

Uniqueness of Equilibria in Interactive Networks

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ABSTRACT. We study a unified network framework and show that equilibrium exists and is unique (almost surely) under either eventually contracting or non-expansive assumptions. We also discuss the computation methods and show the necessity of boundedness conditions when interaction functions are non-expansive. Applying the equilibrium in the study of systemic risk, we provide a measure to determine the key player who causes the most significant impact if removed from the network.

Keywords: Network, Equilibrium, Uniqueness, Key Player

1. INTRODUCTION

Network analysis enhances our comprehension of macroeconomic volatility and systemic risk by capturing agent interactions. For instance, idiosyncratic shocks propagate through the interconnections of a production network, resulting in aggregate fluctuation, where the network structure, such as hubs, sparsity, and asymmetry, influences the shock propagation and the magnitude of aggregate fluctuation (Carvalho, 2008, Acemoglu et al., 2012, Carvalho, 2014, Carvalho and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2019).

In economic network analysis, a critical challenge is determining the uniqueness of equilibrium, as it carries various economic properties and implications and affects the validity of comparative statics if multiplicity exists. For example, Roukny et al. (2018) addresses that the multiple equilibria of a financial credit network make the

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probability of default indeterminate and then make it challenging to evaluate systemic risk. [Jackson and Pernoud \(2020\)](#) indicate that the multiple equilibria of a financial network lead to a self-fulfilling cascade of defaults.¹

In addressing this, we investigate the presence of a unified framework capable of efficiently and systematically verifying uniqueness across various network models, including production networks, network games, and financial networks. We clarify that, under general and widely employed assumptions, there are two types of framework: eventually contracting and non-expansive networks. We show the existence and (almost sure) uniqueness of equilibrium for both eventually contracting and non-expansive conditions, providing researchers with a valuable tool for promptly assessing uniqueness.

Specifically, we demonstrate that the equilibrium is both existent and unique when either the interaction function or the sensitivity matrix is convergent such that Banach contraction exists. That is, if the spectral radius of the sensitivity matrix weighted by the Lipschitz constants of interaction functions is less than one, then equilibrium is both unique and globally stable. Conversely, when the interaction functions are non-expansive but bounded, and the sensitivity matrix has a spectral radius of one, we show that equilibrium exists and is unique almost surely, provided that the shocks are absolutely continuous. We underscore the role of absolute continuity in preventing the occurrence of multiplicity with non-zero probability. For instance, multiple equilibria may occur with strictly positive probability in some financial networks, such as [Acemoglu et al. \(2015a\)](#) and [Acemoglu et al. \(2015b\)](#).²

Consequently, our result shows that the clearing payment for the generalized Eisenberg-Noe model, studied by [Liu et al. \(2020\)](#), is almost surely unique under non-expansive conditions and always unique under eventually contracting conditions. [Liu et al. \(2020\)](#) simulate the U.S. interbank lending system to explore the contagion effect of bank failures and confirm that the extent of the network contagion effect has been

¹When there are multiple equilibria, and the market has pessimistic beliefs, a bank may tend to hold cash and stop payments to others if it believes that other banks experience deterioration in credit conditions. In this case, the ex-ante fear causes the cascade of defaults, even if there is another better equilibrium that banks are solvent.

²The generic uniqueness is defined in the sense that the set of shocks admitting multiplicity is measure zero.

reduced after the 2007-09 financial crisis.³ They only show the existence of equilibrium. Since we demonstrate the uniqueness of clearing payments, their simulation is stable and reliable when shocks are absolutely continuous, such that the probability of multiple clearing payments is zero.

Furthermore, we study the non-bounded linear system and argue that the boundedness condition is essential for both the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium when the network is non-contracting. Leveraging this insight, we propose an algorithm to compute the generalized Eisenberg-Noe interbank lending model in [Acemoglu et al. \(2015a\)](#) and [Acemoglu et al. \(2015b\)](#), where the interaction functions are bounded identity maps. We show that the algorithm converges at most in $n2^{n-1}$ iterations.

Moreover, as a particular case of a non-expansive network, we also show that the equilibrium payment in [Eisenberg and Noe \(2001\)](#) of credit network is always unique without regularity condition, which is also applied by [Amini et al. \(2016\)](#) and [Staum et al. \(2016\)](#). Our result corresponds to the results obtained by [Stachurski \(2022\)](#).

In the applications of the generalized network and the unique equilibrium, we extend our analysis to identify key players, using a measure inspired by [Sharkey \(2017\)](#). The *key players* are the agents who create the highest reduction of aggregate economic states if they are removed from the network ([Ballester et al., 2006](#), [Zenou, 2016](#)). Using the methodology of [Sharkey \(2017\)](#), we calculate the measure by interpreting the equilibrium as the steady state of a continuous-time dynamic system. The benefit of the measure is that it captures the impact of both the received shocks from others and the shocks that agents pass on. Regarding systemic risk, the measure also has the feature that the identified key players are either too big to fail or too interconnected to fail agents.

Related Literature. This paper studies and generalizes the unified network model in [Acemoglu et al. \(2016b\)](#). Unlike [Acemoglu et al. \(2016b\)](#), we consider heterogeneous interaction functions and arbitrary sensitivity matrix. Our result is different from [Acemoglu et al. \(2016b\)](#) that, when a network is eventually contracting, the uniqueness of equilibrium does not merely depend on the Lipschitz contraction of the interaction functions. In our framework, the convergence of either interaction functions or the sensitivity matrix may lead to global stability. For non-expansive cases, we allow the sensitivity matrix to be either row or column stochastic.

³They find that banks have fewer counter-party exposures after the financial crisis.

The unified network model in this paper can be applied to determine the Nash equilibrium in network games, the equilibrium output in input-output analysis, and the clearing payments in generalized Eisenberg-Noe financial networks (Eisenberg and Noe, 2001). For example, the model can be used to describe the best response and solve Nash equilibrium in network games (Calvó-Armengol et al., 2009, Cohen-Cole et al., 2015, Blume et al., 2015, Zenou, 2016, Galeotti et al., 2020). For production networks, the model could represent the input-output relationship and determine the output equilibrium (Acemoglu et al., 2012, Bartelme and Gorodnichenko, 2015, Acemoglu et al., 2016a, 2017, Herskovic, 2018, Carvalho and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2019, Acemoglu and Azar, 2020, Herskovic et al., 2020, Pesaran and Yang, 2020). For financial networks, it calculates the clearing loan repayments, which studies the systemic risk of default cascade (Eisenberg and Noe, 2001, Cifuentes et al., 2005, Elsinger et al., 2006, Rogers and Veraart, 2013, Glasserman and Young, 2015, 2016, Acemoglu et al., 2015a, Gai and Kapadia, 2019, Veraart, 2020).

Outline. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the unified model and the main results of the existence and (almost sure) uniqueness of equilibrium. Section 3 lists out the network models with identical mathematical patterns that can be embodied in the unified framework and discusses some conditions for assumptions and extended results. Section 4 presents the comparative statics and discusses the tightness of assumptions and the importance of the boundedness condition. This section also discusses computation methods when the interaction functions are bounded identity maps. Section 5 presents a measure for identifying key players, which utilizes the property of the uniqueness of equilibrium.

2. GENERAL MODEL

Notation and Preliminary. Let $x, y \in \mathbb{R}^n$ be vectors and $f_i : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be functions for all $i \in V := \{1, \dots, n\}$. In expressions involving matrix algebra, we take the convention that all vectors are row vectors, unless otherwise stated. Denote $|x|$ as $|x| := (|x_1|, \dots, |x_n|)$ and $f(x)$ as $f(x) := (f_1(x_1), \dots, f_n(x_n))$. If $f_i \equiv f$ for all $i \in V$, we write $f(x) := (f(x_1), \dots, f(x_n))$. We say that f_i is *non-expansive* if $|f_i(x) - f_i(y)| \leq |x - y|$ for all $x, y \in \mathbb{R}$. Also, $f = (f_i)_{i \in V}$ is *non-expansive* if f_i is non-expansive for all i . Denote $x \geq y$ if $x_i \geq y_i$ for all $i \in V$, $x > y$ if $x_i \geq y_i$ for all i and $x_i > y_i$ for some $i \in V$, and $x \gg y$ if $x_i > y_i$ for all $i \in V$.

Let $A = (A_{ij}), B = (B_{ij}) \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ be square matrices. Denote $A \geq B$ if $A_{ij} \geq B_{ij}$ for all $i, j \in V$ and $A \gg B$ if $A_{ij} > B_{ij}$ for all $i, j \in V$. A matrix A is *column* (resp., *row*) *stochastic* if $A \geq 0$ and $\sum_{i \in V} A_{ij} = 1$ for all $j \in V$ (resp., $\sum_{j \in V} A_{ij} = 1$ for all $i \in V$). A matrix A is *column* (resp., *row*) *substochastic* if $A \geq 0$ and $\sum_{i \in V} A_{ij} \leq 1$ for all $j \in V$ (resp., $\sum_{j \in V} A_{ij} \leq 1$ for all $i \in V$). The norm $\|\cdot\|$ refers to p -norm for vectors or matrix norm induced by p -norm. Denote $\rho(A) := \max\{|\lambda| : \lambda \text{ is an eigenvalue of } A\}$ as the *spectral radius* of A . A matrix A is *convergent* if $\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} (A^k)_{ij} = 0$ for all $i, j \in V$, where $(A^k)_{ij}$ is the (i, j) -th entry of A^k . Let $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ be a vector. We write $\text{diag}(x)$ as the diagonal matrix with main diagonal x . We know that matrix A is convergent if and only if $\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \|A^k\| = 0$ or $\rho(A) < 1$.

2.1. Model. Consider an economy with $n \geq 2$ agents, indexed by $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$. Each agent's economic state is $x_i \in \mathbb{R}$. Agent j 's state depends on the other agents' states:

$$x_j = f_j \left(\sum_{i=1}^n x_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j \right) \quad (j \in N) \quad (1)$$

where $f_j: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is called the *interaction function* describing how shocks and other agents' states affect the agent j , $w_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}$ is the sensitivity extent of interaction between i and j , and $\varepsilon_j \in \mathbb{R}$ is a shock. We call $W := (w_{ij}) \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ as the *sensitivity matrix*, whose entries are w_{ij} . Let $x := (x_1, \dots, x_n)$, $\varepsilon := (\varepsilon_1, \dots, \varepsilon_n)$, and

$$f(xW + \varepsilon) := \left(f_1 \left(\sum_i x_i w_{i1} + \varepsilon_1 \right), \dots, f_n \left(\sum_i x_i w_{in} + \varepsilon_n \right) \right).$$

Equation (1) can be rewritten in the vector form:

$$x = f(xW + \varepsilon).$$

We call (f, W) a *network*. Let \mathbb{P}_ε be the probability distribution of ε with support E_ε . As presented in the following section, economic states can be the outputs in production networks, the decision choice in network games, and the amount of borrowing in financial networks. The model (1) indicates that the agent i 's state influences the agent j 's state if $w_{ij} \neq 0$. The interaction links and network structure can be presented by graph W . The degree of influence of other agents is determined by both the sensitivity w_{ij} and the interaction function f_j .

To illustrate the framework, Figure 1 demonstrates a graph example, where only the paths with non-zero sensitivity ($w_{ij} > 0$) are presented. In the graph, the equilibrium




FIGURE 1

state of the agent 3 depends on the states of all other agents. But, agent 4's and 5's states also depend on agent 3's state, so there exists a feedback loop to agent 3 from agent 4 and 5. We see that the network model is complex, although there are only 5 agents in the network.

Unlike [Acemoglu et al. \(2016b\)](#), we allow heterogeneous interaction functions so that the framework includes more network models. We list the networks embodied in (1) in Section 3.

2.1.1. Eventually Contraction and Non-expansive Network. Observing the production networks, network games, and financial networks from literature (see Section 3.1), we notice that there are generally two categories of assumptions. In the first category, the interaction functions and sensitivity matrix exist contraction properties. For the second category, the interaction functions are non-expansive but bounded, and the sensitivity matrix is non-convergent: stochastic or $\rho(W) = 1$. In detail, we have the following two assumptions.⁴

Assumption 2.1 (Eventually Contracting). $f = (f_i)$ and W satisfy

- (i) f_i is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant β_i for all $i \in N$, and
- (ii) $\rho(|W| \text{diag}(\beta)) < 1$, where $\beta = (\beta_i)$.

Assumption 2.2 (Non-expansive). $f = (f_i)$ and W satisfy

- (i) f_i is increasing, non-expansive, and bounded for all i , and

⁴Recall that the function $f_i: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is bounded if there is $M > 0$ such that $|f_i(t)| \leq M$ for all $t \in \mathbb{R}$. The function f_i is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant β_i if $|f_i(x) - f_i(y)| \leq \beta_i|x - y|$ for all $x, y \in \mathbb{R}$.

- (ii) W is non-negative and $\rho(W) = 1$.

For instance, as illustrated in Section 3.1, the production networks in Carvalho (2008), Acemoglu et al. (2012), Carvalho (2014), Bartelme and Gorodnichenko (2015), Acemoglu et al. (2017), Herskovic (2018), Acemoglu and Azar (2020) and Herskovic et al. (2020), and the network games such as Ballester et al. (2004), Ballester et al. (2006), Zenou (2012), Blume et al. (2015), Cohen-Cole et al. (2015), Zenou (2016), Galeotti et al. (2020) satisfy Assumption 2.1. While, the financial networks in Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Elsinger et al. (2005), Elsinger et al. (2006), Acemoglu et al. (2015b), Acemoglu et al. (2015a) and Liu et al. (2020) satisfy Assumption 2.2.

We say that a network (f, W) is *(eventually) contracting* if f and W satisfy Assumption 2.1 and is *non-expansive* if f and W satisfy Assumption 2.2. Note that the network model is contracting in the sense that arbitrary economic states are closing to equilibrium after the iteration $x \mapsto f(xW + \varepsilon)$, while its physical structure given by matrix W is fixed. We defer the discussion of the details of these two assumptions to Section 3, where we have more concrete examples.

Comparing these two assumptions, Assumption 2.1 does not require the boundedness of the interaction functions, and the sensitivity matrix can be negative. Conversely, Assumption 2.2 supposes that the interaction functions are increasing but bounded, and the sensitivity matrix is non-negative and has a spectral radius of one. In applications, the spectral radius is one as long as the row/column sum is one.

As shown in the main theorems, if a network is eventually contracting, the map $x \mapsto f(xW + \varepsilon)$ is a Banach contraction, and hence the equilibrium is unique. On the other hand, if a network is non-expansive, there exists an almost surely unique equilibrium.

2.1.2. *Equilibrium.* Following Acemoglu et al. (2016b), the equilibrium is defined as follows.

Definition 2.1. Given the realization of the shocks $(\varepsilon_1, \dots, \varepsilon_n)$, an *equilibrium* of the economy is a collection of states (x_1, \dots, x_n) such that equation (1) holds for all agents simultaneously.

In other words, the equilibrium is a vector of values $x = (x_i)_i$ that solves $x = f(xW + \varepsilon)$, given some fixed graph W and realizations of shocks ε . Next, since a network may have multiple equilibria, we define the "almost sure uniqueness of equilibrium".

Definition 2.2. Let $E_\varepsilon \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ denote the set of all possible realizations of shocks ε . Denote the subset M of E_ε by $M := \{\varepsilon \in E_\varepsilon : \text{Equation (1) has multiple equilibria}\}$. A network has *almost surely unique equilibrium*, or *almost sure uniqueness of equilibrium* holds, if the equilibrium exists for $\varepsilon \in E_\varepsilon \setminus M$ and $\mathbb{P}_\varepsilon(M) = 0$, where \mathbb{P}_ε is the distribution of ε .⁵

We say that the equilibrium is *unique almost surely* when the network satisfies Definition 2.2. When almost sure uniqueness of equilibrium holds, the probability that the shocks admit multiple equilibria is zero. Therefore, as we will demonstrate, the distribution of shocks determines whether there are multiple equilibria or not. If the probability distribution of shocks is discrete, then the multiple equilibria may occur with non-zero probability. We do not adopt the terminology of generic uniqueness, defined in Acemoglu et al. (2016b) and discussed in the subsequent remark, to exclude the problematic cases where multiple equilibria exist with strictly positive probability.

Remark 2.1. In this remark, we first list out the assumptions on (f, W, ε) in Acemoglu et al. (2016b) for comparison and then discuss the generic uniqueness and its confusing results. Acemoglu et al. (2016b) consider the model with homogeneous interaction functions $f_i \equiv g$. They assume that g is continuous, increasing, and either contracting or non-expansive but bounded, W is column stochastic, and the shocks ε_i are independently and identically distributed with mean zero and constant variance.⁶ According to Acemoglu et al. (2016b), we define the generic uniqueness of equilibrium as follows.⁷

Definition 2.3. Let $E_\varepsilon \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ denote the set of all possible realizations of ε . Let M denote the set of shocks that admit multiple equilibria (i.e., $M := \{\varepsilon \in E_\varepsilon : \text{Equation (1) has multiple equilibria}\}$.) *Generic uniqueness* holds if the equilibrium exists for all $\varepsilon \in E_\varepsilon \setminus M$, and the Lebesgue measure of M is zero.

⁵Let $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$ be the measure space. The distribution is defined by $\mathbb{P}_\varepsilon(B) := \mathbb{P}(\varepsilon^{-1}(B))$ for all $B \in \mathcal{B}(\mathbb{R})$, where $\mathcal{B}(\mathbb{R})$ is the Borel algebra on \mathbb{R} .

⁶Since W is column stochastic, every agent has constant total dependence on others.

⁷Acemoglu et al. (2016b) explain the generic uniqueness as "...is generically unique, in the sense that the economy has multiple equilibria only for a measure zero set of realizations of agents-level shocks."

Under the above assumptions, [Acemoglu et al. \(2016b\)](#) show the existence and generic uniqueness of equilibrium for any network.⁸ While their result is true, it introduces potential confusion since measure-zero events can also be probability-one events. We show in [Example 2.1](#) that if the shock variable is discrete, there may be an arbitrarily high probability of multiplicity of equilibria. Therefore, if we follow [Definition 2.3](#), then depending on the shock specification, it might be the case that generic uniqueness holds, but the multiplicity of equilibria exists with arbitrarily high probability. Since this causes confusion, we adopt [Definition 2.2](#).

Furthermore, the above assumptions of [Acemoglu et al. \(2016b\)](#) do not nest the networks (4), (7) - (13), since they require that the sensitivity matrix is column stochastic, and the interaction functions are identical $f_i \equiv f$. For instance, network (12) has row stochastic sensitivity matrix and heterogeneous interaction functions, given that \bar{p}_i is not identical for all i . To this end, we show the existence and almost sure uniqueness under more general assumptions embodying more network models. \square

2.2. Existence and Uniqueness. This section presents the main results. We first show that the contraction of both the interaction functions and the sensitivity matrix could lead to the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium under heterogeneous interaction functions. Next, we show that the equilibrium is unique almost surely when the interaction functions are increasing and all non-expansive but bounded, the spectral radius of the sensitivity matrix is equal to one, and the shock is absolutely continuous. We assume the absolute continuity of shocks to preclude the case that multiple equilibria occur with non-zero probability. Moreover, our results apply to any network structure.⁹ All the proofs are presented in the Appendix.

