

"NON DUCOR, DUCO"

Manipal Model United Nations India-MMUN

January 17 - 20, 2020

MMXX

**Background Guide
to the
Disarmament and
International
Security
Committee**

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Manipal Model United Nations

A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Shivank Chandra
Secretary-General

Tanya Nijhawan
Director-General

Director

Assistant Director

Sincerely,

Shivank Chandra
Secretary-General
Manipal Model United Nations India 2020

Manipal Model United Nations

A LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR GENERAL

Dear Delegates,

Shivank Chandra
Secretary-General

Tanya Nijhawan
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Sincerely,
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A LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR

Dear Delegates,

Shivank Chandra
Secretary-General

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Director

Assistant Director

Director's name
Director, Disarmament and International Security Committee
Manipal Model United Nations India 2020

History of the Committee

When the United Nations Charter was ratified on 24 October 1945, it established the UN General Assembly as forum for “cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security.”¹ The General Assembly is composed of all 193 UN member states, all of which share equal voting rights, and a handful of non-voting observer states, including the Holy See and

Palestine. Unlike the UN Security Council, which passes binding, directly actionable resolutions, the General Assembly passes unbinding resolutions recommending or advising action and is considered the “deliberative, policymaking, and representative organ of the United Nations.”² Under the Charter, the General Assembly’s duties include reviewing and assisting UN Security Council actions, appointing the UN Secretary-General and non-permanent members of the Security Council, approving the UN budget, and acting as the principal forum for international political cooperation.³ The General Assembly convenes at the UN Headquarters in New York for “regular” sessions every September, and “emergency” sessions ordered by the Secretary-General or voted on by the Security Council.⁴

The Disarmament and International Security Committee is the first committee of the General Assembly, and manages “disarmament and international security matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any other organ of the United Nations, the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security... [and the] principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments.”⁵ DISEC focuses on issues related to global security, in its many shapes and forms, and drafts procedural guidelines for disarmament. DISEC also works alongside the other five organs of the General Assembly, particularly the Special, Political and Decolonization Committee, to provide a global perspective on more localized threats to international peace and security. DISEC often functions alongside the UN Disarmament Commission, established in 1978

as a subsidiary body of the General Assembly. The UNDC publishes annual advisory reports related

on disarmament and weapons proliferation.⁶ The Geneva-based Conference of Disarmament (CD), founded in 1979, plays a complementary role to DISEC, acting as a multilateral disarmament negotiating forum for the international community. The CD was directly responsible for principal nuclear non-proliferation treaties of the later twentieth century, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Along with the CD, DISEC has played a critical role in facilitating major twentieth and twenty-first century international security treaties and overseeing the implementation of disarmament protocols, in its advisory role to the Security Council.⁷

1. Counterterrorism mechanisms for the states of Pakistan and Afghanistan

Introduction to the Agenda

Failing states and terrorism represent one of the largest threats to international peace and security. The Fund for Peace and *Foreign Policy Magazine*’s “Fragile States Index,” which ranks and categorizes states based on their degrees of legitimacy, categorizes failing states as “high alert” states: states that have altogether failed are considered “very high alert.”⁸ Failing states are flashpoints of instability, underdevelopment, human rights violation, and poor governance. States are deemed to be in the process of “failing” when a state’s central government begins to lose its “monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory,” which German sociologist Max Weber described as the defining characteristic of a modern nation state in his 1918 lecture, “Politics on Vocation.”⁹

Failed and failing states tend to fall under two categories. First, the term “failed” or “failing” state can denote a geographic space with boundaries that is recognized as a nation, with a government in shambles. This term may also suggest highly coercive apparatus that is either ill equipped to handle the needs of a population or one that systematically fails



Figure 1: The Pakistan-Afghanistan Border, with the proposed Durand Line and Federally Administered Tribal Areas and disputed Balochistan territories. (Source: Al Jazeera)

to provide basic public services.¹⁰ Due to a failure of adequate governance, failed and failing states often serve as incubators or international terrorist groups. Lack of a stable and legitimate central government authority allows them to become trans-shipment points for illicit drugs, weapons and human trafficking.¹¹ Afghanistan and Pakistan, both designated “high alert,” fragile states by the Fund for Peace and *Foreign Policy Magazine*, are quintessential failing states that rose to the forefront of international foreign policy following the 11 September 2001 terror attacks in the United States.¹² In the wake of 11 September, issues revolving failed and failing states became intrinsically entwined with international security, transcending their heretofore largely humanitarian dimension. Former U.S. President George W. Bush, in the United States’ 2002 National Security Strategy, famously articulated that the United States and international community at large was “threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones.”¹³ Although most international policy makers would argue failed and failing states have always posed a tremendous and immediate challenge to international peace and security, the terrorist groups harboured in part by the Afghan and Pakistani governments reoriented international efforts, both aid and security based, towards preventing state failure. Between the 11 September attacks and December 2014, NATO operated in Afghanistan, under multiple mandates as an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to prevent the country from serving as a safe-haven for al-Qaeda, the terror group behind the attacks.¹⁴

