


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VOLUME

LAW ENFORCEMENT
COMMAND AND CONTROL
PROBLEMS RELATED
TO CROWDS AND
DEMONSTRATIONS



"THE IDENTIFICATION, DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMAND AND
CONTROL PROBLEMS RELATED TO
CROWDS AND DEMONSTRATIONS"

VOLUME I

Draft Final Report

Submitted to:

U.S. Department of Justice

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration

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LEAA STUDY FINAL REPORT

VOLUME I

STUDY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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OVERVIEW OF STUDY

A. Study Objective

With the objective of identifying, evaluating and recommending planning, training and operational procedures, methods and techniques used by civilian law enforcement agencies to solve the command and control problems related to the control of crowds and demonstrations, this study has been performed by the Hughes Aircraft Company under Contract Number J-LEAA-017-70.

To arrive at the principal objective; Recommendation of Procedures, Methods and Techniques, the study included:

1. Identification of current law enforcement command and control problems confronting civilian police agencies in the control of crowds and demonstrations,
2. Description of the current law enforcement command and control problems related to the control of crowds and demonstrations by civilian police agencies,
3. Systematic description of the procedures, methods and techniques used by civilian police agencies to solve command and control problems related to the control of crowds and demonstrations,
4. Evaluation in terms of effectiveness of the procedures, methods and techniques used by civilian police agencies to solve command and control problems related to the control of crowds and demonstrations.

During the study, the command and control problems have been evaluated according to the parameters of duration, magnitude, form and frequency.

The time periods, or phases, of the disturbances have been analyzed to determine duration and such event characteristics as locale, behavior of the individuals, groups and organizations involved.

B. Study Approach

To accomplish the desired objectives, the LEAA Study Program Plan began with a survey of the literature for background data on previous disturbances and subsequent investigations made into them. To this data bank was added the practical knowledge obtained by Hughes Aircraft Company personnel working on various law enforcement projects.

In order to broaden the study data base, field interviews with law enforcement personnel and observers of the disturbances were conducted in seven cities, selected by the Contractor with LEAA concurrence. The questionnaire used for the interviews addressed itself to various aspects of the disturbance from the points of view of law enforcement command officers, patrolmen, and observers (usually newspapermen). Questions were phrased to develop data regarding disturbance issues and phases.

All interviews were tape recorded, transcribed and used, along with pertinent newspaper articles, to develop the disturbance scenarios contained in Volume II of this Final Report. Volume II also contains a detailed description of each police department's procedures, methods and techniques

used during the disturbance in planning, training and operations.

Review of the literature provided the Hughes LEAA Study Team with valuable insight into riots and demonstrations from the viewpoint of law enforcement officers, national investigatory committees, sociologists and reporters. It is significant to compare data obtained during this survey with that documented in other publications. Section IV of Volume II contains a computer printout of the study bibliography.

C. Summary of Disturbances Studied

The seven disturbances studied have several significant common factors and many dissimilar characteristics, as summarized in Figure O - 1, which compares the definitive facts without attempting to compare command and control problems or evaluate effectiveness. The individual disturbances are described briefly here to provide a basis for study of issues, phases, command and control problems, and procedures, methods and techniques for disturbance control.

1. Corvallis, Oregon

On 24 July 1969, 40 Oregon State University students moved into a Dean's office for a sit-in protesting the non-promotion of a liberal instructor. In accordance with a contingency plan drawn up 2 years previously by campus, city, county, state and National Guard law enforcement representatives, officials at OSU notified the District Attorney and the Chief of Police.

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	CORVALLIS	ITHACA	DURHAM	ATLANTA	CINCINNATI	ANAHEIM	LOS ANGELES
POPULATION	35,153	25,148	94,000	487,500	500,550	172,000	2,700,000
% NON-WHITE	1%	1.5%	35%	50%	33%	1.4%	20%
COLLEGE ENROLLMENT	15,000 OSU	CORNELL 14,000	8000 DUKE	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
SWORN POLICE	32	NONE INVOLVED (51)	170	860 (75 BLACK)	790 (40 BLACK)	244	6194
PRIVATE/CAMPUS SECURITY	21	27	25	N.A.	N.A.	120	6
MUTUAL AID	NOT REQUIRED; PLANNED AND AVAILABLE	NOT CALLED TO CAMPUS; MOBILIZED IN TOWN	NAT'L GUARD (300) MOBILIZED, NOT USED; STATE POLICE (14) USED	NOT CALLED	ONG (1200) CALLED AND USED	COUNTY MUTUAL AID (250 CALLED AND USED)	NONE CALLED
DISTURBANCE HISTORY	MINOR	INCREASING	MAJOR (HANDLED BY CAMPUS SECURITY)	MAJOR	SEVERE	MINOR	SEVERE
NAME OF INCIDENT	STUDENT SIT-IN	WILLARD STRAIGHT HALL SEIZURE	ALLEN BLDG. SEIZURE	BOULEVARD RIOTS	BLACK MON. RIOT	YIPPIE CONVENTION	CENTURY '67
LOCALE	OSU CAMPUS	CORNELL CAMPUS	DUKE CAMPUS	NEGRO GHETTO	AVONDALE NEGRO COMMUNITY	DISNEYLAND PARK-PRIVATE PROPERTY	CENTURY CITY- PRIVATE PROPERTY
DATE OF INCIDENT	7/24/69	4/19/69- 4/25/69	2/13/69	9/10/66- 9/13/66	4/4/68- 4/12/68	8/6/70	6/23/67
ISSUE/TYPE	COLLEGE	COLLEGE- BLACK STUDIES	COLLEGE- BLACK STUDIES	RACIAL	RACIAL	ANTI- ESTABLISHMENT	PEACE DEMONSTRATION
NUMBER DEMONSTRATORS	40	100 BLACKS 150 SDS UP TO 12,000 OTHER STUDENTS	48 BLACKS 2000 STUDENTS	200-800 BLACKS	3000 BLACKS	400-1000 YIPPIES	15,000
AGITATORS PRESENT	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
DEATHS/INJURIES	0/0	0/4	0/24	1/50	2/ 15 POLICE ? CIVILIANS	0/0	0/ 6 POLICE 26 CIVILIANS
DAMAGE	0	\$35,000	APPROX. \$10,000	PROBABLY \$10,000	\$350,000	MINOR	MINOR
ARRESTS	14	17 (GRAND JURY)	5	97	304	28	52

Figure 0-1. Summary of Incidents Studied

Moving swiftly, the Corvallis Police implemented their emergency plan, calling in officers and stand-by reserves. When police arrived on the campus, the students were advised they were guilty of trespass and that they must leave or be arrested. The 14 students who remained in the office were arrested, photographed, and transported to the Benton County Courthouse. They were all later found guilty of trespass; the convictions were upheld on appeal.

2. Ithaca, New York

On 19 April 1969, about 100 black students invaded Willard Straight Hall, the student union at Cornell University, evicting employees and some parents accommodated there for Parents Weekend. They barred the doors and refused to leave, negotiating frequently via telephone with university officials. After a brief altercation with white students who tried to recapture the building, the black students carried firearms into the barricaded building. (They were allowed entry into the building by campus security officers who stood by to see that no other white students went in.)

After holding the building for 36 hours, the black students marched out between rows of campus police and student members of the SDS, having achieved capitulation by the administration and faculty to their demands. Campus meetings and demonstrations, all non-violent, continued for the remainder of the week and involved up to 12,000 students at one time.

The Ithaca Police Department, the Tompkins County Sheriff and several

hundred deputies from surrounding counties (organized under the New York State Sheriff's Association to handle civil disturbances) stood by during the crisis at Cornell, but were never called to the campus to assist the undermanned Cornell security force.

3. Durham, North Carolina

In a demonstration almost identical to that at Cornell two months later, 50 black students entered Duke University's administration building on 13 February 1969, nailed the doors closed and refused entrance to employees. This act was in contradiction to the recently adopted student demonstration code, and was justified by the dissidents on the grounds that college administrators had delayed action on their demands for black studies and preferential grading.

Duke authorities called the Durham police to the scene, kept them standing for 4 hours in sub-freezing weather while they repeatedly ordered the students to leave the building, finally requesting the police to move in as the dissidents exited through the basement windows. A chaotic scene followed, during which Durham police were assaulted by thrown objects and responded by using tear gas, a pepper-fogger and batons on about 2000 students, faculty and townspeople gathered to watch the excitement.

4. Atlanta, Georgia

Previously the center of non-violent civil rights demonstrations, Atlanta in 1966 suffered its first violent rioting. The "Boulevard" incident erupted

in a Negro ghetto neighborhood about 10 p.m., Saturday, 10 September after a white man shot two black youths, killing one of them. To compound the fury of the ghetto inhabitants, an ambulance responding to the call picked up a slightly injured white police officer before taking care of the injured boys. Arson, looting, rock throwing, and sniping continued at widely separated spots in the Boulevard district before police calmed the neighborhood in the early morning hours of Sunday. Militant leaders of SNCC moved into the district later Sunday agitating the residents to resume rioting, this time demanding the release of the SNCC chairman, who had been jailed for inciting to riot during the Summerhill incident of the previous week. Two more nights of violence followed before police moved through the neighborhood in skirmish lines, dispersing the crowds and defusing the riot.

5. Cincinnati, Ohio

Immediately following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Cincinnati suffered only sporadic incidents of violence. The black community planned to honor Dr. King with a memorial service in the Avondale neighborhood on Monday afternoon, 8 April 1968. They insisted that no whites, especially white officers, be allowed inside their perimeter on that day, planning to police their own community with a volunteer force. (Two members of this "peacekeeping" force were later found guilty of agitating the crowd.)

Only nine black Cincinnati police officers were in the Avondale district when violence broke out as the memorial ended. All windows on Reading Street were broken and smoke from burning business buildings filled the air. Tactical units patrolling the Avondale perimeter moved in quickly in a show of force and cooled down the Reading and Rockdale area, but violence had already spread outside Avondale. During the mobilization that followed, Ohio National Guardsmen reported for duty by midnight and were deployed with Cincinnati police for the next three days.

6. Anaheim, California

The Youth International Party (Yippies) advertised nationwide their plans for a demonstration at Disneyland Park on Thursday, 6 August 1970. Anaheim police, Orange County mutual aid forces, and private security forces prepared for a disturbance by an unknown number of demonstrators. Unfortunately, the civil law enforcement agencies were prevented from handling various incidents as they occurred within the park because Disneyland officials, concerned about their public image of "family fun", wished to cope with the troublemakers by themselves.

However, when the Yippies attacked the Disneyland City Hall and assaulted an official, the police were called onto Main Street and asked to help in emptying the park of all visitors. Police, who had been standing on alert for almost 12 hours, responded with riot formation dispersal tactics when missiles were thrown by the Yippies as they gathered outside the gates.

7. Los Angeles, California

In 1967 many citizens were concerned about the progress of the Vietnam War and government policies. When President Johnson announced he would attend a fund-raising dinner in Los Angeles on 23 June, plans for a massive protest were developed by the Peace Action Council, an organization of 70 peace groups ranging in philosophy from revolutionary to conservative. At the same time, Los Angeles police, whose primary concern was the President's safety, developed an extremely detailed operations plan.

Century '67 began with picketing, speeches and parades, and concluded with a wild swinging confrontation between police and outraged citizens.

The militants -- agitators -- melted away from the front ranks before the battle was joined, leaving well-intended protestors to face the police lines that were trying to move them away from the hotel where President Johnson was dining.*

D. Effect of Issues on Command and Control Problems

The seven disturbances studied fall within three categories -- or issues, according to Statement of Work terminology. Three were college and university protests, two were civil rights oriented, and two were protests of government policies and actions. From analysis of the incidents in each category, it became apparent that the issue behind each disturbance determined to a great extent the actual dynamics of the disturbance itself.

* The Anti-War March: What DID Happen, Los Angeles TIMES 2 July 1967.

The composition of the crowd -- age, sex, race -- depends upon the protest issue. The tactics and weapons used by the dissidents depend upon the composition of the crowd -- the attitudes and types of people involved. Almost invariably, the locale was dependent upon both the issue and the composition of the crowd.

Therefore, it is evident that the police must select tactics suitable for the type of people involved in the demonstration, the extent of violence that can be expected, and the locale where the demonstration takes place.

Low profile tactics may be appropriate for some types of disturbances, but only a massive show of force will defuse others. In a college type protest, it seems advisable for the police to appear suddenly on campus, arrest the offenders and leave quickly before a crowd can form and become aroused.

E. / Significance of Phases in Disturbance Command and Control

Before applying the Statement of Work's five phases to the disturbances studied, it was necessary to establish definitions for beginning and end of each phase. Then, by overlaying the phases on the timetables of the disturbances, definite patterns emerged. Each category -- or issue -- of disturbance exhibited unique characteristics during each phase.

The college/university protests tended to have long Pre-Crowd and Post-Demonstration phases, slow escalation through the Crowd Phase and fast-peaking Demonstration phases. Civil rights demonstrations are marked

by an initial high level of tension and an existing crowd, that is triggered almost instantaneously to the Demonstration-Disorderly Phase, during which there are recurring peaks of violence over several days; continuing police patrols extend the Post-Demonstration Phase. Protests of government policies are usually planned well in advance, therefore have a long Pre-Crowd Phase, slow gathering of the Crowd, a brief Demonstration-Orderly, flaring into violence which lasts only a few hours before the crowd is dispersed and the Post-Demonstration alert cancelled.

Since police always face the problem of when to move to defuse an incipient riot, further investigation of phasing may provide valuable insight into timing and speed for police response.

F. Effectiveness Analysis

Based on the objectives of the police during a disturbance, police command and control effectiveness can be measured by (1) whether or not control was maintained, (2) if control was lost, the duration of the Demonstration-Disorderly Phase, (3) the number of deaths and injuries, and (4) the amount of property damage. In addition, there are secondary criteria including the ratio of convictions to arrests and the overall impact of the disturbance on the community.

In order to compare the effectiveness of police procedures, methods and techniques during the seven disturbances studied, it is necessary to con-

sider other elements of the event. For example, a furious crowd armed with Molotov cocktails and guns poses a different set of command and control problems than protesting marchers with picket signs; it can be expected that the level of violence will constrain the length of time required for the police to regain control of the situation. On the other hand, a quiet handful of trespassing students (who might invoke violence to enforce their demands) requires as much attention to tactical decisions as a hundred trespassing students brandishing firearms.

In assessing rankings for law enforcement effectiveness, such elements as loss of control; time to regain control; deaths, injuries and property damage; number of dissidents; weapons and tactics of dissidents have been taken into consideration, after appropriate weighting.

The resulting arbitrary city rankings of law enforcement effectiveness (for the specific incident studied only) are:

CITY	Anaheim	Atlanta	Cincinnati	Corvallis	Durham	Ithaca	Los Angeles
RANK	4	3	2	1	7	6	5

Using this ranking as the dependent variable, a statistical analysis has been performed which uses as independent variables such measures as quality of: policy and coordination, contingency planning, and training; complexity of operations plans; adequacy of: facilities, Emergency Control Centers, Mobile Command Centers, control of field forces, communications, and intelligence functions; ability to counter dissidents' weapons,

tactics and communications; timing of tactics; and ratio of convictions to arrests. The output of the analysis is determination of the significance of each of these variables to the dependent variable, law enforcement effectiveness. (See Task 4, Section C.)

Formulation of recommendations for law enforcement procedures, methods and techniques has resulted from combination of the qualitative and quantitative analyses. It should be noted that, while adequate planning, training and facilities are extremely important, they are obviously less important than proper collection and application of intelligence, the weapons and tactics used by the police, and especially the timing of the tactics.

G. Recommended Procedures, Methods and Techniques

The output of this study is a set of 17 recommended procedures, methods and techniques in the areas of planning, training and operations. Strictly speaking, the recommendations are applicable only to the seven cities considered in this study; however, there is a strong probability that they would fit many other communities as well. Obvious recommendations for such recognized requirements as riot control training are omitted, as well as detailed field tactics which are considered outside the province of the Contractor. The problems and recommended procedures, methods and techniques are summarized in the following table and discussed in detail in Task 4, Section D.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES, METHODS AND TECHNIQUES	
PROBLEM	RECOMMENDATION
1. PLANNING	
a. Policy and Coordination	A Disturbance Prevention Council should be organized so that useful inputs of law enforcement planning can be provided and also so that a forum would exist among key personnel for the expression of opinions and interchange of ideas pertinent to disturbance prevention and control.
b. Contingency Plans	Disturbances have erupted abruptly, finding the police unprepared to control them because of inadequate or unrealistic prior planning, complicated further by lack of agreements with civic bodies and other law enforcement agencies.
c. Operations Plans	Operations plans developed for demonstrations have proved to be cumbersome, complex and unrealistic.
2. TRAINING	Lack of uniform and consistent training procedures, coupled with infrequent or total absence of field exercises, imposes a serious constraint in integrating mutual aid forces for disturbance control.
3. OPERATIONS	
a. Headquarters Facilities	Most police headquarters visited are housed in new unhardened buildings, inadequate for protection against militant strikes.
	Since bomb attacks on police facilities have become more frequent recently, measures should be taken to install protective screens and baffles inside large window spaces and to restrict access to police facilities. In addition, visitors should be observed or screened, according to the temper of the city's activists. Guards may be required at entrances to secure the facility, especially during disturbances.

3. Operations (Continued)	Recommendations
b. Emergency Command Centers	Few police departments have designated locations for Emergency Command Centers, and even fewer have equipped them with adequate command, control and communications equipment. All existing centers examined in the seven cities, plus those visited in other cities, reflect a lack of knowledge of military systems and what they can offer as a solution to police problems.
c. Mobile Command Centers	Field operations may require a Mobile Command Center (MCC) for rapid deployment to provide improved command and control of tactical forces.
d. Helicopters	Cities having police helicopters are not achieving maximum benefit from these airborne surveillance platforms during fast moving emergency situations or even during normal daily patrols if they are using only voice communications to describe the scene.
e. Auxiliary Vehicles	Few medium or large cities have adequate vehicles for use during emergencies or disturbances.
f. Car Locator Systems	Municipal/police officials should consider the advantages and cost-effectiveness of implementing a Car Locator System within their community.

3. Operations (Continued)		Recommendations
g. Protective Gear		Protective gear should be procured and maintained properly to provide maximum safety to officers performing a hazardous assignment. An "Emergency Trigger" should be utilized in cities which have a Car Locator System and appropriate digital communications.
h. Communications		Police departments should institute an analysis of their normal and emergency message loads to determine requirements, then implement a program to obtain additional frequencies (if required), establish communications nets, and procure additional communications equipment, as indicated. They should also provide and keep up to date a communications plan for immediate use during Unusual Occurrences or other emergencies. Consideration should also be given to the regionalization of communications planning and operations.
i. Dissident Weapons		Police should be on the alert for weapon stockpiling and should urge street and park crews to clear potentially hazardous areas of debris.
j. Dissident Tactics		Police forces should borrow some of the military countermeasure techniques to defeat the dissidents' communications systems. This could involve a manually swept ham receiver and transmitter for jamming or spoofing or it could be used as a source of intelligence for redeployment of the police units. More sophisticated devices are available and could be used if the threat ever becomes significant.
k. Police Intelligence Function		Actual status of the intelligence function within the police department organization should be reviewed to ensure that all information gathered is funnelled into the proper activity, that it is evaluated as to its validity and significance, that it is correlated with other intelligence and that it is used by the planners as appropriate.
l. Field Tactics		Planned events should be considered in the light of the patterns and indices described. Further study of past disturbances, including statistical analysis and computer modeling, should provide added insight into timing and speed for police response.
m. Arrest Procedures		Better understandings with the courts, district attorneys, and detention officials, plus use of modern booking aids, will increase the ratio of arrests to convictions.

TASK 1

LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS DESCRIBED BY ISSUES

A. Summary of Incident Issues

In categorizing the seven disturbances studied according to the Statement of Work's listing, the principal issues were:

Colleges and Universities

Corvallis (Oregon State University)

Ithaca (Cornell University)

Durham (Duke University)

Civil Rights

Atlanta (Boulevard district)

Cincinnati (Avondale community)

Government Policies and Actions

Anaheim (Disneyland Park)

Los Angeles (Century City)

However, none of the incidents can be restricted to protest or support of a single issue. All are the sum of a complex environment and background and usually some immediate precursory events.

As shown in Table 1 - 1, two of the campus disturbances over university curriculum had serious racial overtones and demonstrated disrespect for the university system, faculty and administrators. In the Oregon State

TABLE 1 - 1
COMPLEX COMPONENTS OF DISTURBANCE ISSUES

INCIDENT	CATEGORY	Curricula	Faculty	Admin.	Race (Ethnic)	Mgt. / Labor	War Policy	Anti-Estab-	lishment	Police Action	Political	Housing	Employment	Educational Opportunity
Corvallis	College & University	X	X		X	X								
Ithaca	College & University	X	X	X		X				X		X		
Durham	College & University	X	X	X	X	X			X		X	X		
Atlanta	Civil Rights			X		X			X	X				
Cincinnati	Civil Rights				X	X			X	X				
Anaheim	Govt. Policy				X	X	X		X					
Los Angeles	Govt. Policy				X	X	X	X	X					

incident over the pending dismissal of a liberal professor, government policies were also an issue. (It is unfortunate that no campus peace protest was included in this small sample to provide a different perspective of college demonstrations.)

The two riots on civil rights issues erupted from hostilities over inequities in housing, employment, and lack of civic representation. Both outbursts were set off by shootings, turned into enraged confrontations between police and demonstrators, then became totally racial as the flames of protest were fanned by agitators.

The "government policy protest" issue of the Anaheim and Los Angeles incidents may have been intended as honest peace demonstrations by many citizens, but some elements of the crowd introduced anti-establishment and even revolutionary aspects.

While labor-management problems were a minor issue in the Durham incident, none of the seven disturbances studied resulted from a major labor protest or strike. It is expected that this issue would result in a disturbance having unique characteristics (crowd composition and actions) and an overall profile differing significantly from those of the three types that were studied.

B. Specific Command and Control Problems Imposed by the Issues

Analysis shows that the issues behind each disturbance determine to a great extent the actual dynamics of the disturbance itself. The composition of the crowd--age, sex, race--depends upon the protest issue. The tactics and weapons used by the dissidents depend upon the composition of the crowd--the attitudes and types of people involved. Almost invariably, the location where the incident occurred was dependent upon both the issue and the composition of the crowd.

In the seven events studied, three factors determined by the issues (type of demonstrators, tactics of demonstrators, and locale) placed definite constraints on the police plans and operations for command and control of the disturbance. (Table 1 - 2 compares these factors in each of the seven cities.)

Probably the most severe constraint on police operations during these events was that of private (or non-civic) property, when business and campus leaders denied the police the prerogative of deciding the appropriate tactic and time to defuse the riot. Where the police, through prior planning and agreements, were able to move swiftly onto private property, arrest the law-breakers and leave before a crowd gathered, there was no violence. This was the case at Corvallis, and has proved successful at Durham during an incident that occurred after the disturbance studied in this report. When law enforcement officers are asked by private enter-

TABLE 1 - 2 ISSUE DEPENDENT DISTURBANCE FACTORS

College or University	Crowd Composition	Dissident Tactics	Dissident Weapons	Locale
Corvallis	Young Whites	Sit-in	None	Campus Private Property (non-civic)
Ithaca	Young Blacks & Whites (SDS)	Building Seizure	Rifles Shotguns	Campus Private Property (non-civic)
Durham	Young Blacks White bystanders	Building Seizure	Clubs Focks Steel Rods	Campus Private Property (non-civic)
Civil Rights				
Atlanta	Young & Middleaged Blacks	Arson Looting Sniping	Firebombs Bricks/ Rocks/ Clubs/Guns	Public Streets Houses Business Buildings
Cincinnati	Young & Middleaged Blacks	Arson Looting Sniping	Firebombs Bricks/ Rocks/ Clubs/Guns	Public Streets Houses Business Buildings
Government Policy (Streets/Parks)				
Anaheim	Young & Middleaged Few Minority	Parade Sit-in Disruption of normal business operations	Rocks & any missile	Private Property City Streets at hand
Los Angeles	All ages Few minority	Parade Speeches Sit-in Picketing Disruption of normal business operations	Rocks Picket signs Clubs	Private Property City streets and parks

prise (campus officials or property owners) to stand by and provide protection, but to act only when the private parties so desire, there is a complete subversion of decision-making policy. Officers, standing on tedious alert, watching an unruly and growing crowd and helpless to act, tend to respond in a predictable fashion--overreaction. Also predictable are the charges of police brutality which follow.

The two most destructive events studied were probably the best examples of good law enforcement command and control operations. The issues--primarily racial--tended to bring out individuals intent on destruction and armed for battle. Nevertheless, both Atlanta and Cincinnati police were free to establish their own command posts, their own tactics, and their own timetables.

Another command and control problem facing law enforcement officers operating on private property is that they are customarily unfamiliar with the battlefield--they lack adequate maps of the surroundings and layouts of the buildings. "Playing it by ear" tends to make even a well-trained force look inept.

Police must tune their tactics to the composition of the crowd protesting the issue. In the civil rights issues, black officers were used to great advantage by sending them into the riot-torn area to help "cool it." Los Angeles police, well aware of the hard-core militants promoting the peace demonstration and consequently the threat to President Johnson, found

themselves in a confrontation with solid citizens when the dissidents ducked out. Durham police enraged the crowd when tactics they intended for the trespassing black students were used against curious onlookers.

C. Evolution of Major Issues

Demonstration issues in the United States since the early 60's have not been static but have followed an evolutionary process, as illustrated in Figure 1 - 1, which shows the basic civil rights movement fragmenting into student revolt on the campus against university policies and curriculum and protests against government policies both in the cities and on the campus.*

There promises to be no relief from "issues" to incite demonstrations, if the handbill reproduced in Figure 1 - 2 is an indication. The Peace Action Council, organizer of the Los Angeles Century '67 disturbance, is still leading demonstrations and is now promoting the issues shown in the figure. It takes little imagination to compile a list of problems facing the nation at the present time, any of which can become a major issue for demonstrations in the future. These problems are interactive (Figure 1 - 3) and could result in some "strange bedfellows" in future disturbances.

*The evolution of causes or issues, particularly in colleges and universities, is described in detail in "The Report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest," ARNO PRESS, 1970.




Figure 1-1. Issues Studied in National Context

**WE, THE PEOPLE,
DEMAND LEGISLATIVE ACTION
NOW ! ! !**

ON THE FOLLOWING . . .

ENACTMENT OF:

H.R. 54 (HOUSE RESOLUTION 54)

INTRODUCED BY Rep. Bella Abzug (NY)
Co-sponsored by Calif. Congressmen:
Phillip Burton, Ronald Dellums,
Don Edwards, Paul McCloskey,
Edward Roybal, Jerome Walde,

SET A DATE FOR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL AMERICAN ARMED FORCES
FROM VIETNAM, CAMBODIA AND LAOS, AND THAT THIS DATE BE NO LATER
THAN JULY 4, 1971.

SUPPORT FOR:

THE IMMEDIATE ENACTMENT OF LEGISLATION WHICH WOULD PROVIDE
\$6500 A YEAR MINIMUM GUARANTEED INCOME FOR A FAMILY OF FOUR
AS DEMANDED BY THE NATIONAL WELFARE RIGHTS ORGANIZATION (NWRO).

REPEAL OF:

THE DRAFT --OPPOSE EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO INDUCT YOUNG MEN
AFTER JUNE 1, 1971.

ENACTMENT OF:

H.R. 234 (HOUSE RESOLUTION 234) INTRODUCED BY Reps. Matsunaga (Hawaii)
Kastenmeier (NY), Hollifield (CA)
PROHIBITS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EMERGENCY DETENTION CAMPS
REPEALS TITLE II OF MC CARTER ACT

PEACE ACTION COUNCIL
555 NO. WESTERN AVE., LOS ANGELES, CA. 90004
TELE. 462-8188

Figure 1-2. Handbill Distributed at 1971 Peace Rally




Figure 1-3. Typical Issue Cluster Interactions Which Can Fuel Disturbances

D. Impact on Local Issues

Many factors can impact on a local situation to trigger incidents and even major demonstrations. Indications that old issues may be reopened or new ones initiated may be provided by any of the following:

- National events, such as the Kent State tragedy or Dr. King's assassination
- Federal, state or local government policies, such as extension of the Vietnam War into Cambodia
- Arrival in town of known (or suspected) agitators
- Formation, formally or informally, of new leftist or minority organizations
- Increasing hostility toward law enforcement personnel.

When this information is received by the department's intelligence function, it is vital that there be a recognized procedure for passing it quickly to command officers, the department planning function, and even civic officials. Such pertinent data may indicate the requirement to revise contingency plans to meet new problems.

E. Issues of Specific Incidents Studied

1. Corvallis

The primary issue at OSU for the sit-in of summer school students was the failure of university administrators to promote (and thereby retain) an English professor, who had acquired a good-sized following among liberal

students. Through their protest, the students' objective was to embarrass the university president and his staff, rebel against the administrative structure, and publicize their leftist leanings.

The incident was relatively minor and superficial because (1) OSU is not a radicalized campus and (2) relatively few students were attending summer school. It was marked by presence of a known agitator, the leader of the demonstration, who urged the group to resist arrest, even as the police were leading them out.

Prior to this incident there had been campus/town demonstrations over labor issues, peace demonstrations, and minor school/racial problems. Since the 1969 sit-in, law enforcement agencies have been keeping a close watch on rock concerts in the campus gymnasium where there has been heavy use of narcotics and liquor; however, attendance by OSU students has been very low.

Ithaca

The immediate triggering issues cited by members of the Afro-American Society (AAS) for their takeover of the Cornell student union building were reprimands handed down to three black students by the Cornell Student Board for misconduct that had occurred four months previously. The building seizure represented a denial of the authority of the university judicial system because, according to the AAS, "there were no blacks on the council

and the university adjudicatory system was not in a position to judge a question involving the university itself."*

More basic than this issue was the impatience of the black students with alleged procrastination of the Cornell administration to provide an autonomous black college and a black studies program. The protest of the blacks was not calmed by the fact that only five days previously the trustees had acceded to almost all demands and had provided \$214,000 to initiate the plan.

In an attempt to establish an integrated university, the Committee on Special Education Projects (COSEP) and promoters of the Afro-American Studies program had been actively seeking to increase black enrollment. From less than 20 blacks in 1964, enrollment had grown to 250 by 1969 (100 of these were involved in the building seizure). In 1968 the Negro students began militant action to enforce their separatist ideals, including segregated housing. Women COSEP students were given their own quarters off campus at Wari House, where a cross was burned only minutes after the three reprimands were announced.

In prior incidents, the black students had exhibited disregard for the authority and prestige of Cornell's president, his staff and the faculty.

* "Campus Unrest at Cornell", Office of University Publications,
5 September 1969.

They interrupted classes with sit-ins, they disrupted a public meeting by yanking the microphone from the President, and they performed outrageous acts at student gatherings. By failing to deal with these student violations promptly, the administration lost control of the situation. By failing to recognize the violence occurring at Cornell as well as other campuses across the country, university officials were unprepared for the violence that took place.

The black students at Cornell accepted the active support of a strong SDS chapter and sympathy for their demands from other white students, in forcing the university faculty to yield. Academic freedom became a major issue to the faculty, many of whose members felt that the coercion involved in obtaining reversal of the reprimands was inimical to rational discourse and free discussion.

A significant event following the Cornell disturbance was reported in the Ithaca JOURNAL on 23 May 1969.* Cornell's newly named Black Liberation Front held a meeting in their university headquarters where the negotiated agreement had been signed on 20 April, to "discuss the atmosphere and experiences at Cornell." This meeting was attended by BLF students from North Carolina (see Durham data following) and a black ideology class was taught by a former SNCC organizer, who described the plans for a Malcolm X Liberation University made during a Durham meeting.

