13th - 17th May 2019 – Kuala Lumpur

Fraud Model Development and Deployment in SAS FM

Session 6: Performance Evaluations



Performance Evaluations Topics


- Anatomy of model performance
- Case level metrics
- Transaction level metrics
- Transaction vs case level performance



Anatomy of Model Performance




Anatomy of Model Performance





Anatomy of Model Performance





Notes on Evaluation

- Model performance evaluations are always performed as a function of the model score
 - Starting from highest score (999) going to lowest score (1)
- Metrics defined by considering transactions that score at or above a score threshold. i.e. metric(s) denotes the value evaluated on transactions that score at or above threshold s
 - Score of 1000 is considered to have 0 true positives and 0 false positives since not a single transaction will score at that level
 - Score of 1 will have 100% true positives and 100% false positives since every transaction will have scored at or above 1.
- Some rate/ratio based metrics are already normalized whereas some metrics such as volume may require normalization (for e.g. per day)



Approved and Declined Transactions

- There are 3 points at which an approve / decline (A/D) decision can be made in the flow:
 - Upstream prior to entering SAS FM
 - Typical policy declines such as invalid authentication, insufficient balance, expired cards etc.
 - By the rules within SAS FM
 - Based on model score based rules and other fraud rules
 - Downstream after exiting SAS FM
 - Policy declines, additional fraud processing
- Depending on where SAS FM is placed in the flow, there may be (or not) upstream or downstream decisions
 - Typically we try to place SAS FM as the last decision point so that all prior decisions are available to us



Approved and Declined Transactions

- Upstream decisions are typically mapped to a field within the incoming message
 - E.g. tca_auth_sys_dec / tck_tran_status / tbt_tran_status etc.
- The final decision code after SAS processing is returned via rrr_action_code
- If a downstream process further changes the decision, typically a duplicate message is sent back to SAS FM indicating that that the message is a duplicate, but containing the final decision code
 - Need to be considered when preparing modeling data from consortium feeds



Approved and Declined Transactions

- For first time models, the final decision code available in the historical data will be the only decision code to be considered
- However when using consortium data from consortium for existing models, which decision code to use for model development and evaluations is a critical consideration
- For defining the fraud window for model development, the final decision codes should be used
 - Since it represents the true active fraud state
 - Fraud window is extended to include additional potentially fraud transactions fraud had not been blocked.



Incremental vs. Replacement Evaluations

- An incremental evaluation measures the additional model benefit when the model is placed on top of the existing fraud model + (including any incumbent SAS FM model)
 - i.e. only the frauds missed by the existing model form the universe of fraud under consideration
- However the model should be evaluated as if it will replace the existing fraud model
 - Model should still get credit for catching fraud that was caught by the previous model and vice versa
- Replacement evaluation assumes that the initial post-block declines are real fraud activities had the current model not blocked the fraud episode
 - Some of these declines are treated as approved fraud transactions during evaluations (refer to section on replacement windows in session 4)



Incremental vs. Replacement Evaluations

- This means that for evaluation purposes, we should use only the upstream decision if evaluating against an existing model
 - The final decision code will manifest the effect of the incumbent model score and will result in a partial degeneration to an incremental evaluation
 - May need to redefine the fraud window based on upstream decision codes
- We are still performing an incremental evaluation relative to the upstream checks, but that is reasonable
 - A pure model evaluation should not consider any approve / decision code
 - But we will always deal with systems where there is an implicit or explicit fraud protection mechanism (policy declines for e.g. are implicit fraud checks)
- Unfortunately when replacing a non SAS FM model, we may not have separate upstream and post model decision codes
 - Hence the model may get evaluated against the entire incumbent system



Transaction Level Metrics



Transaction Level Metrics

- Detection rate / hit rate
- Impact rate
- False positive rate



Impact Rate

- Impact rate (s) = $\frac{Number\ of\ transactions\ with\ score \ge s}{Total\ number\ of\ transactions}$
- Essentially indicates what % of transactions will be impacted by the following hypothetical rule:

```
if score >= s then decline;
```

- Essentially combines both false positives and true positives
- Very critical metric since it indicates how much operational impact the bank will have on a given day
 - Multiplying this rate by average daily transaction volumes gives the average number of transactions impacted at the given score threshold
- Transactions declined upstream may be excluded from the population since the bank may not act on those declines regardless of the score



Detection Rate

- Detection rate $(s) = \frac{Number\ of\ fraud\ transactions\ with\ score \ge s}{Total\ number\ of\ fraud\ transactions}$
- Essentially indicates what % of fraud transactions will be detected by the following hypothetical rule:

```
if score >= s then decline;
```

