


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LAW ENFORCEMENT
COMMAND AND CONTROL
PROBLEMS RELATED
TO CROWDS AND
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
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U.S. Department of Justice □ Law Enforcement Assistance Administration

"THE IDENTIFICATION, DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMAND AND
CONTROL PROBLEMS RELATED TO
CROWDS AND DEMONSTRATIONS"

Vol. II -

Draft Final Report

Submitted to:

U.S Department of Justice

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VOLUME II STUDY METHODOLOGY

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VOLUME II STUDY METHODOLOGY

I. INTRODUCTION

As prescribed by the study's statement of work, data were gathered on disturbances in seven cities and analyzed in depth to identify the action of the dissidents, and the specific response of the law enforcement agencies. Through this detailed process it has been possible to identify general and specific problems encountered in command and control of crowds and demonstrations.

This volume contains the rationale for city and incident selection, the procedures for data gathering and analysis, city background data and the civic or campus environment which to a great extent determines the law enforcement response to a given incident. In addition, the specific disturbance is described within the phasing structure dictated by the statement of work, followed by detailed description of the police department's procedures, methods and techniques used during the disturbance in planning, training and operations.

In addition to this straightforward evaluation of interviews and newspaper accounts, the study team has undertaken a statistical analysis of data derived.

Review of the literature has provided the team with valuable insight into riots and demonstrations from the viewpoint of law enforcement officers, national investigatory committees, sociologists and reporters. It is significant to compare data obtained during this survey with that documented in other publications. Section IV contains a printout of the study bibliography computer file.

II. SUMMARY OF INCIDENTS STUDIED

A. Methodology for Selection of Representative Cities

To comply with LEAA statement of work stipulating selection of city samples according to geographic region, city population size, and previous history of civil disturbances, the methodology shown in simplified form in Figure II-1 was used.




Figure II-1. Simplified City Selection Process

On the basis of the literature search and prior knowledge, a large number of cities with disturbance histories were identified as candidates for investigation of problems associated with crowd and demonstration control.

Selection of the cities was made so as to optimize sampling according to city size, disturbance types and regional criteria.

At the conclusion of the city selection tradeoffs, the following cities were recommended to, and approved by, LEAA for sampling:

Corvallis, Oregon

Ithaca, New York

Durham, North Carolina

Des Moines, Iowa

Atlanta, Georgia

Cincinnati, Ohio

Los Angeles, California

Because of the low level of civil disobedience in Des Moines, Iowa, Anaheim, California was substituted for the 100,000 to 250,000 population category.

City Size. The requirement to rely on 1960 census data caused only one perturbation in the cities selected: Corvallis and Ithaca changed places in size category when 1970 population figures were released.

A more difficult problem in city selection by size was the population range specified by the statement of work. According to the "1968 Municipal Year-book" there are approximately:

6 cities with populations over 1,000,000

21 cities with populations between 500,000 and 1,000,000

25 cities with populations between 250,000 and 500,000

100 cities with populations between 100,000 and 250,000

250 cities with populations between 50,000 and 100,000

450 cities with populations between 25,000 and 50,000

1200 cities with populations between 10,000 and 25,000

Records show that most of the major disturbances have occurred in cities above 250,000; yet only three of the seven categories deal with cities of this size.

Geographic Distribution. Because of the widespread nature of civil unrest in the United States, there was little difficulty in selecting cities according to the stipulated regional distribution. However, a potential problem in studying scattered cities is the impact of the "clustering" problem on command and control measures. Both civil unrest and college/school unrest are infectious disturbances often occurring on a regional rather than an isolated incident basis. This is significant for law enforcement because the source of nearby supplementing police forces and equipments is constrained, thus, recognition of need for state police and National Guard assistance at an early stage is vital.

Disturbance Type, Intensity and Recurrence. Cities which have a prolonged history of civil strife do not necessarily fit neatly into a specific disturbance type. A college demonstration may have racial and even labor overtones, if the students see fit to demonstrate for campus black studies or non-academic employees' demands.

The literature proves that most cities over 500,000 and many above 250,000

have suffered severe unrest in the United States in the past 10 years, first of the civil/racial type and more recently in schools, at various grade levels. While racial issues have tended to have a strong local component, national issues have more seriously affected the rash of school disturbances.

Another problem in selecting the cities was the fact that the literature does not accurately distinguish between event intensity and magnitude. This fact became very apparent in the form of some surprises resulting from the interviews, compared with preconceived ideas of the selected incident.

B. Comparison of Disturbance Characteristics

The disturbances studied have several significant common aspects, and many dissimilar characteristics, as shown in Figure II-2, which compares the definitive facts without attempting to compare command and control problems or draw conclusions. That aspect of the study is included in Volume I.

Although three of the disturbances studied occurred on university campuses, the command and control techniques used by law enforcement personnel bear no resemblance to each other, due principally to external constraints and whether or not there had been prior agreement on contingency emergency plans.

In Corvallis, when notified by university authorities of the student sit-in, a

11090-3

	CORVALLIS	ITHACA	DURHAM	ATLANTA	CINCINNATI	ANAHEIM	LOS ANGELES
POPULATION	35,153	25,148	94,000	487,500	502,550	172,000	2,700,000
% NON-WHITE	1%	1.5%	35%	50%	33%	1.4%	20%
COLLEGE ENROLLMENT	15,000 OSU	CORNELL 14,000	8000 DUKE	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
SWORN POLICE	32	NONE INVOLVED (51)	170	800 (75 BLACK)	790 (40 BLACK)	244	6194
PRIVATE/CAMPUS SECURITY	21	27	25	N.A.	N.A.	120	6
MUTUAL AID	NOT REQUIRED; PLANNED AND AVAILABLE	NOT CALLED TO CAMPUS; MOBILIZED IN TOWN	NAT'L GUARD (300) MOBILIZED, NOT USED; STATE POLICE (14) USED	NOT CALLED	ONG (1200) CALLED AND USED	COUNTY MUTUAL AID (250 CALLED AND USED)	NONE CALLED
DISTURBANCE HISTORY	MINOR	INCREASING	MAJOR(HANDLED BY CAMPUS SECURITY)	MAJOR	SEVERE	MINOR	SEVERE
NAME OF INCIDENT	STUDENT SIT-IN	WILLARD STRAIGHT HALL SEIZURE	ALLEN BLDG. SEIZURE	BOULEVARD RIOTS	BLACK MON. RIOT	YIPPIE CONVENTION	CENTURY '67
LOCALE	OSU CAMPUS	CORNELL CAMPUS	DUKE CAMPUS	NEGRO GHETTO	AVONDALE NEGRO COMMUNITY	DISNEYLAND PARK-PRIVATE PROPERTY	CENTURY CITY- PRIVATE PROPERTY
DATE OF INCIDENT	7/24/69	4/19/69- 4/25/69	2/13/69	9/10/66- 9/13/66	4/4/68- 4/12/68	8/6/70	6/23/67
ISSUE/TYPE	COLLEGE	COLLEGE- BLACK STUDIES	COLLEGE- BLACK STUDIES	RACIAL	RACIAL	ANTI- ESTABLISHMENT	PEACE DEMOCRATIC
NUMBER DEMONSTRATORS	40	100 BLACKS 150 SDS UP TO 12,000 OTHER STUDENTS	48 BLACKS 2000 STUDENTS	200-800 BLACKS	3000 BLACKS	400-1000 YIPPIES	15,000
AGITATORS PRESENT	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
DEATHS/ INJURIES	0/0	0/4	0/24	1/50	2/ 15 POLICE ? CIVILIANS	0/0	0/ 6 POLICE 26 CIVILIANS
DAMAGE	0	\$35,000	APPROX. \$10,000	PROBABLY \$10,000	\$350,000	MINOR	MINOR
ARRESTS	14	17 (GRAND JURY)	5	97	304	28	52

Figure II-2. Summary of Incidents Studied

small Corvallis Police Department task force descended on the Oregon State University campus abruptly, arrested the offenders quickly, and left before a crowd was aroused. On the Cornell campus, the Administration attempted to handle a building seizure by 100 black students armed with rifles and shotguns by negotiations and 27 campus security officers; Ithaca police were not asked on campus. At Duke University, Durham Police Department officers stood for 4 hours in sub-freezing weather while university officials coaxed barricaded students to leave the building; subsequent overreaction could almost have been predicted.

Police at the Disneyland Park disturbance and the Century '67 demonstration faced the same problem: the constraints of entering upon private property before agreement is reached with the owners.

The two racial riots, one in Atlanta and the other in Cincinnati, were handled in almost identical fashion. Rioters were contained within their own community by predominantly black police officers, who acted with restraint and good judgment in both cases.

If this small sample is any indication, police tend to overreact when they are prevented from making law enforcement decisions as to when to act to defuse the riot.

C. Interview and Data Gathering Techniques

All seven sets of city interviews were conducted by Tillman L. Brown, a study team consultant. After familiarizing himself with the LEAA program objectives, current law enforcement literature, and the questionnaire, he started on his city tour. In most cities he interviewed police command and operations personnel, newspaper personnel cognizant of the event, and in one case a minister who lived in the riot-torn area.

Most of the interviews were held in the subject's own facility (police station or newspaper office). Every attempt was made to gain the confidence of the interviewee and convince him of the importance of the study and his accurate recall of events. Each interviewee was provided with the portion of the questionnaire that applied to his participation in the incident, thereby aiding him in restricting his answers to the disturbance phase under discussion.

In addition to the question-and-answer format, with the consent of the subject each interview was recorded on tape, which was later transcribed into typed copy. Mr. Brown also obtained in each city any available police training and operations manuals, then visited newspaper morgues to collect accounts of the disturbance including both pre-event and post-event occurrences.

The tape-recorded interviews have been invaluable to all team members and the total data-gathering effort. They contain a wealth of information that would not have been provided solely by answers to the questionnaire. In addition, the attitudes of the interviewees as reflected by their voices (or by sentence

structure in the transcripts) add a new dimension to the cold facts.

The objectives of the study statement of work are well served by the typed interviews since many command and control problems, interface problems with other officers and private security forces,, etc., are identified in extraneous remarks. The interviewer also determined that he was able to complete the questionnaire more accurately from the tape or transcription rather than during the interview when keeping a dialogue going was more important than note-taking.

D. Critique of Questionnaire

While many deficiencies in the questionnaire became obvious during the interviews, the most significant was its very size, which scared off many knowledgeable officers, who did not have the time to devote to such long interviews. The tendency was for the individual being interviewed to totally describe the incident in his own terms before he was willing to turn to the questionnaire, thereby making later questions redundant. On the other hand, significant command and control problems often had to be elicited by in-depth probing, since the questionnaire did not always expose them.

Probably the most serious error in the questionnaire's format is the repetition of questions regarding planning and training under each phase. Planning and training should be discussed as separate subjects--perhaps from before-the-incident and changes-since-the-incident points of view. Only actual operations should be described according to the five phases.

III. DETAILED DISTURBANCE DESCRIPTIONS

A. CORVALLIS, OREGON

1. RATIONALE FOR SELECTION OF CORVALLIS

Corvallis, Oregon, was selected for interviews to investigate the problems faced by a small town police force in handling potential disturbances, specifically demonstrations by students at Oregon State University (OSU) whose campus lies within the Corvallis city limits. OSU's student body, now over 15,000, is half of Corvallis' total population and could conceivably pose a threat to the community if the students united in demonstrating. This potential is recognized by the law enforcement agencies in the area.

Corvallis also meets the geographic (West) and population size (25,000 to 50,000) criteria stipulated by the LEAA Study statement of work.

2. RATIONALE FOR SELECTION OF 1969 SIT-IN INCIDENT

Corvallis police have been on the alert many times in the past years for possible trouble during labor strikes in the lumber and cannery industries. Stirrings of student unrest have been occurring on the OSU campus, reflecting the national collegiate attitudes and actions. Rock concerts in Gill Coliseum on the OSU campus are reported to have been attended by youthful (non-OSU students) mobs who openly drank liquor and smoked marijuana.

However, none of these incidents was marked by planned police intervention, except for a demonstration and sit-in by a handful of OSU students on 24 July,

1969. No violence occurred, but police were prepared with backup forces for a disturbance. This is the incident selected for study.

3. DATA GATHERING AND ANALYSIS

Because of the low-level of police activity associated with the OSU sit-in, the only interview was with Capt. W. L. Hockema of the detective division, who acted as field commander during the event. Capt. Hockema provided copies of the following:

- o The police report and court findings regarding the disturbance
- o Correspondence with the Illinois Crime Investigating Commission relative to one of the young men arrested during the sit-in
- o A commendation to the police department from the OSU administration
- o The local coordinated law enforcement Emergency Plan.

One newspaper article on the sit-in was obtained from the Corvallis GAZETTE-TIMES of 25 July 1969.

Considerable insight into Oregon's law enforcement problems and the action now being taken to upgrade enforcement agencies, prosecution, courts, correction and juvenile procedures in the state is provided by the following reports obtained in Corvallis:

- o "District 4 Law Enforcement Planning Survey", September 1969
- o "Problems and Priorities in the Criminal Justice System, District 4", December 1970
- o "Law Enforcement Council First Annual Report", July 1970

4. CITY BACKGROUND DATA

Corvallis, with a 1970 population of 35,153, is the fourth largest city in Oregon. It lies on the west side of the Willamette River at the intersection of U.S. Highways 99 West and 20. It is linked to Portland (85 miles to the north) and to Eugene (40 miles to the south) by Interstate Freeway No. 5 which is 9 miles east of the city limits.

Corvallis is the county seat of Benton County (population 53,776), has a prosperous and modern city center, and lovely tree-shaded streets. The principal industries are agriculture, lumbering and wood products manufacture---and education. The city's attention focuses on Oregon State University for many reasons. For one, OSU is the biggest single employer in Corvallis; there are 1900 academic and 3000 classified employees on the campus. Off-campus housing and food for students employs many other residents.

OSU occupies a 400-acre campus in the center of Corvallis (see map, Figure A-1). It was established as a land-grant college in 1868 when 90,000 acres of federal land were set aside to finance the college. One hundred years later, OSU became one of the first three sea-grant colleges, with an outstanding oceanography department.

The City of Corvallis is governed by a mayor, six councilmen and a city manager. The Chief of Police, James Goodman, reports to the city manager who also administers and reviews applications for police employment and officer promotional examinations. The police department, consisting of 32 sworn officers, is organized in three divisions:




Figure A-1. Map of Corvallis, Oregon, and OSU Campus

14

- o Patrol (headed by Assistant Chief Ken Burright)

- o Detectives

- o Services

(Detention of prisoners is assigned to the nearby Benton County Jail.)

5. SCENE OF THE INCIDENT

The peaceful sit-in of about 40 OSU students occurred in the office of Dr. Gordon Gilkey, Dean of Humanities and Social Sciences, in Bexel Hall on the OSU campus. They were arrested at that site and transported to the Benton County Jail for booking.

6. CIVIC/CAMPUS ENVIRONMENT

OSU is not known as an incubator for civil disobedience. It is located in a rural area and attracts mostly hard-working self-supporting students who are seeking preparation for careers. As a result, the majority of the student body is little interested in revolutionary concepts and activities and are amenable to following the precepts of law and order.

This is not to say that they are disinterested in national affairs; they have had protest parades as reaction to war issues, the draft and similar issues. Even with the low ratio of black students, there has been a racial incident; this occurred during a basketball game with Brigham Young University. The protesting black athletes were booed off the gym floor when they interfered with the "rights of the audience to watch a performance they had paid to see."

15

This is probably a good example of "square" America. There is a small "left" element, a large middle-of-the-road student body, and a fair sized "right" group. Nevertheless, the law enforcement agencies in the area early recognized the potential danger of agitated young people, and set up rules, regulations, responsibilities. The police officers enjoy an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect when dealing with campus administration, security and students.

7. SUMMARY OF EVENT

In applying the classic phases to the OSU sit-in, it is necessary to omit the Crowd Phase, since no crowd ever gathered, and the Demonstration-Disorderly Phase, because the protesting students were orderly at all times.

PRE-CROWD PHASE

During mid-July of the 1969 summer session at OSU, students became indignant because a promotion had not been granted to Frank Harper, an English instructor at the University for the previous three years. For about a week there were complaints to the administrative officials on campus and some mild attempts at sit-ins in the Administration Office. Finally, a group of students pitched a tent in the middle of the Memorial Union lawn. Campus police and the Physical Plant employees took the tent down because it was damaging the grass and impounded it. They later returned the tent to the students who did not attempt to set it up again.

Articles regarding the controversial teacher promotion were printed in the college newspaper.

DEMONSTRATION-ORDERLY PHASE

On Thursday, 24 July 1969, the protesting students decided to demonstrate in the office of Dr. Gilkey, who (they said) had refused to discuss the Harper promotion. At 1 p.m. a group of students, reported as 40 by the GAZETTE-TIMES, went to Dean Gilkey's office and announced that they would remain there until he either sent a personal letter recommending Harper's promotion or gave them a "reasonable explanation" for not doing so. They sat in chairs or on the floor, playing cards, reading books and going through Dean Gilkey's files.

Dean Gilkey reached his office shortly after 2 p.m. and asked the group to give him their names. When they refused, he gathered up some papers and said he would go elsewhere to do his work; instead, he reported the incident to Col. Charles Blumenfeld, executive assistant to the President's office.

Col. Blumenfeld went directly to Dean Gilkey's office and read a statement to the demonstrators, advising them that their "continued occupancy interferes" with the lawful use of property, that they were guilty of trespass, and that they would be subject to arrest and university discipline. When they did not leave, Col. Blumenfeld notified the Corvallis Police Department.

About 27 students were still in the office when police arrived. At that time, Col. Blumenfeld again read the instructions for the students to leave the

building; some students did leave. After that, Capt. Hockema advised those remaining that he was an officer of the Corvallis Police Department and that they would be arrested if they did not leave the building; no one else left. The 14 students in the room were advised of their rights, removed one-by-one from the room, photographed and transported to the Benton County jail.

The leader of the student demonstrators appeared to be Paul Roy Rothstein, 22, identified variously as a teacher and as a graduate student at OSU.¹ When approached by the police, he attempted to kick them and he urged the other students: "I know how to resist; just sit on the floor and lock arms and go limp." However, he was arrested first, submitting to the procedure without causing trouble. The other students were cooperative.

POST - DEMONSTRATION PHASE

After booking at the jail, the ten men and four women prisoners were processed and arraigned at 4:45 p.m. before Judge Robert L. Gilliland of the Benton County District Court, who set bail at \$100 each. The bail for the four women was posted at 6:45 p.m. by a Corvallis attorney who was affiliated with the American Civil Liberties Union. Later that evening he posted bail for the men prisoners.

The 14 people arrested first demanded single jury trials in order to really

1. He was identified by police photographs, FBI and Illinois law enforcement reports.

"bog down the courts," but later changed their minds and agreed to a mass trial, during which each was identified by the arresting officer who produced the photograph taken at the scene. All were found guilty of trespass and fined \$50 each in the Oregon State District Court (Benton County) on 11 August 1969. All appealed their cases to the Circuit Court where the verdicts were upheld on 15 April 1970. Threatened appeals to the Supreme Court were withdrawn after conviction in Circuit Court.

8.. CORVALLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT PROCEDURES, METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

(In this section Planning, Operations and Training for this specific incident are discussed first, followed by a review of the statewide planning being undertaken by Oregon law enforcement agencies at the present time. The evaluation of present equipment and manpower and projection of future needs is a realistic approach by small community police departments to reduce the increasing crime rate and control civil disturbances.)

PLANNING

The Corvallis Police Department is completely aware of the potential danger of violent outbursts by the 15,000 OSU students because of the campus unrest from coast to coast. To prevent and/or control any disturbances, the police have established an excellent rapport with the University Administration and with the University Security Force. Any reports of crimes committed, demonstrations planned, student unrest, or meetings of dissidents are freely exchanged by these three organizations to maintain coordinated visibility of the current status.

All three organizations are also extremely alert to arrival in the city, or on the campus, of outside agitators or carloads of unknown visitors. License numbers are checked and all outsiders are identified as to criminal records, etc., if possible. In this manner, Corvallis Police were already aware of Rothstein as a full-fledged militant who had arrived from New York only shortly before the sit-in. (As a matter of fact, they have complete records on Rothstein. He has been in trouble at the University of Oregon in Eugene; he tried to disrupt the Democratic Convention in Bend; and he agitated at a labor strike at the American Can Company in Halsey. He was arrested on 11 October 1969 along with 283 others, "when the SDS Weathermen went on a rampage in the Chicago downtown loop area."¹ Bail for his release was sent from Corvallis to Chicago.)

During the past years there have been minor incidents of protest parades, teach-ins, sit-ins and other forms of demonstration. University officials have cooperated, whenever possible, with the students by providing meeting halls or buildings for student gatherings. Police have made it a policy to issue parade permits when requested, and even to provide a lead car with red light flashing.

In October 1967, representatives from the Corvallis Police and Fire Department, Oregon State Police, Benton County Sheriff, OSU Campus Police, and

1. Letter from Charles Siragusa, Executive Director, Illinois Crime Investigating Commission, dated 19 January 1970

the Oregon National Guard met in joint session to make decisions on courses of action, personnel to be involved, and basic responsibilities in the event of a major incident within Corvallis. This Emergency Operations Plan would deploy the Corvallis police as follows:

- o Emergency Operations Center at Gill Coliseum under the direction of Chief Goodman. (This site is next to (1) the campus security office where there is radio equipment to operate on the police department and other frequencies, (2) the campus telephone switchboard, and (3) the ROTC classrooms with status boards and charts.
- o Police Office Command at the police station under the direction of Assistant Chief Burright to monitor all radio and telephone messages, and alert hospitals, ambulances and other services.
- o Field Command Post under the direction of Captain Hockema to coordinate mobile units of patrolmen and command officers, respond to calls, and secure potential trouble spots such as liquor stores and gun stores.

Back-up support in the form of reserves, guards for communication facilities, assistance at the mobile field headquarters, and patrol of the uninvolves portion of the city would be provided by the Sheriff's office, Oregon State Police, and the Oregon National Guard (if called in by the proper authorities). In addition, under the civil defense plan a fleet of volunteers with station wagons

is available on call during a disaster.

According to the Emergency Plan's tactics, radio communications are kept to a minimum for two reasons: (1) To avoid immediate saturation of the single police frequency, and (2) To prevent monitoring by the OSU radio center of critical messages, which is known to occur on both city and state police frequencies.

All law enforcement agencies in Benton County operate over the same radio frequency, except for the Oregon State Police. The operations plan resolves the communications problem between these two frequencies in one of two ways:

- o A State Police unit is stationed outside the back door of the police department.
- o The high-powered portable transmitter/receiver of the State Police sergeant stationed in Corvallis is moved into either the police station or the Emergency Operations Center.

On 24 July 1969 police began preparing a specific operations plan for handling the student sit-in, on the basis of events during the preceding week. They were advised by university officials of the number of people involved (about 40) and their mood (not belligerent nor destructive). Only the commanding officers--lieutenants and sergeants--were advised of the plan, on the basis that patrolmen would respond better to direct commands if they were not involved in the overall tactics.

TRAINING

The Corvallis Police Department, although small, believes in thorough training for all officers and new recruits. Roll-call training occurs for about one-half hour every 40 shifts. Three 2-hour refresher training classes are held in a school gym (out of public view) at least once each year. Men are instructed in use of firearms, gas equipment (including the fitting of masks), and riot control techniques. There are drills and marching, squad formations, and special emphasis on discipline: Know who to take orders from and don't break ranks under any conditions. A special four-man team is trained for anti-sniper patrol.

Training during simulated disasters has proved valuable in several emergency situations.

New recruits (there is a high rate of turn-over) are exposed to in-service training before they are sent to Camp Withycombe, usually in groups of three. This Camp, operated by the State Board of Police Standards and Training, provides identical training for all law enforcement personnel in Oregon. As a result, all agencies can be coordinated quickly. For example: A State Police sergeant could step in and replace a Corvallis police sergeant with no loss of efficiency, since the same commands, same formations and same signals are used.

OPERATIONS

Although the students were not aware of it, when the campus authorities took down their tent earlier in the week, Corvallis Police officers were on standby at the police station and commanding officers were watching the event from a Memorial Union window. Radio communications to the station were available in case of trouble.

At noon Thursday, the students went to Dean Gilkey's office to talk to him, then settled down to wait when he was not there. Police were immediately advised of their presence and prepared for an incident. At 1 p.m., a command post of sorts was set up at the station; at 1:30 p.m., the midnight shift and all off-duty officers were alerted for a possible call. The Sheriff was advised to prepare to book a large number of people and the State Police were informed of a possible requirement to patrol Corvallis if all officers were tied up on the campus.

As soon as Dean Gilkey advised Col. Blumenfeld that the students would not leave, this information was passed on to District Attorney Frank Knight and the police department. At 2 p.m., the City Manager was advised that a minor incident was anticipated. At 3 p.m., just as the evening shift came on duty, the day shift was advised to stay over, and off-duty personnel (previously alerted) were called in.

At 3:30 p.m., Benton County District Attorney Frank Knight contacted the Corvallis Police Department and advised that he had word from the University

that there was a sit-in demonstration in progress. He instructed the officers to move in, warn the demonstrators to leave, and arrest any who remained under the state trespass statute, ORS-164-460.* The District Attorney had already prepared a statement for Col. Blumenfeld to read to the demonstrators, ordering them to vacate, prior to dispatch of police units to the campus.

At 4:05 p.m., Marshall Arthur Freundt of the OSU campus police, requested police assistance in vacating the offices, since the demonstrators had not heeded the warning. Capt. Hockema with 14 officers equipped with helmets and riot batons drove to the campus and marched down the hall in two columns. The size of the police response startled the demonstrators, who exclaimed that "they brought the whole department." Capt. Hockema called the police station, giving Dean Gilkey's phone extension, thereby establishing the only semblance to a Forward Command Post. He then entered the office where the demonstrators were seated and listened to Col. Blumenfeld as he again read the order to vacate the building or be arrested. About 14 students left at that time, hurrying down the hall past the patrolmen and away from the building.

* Capt. Hockema explained the rationale behind the District Attorney's selection of the state statute for trespass:

- (1) The demonstrators were not committing any acts that fit the legal description of "disorderly."
- (2) Those arrested would be transported directly to the Benton County Jail, rather than to the limited (4-prisoner) police holding cell, as would be the case if arrests were based on a municipal ordinance.
- (3) Those arrested would face trial in a state district court, rather than a municipal court.

Capt. Hockema repeated the order to vacate and gave a last chance to leave; no other demonstrators left. He then announced that they were under arrest and read them their rights.

As previously planned, two officers stepped to the door and escorted the demonstrators, one at a time, (they offered no resistance to arrest) out into the hall where a Polaroid picture was taken of each student with his two arresting officers. Each was then walked down to the waiting police cars.

Six officers, stationed outside the building with three unmarked cars, kept watch for possible crowd buildup; none occurred. Four young people were put into each car and immediately transported to jail. No reports were written at this time, and it only required about 3 minutes to remove each student from the office, take the identifying picture and put him in a police unit. The office was secured at 4:38 p.m.

No resistance was encountered, and no force was used. The police reported that there was a friendly interchange with the demonstrators after the arrests started. The University Administration commended the department very highly for the "calm and orderly" handling of the situation.

Police expressed regret that when the demonstrators were booked, they were not fingerprinted at the same time. Capt. Hockema said he felt it would have been a good idea to "open an FBI file for them right at the start." Testimony of the arresting officers (with photographic identification) and university personnel resulted in conviction of all 14 students for trespass.

No formal critique was held after the incident, although there were numerous informal discussions. None of the officers participating could suggest any means of improving the operation because it had gone so smoothly... "but we were lucky, it was summer school, and there could have been a lot more people involved."

There was a noticeable improvement in college/police relations after this incident. The police were commended by the college newspaper, and have since been invited many times to classes to discuss narcotics, traffic, and juvenile problems.

Police operations in this case could be dismissed as insignificant. But who can say that the mood of the dissidents would not have changed to disorderly had they been allowed to remain in the office overnight? Would more students have become involved if the disturbance had not been defused prior to the Demonstration-Disorderly Phase?

9. PROBLEMS OF SMALL COMMUNITY POLICE DEPARTMENTS

The Oregon Law Enforcement Council, in its First Annual Report (July 1970) defines three basic problems that impede the quality of police operations in Oregon, stressing that the most important is unnecessary structural fragmentation. "Most incorporated municipalities in the state maintain their own police force, and each of the 36 counties maintains a Sheriff's office. Eight out of every ten of the more than 3000 sworn police officers in Oregon are

agents of local jurisdiction." While the Council believes it desirable for citizens to know their own police, they feel there should be consolidation of small forces, sharing of communications, and even centralized dispatching, records and training.

District 4 (Benton, Linn and Lincoln Counties) of Oregon's 14 administrative districts for the Criminal Justice System covers an area of more than 2.5 million acres and has a population of 147,670, less than 1% of which is non-white. There are only 115 sworn police officers in the 11 municipalities and 60 Sheriff's officers in the three counties to handle a crime rate* estimated at 130 per 1000 population. Fortunately, backup support is available from the Oregon State Police, who are far more than highway patrolmen.

The law enforcement problems of the district are typified by Corvallis, which is seriously understaffed with only 33 sworn officers and six civilians. The department has nine patrol cars, most of which are replaced yearly. The cars are all equipped with a one-channel radio on the low band frequency that has many technical problems, including "skipping." Four cars are used for patrol, the remainder are used by the chief, assistant chief and detective division. The department also has one walkie-talkie on the police channel and two 3-channel citizen band walkie-talkies, two 30-30 rifles, seven 12-gauge shotguns, forty 4-inch 38 special hand guns, one tear gas gun and two cameras. Because of the possibility of continuing civil disobedience on the

* Seven major crimes

OSU campus, the force has recently acquired helmets, riot sticks, pick-ax handles, leather sap gloves and gas masks which are issued individually to each officer.

One of the major problems of the department is lack of suitable facilities; the present police station is a train station, frequently remodeled. The only holding facilities are a cell (metal cage) which does not meet minimum requirements. Storage facilities for evidence and records are inadequate. The training room is inadequate for the purpose and there is no squad room available to house officers held on alert status for long periods during civil disorder incidents at OSU.

The Corvallis Police Department anticipates increasing problems with a proposed annexation to the city, a second high school and enlargement of the OSU stadium. Additional patrolmen and cars will be required to meet the requirements. In response to the need for improved training material, work is proceeding on a course of instruction and materials for the presentation of a basic recruit training program that will meet or surpass present state board standards, and steps are being taken to obtain a full-time training officer for recruit and refresher classes.

Some of the recommended courses of action for District 4 law enforcement agencies include:

- I. Develop crime prevention programs
- II. Develop major crime investigation team for the district
- III. Improve radio communications on a station-to-station basis
- IV. Develop and improve district-wide record keeping and retrieval system
- V. Develop an educational program at Linn-Benton Community College for all policemen, with emphasis on a planned career development program.

B. ITHACA, NEW YORK

1. RATIONALE FOR SELECTION OF ITHACA

The City of Ithaca, New York, was selected for study as representative of a small city that has been faced with numerous demonstrations and disturbances, predominantly related to campus issues but with racial overtones.

It fits the geographical criteria and is typical of a conservative Eastern Ivy League college town that had not in the past been exposed to any greater violence than that generated by college pranksters.

2. RATIONALE FOR SELECTION OF THE 1969 WILLARD STRAIGHT HALL (CORNELL) SEIZURE

Cornell University, located within the city limits of Ithaca, has had increasingly frequent civil disobedience. The seizure of Willard Straight Hall on 19 April 1969 by members of the Afro-American Society was the start of week-long demonstrations, sit-ins, negotiations, etc. Because pictures of heavily armed blacks emerging from Willard Straight Hall (WSH) received nationwide publicity, this incident was selected for study.

This disturbance differs from the other six studied, in that no civilian law enforcement agencies were directly involved in any of the disturbance phases.

