A comparison of static, dynamic, and hybrid analysis for malware detection(基于动态、静态以及混合分析方法的恶意软件检测对比))

Damodaran A, Di Troia F, Visaggio C A, et al. A comparison of static, dynamic, and hybrid analysis for malware detection[J]. Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques, 2017, 13(1): 1-12.

Keywords: NONE

Summary

- 比较了基于静态、动态和混合分析在恶意软件检测中的效果,最终发现纯动态的方法通常会产生最好的检测率
- 主要使用了隐马尔可夫模型 (HMMs) , 在不同样本集进行训练和检测
- 是一篇 survey , 给了混合检测的一种思路, 该思路主要是在训练和测试时使用了不同的特征 (动态或静态) , 个人认为这个思路不太可行, 因为样本在静态和动态时展现的行为区别还是很大的, 没有可比性, 果然最后结果验证了这一猜想, 混合检测效果并不好
- **启发**:混合检测的方式使用特征混合的方式,而不是将动静态分别用于训练和测试,例如结合动态的API序列和静态的opcodes两种特征,同时用于训练,想来效果会不错

Glossary

- HMM: 隐马尔可夫模型 (Hidden Markov Model, HMM) 是统计模型,它用来描述一个含有隐含未知参数的马尔可夫过程。在隐马尔可夫模型中,状态并不是直接可见的,但受状态影响的某些变量则是可见的。每一个状态在可能输出的符号上都有一概率分布。因此输出符号的序列能够透露出状态序列的一些信息。
- ROC曲线: 纵坐标: TPR 横坐标: FPR




Figure 2: Scatterplot and ROC Curve

$$egin{aligned} FPR & (FalsePositiveRate) & = FP/ & (FP+TN) \end{aligned}$$
 $egin{aligned} TPR & (TruePositiveRate) & = TP/ & (TP+FN) \end{aligned}$

Precision & Recall

$$recall = TP/TP + FN$$
 $precision = TP/TP + FP$

混淆矩阵

| 测试值/真实值 | P | N |
|---------|----|----|
| Р | TP | FP |
| N | FN | TN |

Research Objective(s)

• 对静态、动态和混合检测技术的缺点和优势有一定程度的了解

Background / Problem Statement

There are many approaches to the malware detection problem.
 Signature Based Detection, Behavior Based Detection, Statistical Based Detection

HMM模型 可以解决一些「概率计算、解码、学习」问题

Method(s)

HMM(Hidden Markov Models)

notation

T =length of the observation sequence

N = number of states in the model

M = number of observation symbols

 $Q = \{q0, q1, \dots, qN-1\}$ = distinct states of the Markov process

 $V = \{0, 1, \dots, M-1\}$ = set of possible observations

A =state transition probabilities

B =observation probability matrix

 π = initial state distribution

 $\mathcal{O} = (\mathcal{O}0, \mathcal{O}1, \dots, \mathcal{O}T - 1) = \text{observation sequence}.$

• HMM模型如图




Figure 1: Generic Hidden Markov Model

Tools for Dynamic and Static Analysis

• Static Analysis:IDA Pro -- assembly code from an executable. 进行反汇编,获得 opcodes 和 API序列

 Dynamic Analysis:Buster Sandbox Analyzer (BSA)-- API call sequences.

Datasets

• 恶意样本

Table 1: Datasets

| Family | Number of Files |
|-----------------|--------------------|
| Harebot | 45 |
| Security Shield | 50 |
| Smart HDD | 50 |
| Winwebsec | 200 |
| Zbot | 200 |
| ZeroAccess | 200 |
| benign | 40 |

