

CAROL: Certifiably Robust Reinforcement Learning through Model-Based Abstract Interpretation

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
TEXAS

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REED COLLEGE

Background: RL in Safety-Critical Tasks

- Reinforcement learning (RL) is an established approach for various tasks, including safety-critical ones.



Reinforcement learning AI model improves accuracy of skin cancer diagnoses



Article | Published: 22 March 2023

Dense reinforcement learning for safety validation of autonomous vehicles

[Shuo Feng](#), [Haowei Sun](#), [Xintao Yan](#), [Haojie Zhu](#), [Zhengxia Zou](#), [Shengyin Shen](#) & [Henry X. Liu](#) 

[Nature](#) **615**, 620–627 (2023) | [Cite this article](#)

- State-of-the-art RL methods use neural networks as policy representations.

Background: RL with Neural Network Policies is Vulnerable

Neural networks are vulnerable.




x

“panda”

57.7% confidence

$+ .007 \times$



$\text{sign}(\nabla_x J(\theta, x, y))$

“nematode”

8.2% confidence

$=$




$x + \epsilon \text{sign}(\nabla_x J(\theta, x, y))$
“gibbon”

99.3 % confidence


Background: RL with Neural Network Policies is Vulnerable

Problems are more severe in RL as mistakes can cascade.

A hopper moves forward



Under attacks



Background: Certified Defenses

Certified Neural Networks in Supervised Learning

DiffAI (Mirman et al. 18),
k-ReLU (Singh et al. 19),
RNN Verification (Ryou et al. 21)

Defenses are still heuristic in RL

SA (Zhang et al. 20),
PA-AD (Sun et al. 22),
RADIAL (Oikarinen et al. 21)

Heuristic defenses are defeated by **counter** attacks.

Can we train a **certifiable** RL policy against **arbitrary** attacks?


Goal: Train Certifiable Robust Reinforcement Learning Policies



Goal: Train **Certifiable Robust** Reinforcement Learning Policies

Challenges

- How to represent and quantify worst-case attacks?



Goal: Train Certifiable Robust Reinforcement Learning Policies



Challenges

- How to represent and quantify worst-case attacks?
- How to reason over the black-box environment?

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Challenges

- How to represent and quantify worst-case attacks?


We use abstract interpretation, covering all the attacks.

- How to reason over the black-box environment?

Goal: Train Certifiable Robust Reinforcement Learning Policies

Abstract Interpretation^[1]: A well-established method to effectively compute bounds over functions.

It can be used to certify neural networks^[2].



Challenges

- How to represent and quantify worst-case attacks?

We use abstract interpretation, covering all the attacks.

- How to reason over the black-box environment?

[1] Cousot et, al. Abstract Interpretation. POPL 1977.

[2] Mirman et, al. Differentiable Abstract Interpretation for Provably Robust Neural Networks. ICML 2018.

Goal: Train Certifiable Robust Reinforcement Learning Policies



Challenges


- How to represent and quantify worst-case attacks?

We use abstract interpretation, covering all the attacks.

- How to reason over the black-box environment?


Learn a white-box transition representation of the environment with the policy.

Carol: Certifiably Robust Reinforcement Learning



Step 1: Train a NN represented **model** (verifiable) for the black-box environment during normal training.


Carol: Certifiably Robust Reinforcement Learning



Step 1: Train a NN represented **model** (verifiable) for the black-box environment during normal training.

Step 2: Train the **policy** over the NN model of the real environment.

Carol: Certifiably Robust Reinforcement Learning




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Step 3: A **symbolic** RL algorithm: **RL $^\#$** : with the learnt symbolic reward **R $^\#$** .

Carol: Certifiably Robust Reinforcement Learning



Step 1: Train a NN represented **model** (verifiable) for the black-box environment during normal training.

Step 2: Train the **policy** over the NN model of the real environment.

Step 3: A **symbolic** RL algorithm: **RL $^\#$** : with the learnt symbolic reward **R $^\#$** .

Step 4: In each iteration: we use the accumulative reward lower bound to guide the training:

$$\hat{R}^\# = \text{LowerBound}[\text{RL}^\#(A^\#, O^\#, R^\#)]$$

Theoretical Bound of Reward

With probability $1 - \delta$, the reward (R) under the worst attack is bounded by,

$$R \geq \hat{R}^{\#} - \frac{1}{\sqrt{\delta}} \sqrt{\frac{Var[R^{\#}]}{N}} - \left(1 - (1 - \delta_E)^T\right) C.$$

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1. The bound grows as the δ shrinks.
 \Rightarrow We pay the price of a looser bound as we consider higher confidence levels.
2. The bound depends on $Var[R^{\#}]$ and N in an intuitive way.
 \Rightarrow Higher variance makes it harder to measure the true reward, more samples make the bound tighter.
3. As δ_E increases, the last term grows.
 \Rightarrow A less accurate environment model leads to a looser bound.
4. The bound grows with T .
 \Rightarrow Over longer time horizons, our reward measurement gets less accurate.

Results: Certifiable Accumulative Reward Bound

Reward
Bound under
Worst-case
Attack

Time Horizon (T)

Results: Certifiable Accumulative Reward Bound

CAROL


RL without Defense

Reward
Bound under
Worst-case
Attack

Time Horizon (T)


Results: Certifiable Accumulative Reward Bound

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
Results: Certifiable Accumulative Reward Bound

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
Summary: CAROL

Thank you!

CAROL: **Certifiable** Robust Reinforcement Learning with **Long-Horizon** Reward Bound

Key Idea: Abstract Interpretation for **Verification** in the Learning Loop

White-Box Environment Representation Learning



Future: More **Accurate** and **Scalable** Certified RL

Code: <https://github.com/chenxi-yang/carol>