Cornell Administration and its woefully inadequate Division of Safety and Security were responsible for crowd control. No coordinated plan had ever been discussed with the seven local agencies that might have assisted during the demonstration. These include the Ithaca, Dryden, Groton, Trumansburg and Cayuga Heights municipal police departments, the Tompkins County Sheriff's

office (with its state-wide mutual aid plan) and the New York State Police. Nevertheless, large numbers of law enforcement officers were on standby off campus during all of "The Week" that followed the building takeover.

County officials did move in a month later when the Tompkins County District Attorney presented evidence to the Grand Jury, which returned trespass findings against 17 of the black students who occupied the building.

3. DATA GATHERING AND ANALYSIS

When it was determined during discussions with Ithaca Police Chief Herbert L. Van Ostrand and Deputy Chief James Herson that they were not involved directly in the WSH disturbance, interviews regarding the incident were held with campus personnel. Captain L. T. George, Cornell University Safety Director, responded to both the Command and Operations portions of the questionnaire. Three reels of tape were recorded and transcribed into 30 pages of information, from which data for the questionnaire were extracted. No cognizant individual was located to respond to the Observer portion of the questionnaire.

However, the incident has been documented extensively from different points of view. CORNELL REPORTS, published by the Cornell Office of Public Information, devoted its spring 1969 issue to the disturbance, reprinting verbatim much of the text of the Ithaca JOURNAL's coverage as it appeared in the newspaper. The Editor of CORNELL REPORTS stated, "The Journal's reporting was thorough and comprehensive. But what is most important--it represents an independent view-point."

Valuable data were obtained from the June 1969 edition of the CORNELL ALUMNI NEWS and from a report of the Special Trustee Committee on "Campus Unrest at Cornell."

A requested copy of the Carter Commission Report has not been received. Selected copies of the Ithaca JOURNAL covering the period April 1969 through 1970 have also been obtained along with news photographs, campus maps and college and city background data.

4. CITY BACKGROUND DATA

Ithaca, population 25,148, lies at the southern tip of Lake Cayuga, largest of upstate New York's Finger Lakes (Figure B-1). It is 55 miles from Syracuse, 165 miles west of the state capital, Albany, and 220 miles from New York City. It is the county seat of 482-square mile Tompkins County, which has a population of 75,327, a very small percentage of which is non-white.

Ithaca is an agricultural, recreational and educational center. It is the site of Cornell University (14,000 students), Ithaca College (3500 students), Tompkins Cortland Community College and several agricultural colleges and institutions. The collegiate orientation of the city is reflected in educational statistics: 60% of the city's population are high school graduates and 25% are college graduates; 70% of the city's high school graduates now go on to college.

The city is governed by a mayor and council, with two councilmen being elected from each of seven wards. The city employs full-time Urban Renewal




Figure B-1. Map of Ithaca, New York, and Cornell Campus

and Planning Departments to give professional direction to the city's growth.

Fire protection is provided by a combined volunteer and paid staff. In 1969 the Ithaca Police Department had approximately 50 men, and the Cornell security force consisted of less than 30 men.

5. SCENE OF THE INCIDENT

Cornell University, a land grant college founded in 1865, covers 7000 acres of rolling terrain, streams and lakes in the northeast section of Ithaca; it is also a privately endowed institution. Of Cornell's 14,000 students, about 13,000 are located on the Ithaca campus, and most of the remainder at the New York City Medical School. The faculty of 1200 includes many scholars of international stature.

Most of the students live on campus. There are University residence halls on the west and north sides of the campus, large apartment complexes on the north and a great many Greek fraternity and sorority houses on the west and north. The principal university buildings form the core of the campus.

Willard Straight Hall is Cornell's student union building. It contains the campus radio station, guest facilities and visitor information services, in addition to the customary student union facilities. It is of Gothic architecture and is actually much larger than it appears from the Central Avenue entrance because of its location on a slope. The rambling design and multi-level access made it extremely difficult for a small group of officers to control the nine ground floor exits.

6. CIVIC/CAMPUS ENVIRONMENT

The Cornell Alumni News probably best summarizes the environment on the Cornell campus in 1968 in the article "Prelude to Trouble," excerpted below:

"White activists had been sitting-in, making demands, and heckling speakers for several years, but the first black use of force on campus came in April 1968. Black students criticized a visiting professor's teaching as 'racist', he dismissed a class when a black insisted on reading a statement, and 50 blacks occupied his department's office for 6 hours to demand he apologize, be reprimanded and dismissed.

"Soon after a summit meeting of U. S. black student leaders last Thanksgiving at Howard University, a hard-core of Cornell's 250 black undergraduates began pressing demands for an entirely autonomous black college. A SUN (campus newspaper) reporter was struck and knocked down by a black student outside the black studies center."

The Trustee's Report¹ states: "Back in December and January (1968) the black students carried out a series of comparatively minor disruptions, having the apparent purpose of testing the tolerance limits of the Cornell community, as well as drawing attention to their position. When six of these were cited in February to appear before the Conduct Board for these alleged violations, the Afro-American Society argued that these persons were acting politically on behalf of the entire AAS, that there were no blacks

serving in the judicial system, and that the University adjudicatory system was not in the position to judge a question involving the University itself."

Some of the "comparatively minor disruptions" included dancing on the tables in Willard Straight Hall, three campus attacks on whites, and on 28 February 1969, a black student physically pulled Cornell President Perkins from the microphone in anger over his statements regarding university investment policy in South Africa. The SDS on 10 March broke into Malott Hall to end a bank's recruiting effort; no one was punished for this incident.

On 14 April, the university trustees granted most of the black demands for an Afro-American Society Study Center and appropriated \$214,000 for its implementation.

7. SUMMARY OF EVENT

In order to fit the disturbance at Cornell into the specified phases, it must be assumed that no Demonstration-Disorderly Phase occurs unless there is a definite confrontation between dissidents and police. The Pre-Crowd Phase began with the Conduct Board's announcement of reprimands for three black students at 2 a.m. on Friday 18 April. The Crowd Phase began when 100 Afro-American Students seized Willard Straight Hall at 5 a.m. on Saturday, an act of trespass; a crowd of students began gathering outside the hall about 7 a.m. and grew during the 36 hours that the black students remained in WSH. The Demonstration-Orderly Phase is assigned to the march of the black students from WSH at 4:10 p.m. Sunday to their building at 320 Wait Street. A

1. "Campus Unrest at Cornell", Office of University Publications

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negotiated settlement was signed there by the dissidents and university officials at 4:40 p.m., thereby avoiding a confrontation with police and hence the Demonstration-Disorderly Phase. The Post-Demonstration Phase lasted the remainder of the week, and was marked by frequent, numerous and crowded Orderly Demonstrations.

PRE-CROWD PHASE

More than 4 months after the offenses occurred on 12 December 1968, the Student Conduct Board met and handed down reprimands to three black students and acquitted two; the sixth student cited had already withdrawn from the University. These decisions were announced at 2 a.m. on Friday 18 April. At 2:53 a.m. a rock was thrown through a window and a 6-foot by 3-foot cross was discovered burning on the front porch of Wari House, an off-campus cooperative residence for black women students at 208 Dearborn Place. (This residence had been established the previous spring by the University in response to the Negro women's complaints about sharing dormitories with white women.) Police and security officers, responding almost instantly to the fire, extinguished it quickly. Black male students were reported to have rushed to the scene, but left when the police arrived.

Beginning at 2:57 a.m., three false fire alarms were set off within a two-minute period from three of the large women's dormitories; a total of 11 false alarms were turned in between 1:43 and 5:00 a.m. Throughout Friday tension grew on the campus, but the only documented incidents were five more false fire alarms between 8:14 and 10:43 p.m.

CROWD PHASE

At approximately 5:30 a.m., Saturday, 19 April 1969, Afro-American Students estimated as 50 to 100, entered WSH and began to evacuate the occupants. Because this was Parents Weekend at Cornell, about 30 guests were occupying the bedrooms of WSH. They were awakened, ordered to get dressed, pack their bags and leave. At the same time, two other groups of black students were rounding up the house department employees and the dining employees (approximately 40 in all) and escorting them out of the building.

At 5:38 a.m., employees notified the Safety Division of the building takeover, and at 5:48 a.m., the parents started calling in. At 6:03 a.m., the AAS announced they had seized the building over WVBR, the Cornell student radio station located in the WSH basement. WVBR went off the air at 6:22 a.m.

The blacks themselves later admitted there were more women than men in the group and that there were about 10 non-students from downtown Ithaca. They used wire, chains and rope that they took into the building to secure all the doors. The campus patrol arrived about 6 a.m., verified that the doors were locked from inside and stationed themselves around the building. They directed away white students heading for the hall for breakfast but allowed a black couple to enter the building about 6:30 a.m.

Support from the SDS began at 7:05 a.m. when about 50 arrived and started

picketing; this group swelled to about 150 later in the day. The remainder of the crowd varied during the day as students passed by and paused a while to watch.

The University administrators began deliberations as to proper course of action, considering the alternatives of obtaining an injunction, of negotiating, etc. Between 7:30 and 8 a.m., Vice Provost Keith Kennedy tried unsuccessfully to talk on the telephone to WSH with Edward Whitfield, president of AAS. Determining that an injunction could not be obtained before notice to evacuate had been given, the Administration at 9:30 a.m. had Safety Division Director Eugene Dymek announce such an order through a bull horn on all sides of the building. No one came out.

Violence erupted at 9:35 a.m. when about 25 white students tried to gain admission to WSH through a broken window leading to the WVBR studio. About half got into the building where they were repulsed by the black students, who had broken off pool cues to use as clubs. They left through the same broken window--the casualties were one black and three white students slightly injured. While the battle was going on inside the building, the youths who didn't get in exchanged a few blows with the SDS pickets.

As a result of this incident, tensions were heightened. Campus security continued to let blacks move in and out of the building, but kept all whites away. Throughout the day, the University Council worked on preparation of an injunction. The Intrafraternity Council, despite the growing resent-

ment of white students over both white and black militants' violation of the conduct code, made a strong statement in support of the black students. The AAS, inside WSH, were busily setting up a communication system with observers posted throughout the campus to relay information by radio as well as telephone into their bastion.

At 9 p.m., Whitfield called President Perkins to ask about a rumor that eight carloads of armed students were coming toward the hall. Dymek was unable to deny the rumor because the only phone line was tied up. By 10:15 p.m., campus police reported to President Perkins that the blacks were taking rifles and other armament into WSH. Vice Provost Kennedy talked with Whitfield on the telephone and tried to persuade the group to leave the building, or at least bring out the guns. Both requests were rejected.

Rumors of snipers, bombs, carloads of white students roaming the campus, and false fire alarms continued throughout the night. None were confirmed. The AAS inside WSH claim they were terrified.

At 7:30 a.m., Sunday, the SDS met to plan a rally for later in the morning and resumed picketing of WSH. President Perkins and his staff met at 9 a.m.; the Faculty Council convened at 11 a.m. By noon it was agreed that Vice Provost Kennedy and Vice President Muller would go to WSH and discuss with the blacks the following agreement:

- 1) The University would investigate the cross-burning and the white student invasion of WSH,

- 2) Dean of the Faculty Robert Miller would call a faculty meeting (on Monday) and recommend nullification of the charges against the three black students,
- 3) The blacks must leave the building right away,
- 4) The blacks must help in building a viable and acceptable judicial system.

Other points of discussion were the weapons held by the blacks inside the building, and removal of the SDS pickets from around the building before the blacks evacuated WSH. Muller and Kennedy returned to the Faculty Council where the main points of the agreement were typed up, after which they returned to WSH to escort the blacks from the building, which had been occupied for 36 hours. There was a delay while the blacks cleaned up the building.

DEMONSTRATION-ORDERLY PHASE

The blacks, having given solemn pledge that their guns were unloaded, moved out of WSH at 4:10 p.m. between lines of campus security officers, SDS, curious students, townspeople and newsmen. They were followed by the Vice Provost and Vice President of the University. With their entourage, the AAS marched across the campus (Figure B-2) to their headquarters at 320 Wait Avenue (see map, Figure B-3). In an embarrassing series of pictures, printed in thousands of newspapers and shown on TV, the University's administrators were shown to wait quietly while the still-armed blacks read aloud the agreement before signing it. Some of the pictures show the black spokesman with a shell in the breech of his rifle while speaking to the press.



Figure B-2. After 36-Hours of Occupancy, Armed Afro-American Students Exit Student Union Building between Rows of Campus Police and March across Campus to Sign Negotiated Agreements with Campus Officials




Figure B-3. Detailed Map of Cornell Campus, Showing Route of Black Student March

The seven-part agreement is shown below:

Part I. In a meeting to be held 21 April 1969 the Dean of the Cornell Faculty, Robert D. Miller, will recommend to the full faculty that the judicial procedures taken against the five students as a result of incidents last December and January be nullified by action of the full faculty.

Part II. The University promises best efforts to secure legal assistance to defend against any civil actions arising out of the occupation of WSH by the AAS. Such efforts will be made on behalf of individuals or the group.

Part III. The University will press no civil or criminal charges, or take any measures to punish by means of expulsion or otherwise, activities of the AAS in occupation of WSH. The University will assume all responsibility for damages to WSH.

Part IV. The University will provide 24-hour protection for 208 Dearborn Place (Women's Co-op) and 320 Wait, with men assigned this task at all times.

Part V. The University undertakes to investigate thoroughly police activities related to both the burning of the cross incident and the attack on WSH by unknown individuals. A detailed report will be issued to the AAS and made public including identities of those involved.

Part VI. The AAS has discontinued the occupation of WSH.

Part VII. The AAS undertakes to cooperate in devising a new judiciary system to promote justice on Cornell's campus for all members of the student body.

Thus, by total capitulation, the university administration was able to avoid confrontation between law enforcement and law breakers. The damage, which the university agreed to pay for (Part III), is estimated by the Committee Report as \$10,800 for food, broken billiard cues, and replacement of lock and keys, plus \$15,000 in lost revenue in the student union. The Director of Cornell Safety and Security stated during his interview, that the damage amounted to \$35,000.

POST DEMONSTRATION PHASE

The ensuing week was chaotic, as Cornell underwent a period of institutional crisis that was fully covered by press and television. There were large and small convocations, there were long and short sessions, there were decisions that were almost immediately reversed, and directives that were ignored.

On Monday:

- o President Perkins banned firearms on campus and issued instructions as to how to turn them in; the black president of a campus fraternity (non-AAS member) promptly handed over his guns as did some of the white students. The armed blacks held onto theirs, claiming they needed the protection.

- o President Perkins called a convocation in Barton Hall at 3 p.m. Attended by 12,000 students, faculty and interested citizens (Figure B-4), the meeting did not touch upon the events of the previous days; President Perkins' 20-minute talk was only a plea for "humanity".
- o At 4:40 p.m. 1100 faculty members met in Bailey Hall where they postponed agreement to nullify the penalties against the blacks; Dean Miller immediately resigned, as he had promised. The news spread fast and as the faculty left Bailey Hall, the SDS moved in along with 2000 other students to protest there until AAS demands were met.
- o During the afternoon, 30 members of the Afro-American Society of Ithaca College (located in the southern part of Ithaca) burned their President (Howard Dillingham) in effigy and demanded a black studies program.

On Tuesday:

- o Meeting followed meeting and rumors flew; the vigil in Barton Hall grew to over 6000 students and faculty at times.
- o At 6 p.m., Tom Jones, an AAS member, gave a long talk over a downtown radio station ending up with threats against Perkins, four top administrators and three professors and giving "Cornell 3 hours to live."
- o At 7:25 p.m., the Faculty Council agreed to meet on Wednesday to vote on dismissal of the penalties.



Figure B-4. Mass Meeting of 12,000 Cornell Students to Hear Review of Demonstration

On Wednesday:

- o About 2000 students had spent the night in Barton Hall, still listening to speeches and breaking up into small groups for discussion.
- o At 12:15 p.m., 1100 members of the Faculty Council met in Bailey Hall, reversed its Monday decision, and voted to nullify the complaints against the blacks, in a bitter session that seriously divided the faculty.
- o About 3 p.m., President Perkins went to Barton Hall to tell the 9000 students gathered there of the faculty decision. Eric Evans, vice chairman of the AAS, was speaking; Perkins put his arm around Evans' shoulder; David Burak, SDS leader, put his arm around Perkins' shoulder. Evans laughed, "You know what Perkins just said after putting his arm around my shoulder paternally? 'Sit down, I want to talk.'"¹ Perkins sat on the stage floor while Evans finished his speech.

That evening, Cornell's "silent center" students began a marathon meeting at Barton Hall, which lasted until Friday. Although the blacks were popular and racism a favorite topic, this large assembly was essentially moderate and radicals had lost control by the end of the week. By Saturday, the talk of reconstruction gave way to a committee charged with drafting resolutions.

1. "Student Participation in Cornell 'Restructuring' or 'Reform', Ithaca JOURNAL 24 April 1969.

Most of the students, somewhat talked out, returned to classes the following Monday.

There was a series of investigations of the disturbances by the University faculty, trustees and alumni; by the federal office of Civil Rights; by the Tompkins County Grand Jury; and by other organizations. Late in May President Perkins, who had befriended the SDS and AAS leaders (Burak and Evans) before they demeaned him in public, announced his resignation.

8. PROCEDURES, METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

Because of the unique handling of the Cornell disturbance, it is necessary to evaluate the response to demonstration command and control problems from a different aspect. The very small Cornell Security Division force was required to handle the entire situation, while outside law enforcement agencies were helpless to take action other than standby measures and cautious observation.

As a result, the command and control procedures, methods and techniques are addressed here from the Ithaca Police Department's point of view, then from the Cornell Security Division's point of view.

(a) ITHACA POLICE DEPARTMENT PROCEDURES, METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

PLANNING

Although there had been numerous disturbances at Cornell prior to this incident, there appears to have been no discussion of a possible emergency

contingency plan between Ithaca civic officials, the Ithaca Police Department, the Cornell administration or the Cornell security force. Intelligence on campus activities, if passed at all, seems to have been exchanged informally.

Therefore, it is extremely important that mutual aid agreements were firmly established between law enforcement agencies around the Cornell campus.

The most effective is a statewide force of about 400 deputies organized under the New York State Sheriffs' Association and given training in the control of civil disturbances. In order to activate this organization formally, Cornell officials would have had to request Tompkins County Sheriff Robert Howard to declare a state of emergency in Ithaca in a telegram to Governor Rockefeller, who would send in the men. In the absence of any positive action by the Cornell administration, Sheriff Howard took the responsibility of calling a "training exercise" at Ithaca to call in needed reserve strength.

The City of Ithaca also had plans for disturbance control. Mayor Kiely was prepared to declare a state of emergency that would enable him to establish a curfew, regulate or prohibit the sale, use or transport of alcohol, firearms, ammunition, explosives or flammable liquids. Authority for this action is by amendment to the State Municipal Law.

TRAINING

No information was obtained from the Ithaca Police Department regarding their training procedures or classes.

OPERATIONS

Most of the Cornell campus is within Ithaca City Limits and the Ithaca police

normally perform routine patrol there, particularly of the residential areas. The extreme northern part of the campus adjoins Cayuga Heights City Limits, and police from that municipality patrol some off-campus living quarters, such as Wari House.

Therefore, when the alarm regarding the burning cross was received at 2:57 a.m., it was not unusual that Detective Edward Trainer of the Ithaca Police Department was at the corner of Dearborn and Triphammer within a few yards of Wari House. He was the first to arrive and kicked the cross off the porch and onto the lawn. He was joined almost immediately by a Cayuga Heights officer and a Cornell security officer who helped him extinguish the blaze before the Fire Department arrived. Many false fire alarms from widely scattered campus halls immediately claimed the attention of both police and fire officers.

These incidents were sufficient to trigger action by Ithaca Police officials, who immediately assigned their men to 12-hour shifts for the ensuing week, with only a short break on Sunday afternoon. Regular routine patrols of the university area continued.

Ithaca Deputy Police Chief James Herson is quoted as saying on 23 April, "We're not interested in touching this thing off--we're trying to control it so we are trying to avoid any display of special equipment." He stated that Ithaca has full riot equipment but that "except on a specific call, we've avoided the use of special weapons in the field as a preventive measure."

The gear is available, however.¹

When WSH was seized Saturday morning, a member of the university president's staff notified the Ithaca Chief of Police and Mayor, the Tompkins County Sheriff and the Lieutenant of State Police. Newspaper accounts are not clear as to whether or not mutual aid was called in at that time. However, Sheriff Howard and District Attorney, M.F. McHugh took the responsibility for calling up extra deputies, stating that 50 arrived within less than an hour after alert. Monday evening there were 80 deputies in Ithaca, who were dismissed at 1 a.m., Tuesday. Increasing tensions resulted in calling in deputies later Tuesday until about 300 were on standby during the afternoon and evening. About 100 of these deputies remained overnight and through Wednesday, being billeted at the Army Reserve Unit on Hector Street.

The deputies maintained low profile tactics, remaining as inconspicuous as possible and staying away from the campus. They wore grey fatigues with sheriff shoulder patches and their sidearms. They kept mace, shotguns and helmets in their cars.

Contrary to some reports, no state police were in Ithaca other than some Bureau of Criminal Investigation men being employed as liaison between local authorities and the state.

1. "Extra Deputies Remain on Call" Ithaca JOURNAL, 23 April 1969.

On Friday, 25 April, AAS leaders urged 4000 students meeting in Barton Hall to march to Ithaca in support of a black youth arrested in a bar brawl the previous day. The students rejected the suggestion, so a committee of five black and five white youths met with civic officials where the arrest was discussed. Mayor Kiely stated that police had been leaning over backwards in race incidents, therefore he was convinced there was no harassment of local blacks.

Although campus officials took a permissive attitude toward the law breakers at Cornell, the townspeople were less lenient. District Attorney McHugh filed 17 "informations" for criminal trespass (misdemeanor) before the Grand Jury in mid-May; indictments were returned against all 17. High-power civil rights attorneys were brought in to fight the charges, and by mid-June the indictments were dropped against 14, but retained against Whitfield, Evans and Tom Jones, the AAS leaders. Finally, on 3 September 1970, the case was officially closed when these three were allowed to plead guilty to reduced charges of fourth degree trespass and the judge gave them an unconditional discharge. By this time Jones was a PhD candidate in city planning at Cornell, and both Evans and Whitfield were attending college in North Carolina.

(b) CORNELL DIVISION OF SAFETY PROCEDURES, METHODS, AND TECHNIQUES

PLANNING

The Cornell Safety Division in 1969 was too small (27 officers and 36 building

guards or nightwatchmen) and had too little equipment (five cars, four revolvers shared by all the officers, six portable radios--all on one channel, and no riot gear). In addition, it was so located in the administrative structure as to have virtually no access to the decision makers or planners. The Superintendent of the Safety Division reported to the Director of the Division of Safety and Security (fire and industrial) who reported to the Controller, who reported to the Provost, who reported to the President.

It was the President, along with one or two vice presidents who evaluated any intelligence and established policy for the campus officers. They had previously established the policy that there would be no infiltration of dissident organizations; therefore, there was no prior knowledge of plans to take over the building. Even though violence had been experienced on most of the nation's major campuses, the administrators made no contingency plans for handling such an outburst at Cornell. . . it can't happen here!

It was also unfortunate that one individual who was aware of potential problems, the Director of the Division of Safety and Security, was out of the state at the time of the takeover and could not get back to the campus until the blacks were marching out of WSH.

TRAINING

Campus security officers in 1969 got most of their training on the scene. They had a small program of basic police school, some routine training in crowd control and sensitivity classes, but only the sergeants were given any squad training.

OPERATIONS

After checking that the Wari House fire was extinguished, campus officers were kept busy answering false fire alarms. The head resident at Wari House demanded 24-hour police protection for the girls, and called again to complain; an officer had been stationed there for over 10 minutes but had neglected to notify the women of his arrival.

As soon as word was received of WSH takeover, the entire campus force was called in, and shortly thereafter assigned to 12-hour shifts for the duration of the emergency. A squad of 10 to 12 men was stationed around WSH, directed by a sergeant at the rear and a sergeant at the front entrance, whose radio-equipped patrol car became the Forward Command Post. He also had a portable radio (walkie-talkie) in the patrol car.

Little direction was handed down to the security officers during the early hours, and a serious precedent was established when a black couple was allowed to enter the barricaded building although white students were turned away. During the day, security officers favored taking the building back before the blacks became too firmly entrenched, but the administration favored negotiations. Administration strategy was to regain control of the situation without loss of life and prevent confrontation between campus groups. Because of the WSH sprawling design and many ground floor windows, campus security estimated that it would take 300 men to cordon off the building. Therefore, in the evening, when one officer saw the blacks taking rifles into WSH, he notified the Security Office, but took no other action.

When the black students finally left WSH on Sunday afternoon, security officers were directed to station themselves on each side of the students and accompany them to Afro headquarters on Wait Avenue. During the remainder of the disturbance, campus security officers kept in close contact with mutual aid forces in Ithaca, made plans to move arrestees into a public park or building off campus, and to transport them in buses. None of these tactics were required.

UPGRADING OF CAMPUS SECURITY FORCE

Since the incident described above, many changes have been made in campus security forces, the most significant being in organization. The Director of Safety and Security, who is in charge of police and building guards, now reports directly to the President. There are now 110 people in this Division, including 42 police, 9 traffic controllers, 4 civilian dispatchers, 5 traffic bureau officers, and 46 building guards. An additional 25 campus employees are trained as auxiliary officers.

There are now five uniform cars, two detective cars, two traffic cars, plus the Director's car. Weapons are available for every man. The Division has added a firearms training program, police training school, supervisory training, sensitivity training, and specialized disturbance training offered to all law enforcement officers in the county.

C. DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA

1. RATIONALE FOR SELECTION OF DURHAM

Durham, North Carolina, (population, 94,000) was selected as a typical representative of small cities involved in civil disturbances because of its recent history of demonstrations and riots triggered by racial, college and labor problems, many of them being interactive. The city's population is about 35% non-white (predominantly black) so that racial disturbances are a foregone conclusion. Grave potential for civil disobedience is present at the large universities: Duke University (8000 students), North Carolina Central University (3600 students - all black), University of North Carolina (16,000 students) and North Carolina State University (15,000 students). Thus, more than 42,000 students are enrolled in major institutions within a 23-mile area. Union organizers appeared on the campuses beginning in September 1967, thereby adding another issue for discussion and demonstration.

2. RATIONALE FOR SELECTION OF THE ALLEN BUILDING (DUKE INCIDENT)

The incident selected for investigation at Durham, referred to as the Allen Building Demonstration, occurred on 13 February 1969; a group of Negro students took over the Duke University administration building, known as the Allen Building, to reinforce the demands they had served upon the university administration. The disturbance was selected because it marked the first time Durham law enforcement officers were actually called onto

the Duke campus to quell a demonstration. There were, however, numerous times prior to and since that date when local and state police and National Guard forces have been on alert or on standby, pending resolution of campus tension and demonstration.

This incident is an excellent example of the interaction between college administration, campus security forces and city police officers, and the problems that can occur when contingency plans have not been developed prior to the incident.

3. DATA GATHERING AND ANALYSIS

The LEAA Study Team's interviewer met on 18 January 1971 with two members of the Durham Police Department, one who was Acting Chief of Police and Tactical Field Commander during the Allen Building incident, and the second, who mingled with the crowd as a plainclothes officer. The officers are now, respectively, Major of the Uniform Division and Assistant Training Officer. The Command and Police Operations Sections of the questionnaire were answered simultaneously by the two officers, both of whom were at the scene during the entire event.

The Observer interviewed is a Special Assignments Reporter and Editor for the Durham MORNING HERALD, whose by-lined stories of the demonstration were carried on the front page. She was on Duke Campus during most of the day, attended the militant students' gathering in Duke Chapel, watched the Negro "occupation force" exit the building and the police move in,

and was in the front row when police turned chemical munitions on the crowd. She had left the scene to file her story before the rioting ended.

All interviews were taped, providing six tapes which were transcribed into 86 pages of text. Newspaper articles covering the event, photographs, and pertinent city and college background data were obtained for the files.

4. CITY BACKGROUND DATA

The city of Durham covers an area of 36.7 square miles and is the county seat and only municipality of Durham County (299 square miles) which has over 131,000 residents. Most of the city's 35% non-white population is concentrated on the east side of town. Duke University and Hospital are located on the west side in an area of luxurious homes.

Durham is situated in the rolling Piedmont hills, 263 miles from Washington, D.C., and less than 500 miles from New York City and Jacksonville, Florida. It is a transportation hub, having five major highways, five railway lines and four airlines.

Durham is a prosperous city, with tobacco products and textiles as its most important products. Of 131 major industries, the largest employers are Liggett and Meyers, American Tobacco and Erwin Mills. Also located in the area are numerous drug, computer (IBM) and medical service industries which benefit from association with the educational and medical facilities founded by the great tobacco industries. In recent years a concentrated effort has been made to develop the area between Durham, Raleigh and

Chapel Hill as a high technology Research Triangle Park. Even with such high industrialization, almost 20% of the total wages paid in Durham are to employees of Duke University and Hospital.

Durham is a major educational center with its privately endowed Methodist-oriented Duke University (8000 students) and North Carolina State University, a state-supported liberal arts college in which 3600 Negroes are enrolled.

The campuses are shown on the Durham map (Figure C-1). Durham is also a medical center, the largest hospital being the state mental hospital (2400 beds) located 12 miles away. The Duke teaching hospital with 700 beds is located on the Duke University campus.

The City of Durham operates under a council/manager form of government. According to a new (since the event) organizational structure, both the Police and Fire Chiefs report to a Public Safety Director, who reports to the City Manager. The Police Department station on the city's east side contains facilities for the 170 city and 40 county law enforcement personnel. Equipment includes 38 vehicles and 5 motorcycles, all of which have two-way radios. Most of the police calls are transmitted over a single frequency, but city detectives share a second channel with the North Carolina State Highway Patrol.

5. SCENE OF THE INCIDENT

Trinity College, founded in 1851, became Duke University in 1924, established by an endowment by James B. Duke (American Tobacco Company). It consists

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


Figure C-1. Map of Durham, North Carolina

of two campuses, connected by tree-lined 1-1/4 mile long Campus Drive.

The scene of the Allen Building incident was the beautiful Gothic West Campus, which contains all the university's schools and colleges except for the Woman's College. The multi-story buildings are built around courtyards and quadrangles, as shown in Figure C-2. Large trees, hedges and gardens restrict movement to these open "quads", the streets and sidewalks, and limit visibility around the outside of the buildings. Behind the Allen Building and at a lower level are the Sarah P. Duke Gardens and a parking lot that was important in the deployment of police during the incident.

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


Figure C-2. Aerial View of Duke Campus, Showing Locale of Demonstration

6. CIVIC/CAMPUS ENVIRONMENT

In 1969, the City of Durham had already experienced many types of demonstrations and was gripped in racial, labor and campus unrest. In July 1967, the National Guard was called to quell a destructive racial march through downtown Durham. In February 1968, local police and firemen were called on to constrain another violent march, following which "the more militant Negro leaders in the Durham community were reported to have given up on further conversations with the white community. Reports of imminent, widespread violence were prevalent, as were reports of the organization of vigilante groups among segments of the white community. Duke officials had been in close communication with city officials on these problems for many months, and it was our conviction that any violence in town would probably affect Duke, and that any violence at Duke would undoubtedly spread throughout Durham," according to a report by Frank L. Ashmore, Vice President for Institutional Advancement at Duke.¹

To add to the general tension, union organizers moved onto the Duke campus in September 1967 in an intensive campaign to organize non-academic employees. They sought the support of both faculty and students in this campaign.

When Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated on 4 April 1968, students, faculty and non-academic personnel united to "demonstrate the good faith of the whites toward the blacks." About 250 students moved into President

1. "A Crisis in Conscience," presented to the Greensboro Alumni Association on 24 April 1968.

Knight's home (University House) about 7:30 p.m. the following day (Friday)

with a list of demands. They remained there, alternately caucusing and negotiating with officials, until Sunday when all but 10 students moved out.

