## Online Appendix


Private         0.15***         0.15***           Means of Production         0.68***         0.75***           Business         0.22***         0.20***           Regional Power         0.33***         0.26***           (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.05)           Fed Corruption         0.07*         0.05           Fed Corruption         (0.04)         (0.04)           Age x10         -0.02         0.05           Unpopularity         0.31***         0.29***           (0.05)         (0.05)         (0.05)           Urban         0.24**         0.30***           (0.10)         (0.10)         (0.10)           Native         0.79***         0.61***           (0.11)         (0.12)         (0.10)           Male         0.13         0.11           (0.10)         (0.10)         (0.10)           Education         -0.13***         -0.10**           (0.4)         (0.04)         (0.04)           Dissatisfied         -0.11*         -0.03           (0.06)         (0.06)           Violence x100         -0.03         (0.06)           (0.02)         (0.04)         (0.04)		Model 1	Model 2
Means of Production       0.68***       0.75***         Business       0.22***       0.20***         (0.06)       (0.06)       (0.06)         Regional Power       0.33***       0.26***         (0.05)       (0.05)       (0.05)         Fed Corruption       0.07*       0.05         (0.04)       (0.04)       (0.04)         Age x10       -0.02       0.05         (0.30)       (0.30)       (0.30)         Income       -0.03       -0.01         (0.05)       (0.05)       (0.05)         Unpopularity       0.31***       0.29***         (0.05)       (0.05)       (0.05)         Urban       0.24**       0.33***         (0.05)       (0.05)       (0.05)         Urban       0.24**       0.30****         (0.10)       (0.10)       (0.10)         Native       0.79****       0.61****         (0.11)       (0.12)       (0.10)         Education       -0.13****       -0.10**         (0.04)       (0.04)       (0.04)         Dissatisfied       -0.11*       -0.03         (0.20)       -0.03       (0.06)         Violen	Private	0.15***	0.15***
Business       (0.13) (0.06) (0.06)         Regional Power       (0.06) (0.06)         Regional Power       (0.33*** (0.05) (0.05)         Fed Corruption       (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)         Age x10       (0.02) (0.30) (0.30)         Income       (0.05) (0.05)         Unpopularity       (0.05) (0.05)         Urban       (0.10) (0.10)         Native       (0.79*** (0.11) (0.12)         Male       (0.10) (0.10)         Male       (0.13) (0.04) (0.04)         Dissatisfied       (0.11) (0.12)         Average Salary x100       (0.06) (0.06)         Violence x100       (0.06) (0.06)         Violence x100       (0.02) (0.02)         Unemployment       (0.03) (0.03)         1—2       3.07*** 1.10 (0.03)         2—3       4.72*** 2.81 (0.44) (1.97)         3—4       6.14*** 4.26** (0.47) (1.98)         AIC       3531.55 (3474.80)         BIC       3619.21 (3578.89)         Log Likelihood       -1749.78 (-1718.40)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Business       0.22***       0.20***         (0.06)       (0.06)       (0.06)         Regional Power       0.33***       0.26****         (0.05)       (0.05)       (0.05)         Fed Corruption       0.07*       0.05         (0.04)       (0.04)       (0.04)         Age x10       -0.02       0.05         (0.30)       (0.30)       (0.30)         Income       -0.03       -0.01         (0.05)       (0.05)       (0.05)         Unpopularity       0.31***       0.29***         (0.05)       (0.05)       (0.05)         Urban       0.24**       0.30***         (0.10)       (0.10)       (0.10)         Native       0.79***       0.61***         (0.11)       (0.12)       (0.10)         Male       0.13       0.11         (0.10)       (0.10)       (0.10)         Education       -0.13****       -0.10**         (0.04)       (0.04)       (0.04)         Dissatisfied       -0.11*       -0.03         (0.06)       (0.06)       (0.06)         Violence x100       -0.07       (0.20)         Average Salary x100 <td>Means of Production</td> <td>0.68***</td> <td>0.75***</td>	Means of Production	0.68***	0.75***
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.13)	(0.13)
