	0x28	-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2C	-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A	0x30	-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0A
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x34	-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x38	-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3C	-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

physical addresses	byte	es			physicaddress	cal ses	byt	es		
0x00-3			22	33	0x20				D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x24	-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ	0x28	-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2C	-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A	0x30	-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0A
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x34	-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x38	-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3C	-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

physical addresses	byte	es			physic address	cal ses	byte	es		
0x00-3			22	33	0x20-				D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x24-	-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ	0x28-	-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2C-	-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A	0x30-	-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0A
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x34-	-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x38-	-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3C-	-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

#### 2-level splitting

- 9-bit virtual address
- 6-bit physical address

- 8-byte pages  $\rightarrow$  3-bit page offset (bottom bits)
- 9-bit VA: 6 bit VPN + 3 bit PO
- 6-bit PA: 3 bit PPN + 3 bit PO

- 8 entry page tables  $\rightarrow$  3-bit VPN parts
- 9-bit VA: 3 bit VPN part 1; 3 bit VPN part 2

physical addresses	byte	es			phy addre	sical esses	byt	es		
0x00-3			22	33		0-3			D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x2	4-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ	0x2	8-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2	C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A	0x3	0-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0A
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x3	4-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3	8-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3	C-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

physical addresses	byte	es			physic address	al es_	oyte	es		
0x00-3	00	11	22	33	0x20-				D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x24-	-7[	)4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ	0x28-	·B[8	39	9A	AB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2C-	٠F[	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A	0x30-	-3[E	ЗА	0Α	ВА	0A
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x34-	·7[	DВ	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x38-	·B[	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3C-	·F[	-C	0C	FC	0C

physical addresses	byte	es			physic address	al es_	byt	es		
0x00-3			22	33	0x20-				D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x24-	-7[	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AΑ	ВВ	0x28-	-в[	89	9А	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2C-	-F[	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	3A	4A	0x30-	-3[	ВА	0Α	ВА	0A
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x34-	-7[	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x38-	-в[	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3C-	·F[	FC	0C	FC	0C

physical addresses	byte	es			physical addresses	byt	es		
0x00-3			22	33	0x20-3			D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x24-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ	0x28-B	89	9A	AB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A	0x30-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0A
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x34-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x38-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3C-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

physical addresses	byte	es			phy: addre	sical sses	byt	es		
0x00-3			22	33	0x2				D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x2	4-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AΑ	ВВ	0x2	8-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2	C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	3A	4A	0x3	0-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0Α
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x3	4-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3	8-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3	C-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

physical addresses	byt	es		
0x00-3		11	22	33
0x04-7	44	55	66	77
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ
0x0C-F	CC	DD	ΕE	FF
0x10-3	1A	2A	5A	4A
0x14-7	1В	2B	3B	4B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C

physical addresses	byt	es		
0x20-3			D2	D3
0x24-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x28-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x2C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x30-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0A
0x34-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x38-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x3C-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

physical bytes addresses	physical bytes addresses
0x00-3 <mark>00 11 22 33</mark>	0x20-3 D0 D1 D2 D3
0x04-744 55 66 77	0x24-7D4 D5 D6 D7
0x08-B88 99 AA BB	0x28-B <mark>89 9A AB B</mark> 0
0x0C-FCC DD EE FF	0x2C-FCD DE EF F
0x10-3 1A 2A 3A 4A	0x30-3BA 0A BA 0 <i>A</i>
0x14-7 1B 2B 3B 4B	0x34-7DB 0B DB 0E
0x18-B1C 2C 3C 4C	0x38-BEC 0C EC 00
0x1C-F1C 2C 3C 4C	0x3C-FFC 0C FC 00

physical addresses	byt	es			physica addresse	al byt	es		
0x00-3			22	33	0x20-			D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x24-	7 D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ	0x28-	B89	9A	AB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2C-	FCD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A	0x30-	3ВА	0A	ВА	0A
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x34-	7DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x38-	BEC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3C-	FFC	0C	FC	0C

physical bytes addresses								
0x00-3	00	11	22	33				
0x04-7	44	55	66	77				
0x08-B								
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF				
0x10-3								
			3B					
0x18-B								
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C				

physical iddresses	byt	es		
0x20-3		D1	D2	D3
0x24-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x28-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x2C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x30-3	ВА	0Α	ВА	0A
0x34-7	DΒ	0B	DΒ	0B
0x38-B	EC	0 <sub>C</sub>	EC	0C
0x3C-F	lFC	0C	FC	0C

physical addresses	byte	es			physical addresses	byt	es		
0x00-3			22	33	0x20-3			D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77	0x24-7	D4	D5	D6	D7
0x08-B	88	99	AA	ВВ	0x28-B	89	9A	AB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF	0x2C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	ЗА	4A	0x30-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0A
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B	0x34-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x38-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	1C	2C	3C	4C	0x3C-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