* "Black Students Discuss Atmosphere/Experiences at Cornell," Ithaca JOURNAL, 23 May 1969.

The following year, two of the leaders of the Cornell disturbance were attending college in North Carolina.

3. Durham

Issues behind the Duke University disturbance in February 1969 were almost identical to those at Cornell two months later--as alike as the tactics used by the Afro-American students. It is believed that both incidents were enactments of strategies developed during the black students' summit meeting at Howard University the previous Thanksgiving.* (See comparison of college disturbance vs. national events in Figure 1 - 4.)


As at Cornell, the black students at Duke submitted a list of demands to the university president, the first being initiation of a black studies program headed by Negro students. The list also included separate housing and facilities, more black students and faculty, preferential academic grading for blacks, and tucked in a labor demand for non-academic Duke employees.

The building seizure was also a slap at university authority since it flaunted disregard of rules governing protests and demonstrations recently adopted by the trustees. An interesting departure from the Cornell pattern was rejection by the black students of support by the SDS and other white students.

Also similar to the Cornell incident was the fact that Duke administrators had lost control of the campus situation by permissiveness in prior incidents.**

* "Prelude to Trouble," Cornell Alumni News, June 1969.

** Described by Observer interviewed in Durham in January 1971.



For example, students moved into the President's house after Dr. King's assassination; they threatened the President over his membership in a segregated country club; and they became involved in campus labor-management problems. Therefore, it was not unexpected that the administrators vacillated in handling the situation, alternately threatening, coaxing, calling in Durham police, and negotiating with the students.

After the incident, a new set of issues was debated, including police being called to the campus, police brutality, new demands by black students, plans to establish an off-campus Malcolm X Liberation University. A black organizer from North Carolina Central University led the protests, threatening to bring other blacks onto the campus to enforce the demands.

4. Atlanta

The triggering incident of the Boulevard ghetto riots--the shooting of the Negro boy and the resulting rumors that sped through the neighborhood--is typical of many civil disturbances, including the Summerhill incident in Atlanta just four days earlier. There is still disagreement, however, as to whether the specific issue was the shooting itself, or the preferential treatment by the ambulance crew accorded a white policeman injured while responding to the first shooting.

Officers interviewed believed that the first night--Saturday--of the riots was in truth a citizen/police confrontation and that racial issues did not become a part of the incident until the second day, when agitators from SNCC infiltrated the neighborhood, and focused the issue on release of the SNCC chairman from jail. The Atlanta civic leadership, accustomed to working with SCLC leaders to resolve the problems of the Negroes, discovered that they could no longer count on SCLC control of the black community.

The riot tended to polarize the black/white citizens of Atlanta. The Atlanta Police Department's reputation for even-handed law enforcement remains, but conflict in the ghetto has since been intensified. Today there is evidence that, notwithstanding efforts at both the civic and police levels to prevent open clashes, the basic issues still exist. Atlanta seems to provide more avenues for dialog between the white and black communities than do other cities. The history of civil rights demonstrations in America is traced graphically in Figure 1 - 5.

5. Cincinnati

The ostensible issue behind the 1968 Cincinnati riot was the rage of the Negroes over the death of Dr. King. This issue, according to the black community leaders, was to be expressed in a peaceful memorial service. However, there are many in the black community itself who believe that




Figure 1-5. Geographic Distribution of Typical Civil Rights Incidents

the memorial was a device to distract police attention while the militants moved out to "take over" the entire city.*

The window breaking and looting of the state liquor store and almost simultaneous shooting of a black woman are believed to have been triggered by young black hoodlums, who were not part of the militant movement. As a matter of fact, their vandalism is believed to have ruined the militant plot. Whether or not this plot is fact cannot be proved conclusively. However, there is documented evidence of attacks on peaceful black leaders who are attempting to organize their people to work with civic officials and organizations in alleviating the minority inequities. These attacks, as described in the Cincinnati ENQUIRER, usually consist of firebombing of the leader's home or business.

Nationwide attention has been given to the lack of black representation in civic government and school boards in Cincinnati. There was also, in 1968, a very low percentage of blacks in the police and fire departments, and there was little communication between minorities and law enforcement personnel. Since that time both the police and fire departments have been actively recruiting minority officers. Presently being considered by the Cincinnati City Council is an eight-point proposal to improve the city's Police-Community Relations program.

* Described by Observer interviewed in Cincinnati in January 1971.

From a sociological point of view, an issue common to Atlanta and Cincinnati minorities is inadequate low-cost housing, a problem being compounded by Urban Renewal Programs in the inner city. Ghetto areas are being razed to make room for freeways, high-rise buildings, sports stadiums, convention and civic centers, and acres of parking lots. Construction of low cost housing units has not proceeded as planned; therefore, ghetto living is more crowded and incendiary than previously.

6. Anaheim

The Yippie Convention was probably instigated by leaders of the Youth International Party at headquarters in the East, since earliest intelligence of the plan originated there. The Yippies chose 6 August as a symbolic protest against the Hiroshima bombing. More specifically, they chose Disneyland as a target because it is a symbol of "square" America. To quote Communism and the New Left,* -- "The avowed aim of the Yippies is to destroy 'The Man' -- their term for the Establishment and its present system of government. Their message to young people: 'Revolution is fun.'". Their specific stated objectives at Disneyland were to: (1) close the park, (2) achieve national publicity, (3) ridicule law enforcement, and (4) symbolically raise a foreign flag over a U. S. fort. All these objectives, local college students believe, were accomplished.

*Communism and the New Left - U. S. News and World Report, Inc.
Washington D. C. - 1970

The disturbance at Disneyland occurred during the summer of 1970, when young people had been demonstrating in many Orange County communities. At California State College in Fullerton, anti-war demonstrators escalated events to the point that college buildings were damaged, a campus utility structure was burned, and there were student confrontations with police and outraged taxpayers. Many of the incidents were purportedly triggered by reports of the Kent State student deaths and the moving of U. S. troops into Cambodia.

After school was out for the summer, young agitators took over Fullerton's Hillcrest Park, held rock concerts there and violated city ordinances governing use of alcohol and drugs in a public park. These Sunday get-togethers might be classified as a school or college issue, since those participating were, in large number, students at Fullerton high schools, junior college, and state college. However, the protests were against civic "establishment" rather than a school issue.

In Anaheim a rock festival that attracted 24,000 to the city baseball stadium in July erupted into disorder, as did a rock concert at the Convention Center the first of November.

Were these independent happenings?

Orange County, California, law enforcement personnel, taking a hard look at these events, are beginning to suspect that the issues claimed as the

basis for demonstrations are convenient fabrications. Familiar faces appear frequently in the different crowds--an indication that a hard core of activists is inciting the young people into more aggressive behavior and taking advantage of every possible opportunity for fomenting violence while they escape undetected. In most local cases, police tactics have been successful in culling out the alleged offenders; arrests have brought in a preponderance of out-of-towners.

7. Los Angeles

The wide spectrum of public opinion concerned with the Government's policy on the Vietnamese War encompassed every facet of liberal opinion, from experienced militant activists to business men and housewives who had no prior political experience. Newspaper accounts report 70 groups were united by the Peace Action Council to plan the peace demonstrations although the Los Angeles Police Department refers to only 28, apparently the organizations believed to contain militant members.

Cleavage between militant and moderate organizers on the issue of civil disobedience was reported in the press on 16 June. The militant factions were able to gain control, but kept the door open for moderate participation; this set the stage for the confrontation that followed. The crowd that assembled at Cheviot Hills Playground came with a variety of motives ranging from curiosity, to deep concern, to desire for confrontation.

This diversity was reflected by the rally speakers, whose remarks ranged from mild to inflammatory.

Intelligence, underground newspapers, and reports of informers shaped the police image of the demonstrators, leadership and purpose. Many of the leaders were well known local leftists, some with long records of participation in "front" causes. It was also recognized that many of the protestors had only the most innocent intentions. To the police, the President's safety was the real issue.

To the vast majority of honest protestors, the President was not in danger. Unfortunately, by design or by chance, they were the ones who took the brunt of the police assault. This could not have been more propitious to the radicals, who now had the issue of police brutality and overreaction to stimulate the revolt against the establishment.

Evolution of Los Angeles Disturbance Issues

Since the Watts race riot of 11 - 18 August 1965, when 34 were killed and \$35 million damage was suffered, a number of major disturbances in the metropolitan Los Angeles area have occurred. The incidents can be classified as racial, anti-war, school/anti-war, school/racial, and anti-war/racial, in terms of issues. The evolution of major Los Angeles disturbances in terms of simplified issue sets is grossly illustrated in Figure 1-6.

Predominantly racial issues were involved at Watts and Mini-Watts in




Figure 1-6. Evolution of Major Los Angeles Disturbances Since 1964 by Predominant Issues

1966. No racial disturbances erupted after the Martin Luther King assassination; however, racial issues were prime components in school disturbances from 1967 to 1970.

The most clear cut anti-war demonstration was the Century City disturbance and Vietnam Day observances of 1968 and 1969, which did not create serious problems for the Los Angeles Police Department. Although anti-war sentiment was the most significant component of the UCLA event of 5 May 1970 (following Kent State), this issue also had ethnic overtones (Chicano).

In 1970-71 the racial emphasis shifted from the black community to the Mexican-Americans. The Peace Action Council, which sponsored the Century City demonstration, has also been active in the Chicano demonstrations.

TASK 2

LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS DESCRIBED BY PHASES

A. Comparison of Disturbance Profiles

When the five phases prescribed by the Statement of Work are overlayed on the timetables of the incidents studied, typical patterns emerge for the three different types or categories of events. In addition, each type of disturbance exhibits unique characteristics during each of the phases.

As shown in Figure 2 - 1:

- o College/university protests tend to produce a disturbance envelope with long Pre-Crowd and Post-Demonstration phases, slow escalation through the Crowd Phase and fast-peaking Demonstration Phases.
- o Civil rights demonstrations, which usually occur within the minority community, are marked by an initial high level of tension and an existing crowd, which is triggered by a single violent incident almost instantaneously to the Demonstration-Disorderly Phase, during which there are recurring peaks of violence over several days. Police, keeping a watchful eye on the still simmering ghetto, tend to stretch out the Post-Demonstration Phase.
- o Street/park demonstrations protesting government policy




Figure 2-1. Disturbance Envelopes for Three Types of Demonstrations

or action are marked by an extremely long Pre-Crowd Phase, slow gathering of the crowd, a brief period of planned orderly demonstration, flaring into violence which lasts only a few hours before dispersal of the crowd, which leaves the area to return to their homes.

Typical dissident attitudes and actions during the five phases, according to the three disturbance categories are presented in Table 2 - 1.

It seems reasonable to conclude, based upon the summary data, that the type (or issue) of disturbance controls the disturbance profile, as well as determining the composition of the crowd, their tactics and the locale of the incident. Therefore, it appears logical that law enforcement agencies should recognize the patterns and prepare at least three sets of contingency or operations plans in anticipation of various categories of disturbances.

Unique command and control problems are imposed by the different disturbance profiles and are readily apparent. Police can plan, train and deploy well in advance for advertised street/park demonstrations. If intelligence gathered by the police from college newspapers and student and faculty contacts is properly assessed, the department will be alert to pending campus disturbances and have time to prepare response. However, unless the patrolmen on the beat are feeding information into the police intelligence net on a regular basis, the department may be caught off-guard.

TABLE 2 - 1
PHASE CHARACTERISTICS BY DISTURBANCE TYPE

PHASE	COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY	CIVIL RIGHTS (Excluding non-violent demonstrations)	STREET/PARK
Pre-Crowd	Secretly planned 3 to 5 days in advance Organized agitators, including off-campus leaders Attempts to degrade and embarrass college officials College administration unprepared for action	High level of tension and unrest Frequent violent incidents Attempts to organize by civil rights leaders No formal incident planning	Long planning period -- formal plan prepared Announced objectives Public announcements and advertising Appeal to many elements
Crowd	Crowd collects after initial action is taken by few Size and composition of crowd changes	Crowd already exists on streets because of crowded housing Solid minority crowd, usually residents, with a few agitators	Long period of crowd assembly Staged entertainment to attract crowd Crowd composition consistent (usually)
Demonstration Orderly	Relatively quiet Attempt to gain sympathy and agitate crowd of on-lookers Attempt to negotiate demands	Phase is practically non-existent Explosive triggering incident (usually shooting)	Quite formal -- follows announced protest plan Misdemeanors by crowd triggers dispersal order (picketing, pushing, sit-downs)
Demonstration Disorderly	Triggered by appearance of city police on campus Can be avoided by: (1) arrests before crowds form (2) capitulation to dissident demands	Triggered by violent incident Starts with minority/police confrontation Usually occurs in evening Usually weather dependent Crowd disperses into homes returns to riot next day Agitators take advantage of disorder Extremely violent--arson, looting, attacks on police and equipment Can be avoided only by prior civic/police/community actions	Starts with rock throwing by crowd and dispersal order by police Agitators leave police facing citizens Little damage; few injuries Crowd divided into small groups, leave area to return to homes Phase unavoidable if protest leaders are intent on confrontation
Post Demonstration	Long period of more demands, negotiations, discussions Few arrests, few convictions	Heavy police patrol for several days Attempt at community reconciliation by police Many arrests, many convictions	Civic discussions Police brutality claims Relatively few arrests, low conviction rate

by the typical sudden outburst of a civil rights demonstration. Contingency or emergency plans must then be implemented to effect immediate perimeter control and mobilize forces.

B. Duration of Phases in Specific Incidents

During the course of this study, it became apparent that no single measurement for disturbance level of intensity could be applied to all types of disturbances. The amplitude of the disturbance is not solely dependent on the violence of dissident acts, but also can be determined by such elements as numbers of demonstrators, numbers of law enforcement personnel, potential danger to life and property, police loss of control of the situation, etc.

The duration of the five phases during each of the incidents studied is itemized in Table 2 - 2.

C. Critique of Phasing Structure

The greatest weakness of the disturbance phasing concept lies in the requirement to arbitrarily determine the thresholds for beginning and end of each phase. For example:

- o Should the Pre-Demonstration Phase include prior disturbances or only the immediate build-up or planning period for the incident studied?
- o What constitutes the formation of a crowd--and how many people are a crowd?

- o How do you classify a violent act that occurs before a demonstration starts, and in itself acts to attract a crowd?
- o Does commission of a crime--such as seizure of a building--constitute a disorderly demonstration? If so, the Crowd Phase does not occur until after the Disorderly Phase.

In analyzing the data derived on these seven disturbances, the following ground rules were established for each phase:

Pre-Crowd Includes only those events specifically relevant to the incident being studied; prior incidents are described as city or campus environment.

Crowd Covers only the time that demonstrators or onlookers (other than the hard-core agitators) are gathering.

Demonstration-Oberly The period of non-violent activity by the assembled crowd.

Demonstration-Disorderly The period of police/demonstrator confrontation, marked by misdemeanor and felonious acts by dissidents.

Post-Demonstration The period of continued police patrol after crowd dispersal, arrests and arraignments, resumption of police/community relations, and campus or civic complaints and debates. It does not cover the lengthy period of court appearances and appeals.

TABLE 2 - 2

DURATION OF PHASES

CITY	Type of Disturbance	Pre-Crowd	Dem. Crowd	Dem. Orderly	Dem. Disorderly	Post Dem.
Corvallis	College/ University	7 days	None	3-1/2 hrs.	None	2 hrs.
Ithaca	College/ University	21 hrs.	36 hrs.	30 min.	None	5 days
Durham	College/ University	2-1/2 days	10-1/2 hrs.	5 min.	4 hrs.	4 days
Atlanta	Civil Rights	25 min.	10 min.	25 min.	49 hrs.	7 days
Cincinnati	Civil Rights	3-1/2 days	3-1/2 hrs.	25 min.	6 hrs.	4 days
Anaheim	Street/ Park	6 wks.	7-1/2 hrs.	45 min.	2 hrs.	3-1/2 hrs.
Los Angeles	Street/ Park	6 wks.	8-1/2 hrs.	50 min.	2 hrs.	3-1/4 hrs.

TASK 3

LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS RELATED
TO POLICE PREPARATIONS AND RESPONSE

A. Identification of Fundamental Command and Control Problems

A significant conclusion derived from this study is the need for clear definition of command and control in a system context. Evaluation of the data and continued examination of the literature reveal that established command and control concepts have not been explicitly or formally applied to the civil/police environment. What is needed is a heuristic model to provide a structure within which facts can begin to be ordered rationally. Although many related law enforcement problems are beyond the scope of this command and control oriented study, the test of relevance must be based on definition of command and control.

I. Definition

A Command and Control System is an interactive arrangement of

1. equipment facilities
2. personnel skills, and
3. Procedures which enable effective human decision-making at various echelons of command to accomplish an assigned mission with optimum employment of resources.

The law enforcement mission during disturbances is to minimize human injury and property damage while restoring the peace.

2. System Elements

To implement a Command and Control System, the elements must function together efficiently so that they facilitate the functions of realtime monitoring, evaluation of data, and decision-making. In current military command and control systems, the equipment facilities may include sophisticated operations centers containing electronic equipment designed to aid the human decision maker. The operator positions frequently have automated display consoles and controls, in addition to the traditional status boards and logs. The most vital element is the personnel skills of an experienced watch commander or duty officer or a trained console operator or maintenance man. The system's procedures, developed by system designers and users on the basis of previous effective similar systems, are implemented through careful combination of tasks and required human actions. Communications provide the information flow which ties the total process together.

3. System Use

The ultimate usefulness of a Command and Control System depends on its capability to provide and display the information required for the commander to make correct decisions and its capability to transmit those decisions to the action elements of the force. The final goal of the entity served by the Command and Control System is to get the assigned job done efficiently in a timely manner. Because any force has limited resources, optimum employment of the resources maximizes total effectiveness.

4. Differences Between Civil/Police and Military Command and Control

From a philosophical viewpoint, civil/police command and control differs from military systems by their objectives and the location of their operation. Civil/police systems are embedded in the peacetime domestic environment; they are constrained by law, custom and the local citizenry to whom they are ultimately responsible. The impact on civilians of both long and short range results must be considered in developing strategy and tactics. Except for the internal functioning of the police organization, the word "command" is a misnomer, since civil authority is wielded by permission of the constituents. Resources, provided by a city or area, are not all directly under the control of the law enforcement agency.

By contrast, in a wartime foreign environment, the military command is by direction of the President and Congress and they have direct control of a wide array of resources. The military are not held accountable in the same way as civil/police forces. For example, the area commander need not run for reelection, nor is the tactical commander constrained by worry as to the aftermath of the war. Military objectives are more clear cut and immediate; long range social impact is not weighted as heavily as in the civilian environment.

From an equipment viewpoint, however, the civilian and military command and control systems are quite similar. The basic urgency and implementa-

tion problems are identical. Perhaps the only significant difference lies in the environmental realm, since military equipment must function worldwide and under less than ideal conditions. This difference, of course, accounts for the great cost differential between the two sets of hardware.

5. The Abstract Model

Abstractly, a Command and Control System can be depicted as an information flow network designed for both lateral and vertical interaction, with decision nodes specified in the light of the network's goal. Figure 3 - 1 depicts an information flow network with field sensor inputs feeding data to decision nodes and processing upward aggregated data for decisions at higher levels. A basic problem, already identified in this study, is the large quantity of unprocessed, detailed data that is sent forward in parallel (usually by monitoring the same tactical frequency.) Also, decision nodes are not clearly




Figure 3-1. Generalized Command and Control Information Flow Network

defined and formalized, especially between the authority of the city fathers and the police. Law enforcement goals, as the action arm of civil authority, are sometimes subverted because that authority (either in terms of officials or prior statutes or precedents) is not available in a critical real-time situation. This abstract model is useful in developing a generalized system concept for civil/police command and control.

6. The Model Applied to Civil/Police Command and Control

During this study, significant law enforcement command and control problems have been identified, such as: complicated structures, lack of summary data for decision making, unevaluated field intelligence data, lack of experienced command post cadre, lack of experienced field tacticians, lack of an overall press policy, inadequate personnel status data, lack of timely situation data, lack of uniform data between field and center, a fantastic paper burden, etc. Communications saturation, always critical under stress conditions, is exacerbated by many of these problems. The objectives of an effective law enforcement Command and Control System are summarized in Table 3 - 1 with the overall system requirements to achieve the objectives.

A significant problem has been defined in the division of strategic and tactical command functions during a disturbance. Typically, field forces at the incident operate under a tactical commander who is supported by a fixed police center facility. In order to efficiently utilize the city's resources, certain tasks should be planned and coordinated at the police

TABLE 3 - 1

COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM OBJECTIVES AND REQUIREMENTS

System Objectives

- Rapid situation assessment
- Rapid mobilization and deployment of appropriate manpower and equipment
- Monitor and direct field forces in real time
- Minimize paper load
- Adequate communications
- Up-to-date, uniform data base at both central and field posts

Overall System Requirements

- Monitor current situation
- Monitor and direct current operations
- Maintain manpower status and assignment data
- Provide and disseminate evaluated intelligence data
- Perform field tactical command functions
- Perform strategic planning
- Interface with intelligence planning and data gathering
- Perform logistic support planning
- Issue and maintain equipment records
- Maintain equipment status data
- Perform strategic command functions
- Interface with fire, ambulance and other city services
- Perform resource allocation
- Interface with normal city operations
- Interface with lateral and higher command echelons
- Provide communications
- Perform current and periodic reporting
- Provide press liaison
- Interface with detention and courts

center rather than in the field. Mutual or state aid, which must be requested by the appropriate echelon of civil command, requires more coordination than is possible in the field. Failure to provide properly structured and defined command chains, particularly between police and civil authorities, frequently results in confusion during the event and unpleasantries afterwards.

An approach to law enforcement command and control based on the distinction between strategic (civic-oriented) support functions and tactical (field) operations is recommended because it allows definition of the type of information needed for decision at various command echelons. This is particularly important because the study indicates that a major obstacle to efficient command and control is the volume of microscopic information forwarded without evaluation, in parallel but not in synchronism, throughout the system. In Table 3-2 typical tasks are listed, many of which are presently performed as indicated but not formally identified in the terminology applied here. Identification of this decision structure guides the formalization of an information flow model.

7. Information Flow Concept

An information flow concept for civil/police Command and Control Systems is predicated on a linear model of sensor inputs (men, cameras, etc.) being processed for tactical control in the field and forwarded in summarized form for strategic decisions at higher echelons. Note in Figure 3 - 2 that the kind of decisions made influences the granularity of the derived infor-

mation requirements. In this model, the field commander is relieved from making high-level strategic decisions, and authority rests at the appropriate police or civic echelons.

TABLE 3-2
TYPICAL DECISION STRUCTURE OF STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL COMMAND FUNCTIONS

Strategic Requirements	Tactical Requirements
Evaluate current situations for impact on remainder of city, county, and state.	Monitor and direct current operations.
Develop overall civic/police strategy.	Evaluate tactical situation.
Receive and process requests for tactical support.	Request forces and equipment
Develop policy guidelines.	Define field tactics.
Develop overall operations plan.	Deploy field forces.
Request and coordinate city support.	Monitor progress of field forces against deployment plan and adjust.
Evaluate Operations Plan implementation.	Receive and process requests for information and resources from the field.
Identify strategic/legal constraints.	Provide logistic field support.
Define press policy.	Evaluate and forward intelligence obtained from deployed field forces.
Assess intelligence data.	
Coordinate requests with tactical commander.	




Figure 3-2. Information Flow Concept for Disturbances

B. Summary of Law Enforcement Command and Control Problems

In quelling disturbances, the law enforcement agencies in all seven cities were faced with a set of generic command and control problems such as: intelligence gathering and utilization, evaluation of potential crowd size and mood, operations planning, special training, field command strategy, operational tactics, communications, and post-event legal, press and community interfaces. In each city, the police encountered specific aspects of the generic problems.

A summary of the major generic problems and a breakdown of some specific problems within each category is presented in Table 3 - 3 (page 65).

In section C of this Task 3, the specific problems of each city are examined in detail with a definition of the police response and a tentative evaluation of the appropriateness and effectiveness of that response.

While a seven-city sample is not sufficient to arrive at conclusive results, some interesting correlations appear. Comparing the type of specific problems, it appears that geographic location does not have any significant bearing on law enforcement command and control problems. Other factors, such as nearby high collegiate enrollment or large minority communities, dictate to a great extent the types of disturbances and intensity of violence that may be expected.

Probably the most significant factor impacting law enforcement command

and control problems is city-size. The problems of the small city are magnified, as "neighborness" is lost in the large metropolitan areas.

1. Small City Problems and Police Response

In the small city (less than 250,000), undercover work is extremely difficult because everyone knows everyone else. Or, if one man shows up at too many different affairs, he is soon recognized. In Corvallis, Oregon, a new recruit is used to infiltrate campus radical meetings before he first dons a uniform. However, in the small city, the intelligence that IS obtained can be used immediately and effectively since there is no long, complex police department chain of command through which it must filter before action can be taken.

A small city police department has a more informal interface with other civic officials, thereby simplifying civic and legal strategizing. It is also usually closer to the people. Commanding officers and patrolmen, alike, are acquainted with community, campus and minority leaders; therefore, they can resolve many situations by rational discussions or calm a disturbance by compromise.

The small police department tends to have informal training classes and exercises, and to do little detailed advance planning to cope with demonstrations. For the small city, general disaster and contingency plans, which define prime and backup responsibility, are an excellent precaution as demonstrated by two cities - Corvallis and Anaheim.

Organization of the small police department is straightforward. The strengths and weaknesses of each individual officer are known to his commanding officer so there is seldom misjudgment in task assignments.

Probably the biggest problem of the small city police department is the need for backup forces in case of an extensive incursion of out-of-town agitators or pleasure seekers or if there is a campus incident. Small cities in a rural area need a clear cut mutual aid plan which includes common riot control training and compatible equipment and which is backed up by county sheriff and state police forces. Training should be such that all forces can be integrated and commanding officers interchanged to provide tactical flexibility.

2. Large City Problems and Police Response

As the city population grows, the police department must be increased in size to deal with the higher crime rate and the potential crowd-handling problems. Since large police departments do, indeed, grow, many of them have unwieldy, level-on-level organizational structures that defeat rapid dissemination of data through the system.

Intelligence inputs from undercover agents may not be correlated and evaluated properly and may even be sidetracked before they reach the decision making echelon. The patrolman on his beat is vitally aware of inequities in minority communities, yet the complex organization may not provide him means of alerting the civic authorities to potential "hot spots" where

rebellion may erupt. Progressive large police departments are developing community and press relations bureaus which encourage the exchange of data among police, civic officials, community leaders, campus administrators and citizens. This approach facilitates generation of preventive strategies, coordination of planning and action between local agencies, and direct officer-to-citizen interchange and understanding.

Because of the large number of men on the force, it is impossible for a tactical commander during a disturbance, to know the skills and aptitudes of all men assigned. He requires extensive personnel records, status boards, and summary data to use them effectively, and effective disturbance control depends on extensive planning and preparation.

Each officer on a typical large city police department undergoes extensive formal recruit training, daily roll-call training, and frequent riot (or disaster) control exercises. Intensive identical training is essential for effective integration of officers from all city precincts to handle emergencies. Many large police departments offer specialty training in the use of tear gas, in handling limp prisoners, for hunter/spotter details, for flying squads, etc., thereby freeing the main forces for such tactics as saturation patrol, show-of-force squad formations and perimeter control. Hiring of minority personnel (blacks and Chicanos) for example, is encouraged, so that whole squads can be sent into the midst of civil rights disturbances and relate directly with the demonstrators. In some instances this does

not have the desired immediate calming effect, but the rioters are not further agitated by white officers in their minority community.

A different type of augmentation force is required for large cities. Sufficient manpower is available within the department to handle most disturbances by mobilizing on 12-hour shifts. If backup support is required, it must be massive. Therefore, activation of the National Guard is the logical step for the large city police department, and all training and planning (including communications compatibility) should be based on ready integration of the local police department and the National Guard.

Thus, it can be seen that the major factor impacting the types of law enforcement command and control problems is city-size--hence police department size. Analysis of these command and control problems results in definition of police department needs, which drives the formulation of Recommended Procedures, Methods and Techniques, presented in Task 4.

TABLE 3 - 3

GENERIC AND SPECIFIC COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS

PLANNING Basic Problems	SECONDARY PROBLEMS
Intelligence	Undetected infiltration of dissident organizations Reduction of "new" intelligence into usable data Means of integrating intelligence inputs into civic, police, and campus decision making Provision for rumor control and "debunking"
Threat Assessment	Realistic evaluation of danger to human life, property damage and potential disruption Estimation of crowd size, composition, hostility
Constraints	Early identification of legal options and restraints Definition of jurisdictional and police commitment ground rules with private owners and universities Impact on enforcement options of changing legal interpretations
Plan Preparation	Policy guidelines and resolution of jurisdictional problems by top level civic and campus administrators Organization for planning Mobilization procedures

TABLE 3 - 3 (Continued)

TRAINING	
Basic Problems	SECONDARY PROBLEMS
Discipline in Face of Hostile Crowd	Ability to withstand verbal abuse Ability to withstand long periods of tension before commitment and then not over-react Physical integration of squads and platoons under harassment
Weapons Employment	Selection of appropriate weapons Proper use of baton Special training for chemical munitions Special weapon tactics for crowd control (e.g., fire into ground, etc.)
Special Training	Mass arrest procedures and violation code selection Counter-sniper, counter-guerilla Helicopter/ground team tactics Use of hand-held radio equipment and communications netting discipline
Command	One man in overall command Field command tactics for crowd control Organization of the field tactical force Familiarization with contingency plans and UO procedures and doctrine
Coordinated Training	Joint training with mutual aid, national guard, private security forces Command post cadre training Command post and joint force practice exercises Provisions for post-event critique

TABLE 3 - 3 (Continued)

OPERATIONS	
Basic Problems	SECONDARY PROBLEMS
Crowd Assessment	Accurate methods for estimating crowd size Intelligence operatives recognized by crowd (especially when they carry hand-held radios) Accurate estimation of potential hostility and crowd movement
Constraints	Control by private owners or civic officials of police commitment time table Civic/campus guidelines on use of chemical munitions Legal constraints on arrests: curfew, riot act, trespassing, disturbing peace City ordinances dealing with use of parks, picket signs, loitering, etc.
Strategy	Alternate methods which do not require use of force Avoid charges of police brutality Avoid death or injury to police and citizens and property damage Police misuse of available weapons
Terrain	Dispersal areas or routes Availability to dissidents of weapons of opportunity (rocks, bricks, etc.) Wind and weather conditions for use of chemical agents Dead-end streets and alleys used for ambush and snipers
Field Tactics	Perimeter control requires considerable manpower Effectiveness of sweeps dependent upon street environment Saturation patrol, effectiveness reduced by insufficient manpower Low profile tactic effective but costly and time consuming

TABLE 3 - 3^(Continued)

OPERATIONS	
Basic Problem	SECONDARY PROBLEMS
Command	Complicated transition to a completely different organization for disturbance control Distinction between strategic and tactical functions Confusion between field operations and base support tasks Summary status data on personnel and equipment Critical time to move in and defuse riot Lack of practice with one overall commander
Control	Timely police unit location information Real-time manpower availability and commitment data Established liaison mechanisms with private security forces Aerial surveillance data
Communications	Insufficient radio frequencies Incompatible radio frequencies Switchboard saturation Handie-talkie radio failure (batteries, lack of range, etc.)
Press	Timely release of comprehensive report on incident Coordination between newsmen and deployed police personnel during incident
Legal	Prisoner identification inadequate to support convictions Inappropriate codes used for booking Slow mass booking mechanics Inadequate methods for processing complaints against police

C. Specific Law Enforcement Command and Control Problems of Disturbances Studied

1. Corvallis Police Department

There were no significant weaknesses in the command and control structure during the Corvallis incident. Fundamentally, the environment was favorable to law enforcement because of traditional cooperation between campus and town. There were no strong militant elements on campus and no outside minority or militant support.

