

Claudia Herresthal

CONTACT INFORMATION	Queens' College, University of Cambridge Silver Street, Cambridge, CB3 9ET, UK	Email: cl.herresthal@gmail.com Webpage: www.cherresthal.com
EMPLOYMENT	UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE Junior Research Fellow in Economics	2016 - 2019
EDUCATION	UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD DPhil in Economics supervised by Dr Margaret Meyer	2012 - 2017
	UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD MPhil in Economics	2010 - 2012
	UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL BSc Economics and Mathematics	2007 - 2010
RESEARCH FIELDS	Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Public Economics, Economics of Education	
WORKING PAPERS	<i>"Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence"</i> - Job Market Paper <i>"Performance-Based Rankings and School Quality"</i> - R&R Economic Journal	
ACADEMIC AWARDS	Royal Economics Society Junior Fellowship, Royal Economic Society	2015 - 2016
	Chellgren Scholarship, University College, University of Oxford	2012 - 2015
	Departmental Funded Studentship, University of Oxford	2012 - 2015
	Additional Paper Prize, Warsaw International Economics Meeting	2014
TEACHING AND SUPERVISING EXPERIENCE	BA ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE BA thesis "The Impact of the 2012 Tuition Fee Reform on UK Students" Microeconomic Principles and Problems (3rd year)	2016 - 2019
	BA POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Introductory Microeconomics (1st year) Elementary Mathematical Methods (1st year) Intermediate Microeconomics (2nd year)	2012 - 2016
INVITED TALKS	Toulouse School of Economics, University of Arizona	2018
	Bocconi Workshop on Experimentation; Birkbeck University of London	2017
	University of Cologne	2016
	University of Edinburgh; University of Bonn	2015
	University of Cambridge	2014

FURTHER TALKS AND CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS	EEA Annual Congress; International Game Theory Conference, Stony Brook; Economic Design Conference, York	2017
	Royal Economic Society Annual Conference	2016
	Econometric Society Winter Meeting; Econometric Society World Congress; GESS Mannheim Summer School	2015
	CE2 workshop Microeconomics; Public Economics UK Conference; Warsaw International Economics Meeting; CIREQ Matching Conference; York Symposium on Game Theory	2014
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE	Refereeing: Economic Journal, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of the European Economic Association	
	Scientific Committee: RES Symposium for Junior Researchers	2017
	Organizer: Economics Department DPhil and Postdoc Workshop	2014 - 2015
VISITS AND SHORT-TERM EMPLOYMENT	Bonn Graduate School of Economics Visitor	April 2015
	Research Assistant; Centre for Market and Public Organisation, Bristol 8 weeks; empirical work using Stata; Pisa data	2012
	Undergraduate Admissions Interviewer, Oxford and Cambridge	2012 - 2017
LANGUAGES	English (fluent), German (native), French (basic), Portugese (basic)	
REFERENCES	Dr Margaret Meyer Nuffield College University of Oxford margaret.meyer@nuffield.ox.ac.uk	Prof Marco Ottaviani Department of Economics Bocconi University marco.ottaviani@unibocconi.it
	Dr Matthew Elliot Faculty of Economics University of Cambridge mle30@cam.ac.uk	Prof Sujoy Mukerji School of Economics and Finance Queen Mary, University of London s.mukerji@qmul.ac.uk
WORKING PAPER ABSTRACTS	<i>Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence (Job Market Paper)</i> I consider a game with two players, a decision maker and an advisor, who are uncertain about the state of the world. The advisor can sequentially run informative tests and disclose (some or all) of the outcomes to the decision maker. The decision maker then faces a binary choice. Players agree on the optimal choice under certainty, but their	

preferences are misaligned under uncertainty in that players differ in how they trade off losses from wrong choices. I characterize equilibria of this game. In particular, I compare the case where testing is hidden and the advisor can choose which test outcomes to verifiably disclose to the case where testing is observable. I show that the decision maker is weakly better off when testing is hidden rather than observable if players' preferences are sufficiently misaligned. Otherwise, hidden testing can leave the decision maker strictly worse off. I identify conditions on preference parameters under which both players can be strictly better off when testing is hidden rather than observable.

Performance-Based Rankings and School Quality (R&R Economic Journal)

I study students' inferences about school quality from performance-based rankings in a dynamic setting. Schools differ in location and unobserved quality, students differ in location and ability. Short-lived students observe a school ranking as a signal about schools' relative quality, but this signal also depends on the ability of schools' past intakes. Students apply to schools, trading off expected quality against proximity. Oversubscribed schools select applicants based on an admission rule. In steady-state equilibrium, I find that rankings are more informative if more able applicants are given priority in admissions or if students care less about distance to school.