

Confirmation Bias Emerges from an Approximation to Bayesian Reasoning

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BIASR Model

- 1. Source Reliability, R
- 2. Simultaneous updating, $P(H,R|D)$
- 3. Independence Approximation, $P(H)P(R) \approx P(H,R)$
- 4. Sequential Updating



Confirmation bias, as the term is typically used in the psychological literature, connotes the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand.[1]


1. Source Reliability

How reliable is Bob?
People track source reliability. [2,3]



2. Simultaneous updating

Someone tells you Elvis is outside. How reliable are they?
People update beliefs together. [4, 5]



Simultaneous updating of source reliability, R, and the central hypothesis, H. Blue (thick) bars show the joint belief distribution. Orange (thin) bars show the marginal belief distributions. a) The Bayesian network structure. b) Prior beliefs favour the central hypothesis, and are neutral about source reliability. The posterior following d) disconfirming and e) confirming evidence.

References

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3. Independence Approximation

Upon receiving data, beliefs in H and R are no longer independent. [6]


Size of joint belief distribution:

- 2 beliefs -> $2^2=4$
- 20 beliefs -> $2^{20} \approx 10^6$
- 300 beliefs -> $2^{300} \approx 10^{90}$

Unrealistic memory requirement.

4. Sequential Updating

Small errors magnify.



Data for, then data against, the central hypothesis are received from different sources given neutral initial priors. Under simple and rational models, the belief in the central hypothesis returns to the prior belief. With the BIASR model, data received earlier has a stronger effect on beliefs than data received later.

	Simple Version of Bayes' theorem	Biased Evaluation Prior to Assimilation (Gerber & Green, 1999) Lord et al., 1979	Bayesian Updating Including Source Reliability (Kochler, 1993)	Belief-based Sequential Updating with Source Reliability (Bovens, Hartmann, et al., 2003) Hahn et al., 2014	Bayesian Networks (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016) Henderson & Gebharter, 2018	BIASR, Bayesian updating with an Independence Approximation and Source Reliability
Biased Evaluation		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Biased Assimilation		✓		✓		✓
Attitude Polarisation					✓	✓
Belief Perseverance		✓		✓		✓
Selection of Sources						✓

Comparison of information processing models of confirmation bias.