The university administration was in full control, having recognized the need for contingency planning as early as 1967 and initiated a continuous exchange of information between campus and civic authorities. When the sit-in occurred, the university administration, civic officials, the police and the district attorney were prepared. Police were given accurate estimates of the number of demonstrators and their mood by university personnel. Competent legal advice was provided that ensured later convictions.

University administrators worked with police to set a realistic schedule; once mobilized, the police were not kept waiting. They drove to the campus and proceeded directly about their business, thereby avoiding crowd formation outside the building. All proper legal procedures were followed, including photographs of the suspects with the arresting officers. Assessment of reasonable bail and reasonable fines upon conviction reduced the potential for subsequent rancor.

COMMAND & CONTROL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED	CORVALLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT APPROACH	PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
PLANNING		
Contingency plans	Policies and plans developed by university administration and all local law enforcement agencies	Police guidelines and responsibilities defined; permitted rapid response to emergency
Coordination with university	Responsible personnel at university and police agencies identified	Prevented confusion; authority clearly defined
Availability of university officials	Direct communications between civic officials, police, campus security and university administration	By maintaining open lines of communication, situation could be assessed and coordinated rapidly
Intelligence	Campus security cooperated with city police in monitoring out-of-state cars and any other unknown vehicles, newspapers and handbills. Infiltrated "radical" meetings	Presence of known trouble makers on rural campus frequently traceable to presence of strange cars, etc. Campus security and police had accurate picture of dissidents
Command post location	A pre-selected site for a campus command post available adjacent to scene of disturbance	Not needed; pre-planning could save time and enhance security of decision-making personnel
Communications plan	Command post location influenced by availability of telephone and radio facilities	Not needed, but an excellent precaution
Logistics plan	Sworn officers issued riot gear individually	Permits rapid deployment
TRAINING		
Riot training	All police personnel trained - annual refresher courses	Training out of public sight, an excellent practice
Consistent procedures throughout state	All city, sheriff, and state officers receive identical training	Eliminates confusion in tactical situations; permits greater command flexibility
Joint exercises with campus security force	Joint training in gym held annually	Joint training and exercising develops more efficient operation
OPERATIONS		
PRE-CROWD	NONE	
CROWD	NO PROBLEMS	
Demonstration Orderly Phase		
Notification to police of sit-in	No indecision by administration; faculty and students not involved; police aware as soon as event occurred	Rapid decisive response was possible
Request for police assistance	Pre-arranged procedures and plans dictated anticipated response	Police could act immediately and reduce danger of angry confrontations
Police mobilization	Rapid mobilization procedure and shift change increased readily available manpower	Mobilization time was a fundamental consideration in establishing eviction timetable

COMMAND & CONTROL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED	CORVALLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT APPROACH	PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
OPERATIONS (Continued)		
Request for legal advice	District attorney advised police and administration on legal procedures	Because appropriate code was cited, convictions were obtained
Deployment on campus	Police moved into area rapidly, arrested trespassers, departed immediately	Rapid on-and-off campus deployment prevented crowd build-up
Police appearance	Moved in formation down the hall	Precise professional movements impressed students
Arrest procedure	Students were given dispersal order and notified of rights	Strict attention to legal requirements eliminated grounds for appeal
Removal of leader	Key troublemaker recognized, arrested first and removed from building	By removing leader first, rest of group were not hostile
Arrestee field processing	Photograph made of each suspect with two arresting officers as they left office	Eliminated problems of identification during trial
DEMONSTRATION-DISORDERLY PHASE: NONE		
Post Demonstration Phase		
Booking	Did not fingerprint suspects	Police felt this was a mistake, would have facilitated future identification
Bail	Realistic bail set	Prevented charges of excessive bail
Convictions	All suspects convicted and fined \$50 without long legal delay	By obtaining convictions which withstood appeal, the law enforcement position was reinforced

2. Ithaca Police Department and Cornell Security Division

Although Ithaca police were fully mobilized and specially trained sheriff's personnel were garrisoned in Ithaca during the disturbance, they were not called to the campus by University officials. The campus security force of 27 men was expected to handle the problems under the direction of the university administration. Many serious problems arose because there had been no previous contingency planning and the administration could not decide on a course of action.

The policy of the administration was to prevent bloodshed at any cost.

They refused to bring outside police agencies on campus for fear of triggering violent response, and they would not allow campus security to take positive action. Campus security officers estimated that 300 men would be required to clear the barricaded building; forceful entry would require outside police forces. Similarly, the administration feared that serving a court injunction might require outside police forces to enforce it. The administration sought to involve students and faculty in the liberation and thereby reduce tension and prevent violence.

Because the university administration wanted to regain control without loss of life, to control rumors, and to prevent confrontation between campus groups, campus security officers allowed blacks to move freely in and out of the building, but barred white students.

The introduction of guns into the building on Saturday night was a

contingency no one expected. Thereafter, the administration's job of negotiating with the blacks became more difficult; the agreement between the Afro-American Society and the university administration reached on Sunday was prepared under duress.

In the following table, the command and control problems of Ithaca and Tompkins County law enforcement agencies are addressed first, followed by a review of the Cornell security force's problems.

COMMAND & CONTROL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED	ITHACA POLICE DEPARTMENT APPROACH	PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
<u>PLANNING</u>		
Advance planning	Contingency plans coordinated with university were lacking	Lack of advance planning reduced options available to both university administration and law enforcement personnel
Intelligence	University discouraged own security officers and others from monitoring campus political activity	Political activity using university facilities should have been discouraged, thereby removing the reason for infiltration
Evaluation of potential trouble	City police kept in touch with campus police, and performed routine patrol of campus	Scanty data did not provide adequate visibility
<u>TRAINING</u>		
Special riot control skills	Called in specially trained state force of sheriff's deputies	New York State sheriff deputies well trained in disturbance control. However, police in small cities with large collegiate population require special demonstration control training
Police/campus security field exercises	Normal daily operations well coordinated but not for the emergency	Joint training and joint exercises in demonstration control, etc., could save lives and time in an emergency
<u>OPERATIONS</u>		
<u>Pre-Crowd Phase</u>		
Back up campus police	Responded to crossburning and false alarms	Ithaca police and fire departments alert to campus problems; unable to act except when called
<u>Crowd Phase</u>		
Notification of building seizure by university officials	Mobilized force on 12-hour duty, activated mutual aid, alerted state authorities	Precaution was prudent and justified
Independent evaluation of situation	Plain clothesmen at scene	Reasonable approach since communications with campus authorities were inadequate
<u>Demonstration-Orderly</u>		
Notification of guns in building	Requested additional forces from state	Could not act because aid not requested
Avoid inciting students	Maintain low profile	Best approach to avoid confrontation and alarming citizens
<u>DEMONSTRATION-DISORDERLY</u>	NONE	
<u>Post Demonstration Phase</u>		
Maintain adequate forces	Department mobilized, sheriff's personnel, mutual aid alerted	While the campus situation was unstable this was the prudent approach
Contain unrest at Cornell campus	Maintain close watch on Ithaca College events	Ithaca College administration yielded to demands, did not request assistance

COMMAND & CONTROL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED	ITHACA POLICE DEPARTMENT APPROACH	PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
<u>Post Demonstration Phase</u> (Continued)		
Maintain control of city racial problem	Police chief and mayor met with Cornell students regarding arrest of disorderly black youth in bar	Face-to-face discussion of incident avoided possible demonstration
<u>CORNELL CAMPUS SECURITY FORCES APPROACH</u>		
<u>PLANNING</u>		
Emergency or contingency planning	No contingency planning because university administration did not recognize potential for violence	Previous planning would have permitted rapid decisive action when needed
Intelligence evaluation	Campus security did not have direct access to university president for policy discussions	Security force unable to correlate own observations of student unrest with administration attitudes
<u>TRAINING</u>		
Special training	Very little special crowd control training for officers; squad training only for sergeants	Small campus force inadequate in number and training
<u>OPERATIONS</u>		
<u>Pre-Crowd Phase</u>		
Response to false fire alarms	Campus police backed up by Ithaca police and fire departments	Investigations did not identify culprits; no arrests were made
Response to cross burning at Wari House	Both Ithaca and campus police responded initially. Continued to patrol area and posted guard. Investigated incident following day	Although this action was criticized later, possibility of fires in other dormitories justified action. Investigation was not pursued to apprehend arsonists
Growing campus lawlessness	Hands-off for fear of precipitating violence	Failure of university officials to authorize control action handicapped campus force
<u>Crowd Phase</u>		
Response to seizure of building	Mobilize department rapidly	Splitting 27-man force for two shifts left insufficient manpower to handle situation
Policy of containment	Seven campus patrolmen assigned to allow only blacks to move in and out of building	As a matter of policy, once seizure occurs no dissident movement should be permitted in or out; all but one monitored communication line should be cut off
Perimeter control	Station officers around building with sergeant and car in front	Force insufficient to prevent white students from entering building
Lack of university policy	Muddle through on the basis of whatever guidance was available	University should have established a chain of command and rapid dissemination of decisions
Intelligence evaluation	Campus security infiltration of dissident group on campus discouraged by administration	Presence of radical political activity on campus was known to campus officers, but there was no mechanism for using this information in decision making

COMMAND & CONTROL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED	ITHACA	PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
	CORNELL CAMPUS SECURITY FORCES APPROACH	
<u>Crowd Phase (Continued)</u>		
Scuffle between blacks, SDS and white students	Keep antagonists separated while letting administration negotiate and cool-off situation	Good idea except that force personnel and equipment were inadequate
Passing guns into building	Permitted weapons to be handed into building	Should have been stopped immediately
Threats to administration and faculty	Hold administration meetings at numerous locations	A campus command post should have been established where the administration could deliberate without fear
Prevalence of campus rumors	A rumor control clinic was established	Good idea which might be profitably employed by other schools
<u>Demonstration-Orderly</u>		
Prevent bloodshed during evacuation	Escort blacks to prevent whites from attacking them	Was successful but photographs of event showing campus police gave impression of total university surrender to coercion
Lack of adequate manpower and equipment	Do the best they could with what they had	University recognized security needs subsequently and increased size of force, auxiliary support and equipment
<u>DEMONSTRATION-DISORDERLY</u>	NONE	
<u>Post Demonstration Phase</u>		
Maintain alert posture	Remained mobilized for about 10 days	Sheer exhaustion could have caused errors in judgement or overreaction
Prepare for arrests	Mass arrests and detention facility off campus were coordinated with Ithaca police	No campus arrests were made

3. Durham Police Department

All basic command and control problems during the Durham disturbance apparently stemmed from the failure by city police, campus security, and university administrators to develop either long or short range coordinated plans to use the Durham Police effectively during a campus incident. The role of the police on campus, their authority, and their responsibilities were not defined. As a result, the police responded to confused directives from unidentified individuals, all events tending to culminate in overreaction.

Police command personnel were well aware that the appearance on campus of a large police contingent was tending to excite the student crowd. They were anxious to move in and take whatever action the university officials requested and depart quickly, but were prevented because the officials repeatedly postponed decisive action. The university president later said that he hesitated to call in the police, because once he did so all tactical decisions would be in their hands.

The brief campus meeting at noon after the Afro-American Students occupied the administration building was not sufficient to set down detailed rules.

Lack of direction was demonstrated by the police contingent advancing and retreating across the rose garden as orders were reversed. The decision (b) (an unidentified person--not the police) to occupy the building after the students had left without causing other than minor damage, was inappropriate. Use of tear gas to repel the crowd from in front of the building was

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1 OF 3

ill advised from several points of view. First, there were many newsmen and local citizens in the front ranks. Second, the shifting wind currents blew the gas back and forth around the buildings. Third, the police were poorly trained in use of the gas masks; the goggles fogged up in the cold air and blinded the officers.

Police encountered several communications problems. The power limitations of the hand-held radios made receipt of signals almost impossible in the thick-walled buildings. The switchboard at Duke Hospital, handling all calls, was saturated during the entire event.

COMMAND & CONTROL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED	DURHAM POLICE DEPARTMENT APPROACH	PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
<u>PLANNING</u>		
City and university policy coordination regarding use of city police forces	Confusion evidenced by police, campus officers and administration	Guidelines should be developed between city administration and each major local educational institution, at various echelons of operation
Develop tactical plans for security/police operations	Strategy session held on campus at noon	Apparently tactics and command decision responsibility were not defined
Provide for communication between campus security and Durham police	Ring-down circuit between campus security and police station	Encouraged good day-to-day coordination and cooperation
Evaluate potential campus requirements for city aid	Read school newspapers	Good way to anticipate campus tension
Familiarity with buildings and environs where disturbance occurred	Police unable to move effectively in unfamiliar territory	Police need aerial pictures of campus, simple plans (not blue prints) of buildings
Student leaders to confer with regarding defusing of riot	Police consulted with athletes - the only student leaders they knew	Familiarity with student leaders would lead to better understanding and avoid armed confrontation
Differentiate between tactical plans for handling race riots and student demonstrations	Pepper-fogger and tear gas used on mixed crowd of students and townspeople	Necessary force to control violent race riot may be excessive in handling campus disturbances
<u>TRAINING</u>		
Crowd control strategies	Police command had experience with race riot situation	Alternate strategies for the campus environment should have been explored with college administration
Crowd dispersal tactics	Squad formation had been practiced	Discipline broke down when policemen broke ranks to chase attackers
Use of night sticks	Batons were used as both prod and club	Complaint of use of night stick typical of many such events
Use of chemical agents	Tear gas and pepper-fogger used in crowd area around buildings and large open areas	Training in effective use would have negated use because of changing wind conditions
Use of gas masks	Training in wearing gas masks obviously not given outdoors during cold weather	Fogging of goggles blinded officers
Withstanding crowd abuse	Squads broke formation when angered by students' jeers and profanity	Officers unprepared for hostility from educated, white young people
Integration with state officers	Durham police and state patrolmen operated under unified command	Coordinated training exercises in crowd control would improve performance
<u>OPERATIONS</u>		
<u>Crowd Phase</u>		
Surveillance of crowd	Plain clothesmen mixed with crowd during day; established fixed post on top of Duke Chapel	Provided Durham police with good visibility regarding crowd size and mood
Response to university request for assistance	Strategy devised for police to go to campus, wait 15 minutes for dissidents to leave, then break into building and evict/arrest trespassers	University administration repeatedly extended warning period to dissidents, kept police waiting while crowd grew

COMMAND & CONTROL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED	DURHAM POLICE DEPARTMENT APPROACH	PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
<u>OPERATIONS (Continued)</u>		
Mobilization of mutual aid	Own forces and state police called up immediately; sheriff and National Guard alerted and on standby	Good response from all backup forces
Staging area on campus	Police reported to parking lot--hopefully out of crowd's sight	Students changing classes and news media soon spread word of police on campus
Establish campus facility security	Stationed guards at telephone switchboard and utilities building	Good precautionary measure
Establish Field Command Post	Police cars parked in staging area used for command post; car radios and walkie-talkies used for communication	Post was adequate for only brief period not for 4-hour standby; communications were adequate only because police station nearby
Special equipment for officers	Face shields, riot batons, gas masks, tear gas canisters, mace, distributed in staging area; shotguns distributed later	Protective equipment was necessary for officers after violence erupted, but appearance of officers in full riot gear probably incited violence
Unprotected staging area	Police stood on parking lot for 4 hours waiting for orders to evict trespassers	Long, cold, frustrating inactivity triggered overreaction
Response to request to evict students from building	Police marched in formation toward back of building	Students left through front basement windows, reportedly after hearing police orders to evict them on handie-talkies
Response to request to occupy empty building	Police reluctantly moved in; did not believe it necessary to secure undamaged building	Campus security should have performed this job and allowed police to leave campus quickly
<u>Demonstration-Orderly</u>		
Establish building security	Police squad formed on front steps	Should have maintained low profile; appearance of riot-equipped police in force attracted departing students who had been in building
Police cars in path of student parade toward downtown Durham	Police cars moved toward parade from Traffic Circle	Sealed off campus exit, agitated crowd, blamed for trying to run over Negro girl, and became target for missiles
<u>Demonstration-Disorderly</u>		
Radical element seeking confrontation	Overreacted to taunts and potential violence	Better squad discipline and low profile tactics might have avoided clash
Attack on police officer	Some officers responded to taunts and charged into crowd	Event could have obtained crowd's sympathy; evoked hostility instead
Movement of crowd toward building steps	Tear gas and pepper-fogger used on crowd few feet from steps	Crowd scattered, but rushed back in angrily
Chemical munitions	Police pursued crowd with gas and pepper-fogger	Crowd threw back canisters and wind blew gas back. Gas masks did not fit well, goggles fogged up, and police not adequately trained in use
Dispersal of crowd	Officers pursued groups into and around other buildings, swept quadrangle and other areas	Students, who were familiar with terrain and buildings, had advantage in this maneuver. Police should have remained around Allen Building to maintain its security

COMMAND & CONTROL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED	DURHAM POLICE DEPARTMENT APPROACH	PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
<u>Demonstration-Disorderly</u>	(Continued)	
Identification of militants in crowd on campus	Assumed that entire crowd was intent on violence	Press and public reaction to alleged use of police tactics indiscriminately gave poor law enforcement image
Missiles thrown at officers and patrol cars	Protective helmets for police personnel	Protective gear was effective in most cases; however, cinder block cracked one officer's helmet
Protected command post	Established command post inside Allen Building to coordinate action	Moved most officers out of sight of crowd; provided protection from cold and militants
Communications with field forces	Used handie-talkies that did not have sufficient power for transmission through heavy walls	Communications broke down; a portable antenna strung out of a window would have facilitated transmission/reception
Communications with officials	Established open lines to police station, mayor and governor	Wise tactic, since the telephone switchboard was saturated with other calls
Communications with students	Consulted with football players and athletic department	Athletes suggested police leave campus and rioting would cease. Police should have established prior contact with student leaders
<u>Post Demonstration Phase</u>		
Arrest logistics	Municipal bus stationed outside Allen Building to transport trespassing students	Bus driver forced to leave scene when tear gas blew into vehicle
Arrest evidence	Police identified suspects without supporting evidence	Although originally all 5 arrestees were convicted, subsequently none of the convictions was sustained. Police identification did not stand up under cross-examination and defendant's witnesses' testimony. Photographs or video tape records should have been used to verify identification
Legal advice on riot action	Police did not seek legal advice on planned or possible required action	Proper legal advice on use of injunctions, etc., might have avoided violent police/student confrontation

4. Atlanta Police Department

The natural outrage of the slum area blacks to the shooting of two boys led to a violent police-citizen confrontation. However, the disturbance was complicated by the developing contest for power between two black factions: the moderate Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), which had long been active in Atlanta, and the emerging militant Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). Several SNCC members had been jailed as a result of a riot four days earlier, and the Atlanta Police Department was alert to potential disturbances.

Police moved rapidly and in force to prevent the disturbance from spreading and managed to calm the people down shortly after midnight. The next day, however, agitators were in the Boulevard district inciting two more nights of rioting. Civic officials, meeting with the dissidents and walking the streets to plead for calm were unsuccessful, and a police sweep was required to quell the riot on the third night.

The failure of various civil means to quiet the riot after it had gotten to the violent rock-throwing, fire-bombing stage is typical of civil disturbances in the past 10 years. When tension erupts into overt action, rational appeals have little effect. At this point, the threshold is crossed between use of civic strategies to avoid violence and use of police street tactics to regain control.

Patrolling police appear to have used understanding and restraint in dealing with the rioters, exhibiting almost a paternalistic attitude toward the slum dwellers. At any rate, violence did not spread to nearby Summerhill or any other of Atlanta's ghettos.

Some of the significant command and control problems during Atlanta's Boulevard incident are summarized in the following Table.

COMMAND & CONTROL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED	ATLANTA POLICE DEPARTMENT APPROACH	PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
<u>PLANNING</u>		
Contingency planning	No general operations plan established	Quick response of police to outburst of violence indicates general tactics have been agreed upon
Specific operations plan	Police established plan for containment unless a high threshold of violence was reached, at which time police "show of force" would occur	Relaxation of perimeter control during day allowed agitators to move in. Curfew in area, in addition to curtailment of liquor sales might have helped to calm area sooner. Police sweep down "Boulevard" was effective
Intelligence evaluation	Police were alert to tensions and unrest; under cover agents in area and community contacts through Crime Prevention Bureau provided specific data	Police were aware of potential for violence but were helpless to prevent "trigger" incident
<u>TRAINING</u>		
Crowd control tactics	Police recruit training	No extensive training in squad tactics in 1966
Use of chemical agents	Roll call training and demonstrations	Chemical agents not used in this incident
Training to withstand verbal abuse	Exposure on street considered best training	Patrol forces showed great restraint
<u>OPERATIONS</u>		
<u>Pre-Crowd Phase</u>		
Restore order in Summerhill (scene of riot earlier in week)	Patrol area in strength	Effective; area cooled off
Initiate civic reconciliation	Both white and black civic groups active	Effective; Summerhill did not flare up when Boulevard riot broke out
Reduce agitation in ghettos	Arrested chief agitator and approximately 20 militants	Short range effectiveness mitigated by the fact this became an issue in subsequent rioting at Boulevard
Prevent further incidents from triggering additional riots	Police on alert for signs of potential trouble	Rapid identification of threat potential from trigger incident - major factor in rapid response to Boulevard shooting
<u>Crowd Phase</u>		
Large crowds on street	Keep watchful eye on potential trouble spots	Large street crowds are typical in crowded housing areas. Black youths were returning to area from football game to swell street gathering
Riot trigger incident	Not present when shooting started	Police are virtually powerless to halt a racial riot, once an explosive incident occurs

COMMAND & CONTROL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED	ATLANTA POLICE DEPARTMENT APPROACH	PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
<u>OPERATIONS (Continued)</u>		
Demonstration-Orderly	Response to shooting report	Sergeant and driver responded to investigate shooting. Officer struck in back of head by missile or bullet
Demonstration-Disorderly	Evaluate potential hazard Utilize all intelligence sources	Ambulance responding to call picked up wounded white officer before tending to dead and injured black youths. This inflamed gathering crowd even more than shooting
Contain disturbance area	Immediately recognized by police command informer and street observations evaluated	Immediate action prevented spread of disturbance outside Boulevard district
Set up road blocks and patrolled perimeter	Spontaneous riot requires real-time intelligence which uses different acquisition methods and processing than planned events	Spontaneous riot requires real-time intelligence which uses different acquisition methods and processing than planned events
Preclude involvement of adjacent, but geographically separate, ghettos		
Locate forces strategically	Saturation tactics throughout area	Prevented rioters from spilling out into other areas and kept out additional potential rioters from other areas
Regain control	Interior saturation patrol in strength	Minimized hit-and-run riot tactics
Coordinate civic/police strategy	Mayor, Chief of Police, and some Aldermen walked the area streets trying to calm citizens	Fairly effective but hazardous for patrolling forces
Notify higher police and civic echelons	Promptly notified of danger	Fairly effective Saturday night, but once crowd passed emotional threshold, logical dialog impossible
Reduce tensions in affected area	City officials were willing to expose themselves to personal danger to resolve problems	City officials were willing to expose themselves to personal danger to resolve problems
Police instructed to talk to people, only arrest when absolutely necessary	Prevented unnecessary bitterness. Avoided mass booking and arrest processing problems (only 52 arrested Saturday)	Prevented unnecessary bitterness. Avoided mass booking and arrest processing problems (only 52 arrested Saturday)
Reduce potential for riot leadership	Arrested two SCLC leaders in advance of serious rioting	An error, because when released the next day, the men were ambivalent, and did not forcefully push moderate solutions
Minimize racial/police cleavage	Negro police (when available) used to patrol black ghetto	Probably helped but did not prevent attacks on police
Communicate with deployed forces - only one channel available	Call boxes and radios in cars used first day	Voice contention on car frequency (Atlanta has three frequencies now, still not adequate)
Adjustment of city car plans and re-allocation of resources	Minimum patrol in "secure" areas	Tranquillity of rest of city facilitated maximum assignment of manpower to involved area
Decision to permit demonstration march	Civic strategy to defuse area hostility	Unsuccessful because it aroused emotions and concentrated the potential troublemakers in a group
Right to peaceful dissent recognized	Police aided marchers and did not interfere	Hostility so high that police cooperation was unappreciated
Sporadic barrages of bricks, bottles, and firebombs	Go after real trouble makers	Topography of area and the fact that attackers could "melt" into an apartment building or go out the back door made it very difficult

COMMAND & CONTROL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED	ATLANTA POLICE DEPARTMENT APPROACH	PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
Demonstration Disorderly	(Continued)	
Evaluation of need for State police and mutual aid.	Decision to request aid up to Mayor, based on police advice.	Decided not to request aid; proved justified; however, plans for field use of such aid should have been made at the tactical level.
Sniping, gunfire	Shotguns issued to senior officers at discretion of (Logistics) Superintendent	Weapons used with discretion; no deaths occurred from gunfire after initial incident
Prevention of sniping	Landlords and city crews boarded up likely sniper nests	Civic strategy to minimize obvious sniper sanctuaries
Attacks on firemen	Police guard for firemen in involved area	Effective but slowed fire fighting operation and added to police work load
Molotov cocktails and fire-bombs under police vehicles	More vehicles sent in promptly; increased foot police patrols	Luckily, no one injured
Sweep area if crowd control marginal	Sweep made with shoulder-to-shoulder police lines from both ends of involved area	Very successful. Performed according to plan without change
<u>POST DEMONSTRATION</u>		
Restore contact with citizens	Crime Prevention Bureau immediately began contacting area residents	Attempt to re-establish communication appears to have been successful
Alleviate basic grievances	Set up commission to talk to leaders	Act on recommendations when possible
Improve police communications	Request more radio channels; procure additional handie-talkies	Obtained three radio channels; reorganized radio net
Improve riot training	Introduce riot squad training	Police force not large enough to use military techniques

5. Cincinnati Police Department

When the City of Cincinnati was caught off-guard by the racial riots in 1967, preparations were made to handle future similar disturbances.

The Civil Disturbance Operation Plan (CDOP) and the police department's Crowd Control Manual were both updated to incorporate lessons learned during that riot. The City's Safety Director pointed out that as a result of a study of the previous year's riot, "We are now coordinating the work of police, firemen and communications. We're beefing up in the areas of equipment, manpower, procedure, intelligence and communications with similarly affected agencies like the county and municipality police, Federal troops and National Guard units."

This preparation in planning and training paid off well when Dr. King was assassinated and racial events broke out across the nation. Cincinnati was able to regain control of the situation only 6 hours after the initial outburst of mob rioting. (There had been sporadic, uncorrelated incidents prior to the Black Monday riot and after it.)

If any tactical decision is questionable in the civic/police handling of the Black Monday riot, it has to be the agreement made by civic officials to allow the Negro Avondale Community Council to police the district with their own cars and own men, with the assistance of just nine black Cincinnati Police Department officers. Wisely, this decision was accompanied by an operations plan for a 34-man perimeter patrol of the Avondale district and ready availability of a 30-man Tactical Unit of the Patrol Bureau.

COMMAND & CONTROL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED	CINCINNATI POLICE DEPARTMENT APPROACH	PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
PLANNING		
Contingency plan	5-Phase Civil Disturbance Operation Plan (CDOP) defined procedures and states of readiness	Good flexible plan which facilitated rapid coordinated response by police, fire and communications
Civil anti-riot ordinance	Many of its measures were implemented during riot, using state and county laws	Still being debated by City Council; passed immediately after riot
Protection for firemen	Relieve police of fire guard protection	Firemen deputized; still required police to deter determined snipers
Civic actions: baseball game cancelled	Reduced potential of large crowd that might get out of control	Wise use of civic strategies as a major deterrent
Safety Director granted Avondale Community Council (ACC) right to patrol own area	Only 9 black police officers in area	ACC unable to control situation; in fact, some members contributed to initiating violence
Perimeter control for memorial service	34-man traffic and 30-man tactical units assigned outside perimeter	This force would have been adequate if looting had not occurred within the perimeter
Mutual aid backup	Call up and integration of Ohio National Guard included in CDOP	ONG responded, fully equipped, in fraction of time required during 1967 riot
TRAINING		
Prior experience	Riots in 1967 had provided field exposure	Riot experience itself is the best teacher according to police
Squad formations	Men had extensive training in anti-riot procedures	Operation as a unit (not as an individual) is the chief benefit of this training
Inter-force training	Police and firemen had learned to coordinate efforts as a result of 1967 riots	Effective use of all emergency forces
Special prisoner handling	Handling of limp prisoners, etc.	Effective, but not required in this incident
Counter-sniper/counter-guerrilla tactics	Special squads in each district for anti-sniper and chemical agent use	Provide a high degree of proficiency for specialized tasks not needed by total force
OPERATIONS		
Pre-Demonstration Phase		
Initial looting following Dr. King's death	Mobilized department; men on 12-hour shifts	Police were able to handle scattered incidents
Central command post activated	24-hour operations initiated before memorial service	Effective in coordinating law enforcement planning
Continued low level violence	Police remained mobilized and in heavy patrol mode	Were able to contain scattered violence
Police fatigue	Tried to give men as much rest as possible	Even before riot broke out, men had been physically stressed for 4 days

COMMAND & CONTROL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED	CINCINNATI POLICE DEPARTMENT APPROACH	PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
Crowd Phase		
Minimize patrol by white police in Avondale	Only 9 black officers assigned to area during service	Good philosophy, but insufficient number of black officers in light of determined agitators present
Civilian ACC allowed to provide area security	Police to coordinate efforts with ACC patrol	The ACC did not provide walking talkies to police liaison, as agreed
Intelligence regarding ACC membership	Police assumed ACC sincere, and consisted of responsible community leaders	ACC patrol car blocked truck
Demonstration-Orderly		
Perimeter control	17 fixed posts to keep whites out of Avondale and contain blacks - if necessary	Probably vital factor in containing most violence within Avondale
Maintain traffic control	ACC and 9 black police in area	Traffic control satisfactory
Potential violence	Backup 15-car tactical squad	Recognition of potential problems reassuring squad within Avondale
Demonstration-Disorderly		
Response to shooting incident	Black officer responded to call	False rumors by ACC members that a white policeman had shot a black woman triggered the riot; black police lieutenant stopped rumor
Threats to lynch black man who shot wife	Evacuated man in ambulance	Agitators, stopped on "white cop" charge, instigated lynch mob
Restore order after initial outburst	Sent in 40 men to disperse mob by sweeping area	A rapid show of force was effective. Mass shotgun blast startled rioters
Widespread looting, arson and assault	Police concentrated in Avondale area - spread thin elsewhere	Not enough police to control widespread incidents all over city
Evaluation of incident's potential	Situation evaluated realistically because of 1967 riot. National Guard requested within 30 minutes	Fast police and civic response expedited regaining control
Forward command post	Field Commander established post in store parking lot just outside Avondale perimeter	Store facilities provided telephones and personnel staging ground
Telephone switchboard saturation	Used radio from FCP to police headquarters, until FCP was moved so special telephone lines could be installed	Use of hot lines and army field phones at second FCP site facilitated command of forces
Radio congestion	Two channels available; one from FCP to station; other from FCP to 75 handie-talkies	Needed more frequencies
Legal constraints to crowd formation and looting	Curfew imposed by mayor 1-1/2 hours after incident; governor stopped liquor and gas sales	Prompt response by civic and state officials facilitated containment
Snipers (especially at firemen)	Police and National Guard stood guard, firemen already deputized	Use of helicopters for air cover and surveillance would reduce hazard
Saturation patrol	Ohio National Guard (arriving at 11 p.m.) assigned to patrol with police	Standard practice of 1 officer and 3 National Guardsmen in jeep was effective

COMMAND & CONTROL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED	CINCINNATI POLICE DEPARTMENT APPROACH	PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
<u>Demonstration-Disorderly</u>		
Field supervision of police	Police supervisor responsible for several jeep-mounted units	Communication problems reduced efficiency
Frequency incompatibility between police and national guard radios	Police in jeep with guard given handie-talkie and strict rules for use	More than one common frequency (they had none) is required
Disciplined communications	Only vital intelligence, request for prisoner conveyance permitted on air	Restricted use of field radios denied commanders timely force location data
Mass arrest processing	Opened municipal court at night. Set bail high to prevent rioter return to street	Generally worked well although there were minor complaints
Maintain maximum field strength	Arresting officers summoned to court by radio only when needed for hearing	Police command felt that court procedures took too long (1 hour) when men were needed in field
<u>Post Demonstration</u>		
Reconstruction of community relations	Police community relations, officers and civic officials moved rapidly into area	Good approach to resolve grievances, but blacks who cooperated with whites in reconstruction of community were harassed by neighborhood militants
CDOP procedures for restoring peace followed	Area surveyed for damage, beats checked for riot incidents, complaints against police investigated	Good procedure
After-action critique	Discussion of mistakes and how to correct them, what additional training and equipment are needed	Resulted in re-organization of liaison structure with Ohio National Guard
Obtaining convictions	Arresting officer followed through as witness	Commended by Ohio Bar Association for this procedure
Inappropriate arresting code	Many arrests made for curfew violation (Did not hold up because arrestee claimed he did not know Riot Act was in effect)	Ohio Bar subsequently recommended charge of disorderly conduct
Press relations	Police Chief commended press on cooperation and provided them with pertinent data	Excellent approach

6. Anaheim Police Department

During the 6-week Pre-Crowd Phase, Anaheim police developed an extremely detailed operations plan that provided the tactical guidelines, equipment, force deployment and extensive coordination needed for smooth operation during the other phases. From the police command and control point of view, some of the anticipated problems (such as communications saturation) had been provided for, but not altogether successfully. The Anaheim police point out some specific difficulties.

