Transparent, unprivileged, low-overhead provenance tracing through library interposition

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Abstract

System-level provenance tracing is the idea of automatically capturing how computational artifacts came to be, including what process created each file. While provenance is often discussed in the context of security, it also fills an important niche in computational science, providing data for reproducibility, incremental computation, and debugging. Prior work proposes recompiling with instrumentation, ptrace, and kernel-based auditing, which at best achieves two out of three desirable properties: accepting unmodified binaries, running in unprivilege mode, and incurring low overhead. We present PROBE, a system-level provenance tracer that uses library interpositioning to achieve all three. We evaluate the performance of PROBE on system microbenchmarks and scientific applications. We also discuss the completeness of the provenance that PROBE collects compared to other provenance tracers.

1 Introduction

For computational artifacts, computational provenance (just **provenance** from here on) refers to the process which generated the artifact, the inputs to that process, and the provenance of those inputs. This definition permits a graph representation where the artifacts and processes become nodes; an edge indicates that an artifact was generated by a process or that a process used some artifact (for example, fig. 1).

Provenance data has many applications: **comprehension**, one can visualize how data flows in a pile-of-scripts, **differential debugging**, one can determine how the process behind two computational outputs differ, and, **reproducibility** one can re-execute the process from its description.

The reproducibility use-case is especially compelling due to the reproducibility crisis in computational science . There



Figure 1: Example provenance graph of `fig1.png`. Artifacts are ovals; processes are rectangles.

are other approaches for ensuring reproducibility such as virtualized environments, package managers, and workflows, but these all involve continuous participation from the user. If a system can track provenance automatically, the user need only install or turn on this feature, continue their computational science experiments, and the system would keep track of how to reproduce each artifact *without continuous user participation*.

The reproducibility use-case requires that provenance tracking is "always on", so it will never miss an observation. User-level tracing involves asking the kernel to switch over every time the tracee does a specific kind of action. However, context switching imposes a significant overhead. The most important commands are often the long-running ones (e.g., running a big simulation that drives the key results), but users may be tempted to turn off provenance tracing due to the excessive overhead.

Provenance tracers can avoid the overhead of context switching in two ways: by embedding themselves in the kernel or by statically embedding themselves in user code. Embedding in the kernel is problematic because many computational scientists will not have root-level access to the shared machines they operate on. Embedding in user code involves an added burden of recompiling all user code, including code that the user may not have compiled at all originally in the first place (due to binary package managers).

One solution could be to embed provenance tracing in library code *dynamically* by library preloading. This technique requires neither root-level access, recompiling user code, nor extra context-switching.

Prior work on provenance tracing argues that library preloading is too incomplete, difficult, or fragile. We offer a counter-argument in the form of an implementation of a provenance tracer based on library preloading.

The contributions of this work are:

- a delineation of desirable properties of provenance tracers
- an implementation of a provenance tracer based on library preloading called PROBE: **P**rovenance for **R**eproducibility **OB**servation **E**ngine
- a suite of applications that consume its provenance, demonstrating the practical utility of provenance recorded in PROBE
- theoretical and empirical evaluation of the performance, completeness, and fragility of selected provenance tracers

The rest of the work proceeds as follows:

- Sec. 2 defines kinds of provenance tracers, properties thereof, and use-cases thereof
- Sec. 3 enumerates prior provenance tracers and discusses their properties
- Sec. 4 documents the design of PROBE and its related applications
- Sec. **??** presents an theoretical and empirical evaluation of selected provenance tracers
- Sec. **??** is a general discussion of the evaluation results in the context of prior work
- Sec. **??** discuss how provenance data can be used for real-world benefit and the applications we developed for PROBE

2 Background

Provenance can be collected at several different levels

1. **Application-level**: modify each application to emit provenace data. Application-level provenance is the most semantically rich but least general, as it only enables collection by that particular modified application [3].

2. **Language/workflow-level provenance**: modify the programming language or workflow language, and all programs written for that language would emit provenance data. Workflow engines are only aware of the dataflow, not higher-level semantics, so workflow-level provenance is not as semantically rich as application-level provenance. However, workflow-level is more general than application-level provenance, as it enables collection in any workflow written for that modified engine [3].

3. **System-level provenance**: use operating system facilities to report the inputs and outputs that a process makes. System-level provenance is the least semantically aware because it does not even know dataflow, just a history of inputs and outputs, but it is the most general, because it supports any process (including any application or workflow engine) that uses watchable I/O operations [3].

Operating system-level provenance tracing (henceforth **SLP**) is the most widely applicable form of provenance tracing; install an SLP, and all unmodified applications, programming languages, and workflow engines will be traced. This work focuses on system-level provenance (SLP).

