These notes loosely follow Fernández-Villaverde and Levintal (2018) "Solution Methods for Models with Rare Disasters" but omits several features, such as recursive preferences and disaster risk.

1 Model

1.1 Household

The model admits a representative agent, so I directly write households' problem as the representative agent's. The representative household solves, in the cashless limit,

$$\max_{C_t, L_t, B_{t+1}, X_t, K_{t+1}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \exp(\eta_{\beta, t}) \left(\frac{C_t^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} - \varphi \exp(\eta_{L, t}) \frac{L_t^{1+\nu}}{1+\nu} \right)$$
 (1)

subject to the budget constraint

$$C_t + \frac{B_{t+1}}{P_t} + X_t \le W_t L_t + R_{K,t} K_t + R_{t-1} \frac{B_t}{P_t} + F_t + T_t, \tag{2}$$

where C_t is consumption, B_t nominal bonds, X_t investment, $W_{N,t}$ the real wage, L_t labor, $R_{KN,t}$ the gross real rental rate on capital, K_t capital, R_t the gross nominal interest rate on bonds, F_t real profits from firms, and T_t real lump-sum transfers from the government. The price of the final consumption good is P_t . Markets are assumed complete, but securities are in zero net supply. Because there is a representative agent, I may omit the Arrow securities from the budget constraint. Our notation treats B_t and K_t as pre-determined at time t. Investment for capital follows the law of motion

$$K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)K_t + \exp(\eta_{K,t}) \left(1 - \Phi\left[\frac{X_t}{X_{t-1}}\right]\right) X_t,$$
 (3)

where the investment function takes the functional form

$$\Phi\left[\frac{X_t}{X_{t-1}}\right] = \frac{\chi}{2} \left(\frac{X_t}{X_{t-1}}\right)^2.$$

The Lagrangian for the household is

$$\mathcal{L} = \mathbb{E}_{0} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t} \exp(\eta_{\beta,t}) \left[\frac{C_{t}^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} - \varphi \exp(\eta_{L,t}) \frac{L_{t}^{1+\nu}}{1+\nu} \right]$$

$$+ \mathbb{E}_{0} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t} \exp(\eta_{\beta,t}) \lambda_{t} \left[W_{t} L_{t} + R_{K,t} K_{t} + R_{t-1} \frac{B_{t}}{P_{t}} + F_{t} + T_{t} - C_{t} - \frac{B_{t+1}}{P_{t}} - X_{t} \right]$$

$$+ \mathbb{E}_{0} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t} \exp(\eta_{\beta,t}) \lambda_{t} Q_{t} \left[(1-\delta) K_{t} + \exp(\eta_{K,t}) \left(1 - \Phi \left[\frac{X_{t}}{X_{t-1}} \right] \right) X_{t} - K_{t+1} \right],$$

which implies first-order conditions

$$0 = C_t^{-\gamma} - \lambda_t$$

$$0 = -\varphi \exp(\eta_{L,t}) L_t^{\nu} + \lambda_t W_t$$

$$0 = -\exp(\eta_{\beta,t}) \lambda_t + \beta \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(\eta_{\beta,t+1}) \lambda_{t+1} R_t]$$

$$0 = -\exp(\eta_{\beta,t}) \lambda_t + \exp(\eta_{\beta,t}) \lambda_t Q_t \exp(\eta_{K,t}) \left(1 - \Phi \left[\frac{X_t}{X_{t-1}} \right] \right)$$

$$-\exp(\eta_{\beta,t}) \lambda_t Q_t \exp(\eta_{K,t}) \Phi' \left[\frac{X_t}{X_{t-1}} \right] \frac{X_t}{X_{t-1}}$$

$$-\beta \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(\eta_{\beta,t+1}) \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} \exp(\eta_{K,t+1}) \Phi' \left[\frac{X_{t+1}}{X_t} \right] \left(-\frac{X_{t+1}}{X_t^2} \right) X_{t+1}$$

$$0 = \beta \mathbb{E}_t [\exp(\eta_{\beta,t+1}) \lambda_{t+1} (R_{K,t+1} + Q_{t+1} (1 - \delta))] - \exp(\eta_{\beta,t}) \lambda_t Q_t$$

The first two equations can be combined by isolating λ_t , which obtains the intratemporal consumption-labor condition

$$C_t^{-\gamma}W_t = \varphi \exp(\eta_{L,t})L_t^{\nu}.$$

Using $\lambda_t = C_t^{-\gamma}$ and defining the gross inflation rate $\Pi_t \equiv P_t/P_{t-1}$, I can obtain the Euler equation for households

$$\exp(\eta_{\beta,t}) \frac{C_t^{-\gamma}}{P_t} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\exp(\eta_{\beta,t+1}) \frac{C_{t+1}^{-\gamma}}{P_{t+1}} R_t \right]$$
$$1 = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\frac{\exp(\eta_{\beta,t+1})}{\exp(\eta_{\beta,t})} \frac{C_{t+1}^{-\gamma}}{C_t^{-\gamma}} \frac{R_t}{\Pi_{t+1}} \right].$$