For example, failure of the batteries in the borrowed California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Radio System (CLEMARS) hand-held radios early in the day complicated communications between platoon commanders and their deployed squads. Lack of filtered and evaluated intelligence input to the Tactical Commander complicated the decisions he needed to make on deployment of his forces. Lack of identifying marks on borrowed equipment resulted in poor accountability and delay in its return.

A major constraint on police operations was imposed by Disneyland's desire to keep the park open. A great deal of unlawful behavior, which probably should have been stopped at its inception, was overlooked. For example, the taking over of the Pirate Ship and Tom Sawyer's Island denied these attractions to other paying customers. Many private citizens apparently were enraged with the Yippies behavior. There were angry words and physical altercations between citizens and Yippies, which

Disneyland personnel were able to handle. When the police were called to quell the disturbance on Main Street, they were cheered by the citizens.

The news media added to police problems by monitoring the police Channel 2, by trying to scale the fence at the rear of the park, and by criticizing the police tactics which they obviously did not understand.

In the following table the specific problems, the Anaheim police approach to each one, and a rating in gross terms of the operational success are presented.

COMMAND & CONTROL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED	ANAHEIM POLICE DEPARTMENT APPROACH	PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
<u>PLANNING</u>		
Identify organizers	Data received from informants and undercover intelligence	Individual instigators were never identified
Estimate type and scope of demonstration	Coordinated national and local intelligence inputs	SDS and Yippies participation identified
Estimate size of crowd	Prepared for worst case (50,000 demonstrators)	Gross over-estimation
Maintain integrity of intelligence	Restricted intelligence to a few commanding officers	Mutual aid forces did leak some data
Selectively disseminate operations plan	Mutual aid forces briefed as they were deployed	Divergence of opinion between command/patrol officers on knowledge of plan
Coordinate with civic and public service officials	Operations Command Post assigned staff of city, utility, fire personnel, and other government officials	This expedited installation of special phone lines and mutual aid call-up during incident
Prepare to answer questions regarding events	Established separate rumor control center	This effectively reduced the load on the police system from citizen inquiries
Continuous intelligence of crowd	Undercover men were assigned in the park among crowd, in an observation post and the helicopter	Data was plentiful but not evaluated properly
Instruct private security forces on how to make citizen's arrests	Disneyland security officers filed charges for offenses occurring in Disneyland Park	Charges were invalidated because of improper procedures and codes; better advice should have been provided
Sufficient reserve forces to counter unknown threat	Mutual Aid forces were advised of impending emergency	Advance warning expedited response when called
Special legal preparations	Consulted judge for advice on evidence, arrest codes and booking procedures	This became a serious problem when a different judge heard the cases, disagreed with the codes cited. Prior advice should have been obtained from the city attorney or district attorney
Special protective equipment	Borrowed from National Guard	Problem with identification delayed return of equipment
Communications equipment for field forces	Handie-talkies borrowed from California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Radio system	Provided sufficient units for deployed squads, but on different CLEMARS frequency, necessitating communications netting plan
<u>TRAINING</u>		
Crowd control tactics	Refresher courses in disaster procedures, field bookings, baton, squad formations and emergency code calls replaced regular roll call training for 2 weeks	Men trained to act as unit and to take over any job for flexibility of operation
Special riot tactics	Special Enforcement Detail from LAPD gave training in use of "flying squad"	Used successfully for a few arrests
Practice alert	Police went on 12-hour shifts and conducted emergency exercises a week before demonstration	Valuable training in teamwork; however, exercises alarmed citizens and news media
Common training for all mutual aid forces	Incompatibility of training dictated deployment plans; each force assigned to single task as integrated unit	Mutual aid forces used for traffic control, perimeter patrol, logistic security, and special attack squads. Consistent training is a must for effective mutual aid integration

COMMAND & CONTROL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED	ANAHEIM POLICE DEPARTMENT APPROACH	PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
<u>OPERATIONS</u>		
<u>Pre-Crowd Phase</u>		
Possible buildup of outside demonstrators in Anaheim	Enforced local park, drug and curfew ordinances in the weeks before the event	Successful; denied staging area for out-of-town agitators
Low profile deployment within park	Command post, men and equipment deployed out of public view within Disneyland	Very successful. Visitors complained of lack of police patrols; even newsmen did not know of massive police force nearby
Separate strategic and tactical command functions	Tactical Field Commander in Field Command Post given full authority; municipal strategy developed in downtown Operations Command Post	Good concept; implemented by use of separate frequencies in the field
<u>Crowd Phase</u>		
Disneyland officials allowed to make law enforcement decisions	Police agreed that Disneyland security could handle incidents within park until they could no longer maintain order	Serious strategic error, since demonstrators took advantage of situation, annoyed park visitors and hundreds of officers were held on standby without ability to act on police decisions
Coordination with Disneyland security force	Police forces moved to a reported incident within the park, only to find Disneyland security had handled it	Clear and accurate communications between Disneyland security and police forces deployed in park were not maintained
Dissidents crashing gate	At request of Disneyland officials, police moved to front gate in show of force	This maneuver discouraged the demonstrators, who then bought tickets or dispersed
Issue special equipment to mutual aid and own forces	Complicated record keeping necessitated because National Guard equipment lacked markings	Unique markings and serial numbers are needed to issue equipment. Bookkeeping should be mechanical and simple
Communications with deployed forces	Each squad given CLEMARS hand-held radio for communication with platoon leader; platoon commander given Anaheim police handie-talkie to communicate with FCP	CLEMARS radio batteries ran down in 2 hours; no replacements or battery chargers were available
Voice privacy	FCP switched to telephone communications when news media monitored Anaheim police radio channel	Adequate while situation was static. Monitoring of hand-held radio channels could have posed greater problems
Feeding forces on standby	Food provided by Disneyland and Convention Center kitchens	Worked well because of prior planning. Could have been danger of contamination by dissidents
Continuous, reliable intelligence	Police responded to repeated rumors throughout day by calling up more and more mutual aid forces	Large numbers of officers held in reserve all day; very costly to all cities involved
<u>Demonstration-Disorderly</u>		
Disorderly acts by dissidents massing on Main Street	Police called in from nearby area where they had been waiting all day when Disneyland officials determined they could no longer handle crowd	Disneyland security did not recognize changing mood of crowd in time to avoid crowd/police confrontation
Protection of lives and property	Announced park closed and ordered all visitors to leave. Police squads swept park while others stood in double lines inside gate	Park was evacuated quickly, but tactic was questioned by news media who did not understand the maneuver

COMMAND & CONTROL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED	ANAHEIM POLICE DEPARTMENT APPROACH	PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
<u>Demonstration-Disorderly</u>		
Crowds gathered outside gates; throwing missiles at officers inside	Declared unlawful assembly. Police formations took initiative in crowd dispersal	Earlier declaration inside park might have avoided crowd buildup outside gates
Prevent damage in parking lot	Mutual aid forces dispatched to sweep area	Split up groups; however, not clear that dissidents intended any mass violence
Deviation from operations plan	Anaheim police left Disneyland Park (contrary to operations plan) because mob attempted to outflank mutual aid forces	Maneuver was successful in defeating mob tactics
Mob attack on Disneyland Hotel	Squad lines pursued and intercepted groups of dissidents	Successful, although squad formations did not work well in gardens or confined spaces around building
Surveillance of crowd movement	Helicopter used to observe demonstrators and turn lights on groups hiding in shrubbery	Helicopter proved valuable asset during daylight and night activity
Safety of businesses and homes in vicinity	Police mopping-up activities covered the entire neighborhood for several hours	Demonstrators were moved out of area quite rapidly because there was no park, friendly homes, or other potential re-staging areas where crowd could fall back and regroup
Traffic control	California Highway Patrol and city employees called in for traffic with helicopters for observation; signal broadcast	Dissipation was slow, but efficient
<u>Post Demonstration Phase</u>		
Slow booking procedures and arrest facilities	Requested County Sheriff's booking van twice during day	Response time very slow; suspects kept in holding area for considerable periods
Identification of arrestee	Police made out standard booking and evidence forms	Photographs or video tape of arresting officer with suspect would have substantiated identification and avoided dismissals
Consistent legal advice	Arrest recommendations by one judge were refuted by judge hearing cases	Many cases dismissed because of violation code cited

7. Los Angeles Police Department

Even though police responded to the widely publicized impending peace demonstration by generating a detailed Operations Plan, many command and control problems occurred during the event that required deviations from that plan. Some problems resulted from schedule changes and unanticipated dissident tactics, but other, more basic problems resulted from failure of the police to properly assess the potential crowd size and attitudes.

The Operations Plan was designed around the President's scheduled arrival (which slipped from 6:00 to 8:00 p.m.) and around intelligence inputs about planned crowd actions. For example, needed men were stationed at L.A. International Airport because of threatened action there, which never occurred. An early police detail reported to the hotel to cope with picketing that did not start until 5 hours later than expected.

In the operations plan, the police stated that they were preparing for a crowd ranging in size from 10,000 to 20,000 people, but all indications are that they did not really expect that many and were in truth surprised at the number who showed up. Neither did the police anticipate the ferocity of the crowd; apparently they expected that a crowd of average citizens in a wealthy neighborhood would behave in a lawful manner. A police lieutenant said, "It was the nastiest crowd I've ever encountered in my 12 years on the force. You name it -- they said it to us . . . I led that first wedge of 70 men that split the crowd, and believe me, the profanity was unbelievable . . . We took a lot of punishment . . . We had broken noses, broken fingers, bruises."

On the other hand, Mr. Average Citizen in the parade was astounded and dismayed at the firm positive steps taken by the police and alleged brutality. To quote the Los Angeles TIMES, "The hundreds inexperienced in demonstrations may simply have disbelieved that police were prepared to back up the warning" (to disperse).

COMMAND & CONTROL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED	LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT APPROACH	PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
<u>PLANNING</u>		
General contingency plan	Department developed special operations plan for each event	Basic plans for different types of crowds, different environments could cut down on extensive specific planning and provide better preparation for spontaneous outbreaks
Operations plan	Developed 200-page operation plan that was distributed on day of event	Plan was very detailed, too large for rapid assimilation, and issued to forces too late but provided valuable baseline and repository of information
Timetable for plan	Schedule of President's arrival and intelligence regarding demonstrators' plans used as inputs	Plan disrupted when President was delayed 2 hours and demonstrators did not perform as scheduled
Identity of organizers	Determined by infiltrators at dissident meetings, press conferences, handbills, surveillance	Widespread participation by 70 anti-war factions, including 23 activist-oriented groups with well known militant leaders
Crowd size estimation	Based on intelligence inputs and news releases by organizers	Estimated from 1000 to 20,000 with 15,000 as best guess; police really did not expect that the event would be so widely supported
Terrain and locale analysis	Entire area (and buildings) mapped and studied	All vulnerable spots located and covered by special squads or guards, including oil well in park, utilities building in Century City, tunnel entrances, etc.
Coordination of command	Tactical Field Commander directed efforts of Inside, Outside, Support and Airport Commands	Extremely complicated organizational structure for single event
Full staff support for commanders	Command posts set up for each area. Outside Commander relieved of support functions which were assigned to separate Support Commander	Too many command posts; redundant communications monitoring would have caused difficulty if trouble had erupted in more than one area since all were using the same frequencies
Maximum manpower	Department mobilized on 12-hour shifts	LAPD forces were large enough to handle incident without external forces, although Governor had alerted National Guard
Coordination of security forces	Secret Service, LAPD, FBI made decisions as to force deployment inside and outside hotel and timing and enforcement of dispersal orders	No conflict in authority or responsibility
Safety of President and banquet guests	Established high ground surveillance and sniper teams, and internal and external (hotel) security	Required a great number of men to implement, but covered all contingencies
Danger to shoppers and property damage to adjacent stores	Requested shopping center to close at 5 p.m. Effective maneuver; no problems in shopping center	
Crowd dispersal	Two plans made for dispersal: A in Cheviot Hills Playground and B on lot facing hotel	Neither plan was used as conceived, although plan B did provide basis for deployment of skirmish lines up Constellation Avenue
Use of tear gas	Made on-site measurements of air flow at, and around, hotel	Gas ruled out because of building configuration. Good decision to avoid inciting crowd hostility
Mass detention	Plans worked out for handling up to 1000 arrests	Only 52 actual arrests were made

COMMAND & CONTROL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED	LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT APPROACH	PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
<u>Planning (Continued)</u>		
Legal actions	Century City obtained injunction to prohibit stopping in front of hotel, entering it or using sound trucks within Century City	Injunction provided additional legal grounds for controlling parade and dispersing crowd
Parade permit	Police Commission approved permit, providing parade would contain no vehicles, would follow a specified route and would disband upon return to Cheviot Hills Playground	Demonstrators attempted to void every stipulation in permit. Provided basis for declaration of unlawful assembly
Use of park for crowd rallying area	Denied use of park facilities, including loudspeakers, to demonstrators, but could not deny use of public park, itself. Park rangers assigned responsibility to enforce park ordinances	Demonstrators brought own sound equipment. No guidelines established in advance to prevent this
<u>TRAINING</u>		
Squad tactics and riot formation	Extensive squad training after Watts riots both in-service and during riot call	Officers stood up under stress; were able to move in formation
Special capabilities training		
Anti-sniper	Special marksmen trained and equipped for anti-sniper duty	Deployed for high ground security; their talents not required
Handling sit-in, limp or chained demonstrators	"Untangled" teams trained to handle prisoners	Special arrest teams had trouble moving sit-in arrestees
Crowd control equipment	Extensive training in use of batons	Use of batons as prods or clubs criticized by press and citizens
Withstanding crowd abuse	Extensive training in withstand verbal and physical abuse	Did not break formation or respond to taunts
Pre-event briefing	Field Commander personally briefed task force in small groups	Excellent morale builder
Operations plan assignments	16-page pamphlet distributed to all assigned personnel	Probably was not read by most field deployed personnel due to late issue, but kept as reference
<u>OPERATIONS</u>		
<u>Pre-Crowd Phase</u>		
Establish command posts	Mobile units, field tents, maps, supplies and equipment moved to location night before parade. Posts manned beginning at noon on day of parade	Posts and security forces established before crowds began to form
High school picket line	16-man platoon stationed outside hotel at 6 a.m.	Rumored early picketing did not occur until 11 a.m.
<u>Crowd Phase</u>		
Surveillance of crowd activities	Undercover agents deployed in crowd, helicopters flew reconnaissance missions around neighborhood, high ground surveillance provided from rooftops	Provided good intelligence on plans and mood of crowd, but poor estimation of size

COMMAND & CONTROL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED	LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT APPROACH	PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
Crowd Phase (continued)		
Illegal sound equipment in park	Park rangers were responsible for park ordinances	Decision to eliminate equipment made too late; insufficient officers to enforce rules
Serving injunction	Police protected men distributing hand-bills or read conditions to crowd	Demonstrators refused to accept service of injunction or obey its conditions
Unlawful picketing	Police enforced picketing laws and conditions of injunction, forcing picketers who were blocking sidewalk across street	Some arrests were made at this time. Proved wise precaution to clear main access to the hotel and prevent crowd buildup
Special police equipment	Helmets, visors and batons were issued to all officers; additional riot gear only to few specialty squads	Flak vests, gas masks or shotguns in hands of officers would have agitated crowd more
Demonstration-Orderly		
Formation of parade before permit allowed	Demonstrators were pushed back into park and warned of legal contract of parade permit	Crowd waited until just 5 minutes before appointed time before beginning march
Illegal sound truck in parade	10-man squad sent to remove truck from parade	Truck stopped on one officer's foot; another officer hit on head by picket sign. Whole platoon should have been dispatched into militant crowd
Control of parade route	One platoon stationed at front of parade, one at end; traffic detail diverted vehicle traffic as parade passed	Parade moved smoothly until it joined crowd waiting in front of hotel, when those in front stopped and sat down
Control of parade marchers	Planned strategy to isolate leaders at front of parade could not be used because they were imbedded in the center with women and children around them	This maneuver resulted in innocent people being injured in later confrontation. Parade "monitors" did not try to enforce parade permit; some promoted civil disobedience
Arrival of President and parade marchers at hotel coincided	Separate task forces were assigned to Presidential safety and parade control. Field Commander activated Tactical Alert for additional manpower	All forces were required to handle the two activities; strained the manpower assigned in the area
Demonstrators stopped in front of hotel	Hotel entrances and tunnels were blockaded	Officers at fixed posts were able to repel invaders
Demonstration-Disorderly		
Parade marchers refused to move on	Unlawful assembly order broadcast over powerful speakers	Demonstrators claimed they did not hear order to disperse, but newsmen and officers in crowd verified order could be heard--perhaps not distinctly in middle of yelling mob
Crowd forced officers back toward hotel with missiles, such as rocks, dirt clods, picket sticks, etc.	Double lines of officers with batons at "port arms" pushed crowd into field across from hotel	Demonstrators who wanted to leave were trapped between police lines and activists; police unable to distinguish between them and had to use massive dispersal tactics against all
Dense crowd threatening to storm hotel	Dispersal wedge moved into crowd, splitting into small groups and moving people out across lots	Tactic was effective in moving crowd away from hotel, but criticized by demonstrators and some newspapers

COMMAND & CONTROL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED	LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT APPROACH	PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
Demonstration-Disorderly	(continued)	
Missiles and profanity showered on police	Police lines continued to pursue demonstrators across plowed field	Police training demonstrated; did not break ranks. Picket sign sticks as big as clubs and clods in field were used as weapons by demonstrators
Interference of newsmen during action	Press were jostled out of way	Prior agreements with press and more tact would have prevented some of the bad publicity that ensued
TV cameras encouraged demonstrators	Police forced to defend themselves later against "staged" brutality scenes	Excessive newspaper and TV coverage provides opportunity for demonstrators to gain publicity and attract sympathizers
Traffic hazard on major artery	Police had to disperse demonstrators sitting in highway	Main thoroughfare should have been closed and traffic diverted prior to start of parade
Post Demonstration Phase		
Picture of bloody demonstrator given national circulation	Extensive police investigation required to verify true facts and identify individual	Unbalanced newspaper accounts magnified the incident; rebuttal not widely circulated
Charges of police brutality before City Council	City Council appointed investigative committee	Charges fostered by PAC and ACLU finally dropped; should probably have been completed to permit police to present their case
Disruption of City Council meeting	Dissidents using disruptive tactics physically removed but not arrested	Restraint by law enforcement permits disrupters to expose their own moral bankruptcy, therefore very effective
Picket signs used as weapons	City Council subsequently turned down ordinance to define picket sign design as being restraint of free speech	Ordinances regulating picket signs to reduce their potential use as weapons should be available to protect law enforcement officers
Hostile criticism in press	"Average" citizens and police were interviewed in press; no quotes from "suspected Militants"	Police need better information release, not with PR flavor
Subsequent attempts to obtain parade permits by same group	Request denied	Grounds for refusal adequate and subsequent agitation dwindled
Community relations adversely affected	LAPD documented their intelligence, plans view of events to defend their action	Document is factual - but one-sided - and much too detailed. Clever presentation and honest dialog could be more effective in establishing good relations and open information exchange with the City's newsmen

D. Evaluation of Specific Statement of Work Problem Areas

The study statement of work directs that attention be given to specific command and control problems. They are addressed below.

1. The visual identification of law enforcement crowd and demonstration control personnel when they are wearing gas masks.

Gas masks were employed only during the disturbance at Durham. A problem was encountered in that the mask's eyepieces fogged up from the cold, making it difficult to see at all, let alone identify own forces.

As one officer described the problem, "Once in awhile you had to feel to make sure it was a policeman that you were grabbing hold of."

2. The impact of the noise level of the crowd or demonstration upon voice or radio command and control communications.

Crowd noise was also a problem at Durham; "We had some bullhorns but the crowd was making such noise that they weren't effective. The only solution to a problem like this is that you have live communications-- that you can go to certain people and get them to control their own group. But we didn't have that."

At Los Angeles, at Anaheim, and at Cincinnati, there were complaints from arrestees that they had not heard

the order to disperse, although intelligibility was verified by undercover officers in the field. In Cincinnati, numerous suspects were freed of "failure to disperse" charges because it could not be proved that they had heard the riot act read over the patrol car loudspeakers.

3. Methods and techniques of command and control associated with the use of chemical munitions.

Tear gas and a pepper-fogger were used at Durham, but were not particularly effective in permanently dispersing the crowd, since changes in wind currents blew the gas back upon the officers and allowed the crowd to charge back into the center of the disturbance. The advisability of using tear gas during the

Century '67 demonstration in Los Angeles was thoroughly investigated prior to the incident. It was determined that the multi-level (including basements and tunnels) architecture of the Century Plaza Hotel would make gas ineffective and inappropriate.

4. Effective sight identification of law enforcement command and control personnel during the control of crowds and demonstration.

None of the seven cities reported any difficulty identifying uniformed officers. However, Los Angeles had a little confusion in identifying

undercover officers who were mingling with the crowd gathering at the park and marching down the avenue.

5. Command and control countermeasures against demonstrators equipped with:

Clubs: Sticks on picket signs were used both as clubs and spears (javelins) at Los Angeles. The best counter measure was fending off blows with the batons and wearing helmets.

Gas Masks: While only a few had gas masks, per se, students at Duke University had makeshift masks, using towels or handkerchiefs soaked in a solution of lemon juice and water.

Apparently they anticipated the tear gas attacks, but their efforts doubled their misery when the pepper-fogger was used, since it irritated any moist part of the body.

Chemical Munitions: The only chemical munitions used in any of the seven incidents were tear gas canisters thrown back at the police by Duke students. The officers were equipped with gas masks, so had no problem.

Protective Helmets: The Duke students had some motorcycle helmets, and one student wore a German World War I helmet. The police reported no problems resulting from the helmets.

TASK 4

PROCEDURES, METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

A. Definition of Terms

Although there is no clear-cut differentiation between the three terms, for the purposes of this report Procedures, Methods and Techniques are defined as follows:

Procedures: Extremely detailed step-by-step directions for action; usually written, but may be verbal; Prepared during Planning for disturbance, command and control; used for Training of law enforcement personnel; Implemented during tactical exercises or actual emergencies.

Methods: (1) Top-level policy for police department interfaces with civic and campus officials, private enterprise, the press, the courts and the public; established during Planning for disturbance command and control.

(2) Broad strategy for command and control of disturbances determined by top-level police administrators at headquarters prior to, or during, a disturbance.

Techniques: Tactics for use of logistics and personnel in Field Operations; directed by the Field Commander, within the Methods (policy and strategy) established previously.

B. Description of Procedures, Methods and Techniques

1. Planning

Preparations to cope with crowds and demonstrations require planning at many different levels to develop policy, strategy, contingency and operations plans.

a. Policy

Law enforcement personnel must establish basic policies for interaction with civic officials, other city agencies and legal authorities. It is necessary to have a good understanding with college administrators, owners of private property, and leaders of minority communities. A frank and friendly relationship with the press and the general public will ensure their support during crises. Once these interfaces are established, it is possible to develop broad policies for command and control of a disturbance in any section of the city.

Civic/Legal Interfaces

Considering the civic and legal interfaces as revealed by the incidents studied, it is obvious that in Corvallis there was a direct line of communication and good understanding on policy between the police, the district

attorney and the courts. Ithaca police worked well with civic and county officials in organizing to contain the demonstration on the Cornell campus; the Tompkins County Grand Jury indicted the trespassing students, even though campus officials did not punish them. If the Durham police and civic officials coordinated policy in advance of the Duke incident, it is not apparent; lack of agreement on legal measures was evidenced by dismissal of charges against the five young people arrested.

Police interfaces with civic and other officials becomes more complicated as city size increases. For example, Los Angeles police have a more difficult job coordinating plans within the city government than does Anaheim or Cincinnati, where there are close relationships between the City Manager and Police Chief (and/or Safety Director). In a very large city, approval of policy guidelines by various echelons is slowed by political and jurisdictional problems, such as the fact that numerous independent communities are wholly contained within Los Angeles boundaries. Atlanta is a remarkable example of wholehearted cooperation between law enforcement and civic leaders; the Mayor and many city Aldermen, notified immediately of the "Boulevard" incident, conferred with police, then went into the area personally to talk to the rioters and urge them to return to their homes.

Interfaces with Campus/Business/Minority Leaders

When police must enter a minority community or ghetto, a college campus

or private property to quell a disturbance, it is essential that there be prior agreements on law enforcement policy with the leaders of those social elements. Good understanding becomes more important if the incident erupts out of control, because the police need responsible citizens to assist them in restoring order. Policy must be established between all levels of command and communicated to the officers, as well.

Ithaca police performed routine patrol of the Cornell campus with full cooperation of the university and its security force, but there is no indication in newspaper accounts or interviews that possible violence and means to control it were discussed between campus and town. In Durham there was quick contact between the Police Chief and the Duke security head by means of a ring-down line between their offices. Additionally, the interviews did not reveal any policy agreements. Corvallis, as a small university-oriented community, has excellent working relationships with Oregon State University personnel at all levels; the OSU president and his staff confer with civic and law enforcement officers and the campus security officers have training exercises with city police.

Both Atlanta and Cincinnati law enforcement officers believed they had good rapport with leaders of the minority communities, Atlanta through the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and Cincinnati through the Avondale Community Council. In both cases it developed that these leaders had not been properly screened as to attitudes and some were actively agitating the crowds.

An extremely sensitive relationship exists between police and private enterprise. Large industries are heavy taxpayers and also wield considerable political power. They have a public image to maintain that is as important as the police department's. Therefore, policy regarding methods of handling disturbances on private property must take into account that image, as well as potential property damage. The Anaheim and Los Angeles disturbances, widely publicized for 6 weeks in advance, occurred on private property (and some city streets). Advance planning with police allowed Disneyland and the Century City businesses to establish policy that would maintain their dignity and public image even in the event of police/demonstrator confrontations.

Press/Public Interfaces

An informed press can ensure an informed public, and only through that route can law enforcement obtain the sympathy and support required to control disturbances. Two facets of police/press relations should be established in anticipation of demonstrations: (1) the interaction of working press at the scene with the crowd and with officers deployed in the field, and (2) the frank release of facts by the police during and after an incident.

Lack of factual data and poor understanding of the police department's objectives in their tactics can be detected easily by reading local newspaper accounts of the disturbances studied. Cincinnati and Atlanta newspapers tended to play down the "gory details" of the civil rights demonstra-

tions, thus avoiding adding more fuel to the fire. The Cincinnati Chief of Police publicly commended news media for their reporting the Black Monday riot. Out-of-town papers presented a significantly different account of the Duke riot than the Durham papers, whose reporter complained that official data were handed out as tid-bits by the mayor. News-papers in Anaheim and Los Angeles both stated they did not understand the maneuvers of the police field forces, and it has been impossible to determine if the tactics were ever explained by the police. Los Angeles police received very poor publicity after Operation Century '67, including charges of police brutality, particularly by the Los Angeles TIMES, the city's most widely read paper. On the other hand, the police claimed that newsmen and TV cameramen interfered with their dispersal tactics by interviewing demonstrators at the scene and photographing dissidents "acting out" injuries.

b. Strategy

Strategic planning is the responsibility of top law enforcement administrators in consonance with the civic, college, and community leaders with whom interfaces have been established to determine basic policies. Some of the strategic decisions that may be made at this top level are:

- o Department reorganization and mobilization for emergency
- o Availability of adequate facilities and equipment for field forces
- o Control of parade or park-use permits, and enforcement of city ordinances

- o Use of legal recourse, such as injunction, curfew, order to disperse, etc.
- o Diversion of demonstrators to competitive attractions
- o Support services for police force, such as utilities, street crews, etc.
- o Legal, jurisdictional and political constraints on amount and type of force to be used
- o Call up of mutual aid, state police, or national guard
- o Priority of arrests and codes to be cited.

This type of planning needs to be done at police headquarters prior to the event, and decisions updated or revised during the event by responsible officers in an Emergency Control Center, not at the Field Command Post.

Examples of these strategies in the events studied are described below.

Organization

Los Angeles developed an extremely complicated organizational structure for Operation Century '67 that required excessive manpower and redundant assignments (see Volume II). In Atlanta, the detention supervisor was called up to act as Field Commander. In Cincinnati the District Commander became Field Commander within Avondale; all regular patrolmen reported to him while Crime and Vice Bureau officers covered the downtown area.

Emergency Facilities

Since most of the events studied occurred before civic bodies fully appreciated the potential danger, few departments were provided with adequate facilities and equipment for disturbance control. Makeshift command posts, jury-rigged communications nets, and inadequate handie-talkies increased the command and control problems during the disturbances. In every case, additional equipment was procured after the event--a civic decision.

City Ordinances

For pre-planned demonstrations, strategic decisions may be made to invoke certain city ordinances or permit constraints. Anaheim enforced rules preventing loitering in city parks and rousted suspected narcotics users to prevent a buildup of out-of-town militants prior to Yippie Day.

Los Angeles granted a permit for the peace demonstration parade but imposed restrictions as to route, time, and vehicles; the demonstrators were also refused use of city park facilities in an attempt to minimize crowd size.

Legal Recourse

Another avenue open as a disturbance deterrent is decision: (1) to use injunctions (used as shown in Figure 4 - 1 in Los Angeles and considered for use in Ithaca), (2) to declare an unlawful assembly (used in every case but Ithaca), (3) to invoke a curfew and curb liquor and gas sales (used in Cincinnati).

