Claudia Herresthal

Contact

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Academic Experience

Postdoctoral Researcher, University of Bonn 2019 - present

Research Affiliate, Centre for Economic Policy Research 2022 - present

Junior Research Fellow, University of Cambridge 2016 - 2019

Education

DPhil Economics, University of Oxford 2012 - 2017
supervised by Dr. Margaret Meyer

MPhil Economics, University of Oxford 2010 - 2012

BSc Economics and Mathematics, University of Bristol 2007 - 2010

Research Fields

Microeconomic Theory: Game Theory, Information Economics, Organizational Economics

Publications

Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence
Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 200, 105402, March 2022

Performance-Based Rankings and School Quality
The Economic Journal, Volume 130, Issue 630, August 2020

Working Papers

Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm?
joint with Tatiana Mayskaya and Arina Nikandrova

Work in Progress

Optimal Transparency in Task Design *joint with Helene Mass*

Awards

Royal Economics Society Junior Fellowship, Royal Economic Society 2015 - 2016

Chellgren Scholarship, University College, University of Oxford 2012 - 2015

Departmental Funded Studentship, University of Oxford 2012 - 2015

Teaching

BSc and MSc Economics, University of Bonn
Research module in Microeconomic Theory (MSc)
Seminars on Strategic Communication, Disclosure, Consumer Privacy (BSc)

BA Economics, University of Cambridge
Supervisions for Microeconomic Principles and Problems (3rd year)

BA Politics Philosophy Economics, University of Oxford
Tutorials for Introductory Microeconomics (1st year), Elementary Mathematical Methods (1st year), Intermediate Microeconomics (2nd year)

Invited Talks	University of Marburg; UT Austin; Queen's University Belfast; ITAM	2021
	BI Norwegian Business School; University of Munster	2019
	Toulouse School of Economics; University of Arizona	2018
	Bocconi Workshop on Experimentation; Birkbeck University of London	2017
	University of Cologne	2016
	University of Edinburgh; University of Bonn	2015
	University of Cambridge	2014
Conference Presentations	SAET, online	2021
	Southern Economic Association Meeting, Miami	2019
	Econometric Society Winter Meeting, Naples	2018
	EEA Annual Congress; International Game Theory Conference, Stony Brook; Economic Design Conference, York	2017
	Royal Economic Society Annual Conference	2016
	Econometric Society Winter Meeting; Econometric Society World Congress; GESS Mannheim Summer School	2015
	CE2 workshop Microeconomics; Public Economics UK Conference; Warsaw International Economics Meeting; CIREQ Matching Conference; York Symposium on Game Theory	2014
Professional Service	Refereeing: Econometrica, Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, Economic Journal, Journal of the European Economic Association, Economic Theory, European Economic Review, International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization	
	Scientific Committee: RES Symposium for Junior Researchers	2017
	Organizer: Economics Department DPhil and Postdoc Workshop	2014-2015
Languages	German (native), English (fluent) and Portuguese (basic)	

References

Dr. Margaret Meyer
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University of Oxford
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Prof. Dezsö Szalay
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Dr. Matthew Elliott
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Publication Abstracts

Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence

Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 200, 105402, March 2022

A decision maker faces a choice to withdraw or to retain a product but is uncertain about its safety. An agent can gather information through sequential testing. Players agree on the optimal choice under certainty, but the decision maker has a higher safety standard than the agent. We compare the case where testing is hidden and the agent can choose whether to disclose his findings to the case where testing is observable. The agent can exploit the additional discretion under hidden testing to his advantage if and only if the decision maker is sufficiently inclined to retain the product. Hidden testing then yields a Pareto improvement over observable testing if the conflict between players is larger than some threshold, but leaves the decision maker worse off and the agent better off if the conflict is smaller than this threshold.

Performance-Based Rankings and School Quality

The Economic Journal, Volume 130, Issue 630, August 2020

I study students' inferences about school quality from performance-based rankings in a dynamic setting. Schools differ in location and unobserved quality, students differ in location and ability. Short-lived students observe a school ranking as a signal about schools' relative quality, but this signal also depends on the ability of schools' past intakes. Students apply to schools, trading off expected quality against proximity. Oversubscribed schools select applicants based on an admission rule. In steady-state equilibrium, I find that rankings are more informative if more able applicants are given priority in admissions or if students care less about distance to school.

Working Paper Abstracts

Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm?

joint with Tatiana Mayskaya and Arina Nikandrova

A merger of two companies active in seemingly unrelated markets creates data linkage: by operating in a product market, the merged company acquires an informational advantage in an insurance market where companies compete in menus of contracts. In the insurance market, the informed insurer earns rent through cream-skimming. Some of this rent is passed on to consumers in the product market. Overall, the data linkage makes consumers better off when the insurance market is competitive and, under some conditions, even when the insurance market is monopolistic. The role of competitiveness of the product market and the data-sharing requirement are discussed.