Additional Analysis on "Frustration and Anger in the Ultimatum Game: An Experiment"

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Disclaimer:

the data analysis was designed to extend further the working paper Aina, Battigalli & Gamba (2018). In order not to distribute the original data, this project was run using a dataset with fake data.

Experimental Design

We study the implications of the theory of frustration and anger in the strategic context of the UMG (Binmore *et al.* 1995), a simple binary-choice version of the Ultimatum Game (G{"{u}}th *et al.* 1982). The game form with material payoffs is represented in Figure 1% , where $h > m_i > \ell > 0$, $i = \mathrm{a}, \mathrm{b}$.[1] In this highly stylized social dilemma the first-mover can either propose a default allocation (d), whereby both players receive a similar amount of money, or a "greedy" allocation (g). While the default allocation is automatically accepted, the second-mover can either accept or reject the greedy offer.



Figure 1: A Ultimatum Minigame Tree

[1] In the classic version, the two players are given an amount of money to split, thus it has to be the case that $m_\mathrm{a} + m_\mathrm{b} = h + \ell$.