10-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 16 byte pages, 2 byte PTE

page tables 1 page; PTE: 2 bit PPN (MSB of first byte), 1 valid bit, rest unused

_		_					
physical addresses	hytes		physical addresses	byt	es		
addresses			addresses				
0x00-3		22 33	0x20-3			D2	D3
0x04-7	44 55	66 77	0x24-7	D4	E5	D6	E7
0x08-B	88 99	AA BB	0x28-B	89	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC DD	EE FF	0x2C-F	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A 2A	3A 4A	0x30-3	ВА	0A	ВА	0Α
0x14-7	1B 2B	3B 4B	0x34-7	DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C 2C	3C 4C	0x38-B	EC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	AC BC	DC EC	0x3C-F	FC	0C	FC	0C

10-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 16 byte pages, 2 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 2 bit PPN (MSB of first byte), 1 valid bit, rest unused

0			•	
physical addresses	hytes		physical _ addresses	hytes
addresses			_ addresses	
0x00-3		22 33		D0 E1 D2 D3
0x04-7	44 55	66 77	0x24-7	D4 E5 D6 E7
0x08-B	88 99	AA BB	0x28-B	89 9A AB BC
0x0C-F	CC DD	EE FF	0x2C-F	CD DE EF F0
0x10-3	1A 2A	3A 4A	0x30-3	BA 0A BA 0A
0x14-7	1B 2B	3B 4B	0x34-7	DB 0B DB 0B
0x18-B	1C 2C	3C 4C	] 0x38-B	EC 0C EC 0C
0x1C-F	AC BC	DC EC	] 0x3C-F	FC 0C FC 0C

10-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 16 byte pages, 2 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 2 bit PPN (MSB of first byte), 1 valid bit, rest unused

0			•	
physical addresses	hytes		physical _ addresses	hytes
addresses			_ addresses	
0x00-3		22 33		D0 E1 D2 D3
0x04-7	44 55	66 77	0x24-7	D4 E5 D6 E7
0x08-B	88 99	AA BB	0x28-B	89 9A AB BC
0x0C-F	CC DD	EE FF	0x2C-F	CD DE EF F0
0x10-3	1A 2A	3A 4A	0x30-3	BA 0A BA 0A
0x14-7	1B 2B	3B 4B	0x34-7	DB 0B DB 0B
0x18-B	1C 2C	3C 4C	] 0x38-B	EC 0C EC 0C
0x1C-F	AC BC	DC EC	] 0x3C-F	FC 0C FC 0C

10-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 16 byte pages, 2 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 2 bit PPN (MSB of first byte), 1 valid bit, rest unused

_		_	-	
physical addresses	hytes		physical bytes addresses	
addresses			addresses	
0x00-3	00 11	22 33	0x20-3 D0 E1 D2 D	3
0x04-7	44 55	66 77	0x24-7D4 E5 D6 E	7
0x08-B	88 99	AA BB	0x28-B <mark>89 9A AB B</mark>	С
0x0C-F	CC DD	EE FF	0x2C-FCD DE EF F	0
0x10-3	1A 2A	3A 4A	0x30-3BA 0A BA 0	Α
0x14-7	1B 2B	3B 4B	0x34-7 DB 0B DB 0	В
0x18-B	1C 2C	3C 4C	0x38-BEC 0C EC 0	С
0x1C-F	AC BC	DC EC	0x3C-FFC 0C FC 0	С

10-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 16 byte pages, 2 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 2 bit PPN (MSB of first byte), 1 valid bit, rest unused

O			_	,	,	
physical addresses	hvtes				physical bytes addresses	
addresses					_ addresses	_
0x00-3	00 1	.1	22	33	0x20-3D0 E1 D2 D3	3
0x04-7	44 5	55	66	77	0x24-7D4 E5 D6 E7	<i>'</i>
0x08-B	88 9	9	AA	ВВ	0x28-B89 9A AB BC	
0x0C-F	CC D	D	ΕE	FF	0x2C-FCD DE EF F0	
0x10-3	1A 2	2A	3A	4A	0x30-3BA 0A BA 0A	
0x14-7	1B 2	2B	3B	4B	0x34-7DB 0B DB 0B	}
0x18-B	1C 2	2C	3C	4C	0x38-BEC 0C EC 0C	
0x1C-F	AC B	3C	DC	EC	0x3C-FFC 0C FC 0C	
					-	