I can further simplify the Euler equation by defining the (real) stochastic discount factor

$$M_{t+1} = \beta \frac{\exp(\eta_{\beta,t+1})}{\exp(\eta_{\beta,t})} \frac{C_{t+1}^{-\gamma}}{C_t^{-\gamma}}$$

After dividing through by $\exp(\eta_{\beta,t})\lambda_t$ and re-arranging, the investment condition becomes

$$1 = \exp(\eta_{K,t})Q_{t} \left(1 - \Phi\left[\frac{X_{t}}{X_{t-1}}\right]\right) - \exp(\eta_{K,t})Q_{t}\Phi'\left[\frac{X_{t}}{X_{t-1}}\right]\frac{X_{t}}{X_{t-1}}$$

$$+ \mathbb{E}_{t}\left[M_{t+1}\exp(\eta_{K,t+1})Q_{t+1}\Phi'\left[\frac{X_{t+1}}{X_{t}}\right]\frac{X_{t+1}^{2}}{X_{t}^{2}}\right]$$

$$= \exp(\eta_{K,t})Q_{t} \left(\left(1 - \Phi\left[\frac{X_{t}}{X_{t-1}}\right]\right) - \Phi'\left[\frac{X_{t}}{X_{t-1}}\right]\frac{X_{t}}{X_{t-1}}\right)$$

$$+ \mathbb{E}_{t}\left[M_{t+1}\exp(\eta_{K,t+1})Q_{t+1}\Phi'\left[\frac{X_{t+1}}{X_{t}}\right]\frac{X_{t+1}^{2}}{X_{t}^{2}}\right].$$

Finally, after dividing through by $\exp(\eta_{\beta,t})\lambda_t$, the first-order condition for next-period capital is

$$Q_t = \mathbb{E}_t[M_{t+1}(R_{K,t+1} + Q_{t+1}(1-\delta))]$$

In summary, households' optimality conditions are

$$C_t^{-\gamma} W_t = \varphi \exp(\eta_{L,t}) L_t^{\nu},\tag{4}$$

$$M_{t+1} = \beta \frac{\exp(\eta_{\beta,t+1})}{\exp(\eta_{\beta,t})} \frac{C_{t+1}^{-\gamma}}{C_t^{-\gamma}},\tag{5}$$

$$1 = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[M_{t+1} \frac{R_t}{\Pi_{t+1}} \right], \tag{6}$$

$$1 = \exp(\eta_{K,t})Q_t \left(\left(1 - \Phi \left[\frac{X_t}{X_{t-1}} \right] \right) - \Phi' \left[\frac{X_t}{X_{t-1}} \right] \frac{X_t}{X_{t-1}} \right)$$

$$+ \mathbb{E}_t \left[M_{t+1} \exp(\eta_{K,t+1})Q_{t+1}\Phi' \left[\frac{X_{t+1}}{X_t} \right] \frac{X_{t+1}^2}{X_t^2} \right],$$

$$(7)$$

$$Q_t = \mathbb{E}_t[M_{t+1}(R_{K,t+1} + Q_{t+1}(1-\delta))]. \tag{8}$$

1.2 Production

Final Producers There is a representative final goods firm which sells consumption goods in a competitive market. It aggregates intermediate goods using the CES technology

$$Y_t = \left(\int_0^1 Y_t(j)^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}}\right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}}$$

where $\epsilon > 1$ so that inputs are substitutes. Profit maximization for the final good firm is

$$\max_{Y_t(j)} P_t \left(\int_0^1 Y_t(j)^{\frac{\epsilon-1}{\epsilon}} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}} - \int_0^1 P_t(j) Y_t(j) \, dj.$$

The FOC for $Y_t(j)$ is

$$0 = P_t \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1} \left(\int_0^1 Y_t(j)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\epsilon - 1}} \frac{\epsilon - 1}{\epsilon} Y_t(j)^{-\frac{1}{\epsilon}} - P_t(j)$$

$$0 = \left(\int_0^1 Y_t(j)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\epsilon - 1}} Y_t(j)^{-\frac{1}{\epsilon}} - \frac{P_t(j)}{P_t}$$

$$0 = \left(\int_0^1 Y_t(j)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1}} \right)^{-\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1}} Y_t(j) - \left(\frac{P_t(j)}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon}$$

$$Y_t(j) = \left(\frac{P_t(j)}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon} Y_t.$$

Plugging this quantity into the identity

$$P_t Y_t = \int_0^1 P_t(j) Y_t(j) \, dj$$

and simplifying yields the price index

$$P_t = \left(\int_0^1 P_t(j)^{1-\epsilon} dj\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\epsilon}}.$$