The larger group initiated a "silent vigil" in the Main Quad where crowds ranging from 1000 to 2400 students remained for four days and nights. During this time a 7 p.m. curfew had been imposed on the City of Durham, and National Guardsmen stood by, expecting violence.

According to the Observer, the administration began to lose control of the student body at that time by the informality initiated when students were allowed free access to the President's home, and the Academic Council and the Trustees adopted conciliatory attitudes.

In August 1968, the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees adopted a set of rules prohibiting "disruptive picketing, protesting or demonstrating on Duke University property..."¹ It specifically prohibited the following:

- Unauthorized occupancy of university facilities or buildings.
- Interference with the rights of students, faculty or staff and persons who are guests of the university to gain access to any university facility.
- Interference with the orderly operations of the university by breach of the peace, physical obstruction or coercion, or by noise, tumult or other forms of disturbance.
- Interference with either pedestrian or vehicular university traffic.

1. "Duke Spells Out New Rules Governing Protests," Durham SUN, 8 Aug 1968.

Violators were promised disciplinary action, but campus leaders immediately protested that the rules were too vague. Students, charged with violating the rules during a symposium in November were promptly cleared. In December, students were even demanding that they be allowed to participate in Trustee meetings.

7. SUMMARY OF EVENT

The Allen building incident can be fitted into the phasing structure as follows:

- o Pre-Crowd: Black students' demands delivered to Administration
- o Crowd: Entry of black students into Allen Building
- o Demonstration-Orderly: Exit of black students and start of parade
- o Demonstration-Disorderly: Pitched battle between police and students
- o Post-Demonstration: Police withdraw from campus and students retire to dormitories.

The Negro students (only 100 of the 8000 student body) had limited objectives and did not wish intervention and/or takeover of their movement by white students, many of whom arrived at the scene ready for, and hoping for, armed confrontation.

PRE-CROWD PHASE

On Monday night, 10 February 1969, about 75 Negro students, identified as members of the Afro-American Society, called at the home of Dr. Douglas Knight, President of Duke University. They presented the list of demands itemized below:

- o Initiation of a "black studies" program controlled by Negro students
- o A Negro dormitory,

- o Reinstatement of Negro students who flunked out last semester
- o An increase in the Negro student population to equal 29% by 1973
- o A Negro adviser selected by Negro students
- o A summer program for incoming Negro freshmen
- o An end to "police harrassment" of Negro students
- o More Negro professors
- o An end to the University's "racist policies"
- o An end to the grading system for Negro students
- o Earmarking of fees for a Negro student union
- o Self-determination of working conditions by non-academic employees at Duke.

That evening Dr. Knight was entertaining at a dinner party for Black entertainer Dick Gregory.

According to the Observer, some negotiations ensued and a few changes were made. As negotiations lagged, a deadline was given to the faculty to comply with all demands. (Police were unaware of such a threat, and it is not reported in the Durham newspapers.)

CROWD PHASE

Shortly before 7:30 a.m. on Thursday, 13 February 1969, a group of 25 to 40 Negro students went to Allen Building, opened basement windows and crawled in; they went upstairs and took over the entire ground floor. As employees began arriving for work, the students greeted them and escorted them out of

the building. The students then boarded up the doors to the first floor, and barricaded the door to the university's central record file. They allowed access to the upper two floors of the building.

The barricaded students distributed handbills listing their demands to people passing the building. They prepared themselves for a week's stay in Allen Building, backing a U-Haul trailer loaded with provisions up to the basement windows. During the day they communicated with the Administration, alternately threatening to burn the records and promising to do no harm. Provost Marcus Hobbs, acting in the absence of Dr. Knight, discussed the students' demands with them via telephone, but little headway was made in resolving issues. The black students talked with the press through the windows and allowed some to come inside and take pictures. Police reported that Howard Fuller, executive director of the Foundation for Community Development and a black militant, was pulled in through the window. (After the students had left the building, police found clubs, 2-foot lengths of steel reinforcement bars, and a sawed off baseball bat with nails protruding from it inside the building, apparently provided after the students moved in.)

Throughout the day, groups of students gathered outside the building, most of them curious and unconcerned as they passed from one class to another (Figure C-3). A large contingent of newspaper, radio and television people was in the crowd; their reports over the air caused many Durham business men to join the on-lookers at various times during the day. More than a



Figure C-3. Crowd Gathers Outside Allen Building While Students Are Barricaded Inside

dozen local, state and federal plainclothesmen were identified mingling with the growing, good-natured crowd.

During the afternoon, a group of white students, apparently led by a Duke political science instructor, met in Duke Chapel to consider ways of supporting the black students in a common cause. They were gently "put down" by one of the few blacks in the audience (Figure C-4) who announced that "we should ask the guys in the building because they're the ones who have this planned." Meanwhile, during a meeting of administrative leaders, the advisability of calling in Durham police was discussed; about 60 faculty members walked out in protest of this step. At a meeting of all elected student officers, it was announced that police would probably be required because the blacks refused to compromise on any issue.

At 3:30 p.m., the first of two ultimatums was delivered to the militants by



Figure C-4. During Afternoon Meeting, Offer of Duke White Students to Support Black Student Demands is Rejected by Black Spokesman

Provost Hobbs, allowing them 1 hour to reach a decision (to vacate the building). At 5:25 p.m., Dr. Hobbs issued a second ultimatum: "We request that you leave this building peacefully and do so immediately without damage to building or contents or danger to yourselves or others from actions initiated by you. You are now in violation of the picket and protest policy. You are now suspended pending due process and if you do not vacate the building immediately, all who are present will be deemed trespassers and will be subject to criminal charges for trespassing and other violations of law which may occur." They were given 15 minutes to leave.

DEMONSTRATION-ORDERLY PHASE

About 5:55 p.m., (just as police were moving in) the black students began exiting the building through the same basement windows they had entered 10 hours before. They carried with them a large banner proclaiming "Malcolm X Liberation School" (Figure C-5) and several other smaller hand-made signs. They were joined by black students from high schools, North Carolina Central University and the University of North Carolina, plus white militants as they marched jubilantly toward the Traffic Circle (see map, Figure C-6) and a victory parade through downtown Durham. The group was obviously elated, believing that they were in control and that they had left when they wanted to-- not because of the 15-minute warning. They were gesturing with clenched fists and peace signs.

Ironically, at this precise time, the waiting police forces were instructed to move in and take over Allen Building and to secure the area. They stationed




Figure C-5. After 10-1/2 Hours Occupancy, Afro-American Students Leave Duke Administration Building Headed for Parade to Downtown Durham (note helmets and clubs)

officers around the building and on the steps and front porch; four or five patrol cars loaded with officers in full riot gear moved toward the quad from the Traffic Circle. The crowds of onlookers still standing in front of Allen Building passed this word to the marchers, who whirled around and rushed back.

DEMONSTRATION-DISORDERLY PHASE

There is total disagreement as to what triggered disorderly behavior. The police claimed it was an "unprovoked attack" on an officer: a student threw

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


Figure C-6. Map of Duke University Campus

a heavy cinder block that struck the officer on the head, cracking his helmet and knocking him to the ground. The students claimed that a Negro girl fell, or was pushed, in front of one of the police cars; she was not injured, but the crowd began pounding on the car, shouting they had tried to run over her.

At any rate, the 4 hours of rioting that followed were undoubtedly chaotic and unplanned by either the police or the dissidents. The newspapers, the police and the Observer agree that there were many (mostly white) students who came to the scene armed for combat. They had sticks, purportedly torn from a guard rail; some wore helmets; and 18 to 24 students had gas masks.

The Observer noted about three walkie-talkies in the hands of dissidents, "perhaps to monitor the police frequency." Students had sacks of lemons to use as a counter-irritant to tear gas. They squeezed the lemons into pails of water, then held towels soaked in the solution over their faces. Unfortunately, the action of the pepper-fogger chemical is to irritate where there is moisture and this defensive tactic only increased the students' discomfort.

About 2000 to 3000 students, faculty, reporters and onlookers were now gathered about Allen Building, angry, bewildered and jeering the police. As police carried the wounded officer into the building, the crowd began to close in the 6 feet that separated them from the police and lobbed objects toward the building. The police officers apparently without plan, policy or direction, began throwing tear gas canisters into the crowd and turning the pepper-fogger directly on the people immediately in front of the building to

force them back. The crowd panicked, split and ran in many directions; police are reported to have followed some of them into Duke Chapel and turned the pepper-fogger into that building. The gas, which effectively broke up the mob, was blown back onto the officers as the wind changed. This allowed the students to regroup and charge back into the fray.

(Figure C-7).

Description of the action during the next several hours is very sketchy; if people know the details, they are unwilling to discuss them. There are reports of students being clubbed (Figure C-8), and an account of a teacher being assaulted by the police as he crossed the campus to dinner. Students threw back the canisters, along with rocks, clubs and food brought for the barricaded students.

The new police car, shown in (Figure C-9), entering the campus with a new supply of tear gas canisters was damaged extensively by the students. "All the windows were smashed with the exception of the rear windshield. One door was kicked in, one blue light was broken, and brown paint was poured on the car."¹

The battle surged back and forth across the campus, until most of the officers withdrew into the building, leaving sentries posted outside and patrol cars ringing a 2-block perimeter. About 10 o'clock, at the suggestion of Duke football players and other members of the Athletic Department, the police withdrew completely from the campus; the students returned to their dormitories.

1. "Attack on Police Lit Fuse," Durham SUN, 14 February 1969.




Figure C-7. Use of Tear Gas Was Ineffective Because of Changing Wind Currents and Angered Crowd




Figure C-8. Claims of "Police Brutality" Were Supported by News Photos




Figure C-9. New Police Car Was Heavily Damaged

During the fracas, three police officers and more than 20 students were injured.

Four students were arrested, three for assault on a police officer and one for illegal possession of tear gas, plus one non-student for interference with a police officer.

POST-DEMONSTRATION PHASE

The demonstration ceased as abruptly as it began, leaving behind bitterness and mutual mistrust between the students, the administration, the campus security force, the Durham Police Department, city officials, the press and involved citizens. In the opinion of the Observer:

"The university administration resented the damage done to Allen Building, but more specifically the intimidation tactics used by the students. The students distrusted the administration, who called in police even though they (reportedly) had promised not to do so, and they resented the heavy-handed actions of the police after the problem of Allen Building occupancy had been resolved."

The police felt antagonistic toward the students, and toward the university administration and security force who called them to the campus and kept them waiting in the cold for an interminable period while the administrators gave extended threats to the barricaded students."

On Friday, Dr. Knight announced there would be a mass meeting at 1 p.m.

Saturday in Indoor Stadium to discuss the incident. Then the meeting was cancelled because of general tension on campus. About 900 students gathered in Page Auditorium and threatened a class boycott if the black students' were suspended. Black organizer Howard Fuller threatened to bring other blacks

onto the campus to enforce the demands. New demands and ultimatums were handed to the administration during the ensuing months.

The black students threatened to withdraw from Duke to establish their own Malcolm X Liberation University, and staged several torchlight parades through downtown Durham with their sympathizers. Having gotten the attention they sought, they changed their minds and remained at Duke.

The university scheduled appearances before the Hearing Committee for 26 black students identified as taking part in the building takeover. Unexpectedly, 22 additional black students came forward at the hearing to determine whether or not they would be suspended. All defendants were found guilty of violating the university's disturbance code but were allowed to stay in school on one-year probation.

Court hearings were held the day after the incident for the four arrested students and one outsider; all were convicted, fined and given jail terms, which were suspended. Newspaper accounts indicate that all convictions were appealed and that court trials stretched out for months. Apparently none of the convictions were sustained, and on 5 June 1969 the appeal of James Cromwell, who was accused of throwing the cinder block that triggered the incident, ended in a mistrial.

8. DURHAM POLICE DEPARTMENT PROCEDURES, METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

PLANNING

As discussed earlier, there were many minor disturbances on the Duke campus during 1967 and 1968. The peaceful and highly publicized "vigil" after the

death of Dr. King lasted for over a week. Students had been active in bringing pressure to bear on the administration to raise the minimum wage of non-academic employees of the university. There had been sit-ins and lie-ins protesting military recruitment and Dow Chemical Company recruitment, as was fashionable on campuses throughout the nation.

Even in light of this unrest, basic contingency plans were not generated to coordinate action of the Durham Police Department and the Duke campus security forces. Working relationships were friendly. There was a "hot-line", a ring-down phone between the university security office and the Durham Police Chief's office for exchange of information. A brief, impromptu operations plan for Durham officers to evict the trespassing students was generated during a noon-time meeting. The Durham officers interviewed stressed how much more effective the operation would have been had they previously been able to review layouts of the campus buildings or aerial photos of the environs.

Fortunately, prior incidents in Durham had led to establishing mutual aid arrangements with the Durham County Sheriff's Department, the North Carolina State Highway Patrol and the National Guard. Also, the police had been able to procure riot gear, including helmets, plastic masks, gas masks, nightsticks, shotguns, tear gas grenades (hand thrown), mace and a pepper-fogger.

In addition to lack of communications with the university security force, the Durham police had never set up a campus/police relations program through

which they could have become familiar with the student leaders. This void became a serious problem during the event when attempts to resolve the issue and "cool it" failed because the police had no one with whom to negotiate.

After-the-fact planning included an agreement with the university security that Durham police would not move onto the campus unless they were free to take action immediately and leave. (This tactic proved extremely successful some months later when labor agitators initiated a sit-in at Duke Hospital; police moved in quickly, made mass arrests, and moved out before any crowds were alerted.) However, no follow-up planning was initiated to improve understanding and relations between the students and the city police, or between the press and the police.

TRAINING

As a result of prior race riot experience, Durham police were trained in military formations, riot control, and the use of chemical munitions. (Apparently use of tear gas is common in North Carolina since so many of the student militants came prepared to counter it.) Principally, the police were trained in use of wedge formations to disperse persons from a building, leaving exits open for the dissidents to pass; they had no opportunity to use this training during this incident.

Recently some changes have been made in training classes. Officers are subjected to verbal abuse classes and they are studying standard riot control tactics provided by the FBI, including handling of limp prisoners. A closed circuit

television system has now been installed in order that officers can study films of recent civil disturbances.

OPERATIONS

Shortly after the black students moved into the Allen Building, the campus security officers notified the Durham Police Chief by means of the ring-down circuit. Plainclothes officers were dispatched to the campus as observers; they mingled with the crowds around the building during the day and reported back to the Chief periodically as to the size and mood of the students. (The Observer identified as many as 18 local, state and federal plainclothes officers in the crowd when she arrived on the scene about 1 p.m.)

About 11:30 a.m., university officials notified the Mayor of Durham that police assistance was needed at the campus. (Dr. Knight announced the following day that he had telephoned from New York the final decision to call in city police.) The Mayor notified the police department, and some officers went to the Duke campus for a strategy meeting with university officials during the noon hour. During this brief, impromptu conference, it was agreed that Durham police would quietly move onto a parking lot behind Allen Building at 2 p.m., at which time university officials would give an ultimatum to the black students to leave the building.

In the words of the police officers interviewed, the operations plan consisted of: "We were just going to go as a squad right in back of this building and ask them to come out. If they refused, give them a reasonable time, say 10 minutes to start doing something. If they didn't, we would tear the door down and go on in."

Returning from the campus, police advised civic officials and the Governor of the impending action. At 12:20 p.m., call-up of off-duty--second and third shift--Durham officers began and activation of an emergency squad from the State Highway Patrol was requested.

As scheduled, at 2 p.m. 60 Durham police officers and 14 State Highway Patrolmen assembled on the parking lot, using a standard patrol car as a command post, and three additional marked cars on standby in the lot. Three unmarked police cars patrolled the perimeter area, and a leased community bus was parked on the quadrangle opposite the Allen Building. Supporting this tactical force were fixed posts on top the 210-foot Duke

Chapel, at the Duke Hospital telephone switchboard, at the campus heating plant, and at the traffic circle. Approximately 10 handie-talkies were available to augment patrol car radio and telephone communications.

Regardless of previous plans and schedules, university officials did not take action until 3:30 p.m., when they gave the students an hour's warning; this was not repeated until 5:45 p.m. In the meantime, the assembled police stood around in the parking lot (Figure C-10) for 4 hours in 20-degree weather, with no authority to take action unless given go-ahead by university officials.

Both foot and patrol car officers were issued full riot gear--which they put on. Although the police were ostensibly "out of sight", their presence on campus from 2 p.m. to 6 p.m. was quickly rumored and attracted more and more students and on-lookers around the building.




Figure C-10. Police Waited 4 Hours in Sub-Freezing Weather for Order from Campus Officials to Evict Trespassing Students

What occurred during the afternoon is best recounted by the tactical commander who reported: "In 15 minutes if they (the black students) didn't get out of the building, then we were to go in and take over the building. . . They kept putting us off until we were there until about 6 p.m. We suggested that we had attracted too much attention; we had caused a big crowd of people to be out in the quadrangle, and therefore we were going to have trouble. We advised them to let us pull out, since they (the students) weren't burning the building or anything and go back sometime the next morning when we wouldn't have so many outsiders."

If there was little decision and action before 6 p.m.; there was certainly


a great deal after that time. Shortly after 6 p.m., the police were asked to move into Allen Building. As they were crossing the rose garden, halfway to the building, they were advised in person by campus security that the dissidents had left the building by the front. The police turned, retracing their steps to the parking lot. The Police Chief was notified by radio, and he concurred that the forces should withdraw. However, "just as we got into the middle of this flower garden, they (campus security) called us again and wanted us to secure the building to keep them (the black students) from going back." When the police moved into Allen Building they found no one inside and minimum damage to its contents. They did find some weapons.

In an interview four days after the incident, Dr. Knight stated that the Negroes left the building when "they learned through monitoring police radios that policemen equipped with tear gas and clubs were moving toward the campus." The Observer stated during the interview that she had seen at least three handie-talkies in the hands of the dissidents.

Police took over the main administration office as a command post, opening one line to the Chief of Police's office, one to the University President's office, and one line to the Governor.

All telephone lines went through the Duke Hospital switchboard, which was unable to handle the flood of calls. The handie-talkies proved to be ineffective for inside operation because of the building's thick stone walls. The communications net during the Crowd Phase is compared with that during the Disorderly Phase in Figure C-11.

CROWD PHASE



DEMONSTRATION-DISORDERLY PHASE




Figure C-11. Communications Arrangements During Duke University Student/Police Skirmish

In securing the Allen Building, police stationed sentries at all entrances, including a squad of Highway Patrolmen on the front porch steps, along with a Durham city policeman with "one of the force's new weapons--a Buck Rogers type device which generates a heavy cloud of tear gas."¹ (See Figure C-12). At this time, with a crowd estimated at 2000 standing only a few feet away, a student allegedly dropped or threw a concrete block, hitting the Durham officer. As described before, both tear gas canisters and the pepper-fogger were used by the police. When taunts and objects continued to be thrown by the crowd, some police broke ranks and ran after offenders, continuing to use the pepper-fogger (Figure C-13). It was during this period that a Highway Patrolman and a second Durham police officer were injured (Figure C-14).

The Durham incident is the only one of the seven events studied in which chemical munitions were used. Police had a great deal of trouble with goggles fogging up in the extreme cold, and with pursuing dispersal tactics when the wind shifted and blew the gas in the opposite direction. The driver of the municipal bus, which had been brought along to transport prisoners, abruptly vacated the area when the gas blew into his vehicle. Probably the most serious repercussion to using tear gas and the pepper-fogger was the resentment against the police expressed by dissidents, the press and curious by-standers.

1. "Trouble Erupts After Occupation Ends Peacefully," Durham MORNING HERALD, 14 February 1969.



Figure C-12. Police in Riot Gear and Carrying Pepper-Fogger Confront Crowd from Front Steps of Allen Building



Figure C-13. Police Pursue Crowd across Campus with Peper-Fogger



Figure C-14. Three Officers Were Injured During the Confrontation

The Tactical Commander stated that the only support he received from campus security officers were two plainclothesmen who went into the Allen Building with the police to check for damage. National Guardsmen (variously reported as 300 and 500) were alerted at 6 p.m. and were stationed nearby, but were never called onto the campus. A total of 135 Durham police could have been pressed into service if required, and additional State Highway Patrolmen and Sheriff's deputies were also available.

The police were unable to communicate with the crowd during the demonstration by means of the bullhorns because the noise level in the entire area was so high. The Tactical Commander also stated that one of his biggest problems was finding student leaders to work with in calming the situation. Finally, some Duke football players moved in as tactical advisers, reportedly

saved one the police cars from destruction, and did some "head cracking" of their own.

Summarizing the incident in an interview four days later, Dr. Knight highlighted some of the problems associated with university/civic police relations. He said: "I myself take the responsibility for the final and painfully made decision to send the police to secure the administration building. As long as the students were in the building, we could not negotiate. We're going to be patient but we were going to have order restored. I knew that there was a risk some innocent people might be injured and I deeply regret that some policemen were also injured."

He stated that he did not know whose decision it was to use tear gas, and that once the police were called, the matter was out of his hands. "It was completely a police matter. The university could request the removal of the police but the police chief could have refused."

He concluded, "I would do it the same way again."

D. ATLANTA, GEORGIA

1. RATIONALE FOR SELECTION OF ATLANTA

Atlanta, Georgia, with a 1970 population of 487,500, was selected as representative of medium-sized cities. It has had a long history of civil unrest focused on college and labor issues as well as racial problems. As headquarters of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the city has been the scene of many non-violent sit-ins and demonstrations. It has also had several outbursts of violence in 1966 and 1967, during which time it was also the headquarters for the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).

With an approximately 50% non-white population, Atlanta has great potential for violence, and yet it has not experienced an inordinate amount. The city was able to cope with the assassination and funeral of Martin Luther King in April 1968 with dignity and without incident. The command and control techniques used to temper potentially dangerous situations (whether or not these approaches are unique to the region), were deemed worthy of study. The City of Atlanta projects a self-image of culture and moderation; this influences civic strategy in dealing with social and racial issues.

2. RATIONALE FOR SELECTION OF THE "BOULEVARD" INCIDENT

The incident selected for detailed interviews by the Atlanta Police Depart-

ment was the Boulevard riot of 10 - 13 September 1966. The police officials cited the event as potentially the most difficult and explosive situation with which they had to deal. Initially a spontaneous outburst in one of the city's eight ghetto areas, the Boulevard incident evolved into a struggle between moderate and militant Negro factions. In a sense, it was the precursor of subsequent riots in the Northern and Western regions of the U. S. According to the established categories, it is classified as "racial", although the first part of the riot was a citizen-police confrontation.

The Boulevard incident was preceded earlier the same week by a riot in Summerhill, a ghetto five miles to the southwest, following which SNCC leader Stokely Carmichael was arrested. It is of interest that the Kerner Commission Report¹ devotes a one-sentence paragraph to this Summerhill incident and does not refer specifically to the much more serious Boulevard disturbance which followed it. The Dixie Hill (another Atlanta ghetto) riots of June 1967 are reported by the Kerner Commission and do not warrant further study. Subsequent numerous events, usually in Summerhill, have not erupted into major disturbances comparable to the Boulevard riot.

Atlanta Police successfully avoided major confrontations during the 1970 garbage strike and the Cambodian peace protests.

The Boulevard incident was selected because of its magnitude and because it illustrates an emergent struggle within the Negro community for leadership and power, which complicated the restoration of peace and control in

1. U.S. Riot Commission Report, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder, N. Y. Times Edition, Bantam, March 1968, pp. 53-55.
92

the riot area. As pointed out by a member of the Atlanta CONSTITUTION staff, the series of incidents of Summerhill and Boulevard during the summer of 1966 polarized the blacks against the whites and marked the period of transition from a non-violent civil rights protest to a much more violent approach.

3. DATA GATHERING AND ANALYSIS

Interviews were held in Atlanta on January 13 - 15 with five members of the Atlanta Police Department and one member of the staff of the Atlanta CONSTITUTION in order to obtain a well-rounded description of the events surrounding the Boulevard incident. The command portion of the questionnaire was answered by the present Superintendent of Traffic, who in 1966 was called from his post as Superintendent of Detention to act as tactical field commander. Data provided by a police captain who was a sergeant of field forces deployed in the riot area were used for the operations portion. Backup data were supplied by a detective lieutenant who in 1966 was assigned as a school detective/ police counselor. The reporter who responded to the Observer questions was on the scene during most of the three-day disturbance.

Early in 1966 the Atlanta Police Department initiated a Crime Prevention Bureau to improve police/citizen relations. A lieutenant from this Bureau was interviewed in order to evaluate the impact of the organization on the Boulevard riot and on recent successes in minimizing racial conflicts. General tactics in handling disturbances were discussed with Atlanta's Superintendent of Training.

Some discrepancies in relating the history of the event appeared, mainly because more than four years have elapsed and actual logs of the event are not available. In such cases, daily newspaper accounts have been used to verify the interview data.

All of the interviews are taped, providing ten tape reels which were transcribed into 182 pages of text. Data were then extracted from the transcription to complete the questionnaire forms.

4. CITY BACKGROUND DATA

The City of Atlanta covers an area of 128 square miles, located chiefly in Fulton County, but the metropolitan Atlanta area (population - 1,373,000) includes 1,724 square miles extending into Clayton, Cobb, DeKalb and Gwinnett Counties. The city, itself, grew from a 37 square mile incorporated area to its present size after the "Plan of Improvement" was adopted in 1952. The inner city population has dropped from more than 331,000 within the original 37 square miles in 1950 to about 247,000 in 1970 as the more affluent citizens moved to the suburbs.

During the same period, the population of the metropolitan area increased by about 650,000. Hence, the central city has become predominantly black with the white citizens concentrating in suburbs, as is typical of major U.S. cities. The racial balance changed from 38.3% black in 1960 to over 50% of non-whites (mostly black) in 1970.

During the late 1950's and the 1960's, Atlanta undertook an extensive urban

renewal program, with the resulting construction of the Atlanta Stadium for major league baseball and football, the auditorium and exhibition hall complex at the Atlanta Civic Center, and the Atlanta Memorial (cultural) Center. Six freeways have been completed through downtown Atlanta.

These projects tend to wipe out slum areas without replacing the housing units with alternate or better shelter, thereby increasing crowding in the ghettos. As a matter of interest, the new stadium is only four blocks north of the center of the Summerhill incident, while the new auditorium/exhibition hall is four blocks west of the riot-torn Boulevard section. A city map shows that the freeways, plus the 13 railroad lines serving Atlanta, tend to isolate various sections of the densely populated inner city.

Atlanta is located at an elevation of 1,000 feet on the foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains. The climate is temperate, warm in summer with high humidity. The metropolitan area is an educational center, with 22 colleges and universities enrolling more than 40,000 day and evening students. The Atlanta University complex is the largest center for Negro college and university education in the United States; it enrolls over 6,000 students in six separate institutions. Two additional colleges are black and most of the others are now token-integrated. Of several good trade schools in Atlanta, the Atlanta Area Technical School has 972 day students and 2,000 night students. The City of Atlanta has about 128,000 students enrolled in its public schools: 123 elementary, 3 junior (or middle) high schools, and 25 high schools.

Manufacturing employs the greatest number of Atlanta residents, occupying about 130,000 of the 600,000 civilian work force. The principal manufactured items are transportation equipment, metals and machinery, textile and apparel, and food products. The major employers in the area are Lockheed-Georgia and General Motors. Manufacturing employment has dropped by about 21,600 jobs during 1970, due in part to the general slow-down of the domestic economy, but primarily attributable to Lockheed's problems and the General Motors strike. Increased unemployment, and the continuing housing shortage may create significant economic reasons for civil unrest in the 1970's.

The City of Atlanta is governed by a Mayor and a Board of Aldermen, all of whom are elected by popular vote. Some of the Aldermen comprise the Police Commission that assists the Chief of Police with policy matters. The Chief is nominated by the Mayor and "elected for life" by the Board of Aldermen. The present Chief of Police, Herbert Jenkins, was elected to that position in 1947 from his previous rank as Commander of the uniform evening watch. He is a respected law enforcement officer both at home and throughout the United States. He has an unusually broad view of the police role, probably as a result of his early exposure to political affairs when he was assigned as a police recruit to be driver for Atlanta Mayor Keys from 1933 to 1937.

5. SCENE OF THE INCIDENT

The scene of the Boulevard disturbance lies on either side of Boulevard Street N.E. between North Avenue and Forrest Avenue (about 3/4 mile).

It is one of Atlanta's oldest Negro enclaves consisting of ancient (50 to 60 year old) two-story apartment buildings with 4 to 12 units per building, and several families occupying each unit. There are a few grocery and liquor stores, churches and business buildings.

As shown on the map, Figure D-1, the streets are fragmented and there are many alleys and dead-ends. The general neighborhood is in a pocket formed by freeways and railroad tracks on three sides; the fourth side, north of Ponce de Leon Avenue, is a white neighborhood. Georgia Baptist Hospital is on the south end of the disturbance area and the Atlantic Civic Center and downtown Atlanta are on the west.

Boulevard N.E. can be characterized as a slum; overcrowded, run-down, and dirty. Its irregular terrain and street patterns with alleys full of uncollected trash, loose bricks and mortar are characteristic of many areas where civil disturbances have occurred. The way of life in this area is also characteristic. As described by a black detective lieutenant, "most people in ghettos sit on the street because there is no place to sit in the house; you go in the house to go to bed... if you want to lounge, you lounge on the streets." So, on any given evening, a crowd already exists on the streets in the Boulevard area.




Figure D-1. Scene of Atlanta's "Boulevard" Disturbance

6. CIVIC ENVIRONMENT

During the summer of 1966, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), with its national headquarters in Atlanta, had been active in the city's eight major ghetto areas. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), which also had its headquarters in Atlanta, was the recognized and long-standing leader of the movement for integration in the South. The emergent militant faction was vying for leadership of blacks on both a national and local level. Atlanta, which had a reputation for moderation and even-handed police policies (SNCC located in Atlanta for this reason) was destined to become the site of one of the first civil disturbances where black fractionalism complicated event control.

Although SCLC sit-ins and other non-violent events had been annoying the Atlanta police for several years, the first outburst of racial violence occurred during that summer. Stokely Carmichael and a SNCC sound truck crew had been touring through the Summerhill area of southeast Atlanta when a Negro auto theft suspect was shot by police as he tried to escape. Rumors spread rapidly that he was shot for running a stop sign and the typical street crowds of the ghetto began to riot. In the ensuing melee, centered in the vicinity of Capitol and Ormond Street S.E., 16 persons were injured, 73 were arrested, and 20 autos were smashed. SNCC pickets in the area agitated for further violence on Wednesday and Thursday and were promptly jailed. Stokely Carmichael was arrested on Thursday night for inciting to riot. He was transferred to Fulton County Jail pending grand

jury action and posting of \$10,000 bond; his Friday court appearance was heavily covered by press and television. Arrests of other SNCC members continued throughout the week (apparently about 20), but many appear to have been released (SNCC said 17 were in jail with a total bond of \$70,000).

Both southside residents and the established Negro community decried the uprising and SNCC participation.¹ A group of Negro citizens quickly organized a "Good Neighbor Association" to calm community emotions, beginning with requests to city officials to "remove heavy police patrols from the area, to act decisively to halt police courtesy to slum Negroes, to beef up recreation and anti-slum housing programs, and to ease overcrowding in Negro schools". At the same time, across town, Negro leaders were attending a meeting called by the Atlanta Summit Leadership Conference and making plans to canvass city slum residents about their needs. Movements to oust SNCC from Atlanta were initiated, and the SNCC Vine City rallying post was burned on Wednesday night.

(NOTE: This is the 1966 event described in the Kerner Commission Report)

The southside was calm on Friday and Saturday, and Atlanta breathed a sigh of relief.

1. "Negro Leaders Put Blame on SNCC", Atlanta JOURNAL, 8 September 1966.

7. SUMMARY OF EVENT

The Boulevard riot does not follow clear-cut phases, as defined by the study's statement of work, primarily because it erupted suddenly and spontaneously. In addition, there is evidence that the three nights of rioting did not all stem from the same isolated incident. Initially triggered by the shooting of a neighborhood youth on a Saturday night, the incident appears to have been revived on the following two days by agitators seeking violent racial confrontations.