Promptly following its initial mandate in 2001, NATO forces led by the United States toppled a pro-Pakistan and pro-Taliban regime in Kabul, replacing it with an anti-Taliban, anti-Pakistan government headed by President Hamid Karzai.¹⁵ This exacerbated existing tensions between Afghanistan and neighbouring Pakistan, as conflict spilled across the states’ shared, porous boundary, called the “Durand Line.” The Taliban, an Islamic fundamentalist group that had ruled Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001, regrouped in Pakistan, where its central leadership began mounting an insurgency against the Western-backed government in Kabul.¹⁶ Cross-border

conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the legitimacy of the Afghan state, competing interests amongst ethnic groups, and dispersed, often local and tribal-based government characterize state failure in Afghanistan.

Pakistan, wedged between Afghanistan and India, also wrestles with questions of state legitimacy and trans-border conflict. The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s foremost intelligence agency, is known to support and coordinate Islamist militant group activity, particularly against India. Perhaps the most notorious of these groups is Lashkar-e-Taiba, which orchestrated the 2008 Mumbai hotel bombings.¹⁷ A recognized nuclear state, Pakistan has provided nuclear technology to rogue Iran and North Korea.¹⁸ Since its founding in 1947 as an Islamic Republic, Pakistan has been forced to negotiate its own international identity, geographic


space, and the threats posed by often belligerent neighbours, India and Afghanistan. Questions of how to define “Pakistan,” as a distinct entity from India, continue to directly affect Pakistani security and undermine the legitimacy of its government. This perhaps inherent and founding instability threatens international security, and provides a key staging ground for strategies aimed at preventing state failure. DISEC will take a two-fold approach to the complex geopolitical issues surrounding security and statehood in Afghanistan and Pakistan. First, we will consider the identification mechanisms, conflict de-escalation, and post-conflict state-building and disarmament strategies that have proven effective in

failed and failing states at large. Second, and most importantly, we will examine Afghanistan and Pakistan as flashpoints of state failure in Central and South Asia. We will consider how mechanisms and strategies can prevent further instability, look towards measures for strengthening the Durand Line, and support counter-terrorism initiatives and security sector reform within their respective governments.

A Case Study of terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan

The Taliban ruled in Afghanistan through 2001, under the leadership of cleric and anti-Soviet resistance veteran Mullah Omar, deemed “commander of the faithful.” Ethnic divisions and opposition to Taliban rule persisted, however, particularly among Afghan Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Pashtuns. These three groups became key partners of the United States and its allies in NATO post-9/11, which, through forming the “Northern Alliance,” ousted the Taliban.¹⁹ Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1267, which established the “al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee,” which linked the two groups as terrorist entities and imposed sanctions on arm shipments, travel, and funding.²⁰ The Taliban provided sanctuary for al-Qaeda’s terrorist operations: under its leader, Osama bin Laden, and supported by the Taliban, al-Qaeda expanded its network throughout Afghanistan and western Pakistan, extending to Peshawar, along Pakistan’s north-western border with Afghanistan.²¹ The process of ousting the Taliban, the first stage of the U.S. and NATO-led military campaign in Afghanistan, lasted two months following 9/11. The second phase of the Afghanistan War involved a more robust military effort and strategy: The United States endeavoured to defeat the Taliban militarily and rebuild core institutions of the Afghan state, uniting the disparate ethnic and militant groups within its borders by means of counterinsurgency.²² After the collapse of the Taliban, Bin Laden and al-Qaeda leadership escaped to a cave complex southeast of Kabul: it was later discovered that they were also provided safe-

haven in Pakistan.²³ After the fall of the Taliban in Kabul in 2001, the UN invited major Afghan factions, predominantly the Northern Alliance, to a diplomatic conference that resulted in the establishment of an Afghan interim government, which installed Hamid Karzai as its administrative head.²⁴ In 2003, NATO took up the mantle of the state-building component of the War in Afghanistan, commanding the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The ISAF worked to enable Afghan institutions and security apparatuses, to ensure it become strong enough to dispel and disable terrorist forces (as opposed to being overrun by them). Gradually, NATO helped build the Afghan national security forces to an extent that they took over responsibility for maintaining security in Afghanistan. NATO’s initial mandate expired in December 2014, and a new mission, called “Resolute Support,” began in January 2015 to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces and institutions. Through NATO’s state-building missions, the international community has also lent financial support as part of a broader commitment to Afghanistan.²⁵ International support for Afghanistan, and a continued counterinsurgency military presence in the country, has certainly worked to build state capacity and security forces in a country that has never boasted either. Yet underlying ethnic