Theorem 2.1. *If Assumption 2.1 holds, then the equilibrium exists and is unique for any $\varepsilon \in E_\varepsilon$.*

⁸[Acemoglu et al. \(2016b\)](#) show the generic uniqueness with the assumption of strong connectedness. They do not provide proof for extending the strongly connected graph to a general graph. We extend their proof to any network in [Section 3](#).

⁹We do not assume a strong connection in the case of non-expansive conditions.

Hence, an eventually contracting network with $\rho(|W| \text{diag}(\beta)) < 1$ always has a unique equilibrium. Theorem 2.1 also implies that we can compute the unique equilibrium by iteration. Fix $\varepsilon \in E_\varepsilon$. Define the mapping $T : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ as

$$Tx := f(xW + \varepsilon). \quad (2)$$

We say that T is *globally stable* on \mathbb{R}^n if T has a unique fixed point $x^* \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and $T^k x \rightarrow x^*$ as $k \rightarrow \infty$ for any $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$. Since the map T is a Banach contraction following the proof of Theorem 2.1, we can compute the equilibrium by iteration is $x^* = \lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} T^k x$ by any initial guess $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$, whence T is globally stable. We summarize the results in the following corollary.

Corollary 2.1. *Suppose that Assumption 2.1 holds. Then, we have*

- (i) T is globally stable.
- (ii) $\|T^{k+1}x - T^k x\| \leq \|(|W| \text{diag}(\beta))^k\| \|Tx - x\|$ for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$ and $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$.

Corollary 2.1 provides the speed of convergence. Since $\rho(|W| \text{diag}(\beta)) < 1$, we can find $m \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $q = \|(|W| \text{diag}(\beta))^m\| < 1$. Then, corollary 2.1 implies that the $\|T^{km+1}x - T^{km}x\| \leq \|(|W| \text{diag}(\beta))^{km}\| \|Tx - x\| \leq q^k \|Tx - x\|$ for all $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and $k \in \mathbb{N}$.

On the other hand, when the network is non-expansive with non-expansive interaction functions and sensitivity matrix of spectral radius one, the Banach contraction property does not exist anymore. However, if we further assume boundedness and order preservation conditions, then we can also pin down equilibrium. In general, any network with increasing and bounded interaction functions admit the greatest and the least equilibrium.

Lemma 2.1. *If f_i is increasing and bounded for all $i \in N$, then the greatest and the least equilibria exist.*

We say that the shock variable ε is *absolutely continuous* if $\lambda(E) = 0$ for $E \in \mathcal{B}(E_\varepsilon)$ implies $P_\varepsilon(E) = 0$, where λ denotes the Lebesgue measure, and $E_\varepsilon \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ is the support of ε . If the shock is absolutely continuous, we can show that the equilibrium is almost surely unique.

Theorem 2.2. *If Assumption 2.2 holds, and the shock variables (ε_i) are absolutely continuous, then the equilibrium exists and is unique almost surely.*

By the Tarski's Fixed Point Theorem and the proof of Theorem 2.2, since f_i is continuous for all i , we can compute the equilibrium by iteration from the bounds. In particular, let ℓ_j and u_j be the lower bound and upper bound of the interaction function for all j , if the network satisfies Assumption 2.2. Then, denoting $u := (u_j)$ and $\ell := (\ell_j)$, the largest equilibrium is $x^* = \lim_{m \rightarrow \infty} T^m u$, where $T : [\ell, u] \rightarrow [\ell, u]$ is defined as (2). If the shocks are absolutely continuous, then Theorem 2.2 shows that x^* is the almost surely unique equilibrium.

Corollary 2.2. *If the assumptions of Theorem 2.2 hold, then the almost surely unique equilibrium is $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} T^n u$.*

Unlike the theorem in Acemoglu et al. (2016b), Theorem 2.2 allows the sensitivity matrix to be either row or column stochastic and not necessarily strongly connected. The sensitivity matrix can also be non-stochastic as long as its spectral radius is one (see Example 4.1). In section 3.2.3, we apply Theorem 2.2 to show that the financial network in Liu et al. (2020) has almost surely unique equilibrium as a concrete example.

Notice that it is possible that a non-expansive network admits multiple equilibria with a positive probability if shocks are not absolute continuity. We explain this by providing a counterexample.

Example 2.1. This example demonstrates that if the shocks are discrete, there may be multiple equilibria under Assumption 2.2. Suppose that there are two agents in the economy, $n = 2$. Let $w_{12} = w_{21} = 1$ and $w_{11} = w_{22} = 0$ satisfy $\sum_h w_{hi} = 1$ for $i = 1, 2$ (see Figure 2). Consider the i.i.d. shock $\varepsilon_i \in \{1, -1\}$ for all i with the equal positive probabilities, $\mathbb{P}(\varepsilon_i = 1) = \mathbb{P}(\varepsilon_i = -1) = 1/2$. Then, the shocks ε_i have mean zero and constant variance so that the conditions in Acemoglu et al. (2016b) are satisfied. Also, consider the interaction function as $f_i \equiv g$ for all i and

$$g(z) = -M \mathbb{1}_{\{z < -M\}}(z) + z \mathbb{1}_{\{-M \leq z \leq M\}}(z) + M \mathbb{1}_{\{z > M\}}(z), \quad (3)$$

where we set $M < \infty$. Then, g is a bounded and non-expansive identity mapping (i.e., $g(z) = z$ if $|z| < M$ and $|g(z)| \leq M$ for all $z \in \mathbb{R}$.)

Suppose that $x = (x_i)$ satisfy $x_1 = g(x_2 + \varepsilon_1)$ and $x_2 = g(x_1 + \varepsilon_2)$. Since g is bounded, we have $-M \leq x_1, x_2 \leq M$. If the realization is $\varepsilon = (\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2) = (1, -1)$, then




FIGURE 2

the system $x = f(xW + \varepsilon)$ gives

$$x_1 = x_2 + 1$$

$$x_2 = x_1 - 1$$

where we assume $-M \leq x_2 + 1, x_1 - 1 \leq M$ and then check the solutions. Thus, the solutions are $x_1 = y + 1$ and $x_2 = y$ with $-M \leq y \leq M - 1$, so there are multiple equilibria if $\varepsilon = (1, -1)$. Similarly, there are multiple equilibria if $\varepsilon = (-1, 1)$. Hence, the set of realization of the shocks generating multiple solutions is $M = \{\varepsilon \in \mathbb{R}^2 : \varepsilon = (1, -1) \text{ or } (-1, 1)\}$, which is measure zero $\lambda(M) = 0$. However, the probability of ε that fails the uniqueness is $\mathbb{P}(\varepsilon \in M) = 1/2$, which is non-zero. \square

To avoid the confusion as Example 2.1 that multiple equilibria occur with non-zero probability, we suppose that the idiosyncratic shocks are *absolutely continuous*.¹⁰ When the shocks are absolutely continuous, the events with measure zero are also occurring with zero probability. Hence, the absolute continuity precludes the case of Example 2.1.

3. EXAMPLES AND EXTENSIONS

In this section, we discuss the conditions for Assumption 2.1 and 2.2. We quote some example models about production networks (Section 3.1.1 and 3.1.2), network games (Section 3.1.3 and 3.1.4) and financial networks (Section 3.1.5, 3.2, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3). It aims to show that these network models have the same mathematical pattern as equation (1) and follow either Assumption 2.1 or Assumption 2.2.

We first consider the eventually contracting network and discuss the cases that f and W satisfy Assumption 2.1 such that $\rho(|W| \text{diag}(\beta)) < 1$. One special case is that

¹⁰Recall that the random variable ε_i is *absolutely continuous* if there is a Lebesgue integrable function g such that $\mathbb{P}(\varepsilon_i \in A) = \int_A g(x) d\lambda$ for all Borel sets A and for all $i \in N$.

the contracting condition can merely depend on the interaction functions. Taking the production network (6) in Section 3.1.2 for example, W is non-negative and its row sum is one, and $\beta_i \equiv (1 - \alpha)$, the spectral radius condition is reduced to $\rho(|W| \text{diag}(\beta)) = (1 - \alpha) < 1$. In this case, the Lipschitz contraction determines the uniqueness of equilibrium.

Generally, unlike Acemoglu et al. (2016b), the contraction condition $\rho(|W| \text{diag}(\beta)) < 1$ depends on both interaction functions and the sensitivity matrix. For instance, we may have

$$W = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 2 \\ 4/7 & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \quad \text{diag}(\beta) = \begin{pmatrix} 5/4 & 0 \\ 0 & 2/3 \end{pmatrix}, \quad W \text{diag}(\beta) = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 4/3 \\ 5/7 & 0 \end{pmatrix}.$$

In this case, we have $\rho(W) > 1$, $\beta_1 > 1$ and $\rho(|W| \text{diag}(\beta)) < 1$.

The spectral radius condition considers the sensitivity matrix by taking the absolute values of all entries $|W|$. We can reduce this condition when W is symmetric. For example, if $W \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ is symmetric and $\beta_i \equiv \varphi$, then the condition is $\rho(|W| \text{diag}(\beta)) = \varphi \rho(W) < 1$.

Furthermore, some networks may have more strict conditions on interaction functions. Except for the Lipschitz continuity, the interaction functions of (4) - (10) in Section 3.1 are linear such that $f_i(a) - f_i(b) = \beta_i(a - b)$ for some $\beta_i > 0$, for all $a, b \in \mathbb{R}$ and for all $i \in N$. In this case, we can reduce the condition to $\rho(W \text{diag}(\beta)) < 1$.¹¹

Corollary 3.1. *If for all $i \in N$ there is $\beta_i > 0$ such that $f_i(a) - f_i(b) = \beta_i(a - b)$ for all $a, b \in \mathbb{R}$, then the condition $\rho(W \text{diag}(\beta)) < 1$ for $W \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ implies the uniqueness of equilibrium for any $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{R}^n$.*

3.1. Networks with Linear Interaction Functions. In this section, we consider a simple framework such that the interaction functions are linear. In this case, the uniqueness of equilibrium follows Corollary 3.1.

3.1.1. Input-Output Analysis. The input-output analysis describes the inter-industry relationship by a matrix tracking the flow of money.¹² It studies how the shock in one sector affects the other sectors' output.¹³ The analysis also helps to identify which

¹¹Note that the entry of W could be negative as Assumption 2.1.

¹²See Miller and Blair (2009) and Miller and Temurshoev (2017) for example.

¹³Fletcher (1989) uses input-output analysis to study the impact of tourism.

industry or region is the most significant to optimize aggregate economy, The model is briefly introduced as below.

There are n industries in a closed economy with no inventories. Each industry $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ requires $w_{ij} \in [0, 1]$ dollar amount of intermediate input from industry $j \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ to produce one dollar of i 's output. Input-output tables determine the linkage weights between sectors w_{ij} empirically.¹⁴ For every industry $j \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, the gross output x_j equals the total value of its use as a final good ε_j and its use as an intermediate input to other industries:

$$x_j = \varepsilon_j + \sum_i x_i w_{ij}. \quad (4)$$

That is, the sale of industry j to other sectors is $\sum_i x_i w_{ij}$. To compute the equilibrium, it is conventional to assume that every sector has some inputs from labor or other value-added, so that $\sum_j w_{ij} < 1$ for all i . Let $x = (x_i)$, $\varepsilon = (\varepsilon_i) \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and $W = (w_{ij}) \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$. The vector form of equation (4) is $x = \varepsilon + xW$. Since the row sum of W is less than one, the matrix $(I - W)$ is non-singular. The unique equilibrium of output is $x = \varepsilon(I - W)^{-1}$, where $(I - W)^{-1}$ is known as Leontief inverse.

3.1.2. Production Networks. This subsection presents the production network of [Long and Plosser \(1983\)](#), [Carvalho \(2008\)](#), [Acemoglu et al. \(2012\)](#), [Acemoglu et al. \(2016a\)](#), [Acemoglu et al. \(2017\)](#), [Carvalho and Tahbaz-Salehi \(2019\)](#) and [Acemoglu and Azar \(2020\)](#). The production network investigates how the heterogeneous shock to an individual sector can generate aggregate fluctuations, given the supplier-customer interconnections in a production network. Moreover, the network model illustrates that such aggregate fluctuation and the cascade effect of shocks are correlated with the structure of the networks ([Carvalho \(2008\)](#) and [Acemoglu et al. \(2012\)](#)).

The economy has n competitive sectors. Each sector's output x_j follows the production function:

$$y_j = z_j^\alpha \ell_j^\alpha \prod_{i=1}^n y_{ij}^{(1-\alpha)w_{ij}}$$

where z_j denotes the productivity shock, ℓ_j denotes the labor input, $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ is the share of labor, y_{ij} is the intermediate input from sector i used in the production of good j , and $w_{ij} \geq 0$ is the share of intermediate input i in the total intermediate

¹⁴See [Timmer et al. \(2015\)](#).

input. It is supposed that $\sum_i w_{ij} = 1$ for all $j = 1, \dots, n$. Let p_j be the price of good j and h be the labor wage. Producers maximize their profits:

$$\max_{\ell_j, y_{1j}, \dots, y_{nj}} p_j y_j - h \ell_j - \sum_{i=1}^n p_i y_{ij}$$

The optimal labor input is $\ell_j = \alpha p_j y_j / h$ and the intermediate input is $y_{ij} = (1 - \alpha) w_{ij} p_j y_j / p_i$. The representative household with Cobb-Douglas preferences solves the optimal problem:

$$\max_{c_1, \dots, c_n} u(c_1, \dots, c_n) = A \prod_{j=1}^n c_j^{1/n} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_j p_j c_j = h \sum_j \ell_j$$

where c_j is the consumption of good h , and A is a normalization constant. Normalizing the total labor supply $\sum_i \ell_i = 1$, the first order condition of the optimal consumption gives $c_j = h / (n p_j)$. The clearing condition of commodity market, from equation (4), is $y_j = c_j + \sum_k y_{jk}$. Then, we have

$$p_j y_j = \frac{h}{n} + (1 - \alpha) \sum_{k=1}^n w_{jk} p_k y_k \quad (5)$$

Let $\hat{y}_j = p_j y_j$, $\hat{y} = (\hat{y}_j) \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and $W = (w_{ij}) \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$. The vector form of clearing condition is $\hat{y} = (h/n) \mathbf{1} + (1 - \alpha) \hat{y} W^\top$. Since the row sum of $(1 - \alpha) W^\top$ is strictly less than one, $[I - (1 - \alpha) W^\top]$ is non-singular. Thus, we have $\hat{y} = (h/n) \mathbf{1} [I - (1 - \alpha) W^\top]^{-1}$. Defining $b := \mathbf{1} [I - (1 - \alpha) W^\top]^{-1}$, we write $p_j y_j = b_j h / n$. Hence, it yields $\ell_j = \alpha b_j / n$ and $y_{ij} = (1 - \alpha) w_{ij} y_i b_j / b_i$, so the production function gives

$$\log y_j = \mu_j + \alpha \log z_j + (1 - \alpha) \sum_i (\log y_i) w_{ij}$$

where μ_j is some constant.¹⁵ Denote $x_j = \log y_j$ and $\varepsilon_j = (\mu_j + \alpha \log z_j) / (1 - \alpha)$, it delivers

$$x_j = (1 - \alpha) \left(\sum_i x_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j \right) \quad (6)$$

The equilibrium output is $x = \varepsilon [I - (1 - \alpha) W]^{-1}$. Overall, there are two simple network equations (5) and (6).

¹⁵ $\mu_j = \log(b_j (\alpha/n)^\alpha (1 - \alpha)^{1-\alpha}) + (1 - \alpha) \sum_i w_{ij} \log(w_{ij}/b_i)$.

3.1.3. Simple Network Games. In a social network game, an agent's payoff or well-being not only depends on her action, but also depends on her neighbors' actions. Social network influences decision behavior, such as committing a crime and lending decision (Ballester et al. (2004) and Cohen-Cole et al. (2015)). Consider a simple network game as Zenou (2012), Zenou (2016) and Galeotti et al. (2020). There are n players in a social network, and the social connection is represented by graph W . If agent i is connected with agent j , then $w_{ij} = 1$; otherwise, $w_{ij} = 0$. Moreover, assume that $w_{ii} = 0$ for all $i = 1, \dots, n$ by convention. Thus, $W = (w_{ij})$ is an adjacency matrix with entry w_{ij} . Assume that it is a game of strategic complement with perfect information such that players know everything about the network. Agents choose the actions $x_j \in \mathbb{R}_+$ to maximize their payoffs:

$$u_j(x_1, \dots, x_n) = \alpha_j x_j - \frac{1}{2} x_j^2 + \varphi \sum_{i=1}^n w_{ij} x_i x_j$$

where $\alpha_j > 0$ is the exogenous heterogeneity capturing individual characteristics, $\alpha_j x_j - (1/2)x_j^2$ is the individual benefits, $\varphi \in \mathbb{R}$ specifies the degree of payoff from peer influence, and $\varphi \sum_{i=1}^n w_{ij} x_i x_j$ is the peer influence depends on the location of agents. Hence, every agent's payoff depends on her own action and the other agents' actions. The best-reply function in equilibrium is

$$x_j = \alpha_j + \varphi \sum_{i=1}^n x_i w_{ij} = \varphi \left(\sum_{i=1}^n x_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j \right) \quad (7)$$

where we let $\varepsilon_j = \alpha_j/\varphi$. For the equilibrium, suppose that $\varphi \rho(W) < 1$ so that φW is non-singular. The unique Nash equilibrium is $x^* = \varepsilon(I - \varphi W)^{-1}$. Note that we call ε_j as the shock in our model, but in a network game it captures the observable characteristics of individual j such that it is exogenous.

3.1.4. Network Games with Global and Local Interaction. Ballester et al. (2006) consider both the global substitutability and local influence complementarity in network games. They investigate how to identify the "key player" that, once removed, causes the maximal decrease in aggregate activity. The model is similar to the simple network game in the previous section. Let $G = (g_{ij})$ be the adjacency matrix such that $g_{ii} = 0$ for all $i = 1, \dots, n$, and $g_{ij} = 1$ if i and j are connected and $g_{ij} = 0$ otherwise. Following the setup in the previous section, given the action profile (x_i) , each agent

j has the alternative payoff:

$$u_j(x_1, \dots, x_n) = \alpha_j x_j - \frac{1}{2}(\eta - \gamma)x_j^2 - \gamma \sum_{i=1}^n x_i x_j + \varphi \sum_{i=1}^n g_{ij} x_i x_j$$

where $\alpha_j > 0$ for all j , $\eta, \varphi > 0$, $\gamma \geq 0$, and $\gamma \sum_{i=1}^n x_i x_j$ denotes the global interaction of substitute effect across all agents, and the last term represents the local interaction of strategic complement as the before. The best-reply function is:

$$x_j = \frac{\alpha_j}{\eta} - \frac{\gamma}{\eta} \sum_{i=1}^n x_i + \frac{\varphi}{\eta} \sum_{i=1}^n x_i g_{ij} = \frac{\varphi}{\eta} \left(\sum_{i=1}^n x_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j \right) \quad (8)$$

where $w_{ij} = g_{ij} - \gamma/\varphi$ and $\varepsilon_j = \alpha_j/\varphi$. We see that the best-reply function (8) has the same form as (1).