In this final report, the phasing structure for the disturbance has been changed from the previous analysis (Third Quarterly Report) to reflect more exactly the definition of "disorderly".

PRE-CROWD PHASE

On Saturday evening, 10 September, the first inter-racial high school football game was played at the predominantly white Grady High School, located about one-half mile north of Ponce de Leon Avenue, with the Negro school (David T. Howard High School) losing.

CROWD PHASE

After the game, youthful crowds moved southward along Boulevard to their homes in the Negro section. There they joined the majority of the adult residents who were gathered on the streets for the warm Saturday night, socializing and drinking.

a street corner crowd in the 400 block of Boulevard N.E. Claiming that "someone" had insulted the woman, the man drew a gun and fired into the crowd, striking two 16-year-old Negro boys. One, Herbert Varner, was killed and Roy Wright was wounded. Their assailant fled down Boulevard in his car after the shooting. The Negro street crowds immediately moved toward the scene.

DEMONSTRATION-ORDERLY PHASE

One of the first officers to respond to the complaint about the shooting, Sgt. M. J. Spears, was struck in the back of the head by either a bullet or a flying object. An ambulance, responding to the call of Sgt. Spears' partner, picked up the slightly wounded officer before attending to the injured boys; this is claimed by some newspaper accounts and police officers interviewed to be the actual trigger for the riot, not the shooting. (Defending his request to be picked up first, Sgt. Spears told reporters¹ that the mob began closing in on him shouting "Kill the white bastard. Kill whitey. Black power.")

DEMONSTRATION - DISORDERLY PHASE

Saturday:

By 11 o'clock, rumors had spread like wildfire through the Boulevard enclave, fanned by SNCC representatives, and the crowd swelled to around 250 people. A spontaneous wave of cursing, rock and bottle throwing, fire bombing and sniping (and/or firecracker explosions) spread over a 14-square block area.

1. "Officer Explains Ambulance Call", Atlanta JOURNAL, 13 September 1966.

There was sporadic gunfire and intermittent incidents at varied locations. Police, moving in quickly, cordoned off the riot area. Shots were fired at a fire truck, responding to an alarm. Mayor Ivan Allen and several Aldermen walked the streets trying to calm the people and asking them to return to their homes. Attempts to disperse the crowds resulted in a number of arrests, including two leaders of the SCLC who were arrested at 11:30 p.m. Saturday night's outburst calmed appreciably after 2 a.m. Sunday, and subsided by 3:30 a.m. The statistics showed 58 arrested, one killed and 20 hospitalized, including one severely injured newsman.

News media and TV personnel covering the event in force agreed with police that the disturbance was a spontaneous emotional response to the attack on the Negro youths, that it was a police-citizen confrontation rather than a race riot. All agreed that there was deep anger and hostility. All agreed that there was no planning or crowd organization evident on Saturday night. But the area was a powder keg.

Sunday:

On Sunday, 11 September, the first evidences of organization began to appear. Police patrolmen in the area report that handbills, primarily demanding Carmichael's release from jail, were being circulated throughout the ghetto early on Sunday, apparently by SNCC members. Negro community leaders, including the SCLC leaders who had been arrested Saturday night and later released, called a meeting Sunday afternoon at the Fort Street Methodist Church, south of the riot area, to protest the slaying of the Negro youth.

During the meeting, Mayor Allen appeared and offered a \$10,000 reward for information leading to the arrest of the killer. He was heckled by spectators, who demanded that he jail the KKK leaders for "inciting to riot", as they had jailed Carmichael. SCLC leaders pleaded for non-violent protest; but the SNCC leaders urged violence and led a group of their followers from the church in a march back to the Boulevard district.

The mobs surged up and down Boulevard during the evening hours, finally erupting into widespread violence (on a hit and run basis) about 9 o'clock. The Rev. Clyde Williams, a Negro minister from Mechanicsville, led some of the marchers shouting "We want Carmichael" and "We want peace." Late in the evening a group marched back to the Fort Street Church, where they sat on the steps and were addressed by both Negro and white ministers trying to calm them.

Mayor Allen again walked the streets urging the people to go home. He refused to send the police (the "roaches", according to the rioters) out of the area. All accounts agree that his efforts were fruitless on Sunday evening, and even tended to inflame the residents. A police officer ventures that "no one--the Mayor, Chief of Police, nor Martin Luther King --could calm them down when they are really mad."

During the evening, police cars (including the armored car) were pelted, surrounded and fire-bombed. Four stores and several homes were set afire and the windows of the Milton Bradley office were broken, but police

moved in to prevent looting. Many cars were damaged and there was broken glass everywhere. A total of 32 arrests were made, including three men for rioting at Boulevard and North, four for firebombing a store and the police vehicle, two for breaking windows, and many more for throwing bricks and bottles. Peace was finally restored about 2:30 a.m. Monday by some 250 officers patrolling the area.

Monday:

Monday morning police continued heavy patrolling of the Boulevard district. The street blockades were removed and traffic moved freely. Residents began cleaning up glass and debris. Downtown, the 90 people arrested for charges ranging from arson to violation of liquor ordinances, began appearing in Municipal Court. Stokely Carmichael and 14 other SNCC members were indicted on "riot" charges. Handbills and rumors were again being spread throughout the Boulevard district.

Civic officials met with leaders of the Negro community and agreed to allow a demonstration--a march down Boulevard with police escort--as a means of "letting off steam". The crowd was then to march into the Tabernacle Baptist Church, 475 Boulevard, where alleged "establishment" leaders agreed to talk them into de-escalating the disturbance. The meeting was attended by officials and newsmen, who (according to police and Observer accounts) were appalled to discover that the community leaders they had aided were really militant crowd leaders, exhorting the mob (approximately 450) to greater violence. The inflamed Negroes "roared" out of the church,

armed with sticks, rocks and bottles, and shouting "black power, black power". They paraded back and forth on Boulevard from Forrest to Ponce de Leon, chanting, waving their arms and threatening police and passersby. At this point, with the district again cut off by a tight perimeter control, the tactical commander called in a reserve force of officers, who had been kept out of sight, to sweep the area. Only six men were arrested, no serious injuries were reported, and property damage was minor, principally damage to passing cars and a fire at 400 Forrest Avenue N.E. The crowd dispersed early and quietly.

POST-DEMONSTRATION PHASE

As pointed out by the newspaper reporter interviews, the police sweep effectively defused the riot, and calm prevailed on Tuesday. The Mayor's visit to the parents of the slain boy was appreciated by the neighborhood. Word was passed quickly that suspects had been picked up for the slaying and identified by witnesses. (William H. James, who had a long police record, was later sentenced to 20 years for manslaughter.)

Police maintained heavy patrol of the area for the rest of the week and over the weekend. Three SNCC officials (driving a car with Alabama license plates) were arrested on Wednesday for attempting to distribute "black power" stickers and other literature; police hesitated to serve a Colquitt County warrant for SNCC Field Secretary Willie Ricks (who led the disturbance in the Tabernacle Baptist Church) for fear it would trigger new outbreaks. On Monday, 20 September, the police returned to normal schedules

and assignments. Superintendent Howard Baugh of the recently organized Crime Prevention Bureau had been working in the disturbance area during the entire period, trying to reason with the residents; his entire division moved into the area after the patrol was dismissed in order to let the Negroes air their grievances and to rebuild lines of communication between local residents and law enforcement.

The Atlanta Summit Leadership Conference reviewed the entire episode and stated that they found only few examples of police courtesy, no brutality in handling the rioters.¹ They had high praise for the manner in which officers reacted to great provocation, and for the consideration of civic officials and the courts in handling juveniles and innocent adults arrested during the riot. They did, however, make three recommendations:

- o The police department should reexamine the policy of "halt and shoot."
- o Increase the use of foot patrolmen to achieve better rapport between officers and slum residents, particularly children
- o Expand the police force and increase officer's pay to attract quality men

1. "Summit Finds Courtesy, No Brutality," Atlanta JOURNAL, 15 September 1966.

8. ATLANTA POLICE DEPARTMENT PROCEDURES, METHOD
AND TECHNIQUES

PLANNING

Although all police personnel interviewed agree that no operations plan had been prepared in anticipation of ghetto riots, it is obvious from the quick response that general tactics had been outlined. According to an officer who patrolled the area in a car on Saturday night, the event followed the usual pattern of Atlanta incidents: The initial outbreak is usually spontaneous and the most violent, then the police move in to restore calm, the agitators move in to take advantage of the unrest, and the police are required to use a task force to restore order.

The police reaction (the officer said) was "a normal technical operation". All cars--detective and patrol--responded to the calls for help, then the Captain moved in to deploy the forces in an organized fashion, after which he went into consultation with the Superintendent and the Chief to develop plans. "The plans were a direct outgrowth of the specific situation." Then, several hours later (or next day), a formal tactical operational plan was developed, which allowed for containment of the incident until a certain threshold of violence was reached, when the police moved in a show of force to quell the riot. The tactic of sweeping Boulevard from either end was effective and did not deviate from the planned operation.

It is impossible to determine, from either the newspaper accounts or the interviews, if plans were ever made at higher echelons to call in the State Police or the National Guard. The tactical commander indicated he was

not aware of such planning at the time. He also said that Atlanta had no contingency plans in 1966 but that he developed one later as a result of the incident. He said the plan has not been modified or updated and probably is no longer useful.

Probably because known agitators were active in the Atlanta ghettos, police intelligence sources had been infiltrating meetings and gatherings. Police informers were in the crowds and church meetings both Sunday and Monday of the disturbance. (A problem was encountered with informers, in that it was difficult to obtain people who would not be recognized as police undercover men by the crowds, especially if they showed up at several trouble spots over a period of time.) Police intelligence sources were criticized by the newsmen interviewed because the instigators of Monday's mass meeting in the church were understood by police to be reliable black citizens but proved to be anti-police and militants.

The operations plan developed after the riot began did not call for a formal curfew, or declaration of unlawful assembly; however, liquor sales were curtailed in the district. Planning and execution of arrest procedures were adequate, except for some identification problems.

TRAINING

The Atlanta Police Department had had long experience in handling non-violent demonstrations prior to 1966, but this experience was not reflected in their recruit training curriculum at the time. A copy of the class

(21 March - 30 April 1966) schedule outlines 32 8-hour sessions. Of these, one hour was devoted to enforcement tactics, two hours to civil rights and two hours to street demonstrations and strikes. Other relevant topics were arrest, search and seizure, city government, city ordinances, care of prisoners, etc.

Since that time, there have been significant training changes. Experts from the Department of Justice, FBI, and District Attorney's office are now used to supplement the force's own teaching staff. The curriculum for Recruit Class 59 (4 January - 4 February 1971) has an additional hour devoted to basic psychology, a 3-hour course on dangerous drugs and narcotics by the Department of Justice, and one hour devoted to each of the following:

- o Community Relations
- o Supreme Court Decisions
- o How to Handle Bomb Threats
- o Civil Rights

The Atlanta Police Department had roll call training in 1966 as it does now. Typically, equipment use and instruction occurs then. Since 1970, in-service training has been added to afford the required time for practice and use of special equipments.

In 1966 Atlanta police did not receive training in squad tactics or riot formations. According to the Superintendent of Training, training was introduced attempting "to handle riots as the military does, with the wedge, echelons.

right, left, etc. but very quickly we found that we neither had the manpower nor the equipment to handle riots such as the military handled them."

Atlanta police never did use weapons such as cattle prodders or dogs in riot control. Nothing more was used than the basic baton, tear gas and helmets--and the armored car, which proved unsuitable for riot work.

The Superintendent of Training pointed to the success Atlanta has had recently in avoiding confrontations over the garbage strike, the Yippie infestation, and a campus exploitation of Women's Lib. He believes that the secret of success is to have a minimum of police officers in view (unless "something has already started"), minimize the news media coverage of the event and the resultant publicity, and restrain from making arrests at a place and time that might set off a riot. "The basic philosophy that we've been taking for the last 2 years is go in with the minimum amount of people, make your arrests at the most convenient time that you can. In other words, play the ball game on your own field and not on theirs. So far, it's worked; maybe next time the whole thing will blow up. Even if we must be passive at times and do the job but in a different way, we will get the same end results even though we do get some bad publicity out of it. I'm not ashamed to make a strategic retreat, then go back and do the job later."

This is interesting commentary on tactics, planning and training, from an authoritative member of the Atlanta Police Department.

Undoubtedly a key role in control of the Boulevard riot was played by the

officers of the Crime Prevention Bureau, a division of the Atlanta Police Department which was established in January 1966 to create better police relations and win the respect and confidence of the citizens. The officers, who work out of the 11 Economic Opportunity centers, had already begun to get acquainted with the men, women and especially the children in their small part of the community. Some were white, but most were black officers.

Today, all police recruits are assigned to work with the Crime Prevention Bureau prior to entering the police training school (up to 6 months). They carry no sidearms, but work with foot patrolmen, learning to talk to the residents and understand them and their problems. Not only does the recruit meet the people he will work with, but his supervisors have the opportunity to evaluate his ability to handle himself in both routine and emergency situations.

OPERATIONS

Saturday - 10 September:

Because of the Summerhill riot the previous Tuesday and the subsequent arrest of SNCC leaders, the Atlanta Police Department was tense and alert to a potential massive revolt in more than one of the city's Negro enclaves. They had been on 12-hour (mobilization) shifts following that event and had just returned to normal 8-hour tours of duty when the Saturday night Boulevard disturbance broke out. The newsman interviewed indicated that he had been aware of heavy police activity for at least the previous two weeks,

probably in response to the presence of known agitators in the ghetto areas.

The first complaint from the scene was a request for an ambulance and police investigation of a shooting. The event immediately escalated with the wounding of the first officer to arrive, Sgt. Spears, who claimed there were 200 irate Negroes gathered around the two injured boys. Other patrol cars, responding to officer-needs-help calls, immediately moved into the area, still without knowing that riots were erupting. However, an all-points broadcast must have gone out within minutes, as police poured into the troubled area to seal it off with roadblocks (by 11 p.m.), establish perimeter patrols and initiate saturation patrol tactics inside the ghetto.

The Police Watch Commander obviously recognized the potential danger and alerted higher police officials and civic authorities, who promptly entered the Boulevard District to try to restore peace. The night watch, due to be relieved at midnight, was held over until 3 a.m. Off-duty personnel were reporting to the center station at a steady rate, although the department was not formally mobilized until 8 a.m. Sunday. The time required to call each officer was cited as the delaying factor in mobilization; nevertheless, sufficient manpower was available Saturday night to contain the riot.

The principal tactic employed during the entire three-day riot was saturation patrol. A large number of patrol cars, usually containing four officers (as many black officers as possible), were assigned to criss-cross the area through the streets and alleyways. They concentrated on the businesses,

moving to counter the hit-and-run guerrilla methods of the rioters and to prevent burning and looting. There may have been some foot patrols, assigned from the group of Negro officers familiar with the area and its citizens, on Boulevard Avenue Saturday night, and definitely on Sunday and Monday. They had definite orders to stay out of alleys and avoid ambushes, but were encouraged to talk to the blacks and urge them to return to their homes and protect their own property. No attempt was ever made to corner the rioters or make mass arrests; the objective was just to get them back in their homes.

A field command post of sorts was established at the corner of Forrest and Boulevard where a call box provided direct telephone line with police headquarters. The police armored van, which had radio communication facilities, was kept at this spot most of the time as a command vehicle, along with a small van, plus the occasional addition of police command personnel's radio-equipped cars.

The armored van was also used later as a logistics vehicle to distribute riot guns, tear gas grenades, and batons. In 1966 Atlanta had only one radio frequency, which was shared with the ambulance service, and there was voice contention. In the riot area, an officer could call by saying, "Emergency, emergency," and all other units would yield the air. (Atlanta has since acquired three radio frequencies and reassigned their usage.) There was a problem with equipment issue records, but it apparently did not slow down the operation. (On Saturday night most of the officers were in regulation

soft hats; all were equipped with their service revolvers and a few with riot sticks.) Distribution of riot gear was at the personal discretion of the Superintendent in charge, who was careful to avoid issuing a shotgun to a possible "hot head" on the force.

Paddy wagons (four) were stationed at strategic points; the tactical commander felt that they had a desirable deterrent effect on the rioters. Those arrested were moved immediately into the paddy wagons and transported to the jail in groups of five or six, in order that spectators would not gather and become further inflamed. The arresting officer prepared the arrest tickets, but since each was responsible for arresting 10 or 12 people it was difficult for him to remember all of the details later. (Photographs, movies or video tapes of the actual arrests would have prevented case dismissals because of lost arrest tickets, inaccurate records and mistaken identification.) Since there was not enough time to complete the arrest slip at the scene, many of the arresting officers had to report to the jail to complete the booking procedure after completing a 12-hour shift.

Although saturation patrol was centered in the Boulevard area, there is evidence that police patrol activity in the other ghetto areas was stepped up. Reallocation of forces appears to have been swift and effective because no other disturbances erupted in the other Negro enclaves. It is also possible that civic strategy aided in keeping the adjoining areas cool, using neighborhood leaders effectively.

Adding to police problems during the riot was the fact that more than 400

of Atlanta's firemen were on strike, with police officers filling in at some of the 21 (of 32) fire stations that were in service.

Only one specific accusation of police brutality was made; SCLC Field Secretary Ben Clark, arrested Saturday night for failure to disperse, claimed he had been kicked and clubbed by police in the city jail elevator.

Sunday, 11 September:

With mobilization of the 800-man police department at 8:00 a.m. Sunday, about 350 officers were available for each 12-hour shift, assuming that some men were ill or could not be reached. Of this 800-man force, approximately 75 were Negroes, an extremely high ratio for the South at this time. They were used extensively in the riot area, with marked success.

Command officers reported that they had a real problem with the 12-hour shifts in that there were not enough serviceable vehicles in which to move the men. They had about 25 hand-held radios and needed more. Helmets were issued to some of the foot patrolmen, but they did not have flak vests, face shields or gas masks.

During the day, crowd activity and milling was relatively minor; approximately 100 officers patrolled the area. Toward dusk the crowds grew, began shouting and throwing rocks and bottles; the police forces swelled to about 250 men. According to the tactical commander they were all kept on foot because the mob was attacking all vehicles and would have destroyed the patrol cars. According to newspaper accounts, the police pushed the rioters

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up and down Boulevard, trying to get them to go home; "The crowds were dispersed by midnight, although the police, after changing shifts at that hour, continued to patrol Boulevard and adjacent streets, warning persons they saw to keep inside."

During the first two days of the disturbance the police enforced a holding action, with predominantly black officers patrolling the area on foot and white officers in vehicles patrolling the perimeter, both responding to specific incidents of arson or object throwing. Since these maneuvers served only to contain the crowd, officials developed an operations plan in the event the riots broke out again on the third day.

Monday, 12 September:

"The biggest command problem during a disturbance is to determine when to take positive action and clear the streets, and how long to observe and exercise mild control," is the opinion of the tactical commander during the Boulevard riot. By Monday evening, with the rioting crowds on the street having grown to about 800 from Saturday night's mob of 200, the police decided to move in.

The tactical commander, with the concurrence of Chief Jenkins, prepared to sweep the streets. In addition to the foot and car patrols in the area, a reserve crew of 26 officers waited in a bus outside the area. Perimeter control tightened; only people with important business in the area were allowed through the lines.

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When the infuriated mob charged out of the Tabernacle Baptist Church on Monday evening, the commander called for the officers to move down Boulevard. Thirteen men moved shoulder-to-shoulder up from Forrest, and the other 13, in a similar skirmish line, moved down from North Street, forcing the mobs off the street. Foot patrols also continued, and whole squads pursued groups of rioters into the back lots and alleys.

The maneuver was successful. Violence diminished rapidly and calm was restored by midnight. During the ensuing week, police patrol of the area continued in strength because of fear of further disruption over the weekend, but there were only isolated incidents.

E. CINCINNATI, OHIO

1. RATIONALE FOR SELECTION OF CINCINNATI

Cincinnati, Ohio, the largest city on the Ohio River, has a continuing history of major unrest, mounting as the proportion of black residents in the city's 500, 000 population increases. Most disturbances in the city have been racial, spilling over into school (principally high school) issues in predominantly black neighborhoods.

The increase in crimes stemming from riots and demonstrations beginning in the mid-1960's is dramatically illustrated by statistics which show that in 1964 Cincinnati was proud to have 45% less crime than the national average for cities over 250, 000 population, and double the national average in percent of crimes cleared. The FBI showed Cincinnati in 1965 as the safest large city in the U. S., as related to predatory crimes.

2. RATIONALE FOR SELECTION OF THE "BLACK MONDAY" INCIDENT

"Black Monday", the riot that broke out following a special memorial for slain Martin Luther King Jr., is the Cincinnati incident selected for study. Avondale, a predominantly black Cincinnati neighborhood and the location of previous violence, was the setting for the violent outburst which followed an all-black memorial service to King on the Monday following his assassination. The event was planned by the Avondale Community Council, who requested that no whites be allowed within their community on that day--8 April 1968.

The Avondale riot during July 1967 is already well documented in the literature. Reference to the earlier incident in this study provides an excellent comparison of police planning and response to racial outbreaks after they had already undergone "baptism by fire" in the same area. The changes in civic and law enforcement attitudes toward the two events is remarkable.

Although the Cincinnati Police Department, with the assistance of the Ohio National Guard, succeeded in suppressing the April 1968 violence in an extremely short time, it must be noted that Black Monday was not the end of Cincinnati's unrest. Racial tensions, still prevalent, erupt into demonstrations frequently. As a matter of fact, there were serious school disturbances (sit-ins) in May 1968, while the newspapers were still reporting the disposition of April riot arrests.

3. DATA GATHERING AND ANALYSIS

Interviews were conducted with members of the Cincinnati Police Department in the police facility's Staff Room in January 1970. The Command portion of the questionnaire was answered by the present Commander of the Patrol Section, who, as District 4 (which includes Avondale) Commander, assumed the role of Field Commander during the Black Monday riot. His immediate commanding officer at that time was Lt. Col. Embry Grimes, who acted as "full-view commander"; he has since become Chief of the Cincinnati Police Department, succeeding the late Col. Jacob Schott, who was police chief in 1968.

The ranking black officer of the police department, who led the squadron of Negro officers patrolling the Avondale area throughout Black Monday, responded to the Operations section of the questionnaire.

The Observer for the incident was the minister of a Baptist Church in the heart of the Avondale district. He is described by the Cincinnati ENQUIRER (in a description of the fire-bombing of his home) as the organizer of the Cincinnati Involvement Committee and "an outspoken foe of black militancy, racial violence and rioting". He denies being on the street during the incident, but offers as his evidence the observations of his parishioners... observations that are uniquely different from those of the police officers.

Valuable documentation of the official police reports was provided to the Hughes interviewer by the police department in the form of their "Black Monday" After Action Report, which summarizes the event quite objectively.

An enormous amount of column-inches on local racial issues and attempts to resolve some of the problems is printed in the Cincinnati newspapers. The Hughes' file of these articles, comprising over 200 pages with several articles per page, covers the period from 10 December 1967 to 23 January 1970. This data was used to verify and expand on interview material.

All Cincinnati interviews were tape recorded, then transcribed into a document of 120 pages.

4. CITY BACKGROUND DATA

The City of Cincinnati (see map, Figure E-1) surrounds a northern loop of the Ohio River, the boundary between Ohio and Kentucky; the city is 16 miles east of the Ohio/Indiana border. The city, covering 72.4 square miles, lies in an amphitheater of hills, which divide the city topographically into many different neighborhoods, each with a distinct character, and dictate a pattern of disjointed, irregular and dead-end streets.

Metropolitan Cincinnati covers 414 square miles, including Hamilton, Dearborn, Clermont and Warren Counties in Ohio, and Boone, Kenton and Campbell Counties in Kentucky. The Metropolitan Area, 17th in size in the United States, has a population of 1,313,000, while the City of Cincinnati (21st in the United States) has 502,550 residents.

Cincinnati is a major manufacturing center, employing about 150,000 people, with an annual payroll amounting to approximately \$1 billion. It leads the world in the manufacture of three very different products--machine tools, soap products and playing cards--and also supplies many other consumer goods.

Adopted in 1926, the Cincinnati city charter provides for a council of nine members elected at large for a 2-year term on a nonpartisan rotating ballot; there is no primary or run-off election. The City Council elects one of its members to act as Mayor, and it appoints a City Manager to administer the city's affairs.




Figure E-1. Map of Cincinnati, Ohio, Indicating Location of Avondale District

A Safety Director, appointed by the City Manager with the approval of the City Council, acts as a "cushion of civilian control" in supervising the Chief of Police and the Fire Chief.

During the past 10 years there has been a steady movement of affluent citizens to outlying suburbs throughout the entire Metropolitan Area. The movement has left old, established neighborhoods for occupancy by the blacks, and has changed the black/white balance of the City of Cincinnati as shown in Table I.

TABLE I
CHANGING POPULATION BALANCE IN CITY OF CINCINNATI

	1960	1966	1967	1990*
White	393,000	373,000	365,000	181,097
Black	109,000	127,000	135,000	243,387
TOTAL	502,000	500,000	500,000	424,484

* Estimate by Hamilton County Regional Planning Commission

In 1948 Cincinnati city officials prepared an urban renewal plan, which was not implemented until the 1960's. To quote an encyclopedia, "The first district to be rehabilitated was the West End. Formerly a monotonous square mile of slum, this area was completely transformed. Century-old tenements were torn down and replaced by modern aluminum, brick and stainless steel buildings... In 1962 Cincinnati voted \$150 million toward a complete revitalization of its downtown core area as the second phase in its urban renewal. Portions or all of eight major downtown blocks were to be demolished and replaced. The first new buildings to be completed were the Convention Hall; Provident Towers, an office building; an underground garage beneath Fountain Square; and a multistory parking garage. These were to be followed by a Federal Reserve Bank Building, major office structures, and a \$40 million sports stadium for the Cincinnati Reds baseball team and an American Football League team."

A Federal Housing Project was constructed in Millvale to accomodate some of the displaced West End Negroes.

5. SCENE OF THE INCIDENT

The Avondale District is the largest Negro section of Cincinnati, housing about 40,000 residents, many of them transplanted from the West End area when expressways and urban development forced their displacement. Avondale is not a typical slum area; it was previously a prosperous Jewish neighborhood of two and three-story brick homes. Reading Road (State

Highway 42) is a major thoroughfare from downtown Cincinnati to the northern suburbs bisecting Avondale. It is lined with typical center-city shops, most having apartments above them.

Civic officials said that 1960 census takers found 9583 sound housing units in Avondale, and only 149 dilapidated ones. On the other hand, the Negroes express their displeasure with broken promises: The Avondale-Corryville renewal project was to have rehabilitated 3000 housing units in 3 years-- actually only 1600 buildings have been rehabilitated in 6 years.

Avondale contains numerous schools and churches, a recreation center, the Jewish Hospital, and other major buildings. It is encircled by other individual neighborhoods, including Evanston, Norwood, Clifton, Bond Hill, Roselawn, Winton Terrace, Carthage, Hartwell, Kennedy Heights; most of these have a high percentage of Negro residents. Mt. Auburn, southwest of Avondale, is known as a city medical center and contains the Children's Hospital, Cincinnati General Hospital, State Hospital, a VA Hospital, and many doctors' offices. West of that community is the 31,000-student University of Cincinnati campus, the Burnet Woods, and the famed Zoological Gardens.

6. CIVIC ENVIRONMENT

The City of Cincinnati was braced for racial outbursts as the summer of 1968 approached. In June 1967 there had been a disastrous riot in the Avondale District for which neither the civic authorities nor the police and fire

departments were adequately prepared. Suspects from the 1967 riot were still being tried in March and April 1968, and numerous commissions (local, state and federal) were investigating the previous Cincinnati riot. Chief of Police Schott warned the House Judiciary Committee against writing "unrealistic" penalties into anti-riot legislation. He said "If you make the penalties too severe, you will never convict or the judge will never give the maximum penalty. . . I don't think we have to keep writing new laws, just use existing ones."¹

On the other hand, the National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorder scolded a Cincinnati Municipal Court Judge for creating the impression of discriminatory justice among Cincinnati Negroes by saying that he would mete out "maximum sentences to anyone found guilty of riot-connected offenses."²

Dr. John P. Spiegel, director of the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence at Brandeis University, speaking in Cincinnati, stated that "Urban riots, including those in Cincinnati, have been spontaneous revolts against local problems and not organized plots."³ Nevertheless, Cincinnati newspapers reported numerous cases of firebombings against the homes of responsible leaders of the black community, who tried to organize committees to seek non-militant solutions to the racial problems.

1. "Schott Opposes Stiffer Riot Laws," ENQUIRER, 18 January 1968.
2. "Judge Mathews Rapped In Panel Report on Riots," ENQUIRER, 4 March 1968.
3. "Expert Says Urban Riots Are Not Organized Plots," ENQUIRER, 10 December 1967.

The National Advisory (Kerner) Commission Report on the 1967 Avondale riot states that "Although the city's Negro population had been rising swiftly--in 1967, 135,000 out of the city's 500,000 residents were Negroes--there was only one Negro on the city council. Although by 1967, 40% of the school children were Negro, there was only one Negro on the Board of Education. Of more than 80 members of various city commissions, only three or four were Negro."

Now, painfully aware of the racial inequities, "A great deal of attention is given to race problems by the police, other city departments, the schools, and by groups such as the Human Rights Commission and a number of citizen's organizations," to quote the Greater Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce.

7. SUMMARY OF THE EVENT

During the months that followed the June 1967 Avondale riot, sporadic racial incidents kept the entire city of Cincinnati uneasy. When word was flashed of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., violence was anticipated all over the country. The history of the response in Cincinnati can be fitted quite readily into the stipulated phases.

The Pre-Crowd Phase began when Dr. King was shot at 7 p.m. on 4 April 1968. The Crowd Phase began at 2 p.m. on Monday, 8 April, when the blacks began to gather for the memorial service, and turned into a Demonstration-Orderly Phase at 5:30 p.m. when they began to move into the

business district from the field where the service was held. The Demonstration-Orderly Phase lasted only 25 minutes until the first looting occurred at 5:55 p.m. The Demonstration-Disorderly Phase continued until calm was restored in Avondale at 11 p.m. that night. The Post-Demonstration Phase continued for over 3 days, until noon on Friday 12 April, when the police returned to normal operations. Of particular interest is the long Post-Demonstration Phase, typical of the cooling-off period when the demonstrators live within the riot area.

PRE-CROWD PHASE

Thursday, 4 April:

Within an hour after Dr. King died in a Memphis, Tennessee, hospital at 8:05 p.m., groups of black teenagers began to gather in Avondale and other Negro communities. They roved the streets, breaking windows, looting the State Liquor Store, burglarizing a furniture store, setting fires, and sounding false fire alarms. As a result of swift police action, calm was restored by midnight. There had been a total of 23 false fire alarms and the following 15 offenses:

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| o Malicious destruction of property | 9 |
| o Burglary | 4 |
| o Arson | 1 |
| o Attempted arson | 1 |

Friday, 5 April:

The city remained calm until 8:30 a.m. on Friday when there was a report

of disorderly juveniles at a Reading Road shopping center in the Swifton district. As schools convened there were minor disturbances, and Woodward, Withrow, Hughes, Walnut Hills and Taft High Schools were closed in tribute to Dr. King. As Woodward students were dismissed, about 100 marched upon the Swifton Shopping Center again (9:30 a.m.), where they broke windows in 12 stores with damage in excess of \$7000. Three of the responding police officers were slightly injured by thrown objects before they were able to disperse the crowd as it moved south on Reading from the Swifton Center. This was the last crowd activity of the day, but there were 13 minor incidents involving destruction of property and fires in Negro neighborhoods during the night. There were 23 false fire alarms and a total of 39 other offenses:

o Malicious destruction of property	34
o Arson	3
o Attempted arson	2

An independent Negro security force in nine private autos patrolled Avondale on Friday night and again on Saturday to prevent disorders, operating with full cooperation of the Cincinnati Police Department. This force included 150 men ranging from 18 to 45 years in age, wearing distinctive black shirts and berets and black armbands with red diamonds.