divisions and a lack of unified concept of “Afghanistan” threatens Afghanistan’s future as a sovereign and coherent nation state. Despite the ISAF’s programs, the United States has been putting off troop withdrawal in Afghanistan because of the

weak and tenuous nature of the Afghan state that remains susceptible to terrorist infiltration. The onset of the War in Afghanistan certainly affected Pakistan, testing the legitimacy of its government and its commitment to fending off terrorist organizations. After the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the United States offered Pakistan an ultimatum: it could either reverse its support for the Taliban and become an ally in the U.S.-led War on Terror or it could be considered an aggressor and, thus, a target in that campaign. Pakistan decided to join on the side of the United States and Northern Alliance, yet the installed Karzai government tended to favour Indian interests over Pakistani interests, causing Pakistan to shirk its responsibilities as a partner in the War on Terror. Pakistan began once again to support the Afghan Taliban, as the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) began harboring anti-NATO and anti-Afghanistan jihadists.²⁶ This did not win the Pakistani government the support of all Islamist militant factions in Afghanistan, however, as disparate militant groups in Central and South Asia coalesced into the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), known also as the Pakistani Taliban.²⁷ The TTP operates out of Pakistan's tribal areas and is not only anti-NATO, but also anti-Pakistan. It aids its Afghan counterparts, al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, and spread its influence across the mountainous tribal regions of Western Pakistan that includes FATA. TTP actively targets Pakistani security and intelligence forces, and is thought to have been responsible for the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007.²⁸ Parallel to the TTP is Lashkar-e-Taiba, a terrorist organization based out of Pakistan that experts say receives direct intelligence aid and funding from the ISI. During the 1990s, Lashkar-e-Taiba gained global prominence as an international terror group for its targeting of Hindus in the disputed North Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. By the early 2000s, Lashkar-e-Taiba expanded its terror programs to include directly targeting sites in India, as when it was responsible for an attack on the Red Fort in Delhi in 2002.⁷⁴ Lashkar-e-Taiba is perhaps best known for

orchestrating the devastating 2008 Mumbai hotel bombings, which killed 164 people (of international origin).²⁹ The ISI is thus itself susceptible to terror group infiltration and has demonstrated an acute willingness to support terrorist organizations in order to buttress Pakistan's geostrategic interests. The international community long pressured the ISI about Osama bin Laden's whereabouts: NATO states in particular have been vocally sceptical about ISI's




Figure 2: Hierarchal structure of the Al Qaeda and its departments, gathered from NATO intelligence. (Source: ResearchGate)

legitimacy in dealings with al-Qaeda and the Taliban, finding it difficult to believe the ISI was not aware that Bin Laden had been living in Pakistan.

Public Security Management: Present relevance of the Bonn Agreement

The Bonn Agreement states that the responsibility for insuring security and law and order throughout Afghanistan ultimately rests with the Afghans themselves. More specifically, the Bonn Agreement

decrees that “Upon the official transfer of power, all *mujahidin*, Afghan armed forces and armed groups in the country shall come under the command and control of the Interim Authority, and be reorganized according to the requirements of the new Afghan security and armed forces.”³⁰

The gathering in Bonn, from 27 November to 5 December 2001, represented a historic opportunity for the people of Afghanistan to emerge from a perpetual cycle of conflict. Besides the initially favourable security environment created by the UN-backed intervention and the desire for peace among the Afghan signatories to the Bonn Agreement, the quick consensus reached in Bonn can be attributed to

reform and build democratic, civilian control of public security management institutions loyal to the new central government.

Diminishing Borders: The Durand Line

The porous border dividing Afghanistan and Pakistan contributes substantially to both states’ fragility and is the direct result of imperial meddling and hasty decolonization. The Durand Line was drawn in 1893, delineating the boundary between British colonial India and the tribal lands of Central Asia (now Afghanistan). The late 1800s were marked by an

increased attempt on the part of the Afghans to assert territorial sovereignty: the Durand line allowed the British to expand the frontiers of their sphere of influence westward, as it cut through parts of the tribal lands that were not officially administered by the British crown in India.³⁴ Pashtun tribes occupied the majority

of this land to the north, and the Baluchi tribes, the majority of the land to the south. The act of creating an artificial border divided the semi-autonomous Pashtunistan and Baluchistan in half and deprived Afghanistan of its former access to the Arabian Sea. When Pakistan became an independent state in 1947, it inherited these territories that had typically formed part of