10-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 16 byte pages, 2 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 2 bit PPN (MSB of first byte), 1 valid bit, rest unused

			_	
physical laddresses_	hvtes			physical bytes addresses
addresses_	<i>y</i> :::3			_ addresses
0x00-3		1 22	33	0x20-3D0 E1 D2 D3
0x04-7	44 5	5 66	77	0x24-7D4 E5 D6 E7
0x08-B	88 99	Э АА	ВВ	0x28-B89 9A AB BC
0x0C-F	CC DI	) EE	FF	0x2C-FCD DE EF F0
0x10-3	1A 2	4 3A	4A	0x30-3BA 0A BA 0A
0x14-7	1B 2I	3 3 B	4B	0x34-7DB 0B DB 0B
0x18-B	1C 20	C 3C	4C	0x38-BEC 0C EC 0C
0x1C-F	AC B	C DC	EC	0x3C-FFC 0C FC 0C

10-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 16 byte pages, 2 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 2 bit PPN (MSB of first byte), 1 valid bit, rest unused

0		- 0	
physical bytes addresses			physical bytes addresses
addresses			addresses
0x00-3		22 33	0x20-3D0 E1 D2 D3
0x04-7	44 55	66 77	0x24-7D4 E5 D6 E7
0x08-B	88 99	AA BB	0x28-B89 9A AB BC
0x0C-F	CC DD	EE FF	0x2C-FCD DE EF F0
0x10-3	1A 2A	3A 4A	0x30-3BA 0A BA 0A
0x14-7	1B 2B	3B 4B	0x34-7DB 0B DB 0B
0x18-B	1C 2C	3C 4C	0x38-BEC 0C EC 0C
0x1C-F	AC BC	DC EC	0x3C-FFC 0C FC 0C

### 2-level exercise (5)


10-bit virtual addresses, 6-bit physical; 16 byte pages, 2 byte PTE page tables 1 page; PTE: 2 bit PPN (MSB of first byte), 1 valid bit, rest unused

page table base register 0x10; translate virtual address 0x376

physical addresses	byte	es			;	physica addresse	byt	es		
0x00-3			22	33		0x20-3			D2	D3
0x04-7	44	55	66	77		0x24-	7D4	E5	D6	E7
0x08-B	88	99	AΑ	ВВ		0x28-l	389	9A	ΑB	ВС
0x0C-F	CC	DD	EE	FF		0x2C-I	CD	DE	EF	F0
0x10-3	1A	2A	3A	4A		0x30-3	BA	0A	ВА	0A
0x14-7	1B	2B	3B	4B		0x34-	7 DB	0B	DB	0B
0x18-B	1C	2C	3C	4C		0x38-l	BEC	0C	EC	0C
0x1C-F	AC	ВС	DC	EC		0x3C-I	FC	0C	FC	0C


### space on demand

Program Memory




### space on demand

Program Memory



#### space on demand

Program Memory



%rsp = 0x7FFFC000

```
...
// requires more stack space
A: pushq %rbx

B: movq 8(%rcx), %rbx
C: addq %rbx, %rax
...
```

VPN	valid?	page
•••	•••	
0x7FFFB	0	
0x7FFFC	1	0x200DF
0x7FFFD	1	0x12340
0x7FFFE	1	0x12347
0x7FFFF	1	0x12345
•••	•••	•••

%rsp = 0x7FFC000

```
// requires more stack space
A: pushq %rbx
page fault!
B: movq 8(%rcx), %rbx
C: addq %rbx, %rax
...
```

VPN	valid?	pnysical
VIIN	valiu:	page
•••	•••	•••
0x7FFFB	0	
0x7FFFC	1	0x200DF
0x7FFFD	1	0x12340
0x7FFFE	1	0x12347
0x7FFFF	1	0x12345
•••	•••	•••

. . .

pushq triggers exception hardware says "accessing address 0x7FFBFF8" OS looks up what's should be there — "stack"

%rsp = 0x7FFC000

```
// requires more stack space
A: pushq %rbx restarted

B: movq 8(%rcx), %rbx
C: addq %rbx, %rax
...
```