Saturday, 6 April:

Widespread incidents and offenses continued at about the same pace, with 24 false fire alarms and 26 additional offenses:

130

- o Malicious destruction of property
- o Arson

24

2

(These incidents are summarized in the police department's After Action Report, and given little coverage in the press.)

Sunday, 7 April:

Much newspaper space was devoted to plans for providing equality for the minorities--housing, jobs, and participation in planning. Mayor Ruehle-mann announced a "day of commitment" in Cincinnati to coincide with Dr. King's funeral on Tuesday.

Meanwhile, the Avondale Community Council (ACC) made its own plan for a memorial service for Dr. King--this to be an all-black ceremony on Monday evening at the Avon Recreation Center, Blair and Hartford Avenues.

In an article in the ENQUIRER, Clyde Vinegar of the ACC stated that it "doesn't mean that Avondale will be off-limits to all white people. We have no intentions of closing the hospitals or blocking the routes to the hospitals. All we are asking for is that white people leave us alone this day. We want to honor Dr. King peacefully because that is what he stood for. If white people are around on this day when we are upset, there might be trouble."

The Cincinnati Police Division was directed to withhold patrol service by white police officers in the Avondale area (see map, Figure E-2) bounded by Melish Avenue on the South, Clinton Springs on the north, Washington and Burnet Avenues on the West and Victory Parkway on the east, during




Figure E-2. Map of Avondale and Surrounding Areas, Showing Location of Two Homicides and Police Forward Command Posts

the hours from 4 to 6:30 p.m. on 8 April.

The pre-riot tempo of violence continued on 7 April. At 12:30 a.m., two arsons occurred simultaneously at Kings Run and Este Avenues; a furniture store and pharmacy suffered loss in excess of \$27,000. There were 48 false fire alarms and 30 other offenses:

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|----|
| o Malicious destruction of property | 22 |
| o Arson | 5 |
| o Attempted arson | 3 |

Monday, 8 April:

Avondale was unusually quiet during the morning hours; there was little traffic and few pedestrians. The most significant event was harassment of waste collection crews in the area, first by teen-agers (11:30 a.m.) and then by an ACC security patrol car (1:36 p.m.) after Clyde Vinegar had assured the police of his organization's cooperation. The Waste Collection Supervisor solved the problem by ordering his trucks from the area.

CROWD PHASE

Beginning about 2 p.m., crowds of Negroes began gathering in Avondale and the vehicular traffic became very heavy. Groups of 200 to 300 formed at various locations in the area, but no incidents of any consequence were reported. The people moved toward the Avon Recreation Center; at 4:15 there were over 1000 people on Reading Road from Blair to Lee Place. By the time the memorial started, a crowd variously estimated from 1500 to 3000 had gathered.

During the memorial service, a minister called for Negroes to "forget any differences of the past and face the future with unity." The woman president of the Welfare Rights Group praised Dr. King for his leadership in the field of civil rights. Then, John Poole, vice-chairman of the Cincinnati Congress of Racial Equality, inflamed the crowd with his statement: "The white man killed King, the best thing for us to do is get the white man back. The way he has been getting us for all these years."¹

(This man was later arrested; see Post-Demonstration Phase.)

During this phase, the uniformed ACC civilian security force toured the area, using walkie-talkies for communication. Although they had agreed to provide a walkie-talkie for the police division's liaison officer who was one of the Negro police officers assigned to work in Avondale during the memorial, the ACC did not give it to him.

DEMONSTRATION-ORDERLY PHASE

Immediately following the conclusion of the Memorial Services, the crowds along Reading Road grew to over 3000, lining both sides of the street. Vehicular traffic was bumper to bumper and moving slowly, with the ACC security marshalls trying to keep the cars moving.

The only members of the Cincinnati Police Department within the set perimeter around Avondale at this time were nine black officers comprising a Special Force directed by a police lieutenant. The lieutenant reported that at this time (about 5:45 p.m.) "the people were lined up along the sidewalk

as if they were waiting for a parade to pass. They seemed to be in a festive carnival mood and were laughing and shouting to each other." The older people were heading toward home while the younger group was milling around and starting to build up around the corner of Rockdale and Reading. The Demonstration-Orderly Phase lasted only about 30 minutes after the conclusion of the memorial service.

DEMONSTRATION-DISORDERLY PHASE

Suddenly, at 5:55 p.m., violence erupted as the crowd broke windows in the Ohio State Liquor Store a few feet from the Rockdale/Reading epicenter and started looting. The police Special Force responded, made several arrests and hurriedly removed the prisoners from the scene; some officers were detailed to stand guard to prevent further looting.

Within minutes shots were heard further north on Reading. Heading for the scene, "Lt. Neal heard youths shouting that 'honky cops' had shot somebody. He knew that wasn't so because there were no white policemen in Avondale."¹ This shouting was the trigger that set off the widespread rioting. Entering the building, the Negro officers found that James Smith, the Negro caretaker of the jewelry store, had tried to stop looters with a shotgun and accidentally discharged the gun, killing his common-law wife. The man who had been accusing white policemen (later identified as Don Page, a member of the ACC security force) then started urging the crowd to lynch Smith. It was necessary to remove Smith from the scene in the ambulance carrying his

1. Details on Riots, Cincinnati ENQUIRER, 9 April 1968.

1. "Pride, Peace Go up in Smoke of Hate," Cincinnati ENQUIRER, 9 April 1968.

dead wife. (Page was arrested for disorderly conduct; see details in Post-Demonstration Phase.)

By 6 p.m., windows had been broken in most of the stores on Reading Road from Forest to Windham. (Figure E-3) A fire bomb exploded in the LoMark Drug Store (Figure E-4), setting the interior ablaze. Fire equipment responding to the alarm was driven off by shots from the crowd and the fire kept burning. The Segal Furniture Store a block south erupted in flames just as the fire equipment pulled away from LoMark. Dense smoke from these two fires reduced visibility to a few feet (Figure E-5).

At 6:05 p.m., white tactical police units moved in from the Avondale perimeter. The initial actions of small groups of police officers directed against the rioters at Rockdale and Reading had little effect on the mob, until at 6:47 p.m. two squads of 20 men each arrived simultaneously and controlled the situation in 12 minutes.

However, between 6 and 6:45 p.m., riotous activity spread south on Reading, west on Rockdale and south on Burnet, with looting, arson, and assaults continuing practically unabated. With perimeter control of the Avondale area, and a large concentration of police within the boundary, it was possible to restore calm by 11 p.m.

However, the rioting had spread outside Avondale to other areas of the city. There were serious violent outbreaks in Evanston, Mt. Auburn, Norwood,



Figure E-3. Almost Every Window for Five Blocks along Reading Road Was Broken within Minutes after Riot Started



Figure E-4. Lo-Mark Drug Store, Burned during Riots the Preceding Year, Was First Arson Target



Figure E-5. Firefighters Required Police Protection as Dense Smoke Filled Air

Madisonville and the West End. The second fatality of the night occurred about 7 p.m. when a young couple, Noel and Lois Wright, heading home from the University of Cincinnati stopped at a traffic signal at Auburn and Dorchester Streets. The rear window of their car was smashed by a large rock; when Wright got out to investigate, he was attacked and stabbed in the chest by three young Negro men. His wife was held in the car by several young Negro girls, and was unable to help her husband. (Her description and memory of one nickname enabled the police to locate and arrest five males, two of them juveniles, and two females for the homicide).

Two men were hospitalized after being assaulted at Main and Liberty Streets, and their car was destroyed. A police officer was treated at General Hospital for bruises and facial cuts after being attacked in English Woods. About 10 p.m., there was a sudden flareup of activity in Police District One when a state liquor store, clothing store, other businesses and automobiles in the 1000 block of Central Avenue were damaged and looted.

Kentucky law enforcement officials were alert for possible trouble, and indeed suffered a few incidents. Roadblocks were set up on all Ohio River bridges; autos travelling in both directions were searched for weapons.

For the night's activities, the police recorded 166 arrests, 25 false fire alarms and the following offenses committed:

- o Malicious destruction of property 38
- o Arson 11

o Attempted Arson	1
o Burglary	15
o Housebreaking	14
o Homicide	2
o Assault	6
o Assault and Robbery	2

POST-DEMONSTRATION PHASE

The Cooling-Off Period.

The curfew, and the arrival of the first elements of the Ohio National Guard about 11 p.m., put the lid on the night's violence. The Post-Demonstration Phase started at about midnight. There were occasional incidents of violence on Tuesday. Five people were arrested for looting in the Avondale area during daylight hours. Between 7 and 9 p.m., small roving gangs of youths hit the Walnut Hills, Evanston, Avondale, Madisonville and West End districts, throwing rocks and turning in false fire alarms. They were stopped by police roadblocks and checkpoints. A total of 87 people were arrested on 9 April, and the following offenses were recorded:

o Malicious property destruction	4
o Arson	3
o False Fire Alarms	13

The opening day game of the Cincinnati Reds, which had been scheduled for Monday, was held without incident on Wednesday, although there had been numerous rumors of disturbances that would occur at the game. Gangs of youths created disturbances in Avondale, Walnut Hills and West End between

140

8 and 10 p.m. Twenty-three persons were arrested and the following offenses were reported:

Malicious property destruction	5
--------------------------------	---

Arson	1
-------	---

False fire alarms	7
-------------------	---

Finally, on Thursday, 11 April the last violence of the riot took place, during which 10 arrests were made, and the following offenses committed:

Malicious property destruction	3
--------------------------------	---

Arson	1
-------	---

False fire alarms	8
-------------------	---

Arrests and Trial.

Reports of the police and newspapers regarding arrests vary a great deal. One analysis shows that of 260 arrested, 54 were juveniles. (The charges are itemized in Table II.) A survey of the 176 arrested on Monday and Tuesday showed that only 12 of them reported they were unemployed; the arrestees ranged in age from 12 to 73 years, 130 were under 30 and 66 were under 21. There were seven white men and one white woman arrested, the remainder were black.

Cincinnati's Municipal Courts responded quickly to the heavy load, setting up night courts to hear offenses beginning on Black Monday. The judges purposely set extremely high bail to prevent agitators from being released to rejoin the rioting. Most of the convictions for rioting resulted in one-year jail terms, plus fines. The Grand Jury refused to return an indictment against Smith, whose accidental shooting of his wife triggered the riot.

TABLE II

ARREST CHARGES DURING RIOTING

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Number of Arrests</u>
First Degree Murder	3
First Degree Manslaughter	1
Assault with Deadly Weapon	2
Inciting to Riot	1
Violation of Riot Act (Adults - 105; Juveniles-34)	139
Disorderly Conduct	37
Fire Bombing	3
False Fire Alarm	1
Safe Cracking	1
Burglary	2
Receiving Stolen Property	9
Petit Larceny	6
Carrying Concealed Weapons	29
Assault and Battery on a Police Officer	3
Resisting Arrest	4
Drunk	4
Trespassing	3

By Thursday following Black Monday, police had in custody three male Negroes, whom they charged with first degree murder for the stabbing of Mr. Wright and suspected of two other violent assault cases at Liberty and Main Streets. Also taken into custody for the Wright attack were two male juveniles, charged with

assault with a deadly weapon. On 16 and 18 April, police arrested two juvenile girls for participating in the attack on Mrs. Wright. In subsequent court action, the charges against the three alleged murderers were reduced to second degree murder and the juveniles were held to answer to adult courts.

As a result of the ENQUIRER's report of John Poole's inflammatory speech at the memorial service, he was picked up for sentencing on a disorderly conduct offense the previous August. He had been convicted of the charge, but sentence was deferred when Poole's attorney stated that he had resigned from CORE and no longer was a militant. The Municipal Judge immediately cancelled the deferral, sentenced him to 30 days in the Workhouse and \$100 fine, stating that "Poole was too dangerous a man to be on the streets."¹ He was a member of the Avondale security patrol on Black Monday.

Another member of the patrol, Don Page, was arrested Monday night and charged with disorderly conduct; he was later charged with inciting to riot under a new city ordinance passed the previous October. He had been seen by police at Reading and Rockdale standing on a car and shouting to the crowd to "Get the police" and to lynch the man who accidentally shot his wife.

Records showed Page had been arrested during the June 1967 riots. After repeated court appearances, a mistrial, a mental examination, etc., Page was finally (on 20 August) found guilty of inciting to riot and was sentenced to one year in jail plus a \$5000 fine.

1. "Too Dangerous to be on Streets, Says Judge in Sentencing Violator," Cincinnati ENQUIRER, 13 April 1968.

These two cases explain to a great extent the fear and antagonism of the responsible black citizens of Avondale. Ohio Rep. William F. Bowen, a Negro, stood on a sound truck at Reading and Rockdale as the rioting broke out, urging people to go home. He stated¹ "Instead they started breaking windows. They were mostly teen-agers and they used their feet, stones and their hands. They paid no attention to me... I don't think the riot was an outgrowth of the services. I think it all started when that woman was shot."

On Tuesday (9 April) the Avondale Community Council, disgusted at the way its peace-keeping efforts had failed, decided it was through with attempts to police its own people. The ACC claimed the police had failed to cooperate; the police claimed that the ACC had not screened its 150-man force and that it contained many militant agitators. The ACC stated, "There were those who hesitated to speak out for publication in fear of the black revolutionaries."²

Rev. C. L. Conner, pastor of Pilgrim Baptist Church, heading a special committee appointed to help the court determine which defendants should remain in jail and which should be released on their own recognizance, stated "that he was concerned not only for the men in jail but for the 99.5% of the citizens of this community (Avondale) who are law-abiding and whose lives were in some way disturbed last week because of the actions of a few."

1. "Memorial Service Not Riot Cause, Bowen Says," ENQUIRER, 9 April 1968.
2. "ACC Decides to Quit Policing Own People," ENQUIRER, 10 April 1968.
3. "Panel Investigates 40 Riot Suspects," ENQUIRER, 17 April 1968.

The Observer interviewed about Black Monday stated that his parishioners informed him that the instigators of the King memorial service used it as a convenient excuse to get a lot of people together and precipitate previously planned violence. They intended that the crowds would return to their homes, the police would cancel their alert and leave, after which the radicals would "really tear up the town." He felt that it was providential that the shooting triggered the rioting while the police still encircled Avondale and could restrain most of the violence within that perimeter.

In the week that followed cessation of violence, the City Manager commended the actions of the police, the fire and other departments, including the Ohio National Guard for their handling of the explosive situation. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) commended the Mayor and city administrators for taking "prompt and decisive action" and the police for their restraint, but protested Municipal Court action as being "excess and over-reaction."

In summary the Black Monday rioting, the police provided the following statistics:

COST OF INCIDENT TO CITIZENS AND TAXPAYERS

Police Overtime	\$ 172, 858
Firemen Overtime	22, 350
Payment to Ohio National Guard	296, 000
Arson and Property Damage	305, 475
Stolen Property	39, 606
	\$746, 289

CRIMES (4/4 to 4/11)

Offenses Reported	306
False Fire Alarms	184
Arrests	304

INJURIES

(No report on Civilians injured or killed)

Police	7
Firemen	4
National Guard	4

8. CINCINNATI POLICE DEPARTMENT PROCEDURES, METHODS
AND TECHNIQUES

PLANNING

Long range plans for resolving the racial tensions and for controlling a riot, should one occur in Cincinnati, were prepared from both civic and police points of view. The City Council on 4 January 1968 passed a new city ordinance prohibiting anyone from damaging or destroying a fireplug, violators being subject to a \$1000 fine and/or one year jail term. (Previously firemen had been authorized to be deputized and to protect fire equipment with a fireman "riding shotgun"; the City Council also passed ordinances against inciting riots and interfering with firemen, police or other city workers in line of duty.) On 1 February 1968, an anti-riot ordinance was introduced into the City Council to give the Mayor or City Manager power to:

- o Establish curfew
- o Halt transportation
- o Cordon off streets
- o Close certain businesses
- o Call in extra police

This ordinance was still being hotly debated when Dr. King was assassinated, and was not passed until 17 April.

Caught off-guard by the 1967 riots, the Cincinnati Police Department updated its Crowd Control Manual and its Civil Disturbance Operation Plan (CDOP) to cover problem areas discovered during the earlier riot. "We have refurbished and refreshed our approach, but it has not changed," said Chief Schott.¹ Safety Director Sandman said, "We have studied what happened in the days preceding last summer's rioting, then we studied what happened during the riots. From that study we are now coordinating the work of police, firemen and communications. We're beefing up in the areas of equipment, manpower, procedure, intelligence and communications with similarly affected agencies like the county and municipality police, Federal troops and National Guard units."

The CDOP sets up a phasing-in operation for crowd control:

Phase I can be initiated by the supervisor of the first officer on the scene of a civil disturbance by notifying Station X to dispatch cars, patrol wagon and emergency personnel to the scene, and canine units to patrol station X and transmission towers.

Phase II is initiated by the Police Chief or Assistant Police Chief if assigned

1. "Police Beefing Up," ENQUIRER, 3 March 1968.

personnel cannot contain the disorder, or if two or more Phase I disorders break out simultaneously. All police units are alerted by radio broadcast, teletype or telephone, a Central Command Post and a Forward Command Post and staging area are established, and police officers start 12-hour shifts.

Phase III is initiated, if the local police cannot contain the disorder, by the Mayor or City Manager who requests assistance of the Ohio National Guard, who move into the area and interface with the police according to a pre-arranged plan.

Phase IV is initiated by the Mayor or City Manager, requesting through the State Governor the assistance of Federal Troops. When the disorder is controlled and contained, operations revert through the phases to Phase II.

Phase V is an operations critique held in conjunction with all primary, backup and supporting agencies. An After Action Report is prepared, and all logs, assignment sheets, etc., are submitted to the Central Command Post for inclusion in the Disturbance Report, which is prepared by the Community Relations Section.

The Field Commander (who had been involved in most Cincinnati riots) described the problem of identifying extra cars assigned to the disturbance area in 1967. This problem was eliminated by specific procedures described in the CDOP.

The basic CDOP was implemented shortly after Dr. King's death (see Operations Section following.) When the Avondale Community Council made plans for the all-black memorial service for Dr. King, immediate steps were taken to establish a specific plan for handling potential disturbances. Shortly after

noon on Saturday, 6 April, Mayor Ruelman postponed the Cincinnati Reds opening game from 8 to 10 April.

Permission was granted to the ACC to hold their services, to police the area with their own security patrol, and to have only black police officers within their designated area (see map, Figure E-2). When on Sunday, the Cincinnati Police Division was directed to withhold patrol services by white police officers in the area, a staff meeting was held in the Police Chief's office to formulate a plan to accomplish the directive and to cope with traffic problems due to the memorial service.

A Special (temporary patrol) Force composed of 9 Negro officers directed by Lt. William Neal was formed; four patrol cars and one Scout Car ambulance were assigned to the Special Force. A 34-man traffic detail was set up to man 17 traffic posts around the perimeter to reroute traffic; a radio patrol car was assigned to each post to provide communications and mobility. The Tactical Unit of the Patrol Bureau, consisting of 3 sergeants and 27 police specialists, was ordered to report for duty at 4 p. m. on Monday, to be deployed in 15 patrol cars around the perimeter.

(The total police division resources at this time included 790 personnel and about 150 vehicles. There were two radio frequencies available, but no netting arrangements.)

TRAINING

Because of previous racial outbursts and the major riot of 1967, Cincinnati Police were well trained for handling the 1968 riot. As the field commander commented, facetiously, "We had the best possible training exercises. . .

prior riots." The CDOP became the basis for preparation for major disturbances or disasters and the city was divided into sectors, with Sector Patrol Maps ready for issuance to any officer entering a sector with which he was not familiar.

Numerous training bulletins were issued on crowd control (leave exits available when moving a crowd out of a building or stadium), on riot formations (use for military drill as discipline, not specifically for a disturbance), handling of prisoners (carry, don't drag the suspect), and use of batons. Recently, considerable attention has been given to countering the type of guerrilla tactics becoming prevalent, such as removing persons from a barricaded or sandbagged building, and the advisability of obtaining superior firepower for the police force.

In Cincinnati, special squads in each district are trained for specific duty as anti-sniper and chemical teams, relieving the rest of the force from specialized training.

On 3 March 1968, the ENQUIRER quoted Chief Schott as saying: "We've had roll call training this winter. It gets its name because the largest number of officers are present for training at roll call. The men were given prepared measured material; they studied a Crowd Control Manual. By the middle of this month the roll call training program will be embellished with training in police classrooms."

The Safety Director added, "Our prime aim is to prevent crime. But when prevention fails, we have to suppress crime. We have a desire to improve our repressive techniques."

At the same time, Ohio National Guard had been in special training since the previous September. A surprise mock alert was planned for April during which exercises would involve 20,000 Guardsmen and the police departments of all major Ohio cities. The training exercise was cancelled on 10 April because of the actual rioting in Cincinnati and Youngstown.

OPERATIONS

Thursday, 4 April:

The news bulletin regarding Dr. King's death alerted police departments all over the nation to potential trouble. By 9 p.m., groups of Negroes were gathering in the area of Reading and Rockdale (Figure E-6), windows were broken and looting started. The Relief Commander of District Four reported the vandalism to his superior, Capt. Thomas Dixon, who initiated Phase I of the CDOP at 9:30 p.m., and moved a Forward Command Post (simply the District Commander's patrol car) into the Kroger Store parking lot at Forest Avenue and Bogart.

Additional squads of men, sent from other districts, were unable to effectively patrol all the potential trouble spots and Capt. Dixon requested Lt. Col. Embry Grimes, Patrol Bureau Commander, to initiate Phase II. This occurred at 9:45 p.m., when the Central Command Post (CCP) at the police

station was activated and Third Relief personnel were called in. Second Relief personnel were directed to remain on duty until relieved. By 10:30 p.m., all personnel and vehicles at the FCP were assigned to sector patrol and by midnight order was restored. The CCP was secured at 1:20 a.m., and Phase I and II were terminated at 3 a.m., returning the police division to normal activity.

Friday, 5 April:

Small incidents were handled by normal police operations early in the morning, but a Phase I of CDOP was initiated by Capt. Dixon at 9:30 a.m. in response to property destruction by a group of high school students. While dispersing this mob, three police officers were injured.

The police division was placed on two 12-hour shifts. The First Relief worked from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. and the Second and Third Relief from 7 p.m. to 7 a.m.,

for the ensuing week, except for changes required by emergency conditions.

Phase I was cancelled at 6:48 p.m. and personnel returned to their normal areas of patrol. The combined Second and Third Reliefs were busy handling many isolated incidents.

Saturday, 6 April:

The two-shift assignment continued. The violence level abated significantly.

Sunday, 7 April:

The low-level of violence continued, with several costly store destructions

by arson (Figure E-7). Patrolmen operated on the two-shift schedule, while commanding officers met in staff session to prepare for the anticipated Black Monday problems. At 1 p.m., the Police Division was advised that the Central Command Post would remain in operation 24 hours per day until further notice. The shift order was altered, with Second Relief officers ordered to be relieved at 3 a.m. on 8 April and to report back at 3 p.m.

Duty hours for the First and Third Reliefs remained unchanged.

Monday, 8 April:

During the morning hours the only activity appeared to be harassment of the trash collectors, which was resolved when the operator withdrew the trucks from the neighborhood. Of particular interest, however, was the fact that one ACC security patrol car intentionally blocked a truck, after the ACC had assured its cooperation.

At 3 p.m., the Special Force of Negro officers, led by Lt. Neal, and the Special Traffic Detail were briefed at the Traffic Bureau. The Traffic Detail reported directly to their fixed posts on the Avondale perimeter, but the Special Force reported to District 4 Station for additional instructions by Capt. Dixon and issuing of special equipment. They were then deployed within the Avondale area restricted to blacks.

By 3:30 p.m., the combined First and Second Relief duty personnel of all seven police districts were integrated in patrol cars, briefed and sent out to assigned areas. Crime Bureau and Vice Control Bureau personnel were




Figure E-6. Small Groups Gathered at Reading and Rockdale within an Hour after Dr. King's Death.



Figure E-7. Hit-and-Run Arson Marked the Days Following Dr. King's Assassination

assigned to protect the downtown area. Lt. Col. Grimes assumed command of the city's northern section (including Avondale) and the Community Relations Bureau commander was responsible for the downtown and basin areas.

The first incident of the night's rioting occurred at 5:55 p.m. when Special Force cars rushed to the Ohio State Liquor Store and made arrests for looting; some officers remained on guard to prevent further looting. This incident was followed almost immediately by the accidental shooting by the jewelry store caretaker of his wife. Only the immediate response of the armed Negro officers got the man safely out of the area to District 7 station.

In 10 minutes time, violence erupted in many places at once, and at 6:05 p.m. Lt. Neal notified Station X that he required assistance at Reading and Rockdale. A tactical unit sergeant and seven of the 15 assigned tactical squad cars moved into Avondale. District 4 and 7 cars were ordered to report to the parking lot at the Sears store just outside the perimeter at Reading and Lincoln to standby for assignment.

At 6:15 p.m., Capt. Dixon drove into the Reading/Rockdale area to view first hand the extent of the rioting; he then went directly to the Sears parking lot where he established a Forward Command Post at 6:30 p.m. with the assistance of the District 7 commander. Chief Schott arrived for a personal briefing on the situation and initiated Phase II at 6:32 p.m. The Central Command Post was directed to alert the Ohio National Guard, the City Manager and Safety Director. The Special Traffic Detail was instructed to seal off the Avondale Area.

CONTINUED

2 OF 5

At 6:30 p.m., Mayor Ruehlmann declared the city to be in a state of emergency and invoked the Riot Act, which empowered the field forces to enforce dispersal orders to the crowds. The request for Ohio National Guard troops was made to the Governor.

The first few tactical forces moving into Avondale had little effect on the mobs; one car was stoned by the rioters. The mobs also turned back the fire trucks and reportedly shot at one fire crew. An officer at the scene stated that he believed the firemen fired back into the crowd with a shotgun; a wounded Negro later reported for gunshot treatment but did not file any kind of complaint. During the entire disturbance, firemen were under attack as they tried to put out the blazes and required police protection (Figure E-8).

At 6:47 p.m., two squads of 20 men each, armed with shotguns and full riot gear, arrived at Reading and Rockdale, marched into the intersection and fired several rounds from their shotguns into the air as an "attention getter."

Another group of about 30 officers arrived en masse in a patrol wagon in an impressive show of force. The officers moved in a shoulder-to-shoulder sweep down the streets, forcing the rioters ahead of them. They allowed escape room so that well intentioned citizens could move off to their homes.

Three men, already identified by Lt. Neal as having revolvers in their pockets, were immediately arrested, as were others who refused to move or were loud

and disorderly. Within 12 minutes the Reading/Rockdale area was under control. Patrol cars moved throughout Avondale reading the Riot Act proclamation over loudspeakers.

A Police Division Mobilization Alert was sounded at 6:50 p.m. to recall all off-duty men; however, most of the Third Relief personnel were already reporting for their 7 p.m. assignments. They were immediately transported to the Forward Command Post and deployed into Avondale. Police were notified over their radios at 7:19 p.m. that the Mayor had imposed an immediate city-wide curfew until 6 a.m., and that the Governor authorized the closing of all liquor stores and gasoline stations.

By 7:30 p.m., the peak police field strength of 591 men was reached, most of them assigned to Avondale. By enforcing the curfew regulations, they were able to move the crowds quickly away from the riot centers and into their homes, and arrest troublemakers who remained. There were 124 arrests made between 7:30 and 11 p.m., with the prisoners hurried into patrol wagons (Figure E-9) and whisked out of the riot area before the crowd was further agitated.

For this Black Monday riot, the location for the Forward Command Post was selected by the field commander to be "close to the action but far enough away not to be a target for snipers." Sears management opened the store to the police and it provided an enclosed staging area for the officers who were reporting there for field assignment. These assignments, made by the



Figure E-8. Although Cincinnati Firemen are Authorized to Carry Shotguns, They Required an Armed Guard



Figure E-9. Prisoners Were Removed Quickly to Avoid Further Agitation of the Crowd

field commander, were reported immediately to the Central Command Post and Communications in order that up-to-the-minute status boards could be maintained. A major problem of the field commander at this time was lack of communications. He had at his disposal only two radio channels--one the patrol car radio communications back to the Communications Center and the other frequency for communications with the 75 walkie-talkies in use by police officers in the area. The latter channel was also monitored by the Communications Center. Both channels were saturated at the height of the disturbance and the FCP officers used Sears' telephones for additional communications. Unfortunately, the telephone lines were almost useless because of dead lines that resulted when the city's switching stations were deluged with calls.

At 8:42 p.m., the FCP was moved to Woodward High School at 7001 Reading Road (Figure E-10) and was operational, complete with installation of extra telephone lines, by 9:50 p.m. (The FCP remained at this site for the duration of the emergency, ringed by armed National Guardsmen.)

Phase III of CDOP was initiated at 9:45 p.m. and by 11 p.m. the National Guard elements began arriving at the FCP for immediate assignment to field patrol with police officers. Other ONG units were deployed to guard pre-determined vital installations. A total of 308 ONG personnel were deployed during that night. The pre-arranged procedure for police/ONG liaison was implemented: three National Guardsmen rode in a jeep with one police

officer, who acted as radio operator/squad commander (Figure E-11). A police supervisor was assigned as a sector commander responsible for several of the jeep-mounted units and reported directly to the field commander; however, this chain of command was circumvented if one of the units required emergency assistance or had news on an immediate occurrence. Communications were difficult since the ONG and police radios did not operate on the same frequency. The police officer in each jeep was assigned a walkie-talkie which he was directed to use only:

- to provide vital intelligence
- to request assistance
- to request prisoner conveyance

This was the only means of avoiding total saturation of the channel.

At 7 p.m., all field units were advised that the Municipal Courts were open. A prosecutor, five judges and nine teams of 10 to 15 lawyers each were available to arraign the prisoners as fast as they were brought in. (By 7 a.m., Tuesday, 156 people had been arraigned; usually bond was set high (\$10,000) to prevent the rioter from returning to the scene and the case was continued.) In order to keep maximum police forces in the field, arresting officers were summoned to court by radio when they were needed. Lt. Neal felt that his officers were detained too long when called to court to make identifications, complete affidavits and return to their posts; probably an average of one hour was required for each man at a time that he was needed at the riot scene.



Figure E-10. Original Forward Command Post in Sears Store was Moved to Woodward High School for Duration of Disturbance



Figure E-11. Cincinnati Officer Rode in Jeep with Three Ohio National Guardsmen to Patrol Riot Area

Most officers on First Relief were released by 11 p.m. with orders to report back to duty at 7 a.m. Tuesday. The Second Relief was secured at 3 a.m.

Tuesday, 9 April:

At 11 a.m., the Mayor reinstated the curfew from 7 p.m. to 6 a.m. Liquor stores were still closed. Violence was much reduced from the previous days, and police roadblocks and checkpoints at strategic locations were used to restrict vandals. Guardsmen were posted at all stores that had been broken into to prevent further looting. (Figure E-12). Nearly all police activity subsided at 11:30 p.m., but field strength was kept to a maximum until 7 a.m. with 475 police officers integrated with 264 National Guardsmen.

Wednesday, 10 April:

City officials decided not to reinstitute the curfew because of the relative quiet during the previous 24 hours and the ban on liquor sales was lifted. Daylight incidents were rare. Maximum effective strength was again maintained from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. with 475 officers and 300 ONG personnel.

Thursday, 11 April:

With the city still calm, the ONG guarding vital installations were withdrawn, and at 1 p.m. the ONG contingent patrolling with police officers was substantially reduced. Later, the Mayor advised the Governor that the ONG was no longer required. Most ONG personnel returned to the Shadybrook Armory



Figure E-12. National Guardsmen were Posted to Prevent Further Looting

at midnight, except for those assigned to District 4, who were released about 4 a.m. on 12 April. The ONG remained at the armory on stand-by basis according to prearrangement.