3: Signatories to the Bonn Agreement (Source- Foreign Policy)

foundations laid over the previous two decades through the “Rome process” negotiations, involving the former king, Zahir Shah.³¹ At its core, the Rome approach proposed the traditional means of convening a *loya jirga* (“Grand Assembly of Elders” in Pashto) to resolve outstanding conflicts in Afghanistan. Although an imperfect document, an important characteristic of the Bonn Agreement is that it set into motion an inclusive political process that would be primarily driven locally³², with mechanisms established to accommodate diverse interest groups and power-brokers across the country. But for this process to succeed, the citizens of Afghanistan would need to be convinced that there is a state led by a central government, and therefore, the regional warlords would need to be weakened.³³ As the remainder of this guide illustrates, Afghanistan’s complex political transition has, arguably, met its most difficult challenges in relation to efforts to

the Central Asian tribal lands that would become Afghanistan, east of the Durand

Line. Afghanistan was the only UN member state to vote against Pakistan’s membership bid to the United Nations. Aside from severely souring Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, the Durand Line put into question the legitimacy of a sovereign Afghan state and made governance in Western Pakistan challenging to the point of impossible at the outset.³⁵ Afghanistan became land-locked; its lack of effective trade routes and national resource scarcity exacerbated sectarian infighting and territorial disunity. Because it divides largely ungoverned tribal areas, the Durand Line is also porous: it is ideal for trans-shipment of illegal weapons, and for individuals, particularly from terrorist organizations. Specialty in this case can be designated to the area of Darra Adamkhel, a well-known notorious production facility for cheap

weaponry almost as affordable as a standard dial-phone. Despite the international community's best intentions to aid in the foundation of a stable Afghanistan, Pakistan has repeatedly used the Durand Line's porosity to subvert the Afghan government by aiding jihadist activity across the border.³⁶

A New Approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan?

Donald Trump's ascendance to the U.S. presidency in November 2016 has shifted the ideological perspective of the key actor currently involved in Afghanistan. His perspectives, at odds with those of the Obama administration, have increasingly de-emphasized security building and instead frequently involved derisive and divisive rhetoric and subsequent decision-making. *The Brookings Institute*, writing critically about the path forward in Afghanistan, assessed that "President Trump's overall decision on U.S. policy towards Afghanistan—to stay in the country with a somewhat enlarged military capacity—is to a large extent correct. However, his de-emphasis on Afghan governance and political issues is deeply misguided and could be a fatal flaw in the strategy."³⁷ Due to the absence of an integrated international strategy on security-building and governance in Afghanistan, U.S. policy fluctuations have a disproportional influence on the makeup of programs therein. Just as the United States's approach to the conflict has shifted under President Trump, non-state actors have contributed to deteriorating security. The Haqqani network and Islamic State boast ties to the dysfunctional government. So much so, that the community and the Armed Forces have been privy to so-called green on blue attacks from members of the inner ranks of the Afghan National Defense Security Forces. This has led to a spike in American military deaths, that could possibly be linked to prompting former United States National Security Advisor to adopt a policy of increasingly receding presence.

The Afghan political situation remains highly precarious, and without a sustained international military presence, outbreak of a full-blown civil war is likely, as is the expansion of existing terrorist safe havens. President Trump has also exhorted to Pakistan that it immediately end support for anti-Afghan terrorist and military groups, yet it is unlikely to heed these demands. This also reflects the U.S.

government's January 2018 decision to freeze aid to Pakistan citing the country as a "safe haven for terrorists."³⁸ In general, this approach has largely scrapped previous policies prioritizing development as a means of building security and state capacity. It has demonstrated an increased willingness to employ force (through strikes), and a distrust of existing diplomatic channels. During the Obama administration, American military presence in Afghanistan was heavily reliant on

Pakistani consent.³⁹ This shifting approach has come as the international community has witnessed a deterioration of regional security. Pakistan has continued to augment Afghanistan's violence and instability by providing weapons, intelligence and protection to the Taliban and Haqqani network.⁴⁰ Pakistan continues to fear a strong Afghan government too closely aligned with India. In Afghanistan, the National Unity Government headed by President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah, has been slow and sporadic in enacting promised reforms.⁴¹ ISIS and Taliban forces have begun to clash, revealing conflict spillover and informal network building to the west as well as the east. Both are responsible for immense civilian casualties, with numbers in the several hundreds between October and November 2017. The Security Council convened to discuss the status of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, which expired on 17 March 2018. At the meeting, the delegations from Russia and Kazakhstan emphasized the importance of regional organizations, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, in addressing the situation in Afghanistan.⁴²