INJUNCTION

On June 23, 1967, an order was issued by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The order was directed against the Peace Action Council of Southern California, Students for a Democratic Society, New Politics, the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, members of other organizations, their officers, agents, monitors, pickets, etc., AND all other persons acting by, through, in conjunction, in concert, or in cooperation with the defendants, INCLUDING PARADES AND DEMONSTRATORS.

All such organizations and persons are "RESTRAINED AND ENJOINED AND COMMANDED to desist and refrain from doing, threatening or attempting to do or causing to be done, either directly or indirectly, by ANY means, method or device, any of the following acts:

- "1. Conducting or taking part in any parade within the limits of Century City without first obtaining a permit from the Los Angeles Police Commission.
- "2. During the course of any parade to be conducted at or through Century City, for which a permit has been obtained from the Los Angeles Police Commission:
 - (a) Intentionally stopping the course of any such parade within the limits of Century City;
 - (b) Departing from or leaving the route or boundary of any such parade within the limits of Century City;
 - (c) Entering upon any private property within Century City without the owner's consent.
- "3. Congregating in such numbers or acting individually in such a manner as to block any entrance to or exit from (a) Century City, (b) any building in Century City (including the Century Plaza Hotel), (c) any area within Century City (including Century Square Shopping Center or any building therein), or (d) any parking lot or driveway adjacent to any building or area within Century City.
- "4. Taking any sign, noisemaking device, smell-making device, smoke-making device, or any device or instrument intended to frighten, harass, annoy or obstruct any person, into the area inside the exterior sidewalks and streets surrounding (a) any building in Century City (including the Century Plaza Hotel), (b) any area within Century City (including Century Square Shopping Center or any building therein), or (c) any parking lot or driveway adjacent to any building or area within Century City.
- "5. Parking and using any soundtruck or other vehicle equipped to amplify sounds of any kind or type at any place within the limits of Century City.
- "6. Picketing, standing, sitting, loitering, gathering, assembling, marching, parading, walking, stopping, or stationing, placing or maintaining any pickets or other persons at, in, or in front of entrances to or exits from the Century Plaza Hotel; provided, however, that not more than two persons or pickets may be permitted to be on the sidewalk at or near each of the entrances to the Century Plaza Hotel premises (including the two driveways from Avenue of the Stars) so long as such pickets maintain a distance of 20 feet from each other (except when passing) and so long as said pickets or any of them do not impede or interfere with the progress of any person or vehicle attempting to enter or leave said hotel;
- "7. Inciting any other person or persons to commit acts of violence or acts which constitute violation of this order;
- "8. Entering the premises of Century Plaza Hotel or any shop, store, restaurant or bar located therein from 3 p.m. to 10 p.m. on June 23, 1967; provided, however, that the provisions of this paragraph 8 shall not apply to persons who are registered guests of the hotel or who have reservations for rooms at said hotel for or on June 23, 1967;
- "9. Taking any actions with the intent to interfere with or make more difficult the normal conduct of business at the Century Plaza Hotel or the Century Square Shopping Center (or any shop or concession which forms a part of said hotel or center); including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, any of the following: (a) Congregating in such numbers or acting individually in such a manner as to impede the free passage of any person thereto, therefrom, or therein; (b) Singing or making any loud noises; (c) Handcuffing, chaining, tying, or otherwise fastening themselves to one another or to any other person or object; (d) Taking any animal on the premises; (e) Loosing any animal on the premises; (f) Affixing any sign, pennant, banner, written material or other object to any portion of the premises thereof; or (g) Frightening, annoying, harassing, or physically impeding any person present therein.

DATED: June 23, 1967.

s/Orlando H. Rhodes
Judge of the Superior Court

Figure 4-1. Copy of Century City's Injunction Handbill

Competitive Attractions

This diversionary tactic was not used in any of the seven incidents, but proved extremely successful in Portland, Oregon, last year. City officials planned and sponsored a rock festival in a rural park to drain away the peace protesters who threatened to disrupt the American Legion Convention being held in that city.

Support Services

Public or municipally owned utilities, street maintenance, and civic buildings or equipment (such as schools or busses) may be required in a hurry during an emergency. This civic strategy should be coordinated by the Mayor, City Manager and Chief of Police. In Anaheim, utility representatives were present in the Emergency Control Center and responded immediately when extra telephone equipment was required; street crews were called up to aid in traffic control when Disneyland Park closed abruptly, emptying thousands of cars from the parking lot onto the surrounding surface streets.

Constraints

Strategy should include consideration of the constraints on type and amount of force to be used for different disturbances, depending upon the locale, crowd composition, and level of violence. For example, coordinated civic-campus strategy should have dictated that chemical munitions, apparently used frequently in Durham during civil rights riots, were not used on the Duke campus.

Mutual Aid

Prior arrangements for backup law enforcement support require action by the Chief of Police and top civic officials. The relationship of civic officials with the state government may influence their willingness to call in state resources. Atlanta attempted to contain riots without aid of state police or national guard. In Cincinnati, where city government has had excellent coordination with the state, the Ohio National Guard was called and responded promptly.

Arrests

Strategic planning must incorporate consideration of arrest of law breakers, as well as protection of citizens' rights to peaceful protest. Los Angeles established two arrest priorities: (1) those committing violence against other demonstrators or policemen, (2) those identified by police as inciting to riot. Corvallis sought advice of the district attorney as to the code to be used for arrest; a trespassing charge was recommended and it stood up during original hearings and appeals. In Anaheim, one judge recommended use of certain code violations which were dismissed by another judge hearing the complaints.

c. Contingency Plans

Contingency plans can be developed stipulating responsibility and authority in case of a demonstration in the streets, in a minority neighborhood, on a campus or on private property, providing the policy-making interfaces have

been established. It should be recognized that the contingency plan should be sufficiently broad to encompass any type of disturbance or disaster, or that more specific contingency plans be prepared for the types of incident likely to occur within a given community.

An excellent example of a contingency plan developed for a rural area with large collegiate population is that of Corvallis, reproduced in Appendix A. It establishes the prime and support responsibility for campus, city, county and state law enforcement officers for events occurring at different locations. The document was formulated during a joint meeting of all agencies in October 1967, and has proved valuable many times since.

Cincinnati, after the 1967 race riots, updated their Civil Disturbance Operation Plan (CDOP) and implemented it immediately upon the assassination of Dr. King. The CDOP (Appendix B) identifies five phases for crowd control, escalating from Phase I (alert) to Phase II (department mobilization on 12-hour shifts) to Phase III (integration with Ohio National Guard) to Phase IV (integration with Federal Troops) if the violence becomes widespread. Phase V directs a critique of the operation, preparation of after-action reports, and complaint investigations.

Anaheim's contingency plan, identified as a Disaster Procedure, is so detailed that it resembles an operations plan. Reproduced in Appendix C, the plan defines minor and major disasters, command posts, and duties of command officers and personnel.

d. Operations Plans

Pre-planned demonstrations that are advertised for a long period of time, are appropriate candidates for preparation of a police operations plan, which defines policy, strategy, command posts, organization, personnel assignments, and constraints. The most ambitious operations plan generated for any of the events studied was the LAPD's Operation Century '67 plan. It was prepared over a 2-week period by a huge planning task force and consisted of 360 pages of plans and assignment sheets in two volumes. Unfortunately, the plans were not ready for distribution until 1 p.m. the day of the demonstration, thereby precluding its study by officers assigned to disturbance control.

From the lessons learned in preparing the Operation Century '67 Plan, LAPD planners produced a slim general plan, "Operation En Guardia", prior to the Chicano Moratorium demonstration of January 1971. It was distributed 4 days prior to the event. It is superior in many ways; sections are color-coded for quick reference and there is clear definition of command structure, intelligence, operations, personnel, logistics, field identification, tactical photo teams, outside agencies, news media policy, command post and staging sites, communication, and Emergency Control Center interfaces.

Anaheim also prepared an operations plan prior to Yippie Day, which described policy, ground rules for operation with Disneyland security officers, mutual aid integration, command posts and staging areas.

For spontaneous disturbances, law enforcement officers generated operations plans concurrently with the demonstration. In Atlanta the Field Commander conferred with the Chief of Police in planning the sweep down Boulevard to defuse the riot. Durham police went to the Duke University campus at noon to decide on an informal deployment plan with university administrators and security. Ithaca city police and Tompkins County sheriff's deputies called in members of the New York State Sheriff's Association, who are trained in control of civil disturbances, and planned low profile tactics as they waited for outbursts of violence on campus or in town.

2. Training

a. Procedures

Training officers in most police departments generate procedures as the basis for teaching disturbance control tactics and attitudes. These may be based on, or augmented by state-originated documents such as California's "Crowd Control and Riot Prevention" or the 1967 Federal Bureau of Investigation's "Prevention and Control of Mobs and Riots."

Anaheim's procedure book contains such topics as:

- o Psychological Aspects of Crowd and Mob Behavior
- o Withstanding Crowd Abuse
- o Psychological Aspects of Crowd Control
- o Signals and Formations for Crowd Control

- o Police Officer's Responsibilities in a Disaster
- o Crowd Control Laws
- o Disaster (previously described under Contingency Plans)
- o Strikes and Labor Controversies
- o Use of the Baton
- o Squad Formations
- o Code Charlie C (mutual aid activation)
- o 999 Calls (mutual aid response)

These are typical of disturbance control procedures, which are more or less detailed according to the training philosophy of the particular police department. Cincinnati's CEOPI is identified as Training Bulletin No. 48, and is part of the Cincinnati Police Department's Crowd Control Manual.

b. Lessons

In all of the cities studied, the police had received training in crowd control tactics, and in four of them (Atlanta, Durham, Cincinnati and Los Angeles) the police had been exposed to prior race riots. This, according to Cincinnati's Field Commander, is the best possible training exercise. In fact, response to mutual aid is looked upon favorably by some departments as an opportunity for their men to gain field experience which may prove invaluable later in their own community.

All of the departments contacted provide some formal school training for their recruits, averaging from 2 to 3 months. Most small cities partic-

pate in joint training with other communities. Anaheim, for example, sends their recruits, with those of nearby cities to the North Orange County Training School for 10 weeks training, after which they serve a 1-year probation. After a period of in-service training, Corvallis recruits are sent to Camp Withycombe, which is operated by the State Board of Police Standards and Training and provides identical training for all law enforcement personnel in Oregon.

Large cities usually have a police academy, such as those in Atlanta, Cincinnati and Los Angeles, where recruits receive initial training and in-service courses are given regularly. Both Los Angeles and Atlanta provide 3-month recruit training and 1-year probation. In addition, Atlanta sends its recruits to work with the Crime Prevention Bureau for up to 6 months prior to entering the police training school. The recruits carry no sidearms and work with foot patrolmen, learning to talk to the residents and understand them and their problems. Not only does the recruit meet the people he will work with, but his supervisors have the opportunity to evaluate his ability to handle himself in both routine and emergency situations.

There is an evolutionary change appearing in training curriculum to emphasize civil rights and social interactions of law enforcement with the citizens. Durham police are now subjected to verbal abuse classes and

are studying riot control tactics provided by the FBI, including handling of limp prisoners. A closed circuit television system has been installed so that officers can study films of recent civil disturbances.

Roll-call training is customary in all departments and most conduct refresher or in-training classes to keep all officers aware of current tactics and trends. Corvallis, for example, has only 1/2 hour of roll call training every 40 shifts, while Anaheim police have 7-1/4 hours roll call training each month. If notice is received of an impending demonstration, crowd control training is stepped up.

Selected training in counter-sniper or counter-insurgency for selected police personnel is given at military service schools. Los Angeles has a number of elite teams trained for special purposes, the SWAT team at the U.S. Marine Base (Camp Pendleton) and others at Fort Gordon, Georgia. In addition, Los Angeles maintains the METRO Division, which is specifically trained for fast response in disturbance environment. These men have vast experience and training in how to operate as a team, maneuver in mass formation and perform mass arrests. Normally this division patrols the central downtown area. When required, they are the first supplemental force dispatched in support of a geographic division. By assigning the elite team (several hundred officers) in the early phases of an incident, the likelihood of early control is optimized.

c. Exercises

Because most police officers are accustomed to operating as a two-man team, it is advisable to hold regular training exercises when they operate as a unit within a given scenario. Anaheim police went on special 12-hour shifts prior to Yippie Day and trained with machine guns at the police station in full view of the public. Corvallis, on the other hand, believes in conducting exercises (with campus security officers, county deputies and state police) out of sight.

The Ohio National Guard underwent special training beginning in September 1967 and planned a surprise mock alert for April 1968, when exercises would involve 20,000 Guardsmen and the police departments of all major Ohio cities. The training exercise was cancelled on 10 April 1968 because of the actual rioting in Cincinnati and Youngstown.

Annual large scale Command Post Exercises (CPX) have been held by Los Angeles for the past 4 years, but were omitted in 1971 because of the earthquake. During these exercises, the Emergency Command Post and Mobile Command Post complex is activated and a scenario is enacted.

Two of the exercises, Operations Alpha, involved disaster coordination for earthquakes, and two, Cable Splicer II and III, involved coordination with the California National Guard. Although the exercises are expensive (there are 181 command post cadre in three shifts) they have paid off handsomely in times of real disaster or civic stress.

3. Operations

a. Facilities

Headquarters

The physical plants of the seven cities studied were designed for normal operations in a benign social environment and are vulnerable to attack by militants and agitators. Buildings erected between 1950 and 1969 present severe security problems because of the wide use of glass, pilasters and many accesses. On the other hand, the Corvallis Police Department is housed in an old train station which has been remodelled many times and is still inadequate for the purpose. There is a single inadequate jail cell, and there is no squad room for officers on standby during an alert.

Los Angeles currently assigns 300 of its 6000-man force to security of its main building and 18 outlying division stations, since a bomb attack on the nearby Compton police station in 1970 failed. The new Los Angeles police headquarters will be completely hardened, with critical centers and equipment located in sub-basement areas, and controlled access integral to the design.

Anaheim initiated building security of its 4-year-old headquarters in 1970 when the police received advance warning of the impending Yippie Day. Visitors at the Ithaca and Cincinnati police buildings are screened rather carefully, but security is more lax in the new headquarters of the Durham and Atlanta police departments.

Emergency Control Centers (ECC)

To coordinate the various forces required for a major disturbance, top police officials and supporting staff can function best in an area set aside for this purpose with plentiful communications facilities, status and map boards, and controlled access.

Corvallis police, in cooperation with the Oregon State University security force, has designated a facility in the college gymnasium adjacent to the security office, telephone switchboard, and ROTC headquarters for use during emergency situations. Durham uses the Chief's office and adjoining rooms for an ECC; Atlanta uses facilities adjacent to the radio room; and Cincinnati has a large staff room with plot and status boards.

The Anaheim ECC is semi-hardened and is located in a basement near the police station and adjoining the civil defense disaster office. During the Disneyland event, the center was manned by coordinating personnel from public utilities, the city attorney's office, the City Manager, fire command personnel and police support personnel. The Anaheim facility is commodious and has potential for growth into a first-class operations room if funding is available.

By comparison, the LAPD Emergency Command Control and Communications (ECCC) Center is fairly well developed operationally, but is physically crowded. Its operation is hampered by poor paper flow and the fact that it has been developed piecemeal over the past 10 years. It suffers

from poor ventilation, acoustics, lighting and uncomfortable chairs.

The ECCC was in operation during the Century City event and is used approximately 10 other times per year, frequently for several consecutive days, such as during the Chicano Moratorium and the 1971 earthquake.

Forward Command Posts

Few communities, even today, have suitable mobile equipment for activation as Forward Command Posts. Without special mobile units, most departments designated the Field Commander's patrol car as the FCP and located it close to other communications facilities, such as call boxes, schools or retail stores. In Atlanta, the armored logistics van proved unsatisfactory as an FCP, when it became the target of fire bombs.

Only Anaheim and Los Angeles had mobile command posts. The Anaheim police operated from an inadequately equipped mobile van. The officers manning the FCP spent an uncomfortable day in the hot, non-air conditioned van and complained about their vulnerability as targets through the many windows of the van. Extra communications facilities had to be provided, since those in the FCP were not adequate for the situation. The 5-county region's combination command post and logistics vehicle (known as the Blue Goose) was borrowed for the occasion also.

As early as 1967, Los Angeles was far in advance of the rest of the country in use of mobile equipment which is constantly being refurbished and improved.

For the Century City event, three mobile units were available: Mobile I (command), Mobile II (supply and logistics) and Mobile III (communications), which were not considered adequate to house the large crew assigned.

Field tents set up adjacent to the mobiles contained communications equipment and status boards for command officers. The problems of open air command posts were obvious during the day and evening; later an Operations Vehicle was outfitted with this equipment. LAPD's mobile equipment is summarized in Table 4 - 1.

b. Equipment

Vehicles

Police mobile equipment includes marked patrol cars, unmarked cars, motorcycles, and such supplementary vehicles as logistics vans, portable detention units, airplanes and helicopters. A comparison of disturbance control equipment in each of the seven cities is presented in Table 4 - 2.

Paddy wagons were brought into the Atlanta and Cincinnati black communities; they were stationed in plain sight in the Boulevard ghetto as a deterrent, but were moved in and out of the Avondale district rapidly to avoid further agitating the residents. Mobile booking/jail facilities were provided during the Anaheim and Los Angeles disturbances by the respective county sheriff's offices.

Atlanta still uses its armored van to carry equipment, and has also added a Mobile Precinct for use by the department's Crime Prevention Bureau.

This vehicle, equipped like a typical police station, is moved into the city's neighborhoods in order to communicate with the minority elements

TABLE 4 - 1 LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT MOBILE SUMMARY

MOBILE	DESCRIPTION	POWER	TELEPHONE	RADIO	OTHER	COMMENTS
3 (COMMUN- ICATIONS) (COMM. DIV.)	35 FT. LONG. 8 FT. WIDE. 7½ FT. CEILING. NO AIR COND. 19 POSITIONS (SEATED) 3 AXLE INTER- NATIONAL TRUCK	25,000 W. ONAN GENER- ATOR. FUEL CAPACITY 20 GALLONS. FUEL CONSUMP. 2½ GALLONS PER HOUR	10 TRUNK LINES AND 20 LOCAL CIRCUITS TO SWITCHBOARD. 5 TELEPHONE POSITIONS, 1 SWITCHBOARD OPERATOR. 4 INCOMING LINES/POSITION (6 BUTTON KEY SET) 1 WALL SET NEXT TO LA SCHOOLS POSITION. 1 FIELD COMMANDER'S PHONE. 1 EXTERIOR PHONE.	PATCH PANEL 36 FREQUENCIES AVAILABLE. 13 RADIO POSITIONS OF WHICH 4 CAN BE PATCHED. SELECTABLE (12 FREQUENCY ES) MASTER CONTROL POSITION. FIXED POSITIONS: MASTER, TAC-1, TAC-2, LAFD/NAT. GUARD, HAM/AMATEUR CITIZENS BAND, LA SCHOOL TRANSPORTATION, CIVIL DEFENSE COMMAND NET, STATE AND INTEL. FREQUENCY 21, CLEMARS. PATCHABLE POSITIONS: LA CHP, LA SCHOOLS DISASTER RED CROSS, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, LA COUNTY SHERIFF.	TTY - 60 WORDS/ MINUTE TO WEST- LAKE. EXTERIOR PAGING SYSTEM. EXTERIOR TELE- PHONE.	ANTENNAS POLICE 150 MHZ WHIPS PERMANENT - CAN BE USED IN TRANSIT. LONG FOLDED WHIPS. FIRE, CO, AMATEUR/30 MHZ CHP, NATIONAL GUARD 30 FT. MAST-SLEEVE. MONOPOLE - 150 MHZ EXTENDABLE WHIP. 450 MHZ C FREQ. 21.
5 COMMAND (COMM.DIV)	35 FT. LONG. 8 FT. WIDE. 7½ FT. CEILING. AIR CONDITIONING 9 POSITIONS (SEATED) #4	15,000 W. (120/240 V.B)	6 HOT LINES. 2 WALL PHONES (MADISON LINES) PHONES - 6 POSITION KEYSTRIP.	4 TELEMOTES - 3 FREQUENCIES 1 AM/FM	TTY. 2 TV SETS. 1 AM/FM RADIO.	
7 OPERATIONS (COMM.DIV.)	35 FT. LONG. 8 FT. WIDE. 7½ FT. CEILING. NO AIR COND. 16 POSITIONS (SEATED)	NONE	INTELLIGENCE SECTION: PHONE 1- SWITCHBOARD PHONE 2- ECC PHONE 3- FIXED POINT PHONE 4- SWITCHBOARD	INTELLIGENCE SECTION: FREQUENCY 21 DESIRED: TAC-1 AND TAC-2 PLANNING SECTION: TELEMOTES TAC-1, TAC-2,	DUPLICATION EQUIPMENT	
SOUND #2			ROTATABLE EIGHT SPEAKER WESTINGHOUSE SYSTEM, 100 WATT SPEAKERS - RECORDED ON TAC FREQUENCY DOWNTOWN.		2 MEN USED TO MAN SYSTEM.	
LIGHT #1		25,000 WATT 240 V.B. SAME AS 3.	21 FOOT HYDRAULIC MAST - PLATFORM: 4, 1500 W. AND 2,500 W. FLOODLIGHTS AND HAND-HELD LIGHTS CARRIES EXTRA MOBILE PEDESTALS AND 2000 FOOT EXTENSION CORDS.		COMMON ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS. TOTAL 90,000 WATTS OUTPUT.	
MOBILE CANTEEN						

TABLE 4 - 2

SUMMARY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT EQUIPMENT AND GEAR

	CORVALLIS	ITHACA	DURHAM	ATLANTA	CINCINNATI	ANAHEIM	LOS ANGELES
LOGISTICS VAN				ARMORED VAN		BORROWED	USED
MOBILE JAIL				PADDY WAGON	PATROL WAGON	BORROWED	BORROWED
OTHER							
HELICOPTER					2	11	
FLAK VESTS		AVAILABLE			WORN	HIGH POSTS ONLY	
GAS MASKS		AVAILABLE	USED	AVAILABLE	ISSUED NOT USED	AVAILABLE NOT USED	
CHEMICAL MUNITIONS			USED		ISSUED NOT USED	AVAILABLE NOT USED	
Gas - Mace					ISSUED NOT USED	AVAILABLE NOT USED	
PEPPER-FOGGER			USED		AVAILABLE	AVAILABLE	
SHOTGUNS & SPECIAL WEAPONS			ISSUED	USED	USED		SPOTTER/HUNTER ONLY

and listen to their problems and complaints. It is not appropriate for use as an FCP.

Of the cities studied, only two, Anaheim and Los Angeles, had helicopters at the time of the incidents. Helicopters flying surveillance in Los Angeles were able to keep track of the assembling crowds. Anaheim's helicopters were effective in locating and spotlighting dissidents after the order to disperse had been given. Use of the helicopters as aerial observation platforms was hampered by darkness and lack of ground facilities to integrate aerial intelligence with ground tactical procedures.

Protective Gear

The most common item of protective gear for the officers is a helmet, which can be equipped with face shield to protect against clubs or missiles. Flak vests and body shields and armor can also be used; but in the incidents studied flak vests were worn only by Anaheim officers and high post security at Century City. Gas masks are available in most police departments; they were carried by Anaheim police and used only by Durham officers, who experienced difficulty with fogging of the goggles and some adjustments.

Weapons

Batons, or riot sticks, are considered the most effective weapon of the police in crowd control, providing they are used properly and not as a club or prod. Pictures showing improper use of batons triggered complaints of police brutality in Durham and Los Angeles.

Most officers are regularly equipped with sidearms; however, five Cornell security officers were required to share a single gun. (This situation has since been changed by procurement of additional weapons).

Shotguns were issued to police in three cities:

- (1) in Atlanta where the Field Commander pointed out the importance of not issuing them to "hotheads"
- (2) in Cincinnati where police found a volley of shotgun blasts into the air by 40 officers to be very effective as an "attention getter"
- (3) in Durham where they were issued, but not used.

Chemical munitions were considered as weapons for control of the disturbances in only two cities. Anaheim officers were issued tear gas and mace, but used neither. Durham police used both tear gas and a pepper-fogger.

c. Communications

Because communications are the lifeblood of command and control in a stress situation, problems in this area deservedly have received special attention in two IACP studies, and numerous special studies for the federal government and individual cities.

Voice contention was a problem in three large cities, Atlanta, Cincinnati and Los Angeles. With only one frequency in 1966, an Atlanta officer could obtain the air by calling out "Emergency, emergency!" The

Cincinnati Field Commander had two channels at his disposal -- one between patrol cars and the Communications Center and one for handie-talkies; he also had the problem of frequency incompatibility with the Ohio National Guard. Although there was some frequency congestion in Los Angeles, there would have been a significant problem if disorder had erupted simultaneously at Century City and the Los Angeles airport. Two common channels available, TAC 1 and 2, were assigned on the basis of range. Although there have been improvements in assignment since that event, there is a fundamental need for communications netting studies.

All departments used hand-held radios during operations. Range limitation at Durham was compounded by low signal strengths caused by shielding of the massive buildings. The Anaheim Field Commander successfully assigned different channels to different functions to prevent the FCP personnel from directly assigning deployed officers instead of following the chain of command. However, batteries in the handie-talkies borrowed from the California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Radio System (CLEMARS) ran down after 2 hours operation and no chargers were available. The borrowed radios also had poor audio quality and range limitations.

Increasing use of handie-talkies can be anticipated, and they will possibly be monitored by the dissidents. This is believed to have occurred in both Durham and Los Angeles. In Cincinnati, Ithaca and Los Angeles, the

dissidents had their own communications nets; police should be prepared to locate and monitor, and perhaps jam, these radios.

Telephone switchboards in buildings commandeered by field forces for command posts were quickly saturated. Although Cincinnati police had full use of the Sears' store telephone facilities, the downtown switching stations were jammed. When Durham police moved into the Allen building on the Duke campus, all telephone lines went through the Duke Hospital switchboard and long delays were experienced, except for emergency lines kept open to the Chief of Police, the Governor and the University President's office. Use of military field telephones by police during emergencies might help resolve this problem.

d. Personnel and Organization

For all disturbances studied, local law enforcement personnel were mobilized on two 12-hour watches instead of the normal three 8-hour shifts, thereby effectively increasing the size of the field forces. Mobilization and deployment details were worked out well in advance for the pre-planned events at Anaheim and Los Angeles. In the other five cases, mobilization call-up procedures were initiated promptly. Atlanta had been on 12-hour duty earlier in the week because of the Summerhill riot and was just returning to normal operations when the Boulevard incident erupted.

Cincinnati police went on 12-hour reliefs within an hour after Dr. King was assassinated (7 p.m. on 4 April 1968) and remained on this schedule

through the Black Monday riot on 8 April, not returning to 8-hour shifts until 12 April.

Response time for mobilization was approximately 2 hours for all incidents. Call up procedures worked quite effectively for smaller departments, especially when a command cascade (captain calls lieutenants, who call sergeants, who call squads) was used. This was possible only if a pre-determined emergency command structure existed. Larger departments found that force call-up was time-consuming and complicated because of sheer numbers and personnel assignment rotation. Cities with command posts and special emergency cadre (Los Angeles, Cincinnati and Anaheim) usually call these personnel from duty rosters maintained in or near their dispatch center.

A streamlined organizational structure for emergency operations is effective for fast response to disturbances. The Field Commander should have authority for all tactical decisions, with support on strategic decisions from the ECC. On his field staff he requires specialists in such areas as intelligence, operations, communications, logistics, press relations, and identification/arrest/bookings. Such an organization was implemented for most of the major disturbances studied, but Los Angeles was the only city that released a formal organization chart (Figure 4 - 2). This structure was extremely cumbersome and redundant, and was trimmed down considerably for later demonstrations to expedite command decisions and reaction.




Figure 4-2. Task Force Organization for Operation Century '67

Once in the field, the primary problem is "to convert from a patrol posture of normally low uniform visibility into a well organized and disciplined emergency control force of sufficient size to prevent a disturbance or, if necessary, to control illegal actions and restore peace in the streets."* At this point the effectiveness of prior squad training and exercises is tested; there was no breaking of ranks during confrontation with rioters in Los Angeles, Anaheim or Atlanta.

Most Field Commanders in the incidents studied did not feel that the average patrolman required a detailed knowledge of planned operations and tactics.

By contrast, at Century City the Tactical Commander personally briefed the first groups of officers as they arrived at the staging area; later arrivals were provided with 16-page excerpts of the 200-page Operations Plan.

Those men who had been briefed personally had high morale during the event and were still enthusiastic about their commander 3 years later.

It is not always possible to provide this high level briefing; but sufficient definition of the problem, composition and mood of the crowd, policy, constraints, and general tactics should always be provided. Proper guidance helps to avoid overreaction, unsuitable citations, and citizen/police misunderstandings.

e. Mutual Aid or Support

Mutual aid agreements between police departments of neighboring communities, county sheriff's offices, and state police to assist each other during

* Los Angeles Police Department, "Operation En Guardia," January 1971.

emergencies existed in four of the cities studied: Corvallis, Ithaca, Durham, and Anaheim. The mutual aid forces were on standby in the first two cities and used in the last two.

Both Atlanta and Los Angeles chose to control their disturbances without calling any support forces, but Cincinnati immediately called up the Ohio National Guard. Los Angeles has previously used the National Guard, and conducts exercises with them annually.

It is imperative that definitive agreements be established for mutual aid and support. It was noted that criteria for requesting assistance were not always well defined and that the decision to activate mutual aid was sometimes made at too low a command level. This resulted in outside forces arriving before they were actually needed and held on standby an unnecessarily long time.

Policy for utilization of the outside forces depends to a great extent on the type of training they have had. Where forces train at a single center and use common signals and maneuvers, such as at Corvallis, it is possible to integrate all men into squads or platoons and even interchange sergeants. In Orange County (Anaheim incident), where training procedures are unique to each city, each department's tactical squads were held intact during crowd dispersal or for guard duty at staging areas, logistics pools, etc. Customarily, National Guard forces are assigned to jeep patrol duty in groups of three or four with a single local police officer. The local officer acts as squad leader and is empowered to make arrests.

f. Dissident Weapons and Tactics

Weapons

Two broad categories of dissident weapons can be distinguished, usually depending on prior intent of the demonstrators to commit violent acts.

Weapons of opportunity are those objects readily available on city streets, such as rocks, bottles, fences, and barricades--anything a demonstrator can grab and use to assault the police. Typical weapons of opportunity are listed in Table 4 - 3 with an indication of where they were used.

Militants, intent on destruction, arm themselves with weapons ranging from improvised lethal clubs to high power firearms, Molotov cocktails, and grenades or bazookas stolen from military installations (Table 4 - 4).

They frequently protect themselves with helmets, gas masks and flak vests. In some cases, so-called weapons of opportunity were intentionally brought along to crack an officer's skull, such as the picket sign in the hands of a young lady or super-heavy picket sticks during the Los Angeles demonstration.

Tactics

The tactics used by the dissidents tend to follow a specific pattern unique to the issue (or category) of disturbance.

Invasion of a campus building was the principal tactic in all three college disturbances. At Oregon State University, the students merely walked into an office where they remained until arrested for trespass a few hours later.