Friday, 12 April:

At noon Chief Schott notified the entire police division that the riot proclamation had been lifted, that Phases I, II and III of the CDOP were secured and the division had returned to normal operating procedures.

Post-Riot:

As soon as the emergency ended, the police Community Relations Bureau of the Crime Prevention Bureau and all civic officials began working directly with responsible leaders in the black communities of Cincinnati

to relieve tensions and eliminate some of the inequities and misunderstandings that were causing them. A tragic situation that exists in Cincinnati, pointed out by both Lt. Neal and the Observer, is verified by a newspaper search: black community leaders who attempt to lead their people in organizing to improve community relations are almost invariably the object of a firebombing...their home or their place of business. Although the arsonists are most frequently caught, this hold of terror the militants have over the law-abiding citizens makes the total black community appear to be the agitators, rather than the victims.

Phase V of CDOP establishes procedures to be followed when peace is restored. First, the riot area is surveyed in order to accurately assess the damage, all beats are checked for unreported riot incidents, and any complaints against police officers are immediately investigated. Then starting with the lowest command level (sergeant), critiques are generated to consider what mistakes were made and how to correct them, what additional training is needed, and what additional equipment is required. Some errors committed by the police during the 1967 riot triggered generation of the CDOP and other new procedures prior to the 1968 riot, resulting in the changes shown in Table III.

One significant change after the Black Monday incident was reorganization of the liaison structure with the Ohio National Guard. Rather than having all Guardsmen and equipment report to the FCP, elements of the ONG

TABLE III

COMPARISON OF 1967 AND 1968 RIOTS

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
Violence Erupted	10 p.m., Monday 12 June	5:55 p.m., Monday 8 April
Ohio National Guard:		
Alerted	12:20 a.m., Tuesday	6:22 p.m., Monday
Requested	9:40 p.m., Tuesday	6:30 p.m., Monday
Reported	2:30 a.m., Wednesday	11:00 p.m., Monday
	800 men--no live ammo	1200 men--fully equipped
Riot Trigger	Arrest of picket protesting Negro's murderer conviction	Report white policeman shot Negro woman
Fatalities	1	2
Damage	\$2 million	\$350 thousand
Arrests:		
Monday	14	166
Total	404	304
Bail bond set	\$100	\$10,000
Police Operation Plan	No formal plan	CDOP
Curfew	None	7 p.m. to 6 a.m. Monday, Tuesday Wednesday
Liquor Sales	Open	Halted Monday and Tuesday
Gasoline Sales	Open	Halted Monday and Tuesday nights

were directed to report to the various district stations. The ONG officer commanding each element would then interface directly with each district captain, achieving a quicker integration of police and ONG forces. In addition, the communications would be augmented since ONG radio facilities would be set up at each district station to control all ONG radio-equipped vehicles in that district.

Part of the After Action critique involved a look at the arrests and court hearings stemming from the riot. The police were commended by the

Criminal Law Committee of the Ohio Bar Association for the high number of convictions that resulted because the arresting officer followed through as witness, rather than leaving it to civilians. On the other hand, the Bar

Association recommended that violators should have been charged with disorderly conduct, instead of curfew violation, because many cases were discharged when the suspect claimed he had not been aware that the Riot Act had been announced.

An unusually good relationship appears to exist between the police and the news media in Cincinnati. The police made no complaints about newsmen getting in the way, and there were no charges in the press of police brutality.

A good example of excellent press relations is the letter (Figure E-13) sent to the news media by Chief Schott, summarizing the most pertinent facts of the riot.

May 3, 1968

TO ALL NEP'S MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES

Gentlemen:

We welcome you to our Annual Police Press Conference and extend to you our warmest greetings. We feel that the police and the representatives of the press must always have a very close rapport and a feeling of mutual understanding. We are gratified for our past experiences with the news media which always have been most generous to the cause of law and order here in Hamilton County. We would hope that this feeling would permeate all of our future relationships and we pledge you accurate, factual and sympathetic cooperation.

Following is a brief resume of a typical situation which had occurred in our community in the past and would be of interest to your readers and viewers. The recent riot that occurred following Martin Luther King's death resulted in a cost to the citizens and taxpayers of Cincinnati as follows: \$172,858 in police overtime, \$22,350 in fire division overtime, \$296,000 initial expenditure allotted to national guard, \$305,475 arson and property damage, and \$39,606 in property stolen, for a total of \$746,289. During the period April 4th through 11th a total of 306 offenses were reported to the police, not including the 184 reports of false fire alarms. There were 304 arrests made, with 7 police injuries, 4 firemen injured and 4 national guard injured.

We hope that you will all be able to join us at the Memorial Day Parade on Friday, May 17th which is scheduled to start assemblage on the east side of City Hall at 12:45 p.m. The parade will terminate one half hour later with a very short memorial service. We would hope that this achieves maximum coverage.

The morale of the Police Division is high and with your cooperation and support in these trying times it shall continue.

Sincerely,

Jacob W. Schott

Jacob W. Schott
Police Chief
CINCINNATI POLICE DIVISION

Figure E-13. Letter to Cincinnati News Media from Chief of Police Following Disturbance

Probably the most pointed critique of civic policy came from the Observer, who said, "they (the memorial organizers) had requested that no Caucasian officers be in Avondale that day, and to me this is a violation because I think a policeman should have a right to go anywhere at any time." The field commander concurred; "The only information that could have helped us was the fact that we knew there was going to be a disturbance, and had been in there rather than just relying on our Negro officers; that's the

only thing."

F. ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA.

1. RATIONALE FOR SELECTION OF ANAHEIM

Originally selected as the locale for a pilot interview to test the applicability of the questionnaire, the City of Anaheim, California, later replaced Des Moines, Iowa, as the city in the 100,000 to 250,000 population category for the study. LEAA concurred with this change because of the low level of civil disobedience in Des Moines, compared with the frequency of disturbances in Anaheim.

The Anaheim Police Department is experienced at handling crowds, most of them being good-natured pleasure seekers attending a baseball game at the Angels' Stadium, a rock concert at the Convention Center, or a day's outing at Disneyland Park. However, there have been numerous demonstrations and violent outbursts that have caused the police to develop a relatively sophisticated command and control system.

2. RATIONALE FOR SELECTION OF "YIPPIE DAY AT DISNEYLAND" INCIDENT

Of the numerous incidents that have occurred in Anaheim recently, the National Yippie Convention at Disneyland on 6 August 1970 was selected for study because of the many command and control problems involved in generating a specific operations plan prior to the event and in coordinating police activities in accordance with that plan, which required coordination of mutual aid forces and private security officers. In addition, all details of the event are well documented in logs of the Operations Command Post (at the police

station), the Field Command Post, and the personnel staging area at the Convention Center.

Yippie Day, defies simple categorization according to the Statement of Work's definition. It loosely qualifies as a protest against government policy or action, thereby allowing comparison with the Los Angeles peace protest as a street/park disturbance.

Anaheim was forced to call up mutual aid forces from nearby law enforcement agencies at least four times between July and November 1970. A rock festival at the Angel's Baseball Stadium attended by 24,000 young people in July resulted in a disturbance and the Yippie Day event required many peace officers to control the situation. Police were alert for possible demonstrations triggered by a political speech made by President Nixon at the Convention Center on Friday, 30 October, but no serious incidents occurred. However, two days later unexpected violence broke out in connection with a rock concert in the same Convention Center.

3. DATA GATHERING AND ANALYSIS

At Police Chief David B. Michel's suggestion, interviews for the Command portion of the questionnaire were held with Lt. Harold Bastrup, who served as Field Commander of Yippie Day, and Sgt. Lawrence G. Hutcheson, the police department's training supervisor, who was in charge of the Operations Command Post at the police station. Patrolman R. E. Godsey, who was on duty within Disneyland Park throughout the episode, responded to the Operations Section.

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Mr. Sam Campbell, editor of the Anaheim BULLETIN, answered the Observer section, providing keen insight into events of the day since he had considerable knowledge of preparations for the demonstration. Charles Gibbs, administrative photographer for California State College at Fullerton who was with the demonstrators much of the day, also responded to the Observer questionnaire.

Excerpts from the Anaheim BULLETIN, the Santa Ana REGISTER, and the Los Angeles TIMES were used to verify data gathered regarding the disturbance. In addition, the Anaheim Police Department provided logs of four police elements during Yippie Day, copies of their training lectures, and the study plans and schedule for the Fullerton Police Training School of North Orange County. Both Lt. Bastrup and Sgt. Hutcheson teach classes at this training school.

4. CITY BACKGROUND DATA

Anaheim, a city of 172,000 residents, lies at the hub of Orange County; its boundaries are contiguous with those of Fullerton, Garden Grove, Orange, Buena Park, and other surrounding cities. It is part of the Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden Grove Metropolitan Area, which, with a 1970 population of 1,311,400, is 24th in size of the nation's metropolitan centers, and covers 782 square miles.

Anaheim is 28 miles southeast of Los Angeles and about 20 miles inland from the Pacific Ocean. The city covers an area of 33 square miles and is the home of Disneyland, which attracts more than 50,000 visitors on a single summer day; of a major league baseball team that plays in a stadium capable of seating 45,000 spectators; and of a new Convention Center with a capacity of 6000 to 9000 (depending on its configuration for the occasion).

Of the 350 manufacturing plants in Anaheim, the six largest are engaged in aerospace, electronics and communications production. Autonetics is the largest employer with 21,000 in 1970, and is followed by Disneyland with employment varying from 2400 to 4900 according to the season. Untold thousands of other local residents are employed by the hotels and restaurants that cater to Disneyland visitors.

The Anaheim Police Department enjoys good rapport with and support by the City Manager/Mayor/Council and other city government officials in maintaining the city's reputation as an attractive recreational and tourist center. The department has a sworn force of 244, plus 50 civilians, and has good, modern equipment, including riot gear, armament, vehicles, and two helicopters.

5. SCENE OF THE INCIDENT

Disneyland Park, located at about the geographical center of Anaheim, covers 72 acres, which are completely fenced and policed by Disneyland security officers, some in plainclothes, some in regulation uniform, and some in "character costumes", such as Donald Duck.

As shown on the map (Figure F-1), Disneyland is bounded on the south by a 107-acre parking lot and surrounded on all sides by expensive hotels, motels, restaurants and other businesses, creating an extremely high potential for property damage. The crowds at Disneyland on a summer day include many children, whose lives could be jeopardized in case of violence.

Disneyland Park is carefully arranged so that there is an "on stage", the only part the visitors ever see, and an "off stage" where maintenance and service functions are performed out of sight of the guests. Administrative buildings, supply services, utilities, barns, repair shops, etc., are located off stage, joined by an efficient system of service roads. Via the off-stage roads it was possible to move whole police squads rapidly from one part of the park to another, without the average visitor being aware of any unusual activity.

Disneyland administrators requested that Anaheim police set up their Field Command Post within the park, thereby placing unusual constraints upon law enforcement. Most of the disturbances of the day took place within the boundaries of the park--private property--and Anaheim police had agreed not to intercede unless requested by Disneyland administrators and the private security force.

6. CIVIC ENVIRONMENT

First of all, it must be recognized that the City of Anaheim has been one of the

most aggressive in the nation in acting to attract industry and recreational facilities. This policy certainly constrains law enforcement agencies when there is any question of moving onto private property to enforce the laws without specific request of the owners and bolsters the commitment to protect private property. Excellent interfaces exist between Anaheim police and private enterprise.

The disturbance at Disneyland occurred during the summer of 1970, when young people had been demonstrating in many Orange County communities. At California State College in Fullerton (less than 10 miles northeast) anti-war demonstrators escalated events to the point that college buildings were damaged, a campus utility structure was burned, and there were student confrontations with police and outraged taxpayers. Many of the incidents were purportedly triggered by reports of the Kent State student deaths and the moving of U.S. troops into Cambodia.

After school was out for the summer, young agitators took over Fullerton's Hillcrest Park, held rock concerts there and violated city ordinances governing use of alcohol and drugs in a public park. These Sunday get-togethers might be classified as a school or college issue, since those participating were, in large number, students at Fullerton high schools, junior college and state college. However, the protests were directed against the civic "establishment" rather than a school issue.

In Anaheim the rock festival at the baseball stadium erupted into disorder, as did the rock concert in November.




Figure F-1. Map of Disneyland/Convention Center Area.

Were these independent happenings?

Orange County law enforcement personnel, taking a hard look at these events, suspect that the issues claimed as the basis for demonstrations are convenient fabrications. Familiar faces appear frequently in the different crowds--an indication that a hard core of activists is inciting the young people into more aggressive behavior and taking advantage of every possible opportunity for inciting violence while they escape undetected. Local police have used video tape extensively to record the demonstrators present.

In most local cases, police tactics have been successful in culling out the alleged offenders; arrests have brought in a preponderance of out-of-towners. Few local residents were picked up - and those were juveniles. Many suspects gave "Anaheim - no address" when arrested. No data is available as to the accuracy of the addresses given during booking.

To date, the only issues involved in local demonstrations have been those of young people--schools, government policies and rock festivals.

7. SUMMARY OF THE DISTURBANCE

The event sequences of Yippie Day point out the validity of the phasing structure. The Disneyland disturbance was preceded by a 6-week Pre-Crowd Phase, which provided ample time for police preparation for the incident. A crowd began to form at 8 a.m. when the Disneyland gates were opened, but there was no distinction between the usual park visitors and dissidents.

Figure F-2. Definition of Youth International Party (Yippies).

Who's Who on the Far Left Youth International Party (Yippies)

Position: Avowed aim is to destroy "The Man"--their term for the Establishment and its present system of government. Their message to young people: Revolution is fun.

Leadership: Jerry Rubin, Paul Krassner, Ed Sanders, Abbie Hoffman, Keith Lampe.

Location: Active in New York City, Chicago, and Berkeley. No formal organization.

Character: Small group of white radicals whose dress and speech is purposefully outrageous in an effort to appeal to young people as the antithesis of "stiffness."

Brief History: Conceived of in 1967 by Abbie Hoffman to attract hippies into revolutionary activity. The group was officially founded on January 1, 1968, by several young men, including past members of PLP, SNCC, and SDS.

They are especially attracted to "guerrilla theater" techniques designed to make officials and police appear ridiculous or vicious to young people. As Jerry Rubin (PLP) put it in the November 16, 1967, issue of the Village Voice: "See you next August in Chicago at the Democratic National Convention. Bring pot, fake delegates' cards, smoke bombs, costumes, blood to throw, and all kinds of interesting props."

The Yippie gospel is spread through a network of some 200 newspapers--the Underground Press--in items such as this one in a Washington Free Press: "Even if Chicago does not burn, the paranoia and guilt of the government will force them to bring in thousands of troops, and the more troops, the better the theater."

As one member sees their contribution: "Yippies are chipping away, blacks are chipping away, the enemy overseas is chipping away. If you keep on hitting the Man from every side, punching him, laughing at him, ridiculing him, he will eventually collapse. That's what is going to happen in America."

Excerpt from:
COMMUNISM AND THE NEW LEFT
U. S. News and World Report, Inc.
Washington, D. C., 1970

At about 11 a.m., a group of about 50 Yippies gathered at the front gate, demanding entrance without paying. Disneyland administrators and security officers talked with them; then, anticipating a mass attempt to crash the gate, requested a police show of force. Between 11:16 and 11:48 a.m. three squads moved to the front gate (Figure F-3), during which time Disneyland officials again talked to the Yippies and finally allowed them to enter. All officers, except for one squad, were then removed from the gate.

Any incidents occurring within Disneyland Park from noon until 6 p.m. were handled by Disneyland administrators or their 120-man security force. Inside the park (see map in Figure F-4), the Yippies took over the Pirate Ship




Figure F-3. "Show of Force" — Squads Stationed at Front Gate.




Figure F-4. Map of Disneyland Park.

(Figure F-5) about 11 a.m., then moved on to Tom Sawyer's Island at 4 p.m., where they raised the North Vietnamese flag over Tom's fort. Returning on rafts to the "mainland" beginning at 4:30 p.m., they staged sit-down demonstrations on the pedestrian walks, blocking easy passage. Although reportedly "unorganized," the Yippies were apparently led by head-banded "youths" typified by the leader shown in (Figure F-6) whose long hair proved to be a wig. While these incidents should probably be labeled "demonstration", whether orderly or disorderly, they are not entered into official logs because they were not committed within police jurisdiction and only hearsay evidence is available.

All during the day there were complaints from other Disneyland visitors, annoyed at the disruptive tactics and obscene language of the Yippies. All demanded to know why the police weren't there. They stated their objections to being deprived of their pleasure, after having paid to get into the park. There were numerous reports of citizen/Yippie physical confrontations.

Rumors circulating through the park that the Yippies were going to make forays into various of the park's "lands", finally became stronger, indicating that they were headed for the Disneyland Bank of America or City Hall, intending to "tear up" Main Street.




Figure F-5. Yippies Take Over Pirate Ship in Sit-Down Demonstration.



Figure F-6. One of "Young" Yippie Leaders Was Reportedly This Bewigged Man.

DEMONSTRATION-ORDERLY PHASE

Four hundred Yippies moved down Main Street about 6:30 p.m., headed for the City Hall (Figure F-7). To quote the Anaheim BULLETIN, whose reporter was in position to see the action: "Congregated on the Disneyland City Hall steps, the band of 300 draped a marijuana flag over the red-white-and-blue bunting on a street lamp, spelled out obscenities at the top of their lungs, sang 'Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh, the Viet Cong is going to win', and assaulted a Disneyland security guard. At that point, Disneyland officials called for police who had been waiting all day behind the Main Street facades."

The officers moved into the Plaza area (Figure F-8) simultaneously from five specific areas "to the cheers of the Disneyland visitors who had looked all day for police to handle the Yippies who were ruining their day at Disneyland". Instead of leaving the park through the gates just to the south, the Yippies scattered northward on Main Street into various areas of the park.

At 7:19 pm., Disneyland officials gave the command to empty the park. Police squads, working with Disneyland security, swept the various areas, forcing park visitors toward the south exits. The total of 29,895 persons in the park at that time were hurried through the turnstiles with "rain checks." No violence, other than pushing and shoving occurred inside the park. Obvious violators of narcotics or trespassing codes were arrested within the park.




Figure F-7. Yippies Demonstrate — With Gestures — at Disneyland City Hall.



Figure F-8. Police Squads Move In To Quell Main Street Demonstration.

D

DEMONSTRATION-DISORDERLY PHASE

Once outside the gates, the crowd divided, the normal park visitors moving across the parking lot to their own cars, disgruntled because their day had been terminated so abruptly. The dissidents gathered in front of the gates and began throwing objects at the officers inside the park. Their missiles included rocks, flowers torn from flower beds outside the gates, balloons, a light bulb, and finally the steel stakes used to protect the flower beds.

There were reports of fires in the parking lot (trash cans only), crowds gathering at the Convention Center, an American flag torn down, and windows broken. Inside the park some of the dissidents were battling with officers in Fantasyland, while others prepared to "bed down" in the Indian Village.

The largest part of the crowd, assembled before the gates, was estimated at about 350, although most observers believe that there were up to 1000 Yippies and their sympathizers in and around Disneyland that day. As the violence increased, the Field Commander issued the order to declare an unlawful assembly.

Squads of police moving out from the gates forced the Yippies into the parking lot and split them into smaller groups. The largest contingent (about 200) moved west toward the Disneyland Hotel, picking up and throwing rocks, oranges and any other weapons available. They were soon dispersed into smaller and ineffective groups, then allowed to filter slowly back onto the parking lot to retrieve their cars. Any damage they could have accomplished from their cars was ruled out by the monstrous traffic jam on surrounding surface streets that resulted from the sudden emptying of the park. 187

POST-DEMONSTRATION PHASE

Sporadic incidents were reported from various areas around the Disneyland perimeter, following which sweeps were made to clear the streets. These tapered off about 10 p.m. and the dissidents soon left the area. Shortly after midnight, police operations were back to normal.

During the fracas there were five felony arrests and 19 misdemeanor arrests, plus four misdemeanor arrests at other locations. Bail was set high--\$500 to \$600--to prevent any dissidents from bailing themselves out and returning to the demonstration.

In the legal action that followed, five of the misdemeanor charges were dismissed, principally because the judge hearing the cases determined that the wrong codes were used for booking prisoners. In most cases, those convicted were fined or sentenced to a jail term already served. The only defendant to appear in Superior Court on felony charges, a 22-year old New Jersey man, was allowed to plead guilty to a reduced charge of felony battery of a peace officer instead of the original charge of assault with a deadly weapon. (He was arrested by undercover officers during the demonstration when he threw a pair of bolt cutters and struck one officer on the helmet and knocked him to the ground.) He was given a sentence of 6 months to 10 years in state prison.

8. ANAHEIM POLICE DEPARTMENT PROCEDURES, METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

PLANNING

When intelligence was received six weeks in advance from out of state and local sources that Yippie Day was being planned, Chief Michel advised his commanding officers and initiated planning to control the potential disturbance. While information about the scheduled Yippie Day came from many sources, there was no indication of the magnitude or seriousness of the coming event. Estimates of Yippie attendance ranged from 1000 to 100,000, and rumor was that they intended to crash the gates at Disneyland to gain entrance. Operations men, in retrospect, feel that they could have worked better with more intelligence prior to the event, and that intelligence should not be a "super secret society." On the other hand, it was discovered that information passed to other police departments during preparations for mutual aid, was "leaked" by some officers.

During the weeks prior to the first of August, police officials met with civic administrators, with representatives of all public services, with Chamber of Commerce and Visitors Bureau officials, and with school authorities to advise them of the impending confrontation. Disneyland administrators worked closely with the police, and all businesses near Disneyland Park were warned of the danger so that they could prepare internal security precautions, including hiring private detective agencies, if they desired.

County, Mutual Aid is formally organized and includes most cities, the county sheriff's office and the California Highway Patrol. Orange County law enforcement agencies have the manpower and resources shown in Table I (as of 1969).

For a viable operations plan, it was necessary to develop strategy and tactics for handling the crowd compatible with the police objectives of preserving law and order. The demonstrators could be contained, they could be moved into an area where they could do relatively little damage, or they could be dispersed--possibly into the highly developed business district surrounding Disneyland. The top-level strategy was constrained by the requirements to cooperate with Disneyland officials who elected to try to keep the park open that day. Had the park been closed, the police would have kept the crowds completely off the Disneyland property.

In an attempt to maintain the Disneyland image of "family fun", the Disneyland officials requested--and obtained police agreement--that their park security officers would be responsible for events occurring inside the park, that they would decide how much abuse would be taken and when arrests would be made. They requested that police officers, in force, be available for immediate deployment in case an open riot occurred.

In preparation for the event, Anaheim Police called a Mutual Aid conference to determine exactly how much help would be available on that day. In Orange

Definite commitment of men and equipment from Mutual Aid and other agencies was obtained. Most of the Anaheim Police Department's 100 pieces of rolling equipment was committed to the operation, including marked, unmarked and staff cars; 24 of the department's 32 motorcycles; two transportation vans; and helicopters. Flak vests and gas masks were borrowed from the military, and additional handie-talkies operating on the California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Radio System (CLEMARS) frequency were provided by the state.

While the mutual aid agreements in Orange County are strong and respected, there is at present no single training program that allows the officers from various police departments to be integrated to work as a unified team. There is no county-wide plan, just a series of city plans. Therefore, the Anaheim Police Department's role in the operations plan was to put all of their manpower into the park as coordinated teams. Perimeter patrol, traffic control, and special squad attack formations were assigned to the mutual aid forces. Where squads or platoons were sent by outside forces, they worked under the direction of their own commanding officer with perhaps one Anaheim officer along to aid with special local situations. Some of the small departments have no crowd control training for their officers, who thus are unprepared for handling a stress situation. The Anaheim operations plan, taking into account that Anaheim would be responsible for actions of all peace officers, assigned small task teams from mutual aid cities to security of logistics, the Field Command Post and the Convention Center staging area.

(At the present time, plans are underway to establish a county-wide training plan for police officers, wherein all will be trained in identical formations, signals, tactics, and commands.)

As part of the planning phase, Anaheim called in Unusual Occurrence specialists from the Los Angeles Police Department to give advice on what to expect and to assist with logistics and communications plans.

According to police command personnel, the total plan was ready before the event and each officer was informed 2 weeks in advance of the entire plan and of the role he was to play in it. In the opinion of the patrolman interviewed, the troops were told only as much as each might personally need to know regarding the operations plan just 2 days prior to the event and each was told of his personal assignment early the morning of 6 August.

The Anaheim Police Department was reorganized for the occasion, with assignment of men to other than their normal duties. For example, the detective commander became the A-watch OCP commander; the captain of administrative services was given responsibility for logistics, etc.

For other parts of the operation plan, police worked with city, county and state authorities. The fire department, city services and utilities were included in the master plan. One group of city employees, with a single police officer, set up a rumor center to which all telephone inquiries were routed; this proved to be valuable public relations contact.

TRAINING

The Anaheim Police Department has regular roll-call training 15 minutes a day, 7 days a week. Crowd control techniques have been a part of the training for the last 7 or 8 years. The regular schedule of classes was cancelled during the last week of July and replaced by refresher courses in disaster procedures, field bookings, use of the baton, squad formations, and emergency code calls. Emphasis was placed on training each man to perform many jobs (so that any patrolman could take over a squad if necessary) and on the necessity for all men to perform as a team, act as a single unit, and not split forces for either injuries or arrests.

During this time, Special Enforcement Detail men from the Los Angeles Police Department assisted Anaheim training officers in introducing the "Flying Squad" concept, wherein six men in two patrol cars work together as a single unit at all times. A sergeant and one officer ride together in a car with a prisoner cage in the back seat, and four other officers ride in a four-door unit. The six men remain together, even if booking prisoners, when another six-man flying squad is sent out to replace them. This tactic was intended to be used if the crowd broke up into groups attacking businesses in the area. It was actually used to pick up rock throwers and leaders from behind the lines of dissidents being dispersed. (The only squad formation not used during Yippie Day was the wedge.)

Anaheim officers went on a practice alert--12 hour shifts-with emergency exercises prior to the event conducted at the police station. These were

observed by the Anaheim press, but described to them by the police as "routine" training. The day of the demonstration, 45% of the men were assigned to day shift and 33% to the night shift. During the disorderly phase, there was an overlapping of the two shifts with men who reported for duty at 6 a.m. being held over until 11 p.m.

OPERATIONS

PRE-CROWD PHASE

The operations plan was implemented on 6 August with activation of the Field Command Post (FCP), a converted bus borrowed for the occasion from the County Disaster Services Council. The FCP contained communications facilities, plot boards and space for command personnel. It was located immediately outside the Disneyland security office to take advantage of the radio net established there and to tie into telephone facilities; there was also sufficient space nearby for required standby personnel (Figure F-9).



Figure F-9. Location of Field Command Post Outside Disneyland Administration Building.

At 7 a.m. the Operations Command Post (OCP) in the basement of the police station was activated. Commanding officers there were joined by city officials, a Disneyland representative, key personnel from utilities and services, and representatives of county, state and national law enforcement agencies.

The OCP coordinated all efforts, made command decisions when requested and called up mutual aid forces when required. Lt. Bastrup, as Field Commander, had complete control of the tactical operation, including the helicopters, cars patrolling the Disneyland perimeter and squads within the park.

The logistics area, normally located adjacent to the FCP, was moved to a central location behind the park service areas from which cars, personnel and equipment could be moved very quickly to all parts of the park. The personnel pool and staging area was situated in the Convention Center, directly across the parking lot from Disneyland's main gate, where all men and equipment could be hidden inside the building.

Figure F-10 depicts the communications facilities available to the police. Communications from the Field Command Post to the fixed sites were principally by telephone. Of three lines direct to the Operations Command Center in the police station, one was the command line, one was reserved exclusively for intelligence, and one was used for other services (such as fire and utilities). There were also direct lines to the Convention Center personnel pool, to the logistics area, and to the California Highway Patrol, plus a dial phone.

When officers and equipment deployed in the park discovered that the "small talk" required for logistics would overload radio equipment, a representative of the telephone company, on duty in the OCP, was able to install the direct line from the FCP to logistics within 1/2 hour.




Figure F-10. Police Communications Facilities.

During the operations planning, the Anaheim Police recognized potential problems with their radio frequencies. Channel 1, the regular police operations channel, and Channel 2, the emergency channel, are available in every police vehicle. There were close to 100 vehicles on the scene, plus the helicopters. In addition, the police handie-talkies were on Channel 2. Therefore, the policy was established to use Channel 1 for all routine patrol calls, reserving Channel 2 for those men and mobile units operating in and around Disneyland. The FCP was the sole Channel 2 command center; one man monitored the channel all day. There was no Channel 2 transmitter in operation at the OCP.

Anaheim police forces deployed in the park were organized in platoons under the command of a lieutenant, each lieutenant having four squads of six men, one of whom was a sergeant. The platoon commander had a Channel 2 handie-talkie to communicate directly with the FCP, and a California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Radio System handie-talkie to contact his squad sergeants.

By this procedure, it was possible

- o to avoid saturating Channel 2 with voice loads from sergeants to the FCP
- o To ensure the Field Commander effective control of field forces through the proper chain of command.

Backup radio communications were available between the FCP and OCP through the Fire Marshall's radio channel and through the elaborate communications system of the Disneyland security force. Needless to say, if the day's events had warranted it, every police channel in Orange County could have been assigned.

Men were assigned to protect the manholes leading to Disneyland's underground phone and power cables, and the telephone company was prepared with a "jam breaker" at the police switchboards.

Other than the anticipated saturation of the radio channels at critical periods of the day, only minor problems were encountered with communications. Batteries of the CLEMARS handie-talkies ran down within two hours after start of operations; no spare batteries or chargers were available. Static "wiped out" communications from one handie-talkie to the FCP, so messages were passed down the line to clear locations. The only change to the communications plan occurred when rumors were received that news media were monitoring radio Channel 2, and the FCP chose to rely on telephone lines as much as possible from that time on.

CROWD PHASE

Intelligence played a critical role in the day's activities. There were many false rumors, probably initiated by the Yippies, of proposed crowd action.

Men were moved to counter them, only to discover that there was no incident or that Disneyland security officers had handled it. Since the FCP's location prevented direct visibility into the park, the Field Commander soon learned to take no action until actual movement of a crowd gathering was reported by some of the state, federal, and local intelligence men in the park or by the helicopter flying overhead. (When the crowd moved outside the park, an Observer in an elevated post provided directly to the FCP warnings of crowd movements, which were not visible on the ground.) The Anaheim Police Department's helicopter, receiving all communications from the FCP along with

mobile units, also provided intelligence. Command decisions were facilitated by immediate feedback on the success of the operations from intelligence agents and the platoon leaders.

Nevertheless, intelligence reports to the FCP that the Yippies would crash the gates, caused a request for mutual aid to be sent to Costa Mesa Police Department as early as 10:35 a.m. Typical police command reaction to rumors and intelligence reports during part of the day are shown in Table II, which has been compiled from the four logs of the day's activities.

Logistics presented some problems during the day, principally distribution of protective gear. When the order came to pick up this equipment, one man was sent from each squad and there was a waiting line. At that time a confused order caused an officer to throw the equipment being distributed back into the truck, thereby "lousing" up the paperwork. Paper work was also complicated by the fact that flak vests, which belonged to the military or other departments was not, and could not be, identified by numbers. This caused problems in issuing and returning the equipment. When mutual aid forces arrived, some had equipment and some didn't. This posed a problem in finding vehicles to move the equipment and caused a delay in getting the men into the lines. When the mutual aid forces were relieved, many of them took the gear with them, thereby delaying return of the equipment to the military. It is now recommended that each officer report for mutual aid completely equipped with his own gear.