Terrorism has brought an enormous burden on South Asian countries through the adverse impacts on their social, economic, political and physical infrastructure. Pakistan has suffered particularly excessively from the social, economic and human costs due to terrorism. Surprisingly, Pakistan is portrayed as being on the front line in the international war against terrorism and at the same time has been wrongly labelled as a sponsor of international terrorism. Terrorism in Pakistan is a multidimensional phenomenon and, among many precipitating factors, the policy factor plays an important role. The Soviet–Afghan war, which began in 1979, provided a breeding ground for terrorism in the region. A fundamental change was witnessed that

altered the very character of the existing Pakistani society. Withdrawal of the Soviets revealed a Pakistani society that had been forced into one of violence and weaponisation, plaguing Pakistan with so-called 'Kalashnikov culture' and 'Talibanisation'. Pakistan's social landscape has for the most part been plagued with illiteracy, disease, insecurity and injustice. Since the 9/11 incident, Pakistan has been intricately linked with the many facets of the 'war on terrorism.' Some argue that Pakistan is a breeding ground for terrorist outfits, but it is certain that all of this havoc has resulted in the significant loss of innocent lives as well as loss of economic revenue. These fragile conditions provide a fertile ground for terrorism to grow.

On the outset, a historical perspective of the case is crucial to the resolution of the present identity crisis that the states are plagued by. Key factors like geopolitics and how far factors like corruption is sown into the foundations of the countries will be pivotal to the resolution process as well. Will Imran Khan's surfacing to the front of Pakistani politics be a paradigm shift, or will we continue to prolong one of the West's longest and most impression-dragging wars of the 21st century? The questions demand your answers, delegates.

Suggestions for further research

- Reports of foreign presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan (NATO, UNAMA, US Department of State, Reports of the Russian Federation Embassy etc.)
- Research papers on public policy recommendations on the implementation of key documents in Afghanistan
- UN Programmes- Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), Security Sector Reform (SSR), national policy programmes (eg. Channel Programme-United Kingdom), European Union counterterrorism framework (Source: YouTube)
- Criteria to define the idea of a failed state and statehood: practical and legal models
- Counterterrorism solutions proposed: current flaws associated with them and possible remedies to the same.
- Small Arms Survey reports on global disarmament efforts
- United Nations Secretary-General reports and Disarmament Commission reports on the agenda.



4: A shop at the notorious Darra Adamkhel, as photographed by Al Jazeera reporters (Feb 2019)

2. The Israel-Palestine Conflict

Introduction




Figure 5: Development of the physical territorial occupations of Israel and Palestine, circa 1994 (Source-BBC)

The last 70 years have been of occupation and persistent barriers and limitations to the establishment of a Palestinian State. In these decades of conflict, many wars have been fought and the State of Israel has boosted its borders onto the territory defined as Palestine by the United Nations' (UN) Resolution 181 of 1947. Although many peace agreements and accords have been signed, the State of Palestine is far from being achieved. In the meanwhile, many challenges derived from the occupation have to be dealt with in order to preserve the Palestinian people, their human rights, culture and heritage. Recent developments turned the Palestinian Question one of the main concerns of the international community once again. The United States of America recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in December 2017 and moved the US embassy to the city on 14 May 2018, being that the peak of a situation that has worsened since Trump's campaign and the beginning of his government. It generated

instability in the Middle East and countries feared a possible "Third Intifada". The tensions were high as well in other UN bodies such as the General Assembly (UNGA), where a resolution regarding Jerusalem as an issue with which only the Palestinians and Israelis could deal with was strongly opposed by the US and Israel. The Palestinian situation is an issue with many deadlocks that have not been solved since UNGA's 1947 Partition Plan. Israel's discriminatory policies are sparsely debated in international forums, and yet they are one of the main sources of inequality and human rights violations in Palestine⁴³. The management of resources such as water and electricity are totally controlled by Israeli companies, which restrict access to Palestinians. Also, the Palestinian refugees, under the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees' (UNRWA) mandate, constitute one of the largest nationalities under refuge nowadays. At the same time as UNRWA is currently underfunded and running the risk of going through major restrictions with US cuts, Israel continues to expand its settlements over the West Bank, even though they have already been considered illegal by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). With all these restrictions, the Palestinian National Authority (PA), established by the Oslo Accords (1994-95), is weakened and loses leverage to engage in new negotiations with Israel. Moreover, with Trump's declaration, the establishment of negotiations gets even more complicated, as the Palestinian Authority refuses the US's mediation. The PA also shows signs of changing their demands from a two-State to a one-State solution. Another stalemate is the situation in Gaza: governed by Hamas and under Israeli siege since 2002, the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip face one of the most severe humanitarian crisis in the world. The alliance between Israel and the US obstructs major efforts of the United Nations Security Council in approving substantive resolutions to assure Palestinians' rights. Bearing in mind the latest developments, it is possible to see that the US has recently acquired and even more aligned position towards Israel. Moreover, this tougher approach has increased opposition to the US inside the Council, even from its most traditional allies such as the United Kingdom and France. Therefore, the DISEC's main challenge is to find a way of reaching the consensus through dialogue in the middle of so many standoffs, and bridging the communication gap for the Council to deal with in due process.