TABLE 4 - 3

COMMON DISSIDENT WEAPONS OF OPPORTUNITY

Typical Weapon of Opportunity	Ithaca	Corvallis	Durham	Anaheim	Atlanta	Cincinnati	L.A.	Other
<u>Missiles</u>								
Rocks (native and landscape)								
X	X	X	X	X	X			
Bottles	X	X	X	X	X			
Bricks								
Dirt Clods		X	X	X	X			
Mortar/Plaster		X			X			
Ashtrays			X					
Garbage/food	X							
Tree/stakes (metal)	X	X						
Manhole covers								
<u>Clubs or Spears</u>								
Park benches/fences		X						
Stanchions and chains		X						
Barricades		X						
Picket signs			X					
Flag poles			X					
<u>Obstructions</u>								
Trash cans								
Tree branches								
Old cars								
Oil on street								

Chicago '68
Atlanta '70
Chicano Moratorium ('71)Washington '71
Washington '71
Suggested L.A. '67
Suggested L.A. '67TABLE 4 - 4
TYPICAL DISSIDENT WEAPONS OF INTENT

Weapons of Intent	Ithaca	Corvallis	Durham	Anaheim	Atlanta	Cincinnati	L.A.	Other
<u>Improvised</u>								
Chains/pipes								
X	X							
Stout/sharpened picket signs								
Plastic bags filled with objectionable matter								
Baseball bats/pool cues	X		X					
Baseball bats with nails			X					
Household and other chemicals								
Sling shots/ball bearings etc.								
Hat pins, nails and tacks								
<u>Weapons and Explosives</u>								
Knives, razors, switch blades								
Firearms	X							
Explosives (Molotov cocktails)			X	X	X			
Explosive containers and delivery systems			X	X	X			
Military armament								
<u>Protective & Org. Equip.</u>								
Helmets								
Flak vests								
Tear gas masks								
Communications gear	X							

Portland '70
Columbia Univ. '68

At both Duke University and Cornell University, the Afro-American Students entered through the basement of campus buildings, escorted out the occupants, barricaded the doors and windows and threatened further destructive action unless their demands were met. The Cornell students armed themselves first with broken pool cues, then passed rifles and shotguns into the building when (they said) they were afraid of reprisals by white students. They apparently had a radio net established outside the building to keep up with campus happenings.

Duke black students reportedly left the building when they learned (by monitoring police broadcasts) that police were entering the building. They left behind such weapons as 2-foot lengths of structural steel and sawed off baseball bats with spikes driven through them.

Apparently a victory parade is also part of a campus building seizure.

Cornell students marched out through a line of campus security officers to their headquarters to sign an agreement. Duke youths started on a parade to downtown Durham when they were diverted by appearance of city police.

During a government policy (peace) protest the activists may hide behind women and children in their parade during confrontation with the police, on the theory that police will not use force against them. While the Los Angeles parade started with rally speakers and two dogs leading the marchers, the leaders soon dropped back into the middle of the crowd.

so that it was virtually impossible for the police to extricate them.

Other common tactics of this type of demonstration were sit-downs, lie-downs, linking arms, chaining themselves together, etc. When the violence started, it began with rocks and signs thrown from the rear of the crowd, striking both front-line demonstrators and police.

The sophisticated operation of the Peace Action Council in Los Angeles is exemplified by the use of amplified hand-held speakers and communications by handie-talkie.

The traditional tactics of racial riots held true in Atlanta and Cincinnati. There were fire bombings, looting, sniping, attacks on officers and police equipment, in addition to throwing of rocks, bricks, bottles and any other available missiles. The rioters struck quickly at one place, then hit another spot some distance away to spread out the police and reduce their effectiveness. Because the rioters lived in the neighborhood, they dispersed into their homes toward midnight, then gathered again the next afternoon to start another night of rioting.

g. Police Response and Tactics

According to an authority, "The hard-core activists continuously seek confrontations and quite consciously want the authorities to resort to non-democratic procedures. By linking widely shared grievances to impossible demands, the radicals have shown how easy it is to force the authorities to call the police onto the campus or into the ghetto. . . (a SNCC leader) summed up the rationale behind New Left tactics when he stated that any

demonstration in which the authorities are not maneuvered into a position of using force is a failure for the demonstrators and for the movement."**

If this is the goal of the activists, it is extremely important that the police so temper their response to demonstrations that they are not drawn into unnecessary head-on confrontations. In the words of the Atlanta Field Commander, "the biggest command problem during a disturbance is to determine when to take positive action and clear ~~the~~ streets, and how long to observe and exercise mild control."⁴¹ Granted that the three missions of the police in riot control operations are to CONTAIN, to ISOLATE, and to DISPERSE the mob**, it is also true that the police must have no constraints on their decisions as to how and when to act to accomplish these missions. Police decisions and police tactics were impacted severely in three of the events studied by constraints of private enterprise (Anaheim) and the collegiate community (Ithaca and Durham), and to a lesser degree in Los Angeles. In each of these cities, police were required to standby for frustrating and excessive periods of time; when they were called into action, they tended to overreact.

The police responses and tactics for each event are summarized below:

Corvallis:

Because of previous agreements between city, county, and university

* Carl F. Rosenthal: "The American Student Left," American Institutes for Research, Center for Research in Social Systems.

** "Prevention and Control of Mobs and Riots," Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1967.

officials and the police, the demonstrating students at OSU were removed without agitating any other students. While the incident appears trivial on the surface, there might have been violence if the students had been allowed to remain in the building for any length of time.

The Field Commander and 14 officers entered the office, gave an order to disperse, advised those remaining of their rights before arresting them one by one. Each was photographed with two arresting officers, transported to the county jail and booked. Convictions of all 14 students for trespass were upheld on appeal.

Ithaca:

Ithaca police, Tompkins County Sheriff's deputies and about 300 members of the New York State sheriff's association maintained low profile tactics and "cooled their heels" just off the Cornell campus, anticipating further demonstrations either on campus or in town. Neither occurred. Cornell security officers, who were inadequate in number, training and logistics, were not authorized by university administrators to attempt any kind of control tactics. There was no student/law enforcement confrontation, just negotiations and university capitulation to student demands.

Durham:

The police plan to immediately evict the trespassing students was aborted when the university administration delayed delivering an ultimatum. During the long cold wait, officers attracted a crowd of resentful students.

When they finally were given direction to disperse the students from the building, they discovered the students were already gone and tried to return to their cars and leave the campus. When they were ordered to occupy the building to prevent the students' return, a squad of officers was stationed on the building's front steps. These officers, equipped with gas masks, helmets and visors further excited the growing crowd which pressed in toward the steps. When one officer was struck by a cinder block, the squad retaliated with tear gas canisters and the pepper-fogger; no person has been identified as having given the order for this tactic. Officers are reported to have reacted to taunts of the crowd, pursuing the students across the campus in disorderly formations until advised to withdraw into the building and to leave the campus.

Atlanta:

Police response to the shootings in the Boulevard ghetto was fast and effective, probably because of racial riots in another of the city's ghettos earlier in the week. Perimeter control was established immediately, and black police officers were sent into Boulevard to conduct saturation patrol, to arrest known agitators, and to urge the residents to disperse into their homes. In the ensuing days, police stood by during parades to the church mass meetings, conducted foot patrols, and sent tactical teams in response to the rioters' hit and run tactics. To finally defuse the riot, two skirmish lines (13 officers each) marched shoulder-to-shoulder from each end of Boulevard sweeping the street and chasing

the rioters out of alleys and back streets. The police Crime Prevention Bureau officers moved into the neighborhood as soon as the violence ceased to listen to the complaints of the residents and restore order.

Cincinnati:

Police were alert for trouble when Dr. King was killed, and did not relax their vigil when the black community planned the Black Monday memorial for him. Although they allowed the Avondale Community Council to police the area with the support of only nine black police officers, top level strategy established a 34-man perimeter control with 17 checkpoints plus a 30-man tactical team patrolling the perimeter. When violence broke out within Avondale, police responded immediately with a show of force at the main intersection and startling the rioters with shotgun volleys.

Ohio National Guardsmen, arriving a few hours later, were teamed with police officers in patrolling Avondale and other Negro communities and were also used as guards for critical installations, such as the communications transmitters, utilities, and the F.C.P.

Anaheim:

As planned, Anaheim police maintained low profile tactics throughout the day of the demonstration, with their Field Command Post, logistics and staging areas out of the public's view. Several squads reported to the Main Gate about noon in a show of force to discourage would-be gate-crashers; one squad remained there for the rest of the day. Although Disneyland visitors complained when Yippies disrupted their day's

outing, the police waited for go-ahead from Disneyland officials before taking action. When the crowd converged on the City Hall, officers responded to a request for aid and marched down Main Street, stationed themselves along the street, while other officers and Disneyland security swept the area and closed the park. When departing Yippies, gathered outside the gates, started throwing missiles, police skirmish lines forced them across the parking lot and onto nearby hotel and business property.

Police used the helicopter for crowd surveillance during the day, for reconnaissance during the dispersal, and to locate pockets of hiding Yippies. More than 300 mutual aid forces were called up for long hours of standby in response to unconfirmed rumors of planned crowd activity before they were finally assigned to duty after 8 p.m.

Los Angeles:

Carefully planned tactics for the Century City event were implemented early in the morning when four separate command posts were activated.

Men were stationed at 93 fixed posts within the hotel, plus an inside reserve unit of 30 uniformed men, coordinated with Secret Service agents.

Men were assigned to airport/parade guard duty, park security, traffic control, and special high-ground posts throughout the day in full view of passersby and the gathering crowds. When the picket line in front of the hotel became unruly, officers used the previously obtained injunction as grounds for dispersal, in addition to existing city picketing ordinances.

By this maneuver, which forced the picketers across the wide street in

front of the hotel, the police were able to maintain control of the main hotel entrance, even when the marchers stopped in front.

Two platoons in marked patrol cars were assigned to lead and follow the parade, a third platoon was stationed along the parade route, while a special traffic detail cleared the intersections. When the parade stopped in front of the hotel (violating the parade permit) a motorcycle sweep was used to urge marchers along before the order to disperse was broadcast. When the crowd began throwing objects and shoving the officers toward the hotel, double skirmish lines of police forced them back across the street. Finally, a wedge formation was employed to split the demonstrators into smaller groups and disperse them across the open field pursued by police squads who completed the mopping up tactics.

C. Effectiveness of Procedures, Methods and Techniques

1. Effectiveness Criteria

In order to establish any measures of the effectiveness of police command and control of a disturbance, it is necessary to first define the mission or objectives of law enforcement response. It is generally agreed that the primary objectives are:

- o To maintain control of the situation, or restore it quickly if control is lost
- o To minimize deaths and injuries
- o To minimize damage to property.

A fourth objective has recently been added to this list by law enforcement agencies:

- o To avoid charges of police brutality.

Granted that these are the major objectives, then effectiveness can be measured by the following primary criteria:

1. Did the police maintain control of the situation (and avoid the Demonstration-Disorderly Phase)?
2. If control was lost, how long did it take the police to regain control? (duration of Demonstration-Disorderly Phase)
3. How many deaths and injuries occurred?
4. What was the property damage in dollars and inconvenience to the residents?

In addition to these is a set of secondary criteria:

1. What was the immediate impact on law enforcement policy?
For example, were parade permits denied, different civic ordinances enforced, etc. ?
2. How many convictions were obtained in relation to the number of arrests?

This is a measure of planning (legal advice obtained), of training (how to obtain evidence and make an arrest),

of operations (identification and booking procedures)

and of interfaces between law enforcement and the rest of the Criminal Justice System.

3. What was the attitude of the average citizen (as well as the demonstrators) toward the police after the event?

4. What was the long range impact on the community and on community relations?

Did police action tend to polarize blacks and whites, for example, or to unify minority elements?

Undoubtedly there are other criteria, but these measures were apparent in one or more of the events studied, and qualitative evaluation of effectiveness is based upon these elements.

2. Statistical Analysis

The sample size (seven cities) used for this study is relatively small.

Moreover, much of the data are difficult, if not impossible to quantify.

On the other hand, in order to make meaningful recommendations for improved procedures, methods and techniques it is desirable, even necessary, to have statistical support in the form of significance tests.

The technique chosen here, Spearman's-Rho rank correlation coefficient, is a method generally classed as a nonparametric technique. In particular it is a rank order procedure. Thus, to test the association of

two variables, say law enforcement effectiveness and policy planning, it is not necessary to have quantitative measures of these two variables available for each city but only that the cities be ranked (say from best to worst) with respect to these two variables. Spearman's Rho is then computed from

$$R = 1 - \left[\left(6 \sum_{i=1}^n D_i^2 \right) / n(n^2 - 1) \right]. \quad (1)$$

In (1) n is the sample size and in our case is seven. D_i is the difference in the ranks (for the two variables) for the i th city; $i = 1, \dots, 7$.

Clearly, R is a random variable and under the (null) hypothesis that the two variables are not correlated, R has the critical values, R_c , shown in Table 4-5.

TABLE 4-5 Critical Value, R_c , of Spearman's-Rho for $n = 7$

Significance level	.200	.100	.050	.020	.010
R_c	.57	.71	.79	.89	.93

Thus, if an observed R is greater than or equal to $R_c = .57$, then the two variables are said to be correlated at the .10 significance level.

The lower the significance level the more sure we can be that the variables really are correlated and that we did not observe a rare event (the rare event being that the variables are really uncorrelated and we observed an unusually high value of R (by chance)).

Since the primary purpose of this study is to recommend procedures, methods and techniques which will result in improved law enforcement effectiveness we take, always, the dependent variable law enforcement effectiveness (hereafter L. E. E.). With respect to L. E. E. the cities were ranked

CITY	Anaheim	Atlanta	Cincinnati	Corvallis	Durham	Ithaca	Los Angeles
RANK	4	3	2	1	7	6	5

The variables taken, in turn, as the independent variables are: quality of policy and coordination; quality of contingency planning; complexity of operations plans; quality of training; adequacy of facilities; adequacy of emergency control centers; adequacy of mobile command post; adequacy of control of field forces; adequacy of protective procedures; adequacy of communications; ability to counter dissidents tactics, weapons and communications; adequacy of the intelligence function; timing of tactics; ratio of convictions to arrest.

Table 4 - 6 lists arbitrary ranking of these variables assigned to each city.

TABLE 4 - 6

RANKINGS OF THE SEVEN CITIES WITH RESPECT TO DISTURBANCE CONTROL VARIABLES (AT THE TIME OF INCIDENT STUDIED)

	Anaheim	Atlanta	Cincinnati	Corvallis	Durham	Ithaca	Los Angeles
Quality of policy and coordination	2	1	4	3	7	6	5
Quality of contingency planning	3	5	2	1	7	6	4
Complexity of operations plans	5	3	6	4	2	1	7
Quality of training	2	4	3	5	7	6	1
Adequacy of facilities	2	4	3	7	5	6	1
Adequacy of emergency control centers	2	5	4	3	6	7	1
Adequacy of mobile command center	2	5	5	5	5	5	1
Adequacy of control of field forces	4	2	1	3	7	6	5
Adequacy of communications	2	4	3	6	5	7	1
Ability to counter dissident's weapons, tactics and communications	4	3	2	1	6	7	5
Adequacy of intelligence functions	2	4	5	1	6	7	3
Timing of tactics	3	4	1	2	7	6	5
Ratio of convictions/arrests	5	3	2	1	7	6	4
Size of threat	3	6	7	1	4	5	2

The computer R values are given in Table 4 - 7 with the significance level achieved noted in the righthand column. The designation N. S. means Not Significant. Since the variables listed in Table 4 - 7 represented troublesome areas for law enforcement personnel on the basis of the questionnaires and interviews and most (7 of 13) were significantly related to law enforcement effectiveness, they are used in the next section as the basis for recommended improvements in procedures, methods and techniques.

The failure to detect a significant relationship to L. E. E. for six of the variables is probably due to the small sample size, and hence low power of the rank correlation coefficient test. For example, consider the variable: quality of contingency plans. There is less than 0.02 probability that such a large R ($= 0.893$) could arise if this variable were uncorrelated with L. E. E. This statistical evidence, plus the problems noted in the questionnaire mean this variable is a subject for improvement. On the other hand, quality of training did not show up statistically as significantly related to L. E. E. However, it was a trouble area and probably the lack of significance was due to the small sample size.

The last entry: size of threat requires special mention. It was tested against L. E. E. to make sure the L. E. E. rankings were not correlated with threat size. A significant correlation would indicate the cities received "good" L. E. E. ranks because they faced small threats. This did not happen.

TABLE 4 - 7
CORRELATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY OF LEE

Independent Variable	R	Level of Significance
Quality of policy and coordination	0.714	<.10
Quality of contingency planning	0.893	<.02
Complexity of operations plans	-0.429	N. S.
Quality of training	0.321	N. S.
Adequacy of facilities	-0.107	N. S.
Adequacy of emergency control center	0.393	N. S.
Adequacy of mobile command center	0.036	N. S.
Adequacy of control of field forces	0.893	<.02
Adequacy of communications	0.071	N. S.
Ability to counter dissident's resources	0.964	<.01
Adequacy of intelligence functions	0.643	<.20
Timing of tactics	0.929	<.02
Ratio of convictions/arrests	0.964	<.01
Size of threat	0.036	N. S.

3. Simulation Models

An excellent means of evaluating the effectiveness of command and control tactics is development of performance effectiveness simulation models against which the scenarios (contained in Volume II of the Final Report) of disturbances in the seven cities could be exercised. However, a single effectiveness model would not be sufficient, since effectiveness must be measured against some standard of performance, and the tactics employed for one type of disturbance might be inappropriate if used for another.

Three different categories, or types, of disturbances have been identified in this study: college/university, civil rights, and government policy.

Therefore, a minimum of three simulation models would be required. The alternative responses of law enforcement agencies could be matched against the appropriate model to evaluate the effectiveness of the response.

Simulation modeling is outside the scope of this study, but could prove to be an effective follow-on effort, making use of the derived scenarios.

4. Effectiveness as Perceived by Law Enforcement Personnel and Observers

Corvallis:

No formal critique was held after police broke up the student sit-in, although there were numerous informal discussions. None of the officers participating could suggest any means of improving the operation because it had gone so smoothly . . . "but we were lucky, it was summer school, and there could have been a lot more people involved." The Field Commander

expressed regret that the demonstrators had not been fingerprinted when they were booked; the police felt that it would have been a good idea to "open an FBI file for them right at the start."

The university administration commended the department highly for their "calm and orderly" handling of the situation. There was also a noticeable improvement in student/police relations after this incident. The police were commended by the college newspaper and have since been invited many times to classes to discuss narcotics, traffic, and juvenile problems.

Because of the possibility of further civil disobedience on campus, the police since that time have acquired helmets, riot sticks, pick-ax handles, leather sap gloves and gas masks which are issued individually to each officer.

Ithaca:

The Ithaca Police Department mobilized on 12-hour shifts, prepared for any type of violence. With the specially trained deputy sheriff contingent they maintained low profile tactics, remaining as inconspicuous as possible and staying away from the campus. The Deputy Police Chief stated,

"We're not interested in touching this thing off--we're trying to control it so we are trying to avoid any display of special equipment." These tactics

were reported noncommittally by the Ithaca JOURNAL and ignored by

Cornell administrators.

The Cornell Safety Division was painfully aware of their inability to cope with the building seizure. They had too few officers, very little equipment, and no riot gear. In the university's organizational structure, security was five management levels away from the President and little or no direction for action was handed down. Campus security believed that the students should be evicted from the building, even if it meant calling city police onto the campus, but this tactic was opposed by the administration. The decision not to cordon off the building . . . the blacks were free to enter or leave the building at will, but whites were to be barred from entry . . . was based on an experience occurring almost a year before, when two campus patrolmen were knocked to the floor by blacks when these police had tried to prevent some blacks from entering (an) . . . office already occupied by black students.** Allowing guns to be passed into the barricaded students was considered an especially poor tactic.

It should be noted that the special Trustee Committee believed that campus tactics were effective in that there was no police/student confrontation because "The presence of off-campus police forces on any campus has an escalating effect on students . . . The administration was most anxious to settle this disturbance, if possible, without bloodshed or violence." The administration was supported by the Faculty Council and the student

* "Campus Unrest at Cornell," the Report of the Special Trustee Committee, 5 September 1969.

Interfraternity Council in the primary objective of getting the building vacated without violence or bloodshed.

Campus security was criticized by black students and white students alike. The charges were investigated by the Trustee Committee, which absolved the security force of blame for their handling of the incident and for the bad publicity that resulted. However, the Committee did recognize the deficiencies of the force, and recommended changes.

Since the incident many changes have been made, the most significant being in organization; the Director of Safety and Security, who is in charge of police and building guards, now reports directly to the President. The force has been vastly increased in number, with an additional 25 campus employees trained as backup forces. New vehicles and equipment have been procured and specialized training has been added which includes supervisory, sensitivity and disturbance control courses.

Durham:

Durham police acknowledged that some officers broke ranks to chase the jeering students and that there was overreaction as a result of the long cold wait for orders to occupy the building and the repeated reversal of orders. They did not defend nor comment on the use of tear gas and the pepper-fogger. They did blame the violence on the lack of decisiveness on the part of the administration during which the crowd grew in number and animosity.

The Durham officers who were interviewed stated that "we were not going back out to Duke until there was a definite decision." When this occurred a few months later during a labor sit-in at Duke Hospital, the police "went in and came right out with the suspects; unless you were in the hallway you wouldn't know what was going on. We learned from the first event about this business of hanging around, letting them dictate to us how they wanted us to work."

The Observer interviewed felt the appearance of riot-equipped police on campus was a shock to the students, that the police occupation of the building "to protect the files" after the students had already left was a ridiculous move, and that use of gas was "unnecessary and made people mad."

The Duke University President accepted the responsibility for calling in the police, and stated that he would do the same thing again. However, he felt that he had no control, once it became a police matter: "The university could request the removal of the police, but the police chief could have refused."

Atlanta
Police felt that rapid response in force with perimeter control and saturation patrols by their black officers was responsible for containing the incident within the Boulevard ghetto. After the incident they questioned the capability of the black leaders to calm their people as well as their integrity in promising to do so.

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The strategy of top civic officials to mingle with the street crowd urging them to return to their homes proved less successful than previously believed. The police policy to urge crowds back into their houses, minimize arrests, and treat arrestees leniently won a commendation from the Atlanta Summit Leadership Conference which said they found a little rudeness but no brutality in police handling of rioters.* The restraint of the police during the riot contributed greatly to SNCC's loss of influence in Atlanta.

Since the incident Atlanta police have made some specific changes, including development of a contingency plan, addition of radio frequencies, and activation of a Mobile Precinct which is used in minority communities for public relations work. Probably the most significant change is top level strategy for command and control of disturbances. "We found out quickly that we had neither the manpower nor the equipment to handle riots such as the military handles them." Recently the trend has been to avoid confrontations by (1) having a minimum of police officers in view, (2) minimizing news media coverage, and (3) restraining from making arrests at a place and time that might set off a riot.

In the words of the Superintendent of Training, "Go in with the minimum amount of people and make your arrests at the most convenient time; in other words, play the ball game on your own field and not on theirs. Even

*"Summit Finds Courtesy, No Brutality," Atlanta JOURNAL, 15 Sept. 1966.

if we must be passive at times and do the job but in a different way, we will get the same end results even though we get some bad publicity out of it. I'm not ashamed to make a strategic retreat, then go back and do the job later."

Neither the Observer nor newspaper reports were critical of police tactics during the Boulevard riot.

Cincinnati:

The Cincinnati Police Department's Civil Disturbance Operations Plan (CDOP) calls for a Phase V, during which all records of the disturbance are collected and reviewed, any citizen complaints are investigated, and critiques of tactical operations are held at many levels. As a result, there is better effectiveness evaluation in Cincinnati than in any other city studied. For example, it is possible to compare statistics about the 1967 and 1968 riots to prove how well the police had applied lessons learned earlier, as shown in Table 4 - 8.

In retrospect, Cincinnati police feel that a strategic error was made in allowing the Avondale Community Council to police their own community and exclude all but a few black police officers. They believe that heavy patrol in the area during the memorial service would have acted as a deterrent to violence, and that only rapid deployment into the area of the tactical squads and the Ohio National Guard (ONG) forces prevented the whole city from being engulfed in violence.

TABLE 4 - 8

COMPARISON OF 1967 AND 1968 CINCINNATI RIOTS

	1967	1968
Violence Erupted	10 p.m., Monday 12 June	5:55 p.m., Monday 8 April
Ohio National Guard:		
Alerted	12:20 a.m., Tuesday	6:22 p.m., Monday
Requested	9:40 p.m., Tuesday	6:30 p.m., Monday
Reported	2:30 a.m., Wednesday	11:00 p.m., Monday
	800 men--no live ammo	1200 men--fully equipped
Riot Trigger	Arrest of picket protesting Negro's murder conviction	Report white policeman shot Negro woman
Fatalities	1	2
Damage	\$2 million	\$350 thousand
Arrests:		
Monday	14	166
Total	404	304
Bail bond set	\$100	\$10,000
Police Operation Plan	No formal plan	CDOP
Curfew	None	7 p.m. to 6 a.m. Monday, Tuesday Wednesday
Liquor Sales	Open	Halted Monday and Tuesday
Gasoline Sales	Open	Halted Monday and Tuesday nights

Since the incident, police have reorganized liaison arrangements with the National Guard, whereby elements of the ONG report directly to district police stations, rather than the total contingent reporting to the FCP.

This arrangement achieves quicker integration and improves communications.

Observers and press were not critical of police or National Guard operations. However, the Observer insists that "they (the memorial organizers) had requested that no Caucasian officers be in Avondale that day, and to me this is a violation because I think a policeman should have a right to go anywhere at any time."

Anaheim:

Anaheim police officers believe that their use of low profile tactics, rapid orderly deployment and sweeps of the area were effective in dissipating the crowd. There were no injuries, only minor property damage, and no charges of police brutality. However, in reviewing the day's events, both Anaheim police and Disneyland security believe that a preferable tactic would have teamed uniformed officers with park security guards, patrolling the park and arresting Yippies for disturbing the peace as each individual incident occurred.

The Observer was loud in his complaints of police and Disneyland officials allowing the Yippies to cause closure of the park, because it let the mob think "they can close down any business if they want to." He thought

citizens should have been deputized to take part in controlling the demonstration. Police formations were not understood and were questioned publicly.

Since this disturbance, Anaheim police have obtained additional handie-talkies and have procured video-tape units to ensure better evidence of dissident activities. At present they are seeking a grant for a helicopter mounted low light level TV which would provide the Field Commander on the ground with photographic information on locations and action of the demonstrators.

Los Angeles:

Probably the most controversial incident from an effectiveness viewpoint, was the Los Angeles peace demonstration. Police felt that the steps they took were justified, considering possible threat to the President's safety, and that there were no grounds for complaints of police brutality.

They felt that the wedge formation used to split the crowd was critical and that it worked because of the intensive riot control training the men had received since the 1965 Watts riots.

Participants in the demonstration felt that such harsh police response was unnecessary, especially when directed toward well intentioned business men, women and children in the throng. They did not appreciate the difficulty of distinguishing individuals and motives in the midst of a howling

mob. The activists who promoted the event were delighted with the animosity toward police forces and seized the opportunity to protest police action before the press, nationwide TV, the Los Angeles city council, etc.

There were significant changes after this event at several levels. City officials determined not to grant parade permits to the Peace Action Council for a considerable period. That group has organized other protests since then, but has avoided open confrontation with Los Angeles police. The police department, itself, has improved crowd photographic techniques, obtained a trailer to contain operations previously performed in a field tent, reduced the size and complexity of operations plans, and trained in low profile tactics for subsequent demonstrations. Because the disturbance demonstrated the value of rigorous squad and formation training for a large police department, these activities continue to be emphasized in roll call and academy recruit training.

D. Recommended Procedures, Methods and Techniques

To improve law enforcement command and control during disturbances, various alternative approaches for certain aspects of planning, training and operations must be evaluated. For example, it may be as important for the police to establish good community relations as a disturbance prevention measure as to generate operations plans or to train officers in squad formations and use of the baton. Because the police are in daily

contact with the public and are extremely aware of society's inequities and injustices and the resulting hostilities, they are well qualified to alert the municipal government to potential riot hazards and suggest preventive action. Expert advice of this type, if used properly, maintains community tranquillity and enhances the police image.

Recommendations for procedures, methods and techniques are presented in this section according to the format developed for "Description of Procedures, Methods and Techniques" (Part B above). The "Problems" and "Recommendations" contained herein were developed from data collected in the seven cities considered in this study. Strictly speaking, they are applicable only to them; however, there is a strong probability that they would fit many other communities as well.

1. Planning

a. Policy and Coordination

Problem:

Clear channels of communication and definite policy agreements between law enforcement elements and the remainder of the community had not been established prior to many of the seven incidents studied, thereby contributing to and complicating potentially explosive situations.

Discussion:

One approach which utilizes the diverse talents available in a city to assist in reaching optimum law enforcement policy decisions is implementation of

a Disturbance Prevention Council chaired by the Chief of Police. This Council is adaptable to any size community and can be restructured to meet specific requirements. Its principal function would be to identify or forecast potential disturbance situations and to recommend strategies for avoiding them. It would also provide a forum for consideration of appropriate measures for quickly regaining control should a disturbance actually occur and become disorderly.

In addition to law enforcement personnel, the Disturbance Prevention Council would include such key personnel as aldermen (councilmen), the city attorney, a court representative, and directors of utility services.

Heads of educational institutions, including the superintendent of schools and presidents of universities, would be on the council as well as recognized responsible leaders of minority elements. Since many disturbances directly affect private enterprise, business leaders should also be included, especially those from businesses catering to public entertainment and/or housing, such as amusement parks and hotels. Police representatives on the council would be the chief of each of the department's bureaus, thereby ensuring a complete exchange of information from police middle management to top level civic planners.

It would be the responsibility of the Council to advise and assist in the definition of legal, economic and civic constraints on command and control of potential disturbances on campuses, in city parks or streets, or on private property. Where need is discovered for additional city legislation

to aid the police in law enforcement, recommendations would be prepared for such action as the Chairman deems appropriate. In event of a major disturbance, selected key members of this Council would immediately report to the police department's Emergency Command Center (ECC) to be available as necessary for counsel in reaching top level decisions.

Objective reporting of this civic activity by a cooperative press would create a police public image of civic and social cooperation, rather than unreasoning "strong arm" enforcement. It would also open the door for cooperation between the police and news media and between police and the general public.

Recommendation:

A Disturbance Prevention Council should be organized so that useful inputs to law enforcement planning can be provided and also so that a forum would exist among key personnel for the expression of opinions and interchange of ideas pertinent to disturbance prevention and control.

b. Contingency Plans

Problem:

Disturbances have erupted abruptly, finding the police unprepared to control them because of inadequate or unrealistic prior planning, complicated further by lack of agreements with civic bodies and other law enforcement agencies.

Discussion:

Because there are different hazards from different types of crowds in various locations, separate plans should be prepared for each, or a general plan should be developed that can be adapted easily to meet the specific situation. These plans should stipulate who is the commander and thereby has primary responsibility for decision making and for action, the amount of force and types of weapons, the constraints to be observed by the police, and the type and quantity of augmentation forces. Full consideration must, of course, be given to intelligence and logistics.

For example, if a disturbance occurs on private property, the police should have developed contingency plans on the assumption that they have full authority to handle the situation as deemed necessary. Clearly, this planning process should be thoroughly coordinated with the private enterprise so that their views receive consideration and accommodation wherever possible. These activities must be completed well in advance of potential demonstrations.

Contingency plans should be reviewed and updated regularly to reflect the changing social and political scene.

Recommendation:

A contingency planning and coordination activity should be made an integral part of the law enforcement command and control structure.

c. Operations Plans

Problem:

Operations plans developed for demonstrations have proved to be cumbersome, complex and unrealistic.