Provenance has a number of use-cases discussed in prior work:

1. **Reproducibility** [2] (manual or automatic). Provenance tracing aids manual reproducibility because it documents what commands were run to generate the particular artifact. While this can also be accomplished by documentation or making the structure of the code "obvious", in practice we accept it as an axiom that there are many cases where the authors don't have enough documentation or obvious structure to easily understand how to reproduce the artifact.

Provenance could aid in *automatic* reproducibility, automatically replaying the processes with their recorded inputs, or *manual* reproducibility, showing the user the commands that were used and letting them decide how to reproduce those commands in their environment.

2. **Incremental computation** [13]. Iterative development cycles from developing code, executing it, and changing the code. Make and workflow engines require user to specify a dependency graph (prospective provenance) by hand, which is often unsound in practice; i.e., the user may misses some dependencies and therefore types `make clean`. A tool could correctly determine which commands need to be re-executed based on SLP without needing the user to specify anything.

3. **Comprehension** [8]. Provenance helps the user understand the flow of data in a complex set of processes, perhaps separately invoked. An tool that consumes provenance can answer queries like: "Does this output depend on FERPA-protected data (i.e., data located /path/to/ferpa)?".

4. **Differential debugging** [8]. Given two outputs from two executions of similar processes with different versions of data and code or different systems, what is the earliest point that intermediate data from the processes diverges from each other?

5. **Intrusion-detection and forensics** [8] Provenance-aware systems track all operations done to modify the system, providing a record of how an intruder entered a system and what they modified once they were in. Setting alerts when certain modifications are observed in provenance forms the basis of intrusion detection.

The first four are applicable in the domain of computational science while the last is in security. This work focuses on provenance tracers for computational science.

We define the following "theoretical" properties of provenance tracers. They are theoretical in the sense that one does not need to do any experiments them to determine these properties; only study their methods and perhaps their code. They are enumerated in a feature matrix in Table 1.

- **Runs in user-space**: SLP should be able to implemented at a user-space as opposed to kernel-space. Kernel modifications increases the attack surface and is more difficult to maintain than user-space code.

- **No privilege required**: A user should be able to use SLP to trace their own processes without accessing higher privileges than normal every time. Two motivations for this property are that code running in privileged mode increases the attack surface and presents a barrier to use for non-privileged users. Computational scientists would likely not have root-level access on shared systems and thus may not be able to use SLPs that require privilege to run. We do not distinguish between privileges required to install versus privileges required to run, since they are equivalent by setuid.

- **Ability to run unmodified binaries**: Users should not have to change or recompile their code to track provenance.

- **Not bypassable**: A tracee should not be able to read data in a way that will bypass detection by the provenance tracer.

- **Coverage of many information sources**: Tracing should cover many sources of informatiion, and record whether a process accessed these sources. For example, access to the file system, user input, network accesses, time of day should be recorded. Tracing these dependencies improves reproducibility, because we would know the non-deterministic inputs, comprehension, differential debugging, and other applications of provenance.

- **Records data and metadata**: SLP tracers always record the metadata of which file was accessed. Some also record the data in the file that was accessed, at the cost of higher overhead. One could encompass the advantages of both groups by offering a runtime option to switch between faster/metadata-only or slower/metadata-and-data.

- **Replayable**: The SLP tool should export an archive that can be replayed. The replay may be mediated by the SLP tool itself or by an external tool, e.g. Docker, VirtualBox, QEMU. Recording data and metadata is required for replay.

- **Replay supports deviations**: The replay supports executing a different code path in the reconstructed environment, so long as the different code path does not access any files outside of those the original code path accessed (those are already in the reconstructed environment). For example, replay the recorded execution but replace one command-line flag, environment variable, or input file.

- **Constructs provenance graph**: The SLP tool should construct and export a graph representation of the provenance from the observed log of provenance events. Certain use-cases such as incremental computation, comprehension, differential debugging, and others require the graph representation while merely replaying does not. Constructing the graph from a log of events is difficult due to concurrency in the system.

Prior work misses at least one of these three:

Name	User	No priv.	Unmod. bin.	No bypass	Data & metadata	Replayable	Replay new exe.	Prov. graph
PROBE	●	●	●	○	Optional	●	●	●
ReproZip	●	●	●	●	Both	○	○	○
CDE, PTU, Sciunit, CARE	●	●	●	●	Both	●	○	●
rr	●	●	●	●	Both	●	○	○
strace, ltrace	●	●	●	●	Metadata	○	○	○
CamFlow, eBPF, Linux Audit	●	●	●	●	Both	●	○	○

Table 1: Feature matrix of provenance collectors and the properties described above.