A Timeline to the Conflict ⁴⁴

- **1948:** Israel declared an independent state, Arab-Israeli War over Palestine begins.
- **1949:** Israel concludes Armistice agreements with neighbouring countries, around 1000 infiltrators are killed by the Israeli army.
- **1949 – 1953:** Hundreds of civilians are killed by

infiltrators; Arab infiltrators were killed in the thousands.

- **1967:** Six-Day War between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria takes place; Khartoum Resolution issued at the Arab Summit; UNSC adopts Resolution 242.
- **1974 – 1980s:** Palestinian insurgency in South Lebanon.
- **1987:** First Intifada begins.
- **1991:** Madrid conference, First Intifada comes to an end.
- **1993:** Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin sign the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government in Oslo.
- **1994:** Jordan and Israel sign peace treaty.
- **1995:** Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, also known as Oslo II, signed in Washington D.C.
- **1997:** Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron signed.
- **1998:** Benjamin Netanyahu and Yasser Arafat sign the Wye River Memorandum at a summit in Maryland hosted by Bill Clinton.
- **2000:** Israeli Army withdraws from southern Lebanon in compliance with UN Resolution 425; Camp David Summit takes place.
- **2002:** The United States pushes through the passage of Resolution 1397 by the Security Council.
- **2003:** The Quartet on the Middle East announced the Road map for peace; The International Court of Justice ruled in a non-binding advisory opinion that the Israeli West Bank barrier was illegal under international law, the United Nations had also condemned the construction of the wall as "an unlawful act of annexation".
- **2004:** Operation "Days of Penitence" takes place in the northern Gaza Strip.
- **2005:** Completion of Israel's unilateral disengagement plan.
- **2006:** Hamas Islamist group wins Palestinian parliamentary elections.
- **2007:** Annapolis Conference for first time establishes "two-state solution" as basis for future talks between Israel and Palestinian Authority.
- **2008:** Israel launches month-long full-scale invasion of Gaza to prevent Hamas and other groups from launching rockets.
- **2009:** Discovery of major offshore natural gas deposits; Right-wing parties prevail in elections, Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu forms government.
- **2012:** Israel launches week-long military campaign against Gaza-based armed groups

following months of escalating rocket attacks on Israeli towns.

- **2013:** Benjamin Netanyahu replaces most religious Jewish groups with centrist and secular parties in government after the latter's strong showing in January elections.
- **2014:** Israel responds to attacks by armed groups in Gaza with a military campaign by air and land to knock out missile launching sites and attack tunnels. Clashes end in uneasy Egyptian-brokered ceasefire in August.
- **2015:** Israel suspends contact with European Union officials in talks with Palestinians over EU decision to label goods from Jewish settlements in the West Bank as coming not from Israel but from settlements.
- **2016:** US agrees military aid package worth \$38bn (£28bn) over next 10 years for Israel, largest such deal in US history. Previous pact, set to expire in 2018, saw Israel get \$3.1bn annually.
- **2017:** US President Donald Trump recognises Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, upsetting the Arab world and some Western allies.
- **2019:** US says it no longer considers Israeli settlements on the West Bank to be illegal.

The Issue of Jerusalem




Figure 6: A layout of Jerusalem, dated 2017 (Source-Examrace)

Although UN Resolution 181 of 1947 determines an international mandate for Jerusalem, the city has passed under Israeli control. In the developments surrounding 1948, a huge part of the Western side of Jerusalem's inhabitants was displaced, therefore becoming refugees and having their properties confiscated. After the 1948-49 war, the city was divided, being West Jerusalem taken by Israel and East Jerusalem under Jordanian control. East Jerusalem was also annexed by Israel in 1967 after taking the West Bank from Jordan in the Six-Day War. Israel