Discussion:

Planning functions and actual plans, where available, were examined in each of the seven cities. In the case of Los Angeles, an extremely detailed document had been prepared, but its distribution was so late that the field forces did not have time to assimilate the information and prepare accordingly. It would have been better to prepare an abbreviated version and make it available early enough that all personnel affected by it would have been informed and prepared to carry out its provisions. In the case of Corvallis, a brief, realizable plan was in effect and was carried out with dispatch and efficiency.

Recommendation:

Operations plans for mobilization, deployment and tactics should be developed for specific probable occurrences. Where possible, they should be based on normal procedures and should be sufficiently flexible to cope with any unusual dissident action or emergency. Above all, they should be succinct and clear.

2. Training

Problem:

Lack of uniform and consistent training procedures, coupled with infrequent or total absence of field exercises, imposes a serious constraint in integrating mutual aid forces for disturbance control.

Discussion:

Most of the seven cities had some form of disturbance control training prior to the incident studied, and all have since expanded their training to include more classes. However, the mutual aid agreements are deficient since they do not include training in standardized procedures, formations, and signals so that the officers can be merged into interchangeable squads and platoons.

It is also wise to perform joint exercises at regular intervals to test the efficacy of training, familiarity with equipment, and practicallity of operations plans. Police officials disagree as to whether training exercises should be conducted in private or full view of the public. It appears that this decision should be based on the desired impact on the citizens. Is an image of police preparedness advisable, or will the citizens be alarmed about the possibility of a police state?

In medium to large cities, efficient emergency response can be achieved by training special squads in use of high powered firearms, chemical munitions, handling limp or resisting demonstrators, making mass arrests,

and command post operation. This relieves the main force from specialized training and reduces the chances of tactical errors during a disturbance.

Recommendation:

Effort should be made to develop standardized training plans so that mutual aid can provide efficient response with a minimum of confusion.

3. Operations

a. Headquarters Facilities

Problem:

Most police headquarters visited are housed in new unhardened buildings, inadequate for protection against militant strikes.

Recommendation:

Since bomb attacks on police facilities have become more frequent recently, measures should be taken to install protective screens and baffles inside large window spaces and to restrict access to police facilities. In addition, visitors should be observed and screened, according to the temper of the city's activists. Guards may be required at entrances to secure the facility, especially during disturbances.

b. Emergency Command Centers

Problem:

Few police departments have designated locations for Emergency Command Centers, and even fewer have equipped them with adequate command,

CONTINUED

2 OF 3

control and communications equipment. All existing centers examined in the seven cities, plus those visited in other cities, reflect a lack of knowledge of military systems and what they can offer as a solution to police problems.

Discussion:

Equipment required in an ECC increases in amount and sophistication according to the size and problems of the community. Telephones, radio communications with patrol cars, and a possible second radio transceiver on the augmentation force's frequency may be the only requirements for a very small city. Larger cities require much more external and internal communications equipment. The military departments have long since coped with these problems and much can be gained by studying their techniques and equipment. The command, control and communications problems of cities of all sizes can be solved by a judicious selection of the same type of software and hardware, procured to commercial rather than military specifications, and matched to actual city requirements.

During the 12-month study period, the authors had occasion to visit and examine the command, control and communications systems (planned or existing) in Washington D. C., New York, Chicago, Houston, Cleveland, and Dallas, as well as those of the seven cities. Without exception, these systems show evidence that the contractors who are designing, or have designed them, as the case may be, lack background in this specialized field.

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e. Auxiliary Vehicles

Problem:

Few medium or large cities have adequate vehicles for use during emergencies or disturbances.

Discussion:

Police require many supplies and services (logistic support) in a field operation, in addition to transportation of the increased numbers of officers available for deployment as a result of the necessity for 12-hour shifts. Consideration should be given to the officers' requirements for logistics, first aid, food, etc., and to the possibility of combining some of these requirements within one type of vehicle. For example, the van-type MCC in Figure 4 - 5 also provides storage space for a typical logistics load, such as:

2 cases	12-gauge ammunition
1 case	.38 caliber ammunition
9	shotguns
3	.30 caliber carbines
4 boxes	tear gas
1	tear gas gun
1 carton	mace
36	multipurpose grenades
1	pepper-fogger and gasoline can
1 carton	flex cuffs
2 cases	flares
2	10 x binoculars
1	bullhorn
2	first aid kits
30	gas masks
30	flak vests
30	shields

The requirement for mobile kitchens may be met by a canteen service or Red Cross kitchen as well as by a special police vehicle, unless the city has frequent emergencies or disturbances.

Recommendation:

Suitable vehicles to transport men and equipment and logistics support should be provided for field forces.

f. Car Locator Systems

Problem:

Current communications arrangements in the seven cities do not provide the Field Commander with complete visibility on the location and activities of field forces and patrol units during a disturbance or during normal operations.

Discussion:

As a result of the fluid nature of large and boisterous demonstrations, communications facilities become so overloaded that it is frequently difficult for the Field Commander to maintain accurate status of vehicle deployment, a prerequisite to tactical decisions. Continuous information on the movement of police vehicles in the disturbance area or on perimeter control can be provided by several of the available Car Locator Systems. The value of accurate information is obvious; its cost-effectiveness must be determined for each specific city.

To implement the most suitable Car Locator System, it is necessary to have a computer and certain peripheral equipment, transmit/receive facilities that can cover all parts of the city, and digital equipment installed in each vehicle. This can become quite expensive; but costs can be kept at a reasonable level by careful design. If, for example, a few transmitters can cover all parts of a compact (and level) city, costs of a Car Locator System would be lower and could be within the budget of an average city. However, a hilly or spread-out city would probably require acquisition of many sites. Another factor in cost tradeoffs is to make use of the surplus computer capacity for other purposes, such as record keeping, automated Want/Warrant inquiries, etc. The system, of course, would be equally useful during normal operations and could provide substantial savings over manual dispatching.

There are several technical concepts available for Car Locator Systems. The Department of Transportation is currently evaluating and field testing systems which are based on LORAN, pulse and phase ranging. When this project is completed in 1972, sound judgements can be made for selection of the optimum system.

Recommendation:

Municipal/police officials should consider the advantages and cost-effectiveness of implementing a Car Locator System within their community.

g. Protective Gear

Problem:

The lack of adequate protective gear and means of signalling "officer needs help" exposes officers to undue risks.

Discussion:

Helmets with protective visors, flak vests, gas masks, and even body armor are generally recognized as essential for officers involved in disturbance control. However, several of the seven cities did not have this type of equipment during the incidents studied, but most have acquired it since that time. It is imperative that all departments procure protective equipment in anticipation of an "unlikely" incident, that this equipment be issued to each officer individually, and that the equipment be examined, tested and maintained at regular intervals.

Reassurance that officers are not alone in a hostile mob can be provided by handie-talkies (discussed under Communications) or by an "Emergency Trigger." This pen-size device, carried in the officer's pocket, can be activated to trigger the patrol unit's digital communications to transmit a help-needed message. In combination with a Car Locator System, it is a simple matter to provide help at the critical location promptly. This device presupposed that digital communication facilities are installed in the vehicle and at the Dispatch Center.

Recommendation:

Protective gear should be procured and maintained properly to provide maximum safety to officers performing a hazardous assignment. An "Emergency Trigger" should be utilized in cities which have a Car Locator System and appropriate digital communications

h. Communications

Problem:

Probably the most severe problem facing law enforcement agencies during a disturbance is communications, including such aspects as saturation, voice contention, frequency incompatibility, range limitations, tactical communications netting, and insufficient hand-held radios.

Discussion:

Every city studied experienced problems with insufficient and inadequate radio and telephone communications. Not only did each police department require assignment of more frequencies, but most needed a communications net arrangement, whereby all emergency operations would be reported over a separate tactical frequency.

Incompatibility of frequencies was a problem in Anaheim (between Anaheim police handie-talkies and borrowed CLEMARS radios) and in Cincinnati (between municipal police and Ohio National Guard radios). Equipment revisions or interface arrangements between the different agencies are required. A simple, standard communications plan would consider these problems and specify solutions.

There is a strong trend towards increases in the number of handie-talkies available within each police department. It is important to recall that these battery-powered transceivers require provisions for battery replacement or recharging, as appropriate. Since battery life, on the average, is highly predictable, the communications plan should include consideration of this logistics problem.

Dissidents monitored police frequencies in several of the cities and there were indications that they redeployed their followers to cope with changes in the police maneuvers. Voice privacy devices in the patrol cars can eliminate this problem, but equipping handie-talkies is another matter entirely. No available devices of this sort are sufficiently compact and inexpensive. A temporary solution would be to assign the hand-held intelligence net radios to UHF.

Great improvement in relieving overloaded radio frequencies can be realized by use of digital communications among the dispatcher, patrol units and MCC. Digital messages take only a fraction of the time that voice messages require; and it would require extremely sophisticated equipment to monitor the dispatches, thereby giving a high degree of voice privacy.

Telephone communications during a disturbance are usually hindered by saturated switchboards and jammed lines. Army field phones could be used to good advantage. Stored in the MCC, they could be quickly rigged to provide two-way capability between the MCC and a staging area or

logistics pool. If the Mobile Command Center is equipped with numerous hand sets, it would be wise to pre-wire candidate installations near a stadium, amusement park, or other likely disturbance scene. The MCC could be "on the air" much more quickly than if required to wait for the phone company to rig up lines (as would be required for a disturbance in an unexpected setting, in any case).

An effective approach to communications is regional management of frequency allocations, whereby a single agency would control police, fire, ambulance, public works, civil defense/disaster frequencies. The police department, for example, would then have a normal working frequency and shift to an assigned TAC frequency for emergencies; all frequencies throughout the region could be assigned, if necessary, to a major riot.

Recommendation:

Police departments should institute an analysis of their normal and emergency message loads to determine requirements, then implement a program to obtain additional frequencies (if required), establish communications nets, and procure additional communication equipment, as indicated. They should also provide and keep up to date a communications plan for immediate use during Unusual Occurrences or other emergencies. Consideration should also be given to the regionalization of communications planning and operations.

i. Dissident Weapons

Problem:

When a disturbance becomes disorderly, deployed officers are usually the target for any handy missiles.

Discussion:

Stockpiling of bricks, rocks, bottles and clubs is frequently an indication of preparation for a violent demonstration. Additional ammunition (weapons of opportunity) are often provided by landscapers (rock walkways and borders) or ecologists (trash cans).

Recommendation:

Police should be on the alert for weapon stockpiling and should urge street and park crews to clear potentially hazardous areas of debris.

j. Dissident Tactics

Problem:
Dissidents are becoming more sophisticated in their use of electronic equipment to organize and direct demonstrations, such as the use of handie-talkies. The more controlled a crowd becomes, the bigger the police problem. It is essential to maintain law and order that communications devices used by dissident organizers be disrupted.

Discussion:

Police have several alternatives. One is to locate and jam the radios. Another is to merely monitor the transmissions and move quickly to fore-

stall the action. Search receivers and direction finders can be used to locate permanent radio installations (citizen band or ham radio). Dissidents' handie-talkies can be spot jammed easily by higher powered transmitters, or can be captured (electronically) and the listeners "spoofed" by transmitting confusing or false instructions. The simplest tactic is to monitor the demonstrators' communications in order to anticipate their next moves and then make use of the greater mobility and organization of the police to intercept or physically redirect them.

Recommendation:

Police forces should borrow some of the military countermeasure techniques to defeat the dissidents' communications systems. This could involve a manually swept ham receiver and transmitter for jamming or spoofing or it would be used as a source of intelligence for redeployment of the police units. More sophisticated devices are available and could be used if the threat ever becomes significant.

k. Police Intelligence Function

Problem:

Most cities experienced some problem with their intelligence function -- utilization of the information as well as infiltration of dissident organizations prior to the event.

Discussion:

In small cities or minority communities, an undercover operator was recognized if he appeared at more than one or two incidents or meetings.

In large cities, intelligence on the militant attitudes of the leaders was unreliable. Another serious problem was lack of accurate intelligence on the number of demonstrators, or failure of planners and decision

makers to evaluate and utilize the intelligence.

Recommendation:

Actual status of the intelligence function within the police department organization should be reviewed to ensure that all information gathered is funnelled into the proper activity, that it is evaluated as to its validity and significance, that it is correlated with other intelligence and that it is used by the planners as appropriate.

1. Field Tactics

Problem:

The precise time to defuse an impending riot by police action is extremely critical. A move at the proper time may avoid violence (Corvallis), contain it (Atlanta) or even incite it (Durham).

Discussion:

According to the seven incidents studied, trends are evident in the disturbance time phases and the amount of violence that can be expected during different types or categories of incidents. These patterns are distinguished

by the issue being promoted or protested, the composition of the crowd, its attitudes, and projected tactics. If this seven-city sample is significant, police can, to a certain extent, anticipate the crowd's action and arrive at strategy and tactics commensurate with the amount of violence that is threatened.

Recommendation:

Planned events should be considered in the light of the patterns and indices described. Further study of past disturbances, including statistical analysis and computer modeling, should provide added insight into timing and speed for police response.

m. Arrest Procedures

Problem:

There was a very low ratio of convictions to arrests following the disturbances studied.

Discussion:

While there were several instances of suspects being arrested for the wrong code violation as a result of poor pre-event legal advice, most of the cases were dismissed or suspended because of the lack of proper evidence. Today's technology offers valuable assistance to law enforcement in obtaining convictions. A video tape or movie of the actual incident could refute the testimony of students' teachers and friends as character witnesses (as in Durham) and could verify the activity of the suspect

during a violent confrontation (as in Los Angeles). Photographs of the suspect with the arresting officers definitely places him at the scene and provides positive identification, which is extremely valuable during mass arrests (as in Corvallis). Booking procedures can be simplified by use of the new disposable flex-cuffs with identification, audio tapes for dictating booking records, and other shortcuts.

Recommendation:

Better understandings with the courts, district attorneys, and detention officials, plus use of modern booking aids, will increase the ratio of arrests to convictions.

APPENDIX A

CORVALLIS CONTINGENCY PLAN

October 19, 1967

Joint Meeting

Agencies and Personnel Represented

CORVALLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT--

Chief Goodman

CORVALLIS FIRE DEPARTMENT

Chief Edmondson

Ass't. Chief Lewis

Ass't Chief Carey

OREGON STATE POLICE

Sgt. Gene Daugherty

BENTON COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE

Deputy Mc Daniels

CAMPUS POLICE

Chief Freundt

OREGON NATIONAL GUARD

Captain Shumway

Lt. Derrickson

PURPOSE----To make decisions on course of action, personnel to be involved, and basic responsibilities in the event of a major incident within Corvallis.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

Responsibility

General

1. On Campus: Campus Police assist by other agencies.
2. Off Campus and within City Limits: Corvallis Police Department assisted by other agencies.
3. Outside City Limits: Benton County Sheriff's Office assisted by other agencies.
4. Command Post will be set up in the Gill Coliseum, Room 223 south side of building, phone 754-1473, Coordinated by Department heads.
5. Involved Departments will provide as many men and radio equipment as they have available.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

Campus Police

1. Handle all incidents occurring on O.S.U. campus

Supporting Agencies

- a. Corvallis Police Department
- b. Benton County Sheriff's Office
- c. Oregon State Police
- d. Oregon National Guard

Limitations

Supporting Agencies will not assist on campus unless a request is received from:

1. President Jensen
2. Mr. Popovich
3. Dean of Students (Robert Chick)
4. Dean of Men (Dean Poling)

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

CORVALLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT

1. Responsible for all incidents occurring off campus and within the City Limits of Corvallis.
2. Field Command--Captain W. L. Hockema
 - a. Maintain Mobile Units of patrolmen and command officers.
 - b. Answer calls and investigate. Evaluate situation, handle and/or request additional support.
 - c. Attention to potential trouble spots such as the liquor store and outlets, hardware, sporting and gun stores.
 - d. Provide personnel for a combined police/National Guard sniper search team.
3. Office Command--Assistant Chief Burright
 - a. Monitor all radio and telephone traffic
 - b. Alert Water Department and Public Works (St. Barricades, etc.)
 - c. Alert Ambulance Service
 - d. Alert Good Samaritan Hospital, Civil Defense (Col. Blodgett.)
 - e. Alert Park Department
 - f. Maintain lists of emergency telephone numbers as may be needed.
 - g. Provide personnel and equipment for mobile field headquarters.

Field Headquarters

1. Arrange Mobile Telephone

CORVALLIS FIRE DEPARTMENT

1. Assign Assistant Chief to check fire alarms or calls
2. Task force of firefighters would not respond until the fire call is confirmed by the Assistant Chief or a police officer.
3. Maintain Guard at the vacated station.
4. Focus attention to fire, pull back if confronted by mob attack.
5. Provide man and radio communications at central headquarters to assist in coordination.
6. Provide ambulance drivers and helpers.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

BENTON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

1. Provide as many deputies, plus reserve and posse members as directed by the sheriff, to act as back-up support.
2. Provide guards for police radio communications buildings and antennas.
3. Provide personnel and equipment at mobile field headquarters and command post to coordinate activity.
4. Maintain small reserve force to patrol city outside trouble area

OREGON STATE POLICE

1. Maintain patrol in the four (4) patrol districts to answer routine calls if City Police and Sheriff's Office is committed to trouble areas.
2. Provide additional back-up support with added squads available from other Oregon State Police districts.
3. Provide personnel and equipment at mobile field headquarters and command post to coordinate activity.
4. Maintain Oregon State Police mobilization center at Gill Coliseum.

OREGON NATIONAL GUARD

1. Provide personnel and equipment upon direction of the Governor
 - a. Personnel and equipment at mobile field headquarters and command post to coordinate activity.
2. Maintain a mobile force and back-up support.
3. Provide guards for command posts, roof tops, prisoner transportation and compounds and etc.
4. Provide personnel for a combined police/National Guard sniper search team.
5. Maintain first aid station
6. Provide additional communications

POLICY REGARDING FORCE AND USE OF FIREARMS

Use only that force which is reasonable and necessary when dealing with groups or individuals.

Firearms should be used only in self defense or the defense of another's life.

APPENDIX B

CINCINNATI CIVIL DISTURBANCE OPERATION PLAN

TRAINING MEMO #45
(Revised July 2, 1969)
Page 1 of 10 Pages

CIVIL DISTURBANCE OPERATION PLAN

A. Purpose:

1. To formulate policy to quell those disturbances which could escalate into a riotous situation.
2. To determine policy for the mobilization of personnel for CDOP, Natural Disasters, and other catastrophes.
3. To establish procedure for the formation and deployment of riot control and anti-sniper squads.

B. Procedure:

1. Introduction

- a. The possession of a specific plan of action, and speed in its execution, are basic principles in the prevention and control of civil disturbances. The Police Division has, for many years, maintained plans for such an occurrence.

- b. This memo will revise procedures, and will be incorporated in a revision of the Civil Disturbance Operation Plan.

2. Alert Plans

- a. An incident worthy of classification as an Alert is a situation involving large crowds with a potential

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Page 2

for problems. This includes opening games, large student homecoming festivals, parades, etc.; and the unusual crowd situations such as controversial speakers or meetings, demonstrations, picketing, disorderly crowds, etc., short of a Phase I operation.

- 1) Can be implemented in advance
 - 2) Can be initiated on the "spot"
- b. An Alert includes events requiring detailing of personnel, pre-planning and maintaining personnel strength. It encompasses special equipment and special techniques.
- c. An Alert might include the application of district personnel and Tactical Unit people in a rapid decision and on a smaller scale to take rapid and immediate action aimed at removing the threat.
- 1) It is recommended that prior planning of an unusual crowd situation include the assigning of a two-man car, which would anticipate a Phase I condition; Station X will be advised of its designation.
 - 2) All cars in the immediate area of the Alert situation will remain available for service.
- d. An Alert can be called by Field Supervisors.
- 1) Pre-planned - Captains, Lieutenant Colonels, and Chief of Police. Division will be alerted by orders passed through normal channels.
 - 2) Spontaneous - Sergeants and ranks above, will alert Station X who will alert Division by radio and teletype.

3. Phasing-In Operation for Crowd Control

a. PHASE I

- 1) The first officer who arrives at the scene of a civil disturbance shall summon a district supervisor. The supervisor will evaluate the situation.

- and, if necessary, initiate Phase I or an Alert.
- 2) To initiate Phase I, the district supervisor will notify Station X that an unusual disorder exists and that he is initiating a Phase I, furnishing the location of the staging area to which men are to be dispatched, and Forward Command Post location, if different.
 - a) He will request that the Tactical Unit, if available, be immediately sent to the staging area or other designated location.
 - 3) Station X will dispatch one two-man car or two one-man cars to the designated staging area location from each district, including the district where disorder exists, and from the Traffic Bureau. The cars will proceed directly to the staging area.
 - a) Predetermined locations of staging area and Forward Command Post, and alternates, should be based on several factors: accessibility from different areas, potential trouble areas, etc.
 - b) The return of vehicles which are left at the staging area will be the responsibility of supervisors of the Districts to which the vehicles are assigned.
 - 4) Station X shall also dispatch a Patrol Wagon to a designated location.
 - 5) Station X shall also notify the District Station who will notify the District Commander of the situation.
 - a) The District Commander will respond to the Forward Command Post.
 - 6) The Officer in Charge at the scene of disorder will prepare an emergency lineup of personnel responding. He will form squads, assigning temporary car numbers, and notify Station X of such designations.
 - a) In lieu of a Captain, the ranking District officer will be the Officer in Charge.
 - b) Temporary car numbers will be formed by using the beat sector plan.
 - (1) Command Post will adopt the call sign of the affected district in triplicate; example, District 4: Call sign of Command Post - 444
 - (2) Staging area will use the call number of Officer in Charge.

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Page 4

- c) Fixed posts in the disturbance area will be established as necessary, i.e., vulnerable properties, roadblocks, observation posts, etc.
- 7) Station X will notify the Crime Bureau who will alert all persons on checkoff list (Phase I Notification List) that a riot is in a formative stage. Central Station will be contacted by Station X as the back-up alerting agency, if Crime Bureau cannot be alerted.
- 8) Two Canine Units will be dispatched to patrol the area around Station X and antennae.
 - a) Unless notified to the contrary the relief commander of each District, Juvenile Bureau, Traffic Bureau, and Crime Bureau will begin forming on-duty personnel only into two-man squads, and shall notify Station X of such lineups and call numbers.
 - (1) One three-man car will be assigned in anticipation of a Phase II and Station X advised of its call designation.
 - b) Personnel will not be dispatched to the disturbance until requested.
- 9) All police units will initiate Phase I internal operation plans--District Commanders notified by their districts.
- 10) Police Chief or Assistant Police Chief will inform Station X to initiate a Phase II if committed personnel cannot contain disorder. Request for a second Phase I simultaneous with the other, will indicate a need for a Phase II.
 - a) In the event of two or more Phase I's erupting simultaneously Captain or above can initiate a Phase II.
 - b) A partial Phase II (implementation of those sections and alerting only those people necessary for the containment and quelling of the disturbance) can be implemented.
- 11) If disorder is contained and quelled, Phase V will be initiated.

b. PHASE II

- 1) Upon initiation of a Phase II, or partial Phase II, Station X will alert all units of the Cincinnati Police Division that a Phase II, or partial Phase II, is in effect by radio broadcast and teletype. All units and people on the Phase II Notification Plan shall be notified by Crime Bureau that a Phase II is in effect.
 - a) Alternate alerting agency -- Central Station.
- 2) The Officer in Charge shall establish a Forward Command Post and staging area notifying Station X of the locations. Station X shall dispatch additional personnel to the staging area from the following units:
 - a) Each district and Crime Bureau - Two cars:
 - one three-man squad
 - one supervisor and driver
 - b) Traffic Bureau - Five cars:
 - four two-man squads to be used on traffic posts to cordon area from incoming traffic
 - one supervisor and driver
- 3) The Central Command Post will be activated and assume administrative control.
- 4) On-duty personnel can be held beyond hours of normal relief, and recall of personnel scheduled to work on the next relief can be initiated by Units, Bureaus, or Division, if necessary. (Partial Phase II - refer to 3.a.10)b)
 - a) Cincinnati Police Division placed on 12-hour shifts; off days, off time, and vacations cancelled.
 - b) All or parts of the above pertaining to manpower or locality can be used at the discretion of staff officers; 100% call up can be initiated only by the Chief of Police or Acting Police Chief.

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Page 6

- c) Plan for an adequate relief of duty personnel (reserve force).
- 5) All routine radio dispatches and routine police duties throughout the city will be curtailed, to avoid depletion of reserve forces. Station X will periodically repeat phase notification.
- 6) All units will initiate Phase II Internal Operation Plans.
 - a) When a Phase II has been initiated, relief commanders will form their personnel into the following squads:
 - (1) Riot Control Squads - three Patrolmen and/or Specialists.
 - (a) One man assigned as driver. This officer will man the radio and keep a log of events. He should not be provided with a shotgun, so he can effect arrests, and search and handcuff prisoners.
 - (b) One man assigned to gas equipment. This officer shall be equipped with a haversack containing approximately ten tear gas grenades. (One extra shotgun may be carried in luggage compartment to provide flexibility of operation if the use of tear gas is not warranted.)
 - (c) The third man shall be equipped with a shotgun.
 - (d) These squads shall be assigned designations as previously described. In addition, anti-sniper squads shall further be designated by the letter "S" following the regular squad designation.
 - (2) Anti-Sniper Squads - Each District, Tactical Unit and the Crime Bureau shall form, in addition to riot control squads, two anti-sniper squads. These squads will be composed of three Patrolmen and/or Specialists, as follows:

- (a) One officer assigned as driver. He shall also man the radio and keep a log of events. He shall be responsible for the security of the vehicle.
- (b) Two trained marksmen, familiar with the bolt action 222 rifle.
 - 1- One man shall be assigned a rifle and two boxes of ammunition.
 - 2- The other marksman shall be assigned one pair of binoculars and one handi-talkie radio.
- (c) The two marksmen concept provides one as a rifleman and the other as a spotter, utilizing binoculars. The spotter also serves as a cover man to prevent ambush, and to serve as a rifleman in case of injury. The handi-talkie radio will provide communication when away from the vehicle.
- (d) Personnel who encounter a sniper shall immediately summon an anti-sniper squad and a supervisor with driver. Anti-sniper squads should only be dispatched along with a regular squad, which will assist in isolating the area and apprehending the sniper. This dispatch will provide 8 men for the encounter. For obvious reasons, anti-sniper squads should be reserved for their primary function, except in extreme cases.
- (e) Consideration should be given to the use of defensive equipment, i.e., body armament, Brinks' trucks, etc.
- (f) Consideration should be given to the use of Juvenile Bureau personnel as squads, if needed.
- 7) Aid or assistance, whether pre-planned or of an emergency nature, will be coordinated through the Central Command Post.
 - a) Aid requested from other Police Agencies throughout county; Chief of Police or Safety Director will request aid through Hamilton County Sheriff.
 - b) Predetermined defensive equipment requested from Army installations, if needed.
 - c) Assistance requested from supporting agencies as needed, Red Cross, etc.
- 8) Personnel from Hamilton County Police Agencies integrated into operation.
- 9) Police guard details established at designated posts. (Internal District COOP Plans).

10) If the disorder cannot be contained, the Mayor or City Manager will request the assistance of the National Guard, and Phase III will be initiated.

11) If disorder is contained, the National Guard will not be requested. Phase V will then be initiated.

c. PHASE III

1) Upon initiation of a Phase III, Station X will alert all units of the Cincinnati Police Division that a Phase III is in effect by radio broadcast and teletype. All units and people on the Phase II Notification Plan shall be notified by Crime Bureau that a Phase III is in effect.

a) Alternate alerting agency -- Central Station

2) Cincinnati Police Units will initiate Phase III internal operations.

3) Police personnel will be redeployed and integrated with Ohio National Guard troops upon arrival; place and time will be assigned by Central Command Post.

a) Ohio National Guard will be assigned established guard posts. (Internal District CDOP Plans)

b) One police officer assigned to National Guard troops to form a basic integrated unit.

c) Ohio National Guard vehicle will patrol in close proximity to Police vehicle whenever possible to provide full communication, power of arrest, and a knowledge of the area.

d) Foot patrols and fixed post should be established wherever tactically possible, in order to gain the advantage of surveillance, presence and "close proximity to trouble areas."

4) Ohio National Guard Liaison Officer shall alert the Federal Military Forces assigned to this area.

5) If the disorder cannot be contained, the Mayor or City Manager, through the State Governor, shall request the assistance of Federal Troops, and Phase IV shall be initiated.

6) If the disorder is contained, Federal Troops will not be requested; revert to Phase II.

d. PHASE IV

1) Upon initiation of a Phase IV, Station X will alert all units of the Cincinnati Police Division that a Phase IV is in effect by radio broadcast and teletype. All units and people on the Phase II Notification Plan shall be notified by Crime Bureau that a Phase IV is in effect.

a) Alternate alerting agency -- Central Station

2) Cincinnati Police Units will initiate Phase IV internal operations.

3) Redeployment of personnel - Federal Troops integrated into operations. One Police Officer with each basic unit of Federal troops where possible.

4) When disorder is controlled and contained, revert through phases to Phase II.

e. PHASE V

1) In conjunction with all primary, back-up, and supporting agencies, a critique of the operation is held.

2) After-action reports will be submitted.

3) Complaint investigation will be initiated, completed and reviewed.

4) All logs, assignment sheets, after-action reports, etc. will be submitted to the Central Command Post for inclusion in the Disturbance Report prepared by the Community Relations Section.

a) Compilation of reports and assessment of Riot Damage.

b) Check of all beats for non-reported Riot incidents.

4. Supervisory Personnel

a. During all phases of disorder, Command Officers and Supervisors shall have a subordinate who will act as his recorder and/or driver when assigned to a vehicle. The subordinate shall keep a log of events, assignment of personnel, and provide information and intelligence received.

b. Cars containing supervisory personnel shall be designated by the letter "L" and the district from which they responded. For example, the first supervisor to respond from District One would be designated "Car L-1." 203

Additional supervisors who respond will be given alphabetical designations, in order, i.e., "Car I-1-B," etc. Other supervisors, not responding to the riot area, would retain normal designations, i.e., "Car 119." Command Officers shall retain their current designations.

5. Riot Act -- Reading of Riot Act

a. Section 2923.51 Ohio Revised Code

Where five or more persons are engaged in violent or tumultuous conduct which creates a clear and present danger to the safety of persons or property, a law enforcement officer, or commissioned officer of the organized militia or armed forces of the United States called to duty to protect against domestic violence, shall, forthwith upon view or as soon as may be on information, and unless prevented by such persons, order such persons to desist and disperse to their several homes or lawful employments. Such order shall be given by such means and as often as necessary to reasonably insure that it is heard, unless the giving or hearing of such order is prevented by such persons. Whoever refuses or knowingly fails to obey such order shall be fined not more than fifty dollars.

b. Riot Act shall be read whenever necessary using whatever means available, bull horns, Patrol Car public address system, megaphone, etc.

c. Date, time and location of the reading of the Riot Act will be recorded along with the approximate number of people present.

6. Intelligence acquired during the course of an actual disturbance and judged to be reliable will be disseminated immediately to the CDOP Commander through channels.

APPENDIX C

ANAHEIM DISASTER PROCEDURE

ANAHEIM POLICE DEPARTMENT

Revised: April 4, 1969

PROCEDURE - DISASTER

In the Disaster Services Department of the City of Anaheim there is a slogan posted that reads, "It Can't Happen Here?" "It Can Happen Any Place Any Time." The truth in this statement is more and more evident as the daily newspapers report the many disasters that can and do occur throughout the world. Hopefully the City of Anaheim will not experience any of these catastrophes but past history of disasters in the City of Anaheim itself shows we are just as susceptible to tragedy as any other place. We never know when the next newspaper article will bear the name Anaheim.

