

Claudia Herresthal

CONTACT INFORMATION	Queens' College, University of Cambridge Silver Street, Cambridge, CB3 9ET, UK	Email: cl.herresthal@gmail.com Webpage: www.cherresthal.com
EMPLOYMENT	2016 - 2019	Junior Research Fellow in Economics, University of Cambridge
EDUCATION	2012 - 2017	DPhil Economics, University of Oxford Supervisor: Dr Margaret Meyer
	2010 - 2012	MPhil Economics, University of Oxford
	2007 - 2010	BSc Economics and Mathematics, University of Bristol
RESEARCH FIELDS	Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Public Economics, Economics of Education	
WORKING PAPERS	Performance-Based Rankings and School Quality <i>R&R at The Economic Journal</i> <p>I study students' inferences about school quality from performance-based rankings in a dynamic setting. Schools differ in location and unobserved quality, students differ in location and ability. Short-lived students observe a school ranking as a signal about schools' relative quality, but this signal also depends on the ability of schools' past intakes. Students apply to schools, trading off expected quality against proximity. Oversubscribed schools select applicants based on an admission rule. In steady-state equilibrium, I find that rankings are more informative if more able applicants are given priority in admissions or if students care less about distance to school.</p> Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence <p>I consider a game with two players, a decision maker and an advisor, who are uncertain about the state of the world. The advisor can sequentially run informative tests and disclose (some or all) of the outcomes to the decision maker. The decision maker then faces a binary choice. Players agree on the optimal choice under certainty, but their preferences are misaligned under uncertainty in that players differ in how they trade off losses from wrong choices. I characterize equilibria of this game. In particular, I compare the case where testing is hidden and the advisor can choose which test outcomes to verifiably disclose to the case where testing is observable. I show that the decision maker is weakly better off when testing is hidden rather than observable if players' preferences are sufficiently misaligned. Otherwise, hidden testing can leave the decision maker strictly worse off. I identify conditions on preference parameters under which both players can be strictly better off when testing is hidden rather than observable.</p>	
ACADEMIC AWARDS	Royal Economics Society Junior Fellowship, Royal Economic Society (2015-2016) Chellgren Scholarship, University College, University of Oxford (2012-2015) Departmental Funded Studentship, University of Oxford (2012-2015) Additional Paper Prize, Warsaw International Economics Meeting (2014)	

TEACHING AND SUPERVISING EXPERIENCE	<p>BA Economics, University of Cambridge (2016-present): BA thesis “The Impact of the 2012 Tuition Fee Reform on UK Students”, 1st Class (3rd year); Microeconomic Principles and Problems (3rd year)</p> <p>BA Politics, Philosophy, Economics (PPE), University of Oxford (2012-2016): Introductory Microeconomics (1st year); Elementary Mathematical Methods (1st year); Intermediate Microeconomics (2nd year)</p>	
TALKS AND CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS	<p>2018: Toulouse School of Economics, University of Arizona</p> <p>2017: Bocconi Workshop on Experimentation; Economic Design Conference; International Game Theory Conference, Stony Brook; EEA Annual Congress; Seminar Series, Birkbeck University of London</p> <p>2016: Theory Workshop, University of Cologne; RES Annual Conference</p> <p>2015: Econometric Society WM; Economic Theory Workshop, University of Edinburgh; Econometric Society World Congress; GESS Mannheim Summer School; BGSE Theory Workshop, University of Bonn</p> <p>2014: INET Theory Workshop, Cambridge; CE2 workshop on Microeconomics, Warsaw; Public Economics UK Conference; York Symposium on Game Theory; CIREQ Montreal Matching Conference</p>	
PROFESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT	<p>Referee: Economic Journal, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior</p> <p>Scientific Committee: Royal Economic Society Symposium for Junior Researchers (2017)</p> <p>Economics Department DPhil and Postdoc Workshop; joint with postdoc (2014-2015)</p>	
VISITS AND SHORT-TERM EMPLOYMENT	<p>Research Assistant; Centre for Market and Public Organisation, Bristol (2012); 8 weeks; empirical work using Stata; Pisa data and Mexican Family Life Survey</p> <p>Undergraduate Admissions Assistant; Oxford (2012-2015) and Cambridge (2017)</p> <p>Visit to Bonn Graduate School of Economics (April 2015)</p>	
REFERENCES	<p>Dr Margaret Meyer Nuffield College University of Oxford margaret.meyer@nuffield.ox.ac.uk</p>	<p>Prof Marco Ottaviani Department of Economics Bocconi University marco.ottaviani@unibocconi.it</p> <p>Dr Matthew Elliot Faculty of Economics University of Cambridge mle30@cam.ac.uk</p> <p>Prof Sujoy Mukerji School of Economics and Finance Queen Mary, University of London s.mukerji@qmul.ac.uk</p>