No problem was encountered in feeding the personnel, since good kitchen

TABLE II POLICE COMMAND REACTION TO INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

RUMORS/INTELLIGENCE	POLICE ACTION COMMANDS	MUTUAL AID REQUESTS
8:00 Black Panthers to Aunt Jemima's at 9 a.m.	6:00 Activate FCP 6:30 Activate personnel pool 7:00 Activate EOC 8:00 Four squads in position	
9:00 Hit heliport at 11:00		
10:10 Hit Pirate Ship at 11:00		
10:20 Many hits at 11:00		
10:39 News media assaulting back gate; monitoring police radio	10:33 All motors to Ball Road 10:49 Pick up protective gear; only motor officers wear flak vests	10:35 Activate Costa Mesa PD
11:00 Yippies to crash gate at 11	11:16 Squad 3 to front gate 11:17 Motor squad to front gate	
12:04 Man on hotel roof	11:42 Prisoner van to front gate 11:48 Two squads to front gate 12:00 Remove squads from front gate 12:05 Squad to B of A	11:42 Request Sheriff's booking van 11:54 Activate La Palma PD
1:35 Hit BofA at 4 p.m. 1:45 Hit Gates at 5 p.m.		
2:47 Crowd at front gate 3:05 Bomb threats-two locations 3:59 Hit Bof A and gate at 6 p.m. 4:20 On Island at 5 p.m.	2:16 Send Costa Mesa to FCP from personnel pool	
6:00 400 Yippies to Main Street	6:24 Anaheim, Costa Mesa Orange & Fullerton officers to B of A 6:32 4 additional squads to FCP	4:40 Alert Santa Ana and Huntington Beach PD's
6:34 400 Yippies headed for Main Street	6:56 6:56 All squads to Main Street 6:58 Traffic squad to gate	6:34 Alert all Mutual Aid
6:59 Crowd at Castle		

<u>RUMORS/INTELLIGENCE</u>	<u>POLICE ACTION COMMANDS</u>	<u>MUTUAL AID REQUESTS</u>
7:11 6 men with hand guns in Fantasyland	7:13 All units to streets around Disneyland	
	7:19 Park closed-start sweeps	
		7:25 Activate Santa Ana, Huntington Beach, Garden Grove, & Westminster PD's
7:26 Fire at bus depot		7:40 Activate California Highway Patrol and city employees
8:01 Flying objects at gate		
8:05 Fires in parking lot	8:05 Sweep Fantasyland	
8:07 Yippies on Berm		
8:09 2 men on Global Van Bldg.		
8:09 Rocks thrown at gate		
8:15 Yippies to Indian Village	8:15 Assistance needed at Convention Center	8:15 Request 200-500 CHP and Sheriff's deputies
	8:39 Sigalert issued	8:48 Request Sheriff's booking Van
	8:50 Sweep parking lot	
	8:51 Assist at gate	
8:55 Yippies enroute to Hotel	8:58 Assist at gate	
	9:00 Sweep Disneyland Hotel and Surrounding areas	

facilities were available at both Disneyland and the Convention Center.

The commanding officers were alerted to the danger of accepting food for the men during such a demonstration because of the possibility of intentional contamination (including narcotics) by dissidents. For any disturbance away from adequate facilities, a field kitchen or commercial mobile food vendor would be used.

The operation plan called for the motorcycles to be pooled at the Convention Center, kept under guard to prevent jamming of the radio channels.

However, they proved so valuable in moving squads quickly from one area to another within the park, that they were pooled with logistics. Another plan, which was not required, covered moving of the FCP from one location to another, when command would be transferred to the OCP until the unit was relocated. Officers in the FCP reported that they could have used much more space for planning and plotting; that the FCP should have been air conditioned because of the day's heat; and they felt exposed because the converted bus had so many windows.

When Disneyland officials requested assistance as a large group of Yippies threatened the front gate, one squad marched to the front gate at 11:16 a.m., joined a minute later by a motorcycle squad. The paddy wagon rolled to the scene at 11:40; at 11:48 two additional squads moved in. At noon all officers were removed from the gate, except for one squad that remained at that location for the remainder of the day.

This activity prompted a request at 11:42 a.m. for the Orange County Sheriff's booking van and a request at 12:10 p.m. for La Palma, Fullerton and Orange Police Department mutual aid forces. When these officers had arrived (by 1:30 p.m.), there were over 240 police officers in Disneyland or the Convention Center, in addition to approximately 120 Disneyland security officers on duty in the park.

Neither Anaheim Police Department nor mutual aid officers were involved in any incidents after the noon encounter until after 6 p.m. The police point out that they would not have been as tolerant of misdemeanors had they occurred on city streets instead of within the private park, but Disneyland officials were considering their image. It was later agreed that the tactics employed at this time were not satisfactory; if such occasion should arise in the future, small groups of police officers will circulate through the park with Disneyland administrators and security. Each offender will be picked up as a single incident occurs.

Repeated reports that the entire group would converge on the Disneyland Bank of America or City Hall at 6 p.m., triggered a mutual aid alert to Santa Ana and Huntington Beach Police Departments at 4:40 p.m. As reports continued that 400 Yippies were headed to "tear up" Main Street, Anaheim, Costa Mesa, Orange, and Fullerton police officers took up tactical positions behind the Bank of America at 6:24 p.m.

DEMONSTRATION-ORDERLY PHASE

When Disneyland officials decided that the demonstration was out of hand, they requested the police to move into Main Street, which they did in imposing force. Notice of the park's closing was broadcast over the Disneyland public address system. Squads of police moved with Disneyland officials and security through each section of the park, marching in formation (with no threatening action) behind the peacefully exiting crowd. Police in the Square stood in single lines along Main Street, standing back to back, facing the sidewalks and waiting for the crowd to leave. Just inside the gates, the crowd exited between double rows of officers (Figure F-11).

With this large crowd moving out onto the streets, the Santa Ana, Huntington Beach, Westminster and Garden Grove Police Departments were alerted to the closing of the park at 7:29 p.m. and activated for mutual aid. The California Highway Patrol was requested to move in to control traffic on surface streets, and 13 Anaheim city employees were sent to the area to assist with traffic control.

DEMONSTRATION-DISORDERLY PHASE

There was no violent reaction from the Yippies until they were outside the park, where there were many innocent people walking toward their cars.

When the dissidents began throwing objects, the Field Commander issued the order to declare an unlawful assembly, which was announced by bullhorns to the crowd and from the helicopter overhead. Demonstrators were arrested as the police grabbed those throwing missiles (Figure F-12).



Figure F-11. Disneyland Crowd Leaving Park Through Ranks of Riot-Equipped Officers.




Figure F-12. Arrest of Typical Yippie Demonstrator.

At 8:18 p.m., Chief Michel contacted the Orange County Sheriff's office and California Highway Patrol requesting an additional 200 to 500 men on mutual aid. Between 8 and 8:30 p.m., more than 100 previously activated men from the CHP, Santa Ana, Garden Grove, Huntington Beach and Westminster arrived on the scene, reported to the staging area, then moved out on assignments. At 8:48 p.m., the Sheriff's mobile booking unit was requested for the second time that day, arriving at the park about an hour later. There were close to 400 sworn police officers on duty in the area at the peak of the violence. (See summary of mutual aid activity in Figure F-13).

With the Yippies gathered around the main gate, the police had three alternatives: They could move the crowd out:

- o from the gate to the West Street exit
- o southwest across the parking lot to the front of the Disneyland Hotel parking lot
- o directly south to the Katella entrance.

Most of the demonstrators moved to the West Street exit, with officers following in double file, later moving into different squad formations.

At this point the Anaheim police deviated from their operations plan, according to which they would have remained in the park at all times. As the Mutual Aid forces moved out behind the mob running toward the hotel, some of the dissidents tried to circle back behind the Orange police squads; Anaheim police then moved out of the park to cover their flank.

Costa Mesa and Orange police, in squad formation, marched to the hotel where they were assisted by hotel administrators and security in controlling the Yippies. However, they discovered that the rehearsed mob and riot control formations didn't work because they couldn't maintain formation moving around the hotel buildings. Even so, they were able to split the crowd into small groups within 45 minutes after the outbreak, and the demonstrators dispersed soon thereafter as they were confronted with overwhelming numbers of law enforcement officers at every turn.

The helicopters were particularly effective in controlling this demonstration. They were able to provide immediate information on crowd activities throughout the day, and were able to help with the traffic problem when the park was closed. Orders to disperse were announced over loudspeakers, and the floodlights were used to startle and pinpoint small groups as they broke up. One suspect ducked into a bush; he was spotted by the helicopter and a light was turned on him. When ground forces arrived to arrest him, he said, "That's unfair; we don't have a chance with the helicopter."

POST-DEMONSTRATION PHASE

As the incidents diminished about 10 p.m., some of the officers who had been on duty since 6 a.m. were relieved in increments, beginning with the motorcycle officers. Mutual Aid forces were relieved beginning with the Fullerton Police Department at 9:10 p.m., and ending with release of the Huntington Beach, Costa Mesa and Orange police officers at 11:25 p.m. At 1:10 a.m., 7 August, the Operations Command Post at the police station was moved to




Figure F-13. Mutual Aid Activation and Deployment

the Records Bureau, and at 1:20 a.m. the graveyard shift personnel at the FCP were reassigned to street areas.

Many problems arose during arrest and booking. First, there was over an hour's delay in arrival of the Sheriff's booking bus after it was requested. The Sheriff would not commit manpower until the situation was critical, so the van could not be requested until it was needed immediately. Those arrested were confined in a holding area until the bus arrived. In some cases, individuals arrested could not be identified later and some were arrested without reports being written immediately. Insufficient evidence was a problem in some cases--one boy, arrested on a marijuana charge, ate the cigarette. Disneyland security officers, untrained in booking and filing charges, were responsible for many of the mistakes.

In preparing for the event, Anaheim police had sought the advice of a local judge in the proper penal code section to cite in booking prisoners. Unfortunately, another judge heard the cases and claimed the wrong sections had been filed; he would not allow an amended complaint. Police were concerned about the low level of guilty findings and/or mild punishment meted out. All believe that better results could be obtained if moving pictures or video tapes were made during the booking to identify the suspect and to document his reaction at the scene.

During the days following the event, two critiques were held by police at the staff level and one with the patrolmen, who offered numerous suggestions for

improved techniques. The police operation, which cost the City of Anaheim \$64,000 and Mutual Aid forces lesser amounts, was adjudged successful on the grounds that

- o There were no injuries,
- o There was only minimal damage to private property,
- o There were no charges of police brutality.

News accounts of the event were not generally complimentary to the police. They did describe the pleasure with which John Citizen greeted the arrival of the police on Main Street. But they also criticized the "unsuccessful sweeps" and back-to-back formations down Main Street, tactics which the reporter obviously did not understand, and which were not explained by the police. The newspaper editor who was interviewed was all for deputizing citizens to take a hand in such demonstrations. He said that the event should have been discouraged at the scene, because it let the mob think "they can close down any business if they want to."

G. LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

1. RATIONALE FOR SELECTION OF LOS ANGELES

Los Angeles, was selected as the large city (population over 1,000,000) for disturbance analysis because of its long history of varied violent outbursts, beginning with the disastrous Watts riots of August 1965 and continuing today with current Chicano minority problems. In addition, Los Angeles, only 30 miles from the Hughes Fullerton facility, is readily accessible for in-depth interviews regarding a major incident.

Hughes personnel have worked closely with Los Angeles Police Department personnel for the past several years on various projects and are familiar with the department's organization, equipment, procedures and tactical operations. This familiarity has permitted greater understanding of the command and control problems encountered by law enforcement officials during the incident selected.

2. RATIONALE FOR SELECTION OF THE "CENTURY CITY '67" INCIDENT

The incident selected by the Los Angeles Police Department as appropriate for study is the "Century '67" peace demonstration of 23 June 1967, which sought to confront and harass President Lyndon B. Johnson as he addressed a large Democratic Fund Raising Dinner at Century Plaza Hotel. This planned protest, well publicized in advance, triggered the development of

LAPD's "Operation Century '67 Plan" which involved the largest and most comprehensive task force of Los Angeles police officers (1350) ever assembled for a single event. (Only 496 police officers were deployed at any one time during the Watts riots.) The event also required interfaces with the President's Secret Service staff, FBI, and numerous private security forces. No external support or Mutual Aid was called by the LAPD for the operation, although the National Guard was alerted previously by the Governor.

Disturbances in the Los Angeles area in the past 6 years have covered the complete spectrum of issues cited by the Statement of Work, including elementary and secondary schools, colleges and universities, labor-management problems, civil rights and government policies and action. Many of these events tend to involve more than one type of protest or to trigger secondary issues. For the sake of simplicity, it is desirable to consider an incident which did not involve compound issues; Century '67 was directed almost solely toward protest of President Johnson's position on the Vietnam war.

There were numerous dissident factions promoting the protest, plus support by many well meaning law abiding citizens disenchanted with the government's policies. Possible threat to the safety of the President complicated the entire police operation.

Another reason for selecting this incident is that complete documentation is

available. Hearings on all arrests made at the time have been completed and no appeals are pending; therefore there are no legal constraints to full release of data.

3. DATA GATHERING AND ANALYSIS

Comprehensive documentation of the Century '67 demonstration was made available to the study team by the LAPD in the form of the 200-page operations plan and the 100-page history. Study and comparison of these documents provide remarkable insight into the success of the original plan and the deviations from it necessitated by action of the demonstrators.

Significant explanation of tactical maneuvers was provided by the Police Inspector who was Field Commander for the 1350-man task force assembled to handle this event. An interview with an officer deployed in the field during the height of the disturbance served only to substantiate the printed historical account.

Files of the Los Angeles TIMES were searched for pertinent data covering the planning phase, the actual event, and the legal and civic repercussions that followed.

4. CITY BACKGROUND DATA

The City of Los Angeles sprawls over 463 square miles in an irregularly shaped basin, bordered by high mountains on the north, hills on the east, and the Pacific Ocean on the south and west. The Santa Monica mountains

divide the city into two distinct geographical regions: the San Fernando Valley and the Los Angeles basin. The city's 2,700,000 population, clustered chiefly in 62 community centers, is highly mobile; the city has 1,700,000 registered vehicles travelling its surface streets and 145 miles of freeways.

Los Angeles has long been famed as an entertainment center, is highly industrialized (a leader in aerospace), and has great corporate and individual wealth. Within the city limits are 21 universities with enormous enrollments, some of them as well known for their "liberal" faculties as for their academic achievements.

The City of Los Angeles is governed by elected officials, a Mayor and City Council, operating under an extremely complex and unwieldy city charter which tends to force the city executive and the council into frequent opposition. An appointive official, the City Administrative Officer, performs the fiscal duties of a city manager.

The Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department (presently Chief Edward Davis) reports to the Police Commission, which, in turn reports to the City Council. The police force is considered a model of high professionalism; because of tough admission and training standards, the sworn force is approximately 500 men below authorized strength. The late Chief William Parker, who is still revered in the Department, was a recognized world authority on law enforcement. (At the time of Century '67, Thomas Reddin was Chief of Police.)

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The Los Angeles Police Department (as of 1969) consisted of 6194 sworn and 2388 civilian personnel assigned to two police centers and 18 operating field divisions. Parker Center provides complaint board and dispatch service for the 13 divisions south of the Santa Monica mountains and the Van Nuys center directs the activities of the five San Fernando divisions. Because of the extensive area that it must cover, the LAPD has pioneered the use of mobile command centers for tactical control of Unusual Occurrences, whether a natural disaster or a crowd situation.

5. SCENE OF THE INCIDENT

The plans of President Johnson for his visit to Los Angeles, which included arrival at Los Angeles International Airport and travel by helicopter or motorcade to Century City, were the basis for the dissident plan of attack and therefore the police operations plan. At the airport, located 5 miles south of Century City, elaborate precautions were taken to protect the President as he changed from one means of transportation to another. However, no incidents occurred there; therefore that scene will only be considered in discussion of the operations plan and deployment.

Century City, the site of the demonstration, is a new commercial development on 180 acres of land formerly part of the 20th Century Fox Studios, which still maintains extensive facilities directly across Olympic Boulevard from the Century Plaza Hotel. In 1967, Century City also included two office

buildings with a third under construction, four apartment buildings, a shopping center, and many large parking lots and open fields. As shown in Figure G-1, Century City lies west of the Los Angeles Civic Center and metropolitan area and east of the coastal communities of Santa Monica and Venice. On the east Century City adjoins the city limits of Beverly Hills, an extremely wealthy and fashionable separate municipality. The campus of the University of California at Los Angeles (27,000 students) is 2 miles to the north.

Adjoining Century City on the south is a large "green" area consisting of the private Hillcrest Country Club (east of Motor Avenue) and the Rancho Golf Courses, which surround the Cheviot Hills Playground, on the south side of Motor Avenue. (The baseball diamonds of the Playground were used for a pre-parade rally and parade formation by the demonstrators.)

As shown on the map the surrounding streets are disjointed, interrupted by through boulevards carrying heavy traffic. Century City and its environs are not oriented to typical north layout, resulting in some confusion in descriptions of the area and crowd movements. (See Figure G-2.)

Century Plaza Hotel, where President Johnson was to speak, was the goal for the demonstration. It is a 19-story 800-room luxury hotel with a complex floor plan and multi-level lobbies, gardens, parking lots and approaches. The sunken plaza of the hotel (Figure G-3), one floor below the street, extends




Figure G-1. Map of Century City and Environs




Figure G-2. Detailed Map of Demonstration Scene

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through a tunnel beneath the Avenue of the Stars to Parking Lot 8, directly across the Avenue of the Stars from the hotel's front entry. Behind the hotel the multi-level putting greens, terraces, gardens and parking lots provide a landing field for the President's helicopter (Figure G-4).




Figure G-3. Front of Century Plaza Hotel Showing Sunken Plaza

6. CIVIC ENVIRONMENT

Since the Watts race riots of 11-18 August 1965, when 34 were killed and \$35 million damage was suffered, a number of major disturbances have occurred in Metropolitan Los Angeles. The incidents can be classified as racial, anti-war, school/anti-war, school/racial, and anti-war/racial in terms of issues. The evolution of major Los Angeles disturbances in terms

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


Figure G-4. Outline of Century Plaza Indicating Multi-Levels

of simplified issue sets is illustrated grossly in Figure G-5.

Predominantly racial issues were involved at Watts and Mini-Watts in 1968. No racial disturbances followed the Martin Luther King assassination; however, racial issues were prime components in school disturbances at Manual Arts High School (1967), San Fernando Valley State College (1968-69), Fremont High School (1969) and Roosevelt High School (1970).

Early in 1967, an increasingly wide spectrum of public opinion became concerned about the Government's policy on the Vietnam War. This spectrum tended to encompass every facet of liberal opinion, from experienced militant activists to doctors and housewives who had no prior political experience. They were united in the Peace Action Council, which was controlled by the militant factions, although most of the members were honest protestors.

The most clear cut anti-war demonstrations were the Century City disturbance of 1967 and the Vietnam Day observances in 1968 and 1969. Although anti-war sentiment was the most significant component of the UCLA riot that followed the Kent State disaster, this incident also had racial overtones--Chicano.

In recent years the racial emphasis has shifted from the black community to the Mexican-Americans with serious racial/peace demonstrations occurring in September 1970 and January 1971. The Peace Action Council, which sponsored the Century City demonstration, has been active in the Chicano demonstrations.

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


Figure G-5. Evolution of Major Los Angeles Disturbances Since 1964 by Predominant Issues

For the most part, the Los Angeles police have handled the disturbances effectively, but they have been seriously hampered by poor understandings with civic officials, by distant and unfriendly attitudes of the public toward the police, and by a running battle with the Los Angeles TIMES, the city's most widely circulated and influential newspaper.

7. SUMMARY OF EVENT

The peace march at Century City follows the typical phasing of most pre-planned events. While the police were generating their extremely detailed operations plan, the promoters of the event were just as busy organizing their forces and planning a variety of incidents. Confrontations with law enforcement personnel were planned for several different locations and times, and other incidents erupted spontaneously. In the following text, events at Cheviot Hills Playground, at the hotel, in the parade, and throughout the neighborhood are discussed in time sequence, even though a disorderly incident was occurring at one locale while the disturbance was still in a crowd phase at another spot.

PRE-CROWD PHASE

In the spring of 1967, California Democrats planned a gala dinner dance at the Century Plaza Hotel in honor of President Johnson, and incidentally to raise funds for the upcoming 1968 campaigns. Members of the exclusive President's Club and Citizens for Johnson-Humphrey co-sponsored the \$500-per-plate event, expected to be attended by 1000 guests.

At the same time, dissidents protesting U. S. involvement in Vietnam, grew in number and banded together (about 70 separate organizations) into the Peace Action Council (PAC) of Southern California. Intelligence reports indicated that PAC as early as 12 May began organizing a massive demonstration to coincide with President Johnson's visit. A Los Angeles underground paper, OPEN CITY, printed in its June 2-9 edition, that the first planning session on 28 May at Mt. Hollywood Congregational Church was attended by 50 people, who considered the tactic of handcuffing themselves around, or to, President Johnson.

The Los Angeles Police Department, receiving reports from many different sources relating to the planned violence and disruptive tactics, began on 7 June to develop an operations plan for handling the demonstration, all keyed to the primary objective of protecting the President while he was in Los Angeles. They kept a careful account of the dissident meetings held, the tactics planned, and the leaders involved.

There was continual disagreement among the 70 PAC groups, each of which was allowed one vote. The Los Angeles TIMES on 16 June described "Johnson Visit Causes Split Among Peace Action Group" over the manner of civil disobedience. On 21 June, in an editorial, the TIMES pointed out that "Southland Anti-Vietnam War Groups...are convinced that they are

beginning to make significant inroads in terms of participation by respectable middle class Southern Californians." The article cites debates over civil disobedience between participants at a press conference called by six anti-war leaders to outline plans for the protest. The editorial stated that "In one attempt to bring about more unity and please the youth whose participation is so prized by adult council members, the adults agreed that one of the three main speakers at Friday's protest rally could be elected solely by the young people. They selected H. Rap Brown, the extremely militant head of SNCC, a choice which some of the more moderate adults are not too happy about, particularly since the council is paying the bill."

Although the organizers felt a financial pinch according to printed reports, a flood of handbills was distributed on campuses and thousands of orange pamphlets which urged participation in the peace march were dropped over the San Fernando Valley from an airplane. A folk singer and composer announced he would sponsor a penny-a-plate dinner at Cheviot Hills Playground in a parody of the President's banquet. And actor, Robert Vaughn, heading an organization called Dissenting Democrats, took out a three-page ad in the 23 June TIMES, notifying the President that the 8000 citizens signing the open letter would no longer support him with money or votes while the Vietnam War continued.

While the various groups debated and strategized, the demonstration leaders proceeded with the legal technicalities. PAC submitted to the

Police Commission a request to hold a parade from Cheviot Hills Playground to Century Plaza Hotel from 7:30 to 9:30 p.m. on 23 June. The permit was granted with the stipulations that the parade would contain no vehicles, that it would disband upon its return to the park, and that it would cover the following route: Motor Avenue to Pico, to Avenue of the Stars, to Constellation Boulevard, to Century Park East, back to Pico, Motor Avenue and the park.

On 14 June the Recreation and Park Commission denied a request for use of the Cheviot Hills Recreation Center as a mobilization area; since it had already been scheduled for school events that day: 3500 students during the day and 1500 students for baseball games and a dance that night.

CROWD PHASE

At the Park

Although the Recreation and Parks Commissioners denied use of the Cheviot Hills Recreation Center to the dissidents, they could not legally prevent people from congregating in the park when it was open. By 11:40 a.m., when the Senior Park Ranger arrived at Cheviot Hills Playground, more than 1200 people had gathered, had set up tables with literature ready for distribution, and had arranged a stockpile of placards. He said monitors, with armbands, were collecting contributions for bail for anyone arrested and distributing instructions on how to get legal assistance.

Seven well-known dissidents seen in the park shortly after 1:00 p.m. were advised that public address systems were not allowed in the park. They continued to bring in the equipment while representatives of the Department of Recreation and Parks debated legality. By the time a decision was reached to enforce regulations governing use of loudspeakers in city parks, several were already installed and in use by speakers and rock and roll groups. Undercover officers heard many instructions given over the loudspeakers, chiefly advocating civil disobedience and urging marchers to stop in front of the hotel.

The crowd grew from about 3000 at 3:30 p.m. to 9000 by 6 p.m. At first it was predominantly a young, white, collegiate crowd, joined later by men and women over 25, as people got off work, and included many children.

A truck mounted with loudspeakers was driven on to the ball fields for use as a speakers' platform, and about 6 p.m., the advertised orators began to talk. According to the TIMES¹, "The speakers (Figures G-6) included such figures as Dr. Benjamin Spock, Cassius Clay, H. Rap Brown, national chairman of SNCC, and Irving Sarnoff, who has been labeled a Communist by the House Committee on Un-American Activities." The same article states that "large portions of the crowd appeared to ignore the speeches and, at times, the gathering took on a picnic-like air, with considerable socializing back and forth. But there were ominous undertones. . . It is inarguable, however,

1. "What Did Occur?" L.A. TIMES 2 July 1967.

that agitators--the number of which remains arguable--floated through the crowd."



Figure G-6.

Speakers at Cheviot Hills
Playground Rally

About 6:45 p.m., the speeches were halted briefly while an injunction obtained by Century City was distributed by civilian personnel accompanied by L. A. police officers (Figure G-7). The injunction, reproduced in (Figure G-8), prohibited stopping in front of the hotel, entering it, or using sound trucks within Century City.



Figure G-7.

Injunction Handbills
Being Distributed at Rally

CONTINUED

3 OF 5

INJUNCTION

On June 23, 1967, an order was issued by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The order was directed against the Peace Action Council of Southern California, Students for a Democratic Society, New Politics, the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, numbers of other organizations, their officers, agents, monitors, pickets, etc., AND all other persons acting by, through, in conjunction, in concert, or in cooperation with the defendants, INCLUDING PARADES AND DEMONSTRATORS.

All such organizations and persons are "RESTRAINED AND ENJOINED AND COMMANDED to desist and refrain from doing, threatening or attempting to do or causing to be done, either directly or indirectly, by ANY means, method or device, any of the following acts:

- "1. Conducting or taking part in any parade within the limits of Century City without first obtaining a permit from the Los Angeles Police Commission.
- "2. During the course of any parade to be conducted at or through Century City, for which a permit has been obtained from the Los Angeles Police Commission:
 - (a) Intentionally stopping the course of any such parade within the limits of Century City;
 - (b) Departing from or leaving the route or boundary of any such parade within the limits of Century City;
 - (c) Entering upon any private property within Century City without the owner's consent.
- "3. Congregating in such numbers or acting individually in such a manner as to block any entrance to or exit from (a) Century City, (b) any building in Century City (including the Century Plaza Hotel), (c) any area within Century City (including Century Square Shopping Center or any building therein), or (d) any parking lot or driveway adjacent to any building or area within Century City.
- "4. Taking any sign, noisemaking device, smell-making device, smoke-making device, or any device or instrument intended to frighten, harass, annoy or obstruct any person, into the area inside the exterior sidewalks and streets surrounding (a) any building in Century City (including the Century Plaza Hotel), (b) any area within Century City (including Century Square Shopping Center or any building therein), or (c) any parking lot or driveway adjacent to any building or area within Century City.
- "5. Parking and using any soundtruck or other vehicle equipped to amplify sounds of any kind or type at any place within the limits of Century City.
- "6. Picketing, standing, sitting, loitering, gathering, assembling, marching, parading, walking, stopping, or stationing, placing or maintaining any pickets or other persons at, in, or in front of entrances to or exits from the Century Plaza Hotel; provided, however, that not more than two persons or pickets may be permitted to be on the sidewalk at or near each of the entrances to the Century Plaza Hotel premises (including the two driveways from Avenue of the Stars) so long as such pickets maintain a distance of 20 feet from each other (except when passing) and, so long as said pickets or any of them do not impede or interfere with the progress of any person or vehicle attempting to enter or leave said hotel;
- "7. Inciting any other person or persons to commit acts of violence or acts which constitute violation of this order;
- "8. Entering the premises of Century Plaza Hotel or any shop, store, restaurant or bar located therein from 3 p.m. to 10 p.m. on June 23, 1967; provided, however, that the provisions of this paragraph 8 shall not apply to persons who are registered guests of the hotel or who have reservations for rooms at said hotel for or on June 23, 1967;
- "9. Taking any actions with the intent to interfere with or make more difficult the normal conduct of business at the Century Plaza Hotel or the Century Square Shopping Center (or any shop or concession which forms a part of said hotel or center), including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, any of the following: (a) Congregating in such numbers or acting individually in such a manner as to impede the free passage of any person thereto, therefrom, or therein; (b) Singing or making any loud noises; (c) Handcuffing, chaining, tying, or otherwise fastening themselves to one another or to any other person or object; (d) Taking any animal on the premises; (e) Loosing any animal on the premises; (f) Affixing any sign, pennant, banner, written material or other object to any portion of the premises thereof; or (g) Frightening, annoying, harassing, or physically impeding any person present therein.

DATED: June 23, 1967.

s/Orlando H. Rhodes
Judge of the Superior Court"

Figure G-8. Copy of Century City's Injunction Handbill

As the time for the parade grew near, the crowd bulged out of the parking lot into the street. Women and children were urged to take positions along the edge of the forming parade.

At the Hotel

A rumored sitdown strike by high school boys in front of the hotel at 6 a.m. Friday failed to materialize; in fact, there were only 11 pickets marching at 11 a.m. (Figure G-9). By 3 p.m., they were joined by some pro-Vietnam, American Nazi and left-wing marchers (Figure G-10), and their leader went to Cheviot Hills Playground to get volunteers to bolster his picket line. When this group of 75 joined the others in front of the hotel, they marched in a large circle on the sidewalk, forcing pedestrians to walk in the traffic lanes of Avenue of the Stars.

When police were unsuccessful in getting the pickets to march in an orderly fashion, they broadcast a dispersal order; but the leaders urged the picketers to sit down. The first arrest of the day was a neo-Nazi who was involved in an altercation with the peace marchers, following which the loudspeaker-equipped leader of the demonstrators was arrested. (Figure G-11). Eighteen demonstrators, who sat down on the sidewalk in front of the hotel after being ordered to disperse were arrested. (The Los Angeles TIMES said the first seven were dragged to the paddy wagon, after which the others were cooperative). A leader was arrested for jaywalking as he left the scene.



Figure G-9. Initially Only a Few Young Picketers Paraded in Front of the Hotel




Figure G-10. American Nazis and Other Factions Join Picketers

Unauthorized pedestrian traffic in front of the hotel was now prohibited, so about 300 pickets gathered on the east sidewalk of Avenue of the Stars between Constellation and Olympic. One PAC leader attempted to force his way through the police line, struck an officer with his sign, and was arrested for a felony, Battery on a Police Officer. Some Cuban counter demonstrators joined the pickets (Figure G-12); fights broke out between the demonstrators but ceased as soon as police closed in. Three PAC members were arrested for Public Nuisance as they refused to obey traffic regulations. By 8 p.m., approximately 2000 people were assembled along Avenue of the Stars, chiefly on the southeast corner near the Olympic Boulevard off-ramp, awaiting the arrival of the parade.

DEMONSTRATION PHASE - ORDERLY

The formation of the parade was relatively orderly, disrupted principally because of the marchers' eagerness to get started before the 7:30 p.m. deadline. At the front of the marchers were two large dogs, followed by the rally speakers and other leaders (Figure G-13). Women and children followed the front rank of leaders and edged the sides of the marching group. The militant demonstrators were not leading the group according to patrolmen.

Several loudspeaker trucks, a bus and some passenger vehicles were lined up



Figure G-11. Leader Exhorts Picketers through Amplified Loudspeaker



Figure G-12. Frequent Fights Erupted Among Crowd Across from Hotel

for the march before police reminded the crowd that the parade permit would be invalid if vehicles were used. As the parade began moving north onto Motor Avenue at 7:25 p.m., all but one of the prohibited vehicles left the parade line by turning south on Motor. A civilian pickup truck with a loudspeaker moved forward into the midst of the marchers at the head of the parade. Six policemen attempting to remove the truck from the parade were obstructed by demonstrators, jabbed at with sharpened placard sticks, and cursed. Monitors, whose duty was to maintain control, were heard to incite the crowd. The truck moved forward onto the foot of one officer, pinning him to the pavement, where he was struck by the surrounding demonstrators. When the driver refused to move the truck off his foot, the officer broke the windshield with his baton and in the melee that followed a girl in the back of the truck struck a police sergeant with the picket sign she carried (Figure G-14). Both the driver (a juvenile) and the girl were arrested on felony charges. Four others, 2 men and 2 women, were also arrested at this time.