Denote $J \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ as the square matrix of ones. The Nash equilibrium solves $\eta x^* = \alpha - \gamma x^* J + \varphi x^* G$, where $\alpha = (\alpha_i)$. If $(\eta I + \gamma J - \varphi G)$ or $(\varphi/\eta)W$ is non-singular, then the Nash equilibrium is $\alpha(\eta I + \gamma J - \varphi G)^{-1}$.¹⁶

For example, [Cohen-Cole et al. \(2015\)](#) presents an interbank lending network with the same features. They consider a network with n banks in a lending market, and the adjacency matrix is that $g_{ij} = 1$ if bank j makes a loan to bank i and $g_{ij} = 0$ otherwise. Each bank j has the profit function given its volume of loans x_j to other banks:

$$\pi_j = p x_j - c_j x_j = \left(\theta - \sum_{i=1}^n x_i \right) x_j - \left(c_{0,j} - \varphi_j \sum_{i=1}^n x_i g_{ij} \right) x_j$$

where the $p = \theta - \sum_{i=1}^n x_i$ is price of loans determining the interest rate, and $c_j = c_{0,j} - \varphi_j \sum_{i=1}^n x_i g_{ij}$ is the marginal cost, with $\theta > 0$ and $c_{0,j}, \varphi_j > 0$ for all j . The parameter φ_j specifies the cost cut induced by each link of loan due to the collaboration between banks. Hence, since the profit increases in the links between banks, it implies local strategic competitiveness. Also, since the price is decreasing in the aggregate quantity of loans, there is global strategic substitutability. Under competition, each bank decides the quantity of loan to maximize its profit, so the first order condition gives

$$x_j = (\theta - c_{0,j}) - \sum_{i=1}^n x_i + \varphi_j \sum_{i=1}^n x_i g_{ij} = \varphi_j \left(\sum_{i=1}^n x_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j \right) \quad (9)$$

¹⁶We can further solve the Nash equilibrium. Suppose that W is non-singular. Then x^* is unique and $\bar{x}^* := \sum_j x_j^*$ is constant. We further assume that $\varphi \rho(G) < \eta$. Since $x^* J = \bar{x}^* \mathbf{1}$, we also have $x^* = (\alpha - \gamma \bar{x}^* \mathbf{1})(\eta I - \varphi G)^{-1}$. Then, we can find that $\bar{x}^* = \bar{b}_\alpha / (1 + \gamma \bar{b})$, where $b_\alpha = \alpha(\eta I - \varphi G)^{-1}$, $b = \mathbf{1}(\eta I - \varphi G)^{-1}$, $\bar{b}_\alpha = b_\alpha \mathbf{1}^\top$, and $\bar{b} = b \mathbf{1}^\top$. The Nash equilibrium is $x^* = b_\alpha - \gamma[\bar{b}_\alpha / (1 + \gamma \bar{b})]b$.

where we let $w_{ij} = g_{ij} - 1$ and $\varepsilon_j = (\theta - c_{0,j})/\varphi_j$. In this example, the interaction functions are different, since the coefficients φ_j may be heterogeneous.

3.1.5. Network with Cross-Holdings. [Elliott et al. \(2014\)](#) consider a financial network with cross-holdings and study the cascade effect of financial failure, which has the same form as input-output analysis (4). In their framework, banks own some share of the other banks by lending or investment, so banks' values depend on other banks' holding assets. They show that the cascade effect depends on network interconnections, in the sense that integration and diversification lead to different non-monotonic effects. They consider an economy with n financial institutions or banks, indexed $j = 1, \dots, n$. Each organization holds a basket of primitive assets, indexed $h = 1, \dots, m$, which could be some projects that create cash flows. The share of asset h that organization j holds is denoted $b_{hj} \geq 0$. The market price of the asset h is denoted as p_h .

Organizations crossly hold some shares of the other organizations in the networks. For all $i, j = 1, \dots, n$, let d_{ij} be the debt that organization i has to repay to j or the amount of fund invested in organization i by organization j . Define $w_{ij} := d_{ij}/x_i$. Hence, organization j owns $w_{ij} \in [0, 1)$ fraction of the values of organization i . Assume that $w_{ii} = 0$ for all i . Denote the book value or equity of organization j as x_j . The book value x_j is the total asset value that j owns (i.e., the book total value of its primitive assets and its claims on other organizations.)

$$x_j = \sum_{h=1}^m p_h b_{hj} + \sum_{i=1}^n d_{ij} = \varepsilon_j + \sum_{i=1}^n x_i w_{ij} \quad (10)$$

where $\varepsilon_j = \sum_{h=1}^m p_h b_{hj}$. Assume that external investors hold strictly positive shares of organization i , i.e., $1 - \sum_{j \in I} w_{ij} > 0$. Then, W is non-singular and the equilibrium equity is given by $x = \varepsilon(I - W)^{-1}$.

3.2. Non-linear Interaction Functions: Financial Networks. In this part, we discuss the conditions for the uniqueness of equilibrium in financial interbank lending networks such as [Eisenberg and Noe \(2001\)](#), [Cifuentes et al. \(2005\)](#) and [Acemoglu et al. \(2015a\)](#). Their canonical models are used to study the contagion of default under the conditions of proportional repayments of liabilities, limited liability, and absolute priority of debt over equity. For instance, [Glasserman and Young \(2015\)](#)

bound the probability of default due to contagion when there is a bank that suffers the shock.

There are n risk-neutral banks in the network as the previous section. Each bank i has the nominal liability δ_{ij} to bank j . The total liability obligation of i is $\bar{p}_i = \sum_j \delta_{ij}$. Define relative liability as $w_{ij} = \delta_{ij}/\bar{p}_i$ if $\bar{p}_i > 0$ and $w_{ij} = 0$ otherwise.¹⁷ Assume that $\sum_j w_{ij} = 1$ for all i , in the sense that there is no payment to agents outside the network. All banks have the exogenous cash flow $\varepsilon_j \geq 0$, which can be interpreted as the net asset from outside the financial network. Let x_j be the clearing repayment for all $j = 1, \dots, n$ in equilibrium. Suppose that proportional repayment of liability holds: bank i 's clearing payments to bank j is proportional to its relative liability $x_i w_{ij}$. The amount of total repayment received by j from other banks is $\sum_i x_i w_{ij}$. Suppose that, in equilibrium, all banks follow the conditions of limited liability, $x_j \leq \sum_i x_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j$, and absolute priority, either $x_j = \bar{p}_j$ or $x_j = \sum_i x_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j$. The clearing payment x_j in equilibrium solves

$$x_j = \min \left\{ \sum_i x_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j, \bar{p}_j \right\} \quad (11)$$

for all j . Observe that the interaction functions are

$$f_j(t) = t \mathbb{1}_{\{t < \bar{p}_j\}}(t) + \bar{p}_j \mathbb{1}_{\{t \geq \bar{p}_j\}}(t)$$

for all j . We introduce the assumptions in [Glasserman and Young \(2015\)](#) for the uniqueness of equilibrium, which supposes $\sum_j w_{ij} \leq 1$. We write $i \rightarrow j$ if j is *accessible* from i for $i, j \in N$: $w_{ij}^k > 0$ for some $k \in \mathbb{N}$, where w_{ij}^k is the (i, j) entry of W^k . [Glasserman and Young \(2015\)](#) assume that for every bank i either it has some debt outside the network $\sum_j w_{ij} < 1$, or there is a bank t such that $i \rightarrow t$ (an obligation path from i to t), and bank t has external debt such that $\sum_j w_{tj} < 1$. Under this assumption, W is convergent, and then the clearing payment (11) is unique. To see why uniqueness holds under [Glasserman and Young \(2015\)](#), since $\beta_i \equiv 1$ in (11), it is sufficient to show that $\rho(W) < 1$ when the above conditions hold.

We say that W is *weakly chained substochastic* if W is row substochastic and for each $i \in N$, either $\sum_j w_{ij} < 1$, or there exists $t \in N$ such that $i \rightarrow t$ and $\sum_j w_{tj} < 1$. We can check the convergence of W by weakly chained substochasticity (see [Azimzadeh \(2019\)](#) and Lemma A.6.)

¹⁷The sensitivity matrix (w_{ij}) is also called as the *relative liability matrix* in Eisenberg-Noe model.

We briefly discuss some intuition behind Lemma A.6 and weekly chained convergence. The convergence can be seen by considering a simple case: if $\sum_j w_{ij} \leq 1$ for all i , and for all $i \in N$ there is $t \in N$ such that $i \rightarrow t$ in one step ($w_{it} > 0$) and $\sum_j w_{tj} < 1$, then we can show that $\sum_k w_{ik}^2 = \sum_k \sum_j w_{ij} w_{jk} = \sum_j w_{ij} \sum_k w_{jk} = \sum_{j \neq t} w_{ij} \sum_k w_{jk} + w_{it} \sum_k w_{tk} < 1$ for all i . Hence, the row sums of W^2 are all strictly less than one. It implies that $\|W^2\|_\infty < 1$ so that $\rho(W) < 1$ and W is convergent. We summarize the discussion using the following lemma.

Lemma 3.1. *If f_i is non-expansive for all $i \in N$, W is non-negative, and either W or W^\top is weakly chained substochastic, then Assumption 2.1 holds.*

Lemma 3.1 implies that some network structure of graph W gives the convergence. For instance, Assumption 2.1 holds as long as the network structure is *acyclic* such that there exists no feedback effect: i is not accessible from j whenever j is accessible from i for all $i \neq j \in V$.

Lemma 3.2. *If f_i is Lipschitz continuous for all i , and $W \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ is such that graph W is acyclic, then Assumption 2.1 holds.*

For the following lemma, we say that W is irreducible if $\sum_k W^k \gg 0$.

Lemma 3.3. *If f_i is non-expansive for all $i \in N$, W is non-negative, row (column) substochastic and irreducible, and there is $t \in N$ such that $\sum_j w_{tj} < 1$ ($\sum_j w_{jt} < 1$), then Assumption 2.1 holds.*

Eisenberg and Noe (2001), instead, show that the clearing payment is unique if the financial network is regular.¹⁸ In the rest part of this section, we apply the proof of Theorem 2.2 to show the uniqueness of Eisenberg and Noe (2001) model without regularity or weekly chained substochasticity, which is also shown in Stachurski (2022)¹⁹.

The proof of Theorem 2.2 implies that the set of shocks that admit the multiple equilibria is Lebesgue measure zero. If we can further preclude the realization of such shocks, we can guarantee the uniqueness of equilibrium. Eisenberg-Noe model (11)

¹⁸The *risk orbit* of the bank i is the set that i has a directed path to all nodes in the set. The system is *regular* if any risk orbit has at least one node i with positive cash flow $\varepsilon_i > 0$.

¹⁹Stachurski (2022) shows the same result beautifully by Du's theorem.

of clearing payment is a special case that it precludes the possibility of such shocks. It can be shown that the multiple equilibria occur only if $\varepsilon \mathbf{1}^\top = 0$ in Eisenberg-Noe network (11). Recall that the cash flows are non-negative $\varepsilon \geq 0$ in Eisenberg-Noe model. Hence, if we further assume that there exists some $i \in N$ such that $\varepsilon_i > 0$, the equilibrium is always unique.

Corollary 3.2. *Let f , W and ε follow Eisenberg-Noe model (11). That is, $f_j(t) = t \mathbb{1}_{\{t < \bar{p}_j\}}(t) + \bar{p}_j \mathbb{1}_{\{t \geq \bar{p}_j\}}(t)$ for some $\bar{p}_j > 0$ for all j , W is non-negative and row stochastic, and $\varepsilon \geq 0$. Then, if $\varepsilon > 0$, the equilibrium is unique.*

Since by convention we can set the equilibrium to be zero for all agents if $\varepsilon = 0$ in Eisenberg-Noe model, Corollary 3.2 implies that the equilibrium is unique for any ε . Therefore, the uniqueness of clearing payment holds without regularity or weekly chained substochasticity. Staum et al. (2016) assume that every bank has strictly positive external assets for the uniqueness of clearing payment. Amini et al. (2016) also assumes that either all banks hold external assets or the total of external assets is nonzero so that the conditions of in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) are satisfied.²⁰ Corollary 3.2 implies that we only need one bank with positive external assets to have unique clearing payments.

3.2.1. Extended Eisenberg-Noe Network. Acemoglu et al. (2015a) and Acemoglu et al. (2015b) consider the Eisenberg-Noe network with senior liability and asset liquidation and show that the contagion of financial default depends on both the magnitude of shock and the network structure. In their setting, the shock ε_j could be negative. In detail, each bank can liquidate its assets to pay the debt. Let ℓ_j be the liquidation decision for all j . Assume that banks can only recover $\zeta \in [0, 1]$ fraction of the value of a liquidated project. The repayment decision is

$$x_j = \max \left\{ \min \left\{ \sum_i x_i w_{ij} + c_j + z_j - \nu + \zeta \ell_j, \bar{p}_j \right\}, 0 \right\}$$

where c_j is the cash, z_j is the project return, and ν is the senior liability. A bank's ability to fulfill its liability depends on its resources, including the received repayments from the bank's debtors, its hoarding cash, the return of the invested project minus the senior liability, and the liquidated asset of the project. Except for the rules of

²⁰Amini et al. (2016) studies the equilibrium of Eisenberg-Noe interbank network with asset liquidation, which affects the equilibrium price for the illiquid asset.

limited liability and absolute priority, banks repay nothing if the total cash flow is negative that $\sum_i x_i w_{ij} + c_j + z_j - \nu + \zeta \ell_j < 0$. Moreover, each bank decides the amount of liquidation:

$$\ell_j = \max \left\{ \min \left\{ \frac{1}{\zeta} \left(\bar{p}_j - \sum_i x_i w_{ij} - e_j \right), A \right\}, 0 \right\}$$

where $e_j = c_j + z_j - \nu$ and A is the total value of the invested project. A Bank can liquidate a fraction of its invested project, with value A to meet the shortfall of liability $\bar{p}_j - \sum_i x_i w_{ij} - e_j$. [Acemoglu et al. \(2015a\)](#) show that the payment in equilibrium satisfies.²¹

$$x_j = \max \left\{ \min \left\{ \sum_i x_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j, \bar{p}_j \right\}, 0 \right\} \quad (12)$$

where $\varepsilon_j = c_j + \xi_j - \nu + \zeta A$ could be negative. In particular, the interaction functions are

$$f_j(t) = t \mathbb{1}_{\{0 < t < \bar{p}_j\}}(t) + \bar{p}_j \mathbb{1}_{\{t \geq \bar{p}_j\}}(t)$$

for all j . [Acemoglu et al. \(2015a\)](#) show that the clearing payment is generically unique for a strongly connected network.²² Their proof also shows that the clearing payment (11) of Eisenberg-Noe network is unique, given a strongly connected network. As shown in Example 2.1, there exists confusion that multiple equilibria occur with arbitrarily high probability. Theorem 2.2 shows that the equilibrium is unique almost surely if the shock is absolutely continuous. We discuss the computation method in Section 4.4.

As we see in Example 2.1, the proof of Theorem 2.2 implies if there exist multiple equilibria, there must be some strongly connected subgraph.²³ It also shows that all agents who have multiple equilibria must be in or accessible from some strongly connected subgraph, where all agents in this subgraph admit multiple equilibria.²⁴

Corollary 3.3. *Let (f, W) be such that Assumption 2.2 holds. Given the shocks, if there are multiple equilibria, then any agents having multiple equilibria must be*

²¹See Lemma B2 of [Acemoglu et al. \(2015a\)](#)

²²See Definition 2.3 for the definition of generic uniqueness.

²³A graph $S = (V_S, E_S)$ is a *subgraph* of graph A if $V_S \subset V$ and $E_S \subset E$.

²⁴To prevent confusion, although we assume absolute continuity of shock in Theorem 2.2, we can specify the realized shocks or relax the absolute continuity so that there exists multiplicity, if we want.

accessible from some agents in a strongly connected subgraph S , which admits multiple equilibria.

3.2.2. Financial Network with Bankruptcy Cost. This subsection introduces another generalized Eisenberg-Noe model with bankruptcy cost in [Glasserman and Young \(2015\)](#) and [Glasserman and Young \(2016\)](#).²⁵ Consider a relative liability matrix (w_{ij}) as the previous subsection. Suppose that when each bank $j = 1, \dots, n$ defaults, its asset is further reduced by

$$\alpha_j \left[\bar{p}_j - \left(\sum_i x_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j \right) \right]$$

up to a maximum reduction such that the assets are entirely eliminated. In other words, a large shortfall of liability generates a higher bankruptcy cost than a small shortfall. Then, the clearing payment is

$$\begin{aligned} x_j &= \min \left\{ \max \left\{ \sum_i x_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j - \alpha_j \left[\bar{p}_j - \left(\sum_i x_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j \right) \right], 0 \right\}, \bar{p}_j \right\} \\ &= \min \left\{ \max \left\{ (1 + \alpha_j) \left(\sum_i x_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j \right) - \alpha_j \bar{p}_j, 0 \right\}, \bar{p}_j \right\} \end{aligned} \quad (13)$$

Hence, the interaction functions can be written as²⁶

$$f_j(t) = ((1 + \alpha_j)t - \alpha_j \bar{p}_j) \mathbb{1}_{\{0 \leq (1 + \alpha_j)t - \alpha_j \bar{p}_j < \bar{p}_j\}}(t) + \bar{p}_j \mathbb{1}_{\{t \geq \bar{p}_j\}}(t)$$

for all j , where $\mathbb{1}_A(t)$ is the indicator function with $A \subset \mathbb{R}$.

Following [Glasserman and Young \(2015\)](#) and [Glasserman and Young \(2016\)](#), when $\alpha_i \equiv \alpha$, the clearing payment is unique if $(1 + \alpha) \max_i \sum_j w_{ij} < 1$, which implies that $(1 + \alpha)W$ is non-singular and Assumption 2.1 holds.

3.2.3. Financial Network with Equity Insolvency and Illiquidity. Following Eisenberg-Noe model, [Liu et al. \(2020\)](#) consider a financial lending network that banks are exposed to lending and borrowing with different maturities. They show that the U.S. banking network has diminished its system risk of contagion and illiquidity from 2011 to 2014.

²⁵The bankruptcy costs include auditing, accounting, and legal costs, and the losses associated with asset liquidation.

²⁶For the last term, $\mathbb{1}_{\{(1 + \alpha_j)t - \alpha_j \bar{p}_j \geq \bar{p}_j\}}(\bar{p}_j) = \mathbb{1}_{\{t \geq \bar{p}_j\}}(\bar{p}_j)$.

