

Claudia Herresthal

CONTACT INFORMATION	Institute for Microeconomics University of Bonn	Email: cl.herresthal@gmail.com Webpage: www.cherresthal.com
EMPLOYMENT	UNIVERSITY OF BONN Postdoctoral Researcher	2019 -
	UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE Junior Research Fellow in Economics	2016 - 2019
EDUCATION	UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD DPhil in Economics supervised by Dr. Margaret Meyer	2012 - 2017
	UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD MPhil in Economics	2010 - 2012
	UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL BSc Economics and Mathematics	2007 - 2010
RESEARCH FIELDS	Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Public Economics	
WORKING PAPERS	<i>“Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence”</i> <i>”Performance-Based Rankings and School Quality”</i> - R&R Economic Journal	
ACADEMIC AWARDS	Royal Economics Society Junior Fellowship, Royal Economic Society	2015 - 2016
	Chellgren Scholarship, University College, University of Oxford	2012 - 2015
	Departmental Funded Studentship, University of Oxford	2012 - 2015
	Additional Paper Prize, Warsaw International Economics Meeting	2014
SUPERVISION	BSc ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF BONN Seminar on Strategic Communication	2019-2020
	BA ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE BA thesis “The Impact of the 2012 Tuition Fee Reform on UK Students” Microeconomic Principles and Problems (3rd year)	2016-2019
	BA POLITICS PHILOSOPHY ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD Introductory Microeconomics (1st year) Elementary Mathematical Methods (1st year) Intermediate Microeconomics (2nd year)	2012-2016

INVITED TALKS	BI Norwegian Business School, Oslo; University of Munster	2019
	Toulouse School of Economics; University of Arizona	2018
	Bocconi Workshop on Experimentation; Birkbeck University of London	2017
	University of Cologne	2016
	University of Edinburgh; University of Bonn	2015
	University of Cambridge	2014
FURTHER TALKS AND CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS	Southern Economic Association Meeting, Miami	2019
	Econometric Society Winter Meeting, Naples	2018
	EEA Annual Congress; International Game Theory Conference, Stony Brook; Economic Design Conference, York	2017
	Royal Economic Society Annual Conference	2016
	Econometric Society Winter Meeting; Econometric Society World Congress; GESS Mannheim Summer School	2015
	CE2 workshop Microeconomics; Public Economics UK Conference; Warsaw International Economics Meeting; CIREQ Matching Conference; York Symposium on Game Theory	2014
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE	Refereeing: Economic Journal, Journal of Economic Theory, Econometrica, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of the European Economic Association	
	Scientific Committee: RES Symposium for Junior Researchers	2017
	Organizer: Economics Department DPhil and Postdoc Workshop	2014-2015
REFERENCES	Dr. Margaret Meyer Nuffield College University of Oxford margaret.meyer@nuffield.ox.ac.uk +44 (0) 1865 278570	Prof. Marco Ottaviani Department of Economics Bocconi University marco.ottaviani@unibocconi.it +39 02 5836 3385
	Dr. Matthew Elliot Faculty of Economics University of Cambridge mle30@cam.ac.uk +44 (0) 7771 773022	Prof. Sujoy Mukerji School of Economics and Finance Queen Mary, University of London s.mukerji@qmul.ac.uk +44 20 7882 3348

Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence

An agent can sequentially run informative tests about an unknown state and disclose (some or all) outcomes to a decision maker who then faces an approval choice. Players agree on the optimal choice under certainty, but the decision maker has a higher approval threshold than the agent. I compare the case where testing is hidden and the agent chooses which test outcomes to verifiably disclose to the case where testing is observable. When testing is observable, I show that the agent may strategically stop testing even if further tests could yield a mutual benefit. I find conditions under which the decision maker is strictly better off under hidden testing and in some equilibria both players are strictly better off under hidden testing than in the unique equilibrium under observable testing.

Performance-Based Rankings and School Quality (R&R Economic Journal)

I study students' inferences about school quality from performance-based rankings in a dynamic setting. Schools differ in location and unobserved quality, students differ in location and ability. Short-lived students observe a school ranking as a signal about schools' relative quality, but this signal also depends on the ability of schools' past intakes. Students apply to schools, trading off expected quality against proximity. Oversubscribed schools select applicants based on an admission rule. In steady-state equilibrium, I find that rankings are more informative if more able applicants are given priority in admissions or if students care less about distance to school.