"At twilight, the first wave of marchers came over the hill, a humpbacked overpass which carries the Avenue of the Stars across Olympic Boulevard. To those watching the tide of men, women and children descending the east side of the broad avenue toward the Century Plaza, the sight was unforgettable. No matter where his sympathy lay, no observer could have remained unaffected."¹ The police believe that there were 14,000 in that parade and

1. "The Anti-War March: What DID Happen." L.A. TIMES, 2 July 1967



Figure G-13. Parade is Led by Rally Speakers, Organizers and Dogs



Figure G-14. Police Officer is Struck by Demonstrator in Sound Truck

another 2000 spectators waiting for them. The Los Angeles TIMES claims a total of 10,000 demonstrators.

President Johnson, delayed 2 hours by a meeting in New Jersey with Russia's premiere, landed in a Marine helicopter behind the hotel building (and out of sight of the demonstrators) just as the parade reached the south side of the hotel (8 p.m.). He remained within the hotel, apparently unaware of activities outside, until his departure at 11:33 p.m. Secret Service agents, concerned about the increasing disturbance, were prepared to evacuate the President on a moment's notice, should the crowd rush the hotel.¹

Divergent opinions as to the mood of the crowd triggered arguments for weeks after the event, but it is agreed that the marchers, joined by the waiting crowd, spilled over the traffic islands and sidewalks and slowed down as it reached the hotel. Then eight men (two wearing red monitor's armbands) formed a line across all three lanes facing the oncoming crowd in an effort to further slow the parade (Figure G-15). Participants with sound systems urged the crowd to sit down (Figure G-16). Some groups did stop and sit down (Figure G-17), others walked in circles, or just stood, others moved on. A group of about 100 marchers continued toward Constellation Boulevard, then turned abruptly and returned to the head of the parade, stopping and talking to demonstrators that were still walking.

1. "Anti-War Protest Nearly Drove President Out of Los Angeles,"
L.A. TIMES, 2 July 1967



Figure G-15. Leaders Form Line to Stop Progress of Parade



Figure G-16. Leaders Urge Crowd to Stop Marching and Sit Down



Figure G-17. Large Groups of Demonstrators Sat in Street

The crowd got noisier and increased in size as the marchers further back in line converged on the space immediately in front of the hotel (Figure G-18).

At 8:27 p.m., LAPD's Outside Commander broadcast an announcement that the parade permit required orderly movement, and that if the demonstrators moved on, the parade would be permitted to continue. Police then attempted to encourage people at the head of the parade to move on using a diagonal line of 20 motorcycle officers, who were attacked and impeded by demonstrators.

At 8:35 p.m., the first of three dispersal orders was broadcast by police sound trucks in front of the hotel. Although many demonstrators claimed they did not hear dispersal orders, the TIMES stated flatly that "Almost every newsman present said he heard the warning, but they disagree on the number of times it was broadcast."

DEMOCRATIC PHASE - DISORDERLY

At this point, violence commenced. As soon as the dispersal orders were announced, rocks, clods, placards, and the sharpened sticks from picket signs were thrown from the back of the crowd, striking police officers, newsmen, and front-row demonstrators. Demonstrators grabbed at the officers' batons, badges and uniforms; shouted obscenities and spat upon them. Police officers, manning the lines in front of the crowd, are quoted in the TIMES as follows:

"The crowd up front changed. When the parade started there was a lot of



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Figure G-18. Crowd Spills Over All Northbound Lanes, Traffic Dividers and Sidewalks

women and kids up front. . . By the time we faced each other on the lines, all the women and girls had disappeared and we were looking at men . . . I don't know what happened to the women." "I do," (another officer) "they melted back into the crowd and the middle section of the parade took their place. That's where the hard core was stationed--the guys that were really leading this thing."

On the other hand, the TIMES says in a summary of the events, "Newsmen said they saw no officer hit by a rock nor any demonstrator make violent contact with a policeman before police advanced on the marchers." However, other newspaper, TV and radio reporters witnessed attacks by the crowd.

A double line of officers moved shoulder to shoulder to force the crowds out of the north bound lanes of Avenue of the Stars and out into the vacant field and parking lot behind them. A wedge formation split up the demonstrators, some of whom found their way back to their cars and others regrouped in the neighborhood creating further confrontations and violence. Newsmen added to the confusion as demonstrators "grandstanded" for the cameras and shouted stories of "police brutality." One woman placed about eight children, aged 6 to 12, some dressed as infants, in front of police lines to impede their forward motion. Some parts of the police line moved against little resistance, others were pelted with rocks and sticks.

The TIMES' Paul Houston reported the next morning that "around 9 p.m.

1000 helmeted police began moving on the crowd in lines two-deep, jabbing and beating some unruly demonstrators with riot sticks. Within 15 minutes the crowd had been pushed to the far east side of the four-lane Avenue of the Stars into a vacant lot."

Some of the incidents that occurred as the police chased the demonstrators away from the scene included:

- o Demonstrators chased across the Beverly Hills city limits sat down and threw rocks at police 50 feet away in Los Angeles. They dispersed after reinforcements arrived and the LAPD moved in to apprehend the rock throwers.
- o A group of 1500 demonstrators surged into Olympic Boulevard under the Avenue of the Stars overpass, began dancing and started a sit-in before being dispersed by police.
- o At the Olympic Boulevard incident a woman trapped in a car was injured by flying glass when a 12-inch piece of pipe was hurled through the window. An officer trying to help her was attacked by the crowd which dispersed as a skirmish line approached.
- o The final action of the evening occurred near the Cheviot Hills Playground rally area where a crowd was dispersed at about 10:15 p.m.

POST-DEMONSTRATION PHASE

By 10:15 p.m., the crowds were essentially dispersed and moving out of the area back to their cars; police cancelled the Tactical Alert. At 11:45 p.m., the 12-hour watch schedule was cancelled, and by 1:30 a.m. all command posts had been deactivated. Cleanup work started to remove 18 tons of debris left by the citizens.

The newspapers reported that 40 persons were injured; the police statistics indicate there were 26 citizens and 6 police officers injured, none seriously. There were no fatalities.

A total of 52 arrests were made, (31 men, 8 women and 13 juveniles) including 48 misdemeanors and 4 felonies. The adult defendants were arraigned on 82 charges on 28 June in three different courtrooms, Lincoln Heights (male misdemeanors), Van Nuys (female misdemeanors), West Los Angeles (felonies), while juvenile offenders appeared in Juvenile Court with their parents. About 100 pickets carrying placards decrying police brutality paraded silently at the Lincoln Heights and Van Nuys hearings.

Disposition of the cases is shown in Table I.

As a result of the Century City demonstration, there were numerous civic debates and protests, promoted chiefly by PAC and widely reported in the press:

- o On 26 June, PAC members created a furor during a

Table I. Arrest Summary

	Male	Female	Juv. Male	Juv. Female
Felonies	2	1	1	
Misdemeanors	29	7	10	2

Totals	Adult = 39	Juvenile = 13
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LOCATION OF ARRESTS

Area	Time	Number
Constellation & Avenue of the Stars	5:00-9:30 p.m.	39
Cheviot Hills Playground	7:30 p.m.	6
Olympic & Avenue of the Stars	9:00-10:30 p.m.	4
Olympic & Century Park East	9:30 p.m.	2
Motor & Pico	10:30 p.m.	1

DISPOSITION OF ARRESTS

Adult Felony - (3)

- 2 Found guilty (misdemeanors)
- 1 Failed to appear; warrant issued (felony)

Adult Misdemeanor - (36)

- 21 Guilty
- 1 Not Guilty
- 1 Dismissed by court
- 6 Dismissed by City Attorney
- 1 Hung jury
- 5 Released

Juvenile Arrests - (13)

- 12 Counselled and released (misdemeanors)
- 1 Petition sustained in Juvenile Court (felony)

Los Angeles City Council meeting, when the council refused to grant them a hearing. Two men and a woman were removed forceably from council chambers.

- o On 27 June, one city councilman demanded a full-scale investigation, the City Human Relations Commission voted to hold a fact-finding hearing (later dropped) and the American Civil Liberties Union demanded a summit meeting with city officials; later ACLU sought to have the Century Plaza Hotel Corporation held in contempt of court (subsequently dismissed).
- o On 28 June, the American Legion charged that the PAC leader is a known communist.
- o On 29 June, the Los Angeles City Council, by a vote of 10-5, adopted a motion commending the LAPD and Chief Reddin for their "handling of an extremely difficult and potentially dangerous situation"--without conducting an investigation.

Similar incidents continued during the ensuing weeks and months, but police reported receiving over 2000 letters commenting on the demonstration; 86% approved police tactics.

One picture, widely publicized by newspapers and TV, showed a demonstrator with blood flowing down his head and an upraised police baton behind him.

1. "Reaction: 'Brutal'; 'Nastiest Crowd. . .'", Los Angeles TIMES 2 July 1967

The incident, as described by an ABC newsman, said the demonstrator struck the officer first. The man was removed by a City ambulance and taken to UCLA Medical Center where he became abusive, refused treatment and left the hospital. After lengthy police investigation, he was identified as a James Cameron, who was wanted for violation of the State Narcotics Act. A felony warrant was issued for his arrest for Battery of a Peace Officer.

8. LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT PROCEDURES, METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

PLANNING

As a result of intelligence from many public and private sources which indicated the extreme hazard to the President and to Los Angeles citizens and property, Chief of Police Thomas Reddin on 7 June initiated preparation of the police plan for Operation Century '67. On 8 June, the Tactical Operations Group began planning, on a round-the-clock basis, to handle four separate incidents which would comprise the Century City demonstration:

- o A large rally at Cheviot Hills Playground, expected to start at 1 p.m. and involve thousand of demonstrators.
- o Arrival of President Johnson at L. A. International Airport and transport to Century Plaza Hotel at about 6 p.m.
- o An anti-war parade from Cheviot Hills Playground (about 7:30 p.m.) to the Century Plaza Hotel and back (about 1-1/2 miles).

- o Security of the President and the hotel during demonstrations expected in the morning, afternoon and while the parade passed the hotel.

The potentially explosive situation was compounded by the number and diversity of the 70 anti-war factions planning to demonstrate and by the fact that because 23 June was the last day of school for the summer there would be lots of boisterous kids looking for "action." The police were required to spread their manpower over a wide area, and to defend a building (the hotel) designed for maximum public accessibility at a time that 1000 wealthy patrons were arriving for a banquet.

Intelligence regarding the demonstrators' plans came from many sources and included such disruptive techniques as lie-ins, stall-ins, arson, renting rooms to get access to the hotel, duplicating uniforms of hotel personnel, turning animals loose inside the hotel, and even to placement of a bomb within the hotel. The number and diverse sources of these intelligence reports accelerated as the 23 June date approached. The plan developed by the police took into account these rumored disturbance tactics as shown by Table II which compares prior intelligence with actual events; the only major discrepancy was a predicted demonstration at the airport which did not occur.

The decisions made by Chief Reddin, the Field Commander and the Outside Commander at critical times were influenced significantly by their prior knowledge of the demonstrators' plans.

Up to 50 police personnel expended 2800 hours to prepare the operations plan,
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Table II : Comparison of Intelligence and Actual Events

INTELLIGENCE INPUT	OBSERVED 23 JUNE
Circulate handbills urging civil disobedience at Cheviot Hills Playground.	Small pink slips with message "...If you want to do something, go to head of the line," distributed at park.
Choose monitors who were sympathetic to civil disobedience; have monitors remove armbands and join in.	Monitors urged marchers to stop, to sit down or create disturbance. Some did remove armbands and join in.
Rally at park would be held regardless of action on permit	Rally was held even though permit was denied.
People would lie down in front of President's plane on airport runway.	Did not materialize.
Disturbance to be created in front of hotel as parade approached.	A group started shouting at officers and fights started as the parade approached.
Parade would stop in front of hotel.	It did.
Head of parade would double back and sit down.	About 100 persons at front were seen to double back.
Parade marchers would be encouraged to join with demonstrators already picketing in area.	Prior to parade the number of demonstrators grew and they moved forward to join the marchers.
Marchers at head of parade would sit down in front of hotel.	About 150 did sit down when parade reached hotel.
Sound trucks would be used in parade regardless of restrictions.	All but one sound truck removed after police warning; remaining pickup triggered incident.
Demonstrators would rush the hotel and storm inside to confront the President.	As the parade stopped in front of the hotel, demonstrators surged against police lines and created disturbance.

which established a Task Force organization, command posts, made personnel assignments, presented legal constraints, department policy and background information. The responsibilities and tactics for each officer on the Task Force were detailed.

The Task Force was headed by a Field Commander who was responsible for coordinating the entire operation (see organization chart Figure G-19). Specific authority was handed down to a Support Commander, (communications, personnel, intelligence and logistics), an Inside Commander (security inside the hotel), a Jail Commander (booking, prisoner transportation, medical treatment) and the Outside Commander (tactics, outside security, and traffic).

The Emergency Command Center in Parker Center was activated to coordinate information from/to all parts of the city but most of the operations were directed from four command posts:

- o The Field Command Post, established on the ninth floor of the Century Plaza Hotel, was the headquarters for the Field Commander and his staff, all of whom were experts in their respective fields: intelligence, communications, operations, personnel, logistics, maps and routing, press relations, plus clerks, guards and messengers.

- o The Outside Command Post, located in a parking lot across Constellation Boulevard from the hotel, consisted of Mobile I (the mobile command post), Mobile II (the logistics vehicle),




Figure G-19. Task Force Organization for Operation Century '67

Mobile III (the communications van shown in Figures G-20 and G-21), and a field operations tent (Figures G-22 and G-23). In addition, the field transport unit, jail unit, lighting and sound trucks and Fire Department Command Post were parked nearby. Both the Outside Commander and Support Commander used this post as headquarters; total staffing included more than 100 sworn officers and ten civilians.

- o The Inside Command Post was located on the California level of the hotel, across from the ballroom where the Presidential party was to banquet. The Inside Commander was responsible for directing the security detail stationed at 93 fixed posts within the hotel, plus an inside reserve unit of 30 uniformed men. Small jail wagons, stationed in a parking lot close to the reserve unit, were available to transport arrestees and officers across Constellation Boulevard to the booking area.
- o The Airport Command Post at the FAA Building was manned beginning at 3 p.m., principally by a force of 100 officers and men from the nearby Venice Division. Vehicles, communications equipment and booking equipment were provided.

Personnel assigned to the Century City area were ordered to report to the Staging Area at Century Park West and Constellation Boulevard. In order



Figure G-20.

Interior of Mobile Communications Van



Figure G-21.

Status and Map Boards Posted on
Exterior of Communications Van




Figure G-22. Command Officer Stations in Field Tent Command Post




Figure G-23. Temporary Command Tent Set Up Next to Mobile Communications Van

to meet the great demand for manpower, the LAPD was mobilized on 12-hour shifts and all leaves were cancelled. The 1282 sworn officers required for the operation were obtained as shown in Table III, and assigned as shown in Table IV. (An additional 147 men responded to the Tactical Alert.)

The plan described both interior and exterior fixed posts in detail, described motorcade procedures, and specified hunter and spotter detail assignments, with no other individuals allowed on the rooftops. Telephone numbers and radio frequency assignments were included in the Operations Plan. (See Figure G-24 for diagram of communications plan.). Two tactical dispersal plans were outlined, neither of which was employed.

Quoted by the Los Angeles TIMES, the Field Commander declared that the officers had been briefed on a priority of arrests: "There were two priorities-- arrest of those committing violence against other demonstrators or policemen; arrest of persons officers were able to identify as inciting to riot."

The local press was well aware of the elaborate planning for the President's safety; in an article the day before the dinner, the TIMES reported police days off being cancelled, 1000 LAPD police officers being assigned to Century City, and an influx of "more than 100 Secret Service agents, plus hotel security guards, FBI agents, and city park rangers." Governor Ronald Reagan announced that the National Guard was standing by in case they were needed.

Table III- LAPD Personnel Employment - Operation Century '67

(DATA FROM OPERATIONS PLAN)

Rank	Office of the Chief	Patrol Bureau	Traffic Bureau	Personnel Train	Detective	Technical Service	Administration	Comm. Rel.	Total By Rank
Inspector	1	1				2	2		2
Captain		5					4	1	9
Lieutenant		23	2	2	2	7	4	1	41
Sergeant		55	10	11	47	6	39	3	171
Patrolmen		25	182	144	101	64	13	17	1,046
Sergeant, P.W.					2	2		4	4
Civilian						19	2		21
TOTALS	1	609	202	157	164	100	61	22	1,282 (Sworn) 21 (Civilian) 1,303

Table IV Manpower Assignments - 23 June Summary

Assignment	Description	No.
Fixed Posts	Airport security, inside hotel, outside hotel, rooftops, command posts	831
Field Tactical Operator (all committed)	Mobile and Reserve forces 1) Century Park Reserve Platoon A-F 2) Staging Area Reserves Platoon G-K 3) "Untangle" teams of special arrest squads 4) Recruits with supervisors 5) Inside reserve 6) Responding to TAC alert	186 165 28 138 21 147 689

* Rest of city 886 (available for call, 322 unified, 108 detectives) 147 of these called.

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


Figure G-24. Communications Plan for Operation Century '67

There was extensive pre-event coordination with Federal, Civic, Century City, and Century Plaza hotel personnel. Plans for the President's security were coordinated with Secret Service personnel, who manned a number of posts in the hotel, in the ballroom and at the Field Command Post. Civic planning was involved in the permit for street closures. Century City merchants were requested to close their businesses at 5:00 p.m. Friday, instead of staying open, as customary; shops in the hotel also closed early. Special details had to be assigned to protect an oil well near Cheviot Hills Playground and the services building for Century City.

Because of the likely infringement of demonstrators on private property, it was necessary to instruct hotel and Century City security officers how to make citizen arrests. Within the hotel, special arrangements were made with the parking captain and others to insure that properly authorized guests would be admitted at the time that demonstrators were creating chaos outside the building.

TRAINING

Shortly after the LAPD identified the magnitude of the potential disturbance, roll call and special training were initiated. As a result of the Watts' riots 2 years previously, LAPD had greatly increased its riot training and operational procedures. All men received riot baton, squad formation, and crowd handling training either in service or at roll call. Squad integrity training and discipline were heavily emphasized prior to the event, as well as sensitivity training to verbal abuse and harassment.

Elite marksmen were trained in four-man teams for counter-sniper operations. An "untangle" squad consisting of eight officers in two four-man teams, was trained to handle limp or chained demonstrators. In April 1967, LAPD began annual CPX exercises which simulate a disaster situation and require the use of field command mobile units and the Emergency Command Center; these exercises were critiqued. In 1967 the command post cadre received some training, but because of department personnel rotation policies, specialized personnel were not available to occupy all positions in the command posts. Prior to going on duty on 23 June, all Task Force personnel received a special 16-page excerpt from the Operations Plan containing summary instructions, maps and legal details. As personnel arrived at the Staging Area, small groups were briefed personally by the Field Commander.

OPERATIONS

PRE-CROWD PHASE

On the afternoon and evening of 22 June, maps, supplies and equipment were moved into the ninth floor FCP, the Mobiles were moved into location near the hotel, and all equipment was checked out and secured. Early on the morning of 23 June, the Outside Commander held a 2-hour pre-operations briefing for officers assigned as leaders of security and tactical details.

At 6 a.m., an early detail of 16 men reported to the hotel to handle the predicted high school students' picket line, which never materialized. Century City security officers began to put up "No Trespassing" signs, and the Traffic Department set up street closure signs and barricades in accordance

with the permit issued by the Board of Public Works. Beginning at 12:15 p.m., two helicopter flew reconnaissance flights over Cheviot Hills Play-ground and Century City until the President's helicopter arrived (Figure G-25).




Figure G-25. Helicopters Maintained Reconnaissance Patrols

The command posts at the hotel were activated at 12:15 and the ECC at 1 p.m. About the same time, the main Task Force began to arrive at the Staging Area, where they were briefed in small groups and deployed according to the Operations Plan. (For this event, the force was organized in 10-man squads and 30-man platoons.) Men were deployed inside the hotel to 93 fixed posts, plus 10 sergeants, inside reserves and casual reserves. Two platoons were deployed in front and around the hotel; five platoons were deployed in the Staging Area as reserves; seven platoons were held in reserve at the Century Park Apartments. Undercover units were deployed in the area at 1 p.m.

Officers assigned to the Airport Command (88 men), the Presidential motorcade detail, Firearms and Explosives Unit, and the Mobile Communications Unit reported for duty at 3 p.m.

Reporting the morning after the event, the Los Angeles TIMES noted "uniformed police took up stations 50 feet apart at all intersections surrounding the Century Plaza. . . Inside the hotel uniformed police were stationed 10 feet apart on all four lobby levels. Plainclothesmen roved the building with walkie-talkie radios."

CROWD PHASE

Cheviot Hills Rally

Although the demonstrators had been denied use of the Cheviot Hills' facilities, they could not legally be barred from using the public park. When they started bringing in their own sound equipment, there were only four park rangers empowered to enforce park regulations. Apparently the legality of importing public address systems was questioned by the rally leaders, and by some representatives of the Department of Parks and Recreation as well. By the time agreement was reached to bar it, the equipment was already moved in.

The police decided that trying to remove it would incite the growing crowd.

A few police and plainclothesmen were in the park throughout the afternoon, but made no attempt to interfere with rally activities. At 6:45 p.m., a platoon of policemen was assigned to protect the civilian servers of the injunction and the injunction handbills. (The Field Commander explained

during an interview that serving of the handbill was delayed until such a late hour to prevent PAC from obtaining a "stay of execution" before the parade was due to start.)

Hotel Picket Line:

The picket line in front of the hotel was watched carefully by the officers posted in front of the hotel, although activity was lackadaisical in the early hours. At 3:50 p.m., a group of 75 demonstrators arrived in front of the hotel to join the pickets, having been recruited from the rally area, and began walking in a circle, forcing pedestrians to walk out into the street. A hotel representative orally informed the picketers of the contents of the injunction after they had refused to accept a printed copy. When they refused to leave, the Outside Commander gave them an opportunity to comply with the requirements by stretching out the lines to permit pedestrian passage. When they continued to block the sidewalk, the Outside Commander determined that they were in violation of three sections of the injunction, plus four city ordinances, and at 4:30 p.m., announced an unlawful assembly. As previously planned, officers assigned to fixed posts in front of the hotel remained there and two extra police squads moved in to assist in dispersing the pickets (Figure G-26). Police encountered difficulty with the press at this time as about 25 newsmen tried to get statements from the demonstrators. Then, a skirmish line of foot and motorcycle officers started a sweep northbound on the west sidewalk and west half of Avenue of the Stars which forced the

remainder of the demonstrators and organizers to the north side of the intersection.*



Figure G-26. Police Squads Enforce Picket Dispersal Order

Within an hour a crowd of 300 was gathered on the sidewalk across from the hotel, and two platoons of police were stationed in a line along the east side of the traffic islands as shown in (Figure G-25). They stopped two demonstrators who broke through the line and ran toward the hotel and they arrested a demonstrator, who knocked an officer down with his picket sign. By 8 p.m., the east side of Avenue of the Stars was crowded shoulder to shoulder between Constellation and the Olympic off ramp and the pickets could not move.

*When interviewed, the Outside Commander reported that he was watching the pickets from a hotel balcony when he suddenly had an insight into what they were trying to accomplish: They were holding the confined sidewalk area to insure control of the front of the hotel when the parade arrived. If demonstrators could block the sidewalk, the police would have been unable to gain access and the demonstrators would be in a position to rush the hotel by the two driveways.

DEMONSTRATION PHASE - ORDERLY

As the crowd at Cheviot Hills began to assemble into a parade, the principal problem was keeping them out of the heavily travelled street prior to the 7:30 p.m. start time (Figure G-27). Platoons A and B, which had been assigned to work at the rally area during the day, were deployed in marked police cars; Platoon A in nine cars was assigned to lead the parade and Platoon B to follow it. Platoon C was moved from the Century Park Apartment reserves and assigned to fixed posts along Avenue of the Stars between Pico and Olympic. A traffic detail moved out to divert vehicle traffic as the parade passed.

The only incident that disrupted the parade as it moved to Century Plaza was that with the loudspeaker-equipped pickup truck, described earlier. The six officers who attempted to remove the truck from the parade were assaulted by a large group of (apparently) militant demonstrators, and required assistance from other officers and the Outside Commander to arrest and transport the driver and a passenger to jail.

About 8 p.m., as the parade came over the hill, it was already spilling over the street onto the sidewalks and dividers. The Field Commander, viewing it from a balcony outside the Field Command Post, concluded that the crowd was larger and more agitated than he had anticipated; he immediately decided to commit all reserves and even police recruits. Alarming intelligence reports on activists' plans received from undercover men in the parade and

the arrival of the President for his banquet led the Field Commander to activate a Tactical Alert in anticipation of a need for additional manpower. As the crowd stopped and began milling in front of the hotel, the Communications Division was directed at 8:25 p.m. to implement a response to the Tactical Alert by dispatching half of the City's response units to the Staging Area; the first units began to arrive at 8:35 p.m.

The obvious efforts of some dissidents to stop the crowd either by doubling back or sitting down at the front of the parade confirmed the fears of the police commanders. At 8:27 p.m., police broadcast an announcement that if the crowd would move, the parade would be allowed to continue; only slight and brief northward movement followed. Since the crowd then constituted an unlawful assembly, the police considered sending arrest teams into the northern-most of the parade participants and removing a group at a time. Instead, the Outside Commander ordered a motorcycle platoon to sweep the Avenue to urge the crowd in front to move on (Figure G-28). At first some of the crowd moved back, then began lying down in front of the motorcycles, attacking the police with picket signs, and one attempt was made to "football tackle" an officer off his motorcycle. After several passes along the edge of the crowd, the officers dismounted and joined the police patrol line along the traffic island.

The TIMES described the scene at this time as follows: "The Avenue of the Stars is a four-lane roadway with a wide, planted center divider. Across a



Figure G-27. Parade Begins to Form at Cheviot Hills Playground




Figure G-28. Motorcycle Sweep Urges Marchers Past the Hotel

portion of the center divider is a reflecting pool, whose fountains were turned off Friday night. The protestors (50 to 75 deep) were ranged along the sidewalk and two lanes of the roadway farthest from the hotel. The distance between the crowd and the hotel entrance was about 75 yards. To the grounds of the hotel it was about 15 yards."

DEMONSTRATION PHASE - DISORDERLY

Chief Reddin, in a Los Angeles TIMES interview on 27 June, stated that it was his decision to "declare the march an unlawful assembly" as he watched from the Field Command Post on the hotel's ninth floor. The announcements were made between 8:15 and 8:45 p.m. by the Outside Commander over loud-speaker systems having a range of 14 city blocks. The announcements were met by an outpouring of profanity, a hail of picket signs, rocks and dirt clods, and the crowd slowly began to force the officers back toward the hotel. The Outside Commander determined that the plan to separate participants from the head of the parade was no longer practicable and he gave the order to move the entire crowd into Parking Lot 8. Double lines of officers (Figure G-29), with their batons at "port arms" (Figure G-30) moved against the crowd, pushing them from the traffic dividers and traffic lanes of the Avenue.

The Outside Commander and the Field Commander agreed that a wedge should be used to split the crowd up at its widest point, just north of Garden Lane, where there would be adequate space for the demonstrators to disperse.



Figure G-29.
Police Lines Move to Disperse Crowd After Unlawful Assembly Announcement



Figure G-30. Patrolmen with Batons at "Port Arms" Push Crowd Back

Platoon B moved in to start the dispersal wedge (Figure G-31), and at first met great resistance; Platoons B, C, E and I moved in to protect their flanks and the disorganized demonstrators split and moved across Lot 8 with many painful confrontations.

By shortly after 9 p.m., the first response squads were being assigned, and a total of four skirmish lines were moving across Lot 8 and the Avenue.

By 10 p.m., 687 officers were committed to dispersal tactics or posts in front of the hotel. Activity of the police was impeded by the press and by "grandstanding" dissidents who would go "on stage" as soon as the TV lights swept their way, only to renew the fight when the cameras were pointed away.

Numerous angry confrontations between police and dissidents occurred throughout the area, which involved innocent citizens and impeded passing motorists. By 10:15 p.m., the area was sufficiently cleared that the Field Commander cancelled the Tactical Alert, and by 10:45 p.m., all platoons were ordered to report to their original assignments. Some of the tactical problems which the police encountered are shown in Table V and compared with the original Operations Plan. For example, the tactical plan for a sweep of Lot 8 was not implemented because of the urgency of the situation developing on the corner nearest the hotel. A rioting angry crowd led by militants was gathering in an area where they could rush across the street onto the driveway leading to the front of the hotel or down Garden Lane ramps to the hotel's California Level where the President was dining. In the words

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Figure G-31. Wedge Formation Used to Split Crowd

Table V. Comparison of Planned and Actual Police Tactics

Planned Tactic	Problem	Actual Response
Avoid diverting police forces to park.	To enforce park ordinances larger police commitment would have been necessary.	Minimum assignment of forces, but undercover surveillance.
Riot Plan for Cheviot Hills Play-ground anticipated problems after 6 p.m.	No riotous disturbance but continuous violations of law (loudspeaker equipment on flat bed trucks).	The four Park Rangers persuaded not to try to enforce the ordinance. Riot avoided at Play-ground.
Use of President's schedule to key planning time table.	President 2 hours late.	Police at hotel had to provide outside presidential security and observe at same time approaching parade.
Police outside reserves placed in two locations, near Hotel and at Century Park Apartments.	None.	Successfully provided deployment flexibility.
Parade traffic control plan.	One platoon insufficient to handle parade between Pico and Olympic because of crowd size.	The east lane street width insufficient to handle crowd. Control of traffic lost before Olympic was reached.
Control of sidewalk area in front of Hotel necessary to secure building from crowd charge.	Dissidents tried to deny police control of sidewalk in front of Hotel by using a mass of pickets.	Unlawful assembly declared; area cleared and arrests made; pickets moved across street.
Tactical Plan B to clear Lot 8 envisioned two parallel lines moving from Constellation to Olympic.	Crowd build-up across from hotel drive-way posed immediate threat to Presidential safety.	Wedge formation successfully fragmented crowd. Subsequent sweeps kept them moving.
Plan to separate activist head of parade from main body.	Activist core embedded in parade, using innocent participants as shields.	Activists pelted approaching police from the back of the crowd while police pushed back front-row non-militants.

of the Field Commander, "That wedge had to work." He attributed the fact that it did work to the rigorous training of the forces in squad discipline, field deployment in riot formations and withstanding crowd abuse. His assessment is verified by pictures (Figure G-32) and reports which reveal minimum individual response to abuse or decoying from formations.




Figure G-32. Demonstrators Cursed and Obstructed Police

POST DEMONSTRATION PHASE

The disturbance terminated quickly after the police moved against the crowd, as appears to be typical of demonstrations away from the rioters' homes.

Shortly before 9 p.m., the first police lines moved forward, and the last confrontation occurred at 10:10 p.m. The concluding items in the police log are:

- 10:15 Tactical alert cancelled
- 10:45 All platoons ordered back to original assignments
- 11:33 President's helicopter leaves Century Plaza
- 11:45 All divisions ordered to return to normal watch assignments
- 12:15 Field Command Post ordered deactivated
- 12:20 Airport Command Post and Outside Command Post ordered deactivated
- 12:33 ECC ordered deactivated
- 1:30 All command posts secured

Probably the most serious problem facing the Los Angeles Police Department in the weeks and months that followed was to reestablish communications and good community relations with the business and professional people who had innocently become involved in a violent demonstration when all they intended was to voice their peaceful protest of government policy. Few of these people realized the extent to which they were "used" by the activists and carried only the frightening memory of a "police state" when armed officers moved toward them in military formations.

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