Intermediate Producers Intermediate goods are producing according to the Cobb-Douglas technology

$$Y_t(j) = A_t K_t^{\alpha}(j) L_t^{1-\alpha}(j).$$

Intermediate producers minimize cost subject to the constraint of meeting demand and Calvo price rigidities. Formally,

$$\min_{K_t(j),L_t(j)} R_{K,t} K_t(j) + W_t L_t(j) \qquad \text{s.t.} \qquad A_t K_t^{\alpha}(j) L_t^{1-\alpha}(j) \ge \left(\frac{P_t(j)}{P_t}\right)^{-\epsilon} Y_t.$$

The RHS of the inequality constraint is the demand from final goods producers for intermediate j. The Lagrangian is

$$\mathcal{L} = R_{K,t}K_t(j) + W_tL_t(j) + MC_t(j) \left(\left(\frac{P_t(j)}{P_t} \right)^{-\epsilon} Y_t - A_tK_t^{\alpha}(j)L_t^{1-\alpha}(j) \right),$$

so the first-order conditions are

$$0 = R_{K,t} - MC_t(j)\alpha A_t \left(\frac{L_t(j)}{K_t(j)}\right)^{1-\alpha}$$
$$0 = W_t - MC_t(j)(1-\alpha)A_t \left(\frac{K_t(j)}{L_t(j)}\right)^{\alpha},$$

hence the optimal capital-labor ratio satisfies

$$\frac{R_{K,t}}{\alpha A_t(K_t(j)/L_t(j))^{\alpha-1}} = \frac{W_t}{(1-\alpha)A_t(K_t(j)/L_t(j))^{\alpha}} \frac{K_t(j)}{L_t(j)} = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{W_t}{R_{K,t}}.$$

Since the RHS does not vary with j, all firms choose the same capital-labor ratio. Given this optimal ratio, the marginal cost satisfies

$$MC_{t} = \frac{R_{K,t}}{\alpha A_{t}} \left(\frac{K_{t}}{L_{t}}\right)^{1-\alpha}$$

$$= \frac{R_{K,t}}{\alpha A_{t}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{W_{t}}{R_{K,t}}\right)^{1-\alpha}$$

$$= \left(\frac{1}{1-\alpha}\right)^{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{1}{\alpha}\right)^{\alpha} \frac{W_{t}^{1-\alpha} R_{K,t}^{\alpha}}{A_{t}}.$$

It follows that

$$R_{K,t}K_t + W_tL_t = \left(\frac{R_{K,t}}{A_t} \left(\frac{K_t}{L_t}\right)^{1-\alpha} + \frac{W_t}{A_t} \left(\frac{L_t}{K_t}\right)^{\alpha}\right) (A_t K_t^{\alpha} L_t^{1-\alpha})$$
$$= (\alpha M C_t + (1-\alpha) M C_t) Y_t(j) = M C_t Y_t(j).$$

Therefore, (real) profits for an intermediate producer become

$$F_t(j) = \frac{P_t(j)}{P_t} Y_t(j) - MC_t Y_t(j).$$

In addition to the capital-labor choice, firms also have the chance to reset prices in every period with probability $1 - \theta$. This problem can be written as

$$\max_{P_{t}(j)} \mathbb{E}_{t} \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} (\beta \theta)^{s} \frac{\exp(\eta_{\beta,t+s})}{\exp(\eta_{\beta,t})} \frac{u'(C_{t+s})}{u'(C_{t})} \left(\frac{P_{t}(j)}{P_{t+s}} \left(\frac{P_{t}(j)}{P_{t+s}} \right)^{-\epsilon} Y_{t+s} - mc_{t+s} \left(\frac{P_{t}(j)}{P_{t+s}} \right)^{-\epsilon} Y_{t+s} \right),$$

where I have imposed that intermediate output equals demand. The first-order condition is

$$0 = (1 - \epsilon) P_t(j)^{-\epsilon} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} (\beta \theta)^s \frac{\exp(\eta_{\beta,t+s})}{\exp(\eta_{\beta,t})} \frac{u'(C_{t+s})}{u'(C_t)} (P_{t+s})^{-(1-\epsilon)} Y_{t+s}$$
$$+ \epsilon P_t(j)^{-\epsilon - 1} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} (\beta \theta)^s \frac{\exp(\eta_{\beta,t+s})}{\exp(\eta_{\beta,t})} \frac{u'(C_{t+s})}{u'(C_t)} m c_{t+s} P_{t+s}^{\epsilon} Y_{t+s}$$