- Variations of this measure can be introduced by applying different filters on the population of transactions being considered. E.g.
 - CNP Detection rate $(s) = \frac{Number\ of\ CNP\ fraud\ transactions\ with\ score \ge s}{T_{sol}}$

Total number of CNP fraud transactions

• True Detection rate $(s) = \frac{Number of approved fraud transactions with score \ge s}{Total number of approved fraud transactions}$

 $Total\ number\ of\ approved\ fraud\ transactions$




False Positive Rate

• False positive rate $(s) = \frac{Number\ of\ non\ fraud\ transactions\ with\ score \ge s}{Total\ number\ of\ non\ fraud\ transactions}$



Transaction Level ROCs

- RoCs are mostly plotted as detection rate vs. impact rate
- In fraud we are almost always interested in the very low impact rate region (< 1 2%)
 - Even the smallest of banks will not be able operate above that region





Case Level Metrics



Case Level Evaluation Metrics


- Case / alert level detection rate
- Value detection rate
- No recontact period
- Case / alert false positive ratio
- Outsort volume
- Outsort rate




Case Detection Rate (CDR)


- CDR measures if a fraud case (episode) was detected or not
 - Not if individual transactions within the case was detected
- A fraud case is considered detected if there is at least 1 transaction that scores at or above the evaluation threshold
 - All subsequent fraud transactions are all considered detected
- $CDR(s) = \frac{No. of fraud cases where at least 1 transaction in fraud window scores \ge s}{Total number of fraud cases}$














Case Detection Rate - Illustration




Fraud Window



Missed detection for s = 950

1000










Value Detection Rate (VDR)

- VDR measures the actual monetary amount of saved fraud losses
- Only the amounts associated with fraud transactions that occur after the case is detected are considered saved.

•
$$VDR(s) = \frac{Sum \ of \ detected \ fraud \ transactions \ when \ case \ is \ detected \ at \ score \ge s}{Total \ potential \ fraud \ loss}$$

 Fraud transactions that were declined prior to being scored by the model are typically excluded from these calculations

























False Positives and No – Recontact Period


- A false positive at score s is triggered when a non-fraudulent transaction score greater than s.
- Typically a cluster of non-fraudulent transactions may score above the evaluation threshold
- In practice however these are all grouped into a single alert
- Also for operational and relationship reasons, a customer may not be contacted for a certain period of time when they have experienced a recent false positive
- The 'quiet' period after which a customer is not contacted after a false positive is termed the no – recontact period
- This should be factored in when counting the number of false positives during evaluations.



No – Recontact Period Illustration



No – Recontact Period Illustration



Case False Positive Ratio (CFPR)

 A common metric to quantify false positives is the measure of how many false positives the bank needs to create for each detected fraud case

•
$$CFPR(s) = \frac{No. of false positive cases created at score \ge s}{No. of fraud cases detected at score \ge s}$$

- Range of interest for high fraud rate problems would be between 3:1 to 20:1 (e.g. cards)
- Range of interest for low fraud rate problems could be anywhere between 50:1 to 200:1 (e.g. payments, online banking, deposits)





Outsort Volume and Outsort Rate

- Outsort volume for a given period is the number of alerts to be worked during that period
- Daily Outsort $(s) = \frac{FPs + Detected Cases at score \ge s}{Days in the evaluation period}$
- Daily Outsort Rate (s) = $\frac{Daily\ Outsort\ (s)}{Daily\ Outsort\ (1)}$
- Outsort can be defined for different periods (week, month, quarter etc.)
- Outsort is a better measure in terms of quantifying operational impact since it directly relates the number of alerts to be worked during a given period



Case Level RoCs








Speed to Detection

- Measure of how fast cases are detected when they are detected
 - Will have an impact on the value of VDR





Transaction vs Case Level Evaluations



Transaction vs Case Level Evaluations

- The fraud problem typically dictates the evaluation methodology
- Cards are by far the ideal candidates for case level evaluations
 - Cards are typically closed when there is fraud; a clean fraud window can be defined which is ideal for case level evaluations
 - However it can be applied where the notion of 'fraud state' is applicable. For e.g. online user IDs, payment fraud where the account is compromised etc.
- Transaction level evaluations are better suited when the notion of 'fraud state' is not applicable
 - E.g. in check fraud, it is individual checks that are fraudulent; the underlying account does not go into a state of fraud
 - Many payment fraud problems related to social engineering



Transaction vs Case Level Evaluations

- If an entity is put back in use after a compromise (e.g. online user ID), it can be re-compromised again
 - Creates some complexities in demarcating fraud boundaries between episodes
 - Even if there was only a single episode, there needs to be a clear way of identifying where the post-block period ends and where legitimate behavior begins again
- This is also a consideration in fraud tagging for model development