Consider that for each bank i the asset in its balance sheet equals to the sum of overnight lending, short-term lending, long-term lending, cash and cash equivalents ε_i and other assets OA_i , while the liability consists of overnight borrowing, short-term borrowing, other liability OL_i and equity E_i . Each period t , bank i has an obligation to repay some fraction of overnight, short-term, and long-term liability δ_{ij} to bank j . The total liability obligation is \bar{p}_i in the period t . The relative liability matrix (w_{ij}) is defined as before that $w_{ij} = \delta_{ij}/\bar{p}_i$ if $\bar{p}_i > 0$ and $w_{ij} = 0$ otherwise, so that (w_{ij}) is non-negative. Assume that $\sum_j w_{ij} \leq 1$ following [Liu et al. \(2020\)](#). Let Q_{ij} be the remainder of all loan obligations that i has to repay j , including overnight market, short-term and long-term loans, at the end of the period. Let x_i be the realized payment made at the end of the period. Define the equity

$$E_i = \sum_h x_h w_{hi} + \varepsilon_i - \bar{p}_i + \left(\sum_h Q_{hi} - \sum_j Q_{ij} \right) + (OA_i - OL_i)$$

Denote $B_i := \sum_h Q_{hi} - \sum_j Q_{ij} + OA_i - OL_i$ as the net remaining and other assets. Each bank fails to repay in full if either it is illiquid due to insufficient cash and incoming payment or it is insolvent so its equities are negative $E_i < 0$. The payment in equilibrium satisfies:

$$x_i = \min \left\{ \left[\sum_h x_h w_{hi} + \varepsilon_i \right]^+, \left[\sum_h x_h w_{hi} + \varepsilon_i + B_i \right]^+, \bar{p}_i \right\} \quad (14)$$

where $[z]^+ := \max\{z, 0\}$ for $z \in \mathbb{R}$. The interaction functions are

$$f_i(t) = \min \{ [t]^+, [t + B_i]^+, \bar{p}_i \}$$

for all i . [Liu et al. \(2020\)](#) show that the equilibrium payment exists. We further show that it is almost surely unique when W is stochastic and unique when W is convergent. We have $0 \leq W \leq 1$ and for agent j

$$\begin{aligned} x_j &= \min \left\{ \left[\sum_i x_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j \right]^+, \left[\sum_i x_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j + B_j \right]^+, \bar{p}_j \right\} \\ &= \begin{cases} \min \{ [\sum_i x_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j]^+, \bar{p}_j \} & \text{if } B_j \geq 0, \\ \min \{ [\sum_i x_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j + B_j]^+, \bar{p}_j \} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

Then, the interaction function is

$$f_j(z) = \begin{cases} z \mathbb{1}_{\{0 \leq z < \bar{p}_j\}}(z) + \bar{p}_j \mathbb{1}_{\{z \geq \bar{p}_j\}}(z) & \text{if } B_j \geq 0, \\ (z + B_j) \mathbb{1}_{\{0 \leq z + B_j < \bar{p}_j\}}(z) + \bar{p}_j \mathbb{1}_{\{z + B_j \geq \bar{p}_j\}}(z) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Clearly, f_j is increasing and bounded for all j . By figure 2, we know that the interaction function is non-expansive for either $B_j \geq 0$ or $B_j < 0$. When the shock is absolutely continuous, Theorem 2.2 shows that the clearing payment is unique almost surely when W is stochastic. On the other side, if W is weakly chained substochastic or $\rho(W) < 1$, the clearing payment is unique by Theorem 2.1.

4. COMPARATIVE STATICS, TIGHTNESS AND BOUNDEDNESS

In this section, we first study the comparative statics of how the increase in interaction functions, sensitivity matrix, and shocks affect the equilibrium. We further investigate the tightness of the conditions of Assumption 2.1 and the requirement of boundedness in Assumption 2.2. We discuss an example to show that the spectral radius condition of Assumption 2.1 could be also a necessary condition. We then argue the boundedness condition is essential in Assumption 2.2. In Section 4.4, we consider an algorithm to compute the equilibrium when the interaction functions are bounded identity maps as financial network (12).

4.1. Comparative Statics. This section presents some simple comparative statics between two networks. We show that the equilibrium is increasing in the shock, ε , holding all other things constant. Moreover, *ceteris paribus*, when a network has a dominant interaction function, it has a greater equilibrium. We also see that the rise in strength of interactions also increases the equilibrium. These results are valid under both Assumption 2.1 and Assumption 2.2. In detail, we have the following two lemmas.

Lemma 4.1. *Let (f, W, ε) and (f', W', ε') be two networks satisfying Assumption 2.1, and denote their corresponding equilibrium as \hat{x} and \hat{x}' , respectively. If f_i and f'_i are increasing functions for all $i \in N$, $f_i(t) \leq f'_i(t)$ for all $t \in \mathbb{R}$ and all i , $W \leq W'$, and $\varepsilon \leq \varepsilon'$, then $\hat{x} \leq \hat{x}'$.*

Lemma 4.2. *Let (f, W, ε) and (f', W', ε') be two networks satisfying Assumption 2.2 such that they have unique equilibrium, denoted by \hat{x} and \hat{x}' , respectively. Suppose*

that for all i we have $f_i(t) \leq u_i$ and $f'_i(t) \leq u'_i$ for all $t \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $u_i \leq u'_i$. If $f_i(t) \leq f'_i(t)$ for all $t \in \mathbb{R}$ and all i , $W \leq W'$, and $\varepsilon \leq \varepsilon'$, then $\hat{x} \leq \hat{x}'$.

These two lemmas imply that the equilibrium is increasing in the shock, the sensitivity matrix, or the interaction functions. When we add edges or increase the weight of edges in a network, since the interaction functions are increasing, the strengthened interconnections lead to greater equilibrium.

About Lemma 4.2, note that it is possible that for two sensitivity matrices $W, W' \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ we have $\rho(W) = \rho(W') = 1$ while $W \leq W'$. For example, the sensitivity matrices in Example 4.1 both have spectral radius one. However, if we restrict the sensitivity matrix to a stochastic matrix, then we should fix $W = W'$ in Lemma 4.2, otherwise the row or column sum is not one anymore.

Example 4.1. Consider the following specifications for f, W and ε as

$$\begin{aligned} f_i^a(t) &:= \min\{\max\{t, 0\}, 2\}, \quad \forall i & \varepsilon^a &:= (0.2, -0.6, -0.2, 0.2) \\ f_i^b(t) &:= \min\{\max\{t, 0.1\}, 2\}, \quad \forall i & \varepsilon^b &:= (0.2, 0, -0.2, 0.2), \end{aligned}$$

and

$$W^a := \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 2 & 0 & 0 \\ 0.5 & 0 & 0.5 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0.8 \\ 0 & 0 & 0.8 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \quad W^b := \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 2 & 0.1 & 0.8 \\ 0.5 & 0 & 0.8 & 0.1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0.9 \\ 0 & 0 & 0.9 & 0 \end{pmatrix}. \quad (15)$$

The equilibrium for $(f^a, W^a, \varepsilon^a)$ is $(0.2, 0, 0, 0.2)$, the equilibrium for $(f^b, W^a, \varepsilon^a)$ is $(0.25, 0.1, 0.1, 0.28)$, the equilibrium for $(f^a, W^b, \varepsilon^a)$ is $(0.2, 0, 0.7579, 1.0421)$, the equilibrium for $(f^a, W^a, \varepsilon^b)$ is $(1.2, 2, 2, 1.8)$, and the equilibrium for $(f^b, W^b, \varepsilon^b)$ is $(1.2, 2, 2, 2)$. Last, for the network with both W^a and W^b , the multiplicity exists if $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{R}^4$ satisfies $2\varepsilon_1 + \varepsilon_2 = 0$. This condition does not hold almost surely if the shock is absolutely continuous. \square

4.2. Tightness of Condition. In some cases, the spectral radius condition in Assumption 2.1, $\rho(|W| \text{diag}(\beta)) < 1$, can be the necessary condition for the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. For example, consider the system with two agents such that the interaction function is $f_i(t) = \sqrt{t^2}$ for all $t \in \mathbb{R}$ for all $i = 1, 2$, and the realization of shocks are positive $\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2 > 0$. Assume that agents' states do not affect

themselves and have a positive influence on each other, such that $w_{11} = w_{22} = 0$ and $w_{12}, w_{21} > 0$:

$$W = c \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ \lambda & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

where $\lambda, c > 0$. Then, the interaction functions are Lipschitz continuous with a Lipschitz constant $\beta_i = 1$ for $i = 1, 2$. Further, we can see that the eigenvalues of W are $\pm c\sqrt{\lambda}$, whence the spectral radius is less than one, $\rho(W) < 1$, if and only if $c^2\lambda < 1$. Now, the equilibrium follows

$$\begin{aligned} x_1 &= \sqrt{(c\lambda x_2 + \varepsilon_1)^2} = c\lambda x_2 + \varepsilon_1 \\ x_2 &= \sqrt{(cx_1 + \varepsilon_2)^2} = cx_1 + \varepsilon_2. \end{aligned}$$

for $x_1, x_2 \in [0, \infty)$. Since we can show that this system has a unique solution if and only if $c^2\lambda < 1$, the condition $\rho(W) < 1$ is a necessary condition for the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.

As another example, considering the linear system $x = xW + \varepsilon$, the equilibrium could exist and be unique when $\rho(W) > 1$, but $T: x \mapsto f(xW + \varepsilon)$ is not globally stable. In some applications, we want the equilibrium to be non-negative or positive. For instance, the equilibrium in the production networks (4) and (5) should be non-negative. Since $(I - W)^{-1} \geq 0$ if and only if $\rho(W) < 1$, Assumption 2.1 is sufficient and necessary for non-negative equilibrium.²⁷

In some other cases, the spectral radius condition is not a necessary condition for the existence. The equilibrium may still exist when $\rho(|W| \text{diag}(\beta)) \geq 1$. However, the system is not globally stable anymore when the spectral radius is greater than one. Also, the uniqueness of equilibrium could fail. For example, suppose that the equilibrium satisfies

$$(x_1, x_2) = \min \left\{ \max \left\{ \left[(x_1, x_2) \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 2 \\ 3 & 0 \end{pmatrix} + (\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2) \right], (0, 0) \right\}, (5, 5) \right\}.$$

The multiplicity and global stability depend on the shocks. For example, if we have $(\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2) = (-6, 2)$, then there are multiple equilibria $x^* = (0, 2)$ or $(5, 5)$. More, it is not globally stable, since some iteration may not converge, say, the iteration starting from $(0, 5)$.

²⁷See Lemma A.7.

4.3. Linear System and Boundedness Condition. This part attempts to argue that when the interaction function is non-expansive and the sensitivity matrix is not convergent, the boundedness is essential for existence of the equilibrium. That is, the boundedness condition in Assumption 2.2 cannot be precluded. We use a linear system to illustrate this concept. In particular, if the interaction system is an identity mapping, and the sensitivity matrix has spectral radius one $\rho(W) = 1$, then the equilibrium does not exist with probability one.

In detail, consider a linear system:

$$x = xW + \varepsilon \quad (16)$$

where x and ε are vectors in \mathbb{R}^n and $W \in \mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{R}^n$ is a non-negative matrix. By Theorem 2.2, we know that the linear system has a unique solution x if the spectral radius of W is less than one. For instance, the study of input-output analysis assumes that the producers have positive value-added and then that $\sum_j w_{ij} < 1$ for all i (Antràs et al., 2012). Note that (16) may not have the solution if the scalar one is the eigenvalue of W , since $(I - W)$ is not invertible. If one is not the eigenvalue of W , then the solution always exists and is unique. Therefore, when the sensitivity matrix is stochastic, the solution does not exist almost surely. Similar to almost sure uniqueness, we define almost sure non-existence as follows.

Definition 4.1. Let E denote the set of shocks that the solution exists (i.e., $E := \{\varepsilon \in E_\varepsilon : \text{Equation (16) has a solution}\}$.) We say that the solution *does not exist almost surely* if $\text{Prob}(\varepsilon \in E) = 0$.

Lemma 4.3. *If W is non-negative and $\rho(W) = 1$, and the shocks (ε_i) are absolutely continuous, then the solution of linear system (16) does not exist almost surely.*

Comparing Theorem 2.2 and Lemma 4.3, we see that boundedness plays a key role in guaranteeing the existence of equilibrium. Boundedness also helps to pin down the uniqueness of equilibrium. We provide some intuition as below. Consider again the interaction function of a bounded identity map (3) and a row stochastic and irreducible matrix W . From the proof of Lemma A.4, we see that the multiple equilibria x must satisfy $-M\mathbf{1} \leq x = xW + \varepsilon \leq M\mathbf{1}$. Since W is stochastic, $\mathbf{1}$ is the right eigenvector, whence we have $\varepsilon\mathbf{1}^\top = (x - xW)\mathbf{1}^\top = 0$ if there exists multiplicity. To notice how boundedness pins down the unique solution, suppose on the contrary that $\varepsilon\mathbf{1}^\top \neq 0$. If x is a solution in $[-M\mathbf{1}, M\mathbf{1}]$, then we have $x\mathbf{1}^\top =$

$xW\mathbf{1}^\top + \varepsilon\mathbf{1}^\top = x\mathbf{1}^\top + \varepsilon\mathbf{1}^\top \neq x\mathbf{1}^\top$, a contradiction. Thus, we have $xW + \varepsilon \not\leq M\mathbf{1}$ or $-M\mathbf{1} \not\leq xW + \varepsilon$. Without loss of generality, assume that node i is such that $(xW + \varepsilon)_i > M$, whence i 's equilibrium state equals M . Remove such node i from the graph and consider the shock $\varepsilon_s + x_i w_{is}$ for all remaining agents $s \neq i$. Let \bar{W} be the submatrix of W by removing the column i and row i from W . Using Lemma A.9, we have $\rho(\bar{W}) < 1$. Therefore, the remaining network with vertices $N \setminus \{i\}$ has a unique solution by Theorem 2.1. We see that when $\varepsilon\mathbf{1}^\top \neq 0$ in this example, the boundedness pins down the unique solution.

4.4. Algorithm for Bounded Identity Map. In this section, we provide an algorithm to compute the equilibrium under the bounded identity maps of interaction functions. We show that the algorithm converges in at most $n2^{n-1}$ iterations. From the discussion in Section 4.3, we know that the boundedness condition is the key to the uniqueness of equilibrium. It implies that we can compute the equilibrium by assuming that there exists an agent whose state is always equal to the upper or lower bound of her sensitivity function. In detail, consider the interaction functions

$$f_j(t) = \min \{ \max \{ t, \ell_j \}, u_j \} \quad (17)$$

for all $j \in N = \{1, \dots, n\}$, where $u_i > \ell_j$ for all $j \in N$. The bounded identity maps are the generalized Eisenberg-Noe model (12). Assume that the sensitivity matrix W is row or column stochastic as the financial network. Following the discussion in Section 4.3, we conclude the lemma below. Denote $u = (u_i)$ and $\ell = (\ell_i)$.

Lemma 4.4. *Let u, ℓ be such that $u \gg \ell$, f be defined as (17), and $W \geq 0$ be row/column stochastic. Given ε , if the equilibrium x^* is unique, then there is $j \in N$ such that either $x_j^* = u_j$ or $x_j^* = \ell_j$.*

In fact, for any strongly connected subgraph $G_s \subset \text{graph } W$, we can show that there exists an agent j in subgraph G_s such that $x_j^* = u_j$ or $x_j^* = \ell_j$. Lemma 4.4 implies that every agent's equilibrium state is either at the upper bound, lower bound, or in between. Since there are n agents in the network, we have 3^n possibilities. Since we can pin down the equilibrium for those agents at the boundedness, we only need to decide the equilibrium for the remaining agents. Using this idea, we are able to design an algorithm that converges to the equilibrium in at most 3^n iterations. Algorithm 1 applies this concept to compute the equilibrium in finite iterations.

To illustrate the algorithm, given the states x , define the sets $A(x)$ and $B(x)$ as

$$\begin{aligned} A(x) &:= \{j \in N : \sum_i x_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j \geq u_j\}, \\ B(x) &:= \{j \in N : \sum_i x_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j \leq \ell_j\}. \end{aligned} \tag{18}$$

In words, $A(x)$ (resp., $B(x)$) is the set of agents whose equilibria are greater (resp., less) than or equal to the upper (resp., lower) bounds at states x . Also, define the diagonal matrix Λ^D for $D \subset N$ as

$$\Lambda_{ij}^D := \begin{cases} 1 & i = j \text{ and } i \in D, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}. \tag{19}$$

Hence, $\Lambda^{A(x)}$ and $\Lambda^{B(x)}$ indicate which agents are at the upper and lower bound, respectively.

In the financial network, $N \setminus A(x)$ is the set of banks that default under the clearing payment x , while $N \setminus B(x)$ is the set of banks that are able to make some payments under the clearing payment x . Inspired by [Eisenberg and Noe \(2001\)](#), Algorithm 1 returns the equilibrium $x^{(t)}$ given the interaction function (17). The inner for-loop of Algorithm 1 is the fictitious default iteration introduced by [Eisenberg and Noe \(2001\)](#). If we have $B(\ell) = \emptyset$, then Algorithm 1 is simply the fictitious default algorithm in [Eisenberg and Noe \(2001\)](#), which converges in at most n iterations. The outer for-loop searches the set of agents whose equilibria are at the lower bounds, $B(x^*)$, from the potential candidates in the power set of $B(\ell)$, $\mathcal{P}(B(\ell))$. At some $t \in \mathbb{N}$, when the guess is correct: $P_i = B(x^*) = B^*$ for $P_i \in \mathcal{P}(B(\ell))$, we iterate the solutions from $\hat{u} := u(I - \Lambda^{P_i}) + \ell \Lambda^{P_i}$, and set $A_{t-1} = A(\hat{u}) \cap (N \setminus B(x^*))$. Next, if $P_i = b^*$, step 11 is equivalent to set $x^{(t)}$ as

$$x_j^{(t)} = \begin{cases} u_j & \forall j \in A_{t-1} \\ \ell_j & \forall j \in B^* \\ \sum_{i \in A_{t-1}} u_i w_{ij} + \sum_{i \in B^*} \ell_i w_{ij} + \sum_{i \in N \setminus (A_{t-1} \cup B^*)} x_i^{(t)} w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Note that since $A_{t-1} \supset A(x^*)$, the matrix $I - (I - \Lambda^{A_{t-1}} - \Lambda^{P_i})W(I - \Lambda^{A_{t-1}} - \Lambda^{P_i})$ in step 11 is non-singular so that $x^{(t)}$ is unique.²⁸

$$x^{(t)} = [((u\Lambda^{A_{t-1}} + \ell\Lambda^{P_i})W + \varepsilon)(I - \Lambda^{A_{t-1}} - \Lambda^{P_i}) + u\Lambda^{A_{t-1}} + \ell\Lambda^{P_i}][I - (I - \Lambda^{A_{t-1}} - \Lambda^{P_i})W(I - \Lambda^{A_{t-1}} - \Lambda^{P_i})]^{-1}.$$

The solution $x^{(t)}$ is the equilibrium when $x_i = u_i$ for $i \in A_{t-1}$ and $x_i = \ell_i$ for $i \in B^*$. In the next step, we check whether $A_t = A(x^{(t)})$ equals A_{t-1} or not. If they are equal, the algorithm terminates and returns x^t as the equilibrium; otherwise, we repeat the step 11 of Algorithm 1 to get $x^{(t+1)}$ with the updated set A_t . Conversely, if the guess from the power set of $B(\ell)$ is not correct, then it may be the case that it raises a singular matrix error in step 11. In this case, we skip it and try another guess from $\mathcal{P}(B(\ell))$. Therefore, the convergence time depends on how many agents in $B(\ell)$. In general, the next lemma shows that Algorithm 1 converges in at most $n2^{n-1}$ iterations.²⁹

Lemma 4.5. *Let f follow (17), $W \geq 0$ be column/row stochastic, and ε be such that the equilibrium is unique. Algorithm 1 returns the equilibrium $x^{(t)}$ in at most $n2^{n-1}$ iterations.*

Example 4.2. We consider a numerical example to demonstrate Algorithm 1. Let the system (f, W, ε) be

$$f = \min\{\max\{xW + \varepsilon, 0\}, u\} \text{ where } u = (5, 10, 10, 8, 10, 10, 6)$$

$$W = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0.4 & 0.15 & 0 & 0.4 & 0.05 & 0 \\ 0.4 & 0 & 0.15 & 0.25 & 0 & 0.2 & 0 \\ 0.3 & 0.1 & 0 & 0.25 & 0.15 & 0.2 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \quad (20)$$

$$\varepsilon = 10^{-5}(2, 1, -1, 3, 2, -1, -2).$$

²⁸We can use the iterative method to approximate the solution.