Divide by $P_t(j)^{-\epsilon}/(\exp(\eta_{\beta,t})u'(C_t))$, apply the abuse of notation that $\prod_{u=1}^0 \Pi_{t+u} = 1$, and re-arrange to obtain

$$P_{t}(j) = \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1} \frac{\mathbb{E}_{t} \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} (\beta \theta)^{s} \exp(\eta_{\beta,t+s}) u'(C_{t+s}) m c_{t+s} P_{t+s}^{\epsilon} Y_{t+s}}{\mathbb{E}_{t} \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} (\beta \theta)^{s} \exp(\eta_{\beta,t+s}) u'(C_{t+s}) P_{t+s}^{\epsilon-1} Y_{t+s}}$$

$$= \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1} \frac{\mathbb{E}_{t} \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} (\beta \theta)^{s} \exp(\eta_{\beta,t+s}) u'(C_{t+s}) m c_{t+s} P_{t}^{\epsilon} \left(\prod_{u=1}^{s} \prod_{t+u}\right)^{\epsilon} Y_{t+s}}{\mathbb{E}_{t} \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} (\beta \theta)^{s} \exp(\eta_{\beta,t+s}) u'(C_{t+s}) P_{t}^{\epsilon-1} \left(\prod_{u=1}^{s} \prod_{t+u}\right)^{\epsilon-1} Y_{t+s}}$$

$$\frac{P_{t}(j)}{P_{t}} = \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1} \frac{\mathbb{E}_{t} \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} (\beta \theta)^{s} \exp(\eta_{\beta,t+s}) u'(C_{t+s}) m c_{t+s} \left(\prod_{u=1}^{s} \prod_{t+u}\right)^{\epsilon} Y_{t+s}}{\mathbb{E}_{t} \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} (\beta \theta)^{s} \exp(\eta_{\beta,t+s}) u'(C_{t+s}) \left(\prod_{u=1}^{s} \prod_{t+u}\right)^{\epsilon-1} Y_{t+s}}.$$

This expression gives the optimal (real) reset price $P_t^* \equiv P_t(j)/P_t$ (note that the RHS does not depend on j). Define

$$S_{1,t} = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} (\beta \theta)^s \exp(\eta_{\beta,t+s}) u'(C_{t+s}) m c_{t+s} Y_{t+s} \left(\prod_{u=1}^s \Pi_{t+s} \right)^{\epsilon},$$

$$S_{2,t} = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} (\beta \theta)^s \exp(\eta_{\beta,t+s}) u'(C_{t+s}) Y_{t+s} \left(\prod_{u=1}^s \Pi_{t+s} \right)^{\epsilon-1}.$$

Using these definitions, I may write the optimal reset price more compactly as

$$P_t^* = \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1} \frac{S_{1,t}}{S_{2,t}}$$

where $S_{1,t}$ and $S_{2,t}$ satisfy the recursions

$$S_{1,t} = \exp(\eta_{\beta,t}) u'(C_t) M C_t Y_t + \theta \beta \mathbb{E}_t \Pi_{t+s}^{\epsilon} S_{1,t+1}$$

$$S_{2,t} = \exp(\eta_{\beta,t}) u'(C_t) Y_t + \theta \beta \mathbb{E}_t \Pi_{t+s}^{\epsilon-1} S_{2,t+1}.$$

These recursions can be further rewritten as

$$\frac{S_{1,t}}{\exp(\eta_{\beta,t})u'(C_t)} = MC_tY_t + \theta\beta\mathbb{E}_t \left[\frac{\exp(\eta_{\beta,t+1})u'(C_{t+1})}{\exp(\eta_{\beta,t})u'(C_t)} \Pi_{t+s}^{\epsilon} \frac{S_{1,t+1}}{\exp(\eta_{\beta,t+1})u'(C_{t+1})} \right]
\frac{S_{2,t}}{\exp(\eta_{\beta,t})u'(C_t)} = Y_t + \theta\beta\mathbb{E}_t \left[\frac{\exp(\eta_{\beta,t+1})u'(C_{t+1})}{\exp(\eta_{\beta,t})u'(C_t)} \Pi_{t+s}^{\epsilon-1} \frac{S_{2,t+1}}{\exp(\eta_{\beta,t+1})u'(C_{t+1})} \right],$$

By defining $\tilde{S}_{1,t} \equiv S_{1,t}/(\exp(\eta_{\beta,t})u'(C_t))$ and $\tilde{S}_{2,t} \equiv S_{2,t}/(\exp(\eta_{\beta,t})u'(C_t))$, I can simplify these recursions into the form I use for the numerical solution.

From this section, we obtain the following five equilibrium conditions:

$$MC_t = \left(\frac{1}{1-\alpha}\right)^{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{1}{\alpha}\right)^{\alpha} \frac{W_t^{1-\alpha} R_{K,t}^{\alpha}}{A_t},\tag{9}$$

$$\frac{K_t}{L_t} = \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \frac{W_t}{R_{K,t}},\tag{10}$$

$$P_t^* = \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1} \frac{\tilde{S}_{1,t}}{\tilde{S}_{2,t}},\tag{11}$$

$$\tilde{S}_{1,t} = MC_t Y_t + \theta \beta \mathbb{E}_t[M_{t+1} \Pi_{t+s}^{\epsilon} \tilde{S}_{1,t+1}], \tag{12}$$

$$\tilde{S}_{2,t} = Y_t + \theta \beta \mathbb{E}_t [M_{t+1} \Pi_{t+s}^{\epsilon-1} \tilde{S}_{2,t+1}]. \tag{13}$$

1.3 Monetary Policy

To close the model, I specify the monetary policy rule as the following Taylor rule

$$\frac{R_t}{R} = \left(\frac{R_{t-1}}{R}\right)^{\phi_R} \left(\left(\frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi}\right)^{\phi_\Pi} \left(\frac{Y_t}{Y_{t-1}}\right)^{\phi_Y}\right)^{1-\phi_R} \exp(\eta_{R,t}) \tag{14}$$

Any proceeds from monetary policy are distributed as lump sum to the representative household.