- eBPF, Linux Audit framework, Linux Provenance Modules/Linux Security Modules [1], and CamFlow [10] use Linux kernel-level functionality violating non-privilege.
- ReproZip [2] and Sciunits [12] use ptrace, which has a significant performance overhead. Record/replay tools such as RR [9] and CDE [4] are similar to provenance tracers in this category. Record/replay tools seek automatic reproducibility but do not satisfy the other features of provenance tracers discussed above.
- PASSv2 [7] requires the user to instrument their code to emit provenance data to a colelctor, violating transparency.

3 Prior work

There have been several methods of tracing SLP proposed in prior work:

- **Virtual machines**: running the tracee in a virtual machine that tracks information flow. This method is extremely slow; e.g., PANORAMA has 20x overhead [14].
- **Recompiling with instrumentation**: recompile, where the compiler or libraries insert instructions that log provenance data, e.g., [6]. This method is not transparent.
- **Static/dynamic binary instrumentation**: either before run-time (static) or while a binary is running (dynamic) change the binary to emit provenance data [5]. This method requires special hardware (Intel CPU) and a proprietary tool (Intel PIN).
- **Kernel modification**: modify the kernel directly or load a kernel module that traces provenance information, e.g., [10]. This method is neither non-privileged nor user-level.
- **Use kernel auditing frameworks**: use auditing frameworks already built in to the kernel (e.g., Linux/eBPF, Linux/auditd, Windows/ETW). This method is not non-privileged.
- **User-level debug tracing**: use user-level debug tracing functionality provided by the OS (e.g, Linux/ptrace used by strace, CDE [4], SciUnit [11], Reprozip [2], RR [9]).



Figure 2: Sequence diagram of process with user-level debug tracing

- **Library interposition**: replace a standard library with an instrumented library that emits provenance data as appropriate. This could use the `LD_PRELOAD` of Linux and `DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES` on MacOS.

If non-privilege, transparency, no special hardware, and performance overhead less than 10-times are hard-requirements, the only possible methods are user-level debug tracing and library interposition.

In user-level debug tracing, the tracer runs in a separate process than the tracee. Every time the tracee does a system call, control switches from the tracee to the kernel to the tracer and back and back fig. 2. This path incurs two context switches for every system call.

On the other hand, in library interposition, the tracer code is part of a library dynamically loaded into the tracee's memory space. While this imposes restrictions on the tracer code, it eliminates the extra context switches fig. 3.

TODO: Matrix:

- Each row is a group of prior works
- Each column is an SLP tracer-feature

Prior works argue that library interposition is not appropriate for SLP for the following reasons:

- **Bypassable by direct system calls**



Figure 3: Sequence diagram of process with library interposition

- **Fragility due to variations in C libraries**
- **Breaks other applications that use preloading**
- **Requires rebuilding or re-linking**
- **TODO**

  A common technique for intercepting system calls inprocess is to use dynamic linking to interpose wrapper functions over the C library functions that make system calls. In practice, we have found that method to be insufficient, due to applications making direct system calls, and fragile, due to variations in C libraries, and applications that require their own preloading [37, 3].

  An alternative implementation of whole-system provenance is interposition between system calls and libraries in user space, as in OPUS [9]. An argument in favour of such systems is that modifications to existing libraries are more likely to be adopted than modifications to the kernel. However, for this approach to work, all applications in the system need to be built against, or dynamically linked to, provenance-aware libraries, replacing existing libraries.

4 Concepts

The user supplies a **command**, such as `python script.py -n 42`, to PROBE.

PROBE runs command with certain environment variables set, resulting in a **process**.

The process may create **child processes** that will also get traced by PROBE.

If a process calls a syscall from the `exec`-family, a new process is created with the same PID. We call the pair of (PID, "number of times `exec` has been called"), an **exec epoch**. Each process has at least one exec epoch.

Each process can spawn kernel-level **threads** that provide concurrent control-flow in the same address-space identified by the triple (PID, exec epoch, TID).

Threads do **operations**, like "open `file.txt` for reading" or "spawn a new process", identified by (PID, exec epoch, TID, operation number), where operation number increments for every operation the thread does.

A **dynamic trace** of a command is an tuple of:

- a PID which is the root
- a mapping of processes to an ordered list of exec epochs
- a mapping of exec epochs to threads
- a mapping of threads to a list of operations

Dynamic traces are what PROBE actually records.

Program order is a partial order on operations where A precedes B in program order if A and B are in the same thread and A's operation number is less than B's.

Synchronization order is a partial order on operations where A precedes B in program order for specific special cases based on the semantics of the operation. PROBE currently tracks the following cases:

- A is an exec and B is the first operation of the next exec epoch for that process
- A is a process-spawn or thread-spawn and B is the first operation in the new process or thread.
- A is a process-join or thread-join and B is the last operation in the joined process (any thread of that process) or joined thread.

But the model is easily extensible other kinds of synchronization including shared memory locks, semaphores, and file-locks.

Happens-before order, denoted $\leq$, is a partial order that is the transitive closure of the union of program order and synchronization order.

