

Lemma	Scenario	models/lake-edhoc	models/lake-edhoc-KEM
auth-IR-unique	$\text{Sig}^\ell\text{-proof, SessKey}^\ell, \text{AEAD}^\ell, \oplus^\ell, \text{DHShare}^\ell$	\textcircled{P}	$\checkmark^P (41) \checkmark^T (1272)$
	$\text{Sig}^\ell\text{-proof, SessKey}^\ell, \text{AEAD}^\ell, \oplus^\ell, \text{DH}^\ell$	$\checkmark^P (615) \textcircled{T}$	\emptyset
auth-RI-unique	$\text{Sig}^\ell\text{-proof, SessKey}^\ell, \text{AEAD}^\ell, \oplus^\ell, \text{DHShare}^\ell$	\textcircled{P}	$\checkmark^P (32) \checkmark^T (1630)$
	$\text{Sig}^\ell\text{-proof, SessKey}^\ell, \text{AEAD}^\ell, \oplus^\ell, \text{DH}^\ell$	$\checkmark^P (585) \textcircled{T}$	\emptyset
data-authentication-IR	\oplus^ℓ	$\times^P (23)$	$\times^P (2)$
	$\text{Sig}^\ell\text{-proof, DHShare}^\ell$	\textcircled{P}	$\times^P (4)$
	$\text{Sig}^\ell\text{-proof, SessKey}^\ell, \text{AEAD}^\ell$	$\checkmark^P (\Rightarrow) \textcircled{T}$	$\checkmark^P (3) \textcircled{T}$
	$\text{Sig}^\ell, \text{SessKey}^\ell, \text{AEAD}^\ell, \text{DHShare}^\ell$	\textcircled{P}	$\checkmark^P (3) \checkmark^T (1347)$
	$\text{Sig}^\ell\text{-proof, SessKey}^\ell, \text{AEAD}^\ell, \text{DH}^\ell$	$\checkmark^P (46) \textcircled{T}$	\emptyset
data-authentication-RI	$\oplus^\ell, \text{DHShare}^\ell$	\textcircled{P}	$\times^P (21)$
	$\text{Sig}^\ell\text{-proof, DHShare}^\ell$	\textcircled{P}	$\times^P (23)$
	$\text{Sig}^\ell, \text{SessKey}^\ell, \text{AEAD}^\ell, \text{DHShare}^\ell$	\textcircled{P}	$\checkmark^P (6) \checkmark^T (1647)$
	$\text{Sig}^\ell\text{-proof, SessKey}^\ell, \text{AEAD}^\ell, \oplus^\ell$	$\checkmark^P (\Rightarrow) \textcircled{T}$	$\checkmark^P (25) \textcircled{T}$
	$\text{Sig}^\ell\text{-proof, SessKey}^\ell, \text{AEAD}^\ell, \oplus^\ell, \text{DH}^\ell$	$\checkmark^P (933) \textcircled{T}$	\emptyset
honest-auth-RI-non-inj	$\text{Sig}^\ell\text{-proof, SessKey}^\ell, \text{AEAD}^\ell, \oplus^\ell, \text{DHShare}^\ell$	\textcircled{P}	$\checkmark^P (57) \textcircled{T}$
	$\text{Sig}^\ell\text{-proof, SessKey}^\ell, \text{AEAD}^\ell, \oplus^\ell, \text{DH}^\ell$	$\checkmark^P (742) \textcircled{T}$	\emptyset
honest-auth-RI-unique	$\text{Sig}^\ell\text{-proof, SessKey}^\ell, \text{AEAD}^\ell, \oplus^\ell, \text{DHShare}^\ell$	\textcircled{P}	$\checkmark^P (50) \checkmark^T (1319)$
	$\text{Sig}^\ell\text{-proof, SessKey}^\ell, \text{AEAD}^\ell, \oplus^\ell, \text{DH}^\ell$	$\checkmark^P (598) \textcircled{T}$	\emptyset
secretI	$\text{Sig}^\ell\text{-proof, SessKey}^\ell, \text{AEAD}^\ell, \oplus^\ell, \text{DHShare}^\ell$	\textcircled{P}	$\checkmark^P (143) \textcircled{T}$
	$\text{Sig}^\ell\text{-proof, SessKey}^\ell, \text{AEAD}^\ell, \oplus^\ell, \text{DH}^\ell$	$\checkmark^P (1891) \textcircled{T}$	\emptyset
secretR	$\text{Sig}^\ell\text{-proof, SessKey}^\ell, \text{AEAD}^\ell, \oplus^\ell, \text{DHShare}^\ell$	\textcircled{P}	$\checkmark^P (232) \textcircled{T}$
	$\text{Sig}^\ell\text{-proof, SessKey}^\ell, \text{AEAD}^\ell, \oplus^\ell, \text{DH}^\ell$	$\checkmark^P (1181) \textcircled{T}$	\emptyset
honest-auth-IR-non-inj	$\text{Sig}^\ell\text{-proof, SessKey}^\ell, \text{AEAD}^\ell, \oplus^\ell, \text{DHShare}^\ell$	\textcircled{P}	$\checkmark^P (30) \textcircled{T}$
	$\text{Sig}^\ell\text{-proof, SessKey}^\ell, \text{AEAD}^\ell, \oplus^\ell, \text{DH}^\ell$	$\checkmark^P (504) \textcircled{T}$	\emptyset
honest-auth-IR-unique	$\text{Sig}^\ell\text{-proof, SessKey}^\ell, \text{AEAD}^\ell, \oplus^\ell, \text{DHShare}^\ell$	\textcircled{P}	$\checkmark^P (40) \checkmark^T (1468)$
	$\text{Sig}^\ell\text{-proof, SessKey}^\ell, \text{AEAD}^\ell, \oplus^\ell, \text{DH}^\ell$	$\checkmark^P (619) \textcircled{T}$	\emptyset

Automated aggregation of results

For each lemma and each scenario, we display the result of the automated analysis based on Proverif and Tamarin.

We display all scenarios for which at least one of the protocol has a non trivial and non timeout result.

$\times^T (x), \times^P (x)$: attack found with Tamarin (T) or Proverif (P) in x seconds

$\checkmark^T (x), \checkmark^P (x)$: proof found with Tamarin (T) or Proverif (P) in x seconds

(\Rightarrow) : means the result is implied by another displayed result

$\textcircled{T}, \textcircled{P}$: timeout for Tamarin (T) or Proverif (P)

\emptyset : the scenario is irrelevant for this protocol (e.g., DH weakness in KEM setting)