Regional Power       0.33***       0.26***         (0.05)       (0.05)         Fed Corruption       0.07*       0.05         (0.04)       (0.04)       (0.04)         Age x10       -0.02       0.05         (0.30)       (0.30)       (0.30)         Income       -0.03       -0.01         (0.05)       (0.05)       (0.05)         Unpopularity       0.31***       0.29***         (0.05)       (0.05)       (0.05)         Urban       0.24**       0.30***         (0.10)       (0.10)       (0.10)         Native       0.79***       0.61***         (0.11)       (0.12)         Male       0.13       0.11         (0.10)       (0.10)       (0.10)         Education       -0.13***       -0.10**         (0.04)       (0.04)       (0.04)         Dissatisfied       -0.11*       -0.03         (0.06)       (0.06)       (0.06)         Violence x100       -0.07       (0.20)         Average Salary x100       -0.03       (0.04)       (0.04)         1—2       3.07***       1.10         (0.44)       (1.97) <t< td=""><td>Business</td><td><math>0.22^{***}</math></td><td><math>0.20^{***}</math></td></t<>	Business	$0.22^{***}$	$0.20^{***}$
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Fed Corruption       0.07*       0.05         (0.04)       (0.04)       (0.04)         Age x10       -0.02       0.05         (0.30)       (0.30)       (0.30)         Income       -0.03       -0.01         (0.05)       (0.05)       (0.05)         Unpopularity       0.31***       0.29***         (0.05)       (0.05)       (0.05)         Urban       0.24**       0.30***         (0.10)       (0.10)       (0.10)         Native       0.79***       0.61***         (0.11)       (0.12)       (0.10)         Male       0.13       0.11         (0.10)       (0.10)       (0.10)         Education       -0.13****       -0.10**         (0.04)       (0.04)       (0.04)         Dissatisfied       -0.11*       -0.03         (0.06)       (0.06)       (0.06)         Violence x100       -0.07       (0.20)         Average Salary x100       -0.03       (0.02)         Unemployment       (0.44)       (1.97)         2-3       4.72***       2.81         (0.45)       (1.97)         3-4       (0.45)       (1.9	Regional Power		$0.26^{***}$
Age x10			
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$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Male		
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Education		` ,
Dissatisfied       -0.11* (0.06)       -0.03 (0.06)         Violence x100       -0.07 (0.20)         Average Salary x100       -0.03 (0.02)         Unemployment       0.04 (0.03)         1-2       3.07*** 1.10 (0.44) (1.97)         2-3       4.72*** 2.81 (0.45) (1.97)         3-4       6.14*** 4.26** (0.47) (1.98)         AIC       3531.55 (3474.80)         BIC       3619.21 (3578.89)         Log Likelihood       -1749.78 (-1718.40)	Education		
Violence x100 $(0.06)$ $(0.06)$ Average Salary x100 $-0.03$ $(0.02)$ Unemployment $(0.02)$ $1-2$ $3.07^{***}$ $1.10$ $(0.44)$ $2-3$ $4.72^{***}$ $2.81$ $(0.45)$ $3-4$ $6.14^{***}$ $4.26^{**}$ $(0.47)$ AIC $3531.55$ $3474.80$ $10.97$ AIC $3531.55$ $3474.80$ $3619.21$ BIC $3619.21$ $3578.89$ $1718.40$	Diggotiafied		` ,
Violence x100 $-0.07$ $(0.20)$ Average Salary x100 $-0.03$ $(0.02)$ Unemployment $0.04$ $(0.03)$ $1-2$ $3.07^{***}$ $(0.44)$ $(0.44)$ $(1.97)$ $2-3$ $4.72^{***}$ $2.81$ $(0.45)$ $(1.97)$ $3-4$ $6.14^{***}$ $6.14^{***}$ $4.26^{**}$ $(0.47)$ AIC $3531.55$ $(0.47)$ $3474.80$ $(0.47)$ BIC $3619.21$ $(0.47)$ $3578.89$ $(0.47)$ Log Likelihood $-1749.78$ $(0.47)$ $-1718.40$	Dissaustied	=	
$\begin{array}{c} \text{Average Salary x100} & (0.20) \\ \text{Average Salary x100} & -0.03 \\ (0.02) \\ \text{Unemployment} & 0.04 \\ & (0.03) \\ 1-2 & 3.07^{***} & 1.10 \\ (0.44) & (1.97) \\ 2-3 & 4.72^{***} & 2.81 \\ (0.45) & (1.97) \\ 3-4 & 6.14^{***} & 4.26^{**} \\ (0.47) & (1.98) \\ \\ \text{AIC} & 3531.55 & 3474.80 \\ \text{BIC} & 3619.21 & 3578.89 \\ \text{Log Likelihood} & -1749.78 & -1718.40 \\ \end{array}$		(0.00)	
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Violence x100		
$\begin{array}{c} \text{Unemployment} & (0.02) \\ \text{Unemployment} & 0.04 \\ & (0.03) \\ 1-2 & 3.07^{***} & 1.10 \\ & (0.44) & (1.97) \\ 2-3 & 4.72^{***} & 2.81 \\ & (0.45) & (1.97) \\ 3-4 & 6.14^{***} & 4.26^{**} \\ & (0.47) & (1.98) \\ \hline \text{AIC} & 3531.55 & 3474.80 \\ \text{BIC} & 3619.21 & 3578.89 \\ \text{Log Likelihood} & -1749.78 & -1718.40 \\ \end{array}$			` ,
$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Average Salary x100		
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$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	2—3		
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AIC 3531.55 3474.80 BIC 3619.21 3578.89 Log Likelihood -1749.78 -1718.40	3—4		
BIC 3619.21 3578.89 Log Likelihood -1749.78 -1718.40		(0.47)	(1.98)
$Log\ Likelihood \qquad -1749.78  -1718.40$		3531.55	3474.80
0			
Num. obs. 1769 1769	_		
	Num. obs.	1769	1769