²⁹In some cases, the equilibrium x^* has the features that $x^* \gg \ell$ or $x^* \ll u$. If this is the case, then we can save time by implement the Eisenberg-Noe iteration and the reverse Eisenberg-Noe iteration firsts.

Algorithm 1: Compute equilibrium given the interaction functions (17).

```

1  $t \leftarrow 0$ ;
2 if  $A(u) = N$  then return  $x^{(0)} \leftarrow u$  ;
3 else if  $B(\ell) = N$  then return  $x^{(0)} \leftarrow \ell$ ;
4  $\mathcal{P} \leftarrow$  the power set of  $B(\ell)$ ;
5 for  $i = 0$ ;  $i < |\mathcal{P}|$ ;  $i = i + 1$  do
6    $\hat{u} \leftarrow \ell \Lambda^{P_i} + u(I - \Lambda^{P_i})$ , where  $P_i \subset B(\ell)$  is the  $i$ -th element of  $\mathcal{P}$ ;
7    $A_t \leftarrow A(\hat{u}) \cap (N \setminus P_i)$ ;
8   for  $j = 0$ ;  $j < n$ ;  $j = j + 1$  do
9      $t \leftarrow t + 1$ ;
10    try
11       $x^{(t)} \leftarrow$  the fixed point of  $x = u\Lambda^{A_{t-1}} + \ell\Lambda^{P_i} + \{[u\Lambda^{A_{t-1}} + \ell\Lambda^{P_i} +$ 
         $x(I - \Lambda^{A_{t-1}} - \Lambda^{P_i})]W + \varepsilon\}(I - \Lambda^{A_{t-1}} - \Lambda^{P_i})$ ;
12    except singular matrix error break ;
13     $A_t \leftarrow A(x^{(t)})$ ;
14    if  $A_t = A_{t-1}$  then break;
15 if  $f(x^{(t)}W + \varepsilon) = x^{(t)}$  then return  $x^{(t)}$ ;

```

First, compute $B(\ell) = B(0) = \{3, 6, 7\}$ and $A(u) = \{1, 4, 5, 6, 7\}$. Then, the power set $\mathcal{P}(B(\ell))$ has 2^3 elements. When P_i in Algorithm 1 equals $\{3, 6, 7\}$, we have $\hat{u} = (5, 10, 0, 8, 10, 0, 0)$ and $A(\hat{u}) \cap (N \setminus P_i) = \{4, 5\}$. The iterations of Algorithm 1 give:

$x^{(t)}$	A_t
$\hat{u} = (5, 10, 0, 8, 10, 0, 0)$	$\{4, 5\}$
$x^{(1)} = (2.857 \times 10^{-5}, 2.143 \times 10^{-5}, 0, 8, 1, 0, 0)$	$\{4\}$
$x^{(2)} = (2.857 \times 10^{-5}, 2.143 \times 10^{-5}, 0, 8, 8.00003, 0, 0)$	$\{4\}$

In this case, since $|\mathcal{P}| = 2^3$ and $|N \setminus P_i| = 4$, the algorithm converges to the equilibrium in at most 2^5 iterations. Alternatively, if we use the operator T of (2) to iterate from the upper bound to compute equilibrium $\lim_{m \rightarrow \infty} T^m u$, the iteration time is more than 4.9×10^5 given the convergence tolerance 10^{-5} . If we iterate from the lower bound $\lim_{m \rightarrow \infty} T^m \ell$, the iteration time is more than 2.3×10^5 . \square

Alternatively, we can use (nonlinear) programming to solve the problem (17) as [Eisenberg and Noe \(2001\)](#). Let $g: \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be a strictly increasing function. Define the programming problem as

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{x \in [\ell, u]} g(x) \\ \text{subject to} \quad & 0 \leq \max\{xW + \varepsilon - x, \ell - x\}. \end{aligned} \tag{21}$$

As shown in [Eisenberg and Noe \(2001\)](#), the solution to (21) is the (almost surely) unique equilibrium.³⁰

Lemma 4.6. *Let f follow (17), $W \geq 0$ be stochastic, and $\varepsilon \in E_\varepsilon$. If g is strictly increasing, then any solution to programming problem (21) is an equilibrium.*

5. KEY PLAYERS

In this section, we utilize the unique equilibrium to identify the most influential agent. There are many measures or centralities that evaluate the importance scores for agents in a network.³¹ For instance, in input-output analysis, the output multiplier measures the overall output impact of a sector when it has a dollar-worth increase in final demand, so we can use the output multiplier to identify the most influential production sector, and then policymakers can decide which sector to bail out during recession ([Miller and Blair, 2009](#)). In network games, [Ballester et al. \(2006\)](#) define the "key player" as the agent that has the highest total impact on the aggregate activity once she is removed from the network.³² We provide a measure for identifying the key player by casting an equilibrium to the steady state of continuous-time dynamics, following and generalizing the control analysis in [Sharkey \(2017\)](#).

Observe that the equilibrium of the interaction system (1) can be interpreted as the steady state of the following continuous-time dynamics:

$$\frac{dx}{dt} = f(xW + \varepsilon) - x \tag{22}$$

³⁰The solution to the following programming problem is also an equilibrium.

$$\min_{x \in [\ell, u]} g(x) \quad \text{subject to} \quad \min\{xW + \varepsilon - x, u - x\} \leq 0,$$

where $g: \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is strictly increasing.

³¹See [Das et al. \(2018\)](#) for a survey of centralities.

³²They show that the key player has the highest intercentrality, a measure defined by Katz (Bonacich) centrality.

where $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ are economic states and $f(xW + \varepsilon) = (f_j(\sum_i x_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j))_{j=1}^n$ is defined as before. The *steady state* x^* of (22) is such that $f(x^*W + \varepsilon) - x^* = 0$. Suppose that the interaction functions are increasing. In this dynamics, an agent's equilibrium increases in others' equilibrium $f(xW + \varepsilon)$ and decreases in the amount of itself x . Clearly, if y is the equilibrium of model (1), then it is the steady state to the continuous-time dynamic system (22) that $dx/dt = f(yW + \varepsilon) - y = 0$. If Assumption 2.1 holds and then the equilibrium is unique by Theorem 2.1, then the steady state is also unique.

In this section, suppose that f_i is differentiable for all i . For some networks, including equation (12), the interaction function is non-differentiable. In this case, we can approximate the interaction function by a smooth function without loss of economic meaning.

Like Sharkey (2017), we know that the contraction condition in Theorem 2.1, $\rho(|W| \text{diag}(\beta)) < 1$, also deliveries a stable continuous-time dynamics by Lemma 5.1.

Let $dx/dt = F(x(t))$ and $x(0) = x^0$ be an autonomous system, where $x(t) \in \mathbb{R}^n$ denotes the state vector, and $F: \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ is a differentiable function of $x(t)$. Denote x^* as the steady state such that $F(x^*) = 0$. Recall that the steady states x^* of an autonomous system is *stable* if for every $\varepsilon > 0$ there exists $\delta > 0$ such that $\|x(0) - x^*\| < \delta$ implies $\|x(t) - x^*\| < \varepsilon$ for all $t \geq 0$. The steady state x^* is *asymptotically stable* if it is stable and there is $\delta > 0$ such that $\|x(0) - x^*\| < \delta$ implies $x(t) \rightarrow x^*$ as $t \rightarrow \infty$.

Lemma 5.1. *Suppose that f_i is increasing and continuously differentiable for all i , and $\rho(|W| \text{diag}(\beta)) < 1$. Then the dynamic system (22) is asymptotically stable.*

Again, if W is non-negative and $\beta_i \equiv \psi$, we can reduce the condition for asymptotic stability to $\psi\rho(W) < 1$. To have an asymptotically stable system, assume that $\rho(|W| \text{diag}(\beta)) < 1$ in this section.

Denote the symbol \circ as the Hadamard product such that $s \circ x := [s_1 x_1, \dots, s_n x_n]$ for $s, x \in \mathbb{R}^n$. Define an alternative continuous-time dynamics as

$$\frac{dx}{dt} = F(x, s) := f(xW + \varepsilon) - s \circ x \quad (23)$$

Here, the coefficients s specify the small shocks to the agents.

When $s = \mathbf{1}$, equation (23) is equal to the original system. Let x^* be the steady state for $s = \mathbf{1}$ that $F(x^*, \mathbf{1}) = 0$. Assume that $s = \mathbf{1}$ so that the analysis is around the

equilibrium when there is fluctuation in the system. Following the definition of key players, we remove agent i from the dynamics (23) while the others are holding the same. The equivalent shock to the removal of i is

$$\frac{\partial s_i}{\partial x_i^*} x_i^*$$

The impact to the other agent j 's steady state is then given by:

$$C_{ij} = \frac{dx_j^*}{ds_i} \frac{\partial s_i}{\partial x_i^*} x_i^*$$

where dx_j^*/ds_i is the extent of change in j 's steady state responding to the shocks. Hence, C_{ij} measures the impact on agent j when the shock is equivalent to the removal of i . With everything else remaining the same, the total impact of the removal of i is equal to $\sigma_i := \sum_j C_{ij}$. We evaluate the total impact around the steady state $(x, s) = (x^*, \mathbf{1})$ in the following lemma. Denote $f'_i(x^*W + \varepsilon) := (f'_i(\sum_h x_h^* w_{hi} + \varepsilon_i))_i$.

Lemma 5.2. *If f_i is differentiable for all i and $\rho(|W| \text{diag}(\beta)) < 1$, then the total impact is $\sigma = \mathbf{1} [I - \text{diag}(f'(x^*W + \varepsilon))W^\top]^{-1} \text{diag}(x^*)$.*

Therefore, the total impact, when agents are removed in the continuous-time dynamics, is determined by the steady state or equilibrium, the network structure W , and the derivative of interaction function. The key player is the agent with the highest σ_i . The term $\text{diag}(x^*)$ implies that the larger the agent's equilibrium state is, the higher the measure σ_i is. Moreover, the first term, $\mathbf{1}[I - \text{diag}(f'(x^*W + \varepsilon))W^\top]^{-1}$ implies that the impact measure depends on the interaction behavior $f'(x^*W + \varepsilon)$ and the network connections, W^\top . From the Neumann series, we can see that the more interconnected agents tend to have higher impact measure σ_i .³³ Also, $\mathbf{1}[I - \text{diag}(f'(x^*W + \varepsilon))W^\top]^{-1}$ can be view as the authority-based Katz centrality adjusted by the interaction functions $\text{diag}(f'(x^*W + \varepsilon))$. Hence, the measure σ captures either the too-big-to-fail or too-interconnected-to-fail agents.

Note that unlike Ballester et al. (2004) this control analysis does not change the network structure (i.e., W is the same after removing an agent.) On the other have, Ballester et al. (2004) assume that the sensitivity matrix is symmetric in the network (7), while the control analysis in continuous-time system allows arbitrary network structure.

³³Neumann series: $[I - A]^{-1} = I + A + A^2 + A^3 + \dots$ for a matrix A . A highly interconnected agent also tends to have high equilibrium x^* .

One issue for the measure σ is that when $\text{diag}(f'(x^*W + \varepsilon))W^\top$ has constant column sums, the measure is collapsed to $\sigma = x^*$, which is just the comparison among equilibria in magnitude.

In many applications, the derivative of the interaction function is constant. In this case, we can see that the measure σ evaluates both effects of the agents' impact on others and the perturbations received from others. We illustrate this property by the following example.

Example 5.1. Given the network $x = \alpha xW + \mathbf{1}$ for some $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$, the equilibrium is $(I - \alpha W)^{-1}$ and $f'_i \equiv \alpha$. The measure for key player σ is reduced to

$$\sigma = \mathbf{1} (I - \alpha W^\top)^{-1} \text{diag}(\mathbf{1}(I - \alpha W)^{-1}).$$

Define the hub-based Katz centrality as $\kappa_h := \mathbf{1}(I - \alpha W)^{-1}$, and the authority-based Katz centrality as $\kappa_a := \mathbf{1}(I - \alpha W^\top)^{-1}$. Then, the total impact is the element-wise multiplication of hub-based Katz centrality and authority-based Katz centrality.

$$\sigma = \kappa_a \circ \kappa_h.$$

As the explanation in Sharkey (2017), the hub-based Katz centrality measures the "receiver" property that agents are affected by others, and the authority-based Katz centrality describes the "sender" property that agents influence others. The agent has high σ_i if either she is influenced significantly by others or she propagates shocks and affects others significantly.

Similarly, the network game (9) of the interbank lending market has the equilibrium $x^* = \varepsilon \text{diag}(\varphi)[I - W \text{diag}(\varphi)]^{-1}$, where $\varphi = (\varphi_i)$. The key player measure is

$$\sigma = (\mathbf{1}[I - \text{diag}(\varphi)W^\top]^{-1}) \circ (\varepsilon \text{diag}(\varphi)[I - W \text{diag}(\varphi)]^{-1})$$

It also illustrates the "receiver" and "sender" effect of shock transmission, where the receiver effect is weighted by $\varepsilon \text{diag}(\varphi)$. Due to the term $\varepsilon \text{diag}(\varphi) = \theta I - \text{diag}(c_0)$ with $c_0 = (c_{0,i})$, if a bank i has lower marginal cost $c_{0,i}$ when it has no links to other banks, then it tends to have higher impact measure. Overall, the equation implies that the banks with significant impact measure may be either the too-big-to-fail or too-interconnected-to-fail. \square

6. CONCLUSION

We show the (almost sure) uniqueness of equilibrium for the generalized and unified network model. The uniqueness of equilibrium holds if either the interaction functions or sensitivity matrix has a contraction property such that the corresponding spectral radius is less than one. Alternatively, if the interaction functions are non-expansive and bounded, and the sensitivity matrix is non-convergent (spectral radius of one), then the equilibrium is unique almost surely, given the absolutely continuous shocks. Moreover, we demonstrate that if the interaction functions are non-expansive, the boundedness of the interaction functions is essential to determine the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. Using this idea, we can compute the equilibrium of the generalized Eisenberg-Noe interbank network in finite steps by checking which agents are at the bounds. Lastly, concerning systemic stability, we illustrate a measure for identifying the key players in the unified network by interpreting the equilibrium into the steady state of a continuous-time dynamic system and computing the total impact of removing an agent. The measure has the desired properties to evaluate the impact of both receiving and broadcasting perturbations. Since either the magnitude of economic states in equilibrium or the strength of interconnection affects the measure, it helps identify either too-big-to-fail or too-interconnected-to-fail agents.

APPENDIX A. APPENDIX

Intuition of Multiple Equilibria. In this appendix, we explain some intuition for Example 2.1 in Section 2.2 with n agents that admits multiple equilibria. We suppose that $\sum_j w_{ij} = 1$ for all i and $\sum_i \varepsilon_i = 0$ as Example 2.1. The interaction function f is the bounded identity mapping (3) broadcasted to the vectors.

The row-sum assumption imply that $W\mathbf{1}^\top = \mathbf{1}^\top$, where $\mathbf{1}$ is a row vector of ones. We also assume that the matrix W is irreducible as Example 2.1. Suppose that there exists one solution x such that $-M\mathbf{1} \leq x = xW + \varepsilon \leq M\mathbf{1}$. Then, we have $x\mathbf{1}^\top = x\mathbf{1}^\top + \varepsilon\mathbf{1}^\top$ so that it has to be that $\varepsilon\mathbf{1}^\top = 0$. By Perron–Frobenius Theorem and irreducibility, the matrix W has a simple left eigenvector e that is strictly positive and satisfies $eW = e$. Let $y = x + te$ and $t \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $y \in [-M\mathbf{1}, M\mathbf{1}]$. Since $yW + \varepsilon = teW + xW + \varepsilon = te + x = y$, we create another solution y . We can see that the uniqueness may fail with non-zero probability if $\Pr(\sum_i \varepsilon_i = 0) > 0$.

Remark A.1. Consider the generalised Eisenberg-Noe financial network (12) in [Acemoglu et al. \(2015a\)](#) and [Acemoglu et al. \(2015b\)](#) and assume that $\bar{p}_i \equiv M$ for all i . The interaction function is

$$f_i(z) = z \mathbb{1}_{\{0 \leq z < M\}}(z) + M \mathbb{1}_{\{z \geq M\}}(z). \quad (24)$$

for all i . In words, the interaction function is non-negative and $f_i(z) = 0$ if $z < 0$. Moreover, the sensitivity matrix satisfies $\sum_j w_{ij} = 1$ for all i but not $\sum_h w_{hi} = 1$ for all i . Therefore, we cannot apply the theorem of [Acemoglu et al. \(2016b\)](#) directly, although their proof can be extended by relaxing this assumption (see Theorem 2.2). [Acemoglu et al. \(2015a\)](#) show that the equilibrium is also generically unique for such interaction function and irreducible sensitivity matrix.