In preparing for such an eventuality, and so that all Officers of the Anaheim Police Department are prepared in the event of a disaster, a detailed but simple plan has been established by the Training Bureau. Each Officer should know his part in our disaster operations in the event a tragedy should strike our city. With preparation, training and the proper execution of the procedure at the time of an incident, life saving and control of the disaster scene are better assured.

The following Index as a preface to this Procedure will assist Officers in quick location of desired references in the Procedure.

Training Supervisor

ANAHEIM POLICE DEPARTMENT

Revised: 4-2-69

PROCEDURE - DISASTER

SECTION A

Definition

1. Minor Disaster

The type of emergency control which, though critical, can be coordinated and directed by the Anaheim Police Department with the aid of related agencies. Normally involved in this type of critical incident is only a small area of the city.

Examples: a. Train Wreck

b. Plane Crash

c. Explosion

d. Situations involving criminals where some degree of control is necessary in the area to protect lives and property.

e. Major Fires

(1) A coordinated effort with the Fire Department to help them in their performance of fire fighting duties.

f. Mob and Riot Situations

2. Major Disaster

The type of emergency control that involves a large area of the city and will necessitate the combined effort of many City departments and public agencies, such as police, fire, public works, utilities, health, hospital, etc. Direction and coordination of this type of control is normally from one central control post and under the direction of the Disaster Services Department of the City of Anaheim.

Examples: a. Earthquake

b. Flood

c. Acts of War

d. Epidemics

3. Comment

The reason disasters have been classified into two types is as follows:

a. When a disaster occurs, police action must be immediate in all cases.

b. In minor disasters, however, the Police Department is normally able to move into the area and take immediate steps to control the situation, often in a matter of minutes. In minor disasters, normally it only involves a small area and can easily be controlled from a Police Field Command Post.

c. In a major disaster large areas of the city are involved and the Police Department becomes a part of a large working team coordinated by the Disaster Services Office. (There are some minor disasters that, if prolonged, could better be coordinated from the Disaster Services Office, such as a riot situation.) The team, consisting of the City Manager, City Council, Disaster Services staff and City Department Heads, as well as, directors of other community services, work from a central Command Post which has adequate communications and the facilities necessary to coordinate activities and handle the disaster. Because it takes a period of time to organize these forces, even in a major disaster, the Anaheim Police Department must be prepared to take immediate steps to handle critical situations until such time as the Disaster Services organization becomes operative.

PROCEDURE - DISASTER

SECTION A (Continued)

Purpose of Department Procedure for Disasters

This procedure concerns mainly the duties of police personnel in minor disasters, however, the procedure as outlined can be used to some extent in the Police Department's role in major disasters.

The overall objective to be sought in handling disaster problems is to achieve, in the shortest possible time, that degree of control that is necessary to accomplish the following:

- a. Caring for and protecting the injured; which would include obtaining medical treatment, rescue, and summoning and dispatching ambulances to and from the scene.
- b. Protecting the immediate scene to safeguard property, preserve evidence and to permit the personnel assigned or requested with responsibilities for fire fighting, rescue, safety, investigative and clean-up duties to perform their services.
- c. Dispersal of unauthorized traffic and people away from the immediate area and maintenance of emergency routes to and from the scene.
- d. To assist newsgathering agencies to obtain complete coverage.

These four basic police functions are to be accomplished in most minor disasters, however, responsibility may increase in major situations that call for additional police services.

SECTION B

Command Post Defined

The responsibilities of organization, direction and coordination of all activities to expedite the necessary duties to be performed can best be controlled by strategically located operational bases, here-in-after referred to as:

I Field Command Post

II Station Command Post

III Disaster Services Command Post

Field Command Post

Defined: Field headquarters located at or near the scene of an emergency. It is the location of the emergency commander and his staff exercising authority over an immediate scene.

Located: The location must be selected in accordance with the circumstances of the particular incident.

Station Command Post

Defined: Police Station operations center in control of all station activities necessary to assist the Field Command Post in a minor disaster and the Disaster Services Command Post in a major disaster.

Located: In Police building in immediate vicinity of radio and telephone communications.

PROCEDURE - DISASTER

SECTION B (Continued)

Disaster Services Command Post

Defined: Operations center staffed by Administrative staff of the City of Anaheim, including Department Heads, coordinated by the Disaster Services staff and directed by the City Manager and City Council. This operation center directs all operations in a major disaster.

Located: In Police building basement, Disaster Services Department.

Inner (People) and Outer (Traffic) Perimeter Defined

To assure proper command of a disaster scene both vehicles and people must be regulated into two groupings:

- (1) Those that have business at the scene and will be of some assistance.
- (2) Those that have no business at the scene and must be kept away so that operations are not hampered.

The Inner Perimeter (People)

The inner perimeter is established around the immediate disaster area itself. This perimeter is maintained by roping and blocking off the area. Entrance into the area by other than easily identifiable emergency services must be approved at the Field Command Post and passes issued to authorized persons into the area. All other persons without authority in the disaster area will be kept out by crowd control techniques designed to maintain the inner perimeter.

The Outer Perimeter (Traffic)

The outer perimeter is a flexible line connecting traffic control points in such a manner outside of the inner perimeter so as to isolate the general area of the disaster from unauthorized vehicles. The outer perimeter must be set up immediately after a disaster to assure that streets into the Disaster area do not become clogged with unauthorized vehicles thereby preventing free movement of emergency vehicles. At least one boundary of the outer perimeter is connected with a main street which connects with other main streets throughout the city leading to hospitals, fire departments, etc.

SECTION C

Duties of the First Unit to Scene

The officer in the first unit to the scene must make an immediate evaluation and notify the police station via radio of the following:

- (1) Type of emergency and location.
- (2) Potentials and details.
- (3) Assistance needed.
- (4) Emergency access routes.

Sets up temporary command post in his unit until arrival of first Supervisor.

Comment: Officers should be trained and retrained on what their actions shall be if they are the first unit to the scene. The officer must first discipline his emotions and then radio in a word picture of the scope of the emergency. He is not to leave his vehicle. (First instinct is to jump out of vehicle and assist casualties. This defeats main purpose of first unit to scene, as Headquarters cannot start sending equipment until they are aware of needs.) The officer must radio in:

- (1) Type of emergency and location.

PROCEDURE - DISASTER

SECTION C (Continued)

Comment: Plane crash? Explosion? Train wreck? What is the location and, if possible, how much of an area is involved?

(2) Potentials and details.

Comment: What can be seen by the officer? Are there casualties? Is there fire or possibility of a fire or explosion? Officer should give brief description as to what has happened and what can happen as a result of the tragedy.

(3) Assistance needed.

Comment: Types of emergency equipment needed immediately at the scene.

(4) Emergency access routes.

Comment: What street routes should be kept open to assure that emergency vehicles can reach scene? What streets must be immediately blocked to keep unauthorized vehicles from entering area and blocking streets?

SECTION D

Duties of First Supervisor at Scene

a. Establishes Field Command Post.

Comment: The first Supervisor to the scene must immediately determine where the permanent Field Command Post will be located. This information is radioed in immediately to Headquarters. At the same time, depending on the scope of the emergency, the Supervisor must decide on what will be used as a Field Command Post. The department Identification truck has served as a practical post for minor situations, but, if it is determined that the emergency will involve a period of hours, the Communications bus from Control I should be requested. This contains in one unit all the room necessary to house the Command Post, and it has Channel 1 and 2 radio capabilities with all cities, as well as, a telephone tie-in. A pass issuance window is also built into the bus.

b. Command Post Location.

Where Located: The location must be selected in accordance with the circumstances of the particular incident.

Comment: The Field Command Post should be located on a spot on the boundary of the inner perimeter where there is a street leading into the disaster scene. The Command Post should not be located within the perimeter. As the Command Post is responsible for coordinating all activity at the disaster scene, it should be in a place where specialist assignments, such as outer (traffic) perimeter, pass issuance, press liaison and crowd control, can be supervised.

c. Assumes Command.

Comment: The first unit to the scene takes command until the arrival of the first Supervisor. The first Supervisor then takes over and, after establishing permanent Command Post location, rechecks the potentials of the emergency and radio facts to Watch Commander at Station Command Post. From this point on the first Supervisor at the scene,

PROCEDURE - DISASTER

SECTION D (Continued)

having assumed command, places the department disaster procedure into operation. At a later time he may be relieved by Disaster Specialists, however, even the specialists will probably not relieve him but allow him to continue command under their direction. Those authorized to take overall command of the Field Command Post are the Chief of Police, Captains and the Training Supervisor.

SECTION F

Personnel Assignments to the Field Command Post

The Supervisor in charge should not be burdened with assignments other than administrative direction and decision making. Upon arrival at the scene, and after deciding on the Command Post location, the following assignments should immediately be made by the Supervisor in charge of the Command Post.

1. Radio Communications Officers

These officers, working under the direction of the Command Post Supervisor, will relay messages to Police Headquarters and to units responding to the scene. One officer will work Channel 1 (Field Command Post Supervisor to Station Command Post) communications, and the other officer Channel 2 (Field Command Post Supervisor to units responding to scene) communications.

At a later time, after the arrival of the Field Command Post Disaster Kit, a Radio Communications Supervisor will be assigned to the overall communications needs for the disaster. These officers will then come under his command.

2. Log Assistant

This officer is to keep a running log of activities. This should include a chronological record of steps taken, orders given by the Field Command Post, units and/or personnel reporting, assignments made, and equipment in use or requested.

At a later time, after the arrival of the Field Command Post Disaster Kit at the scene, a Log Assistant Supervisor will be assigned to make more specific assignments necessary to maintain proper logging of events. Original officer assigned as log assistant would then come under his command.

3. Outer (Traffic) Perimeter Officers (Normally Traffic Motors if available)

These officers will be responsible to keep selected access routes open to emergency vehicles until such time as the outer perimeter can properly be blocked off.

At a later time, after the arrival of the Field Command Post Disaster Kit, an outer perimeter Supervisor will be assigned to overall supervision of the outer (traffic) perimeter. These officers will then come under his command.

4. Inspecting Officers

These officers will go into the immediate area of the disaster reporting back to the Field Command Post Supervisor the immediate needs at the disaster scene. They will also determine what boundaries will encompass the inner (people) perimeter. At a later time an Inspector Supervisor will be placed in charge of this detail and these officers will come under his command.

5. First Aid and Rescue Officers

These officers will be responsible for the direction of immediate needs for first aid and rescue. This will include supervising ambulances in and out of the scene.

PROCEDURE - DISASTER

SECTION F (Continued)

At a later time, after the arrival of the Field Command Post Disaster Kit, a Supervisor will be placed in charge of first aid and rescue coordination and these officers will come under his command.

These five critical assignments, once instigated, should assure the beginning of proper control of the area pending the arrival of the Field Command Post Disaster Kit from headquarters. Once the kit has arrived, the following assignments will be made.

1. Log Assistant Supervisor

The Log Assistant Supervisor is assigned to the Field Command Post Coordinator and will be by his side during all of the command post operation. The following are the duties of the Log Assistant Supervisor.

- a. Maintain the disaster map which shows location of units, perimeters, rescue operations, etc.
- b. Maintain a log which keeps a chronological list by time of all orders given, all information received, and pertinent information needed for recall if necessary. The log will also be a permanent record of the whole Command Post operation and will be useful in many areas after the disaster is over. The log can be used to critique the situation in order to prepare for future operations of this type and can be used to settle disputes that may arise concerning the operation.
- c. Equipment needed to maintain the Log Assistant Supervisor's assignments will be found in the Field Command Post Disaster Kit.
- d. Officers assigned to original task of Log Assistant will now come under his command.

2. Radio Communications Supervisor

It will be the duty of this Supervisor to see that proper radio communications are maintained.

- a. He will be responsible for the issuance of walkie talkies to key personnel.
- b. He will be responsible for the assignment of amateur radio services that might be utilized at a scene.
- c. He will see that officers assigned to the Command Post as Communications Officers are doing their job properly and maintaining accurate logs.
- d. Where necessary the Communications Supervisor will arrange for the Telephone Company to establish telephone communications into the Command Post.
- e. Equipment needed to accomplish these tasks will be found in the Field Command Post Disaster Kit.

3. Outer (Traffic) Perimeter Supervisor

It will be the duty of this Supervisor to maintain the outer perimeter.

- a. Traffic directions, establishment and maintenance of barricades around the outer perimeter is his responsibility.
- b. The vehicle pass issuance officers will be under his command.

1. Duties of the Vehicle Pass Issuance Officers

To issue passes to vehicles who have business within the traffic perimeter or at the inner perimeter. It will be the duty of these officers to stop each vehicle, determine their business and if they have business within the traffic perimeters, to issue a traffic perimeter pass.

PROCEDURE - DISASTER

SECTION F (Continued)

The issuance of traffic perimeter passes does not include emergency or obvious work vehicles but vehicles not otherwise identified as emergency vehicles. The officer, in issuing a pass, will use the materials provided in the Field Command Post Disaster Kit for this purpose.

A log will be kept on the issuance of each pass. Completed passes will be affixed to the windshield of the vehicle to which the pass is issued, showing destination, to whom issued, etc. Destination listed is the only place this vehicle is allowed to go. Once inside the perimeter, and with a perimeter pass, a vehicle is not allowed to drive indiscriminately throughout the traffic perimeter area.

Example: a. A pass is issued to a Physician. His destination is the Police Command Post and it should be so stated on the pass. b. A resident who resides within the traffic perimeter desires to go to his home. His destination would be listed as his home address and the vehicle would not be allowed any other place within the traffic perimeter.

d. Equipment necessary for pass issuance will be found in the Field Command Post Disaster Kit. Other equipment, such as barricades, must be ordered.

4. Inspector Supervisor

The Supervisor assigned is to roam the area to oversee proper supervision, coordination of activities in the disaster area and report to the Commander of the Field Command Post needs and suggestions for improvement of the operation.

5. First Aid and Rescue Supervisor

- a. This Supervisor will be responsible for rescue operations, first aid, medical and ambulance services.
- b. He will maintain a post close to the Field Command Post to which medical personnel and rescue workers will report for assignment.
- c. He will be responsible to see that proper loading areas are maintained for ambulances responding to the scene. It will be his duty to see that ambulances are dispatched to hospitals that will have accommodations for the victims.
- d. Rescue equipment needs, such as bulldozers, cutting equipment, tow lines, etc. will be ordered through this Supervisor.
- e. A log will be maintained on all of these activities. It will be the duty of this Supervisor to keep the Field Command Post Coordinator properly informed as to his needs and his actions.
- f. It will be the duty of this Supervisor to maintain a First Aid Station at the scene if necessary. (The Anaheim Police Department Explorer Post has a trailer that has the necessary first aid materials, beds and tenting necessary for a first aid station.)
- g. Some of the materials necessary for this assignment will be found in the Field Command Post Disaster Kit, however, many of the rescue and first aid supplies must be ordered.

PROCEDURE - DISASTER

SECTION F (Continued)

6. Control Officer Supervisor

At a disaster curious spectators, souvenir hunters, and possibly thieves, are always a problem. People moving into a scene, as in an airplane disaster, can also destroy valuable evidence that would be necessary in determining the cause of the disaster.

- a. The Control Supervisor is responsible for seeing that the area is roped and barricaded off to allow for proper disaster operations such as rescue, etc. and to preserve the scene.
- b. (The Anaheim Police Explorer Post has a trailer that contains over 2,000 ft. of crowd control rope. The Explorers also are trained in crowd control and by using them for this purpose, regular police officers can be utilized in more important operations.)
- c. One of the important functions of the Control Supervisor is to see that unauthorized people do not enter the disaster area. Officers should be assigned to walk throughout the disaster area looking for unauthorized persons within the area. All people in the area, with the exception of uniformed personnel, such as police, fire, utility and ambulance people, must have identification passes issued at the Field Command Post.
- d. Materials for this assignment must all be ordered.

7. Press Liaison Supervisor

- a. It will be the duty of this Supervisor to keep the press informed of all things that are happening in the disaster area and to disseminate proper information. Also to keep the press away from the Police Command Post so that there will be no interference. To help the press wherever possible and to issue passes to members of the press for the inner perimeter.

1. Issuance of Press Passes

Press passes will be issued by the Press Liaison Supervisor to bona-fide members of the press. This includes newspaper and TV and radio personnel assigned to newsgathering. The law specifically states that the news media cannot be stopped from gathering news at the scene of a disaster; however, on demand a member of the press must present his credentials. With our method of pass issuance, the member of the press need only be challenged once and will be issued an inner perimeter pass marked "Press".

Caution should be taken during the checking of credentials to see that those representing themselves as the news media are actually members of the news media. Often news media members themselves can be asked to assist you where there is a question as to another person's validity. Freelance photographers, and persons that state that they are members of unknown publications, are not deemed members of the press. Members of the City of Anaheim Public Information Office will be dispatched to the scene to assist with identifying and helping the press.

- b. Location of the Press Liaison Supervisor at the disaster scene should be situated as close as possible to the Field Command Post but not close enough to hamper normal operations of the Post.
- c. As soon as possible the Press Liaison Supervisor should gather as many pertinent facts as he can regarding the situation. These facts would be given as quickly as possible to the press. In a major situation, a stenotypist should be brought to the scene from the Police Department. Once the Press Liaison Supervisor has roughed in his information, it should be typed

PROCEDURE - DISASTER

SECTION F (Continued)

up as quickly as possible and posted on the table by means of scotch tape. In this manner members of the press that arrive later will be able to get accurate information with a minimum of effort.

- d. One or two officers (or Explorer Scouts, if available) should be used as messengers. Their duty would be on the Press Liaison Supervisor's command to gather pertinent information and to assist in such things as casualty lists, etc. The Press Liaison Supervisor is expected to stay at his position and will depend on his messengers to get the information that is needed.

e. Some suggestions for the Press Liaison Supervisor

1. Immediate setup and identification of your post.
 2. As quickly as possible take statements from first officers at scene.
 3. Gather casualty lists as quickly as possible.
 4. At the beginning meet with the Field Command Post Supervisor to determine what information can be released.
 5. Assist where possible in setting up news media equipment such as TV cameras, etc.
 6. Enlist the aid of the City of Anaheim Public Information Office in maintaining rapport with the news media.
- f. In no way are we allowed as police officers to interfere with the press in the gathering of news. The Press Post is established as a service to the press and if they do not choose to use it there is nothing that can be done about it. However, two areas can be enforced - one is proper identification and secondly, prohibiting the press from interfering with the Field Command Post function. The press has always been cooperative and it will be the Press Liaison Supervisor's duty to make releases personally to TV and radio. It will be found that the press can be very helpful in the areas of calling for additional specialists to help and for appealing to the public to stay away from the scene.

8. Pass Issuance Supervisor

- a. A ranking officer should check identification of persons reporting to the scene and issue tags or identifying insignia to be worn by those authorized to be in the scene area. Specific duties are to establish Pass Issuance Post for inner perimeter passes. The Pass Issuance Supervisor will determine whether a person has business in the inner perimeter area. Where there is a question as to whether a pass should be issued, the Command Post Supervisor will make the final decision.

9. Assistant to the Coroner

It will be the duty of this Supervisor to coordinate necessary activities between the Anaheim Police Department and the Coroner's office. This will include the removal of the dead from the disaster scene to a spot designated as a temporary mortuary.

The Anaheim Police Department has a number of casualty bags which are located in the Range Office of the police department and on the Police Explorer Post rescue trailer.

It will be the duty of this Supervisor to assign personnel to guard the bodies and belongings of the deceased until authority for removal is given by the Coroner.

PROCEDURE - DISASTER

SECTION F (Continued)

Identification personnel of the Anaheim Police Department will be assigned to assist the Coroner in the identification of the dead. It will also be the duty of this Supervisor to maintain a casualty list to be given to the Field Command Post Coordinator.

The Assistant to the Coroner will work as closely as possible with the Coroner, following the Coroner's directions. It is not our duty to take command of the situation but rather to assist the Coroner in his activities.

10. Investigation Supervisor

One Supervisor must be assigned and with the help of other investigators investigate the cause of the disaster.

- a. He shall be responsible for the gathering of all information for the overall report of the disaster.
- b. Where evidence must be preserved, arrests made, statements taken, etc. it will be subordinates under this Supervisor's command that will accomplish this task.

SECTION G

The Station Command Post

Where Established? In Police building in immediate vicinity of radio and telephone communications.

Who is in charge of the Station Command Post? The Watch Commander unless relieved by a person of higher rank.

Comment: When the police station first receives word of a disaster, or possible disaster, and during the interim until the first notifications of the first Officer at the scene, the Watch Commander shall alert all personnel within the police building to standby for emergency assignment. Immediate assignments should be made by the Watch Commander as follows:

1. The placing of the Field Command Post Kit into an emergency vehicle to be transported to the scene of the established Field Command Post once the location is established.
2. Assign office personnel (clerks where they can be utilized) as follows:
 - a. Station Command Post Log Assistant.
This person will assist the Watch Commander and radio operator in maintaining a log on all requests from the Field Command Post, the fulfillment of these requests and all other necessary data.
 - b. Staff Notification Assistant.
This person will notify the Chief of Police and his staff and all other city agencies that will be needed. (Decision later if these agencies are to move into action or put on alert.)
 - c. Off-duty Personnel Notification Assistant.
This assistant, using a current list of officers, will notify those additional off-duty officers needed at the scene. Also listings of Mutual Aid Police Departments.
 - d. Special Equipment and Manpower Log Assistant.
This assistant will have a current list of the following listed agencies and will request their assistance as directed by the Watch Commander.
(1) All city services. (4) Armed Services (Special Equipment)
(2) Press (5) Police Explorer Post
(3) Red Cross (6) Amateur Radio (REACT)

(7) Etc.

PROCEDURE - DISASTER

SECTION G (Continued)

Once confirmation of the disaster is established, these units, now in readiness, will be set to move immediately into action.

Comment: As the Training Bureau is responsible for the maintenance of Disaster equipment, training of personnel and keeping the Disaster Plan current, it will be the duty of the Training Supervisor to see that the Watch Commander's office has a Disaster book containing all the data necessary to facilitate the foregoing assignments.

It must be remembered that the Station Command Post in a minor disaster takes care of the requested needs from the Field Command Post and not to assume control of the disaster. This can be better accomplished by the Field Command Post. (Exception - where it is necessary to use the Disaster Services Command Post in a minor disaster, such as a riot.)

SECTION H

The Disaster Services Command Post

Duties of the Disaster Services Command Post.

The duties are the responsibility of the Disaster Services Coordinator and the operation of the Disaster Services Command Post are outlined in the "City of Anaheim Disaster Plan", prepared by them and in the Police Department issued to the Chief of Police, Captains, Training Supervisor and a copy in the Watch Commander's Office, along with the Anaheim Police Disaster Plan. The duties of the Anaheim Police personnel under this Plan are listed as follows:

Duties of the Chief of Police

- Respond to the Disaster Services Command Post as quickly as possible.
- Take command of the Police Department from Disaster Services Command Post.
- Coordinate activities of the Anaheim Police Department with other city departments involved in the disaster center. (Note: ANNEX G - Green of City of Anaheim Disaster Plan.)
- In the absence of the Chief of Police, the next Supervisor in line, as noted in "Succession in Command", page 6-11 of the ANNEX, will take over the duties of the Chief of Police.

Duties of the Captain of Operations

- Report immediately to the Anaheim Police Department upon notification.
- Take over command of the following:
 - Patrol Division
 - Traffic Division
 - Patrol - delegates supervisory duties to subordinate Supervisors in the following areas:
 - Life-saving operations
 - Prevention of looting and sabotage
 - Determination of unsafe areas and the blocking off of these areas and, where necessary, establish a Field Command Post for these areas.
 - Traffic
 - Control pedestrians and vehicle traffic
 - Panic prevention and crowd control
 - Specialized Details - the assignment of specialized personnel to radiological monitoring and also the assignment of specialized personnel to bomb control.

PROCEDURE - DISASTER

SECTION H (Continued)

Duties of the Watch Commanders

- All Watch Commanders, except the one who is on duty, will report to the Captain of Operations for specific assignments.
- The Watch Commander on duty will be responsible for seeing that the major disaster procedure for Watch Commanders is followed as outlined in a special manual in the Watch Commander's office.

Duties of the Field Sergeants

- Field Sergeants, except those who are on duty in the field, or directed otherwise, will report to the Anaheim Police Department for assignment.
- Field Sergeants on duty in the field will be responsible for seeing that their subordinates take immediate action in evaluating situations in their areas and taking over temporary leadership in the field until such time as orders are forthcoming from Disaster Services.

Duties of the Traffic Sergeants

- All Traffic Sergeants, except those who are on duty in the field or directed otherwise, will report to the Anaheim Police Department for assignment.
- Traffic Sergeants on duty will see that subordinates take whatever action is necessary to survey the disaster area to see that the area is kept open for emergency vehicle traffic and for the evacuation of citizens on the public streets. Where Field Command Posts have been established by the Field Sergeant, the traffic sergeant will assist in the area of maintaining an outer perimeter as outlined in Procedure 2-33 A.

Duties of the Patrol Officers

- Patrol Officers who are off duty will respond to the Anaheim Police Department unless otherwise directed. (Briefing Room)
- Patrol Officers on duty will remain in their patrol areas unless otherwise directed and will immediately evaluate the situation in their area so that they will have preliminary reports for Disaster Services once it has been totally activated.
- During the interim in which there will possibly be no communications with Police Headquarters or Disaster Services, it becomes the duty of each area officer to become a leader. Until such time as he receives proper instructions and assistance, he will be responsible for the setting up of a Command Post and deputizing citizens to see that the following tasks are carried out.
 - Life-saving operations
 - Control of pedestrians and vehicle traffic
 - Prevention of looting and sabotage
 - Panic prevention and crowd control
 - The setting up of the inner perimeter and outer perimeter of the disaster areas under his control.

Duties of Motorcycle Officers

- All motor vehicle officers who are on duty at the time of a major disaster will, unless otherwise directed, immediately respond to those areas where they feel their help is needed, assisting the area patrol officer in whatever areas possible, with emphasis on keeping the area open for emergency vehicles and evacuation of citizens on public streets.
- Off-duty motorcycle officers will report to the Training Room of the Police Department unless otherwise directed.

PROCEDURE - DISASTER

SECTION H (Continued)

Duties of Captain of Services

- a. Under the supervision of the Chief of Police, the Captain of Services, unless otherwise directed, will take control of the police facility.
- b. His area of responsibility includes: communications, records, identification (Including identification of the dead), detention - jail.
- c. He will be responsible for all equipment and supplies kept in stock in the Police Department that must be sent to the scene.
- d. In order to perform all of these tasks, he will use the supervisory personnel and subordinates normally assigned to his Division with the exception of the Training staff.

Duties of Services Personnel

- a. Report to regular assignment posts in the Police Department, unless otherwise directed.

Duties of Captain of Investigation Division

- a. Under direction of the Chief of Police he will be responsible for the following:
 - (1) Sabotage control
 - (2) Intelligence
 - (3) Assignment of plainclothes personnel to the different areas to be utilized as needed.
For example: (a) prevention of looting
(b) intelligence
(c) detection of undesirable elements within a crowd, etc.
- b. He will be responsible for control of alcoholic beverages, narcotics and vice.
- c. Vice detail would come under the Investigation Division's supervision in a disaster situation.

Duties of Juvenile and Detective Division Personnel

- a. All personnel from Juvenile and Detective Bureaus would be under the supervision of the Investigation Commander for assignment to the activities noted for the Captain of Investigation.
- b. Where there is an excess of manpower in the Investigation Division, they will be assigned to uniform and assigned to the Operations Division.

Duties of Training Staff

- a. The Training staff in a disaster situation will be directly responsible to the Chief of Police.
- b. Since it will be the Training staff's responsibility to maintain a disaster program for the Police Department, and for keeping personnel trained in this area, the Training staff will report directly to the Chief of Police on areas where problems exist.
- c. They will be responsible for on-the-spot training of additional deputized personnel when necessary.

Alternate mobilization points in the event that the Anaheim Police Department building cannot be used are: Stadium Police Office (first choice); Disneyland Security (second choice) and basement of Broadway Anaheim (third choice).

APPENDIX D

TYPICAL LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS PARAMETERS

INTELLIGENCE

- Availability of needed data
- Reliability of evaluated data
- Time required to pass intelligence data to civic and private sector
- Time required to receive, evaluate, integrate and transmit data to police in field and police center command elements.
- Method of integrating field intelligence in real time
- Method for rapid intelligence transfer to field command
- Validity of initial estimate of threat as compared to actual event.

PLANNING

- Accuracy of estimate of dissident tactics, objectives, schedule, and force size.
- Adequate definition of constraints
- Effectiveness of legal advice
- Coordination with private owners
- Terrain analysis accuracy
- Accuracy of weather impact evaluation
- Adequacy of basic strategy - (city wide)
- Adequacy of police tactics (e.g. low profile, saturation patrol)
- Complexity of command organization
- Realistic definition of manpower requirements
- Manpower mobilization plan effectiveness
- Manpower deployment plan
- Existence of mutual aid/national guard agreements and effectiveness of call-up procedures

Adequacy of procedures for coordination

- Civic government officials
- Private owners and private security forces
- Other law enforcement (adjacent)
- Other city services (e.g. fire, ambulance)
- Utilities

Identification of logistic support requirements

- Methods for obtaining equipment
- Problems associated with issue and retrieval of equipment
- Specification of legal coordination and detention guidelines

Adequacy of communications plan
Equipment deployment effectiveness (e.g. radio range)
Method of netting command and tactical frequencies
Ability to communicate with non-indigenous (mutual aid) forces
Methods employed to avoid switchboard saturation
Methods to guard intelligence security
Ability of station operators to handle radio volume
Effective employment of technological aids
Helicopters
Closed circuit TV
Weapon - normal riot complement
Special weapons - (e.g. chemicals)
Development of an information management policy
Aggregation of command information
Provisions for periodic reporting
Provisions for official incident records
Provision for manpower and overtime records pay
Provisions for debriefing
Evaluation of plan effectiveness
Flexibility
Complexity and length
Adequate time for dissemination
Ease of plan use
Policy guidelines for command authority
Guidelines for operation force conduct
Guidelines for the use of special weapons and chemical munitions
Development of a flexible schedule

OPERATIONS

Mobilization (Plan) activation response time
Time required to activate U.O. Command
Mechanization of personnel call up
Time required to reach 35% of available strength
Call up/response time of mutual aid, National Guard
Peace/Park Disturbance
Adequate coordination with private owners
Identification of image and legal constraints
Effective coordination with civic officials (park permits, march permits, etc.)
Adequacy of perimeter and traffic control plans
Effective coordination with event leadership
Police coordination with event time table and schedule
Realistic manpower requirements and deployment plans
Adequate real time intelligence gathering, evaluation, and integration
Adequacy of dispersal routes and dispersal tactics employed

Civil Disturbance
Political constraints on activation time table
Effectiveness of:
Perimeter control
Sweeps
Patrol in strength
Use of local leaders
Use of black police
Restricted sales of gas and liquor
Defusing "milling" techniques
Arrest priorities
Protection of firemen
Methods for arrest of agitators
Use of terrain
Counter-sniper tactics
Campus Disturbance
Image constraints identified
Coordination between campus administration and campus security
Evaluation of pre-event indications (local and national)
By security
By administration
By local police department
Normal coordination between campus security and local police department
Identification of legal constraints and options
Development of administrative and legal strategies to avoid confrontation
Identification of known troublemakers
Identification of possible targets.

Command and Control Segment

Effectiveness of information management plan, summarizing of command data in field and in centers
Effectiveness of communications plan (netting)
Communications equipment performance
Command Post activation time
Communication between deployed forces and tactical commander
Availability and timeliness of own force location data
Availability of data on reserve forces

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Use of firearms

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