annexed not only Jerusalem's land but adjacent territories belonging to the West Bank, encompassing it into Jerusalem city boundaries eventually, in a breach of international law. In 1980, the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, passed a Basic Law claiming that "Jerusalem, united and complete, is the capital of Israel" (Civic Coalition for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem 2014, 2). Latest developments include UNESCO's declaration that East Jerusalem is part of the occupied Palestinian territory and the already mentioned Trump's declaration that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel (Rose 2018). The situation installed in Jerusalem since its annexation to Israel in 1967 is very particular. First of all, Palestinians that were in Jerusalem in 1967 were given not an Israeli citizenship, but instead the status of permanent resident in Israel. It means that, although they have access to public services, they cannot vote for national elections, only for municipal ones, not having full citizen political rights. Also, the residency permit "does not convey unconditional rights to stay, register children or unite with relatives in Jerusalem" (Civic Coalition for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem 2014, 5). The status of permanent resident is also more unstable than citizenship, as it can be revoked by the discretion of the Interior Ministry – "since 1967, Israel has revoked the permanent residency of some 14,500 Palestinians from East Jerusalem" (B'Tselem 2017a). Furthermore, the "center of live" law implies that Palestinian residents of Jerusalem that have their center of live outside Jerusalem – e.g. lives at Jerusalem but works in a West Bank city – may have its residency permit revoked. It can also be revoked if the person spends more than six years abroad or acquire citizenship or residency in another country (Al Haq and Al-Quds University 2018). About 30,000 Palestinians from Jerusalem that were outside the city in 1967 were considered absentees, they did not receive the residency permit and have no right to return to the city, according to Israel; their properties were confiscated by the State (Civic Coalition for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem 2014).

The Oslo Accords

The Oslo Accords, officially known as the Declaration of Principles, is a timeline established to systematically fast track the peace process in the Middle East. It marked a historic moment in Israel-Palestine relations as after signing it, the Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat, the President of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, shook hands on September 13th, 1993. The Details of Oslo Accords: The Declaration calls for: - Israel to withdraw from Jericho and Gaza, and eventually the West Bank. - Establishment of a Palestinian police force. - Five years of limited autonomy for Palestinians in those areas. - Election of Palestinian Legislative Council within nine months. - The question of Jerusalem was left

undecided. With meetings being carried out over several months of 1992 and 1993, a number of plans along the lines of Israel military leaving a number of major West Bank cities and the organisation of elections to the Palestinian Legislative Assembly were decided. These meetings between high ranking officials from both sides were conducted in secret and in a number of locations worldwide. They became exceptional due to the reduced role of the United States as a moderator. This was evident especially during the initial stages. All this resulted in more direct contact between both countries and helped in detailed policy discussion at the executive level.

The Palestinian Authority-where do they stand?




Figure 7: Boundary frontiers between the Israeli Government and the Palestinian National Authority

The **Palestinian National Authority** is the interim self-government body established in 1994 following the Gaza-Jericho Agreement to govern the Gaza Strip and Areas A and B of the West Bank,^[4] as a consequence of the 1993 Oslo Accords.

With the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004, the Palestinian Authority was left extremely weakened due to internal conflicts as well as external allegations. The supposed corruption taking place within the PA of the monetary donations received over the years from international organisations had reduced the party's popularity all over the region. The new and more extremely oriented Hamas became the

people choice due to their social work for the commons as well as their complete rejection to any two-state solution.

In the summer of 2007, the Fatah-Hamas conflict broke out which resulted in Hamas domination of the Gaza strip and a division of the Palestinian authority. Fatah did remain in control of the West Bank and President Abbas created a somewhat unconstitutional division from the Party since it was the Hamas that had Parliamentary majority.

2006 Palestinian Legislative Elections

In these elections, Hamas won a clear majority in Palestine. Following this came the decision of the Western world to cut-off all official ties with the Leadership of the Hamas. The development of Israel-Palestine issues was paralyzed due to the fact that the State of Israel refused to negotiate with the Hamas, an organization which did not recognize Israel's Right to Exist and even promoted violence against Israeli citizens. This complete break in dialogue was accompanied by constant violence along the Gaza strip and other adjoining areas of the two states and hence some form of communication had to be restored.

Annapolis Conference, 2007

On 27th November 2007, a conference was held at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. Palestine was represented by the Leader of the PA Mahmoud Abbas, and attended by Israeli President Ehud Olmert and the President of the United States, George W. Bush.

Abbas at the conference demanded a state the size of West Bank and the Gaza Strip meanwhile Olmert was willing to piece out parts of East Jerusalem as part of a broader and more holistic peace deal. This decision was not without major criticism from right wing Israelis and resulted in parties' part of the coalition threatening to back out.

However, despite the issues faced, a two state solution was mutually agreed upon and all the parties present issued joint statements regarding the same.

Operation Pillar of Defense

The long years of disagreement between the Hamas and the State of Israel led to violent consequences for

the non-combatants on both sides of the Gaza strip. Over the years, Hamas intensified its rocket campaigns and Israel engaged in bombardments and ground invasions of the Gaza Strip.

On November 14th 2012, Israel began with the Operation Pillar of Defense. The aim of this Operation was to "reduce the offensive capabilities of the opposition" and began with the killing of Hamas Military Chief Ahmed Jabari. It was followed by bombing of civilian centres by both sides and resulted in thousands of casualties. Israel's Iron Dome missile defense system was seen to be very successful against Hamas attacks and on November 21st, a ceasefire was called between the Hamas and Israel to be mediated by Egypt. In November 2014, another prisoner exchange program was carried out between the two parties.

