Claudia Herresthal

CONTACT Information	Institute for Microeconomics University of Bonn	Email: cl.herresthal@gmail.com Webpage: www.cherresthal.com	
Employment	University of Bonn Postdoctoral Researcher	2019 -	
	University of Cambridge Junior Research Fellow in Economics	2016 - 2019	
Education	University of Oxford DPhil in Economics supervised by Dr. Margaret Meye	2012 - 2017 er	
	University of Oxford MPhil in Economics	2010 - 2012	
	University of Bristol BSc Economics and Mathematics	2007 - 2010	
RESEARCH FIELDS	Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Public Economics		
Working Papers	"Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence" "Performance-Based Rankings and School Quality" - R&R Economic Journal		
ACADEMIC	Royal Economics Society Junior Fellowship, Royal Eco	onomic Society 2015 - 2016	
Awards	Chellgren Scholarship, University College, University	of Oxford 2012 - 2015	
	Departmental Funded Studentship, University of Oxfo	ord 2012 - 2015	
	Additional Paper Prize, Warsaw International Econom	nics Meeting 2014	
Supervision	BA ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE BA thesis "The Impact of the 2012 Tuition Fee Reform Microeconomic Principles and Problems (3rd year)	2016-2019 m on UK Students"	
	BA POLITICS PHILOSOPHY ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY Introductory Microeconomics (1st year) Elementary Mathematical Methods (1st year) Intermediate Microeconomics (2nd year)	7 OF OXFORD 2012-2016	
Invited Talks	Toulouse School of Economics; University of Arizona	2018	
	Bocconi Workshop on Experimentation; Birkbeck Univ	versity of London 2017	
	University of Cologne	2016	

			2015
University of Edinburgh; Univ		ty of Bonn	
	University of Cambridge		2014
FURTHER TALKS AND CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS	Econometric Society Winter Meeting, Naples		2018
	EEA Annual Congress; International Game Theory Conference, Stony Brook; Economic Design Conference, York		2017
	Royal Economic Society Annual Conference		2016
	Econometric Society Winter Meeting; Econometric Society World Congress; GESS Mannheim Summer School		2015
	CE2 workshop Microeconomics; Public Economics UK Conference; Warsaw International Economics Meeting; CIREQ Matching Conference; York Symposium on Game Theory		2014
Professional Service	Refereeing: Economic Journal, Journal of Economic Theory, Econometrica, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of the European Economic Association		
	Scientific Committee: RES Symposium for Junior Researchers		2017
	Organizer: Economics Department DPhil and Postdoc Workshop		2014-2015
VISITS AND SHORT-TERM EMPLOYMENT	Bonn Graduate School of Economics Visitor		April 2015
	Research Assistant; Centre for Market and Public Organisation, Bristol 8 weeks; empirical work using Stata; Pisa data		2012
	Undergraduate Admissions Interviewer, Oxford and Cambridge		2012-2017
References	Dr. Margaret Meyer Nuffield College University of Oxford margaret.meyer@nuffield.ox.ac.uk +44 (0) 1865 278570	Prof. Marco Ottaviani Department of Economics Bocconi University marco.ottaviani@unibocconi.it +39 02 5836 3385	
	Dr. Matthew Elliot Faculty of Economics University of Cambridge mle30@cam.ac.uk +44 (0) 7771 773022	Prof. Sujoy Mukerji School of Economics and Finance Queen Mary, University of London s.mukerji@qmul.ac.uk +44 20 7882 3348	

WORKING PAPER
ABSTRACTS

Hidden Testing and Selective Disclosure of Evidence

I consider a game with two players, a decision maker and an advisor, who are uncertain about the state of the world. The advisor can sequentially run informative tests and disclose (some or all) of the outcomes to the decision maker. The decision maker then faces a binary choice. Players agree on the optimal choice under certainty, but their preferences are misaligned under uncertainty in that players differ in how they trade off losses from wrong choices. I characterize equilibria of this game. In particular, I compare the case where testing is hidden and the advisor can choose which test outcomes to verifiably disclose to the case where testing is observable. I show that the decision maker is weakly better off when testing is hidden rather than observable if players' preferences are sufficiently misaligned. Otherwise, hidden testing can leave the decision maker strictly worse off. I identify conditions on preference parameters under which both players can be strictly better off when testing is hidden rather than observable.

Performance-Based Rankings and School Quality (R&R Economic Journal)

I study students' inferences about school quality from performance-based rankings in a dynamic setting. Schools differ in location and unobserved quality, students differ in location and ability. Short-lived students observe a school ranking as a signal about schools' relative quality, but this signal also depends on the ability of schools' past intakes. Students apply to schools, trading off expected quality against proximity. Oversubscribed schools select applicants based on an admission rule. In steady-state equilibrium, I find that rankings are more informative if more able applicants are given priority in admissions or if students care less about distance to school.