1.4 Aggregation

The price level is currently characterized as the integral

$$P_t^{1-\epsilon} = \int_0^1 P_t(j)^{1-\epsilon} \, dj.$$

To represent the model entirely in terms of aggregates, notice that, without loss of generality, we may re-order the fraction ϕ of firms which cannot reset prices to the top of the interval so that

$$P_t^{1-\epsilon} = (1-\phi)(P_t^*)^{1-\epsilon} + \int_{1-\phi}^1 P_{t-1}(j)^{1-\epsilon} dj.$$

The latter term can be further simplified under the law of large numbers assumption that a positive measure of firms which cannot change their price still comprise a representative sample of all firms, yielding

$$P_t^{1-\epsilon} = (1-\phi)(P_t^*)^{1-\epsilon} + \phi \int_0^1 P_{t-1}(j)^{1-\epsilon} dj = (1-\phi)(P_t^*)^{1-\epsilon} + \phi P_{t-1}^{1-\epsilon}.$$

Dividing by $P_{t-1}^{1-\epsilon}$ implies

$$\Pi_t^{1-\epsilon} = (1-\phi)(P_t^*\Pi_t)^{1-\epsilon} + \phi. \tag{15}$$

The price dispersion term can similarly be re-written in terms of aggregates by distinguishing which firms get to change prices.

$$v_{t} = \int_{0}^{1-\phi} (P_{t}^{*})^{-\epsilon} dj + \int_{1-\phi}^{1} \left(\frac{P_{t-1}(j)}{P_{t}}\right)^{-\epsilon} dj$$

$$= \int_{0}^{1-\phi} (P_{t}^{*}\Pi_{t})^{-\epsilon} \left(\frac{1}{\Pi_{t}}\right)^{-\epsilon} dj + \int_{1-\phi}^{1} \left(\frac{P_{t-1}(j)}{P_{t-1}}\right)^{-\epsilon} \left(\frac{P_{t-1}}{P_{t}}\right)^{-\epsilon} dj$$

$$= (1-\phi)(P_{t}^{*}\Pi_{t})^{-\epsilon}\Pi_{t}^{\epsilon} + \Pi_{t}^{\epsilon} \int_{1-\phi}^{1} \left(\frac{P_{t-1}(j)}{P_{t-1}}\right)^{-\epsilon} dj.$$

By invoking the law of large assumptions applied to any positive measure subset of firms, we must have

$$\int_{1-\phi}^{1} \left(\frac{P_{t-1}(j)}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{-\epsilon} dj = \phi \int_{0}^{1} \left(\frac{P_{t-1}(j)}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{-\epsilon} dj = \phi v_{t-1}.$$

Thus, we acquire

$$v_t = \Pi_t^{\epsilon}((1 - \phi)(P_t^* \Pi_t)^{\epsilon} + \phi v_{t-1})$$

$$\tag{16}$$

1.5 Equilibrium

To close the model, I need to specify the functional form for investment, aggregate shocks, and market-clearing conditions.

Following the literature, I assume quadratic adjustment investment costs so that

$$\Phi\left[\frac{X_t}{X_{t-1}}\right] = \frac{\chi}{2} \left(\frac{X_t}{X_{t-1}}\right)^2,\tag{17}$$

which has first derivative w.r.t. X_t/X_{t-1}

$$\Phi'\left[\frac{X_t}{X_{t-1}}\right] = \chi\left(\frac{X_t}{X_{t-1}}\right). \tag{18}$$

There are five shocks in the model: $\eta_{A,t}$, $\eta_{\beta,t}$, $\eta_{L,t}$, $\eta_{K,t}$, and $\eta_{R,t}$. Without loss of generality, I assume all shocks follow AR(1) processes with persistence ρ_i and standard deviation σ_i . Markets must clear for capital, labor, bonds, final goods, and intermediate goods, . The first three markets clear as a consequence of optimality conditions and the assumption that bonds have zero net supply. To clear the market for final goods, we set aggregate consumption demand C_t equal to aggregate supply Y_t , which satisfies

$$\int_0^1 A_t K_t^{\alpha} L_t^{1-\alpha} dj = \int_0^1 \left(\frac{P_t(j)}{P_t}\right)^{-\epsilon} Y_t dj$$
$$A_t K_t^{\alpha} L_t^{1-\alpha} = Y_t \int_0^1 \left(\frac{P_t(j)}{P_t}\right)^{-\epsilon} dj = v_t Y_t.$$

Re-arranging yields the consumption market-clearing condition

$$C_t = \frac{A_t K_t^{\alpha} L_t^{1-\alpha}}{v_t}. (19)$$

It can be shown that $v_t \ge 1$ by applying Jensen's inequality.