We define a **dataflow** as a directed acyclic graph whose nodes are operations or versioned files. The edges are the union of happens-before edges and the following:

- If operation A opens a file at a particular version B for reading, $A \rightarrow B$.
- If operation A closes a file at a particular version B which was previously open for writing, $A \rightarrow B$.

Tracking the *versioned files* instead of files guarantees non-circularity.

Rather than track every individual file operation, we will only track file opens and closes. If processes concurrently read and write a file, the result is non-deterministic. Most working programs avoid this kind of race. If a program does have this race, the dataflow graph will still be sound, but it

may be *imprecise*, that is, it will not have all of the edges that it could have had if PROBE tracked fine-grain file reads and writes.

A **file** is an inode. Defining a file this way solves the problem of *aliasing* in filesystems. If we defined a file as a path, we would be fooled by symlinks or hardlinks. When we observe file operations, it is little extra work to also observe the inodes corresponding to those file operations.

In practice, we use the pair modification times and file size as the version. Modification time can be manipulated by the user, either setting to the current time with `touch` (very common) or resetting to an arbitrary time with `utimes` (very uncommon). Setting to the current time creates a new version which does not threaten the soundness of PROBE. Setting to an arbitrary time and choosing a time already observed by PROBE does threaten its soundness. For this reason, we consider the file size as a "backup distinguishing feature". We consider it very unlikely that a non-malicious user would accidentally reset the time to the exact time (nanosecond resolution) we already observed and have the exact same size.

In the event of a data race on a file write, the dataflow graph generated by our approach ensures that all potential dependencies are captured as edges. The child processes of a parent process inherit write access to a file opened by the parent and are treated as dependencies of the incremented final version of the file. This guarantees that no critical dependency is overlooked, ensuring the soundness of the dataflow graph. However, the approach may not achieve completeness, as some processes with write access may not represent true dependencies. Since we have limited information about the order in which the shared file is accessed by the processes and the exact change made to the file, this approach uses the access mode effectively to construct a graph that prioritizes soundness.

5 Implementation

The core of PROBE is a library interposer for libc, called `libprobe.so`. `libprobe.so` exports wrappers for I/O functions like `open(...)`. The wrappers:

1. log the call with arguments
2. forward the call to the *true* libc implementation
3. log the underlying libc's returned value
4. return the underlying libc's returned value

There is no data shared between threads as the log is thread-local. The dynamic-trace consists of information that was collected at a thread-local level, but can be aggregated into a global-level dataflow graph as described in Sec. 4.

To make logging as fast as possible, the log is a memory-mapped file. If the logged data exceeds the free-space left in the file, `libprobe.so` will allocate a new file big enough for the allocation. After the process dies, these log files can be stitched together into a single dynamic trace.

PROBE has a command-line interface. The `record` subcommand:

1. sets `LD_PRELOAD` to load `libprobe.so`
2. runs the user's provided command
3. stitches the PROBE data files into a single, readable log for other programs

There are also several subcommands that analyze or export the provenance. Those subcommands generally use the dataflow representation rather than the PROBE dynamic trace.

6 Completeness analysis

We read the GNU C Library manual[1] and wrapped every function that does file I/O or changes how paths are resolved (e.g., `chdir`) in the following chapters, with the exception of redundant functions[2]:

- Chapter 12. Input/Output on Streams
- Chapter 13. Low-Level Input/Output
- Chapter 14. File System Interface
- Chapter 15. Pipes and FIFOs
- Chapter 16. Sockets
- Chapter 26. Processes

Our research prototype wraps:

- file `open` and `close` family of functions[3]
- `chdir` family of functions
- directory opens, closes, and iterations families of functions
- file `stat` and `access` families of functions
- file `chown`, `chmod`, and `utime` families of functions
- `exec` family of functions
- `fork`, `clone`, `wait` families of functions
- `pthread_create`, `pthread_join`, `thrd_create`, `thrd_join`, etc. functions

7 Future work

- Improve completeness: static binary rewriting
- Improve performance
- Multi-node and HPC cases

[1] https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/

[2] One function, A, is redundant to another one B, if I/O through A necessitates a call through B. We need only wrap B to discover that I/O will occur. For example, we need only log file openings and closings, not individual file reads and writes.

[3] The "family of functions" includes 64-bit variants, `f*` variants (`fopen`), re-open, close-range

7.1 Performance analysis

We intend to do a performance analysis by studying commonly used scientific applications. We will sample popular projects from several repositories and run them in PROBE including:

- Spack packages, filtering for packages that contain an executable, and using each package's project's GitHub repo's stars as a measure of popularity
- Kaggle notebooks, using the number of stars as popularity
- WorkflowHub, using the number of citations of the associated DOI as a measure of popularity

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