VPN	valid?	physical page
VIIN	valiu:	page
•••	•••	•••
0x7FFFB	1	0x200D8
0x7FFFC	1	0x200DF
0x7FFFD	1	0x12340
0x7FFFE	1	0x12347
0x7FFFF	1	0x12345
•••	•••	•••

in exception handler, OS allocates more stack space OS updates the page table then returns to retry the instruction

note: the space doesn't have to be initially empty

only change: load from file, etc. instead of allocating empty page

loading program can be merely creating empty page table everything else can be handled in response to page faults no time/space spent loading/allocating unneeded space

#### mmap

```
Linux/Unix has a function to "map" a file to memory
int file = open("somefile.dat", O_RDWR);
    // data is region of memory that represents file
char *data = mmap(..., file, 0);
   // read byte 6 from somefile.dat
char seventh_char = data[6];
   // modifies byte 100 of somefile.dat
data[100] = 'x';
    // can continue to use 'data' like an array
```

### swapping almost mmap

```
access mapped file for first time, read from disk (like swapping when memory was swapped out)
```

write "mapped" memory, write to disk eventually (like writeback policy in swapping) use "dirty" bit

extra detail: other processes should see changes all accesses to file use same physical memory

### Linux maps: list of maps

```
$ cat /proc/self/maps
00400000-0040b000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 48328831
                                                        /bin/cat
0060a000-0060b000 r-p 0000a000 08:01
                                                        /bin/cat
0060b000-0060c000 rw-p 0000b000 08:01 48328831
                                                         /bin/cat
01974000 - 01995000 \text{ rw-p} 00000000 00:00 0
                                                        [heap]
7f60c718b000_7f60c7490000
                                                         /usr/lih/locale/locale—archive
7f60c749 PCB contains list of struct vm_area_struct with:
                                                                           u/libc-2.1
7f60c764
                                                                            u/libc-2.1
        (shown in this output):
7f60c784
                                                                            u/libc-2.1
7f60c785
                                                                            u/libc-2.1
           virtual address start, end
7f60c785
7f60c785
                                                                            u/ld-2.19.s
           permissions
7f60c7a3
7f60c7a7
           offset in backing file (if any)
7f60c7a7
                                                                            u/ld-2.19.s
                                                                            u/ld-2.19.s
7f60c7a7
           pointer to backing file (if any)
7f60c7a7
7ffc5d2b
7ffc5d3t
        (not shown):
7ffc5d3t
ffffffff
           info about sharing of non-file data
```

#### swapping

early motivation for virtual memory: swapping

using disk (or SSD, ...) as the next level of the memory hierarchy how our textbook and many other sources presents virtual memory

OS allocates program space on disk own mapping of virtual addresses to location on disk

DRAM is a cache for disk

#### swapping

early motivation for virtual memory: swapping

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#### swapping versus caching

"cache block" pprox physical page

#### fully associative

every virtual page can be stored in any physical page

replacement/cache misses managed by the OS

normal cache hits happen in hardware

hardware's page table lookup common case that needs to be very fast

#### swapping components


```
"swap in" a page — exactly like allocating on demand!
    OS gets page fault — invalid in page table
    check where page actually is (from virtual address)
    read from disk
    eventually restart process
"swap out" a page
    OS marks as invalid in the page table(s)
    copy to disk (if modified)
```


HDD reads and writes: milliseconds to tens of milliseconds minimum size: 512 bytes writing tens of kilobytes basically as fast as writing 512 bytes


HDD reads and writes: milliseconds to tens of milliseconds minimum size: 512 bytes writing tens of kilobytes basically as fast as writing 512 bytes


HDD reads and writes: milliseconds to tens of milliseconds minimum size: 512 bytes writing tens of kilobytes basically as fast as writing 512 bytes


HDD reads and writes: milliseconds to tens of milliseconds minimum size: 512 bytes writing tens of kilobytes basically as fast as writing 512 bytes














#### page tricks generally

deliberately make program trigger page/protection fault

but don't assume page/protection fault is an error

have seperate data structures represent logically allocated memory e.g. "addresses 0x7FFF8000 to 0x7FFFFFFFF are the stack" might talk about Linux data structures later (book section 9.7)

page table is for the hardware and not the OS

#### hardware help for page table tricks

information about the address causing the fault
e.g. special register with memory address accessed
harder alternative: OS disassembles instruction, look at registers

(by default) rerun faulting instruction when returning from exception

precise exceptions: no side effects from faulting instruction or after

e.g. pushq that caused did not change %rsp before fault

e.g. instructions reordered after faulting instruction not visible

# backup slides