• 良性样本

Table 2: Benign Dataset

| alg | calc | cipher |
|-----------------|--|---|
| cmd | cmdl32 | driverquery |
| dvdplay | eventcreate | eventtriggers |
| narrator | freecell | grpconv |
| ${\tt mspaint}$ | netstat | nslookup |
| packager | regedit | sndrec32 |
| sol | sort | spider |
| ipconfig | taskmgr | telnet |
| winchat | charmap | clipbrd |
| wscript | mplay32 | winhlp32 |
| | cmd dvdplay narrator mspaint packager sol ipconfig winchat | cmd cmd132 dvdplay eventcreate narrator freecell mspaint netstat packager regedit sol sort ipconfig taskmgr winchat charmap |

• 特征示例-opcodes

call, push, lea, push, push, call, add, test, jz

• API序列

OpenMutex, CreateFile, OpenProcessToken, AdjustTokenPrivileges, SetNamedSecurityInfo, LoadLibrary, CreateFile, GetComputerName, QueryProcessInformation, VirtualAllocEx, DeleteFile

Evaluation

• AUC-ROC Results for API Call Sequence

Table 4: AUC-ROC Results for API Call Sequence

| Family | Dynamic/ | Static/ | Dynamic/ | Static/ |
|-----------------|----------|---------|----------|---------|
| | Dynamic | Static | Static | Dynamic |
| Harebot | 0.9867 | 0.7832 | 0.5783 | 0.5674 |
| Security Shield | 0.9875 | 1.0000 | 0.9563 | 0.8725 |
| Smart HDD | 0.9808 | 0.7900 | 0.7760 | 0.7325 |
| Winwebsec | 0.9762 | 0.9967 | 0.7301 | 0.6428 |
| Zbot | 0.9800 | 0.9899 | 0.9364 | 0.8879 |
| ZeroAccess | 0.9968 | 0.9844 | 0.7007 | 0.9106 |

• AUC-PR Results for API Call Sequence

Table 5: AUC-PR Results for API Call Sequence

| D:1 | Dynamic/ | Static/ | Dynamic/ | Static/ |
|-----------------|----------|---------|----------|---------|
| Family | Dynamic | Static | Static | Dynamic |
| Harebot | 0.9858 | 0.8702 | 0.7111 | 0.4888 |
| Security Shield | 0.9884 | 1.0000 | 0.9534 | 0.3312 |
| Smart HDD | 0.9825 | 0.8799 | 0.3768 | 0.4025 |
| Winwebsec | 0.9800 | 0.9967 | 0.7359 | 0.3947 |
| Zbot | 0.9808 | 0.9931 | 0.9513 | 0.3260 |
| ZeroAccess | 0.9980 | 0.9879 | 0.4190 | 0.3472 |

• ROC Results for API Call Sequence




Figure 4: ROC Results for API Call Sequence

• PR Results for API Call Sequence





Figure 5: PR Results for API Call Sequence

• AUC-ROC Results for Opcode Sequences

Table 6: AUC-ROC Results for Opcode Sequences

| Easails: | Dynamic/ | Static/ | Dynamic/ | Static/ |
|-----------------|----------|---------|----------|---------|
| Family | Dynamic | Static | Static | Dynamic |
| Harebot | 0.7210 | 0.5300 | 0.5694 | 0.5832 |
| Security Shield | 0.9452 | 0.5028 | 0.6212 | 0.5928 |
| Smart HDD | 0.9860 | 0.9952 | 1.0000 | 0.9748 |
| Winwebsec | 0.8268 | 0.6609 | 0.7004 | 0.6279 |
| Zbot | 0.9681 | 0.7755 | 0.6424 | 0.9525 |
| ZeroAccess | 0.9840 | 0.7760 | 0.8970 | 0.6890 |






Figure 7: ROC Results for Opcode Sequences

• add factor n (模拟良性样本集数量较大的情况)




Figure 8: AUC-PR and Imbalanced Data (API Calls)

Conclusion

- 最终结果表明基于 API 调用的完全动态方法非常对一系列恶意软件系列有效
- 基于 API 调用的静态检测方法在大多数情况下几乎同样有效
- 混合检测方法不太有效