All together, the full set of endogenous equilibrium conditions are

$$C_t^{-\gamma} W_t = \varphi \exp(\eta_{L,t}) L_t^{\nu},\tag{20}$$

$$M_{t+1} = \beta \frac{\exp(\eta_{\beta,t+1})}{\exp(\eta_{\beta,t})} \frac{C_{t+1}^{-\gamma}}{C_t^{-\gamma}},\tag{21}$$

$$1 = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[M_{t+1} \frac{R_t}{\Pi_{t+1}} \right], \tag{22}$$

$$1 = \exp(\eta_{K,t})Q_t \left(1 - \frac{3\chi}{2} \left(\frac{X_t}{X_{t-1}}\right)^2\right) + \mathbb{E}_t \left[M_{t+1} \exp(\eta_{K,t+1})Q_{t+1}\chi \left(\frac{X_{t+1}}{X_t}\right)^3\right], \quad (23)$$

$$Q_t = \mathbb{E}_t[M_{t+1}(R_{K,t+1} + Q_{t+1}(1-\delta))], \tag{24}$$

$$MC_t = \left(\frac{1}{1-\alpha}\right)^{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{1}{\alpha}\right)^{\alpha} \frac{W_t^{1-\alpha} R_{K,t}^{\alpha}}{A_t},\tag{25}$$

$$\frac{K_t}{L_t} = \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \frac{W_t}{R_{Kt}},\tag{26}$$

$$P_t^* = \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1} \frac{\tilde{S}_{1,t}}{\tilde{S}_{2,t}},\tag{27}$$

$$\tilde{S}_{1,t} = MC_t Y_t + \theta \beta \mathbb{E}_t [M_{t+1} \Pi_{t+s}^{\epsilon} \tilde{S}_{1,t+1}], \tag{28}$$

$$\tilde{S}_{2,t} = Y_t + \theta \beta \mathbb{E}_t[M_{t+1} \Pi_{t+s}^{\epsilon-1} \tilde{S}_{2,t+1}],$$
 (29)

$$\Pi_t^{1-\epsilon} = (1-\phi)(P_t^*\Pi_t)^{1-\epsilon} + \phi, \tag{30}$$

$$v_t = \Pi_t^{\epsilon} ((1 - \phi)(P_t^* \Pi_t)^{\epsilon} + \phi v_{t-1}), \tag{31}$$

$$\frac{R_t}{R} = \left(\frac{R_{t-1}}{R}\right)^{\phi_R} \left(\left(\frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi}\right)^{\phi_\Pi} \left(\frac{Y_t}{Y_{t-1}}\right)^{\phi_Y}\right)^{1-\phi_R} \exp(\eta_{R,t}),\tag{32}$$

$$C_t = \frac{A_t K_t^{\alpha} L_t^{1-\alpha}}{v_t},\tag{33}$$

as well as the law of motion for capital

$$K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)K_t + \exp(\eta_{K,t}) \left(1 - \frac{\chi}{2} \left(\frac{X_t}{X_{t-1}}\right)^2\right) X_t$$
 (34)

and the five exogenous processes

$$\eta_{\beta,t+1} = \rho_{\beta}\eta_{\beta,t} + \sigma_{\beta}\varepsilon_{\beta,t+1},\tag{35}$$

$$\eta_{L,t+1} = \rho_L \eta_{L,t} + \sigma_L \varepsilon_{L,t+1},\tag{36}$$

$$\eta_{A,t+1} = \rho_A \eta_{A,t} + \sigma_A \varepsilon_{A,t+1},\tag{37}$$

$$\eta_{K,t+1} = \rho_K \eta_{K,t} + \sigma_K \varepsilon_{K,t+1}, \tag{38}$$

$$\eta_{R,t+1} = \rho_R \eta_{R,t} + \sigma_R \varepsilon_{R,t+1}. \tag{39}$$

2 Risk-Adjusted Linearization

We now proceed to converting the equilibrium conditions into a suitable form for a risk-adjusted linearization. The system should conform to the representation

$$0 = \log \mathbb{E}_t \left[\exp \left(\xi(z_t, y_t) + \Gamma_5 z_{t+1} + \Gamma_6 y_{t+1} \right) \right]$$

$$z_{t+1} = \mu(z_t, y_t) + \Lambda(z_t, y_t) (y_{t+1} - \mathbb{E}_t y_{t+1}) + \Sigma(z_t, y_t) \varepsilon_{t+1},$$

where z_t are (predetermined) state variables and y_t are (nondetermined) jump variables. For the remainder of this section, lower case variables are the logs of previously upper case variables, and with a small abuse of notation, let $s_{1,t} = \log(\tilde{S}_{1,t})$ and $s_{2,t} = \log(\tilde{S}_{2,t})$. Additionally, let $r_{k,t} = \log(R_{K,t})$.