\*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05

Appendix Table 1: Comparison of Two Ordinal Logistic Regression Models

Private	0.25**		
Means of Production	$(0.10)$ $0.41^*$		
Business	$(0.22)$ $0.22^{**}$		
Regional Power	$(0.10) \\ 0.17**$		
Fed Corruption	$(0.08) \\ 0.02$		
Age x10	$(0.07) \\ 0.03$		
Income	(0.58) $-0.24**$		
Unpopularity	$(0.11) \\ 0.17^*$		
·	(0.09) $-0.26$		
Urban	-0.26 $(0.19)$		
Native	1.07*** (0.20)		
Male	0.24		
Education	$(0.18) \\ -0.13^*$		
Dissatisfied	(0.07) $0.02$		
1—2	$\frac{(0.11)}{2.30^{***}}$		
	(0.78)		
2—3	3.91*** (0.79)		
3—4	5.53*** (0.82)		
AIC	1043.84		
BIC	1112.86		
Log Likelihood	-505.92		
Num. obs.	552		
% obs. missing	69		
*** n < 0.001. ** n < 0.01. * n < 0.05			

\*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05Appendix Table 2: Ordinal Logistic Regression Model with Missing Data




Appendix Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of supporting for Sharia.

We also calculated the predicted probabilities of support for Sharia (Appendix Figure 2). The dots indicate the predicted probability of supporting Sharia (with standard errors) for respondents who expressed low values (triangle) and high values (circle) of the independent variables. The Y-axis indicates the probability of the respondent supporting "Sharia" or "rather Sharia". Since the combined support for Sharia among respondents comprises only about 15% of the sample, the percentages are relatively small substantively, but they are still meaningful in statistical sense, because the shifts are quite pronounced.

All else equal, respondents who expressed a high level of support for private ownership of enterprises have a 8% higher chance of supporting Sharia (i.e. falling into the level 3 and 4 of our 4-level ordered dependent variable), compared to respondents who expressed a low level of support private ownership of enterprises. Support for private ownership of the means of production is associated with 65% increase in the probability of the respondent landing in the category "rather Sharia" or "Sharia." Respondents who strive to own or already own private enterprise are about 12% more likely to support Sharia. Those respondents who seek greater regional autonomy are about 60% more likely to support Sharia. Respondents who place responsibility for corruption on the federal government are about 7% more likely to support Sharia.

In order to illustrate the substantive impact of our independent variables, we also calculate their predicted effects on the level of support for Sharia. Based on Model 1 (without fixed effects), we estimated the marginal effects of our independent variables. While holding all other variables in the model constant, we estimate the predicted change in support for Sharia when the key independent variables were varied from low to high values in the empirical distribution. The dependent variable is measured on a four-level ordinal scale and the vast majority of respondents, about 85% are in favor of secular law, so we zoom in to the area between 1.0 and 2.5 for improved visibility (Figure 3). The Y-axis shows the average value of the dependent variable when the corresponding independent variable of interest is near the bottom of its empirical range (circle) and then near the top of its empirical range (triangle). In this figure, the symbol (circle and triangle) is the mean value of support for Sharia—circles indicate high values of the independent variables and triangles indicate the low values. The bars above and below the symbol indicate the standard error around the estimated value. All of our explanatory variables are either ordinal or binary, so we used the variable's 25<sup>th</sup> percentile as its "low" value and 75<sup>th</sup> percentile as its "high" value for fourlevel ordinal variables. For binary indicators, we use 0 as its "low" values and 1 as its "high" values. The visual gap between the two means can be interpreted as the difference in support for Sharia between respondents who scored low and those who scored high on that explanatory variable. Since the overall percentage of those who are willing to express their open support for sharia rule is relatively low in our sample (about 15%) - which is not surprising, given the risks - these relatively small differences in the predicted probabilities represent substantively meaningful marginal effects.

For example, when support for private ownership of "the means of production" is at 0, predicted support for Sharia is centered around 1.5. When support for private ownership of "the means of production" is at 1, predicted support for Sharia is centered around 1.8, which represents an increase of support for Sharia of about 20%. When respondents express more support for owning a private business, their support for Sharia increases also by about 20%, from 1.4 to 1.7. When respondents want greater regional autonomy, their support for Sharia increases from 1.4 to above 1.6, which represents approximately 15% increase. When support for private ownership of enterprises is low (the 25% percentile), predicted support for Sharia is centered around 1.4. When support for private ownership of enterprises is high (the 75% percentile), support for Sharia is centered around 1.65, which represents a 15% increase in support for Sharia. "Federal Corruption", which measures a respondent's perception about who is responsible for the eradication of corruption – regional (Muslim) or federal (non-Muslim) authorities - also shows that the more federal authorities are blamed, the stronger the support for Sharia by about 10% from 1.5 to just above 1.65.



Appendix Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Significant Predictors. 95% Confidence Interval.