However, we see that Example 2.1 can be easily modified as an example to show that it may admit multiple equilibria with non-zero probability under the interaction function (24). The shock in [Acemoglu et al. \(2015a\)](#) is equal to the sum of holding cash, project return, and the liquidation of asset minus senior liability (see Section 3.2). In their setting, the cash, senior liability, and liquidation of asset are all constant, while the realizations of project returns are i.i.d, and only take two values. Hence, the shocks are also i.i.d. and $\varepsilon_i \in \{e_1, e_2\}$ with $e_1 > 0$ and $e_2 < 0$.³⁴ Therefore, it is possible that uniqueness fails with non-zero probability when we assign strictly positive probabilities to both e_1 and e_2 . Hence, the generic uniqueness result in [Acemoglu et al. \(2015a\)](#) may be problematic when the shock variable is not absolutely continuous.

□

Remark A.2. [Hurd \(2016\)](#) shows that the multiple solutions of generalized Eisenberg-Noe model (12) are eigenvectors of W . Clearly, Example 2.1 and the above discussion show that the claim is incorrect, and it should be that the differences in solutions are eigenvectors.

□

Proofs in Section 2.2.

Definitions. A matrix A is *irreducible* if $\sum_k A^k \gg 0$. Given a square matrix $A = (a_{ij}) \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$, *graph* A is a tuple (V, E) consisting of the vertex set $V := \{1, \dots, n\}$ and the edge set $E \subset V \times V$ set such that $(i, j) \in E$ if and only if $a_{ij} \neq 0$. The

³⁴The holding cash and liquidation are both zero in section three of [Acemoglu et al. \(2015a\)](#).

graph A has a *directed path* $i \rightarrow j$ for $i, j \in V$ if $a_{ij}^k > 0$ for some $k \in \mathbb{N}$, where a_{ij}^k is the (i, j) th entry of A^k . A graph $S = (V_S, E_S)$ is a *subgraph* of graph A if $V_S \subset V$ and $E_S \subset E$. In the following model, $a_{ij} \neq 0$ means agent i 's state affects agent j 's state or j 's state is sensitive to i 's state. A vertex j is *accessible* from a vertex i if either $i = j$ or there is a directed path $i \rightarrow j$. Graph A is *strongly connected* if vertex j is accessible from vertex i for any $i, j \in V$. We know that graph A is strongly connected if and only if A is irreducible. We say a graph A is *acyclic* if i is not accessible from j whenever j is accessible from i for all $i \neq j \in V$.

The proofs of Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 2.2 follows the subsequent lemmas. To begin with, recall that we have the map $T: \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$:

$$Tx := f(xW + \varepsilon) \quad (25)$$

for $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$, where $f(xW + \varepsilon) = (f_i(\sum_h x_h w_{hi} + \varepsilon_i))_{i \in N}$. Clearly, the vector x is a fixed point of T if and only if it is an equilibrium.

Proof of Lemma 2.1. Suppose that f_i is increasing and bounded for all $i \in N$. Then, there is $E_i > 0$ such that $|f_i(t)| < E_i$ for all i . Let $E = (E_i)$. Define T by (25). Hence, it must that $Tx \in [-E, E]$ for all $x \in [-E, E]$. Note that if $x^* > E$ or $x^* < -E$ is a fixed point of T , then we have $Tx^* \leq E < x^*$ or $x^* < -E \leq Tx^*$, which contradicts the fact that x^* is a fixed point. Hence, we can restrict the domain of T on $[-E, E]$ without loss of generality, so that T is an increasing self-map on $[-E, E]$. Tarski's Fixed Point Theorem shows that there exists an equilibrium in $[-E, E]$, and the set of equilibria forms a complete lattice, whence both the highest and the lowest equilibria exist. \square

The following lemma shows that T is a contraction mapping if $\|(|W| \text{diag}(\beta))^k\| < 1$.

Lemma A.1. $\|T^k x - T^k \hat{x}\| \leq \|(|W| \text{diag}(\beta))^k\| \|x - \hat{x}\|$ for all x, \hat{x} in \mathbb{R}^n and $k \in \mathbb{N}$.

Proof of Lemma A.1. Let $x, \hat{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n$, fix $\varepsilon \in E_\sigma$, and define T by (25). We first show that $|T^k x - T^k \hat{x}| \leq |x - \hat{x}| (|W| \text{diag}(\beta))^k$ for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$ by induction. Since $Tx = f(xW + \varepsilon)$ and $|f(xW + \varepsilon) - f(\hat{x}W + \varepsilon)| \leq |(xW + \varepsilon) - (\hat{x}W + \varepsilon)| \text{diag}(\beta)$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} |Tx - T\hat{x}| &\leq |(xW + \varepsilon) - (\hat{x}W + \varepsilon)| \text{diag}(\beta) \\ &= |(x - \hat{x})W| \text{diag}(\beta) \leq |x - \hat{x}| |W| \text{diag}(\beta). \end{aligned}$$

Hence, the claim holds for $k = 1$. Suppose that the claim holds for some $m \in \mathbb{N}$, i.e. $|T^m x - T^m \hat{x}| \leq |x - \hat{x}|(|W| \text{diag}(\beta))^m$. By iteration, we have

$$\begin{aligned} |T^{m+1} x - T^{m+1} \hat{x}| &= |f(T^m x W + \varepsilon) - f(T^m \hat{x} W + \varepsilon)| \\ &\leq |T^m x W - T^m \hat{x} W| \text{diag}(\beta) \\ &\leq |T^m x - T^m \hat{x}| |W| \text{diag}(\beta) \\ &\leq |x - \hat{x}| (|W| \text{diag}(\beta))^{m+1}. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, the induction implies that $|T^k x - T^k \hat{x}| \leq |x - \hat{x}|(|W| \text{diag}(\beta))^k$ for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$. The definition of p -norm gives $\|T^k x - T^k \hat{x}\| \leq \| |x - \hat{x}|(|W| \text{diag}(\beta))^k \| \leq \|(|W| \text{diag}(\beta))^k\| \|x - \hat{x}\|$ for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$.³⁵ \square

We are ready to prove the first statement of Theorem 2.1 and its following corollaries.

Proof of Theorem 2.1. Let f and W satisfy Assumption 2.1 so that $\rho(|W| \text{diag}(\beta)) < 1$, where $\beta = (\beta_j)$. Fix $\varepsilon \in E_\sigma$. Then, we have

$$\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \|(|W| \text{diag}(\beta))^k\| = 0.$$

Thus, $\|(|W| \text{diag}(\beta))^k\| < 1$ for some $k \in \mathbb{N}$. Lemma A.1 and the Banach Contraction Theorem show that there is a unique equilibrium. \square

Proof of Corollary 2.1. Let f, W and ε satisfy the conditions of Theorem 2.1. Let x^* be the equilibrium and $T: \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ be defined as $Tx = f(xW + \varepsilon)$. Denote $A = |W| \text{diag}(\beta)$. The first statement follows from Theorem 2.1 and Banach Fixed Point Theorem. From Lemma A.1, we have $\|T^{k+1}x - T^kx\| = \|T^k(Tx) - T^kx\| \leq \|A^k\| \|Tx - x\|$ for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$. \square

Next, we attempt to prove the almost surely uniqueness for the case with non-negative f_i and matrix with spectral radius one. Firstly, we consider that W is irreducible or the graph W is strongly connected. Note that Acemoglu et al. (2016b) use the continuity of f to show the existence of equilibrium. However, they argue that f has at most countably many discontinuous points when they show the uniqueness of equilibrium. Since f is non-expansive, it is Lipschitz continuous so that their argument is ambiguous. Alternatively, we consider at most countably many intervals with unit slope.

³⁵For the max norm, we can take the maximum on both sides of inequality. For a *Riesz norm*, $|x| \leq |y|$ implies $\|x\| \leq \|y\|$.

Lemma A.2 (Acemoglu et al. (2016b)). *If f is increasing and $|f(a) - f(b)| = |a - b|$ for $a, b \in \mathbb{R}$ and $b > a$, then f is linear in the interval $[a, b]$ with a unit slope, i.e., $f(z) = z + f(a) - a$ for all $z \in [a, b]$.*³⁶

Lemma A.3. *If f is increasing and bounded, there are at most countably many intervals that f is linear with unit slopes in these intervals.*

Proof. Let f be an increasing and bounded mapping. Let I be the set of intervals in \mathbb{R} such that f is linear and with unit slopes in these intervals. Let $[a_i, b_i] \in I$. Since $b_i > a_i$ and f is an increasing and linear mapping on $[a_i, b_i]$ with a unit slope, we have $f(a_i) < f(b_i)$. Then, there is a rational $c_i \in \mathbb{Q}$ such that $f(a_i) < c_i < f(b_i)$. The map $[a_i, b_i] \mapsto c_i$ is injective, so the set I is countable. \square

Lemma A.4. *Suppose that f_i is increasing, non-expansive, and bounded for all i , the shock is absolutely continuous for all i , and W is irreducible with $\rho(W) = 1$. Then, the equilibrium is almost surely unique.*

Proof of Lemma A.4. Let $f = (f_i)$, W be such that the conditions of Lemma A.4 hold. By Lemma 2.1 or Tarski's Fixed Point Theorem, the equilibrium exists and the set of equilibria is complete. Without loss of generality, assume that there are two different equilibria x and y with $x > y$. Since f is non-expansive, we have

$$\begin{aligned} e := x - y &= |f(xW + \varepsilon) - f(yW + \varepsilon)| \\ &\leq |xW + \varepsilon - (yW + \varepsilon)| = |(x - y)W| = (x - y)W = eW. \end{aligned} \quad (26)$$

Let $q \in \mathbb{R}^n$ be the right eigenvector corresponding to $\rho(W)$ so that $Wq^\top = \rho(W)q^\top$. By the Perron-Frobenius Theorem and irreducibility, q is strictly positive, $q \gg 0$. Suppose that the inequality of equation (26) does not bind. It implies that

$$eq^\top < eWq^\top = eq^\top,$$

which is a contradiction. Hence, it must be that the equality of (26) binds so that $e = |f(xW + \varepsilon) - f(yW + \varepsilon)| = |(x - y)W| = eW$. We see that the vector e is the left eigenvector of W , so Perron-Frobenius Theorem shows that $e \gg 0$. Now, define $b := xW + \varepsilon$ and $a := yW + \varepsilon$. Then, we have $|f_i(b_i) - f_i(a_i)| = |b_i - a_i|$ for all $i \in N$. Since $b - a = eW = e \gg 0$, we have $b \gg a$. Therefore, the interval $[a_i, b_i]$ is well-defined for all i . Since f_i is increasing for all i , it follows from Lemma A.2 that

³⁶See lemma B.2 of Acemoglu et al. (2016b).

f_i is a linear mapping with unit slopes in the intervals $[a_i, b_i]$ for all i . That is, we get $f(z) = z + f(a) - a$ for all $z \in [a, b]$. In particular, since x is the fixed point, we have $x = f(b) = b + f(a) - a = xW + \varepsilon + f(a) - a$. Multiplying q^\top on both sides, it implies that $xq^\top = xWq^\top + \varepsilon q^\top + (f(a) - a)q^\top = xq^\top + \varepsilon q^\top + (f(a) - a)q^\top$. Since q is the right eigenvector, if there are multiple fixed points, it has to be that $\varepsilon q^\top = (a - f(a))q^\top$. Denote the sets M and A as

$$M := \{\varepsilon \in E_\varepsilon : \text{There are multiple equilibria.}\}$$

$$A := \{a \in E_\varepsilon : f_i \text{ is a linear map with unit slope on } [a_i, b_i] \\ \text{with } b_i > a_i \text{ for } i = 1, \dots, n.\}$$

By the above discussion, we have $\varepsilon \in M$ only if $\varepsilon q^\top = (a - f(a))q^\top$, so $M \subset E_1 := \{\varepsilon \in E_\varepsilon : \varepsilon q^\top = (a - f(a))q^\top, a \in A\}$. Therefore, $\varepsilon_1, \dots, \varepsilon_n$ are linearly dependent when there exists multiplicity. Since Lemma A.3 implies that there are countably many intervals $[a_i, b_i]$ for f_i , there are countably many vectors a , whence A is at most countable. Therefore, the dimension of E_1 is strictly less than n , and the Lebesgue measures of E_1 and M are zero. Since the measure of shocks is absolutely continuous, the probability of realizations in M is zero, $\mathbb{P}_\varepsilon(\varepsilon \in M) = 0$. \square

Define in-subgraph and out-subgraph for the proof of Theorem 2.2. Let $A = (a_{ij}) \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ and graph $A = (V, E)$. Let graph $S = (V_S, E_S)$ be a *subgraph* of graph A such that $V_S \subset V$ and $E_S \subset E$. Subgraph S is an *in-subgraph* if there is no path from i to j for some $i \in V_S$ and $j \in V \setminus V_S$. Subgraph S is an *out-subgraph* if there is a path from i to j for some $i \in V_S$ and $j \in V \setminus V_S$.

Proof of Theorem 2.2. Let $f = (f_i)$ and W be such that the conditions of Assumption 2.2 hold, and ε be absolutely continuous. Suppose that $\rho(W) = 1$. By Lemma 2.1, the equilibrium exists. Define the equivalence relation \sim as $i \sim j$ if and only if i and j are accessible from each other for all $i, j \in N$. Denote $[i] := \{s \in N : s \sim i\}$ as the equivalence class. We see that $[i] \neq [j]$ if either i is not accessible from j , or j is not accessible from i , so the equivalence classes are mutually disjoint. Moreover, the set $\{[i] : i \in N\}$ forms a partition of N . By definition, each equivalence class $[i]$ is either an in-subgraph or out-subgraph. Since the number of vertices is finite, there are finite in-subgraphs, denoted by S_1, \dots, S_m . Let S_0 be the union of all out-subgraphs. By definition of in-subgraphs and out-subgraphs, we can permute the matrix W and

write it as ³⁷

$$W = \begin{pmatrix} W_0 & P_1 & P_2 & \cdots & P_m \\ 0 & W_1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & W_2 & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & W_m \end{pmatrix}$$

where $W_t \in \mathbb{R}^{|S_t| \times |S_t|}$, for $t = 0, 1, \dots, m$, is the weighting adjacency matrix of subgraph S_t , and $P_t \in \mathbb{R}^{|S_0| \times |S_t|}$ describes the path from S_0 to S_t .³⁸ Note that W_1, \dots, W_m are irreducible, since in-subgraphs are strongly connected. Let x be an equilibrium of states. Decomposing the state vector and shock vector into block forms corresponding to S_0, S_1, \dots, S_m , we have $x = (x_0, x_1, \dots, x_m)$ and $\varepsilon = (\varepsilon_0, \varepsilon_1, \dots, \varepsilon_m)$, where $x_t, \varepsilon_t \in \mathbb{R}^{|S_t|}$ for $t = 0, 1, \dots, m$. The equilibrium system can be written as

$$\begin{aligned} x_0 &= f(x_0 W_0 + \varepsilon_0) \\ x_1 &= f(x_1 W_1 + x_0 P_1 + \varepsilon_1) \\ x_2 &= f(x_2 W_2 + x_0 P_2 + \varepsilon_2) \\ &\vdots \\ x_m &= f(x_m W_m + x_0 P_m + \varepsilon_m) \end{aligned}$$

where $f(x_t W_t + x_0 P_t + \varepsilon_t) := (f_i(\sum_{h \in S_t} x_h w_{hi} + \sum_{h \in S_0} x_h w_{hi} + \varepsilon_i))_{i \in S_t}$. Since $\rho(W) = 1$, we have $\rho(W_0) \leq 1$. We first assume that $\rho(W_0) < 1$. Then, $x_0 = f(x_0 W_0 + \varepsilon_0)$ has a unique solution following Theorem 2.1. Fix $t = 1, \dots, m$. Given the unique x_0 , Lemma A.4 shows that the equilibrium x_t is almost surely unique for $t = 1, \dots, m$. It is not unique only if $(x_0 P_t + \varepsilon_t) q_t^\top = (a_t - f(a_t)) q_t^\top$ from Lemma A.4, where q_t is the right eigenvector for W_t , f_i is a unit-sloping mapping in intervals $[a_{t,i}, b_{t,i}]$ for all $i \in S_t$, and a_t is defined as a in Lemma A.4. Denote the set

$$E_t := \{\varepsilon \in E_\varepsilon : \text{the system } x_t = f(x_t W_t + x_0 P_t + \varepsilon_t) \text{ has multiple solutions}\}.$$

We see that E_t has Lebesgue measure zero by the argument in Lemma A.4. It implies that $\lambda(E_1 \cup \dots \cup E_m) \leq \lambda(E_1) + \dots + \lambda(E_m) = 0$, where λ denotes the Lebesgue measure. Let $E = \bigcup_t E_t$. Since the random variable of ε is absolutely continuous, we have $\mathbb{P}_\varepsilon(\varepsilon \in E) = \int_E g(x) d\lambda = 0$, where g is the density function of shock. Overall,

³⁷See also (Berman and Plemmons, 1994, chapter 8).

³⁸ $|S_t|$ denotes the number of nodes in subgraph S_t .

each in-subgraph has an almost surely unique equilibrium, and the equilibrium x is also almost surely unique.

Next, suppose that $\rho(W_0) = 1$, and W_0 is irreducible. Denote the equilibrium of $x_0 = f(x_0 W_0 + \varepsilon_0)$ as $x_0(\varepsilon_0)$. In this case, the solution $x_0(\varepsilon_0)$ is unique almost surely by Lemma A.4. If x_0 is unique, the equilibrium x is almost surely unique following the above argument. If x_0 is not unique, then it must be $\varepsilon_0 q_0^\top = (a_0 - f(a_0)) q_0^\top$, where q_0 is the right eigenvector of W_0 and a_0 is some vector in $R^{|S_0|}$ by Lemma A.4. When x_0 is not unique, the solution x_t , for $t = 1, \dots, m$, is not unique only if $(x_0(\varepsilon_0) P_t + \varepsilon_t) q_t^\top = (a_t - f(a_t)) q_t^\top$. Note that $\{\varepsilon \in E_\varepsilon : \varepsilon_0 q_0^\top = (a_0 - f(a_0)) q_0^\top \text{ and } (x_0(\varepsilon_0) P_t + \varepsilon_t) q_t^\top = (a_t - f(a_t)) q_t^\top\}$ is a subset of $\{\varepsilon \in E_\varepsilon : \varepsilon_0 q_0^\top = (a_0 - f(a_0)) q_0^\top\}$, which has measure zero. Therefore, x_t is also almost surely unique for all $t = 1, \dots, m$.