Equation (20) becomes

$$1 = \varphi \exp(\eta_{L,t}) \frac{L_t^{\nu}}{C_t^{-\gamma} W_t}$$

$$0 = \log \mathbb{E}_t \left[\exp\left(\underbrace{\log(\varphi) + \eta_{L,t} + \nu l_t - (-\gamma c_t + w_t)}_{\xi}\right) \right].$$

Equation (21) will not be used in the system of equations for the risk-adjusted linearization, but it simplifies the other equations. Taking logs and re-arranging yields

$$0 = \log(\beta) + \eta_{\beta,t+1} + (-\gamma c_{t+1}) - \eta_{\beta,t} - (-\gamma c_t) - m_{t+1}$$
$$= \underbrace{\log(\beta) - \eta_{\beta,t} + \gamma c_t}_{\xi} + \underbrace{\eta_{\beta,t+1} - \gamma c_{t+1} - m_{t+1}}_{\text{forward-looking}}.$$

Equation (22) becomes

$$0 = \log \mathbb{E}_t \left[\exp \left(\underbrace{\log(\beta) + r_t}_{\xi} + \underbrace{m_{t+1} - \Pi_{t+1}}_{\text{forward-looking}} \right) \right].$$

Equation (23) becomes

$$1 - \exp(\eta_{K,t})Q_t \left(1 - \frac{3\chi}{2} \left(\frac{X_t}{X_{t-1}}\right)^2\right)$$

$$= \mathbb{E}_t \left[M_{t+1} \exp(\eta_{K,t+1})Q_{t+1}\chi \left(\frac{X_{t+1}}{X_t}\right)^3 \right]$$

$$\log \left(1 - \exp(\eta_{K,t} + q_t) \left(1 - \frac{3\chi}{2} \exp(2x_t - 2x_{t-1})\right)\right)$$

$$= \log \mathbb{E}_t \left[\exp\left(m_{t+1} + \eta_{K,t+1} + q_{t+1} + \log(\chi) + 3x_{t+1} - 3x_t\right)\right]$$

$$0 = \log \mathbb{E}_t \left[\frac{\exp\left(m_{t+1} + \eta_{K,t+1} + q_{t+1} + \log(\chi) + 3x_{t+1} - 3x_t\right)}{\exp\left(\log\left(1 - \exp(\eta_{K,t} + q_t) \left(1 - \frac{3\chi}{2} \exp(2x_t - 2x_{t-1})\right)\right)\right)}\right].$$

Re-arranging yields

$$0 = \log \mathbb{E}_t \left[\exp \left(\underbrace{\log(\chi) - 3x_t - \log\left(1 - \exp(\eta_{K,t} + q_t)\left(1 - \frac{3\chi}{2}\exp(2x_t - 2x_{t-1})\right)\right)}_{\xi} \right) \right] + \log \mathbb{E}_t \left[\exp(\underbrace{m_{t+1} + \eta_{K,t+1} + q_{t+1} + 3x_{t+1}}_{\text{forward-looking}}) \right].$$

Equation (24) becomes

$$1 = \mathbb{E}_t \left[\frac{M_{t+1}(R_{K,t+1} + Q_{t+1}(1-\delta))}{Q_t} \right]$$

$$0 = \log \mathbb{E}_t \left[\exp\left(m_{t+1} + \log(\exp(r_{k,t+1}) + (1-\delta)\exp(q_{t+1})\right) - q_t \right] \right].$$

This equation is not linear in the forward-looking variables, we define a new variable

$$N_t = R_{K,t} + Q_t(1 - \delta), \tag{40}$$

so that we may represent (24) in the required form for risk-adjusted linearizations as the following two equations:

$$0 = \log \mathbb{E}_t \left[\exp \left(\underbrace{-q_t}_{\xi} + \underbrace{m_{t+1} + n_{t+1}}_{\text{forward-looking}} \right) \right],$$

$$0 = \log \mathbb{E}_t \left[\exp \left(\underbrace{n_t - \log(\exp(r_{k,t}) + (1 - \delta) \exp(q_t))}_{\xi} \right) \right],$$

Equation (25) becomes

$$0 = \log \mathbb{E}_t \left[\exp \left(\underbrace{(1 - \alpha)w_t + \alpha r_{k,t} - a_t - (1 - \alpha)\log(1 - \alpha) - \alpha\log(\alpha) - mc_t}_{\xi} \right) \right].$$