Palestinian Unity Government

The only directly negotiating parties presently are the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Attempts to form a united front in order to represent Palestinian interests in a more systematic manner. In 2008, the division in governance of the Palestinian Authority between the two parties resulted in the collapse of centralized order in the country. Attempts to form a united government had taken place in 2014, the Palestinian United Government containing both Hamas and Fatah officials, however, all negotiations ceased by 2015.

Bloc Positions and Foreign Policy

Russian Federation

Russia recognizes the importance of the United States on the matter, pointing out that no accord will be reached without such country. Notwithstanding, the country expressed its deep concern regarding the innumerable deaths at Gaza, blaming the United States for these developments due to the move of their Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. In this sense, Moscow believes that Jerusalem should be divided between Israel and a Palestinian State with both countries living in peace and safety. The Russian government has been enhancing bilateral talks between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, promoting meeting and studies concerning the matter.

At last, part of the international community, specially the United States, has shown some concerns over Russian involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli issue, arguing that Russia was using it with the purpose of improving its influence over the Middle East.

United States of America

The United States of America strongly believes the United Nations has been spending a disproportionate amount of resources and time in the Israeli-Palestinian issue, whereas there are dozens of other matters, also in the Middle East, that are in need of a higher focus of such organization. Besides, on August 31, 2018, Washington's Department of State announced the country would not provide any further contributions to UNRWA, therefore cutting all its funding directed to the organization. The Trump administration based such decision on the claim that the US was shouldering a "very disproportionate share of the burden of UNRWA's costs" and on the judgment that the agency overstates the number of Palestinian refugees. The United States has voted against innumerable resolutions of the General Assembly regarding this issue, such as: Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine (A/Res/65/16), Jerusalem (A/RES/65/17), the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination (A/Res/65/202), among others. It argues these resolutions are biased, focusing its criticism only against the Israeli government, and they undermine the two-State solution - which is endorsed by Washington -, apart from jeopardizing the peace process negotiations. Moreover, in spite of recognizing some human rights violations against the Palestinian population, the United States tries to bar any kind of measures to punish the Israeli State, having also withdrawn itself from the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) recently, accusing it of being biased in several matters, including the Israeli-Palestinian one. At last, the country states that it is willing to cooperate with Palestinian leaders, even though its decision to move the US Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem is final and not subject to appeal.

People Republic of China

People's Republic of China has as its guiding principle the two-State solution, calling upon Israel to abide by previous UN resolutions on the matter. The country strongly supports UNRWA, requesting all

States to keep a constant uphold to this agency in order to ease the suffering of the Palestinian refugees. Moreover, the Chinese government claims for a peaceful coexistence between Israel and a Palestinian State, asserting that the latter's existence - independent and with full control of its borders - is a just cause of its people. Also, it should be based on the 1967 frontiers, having East Jerusalem as its capital, meanwhile West Jerusalem would be the capital of Israel. In the last few decades, China has been one of the greatest sponsors of a peace process in the Middle East. Therefore, it is seen as a substitute of the United States in promoting the reengagement of Israel and the Palestinian Authority in bilateral and multilateral talks in order to solve the matter. In this regard, it has promoted dozens of debates and conferences concerning such matter within its territory and internationally. On the recent developments, the country expressed deep concern regarding the move of the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, stating that it could entail more hostilities in the region.

The French Republic

Having good relations with both the Palestinian as well as the Israeli populace, the French Republic believes that peace has to be maintained by abiding to certain principles from previously signed treaties and resolutions. France urges both nations to accept a two state solution based on 1967 frontiers. It recognizes Gaza should be a part of Palestinian territory but also sees Israel's right to defend itself and demands that Hamas stop the aerial campaign on Israeli civilian centres. The French have extended their concern not only in words but also in monetary terms, donating large sums of money to the region. French president Emmanuel Macron has also publicly stated that the move of the US Embassy to Jerusalem will only create more hatred and instability in the region.

Suggestions for further research

- History of the conflict- Balfour declaration, UN Partition Plan, First Arab-Israeli War, The Six Day War, the Entebbe Hostage Crisis etc.
- Religious importance of the conflict
- Threat posed to international security- possible presence of Weapons of Mass Destruction, warfare and riot management

mechanisms, non-state actors etc.

- Media coverage of the crisis-dissemination of facts and information with credibility and avoidance of propaganda
- Regional/foreign involvement-role of Member States, UN organs, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Arab League, NATO, EU etc.
- Distribution and management of territory-one/two-state solutions and its alternatives.

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44 Timeline to the Israeli-Palestine Conflict

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Israeli%E2%80%93Palestinian_conflict