Suppose that $\rho(W) = 1$ and W_0 is not irreducible. Considering an equivalence class as an entity, since S_0 is the collection of out-subgraphs of equivalence class $[i]$, these equivalence classes form an acyclic graph; otherwise, they will deviate from their definition. Assume that there are r equivalence classes $[i]$ in S_0 . Since W_0 forms an acyclic network, W_0 can be written as an upper triangular matrix as

$$W_0 = \begin{pmatrix} B_{11} & B_{12} & B_{13} & \cdots & B_{1r} \\ 0 & B_{22} & B_{23} & \cdots & B_{2r} \\ 0 & 0 & B_{33} & \cdots & B_{3r} \\ \vdots & \vdots & & & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & B_{rr} \end{pmatrix}$$

where B_{tt} is a square matrix with respect to the corresponding equivalence class for $t = 1, \dots, r$. Then, we can decompose $x_0 = f(x_0 W_0 + \varepsilon_0)$ into r systems and pin down the equilibrium in order. Since each equivalence class is strongly connected, each subgraph B_{tt} is irreducible. Using the similar argument above, Lemma A.4 and Theorem 2.1, we see that the equilibrium for the system with respect to graph B_{11} is almost surely a unique solution if $\rho(B_{11}) = 1$ and unique if $\rho(B_{11}) < 1$. For $t = 2, \dots, r$, if $\rho(B_{tt})$ is less than one, the system with respect to B_{tt} has a unique equilibrium. If the $\rho(B_{tt})$ is one, its equilibrium is almost surely unique. Overall, $x_0 = f(x_0 W_0 + \varepsilon_0)$ has almost surely a unique equilibrium following the above argument. A similar argument for the irreducible case concludes the result for the whole system $x = f(xW + \varepsilon)$. \square

Proof of Corollary 2.2. Suppose that (f, W, ε) follows the assumptions of Theorem 2.2. Define $T : [\ell, u] \rightarrow [\ell, u]$ as $Tx := f(xW + \varepsilon)$ following the statement. Hence, since u is the upper bound, we get $Tu \leq u$. Since T is monotone given the monotonicity of f , we get $T^2u \leq Tu$, whence the iteration implies that $T^n u \leq T^{n-1}u \leq \dots \leq Tu \leq u$. Let $x_n := T^n u$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Then, (x_n) is a non-increasing sequence and bounded below by ℓ , so it has a limit, denoted by $x^* := \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} T^n u$. Now, consider $Tx_n = T^{n+1}u$. Letting $n \rightarrow \infty$ on both sides of the equation, since T is continuous from above given the continuity of f , we have $Tx^* = T(\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} x_n) = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} Tx_n = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} T^{n+1}u = x^*$. Therefore, x^* is the fixed point of T . Since Theorem 2.2 implies that T has a unique fixed point almost surely, x^* is the almost surely unique equilibrium. \square

A.1. Proofs in Section 3.

Proof of Corollary 3.2. Let f , W , and ε follow the conditions of Corollary 3.2. Let $\bar{p} = (\bar{p}_i)$. By Lemma 2.1, we know that the equilibrium exists. From the proof of Theorem 2.2, if there are multiple equilibria, there must be some irreducible subgraph of W that admit multiple equilibria. Without loss of generality, assume that W is irreducible. On the contrary, suppose that x and y are two fixed points with $x > y$. By equation (26) and Lemma A.4, we know that it must follow $|x - y| = |f(xW + \varepsilon) - f(yW + \varepsilon)|$. Hence, we have $|x - y| = |(xW + \varepsilon)^+ \wedge \bar{p} - (yW + \varepsilon)^+ \wedge \bar{p}|$. Since $|(\alpha)^+ \wedge \gamma - (\beta)^+ \wedge \gamma| = |\alpha - \beta|$ for $\gamma > 0$ and $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{R}$ if and only if $\alpha, \beta \in [0, \gamma]$, we get $0 \leq xW + \varepsilon, yW + \varepsilon \leq \bar{p}$. Therefore, we have $x = f(xW + \varepsilon) = xW + \varepsilon$ and $y = f(yW + \varepsilon) = yW + \varepsilon$.

By the Perron-Frobenius theorem, the right eigenvector q of W is strictly positive. Since the row sum is one, q is a vector of ones or constants. Multiplying both side of $x = xW + \varepsilon$ by q^\top , we have $xq^\top = (xW + \varepsilon)q^\top = xq^\top + \varepsilon q^\top$. Thus, we get $\varepsilon q^\top = 0$, whence $\varepsilon \mathbf{1}^\top = 0$. Since $\varepsilon \geq 0$ and there is $\varepsilon_i > 0$ for some i , we obtain a contradiction. \square

Proof of Corollary 3.1. Let f and W satisfy the conditions in Corollary 3.1 so that $\rho(W \text{ diag}(\beta)) < 1$, where $\beta = (\beta_j)$. The proof is similar to Lemma A.1 and Theorem 2.1. In detail, we can show that $T^k x - T^k \hat{x} = (x - \hat{x})(W \text{ diag}(\beta))^k$ for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$ by the same induction in Lemma A.1. Thus, we have $\|T^k x - T^k \hat{x}\| \leq \|x - \hat{x}\| \|(W \text{ diag}(\beta))^k\|$.

If $\rho(W \text{diag}(\beta)) < 1$, then $\|(W \text{diag}(\beta))^k\| < 1$ for some k . The result follows from the Banach Contraction Theorem. \square

Proof of Lemma 3.1. Let f and W be such that the conditions of Lemma 3.1 hold. Let $\beta = (\beta_i)$ be Lipschitz constants. If the first condition of Lemma A.6 holds, it implies that $\|W^m\|_\infty < 1$ for some $m \in \mathbb{N}$ by Theorem 2.5 of Azimzadeh (2019). Similarly, the second condition of Lemma A.6 implies that $\|W^m\|_1 = \|(W^\top)^m\|_\infty < 1$ for some $m \in \mathbb{N}$. Since $\text{diag}(\beta) = I$ for non-expansiveness of f , we have $\rho(|W| \text{diag}(\beta)) = \rho(W) < 1$. \square

Proof of Lemma 3.2. Let f and W be such that the conditions of Lemma 3.2 hold. Let $\beta = (\beta_i)$ be Lipschitz constants. An acyclic graph contains some sink node i such that $\sum_j w_{ij} = 0$. For each node s in an acyclic graph, there is an acyclic path to some sink node t . Suppose that node s can reach t in K_t steps such that $w_{st}^{K_t} > 0$. Let $K^* = \max_t K_t$ be the length from node s to the farthest connected sink node t^* . (Since if there are multiple farthest sink nodes, they have the same length. Without loss of generality, assume that there is only one farthest sink node from s .) Then, we must have $\sum_u w_{su}^{K^*+1} = 0$.³⁹ Since s is arbitrary, we have $W^T = 0$ for some large enough $T \in \mathbb{N}$. It implies that $\rho(W) = 0$. Let $A = |W| \text{diag}(\beta)$. The sink nodes for graph W are also the sink nodes for graph A . Hence, the same argument shows that $\rho(A) = 0$. \square

Proof of Lemma 3.3. Let f and W be such that the conditions of Lemma 3.3 hold. Then, the conditions of Lemma A.6 are satisfied. The result follows from Lemma 3.1. \square

Proof of Corollary 3.3. Let f and W be such that Assumption 2.2 holds. Using Lemma 3.2 and Theorem 2.1, if the network graph is acyclic, then the equilibrium is unique. Hence, if there exists multiplicity, there must be a strongly connected subgraph. We then decompose the graph into strongly connected subgraphs as the proof of Theorem 2.2. The proof of Theorem 2.2 implies that, given the realized shocks ε , the multiplicity occurs in and originates from some strongly connected in-subgraphs or out-subgraphs S (the shocks corresponding to S are linearly dependent). It implies

³⁹If not zero, it contradicts with the definition of K^* .

that all agents in S admit multiple equilibria.⁴⁰ Moreover, the agents with multiple equilibria must be accessible from at least one subgraph with multiple equilibria. \square

Proofs in Section 4.

Proof of Lemma 4.1. Suppose that (f, W, ε) and (f', W', ε') are two networks such that Assumption 2.1 holds. Assume that $W \leq W'$, $\varepsilon \leq \varepsilon'$, and f_i and f'_i are increasing functions for all $i \in N$, and $f_i(t) \leq f'_i(t)$ for all $t \in \mathbb{R}$ and all $i \in N$. It then follows from Theorem 2.1 that (f, W, ε) and (f', W', ε') have unique equilibrium \hat{x} and \hat{x}' , respectively. Define the maps $T: \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ and $\hat{T}: \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ as $Tx := f(xW + \varepsilon)$ and $\hat{T}x := f'(xW' + \varepsilon')$ for all $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$. We first show that $T^k x \leq \hat{T}^k x$ for all $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and $k \in \mathbb{N}$. Since $f_i(t) \leq f'_i(t)$ for all $t \in \mathbb{R}$ and all i , we see that $f(x) \leq f'(x)$ for all $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$. Then, since f_i and f'_i are increasing functions for all i , and $W \leq W'$, and $\varepsilon \leq \varepsilon'$, we obtain $Tx = f(xW + \varepsilon) \leq f(xW' + \varepsilon) \leq f'(xW' + \varepsilon') = \hat{T}x$ for all $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$. Suppose the induction hypothesis that $T^k x \leq \hat{T}^k x$ for some $k \in \mathbb{N}$ and all x . Hence, since $Tx \leq \hat{T}x$ for all $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$, we have $T(T^k x) \leq \hat{T}(T^k x) \leq \hat{T}(\hat{T}^k x)$. Therefore, the Mathematical Induction implies that $T^k x \leq \hat{T}^k x$ for all $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and all $k \in \mathbb{N}$. Since Corollary 2.1 shows that $\hat{x} = \lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} T^k x$ and $\hat{x}' = \lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \hat{T}^k x$ for any $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$, we obtain $\hat{x} = \lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} T^k x \leq \lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \hat{T}^k x = \hat{x}'$. \square

Proof of Lemma 4.2. Let (f, W, ε) and (f', W', ε') be two networks such that the assumptions of the statement hold. Suppose that $f_i(t) \leq u_i$ and $f'_i(t) \leq u'_i$ for all $t \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $u_i \leq u'_i$ for all i . Let $u := (u_i)$ and $u' := (u'_i)$. Define the maps $T: \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ and $\hat{T}: \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ as $Tx := f(xW + \varepsilon)$ and $\hat{T}x := f'(xW' + \varepsilon')$ for all $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$. Following Theorem 2.2, we know that the equilibrium for both (f, W, ε) and (f', W', ε') are unique almost surely, denoted by \hat{x} and \hat{x}' , respectively. Moreover, it follows from Corollary 2.2 that $\hat{x} = \lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} T^k u$ and $\hat{x}' = \lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \hat{T}^k u'$. Now, we show that $T^k u \leq \hat{T}^k u'$ for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$. Since $f_i(t) \leq f'_i(t)$ for all t and all i , we see that $Tx = f(xW + \varepsilon) \leq f'(xW + \varepsilon) \leq f'(xW' + \varepsilon') = \hat{T}x$ for all x . Hence, since $u \leq u'$, we have $Tu \leq \hat{T}u \leq \hat{T}u'$. Suppose that $T^k u \leq \hat{T}^k u'$ for some $k \in \mathbb{N}$. Then, since $Tx \leq \hat{T}x$ for all x , and \hat{T} is an increasing map, we get $TT^k u \leq \hat{T}T^k u \leq \hat{T}\hat{T}^k u'$.

⁴⁰Since S admit multiple equilibria (shocks are linearly dependent), given an equilibrium, we can create another equilibrium. In particular, let W_s be the submatrix of W corresponding to subgraph S , and x_s be the equilibrium for agents in S . From equation (26), $x_s + te_s W_s$ is another equilibrium, where e_s is the eigenvector of W_s , and $t \in \mathbb{R}$ is a parameter such that $x_s + te_s W_s$ is in the range of the interaction functions.

Therefore, the Mathematical Induction implies that $T^k u \leq \hat{T}^k u'$ for all $k \in \mathbb{N}$. Consequently, we have $\hat{x} = \lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} T^k u \leq \lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} \hat{T}^k u' = \hat{x}'$. \square

Proofs in Section 4. Define the set of ε that the solution exists as

$$E_0 = \{\varepsilon \in E_\varepsilon : \text{Linear system (16) has a solution.}\}$$

Define the set of ε that allows multiple solutions as

$$E_1 := \{\varepsilon \in E_\varepsilon : \text{Linear system (16) has multiple solutions.}\}$$

Lemma A.5. *Suppose that ε is absolutely continuous. If W is non-negative, and $\rho(W) = 1$, then $\lambda(E_0) = 0$ and $E_0 = E_1$.*

Proof of Lemma A.5. Let W be a non-negative, irreducible matrix W with $\rho(W) = 1$. Using Perron-Frobenius Theorem, $\rho(W)$ is an eigenvalue of W , and its corresponding left eigenvector and right eigenvector are non-negative, denoted by v and e , respectively. First, note that $x = xW + \varepsilon$ has a solution if and only if $\varepsilon e^\top = 0$. To see this, let $A := I - W$ and rewrite the linear system (16) as $xA = \varepsilon$. Hence, if x is a solution, then $xAe^\top = xe^\top - xWe^\top = xe^\top - xe^\top = 0 = \varepsilon e^\top$. Conversely, if $\varepsilon e^\top = 0$, then since $Ae^\top = e^\top - e^\top = 0$, we have $\text{rank}(A) = \text{rank}([A|\varepsilon])$, where $[A|\varepsilon]$ is the augmented matrix for $xA = \varepsilon$. Since the solution exists if and only if $\text{rank}(A) = \text{rank}([A|\varepsilon])$, there must be a solution. Therefore, $E_0 = \{\varepsilon : \varepsilon e^\top = 0\}$ is measure zero. For the second statement, it is clear that $E_1 \subset E_0$. Suppose that $\varepsilon \in E_0$. Thus, there is x such that $x = xW + \varepsilon$. Letting $t \in \mathbb{R}$, since v is the left eigenvector, we have $x + tv = xW + \varepsilon + tv = (x + tv)W + \varepsilon$, whence $x + tv$ is a solution. Then, $\varepsilon \in E_1$ and $E_0 \subset E_1$. \square

Proof of Lemma 4.3. Let W and ε follow the conditions of Lemma 4.3. Lemma A.5 and absolute continuity of shock imply that $\mathbb{P}_\varepsilon(\varepsilon \in E_0) = 0$. \square

Proof of Lemma 4.4. Let $\ell, u \in \mathbb{R}^n$ be such that $u \gg \ell$, $f = (f_i)$ be defined as (17), and W is stochastic. Assume that x^* is the unique equilibrium. Suppose on the contrary that for all $j \in N$ we have $x_j^* = \sum_i x_i^* W_{ij} + \varepsilon_j < u_j$ and $x_j^* = \sum_i x_i^* W_{ij} + \varepsilon_j > \ell_j$, whence $\ell \ll x^* W + \varepsilon \ll u$ and $x^* = f(x^*) = x^* W + \varepsilon$. Since W is stochastic and hence non-negative, Perron-Frobenius theorem implies that W has a non-negative left eigenvector v with respect to the eigenvalue 1. That is, $vW = v$. Now, since $\ell \ll x^* \ll u$, we can find $\lambda \neq 0$ such that $\ell \leq x^* + \lambda v \leq u$. Then, since

$(x^* + \lambda v)W + \varepsilon = x^*W + \lambda v + \varepsilon = x^* + \lambda v$, we have $\ell \leq (x^* + \lambda v)W + \varepsilon \leq u$. Therefore, we get $f((x^* + \lambda v)W + \varepsilon) = (x^* + \lambda v)$, so that $(x^* + \lambda v)$ is another equilibrium. Since x^* is the unique equilibrium, we have a contradiction. \square

Proof of Lemma 4.5. Let (f, W, ε) follows the conditions of lemma. Let $u = (u_i)$ and $\ell = (\ell_i)$ be the upper bounds and lower bounds of f , respectively. Given the states $x \in [\ell, u]$, let $A(x)$ and $B(x)$ be the sets of agents with the equilibrium at the bounds as (18). Denote x^* as the unique equilibrium. Let $A^* := A(x^*) = \{j \in N : \sum_i x_i^* w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j \geq u_j\}$ be the sets of agents having the equilibrium at the upper bounds, and $B^* := B(x^*) = \{j \in N : \sum_i x_i^* w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j \leq \ell_j\}$ be the sets of agents with the equilibrium at the lower bounds. Following the algorithm, if $x^* = u$ or $x^* = \ell$, then step 2 or step 3 of Algorithm 1 terminates and returns the equilibrium. Without loss of generality, suppose that $x^* \neq u, \ell$.

Define $\mathcal{P} := \mathcal{P}(B(\ell))$ as the power set of $B(\ell)$. Then, since $B^* \subset B(\ell)$, there exists $P \in \mathcal{P}$ such that $P = B^*$. Define $\hat{u} := \ell \Lambda^{B^*} + u(I - \Lambda^{B^*})$. Hence, economic states \hat{u} indicate that an agent i in B^* has economic state ℓ_i , and an agent i in $N \setminus B^*$ has state u_i .

Since $x^* > \ell_j$ for $j \in N \setminus B^*$, we can be reduced the system to:

$$\begin{aligned} \forall j \in B^*, \quad x_j &= \ell_j \\ \forall j \in N \setminus B^*, \quad x_j &= \min \left\{ \max \left\{ \sum_{i \in N \setminus B^*} x_i w_{ij} + \sum_{i \in B^*} \ell_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j, \ell_j \right\}, u_j \right\} \\ &= \min \left\{ \sum_{i \in N \setminus B^*} x_i w_{ij} + \sum_{i \in B^*} \ell_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j, u_j \right\} \\ &> \ell_j \end{aligned} \tag{27}$$

We write (27) in vector form and define the operator $\hat{T} : [\ell, \hat{u}] \rightarrow [\ell, \hat{u}]$ as

$$\hat{T}x := \{[x(I - \Lambda^{B^*})W + \ell \Lambda^{B^*}W + \varepsilon](I - \Lambda^{B^*})\} \wedge [u(I - \Lambda^{B^*})] + \ell \Lambda^{B^*}.$$

Then, x^* is the fixed point of \hat{T} . Following the algorithm, we let $x^{(0)} = \hat{u}$ and $A_0 := A(\hat{u}) \cap (N \setminus B^*)$, so that $A^* \subset A_0 \subset N \setminus B^*$. Define $x^{(t)}$ for $t \in \mathbb{N}$ as the fixed

point of Φ_t :

$$\begin{aligned}\Phi_t x &:= u\Lambda^{A_{t-1}} + \ell\Lambda^{B^*} \\ &+ [u\Lambda^{A_{t-1}}W + \ell\Lambda^{B^*}W + x(I - \Lambda^{A_{t-1}} - \Lambda^{B^*})W + \varepsilon](I - \Lambda^{A_{t-1}} - \Lambda^{B^*}).\end{aligned}\quad (28)$$

We have $x^{(t)} = \Phi_t x^{(t)}$ for all $t \in \mathbb{N}$. For $t \in \mathbb{N}$, define $A_t = A(x^{(t)})$. We first show that $\hat{T}x^{(t)} \leq x^{(t)}$ and $x^{(t+1)} \leq x^{(t)}$ for all $t = 0, 1, 2, \dots$ by induction.