Equation (26) becomes

$$0 = \log \mathbb{E}_t \left[\exp \left(\underbrace{k_t - l_t - \log \left(\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \right) - (w_t - r_{k,t})}_{\xi} \right) \right].$$

Like the stochastic discount factor, equation (27) will not be used in the system of equations, but it will be useful to simplify other equations. Taking logs yields

$$p_t^* = \log\left(\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1}\right) + s_{1,t} - s_{2,t}.$$

The first equation becomes

$$1 = \beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left[\frac{C_{t+1}^{-\sigma}}{C_{t}^{-\sigma}} \frac{1 + i_{t}}{1 + \pi_{t+1}} \right]$$

$$0 = \log \mathbb{E}_{t} \left[\exp \left(\log(\beta) - \sigma(c_{t+1} - c_{t}) + \tilde{i}_{t} - \tilde{\pi}_{t+1} \right) \right]$$

$$= \log \mathbb{E}_{t} \left[\exp \left(\underbrace{\log(\beta) + \sigma c_{t} + \tilde{i}_{t}}_{\text{Forward-Looking}} \right) \right],$$

where $c_t = \log(C_t)$, $\tilde{i}_t = \log(1 + i_t)$, and $\tilde{\pi}_t = \log(1 + \pi_{t+1})$.

The second equation becomes

The third equation becomes

$$1 = \frac{w_t}{A_t M C_t}$$
$$0 = \log \mathbb{E}_t \left[\exp \left(\hat{w}_t - a_t - \tilde{m} c_t \right) \right].$$

The fourth and fifth equation become

$$0 = \log \mathbb{E}_t \left[\exp \left(c_t - a_t - n_t + \hat{v}_t \right) \right].$$

The sixth equation becomes

$$0 = \hat{v}_t - \epsilon \tilde{\pi}_t - \log((1 - \phi) \exp(\tilde{\pi}_t^*)^{-\epsilon} + \phi \exp(\hat{v}_{t-1})),$$

where \hat{v}_{t-1} will be treated as an additional state variable, i.e. if $a_t = \hat{v}_t$ is a jump variable and $b_t = \hat{v}_{t-1}$ is a state variable, then

$$b_{t+1} = a_t$$
.

The seventh equation becomes

$$0 = (1 - \epsilon)\tilde{\pi}_t - \log((1 - \phi)\exp(\tilde{\pi}_t^*)^{1 - \epsilon} + \phi).$$

The eighth equation becomes

$$0 = \tilde{\pi}_t^* - \log\left(\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1}\right) - \tilde{\pi}_t - (\hat{x}_{1,t} - \hat{x}_{2,t})).$$

By plugging this expression for $\tilde{\pi}_t^*$ into the previous two equations, we can also remove one more variable from the system.

The ninth and tenth equation become

$$1 = \mathbb{E}_t \left[\phi \beta \frac{x_{1,t+1}(1 + \pi_{t+1})}{x_{1,t} - C_t^{-\sigma} M C_t A_t N_t / v_t} \right]$$

$$0 = \log \mathbb{E}_t \left[\exp \left(\underbrace{\log(\phi) + \log(\beta) - \log(\exp(\hat{x}_{1,t}) - \exp((1 - \sigma)c_t + \tilde{m}c_t))}_{\xi} + \hat{x}_{1,t+1} + \epsilon \tilde{\pi}_{t+1} \right) \right]$$

$$0 = \log \mathbb{E}_t \left[\exp \left(\underbrace{\log(\phi) + \log(\beta) - \log(\exp(\hat{x}_{2,t}) - \exp((1 - \sigma)c_t))}_{\xi} + \hat{x}_{2,t+1} + (\epsilon - 1)\tilde{\pi}_{t+1} \right) \right],$$

where the fact that $x_{1,t}$ and $x_{2,t}$ must both be positive implies $x_{1,t} - C_t^{-\sigma}MC_tY_t$ and $x_{2,t} - C_t^{-\sigma}Y_t$ are both positive, as the expectations on the RHS are also both positive.

For the monetary policy rule, we use $\tilde{i}_{t-1} \equiv \log(1+i_{t-1})$ and $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ as states and treat i_t as a jump variable, hence

$$\tilde{i}_t = (1 - \rho_i)\tilde{i} + \rho_i\tilde{i}_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_i)\phi_{\pi}(\tilde{\pi}_t - \tilde{\pi}) + \varepsilon_{i,t}.$$

This formulation allows us to treat the policy rule as an expectational equation.

The above nine equations comprise the expectational equations. The following four equations comprise the states:

$$a_{t+1} = \rho_a a_t + \varepsilon_{a,t+1}$$
$$\hat{v}_{(t-1)+1} = \hat{v}_t$$
$$\hat{i}_{(t-1)+1} = \hat{i}_t$$
$$\varepsilon_{i,t+1} = \varepsilon_{i,t+1}$$

To conclude, note that we have three forward difference equations. The first is the Euler equation, which can be expressed as