Consider $t = 0$. Clearly, we have $\hat{T}x^{(0)} \leq x^{(0)}$. We need to check that Φ_1 has a unique fixed point. Since $A_0 \supset A^*$, the matrix $I - (I - \Lambda^{A_0} - \Lambda^{B^*})W(I - \Lambda^{A_0} - \Lambda^{B^*})$ is non-singular. Otherwise, there exists an irreducible submatrix W_s of $(I - \Lambda^{A_0} - \Lambda^{B^*})W(I - \Lambda^{A_0} - \Lambda^{B^*})$ such that $\rho(W_s) = 1$. But, using Lemma A.4, the proof of Theorem 2.2, and Lemma 4.4, since the equilibrium is unique, every strongly connected subgraph must contain a node m such that its equilibrium is at the bound. Since the operation $(I - \Lambda^{A_0} - \Lambda^{B^*})W(I - \Lambda^{A_0} - \Lambda^{B^*})$ removes such node m from the graph W , Lemma A.9 implies that $\rho(W_s) < 1$. Therefore, such irreducible submatrix W_s with $\rho(W_s) = 1$ does not exist, so the spectral radius of $(I - \Lambda^{A_0} - \Lambda^{B^*})W(I - \Lambda^{A_0} - \Lambda^{B^*})$ is less than one. Therefore, the fixed point of Φ_1 is unique, and we can compute the fixed point $x^{(1)}$ by the iteration from any initial guess. In particular, we can iterate from $x^{(0)}$: $x^{(1)} = \lim_{m \rightarrow \infty} \Phi_1^m(x^{(0)})$. Moreover, since $x^{(0)} = u(I - \Lambda^{B^*}) + \ell\Lambda^{B^*}$ and then $x^{(0)}(I - \Lambda^{A_0} - \Lambda^{B^*}) = u(I - \Lambda^{A_0} - \Lambda^{B^*})$, we have

$$\begin{aligned}\Phi_1(x^{(0)}) &= u\Lambda^{A_0} + \ell\Lambda^{B^*} \\ &+ [u\Lambda^{A_0}W + \ell\Lambda^{B^*}W + x^{(0)}(I - \Lambda^{A_0} - \Lambda^{B^*})W + \varepsilon](I - \Lambda^{A_0} - \Lambda^{B^*}) \\ &= u\Lambda^{A_0} + \ell\Lambda^{B^*} + [u(I - \Lambda^{B^*})W + \ell\Lambda^{B^*}W + \varepsilon](I - \Lambda^{A_0} - \Lambda^{B^*}) \\ &\leq u\Lambda^{A_0} + \ell\Lambda^{B^*} + u(I - \Lambda^{A_0} - \Lambda^{B^*}) \\ &= u(I - \Lambda^{B^*}) + \ell\Lambda^{B^*} = x^{(0)}\end{aligned}$$

where the inequality holds because the definition of A_0 implies that if $A_0 \subsetneq N \setminus B^*$, then $\sum_{i \in N \setminus B_0} u_i w_{ij} + \sum_{i \in B_0} \ell_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j < u_j$ for $j \notin A_0$; otherwise, if $A_0 = N \setminus B^*$, then $I - \Lambda^{A_0} - \Lambda^{B^*} = 0$ and $x^{(0)} = \hat{u}$ is the fixed point of \hat{T} . Since Φ_t is an increasing operator for all t , we get $\Phi_1^m(x^{(0)}) \leq \Phi_1^{m-1}(x^{(0)}) \leq \dots \leq \Phi_1(x^{(0)}) \leq x^{(0)}$ for all $m \in \mathbb{N}$, so that $x^{(1)} = \lim_{m \rightarrow \infty} \Phi_1^m(x^{(0)}) \leq x^{(0)}$.

Suppose that $\hat{T}x^{(k)} \leq x^{(k)}$ holds for some $t = k \in \mathbb{N}$. Since $A_k = A(x^{(k)}) = \{j \in N : \sum_i x^{(k)} w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j \geq u_j\}$, we have $x^{(k)}(I - \Lambda^{A_k} - \Lambda^{B^*}) + u\Lambda^{A_k} + \ell\Lambda^{B^*} = x^{(k)}$. Hence, we

have

$$\begin{aligned}
\Phi_{k+1}(x^{(k)}) &= u\Lambda^{A_k} + \ell\Lambda^{B^*} \\
&\quad + [u\Lambda^{A_k}W + \ell\Lambda^{B^*}W + x^{(k)}(I - \Lambda^{A_k} - \Lambda^{B^*})W + \varepsilon](I - \Lambda^{A_k} - \Lambda^{B^*}) \\
&= u\Lambda^{A_k} + \ell\Lambda^{B^*} + (x^{(k)}W + \varepsilon)(I - \Lambda^{A_k} - \Lambda^{B^*}) \\
&= \hat{T}x^{(k)} \leq x^{(k)}
\end{aligned} \tag{29}$$

Similar to the above argument, $I - (I - \Lambda^{A_k} - \Lambda^{B^*})W(I - \Lambda^{A_k} - \Lambda^{B^*})$ is non-singular, so $x^{(k+1)}$ is unique. Then, since Φ_{k+1} is an increasing operator, and its iteration converges from any initial point, we have $x^{(k+1)} = \lim_{m \rightarrow \infty} \Phi_{k+1}^m(x^{(k)}) \leq \dots \leq \Phi_{k+1}(x^{(k)}) \leq x^{(k)}$. Next, since $x^{(k+1)} \leq x^{(k)}$, we have $A_{k+1} = A(x^{(k+1)}) \subset A(x^{(k)}) = A_k$. If $A_{k+1} = A_k$, then using the definition of A_{k+1} we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{T}x^{(k+1)} &= \{[x^{(k+1)}(I - \Lambda^{B^*})W + \ell\Lambda^{B^*}W + \varepsilon](I - \Lambda^{B^*})\} \wedge [u(I - \Lambda^{B^*})] + \ell\Lambda^{B^*} \\
&= [x^{(k+1)}(I - \Lambda^{B^*} - \Lambda^{A_{k+1}})W + u\Lambda^{A_{k+1}}W + \ell\Lambda^{B^*}W + \varepsilon](I - \Lambda^{B^*})(I - \Lambda^{A_{k+1}}) \\
&\quad + u\Lambda^{A_{k+1}} + \ell\Lambda^{B^*} \\
&= [x^{(k+1)}(I - \Lambda^{B^*} - \Lambda^{A_k})W + u\Lambda^{A_k}W + \ell\Lambda^{B^*}W + \varepsilon](I - \Lambda^{B^*} - \Lambda^{A_k}) \\
&\quad + u\Lambda^{A_k} + \ell\Lambda^{B^*} \\
&= \Phi_{k+1}x^{(k+1)} = x^{(k+1)}
\end{aligned}$$

Then, $x^{(k+1)}$ is the fixed point of \hat{T} if $A_{k+1} = A_k$. Moreover, since $A_{k+1} = A_k$ implies $\Phi_{k+1} = \Phi_{k+2}$, we have $x^{(k+1)} = x^{(k+2)}$.

On the other hand, suppose that $A_{k+1} \subsetneq A_k$. Denote $\hat{T}x_j^{(k+1)}$ and $\Phi_{k+1}x_j^{(k+1)}$ as the j -th entry of $\hat{T}x^{(k+1)}$ and $\Phi_{k+1}x^{(k+1)}$, respectively. Then, for $j \in A_{k+1}$, we have $\hat{T}x_j^{(k+1)} = u_j = \Phi_{k+1}x_j^{(k+1)} = x_j^{(k+1)}$, where the second equality holds because $j \in A_k$. For $j \in A_k \setminus A_{k+1}$, we have $\hat{T}x_j^{(k+1)} < u_j = \Phi_{k+1}x_j^{(k+1)} = x_j^{(k+1)}$. For $j \in B^*$, we have $\hat{T}x_j^{(k+1)} = \ell_j = \Phi_{k+1}x_j^{(k+1)} = x_j^{(k+1)}$. For $j \in N \setminus (A_k \cup B^*)$, we have $j \notin (A_{k+1} \cup B^*)$

so that

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{T}x_j^{(k+1)} &= \sum_{i \in B^*} \ell_i w_{ij} + \sum_{i \in A_{k+1}} u_i w_{ij} + \sum_{i \in N \setminus (A_{k+1} \cup B^*)} x_i^{(k+1)} w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j \\
&= \sum_{i \in B^*} \ell_i w_{ij} + \sum_{i \in A_{k+1}} u_i w_{ij} + \sum_{i \in N \setminus (A_k \cup B^*)} x_i^{(k+1)} w_{ij} + \sum_{i \in A_k \setminus A_{k+1}} x_i^{(k+1)} w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j \\
&= \sum_{i \in B^*} \ell_i w_{ij} + \sum_{i \in A_{k+1}} u_i w_{ij} + \sum_{i \in N \setminus (A_k \cup B^*)} x_i^{(k+1)} w_{ij} + \sum_{i \in A_k \setminus A_{k+1}} u_i w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j \\
&= \sum_{i \in B^*} \ell_i w_{ij} + \sum_{i \in A_k} u_i w_{ij} + \sum_{i \in N \setminus (A_k \cup B^*)} x_i^{(k+1)} w_{ij} + \varepsilon_j \\
&= \Phi_{k+1} x_j^{(k+1)} = x_j^{(k+1)}
\end{aligned}$$

where we use $x_i^{(k+1)} = u_i$ for $i \in A_k$ by (28). Therefore, we see that $\hat{T}x^{(k+1)} \leq x^{(k+1)}$ when $A_{k+1} \subsetneq A_k$. Then, we get $\hat{T}x^{(k+1)} \leq x^{(k+1)}$. The Mathematical Induction shows that $\hat{T}x^{(t)} \leq x^{(t)}$ and $x^{(t+1)} \leq x^{(t)}$ for all $t = 0, 1, 2, \dots$.

The above argument also shows that if $A_{k+1} = A_k$ for some $k > 0$, then $x^{(k+1)}$ is the fixed point of \hat{T} . Also, (29) implies that $x^{(k+2)} = \Phi_{k+2} x^{(k+1)} = \hat{T}x^{(k+1)} = x^{(k+1)}$, so that $x^{(t)}$ for $t \geq k+1$ remains constant. On the other hand, if $x^{(k+1)}$ is not the fixed point of \hat{T} , since $x^{(k+1)}$ is the fixed point of Φ_{k+1} , there exists $j \in A_k \setminus A_{k+1}$ such that A_{k+1} decreases. Since there are only n nodes, and A_0 contains at most $n-1$ elements due to $x^* \neq u$, A_t and $x^{(t)}$ stop to change after at most n iterations. Since the sequence $x^{(t)}$ is constant only at fixed point by (29), we obtain the equilibrium in at most n iterations. Now, in searching of $P = B^*$ from the power set of $B(\ell)$, since $x^* \neq \ell$ and then $B(\ell)$ contains at most $n-1$ agents, \mathcal{P} has at most 2^{n-1} elements. Then, we need at most 2^{n-1} searching time for $P = B^*$ and n iterations for each possible $P \in \mathcal{P}$ to find the fixed point, so the overall iteration is at most $n2^{n-1}$. \square

Proof of Lemma 4.6. Let f follow (17), $W \geq 0$ be stochastic, and $\varepsilon \in E_\varepsilon$. Let $g: \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be a strictly increasing function. Suppose that x^* is a solution to programming problem (21). Then, x^* satisfies $x^* \in [\ell, u]$ and $x^* \leq \max\{x^*W + \varepsilon, \ell\}$. We want to show that x_j^* satisfies either $x_j^* = u_j$ or $x_j^* = (\max\{x^*W + \varepsilon, \ell\})_j$ for all $j \in N$, where $(\max\{x^*W + \varepsilon, \ell\})_j$ is the j -th entry of $\max\{x^*W + \varepsilon, \ell\}$. Suppose not. Then, there is $i \in N$ such that $x_i^* < u_i$ and $x_i^* < (\max\{x^*W + \varepsilon, \ell\})_i$. Then, we can find $\delta > 0$ such that $x_i^* + \delta \leq u_i$ and

$$x_i^* + \delta \leq (\max\{x^*W + \varepsilon, \ell\})_i \leq (\max\{(x^* + \delta \mathbb{1}^i)W + \varepsilon, \ell\})_i,$$

where $\mathbb{1}_j^i = 1$ if $j = i$ and $\mathbb{1}_j^i = 0$ otherwise. Therefore, $x^* + \delta \mathbb{1}^i$ satisfies the conditions of programming problem (21). Since g is strictly increasing, we have $g(x^*) < g(x^* + \delta \mathbb{1}^i)$, contradicting that x^* is the solution. Hence, it must be that either $x_j^* = u_j$ or $x_j^* = (\max\{x^*W + \varepsilon, \ell\})_j$ for all $j \in N$, so that $x^* = \min\{\max\{x^*W + \varepsilon, \ell\}, u\}$. \square

Proofs in Section 5.

Proof of Lemma 5.1. Suppose that f_i is increasing and continuously differentiable for all i , and $\rho(|W| \text{diag} \beta) < 1$. Let $F(x) := f(xW + \varepsilon) - x$. Then, the system (22) is $dx/dt = F(x)$. We follow Lyapunov's linearization method. We have the partial derivatives

$$\frac{\partial F_i(x)}{\partial x_m} = \begin{cases} f'_i(\sum_h x_h w_{hi} + \varepsilon_i) w_{ii} - 1 & \text{if } m = i, \\ f'_i(\sum_h x_h w_{hi} + \varepsilon_i) w_{mi} & \text{if } m \neq i, \end{cases}$$

Denote $f' := (f'_1(\sum_h x_h w_{h1} + \varepsilon_1), \dots, f'_n(\sum_h x_h w_{hn} + \varepsilon_n))$. The Jacobian matrix of F is $W \text{diag}(f') - I$. Let λ be the eigenvalue of $W \text{diag}(f') - I$. The dynamics is asymptotically stable if the real part of λ , denoted as $\text{Re}(\lambda)$, is negative for all λ . From the characteristic equation, eigenvalue λ satisfies $0 = \det((W \text{diag}(f') - I) - \lambda I) = \det((W \text{diag}(f') - (\lambda + 1)I))$, so $\lambda + 1$ is the eigenvalue of $W \text{diag}(f')$. We then have $\text{Re}(\lambda) + 1 \leq |\lambda + 1| \leq \rho(W \text{diag}(f'))$.

Since the interaction functions are Lipschitz continuous, the derivatives are bounded $|f'_i| \leq \beta_i$ for all i , so that $\text{diag}(f') \leq \text{diag}(\beta)$. Then, we can show that $|(W \text{diag}(f'))^k| \leq (|W| \text{diag}(\beta))^k$ for $k \geq 1$. Since $\rho(A) \leq \|A^k\|^{1/k}$ for a matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ and $k \geq 1$, we have $\rho(W \text{diag}(f')) \leq \|(W \text{diag}(f'))^k\|^{1/k} \leq \|(|W| \text{diag}(\beta))^k\|^{1/k}$ for all $k \geq 1$. Taking the limit of k , we have $\text{Re}(\lambda) \leq \rho(W \text{diag}(f')) - 1 \leq \rho(|W| \text{diag}(\beta)) - 1 < 0$. Since the real part of any eigenvalue of $W \text{diag}(f') - I$ is negative, the system is asymptotically stable. \square

Proof of Lemma 5.2. Let f_i be differentiable for all i and $\rho(|W| \text{diag} \beta) < 1$. Define the system and function F as (23). Define C_{ij} as

$$C_{ij} := \frac{dx_j^*}{ds_i} \frac{\partial s_i}{\partial x_i^*} x_i^*$$

for $i, j \in N$. For the steady state, by (23), we have $x_i^* = f(\sum_h x_h^* w_{hi} + \varepsilon_i) / s_i$, so that

$$\partial x_i^* / \partial s_i = -f \left(\sum_h x_h^* w_{hi} + \varepsilon_i \right) / s_i^2 = -x_i^* / s_i.$$

For $s = \mathbf{1}$, we have

$$C_{ij} = \frac{dx_j^*}{ds_i} \frac{\partial s_i}{\partial x_i^*} x_i^* = \frac{dx_j^*}{ds_i} \left(\frac{-s_i}{x_i^*} \right) x_i^* = -\frac{dx_j^*}{ds_i}. \quad (30)$$

After the removal of i , the system goes to a new steady state near the original one. Since $F = 0$ at both new and original steady states, we have $dF/ds = \mathbf{0}$, where $\mathbf{0}$ is an n by n zero matrix. The total derivative $dF = (\partial F/\partial s)ds + (\partial F/\partial x)dx$ gives

$$\frac{dF}{ds} = \frac{\partial F}{\partial s} + \frac{\partial F}{\partial x} \frac{dx}{ds} = \mathbf{0}. \quad (31)$$

By (30) and (31), since $\partial f/\partial x = W \text{diag}(f')$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} C &= -\frac{dx^*}{ds} = -\left[\frac{\partial F}{\partial s} \Big|_{(x,s)=(x^*,\mathbf{1})} \right] \left[\frac{\partial F}{\partial x} \Big|_{(x,s)=(x^*,\mathbf{1})} \right]^{-1} \\ &= \text{diag}(x^*) [I - W \text{diag}(f'(x^*W + \varepsilon))]^{-1} \end{aligned}$$

where $f'(x^*W + \varepsilon) = (f'_1(\sum_h x_h^* w_{h1} \varepsilon_1), \dots, f'_n(\sum_h x_h^* w_{hn} \varepsilon_n))$. The result follows from that $\sigma = (C\mathbf{1}^\top)^\top$. \square

Other Lemmas.

Lemma A.6. *If $W \geq 0$ or $W^\top \geq 0$ is weakly chained substochastic, then W is convergent.*⁴¹

Lemma A.7. *Let $A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ be non-negative. Then, $\rho(A) < 1$ if and only if $(I - A)^{-1}$ exists and $(I - A)^{-1} \geq 0$.*

Let $A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ be a matrix. Define A_{-i} as the submatrix of A deleting row i and column i of A .

Lemma A.8. *Let $A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ be a non-negative matrix. Then, $\rho(A_{-i}) \leq \rho(A)$.*

Lemma A.9. *Let $A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ be an irreducible stochastic matrix. Then, $\rho(A_{-i}) < 1$.*

Proof. Let $A = (a_{ij}) \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ be an irreducible stochastic matrix. It is enough to consider the strongly connected graph with the least number of links, the ring. That is, consider the graph such that for all $i \in N$ we have $a_{i,j} = 1$ if $j = (i + 1) \pmod{n}$,

⁴¹ W^\top is weakly chained substochastic if and only if W is column substochastic, and for each $j \in N$, either $\sum_i w_{ij} < 1$, or there exists $t \in N$ such that there is a path from t to j ($t \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow j$) and $\sum_i w_{it} < 1$.

otherwise $a_{i,j} = 0$. Fix $i \in N$ and delete row i and column i to get A_{-i} . Then, the row sum of row $i - 1$ is less than one. Also, every other node has a path to node $i - 1$. Therefore, A_{-i} is weakly chained substochastic, so it follows from Lemma A.6 that $\rho(A_{-i}) < 1$. We can extend the argument to an irreducible matrix, since if we remove a node i from a strongly connected graph, then i must be in a ring, and any other nodes have some path to that ring. \square

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