

Homework 9

Chirag Sachdev

Week 9

Abstract

This project is a part of HW8 of Assurance Foundations. The homework deals with integration of ML and HOL to L^AT_EX. The goal of this report is to show reproducibility which is the groundwork for credibility that I have done this on my own without any external help. Every Chapter demonstrates the following sections:

- Problem Statement
- Relevant Code
- Test Results

This project includes the following packages:

634format.sty A format style for this course

listings Package for displaying and inputting ML source code

holtex HOL style files and commands to display in the report

This document also demonstrates my ability to :

- Easily generate a table of contents,
- Refer to chapter and section labels

My skills and my professional details can be found at <https://www.linkedin.in/in/chiragsachdev>.

Acknowledgments

I would gratefully acknowledge Dr. Shiu-Kai Chin and my other professors at Syracuse University and my Professors at Drexel University for being the wonderful mentors they are to guide me through my journey of obtaining a Master's Degree.

Contents

1	Executive Summary	3
2	Excercise 15.6.1	4
2.1	Problem statement	4
2.2	Proof of exercise15_6_1a.thm	4
2.2.1	Relevant Code	4
2.2.2	Session Transcript	4
2.3	Proof of exercise15_6_1b.thm	5
2.3.1	Relevant Code	5
2.3.2	Session Transcript	5
3	Excercise 15.6.2	6
3.1	Problem statement	6
3.2	Proof of exercise15_6_2a.thm	6
3.2.1	Relevant Code	6
3.2.2	Session Transcript	6
3.3	Proof of exercise15_6_2b.thm	7
3.3.1	Relevant Code	7
3.3.2	Session Transcript	7
4	Excercise 15.6.3	8
4.1	Problem statement	8
4.2	Proof of exercise15_6_3.thm	8
4.2.1	Relevant Code	8
4.2.2	Session Transcript	8
A	Source code: cipherScript	9
B	Source code: cryptoExercisesScript	20

Chapter 1

Executive Summary

All requirements for this project are satisfied. Specifically we prove the following theorems:

[exercise15_6_1a_thm]

$$\vdash \forall key \ enMsg \ message. \\ (\text{deciphS } key \ enMsg = \text{SOME } message) \iff \\ (enMsg = \text{Es } key \ (\text{SOME } message))$$

[exercise15_6_1b_thm]

$$\vdash \forall keyAlice \ k \ text. \\ (\text{deciphS } keyAlice \ (\text{Es } k \ (\text{SOME } text))) = \\ \text{SOME } \text{"This is from Alice"} \iff \\ (k = keyAlice) \wedge (text = \text{"This is from Alice"})$$

[exercise15_6_2a_thm]

$$\vdash \forall P \ message. \\ (\text{deciphP } (\text{pubK } P) \ enMsg = \text{SOME } message) \iff \\ (enMsg = \text{Ea } (\text{privK } P) \ (\text{SOME } message))$$

[exercise15_6_2b_thm]

$$\vdash \forall key \ text. \\ (\text{deciphP } (\text{pubK } Alice) \ (\text{Ea } key \ (\text{SOME } text))) = \\ \text{SOME } \text{"This is from Alice"} \iff \\ (key = \text{privK } Alice) \wedge (text = \text{"This is from Alice"})$$

[exercise15_6_3_thm]

$$\vdash \forall signature. \\ \text{signVerify } (\text{pubK } Alice) \ signature \\ (\text{SOME } \text{"This is from Alice"}) \iff \\ (signature = \\ \text{sign } (\text{privK } Alice) \ (\text{hash } (\text{SOME } \text{"This is from Alice"})))$$

[Reproducibility in ML and L^AT_EX]

The ML and L^AT_EX source files compile with no errors.

Chapter 2

Exercise 15.6.1

2.1 Problem statement

Using properties of symmetric key encryption and decryption in *cipherTheory* to prove the following theorems:

```
[exercise15_6_1a_thm]
⊢ ∀ key enMsg message.
  (deciphS key enMsg = SOME message) ⇔
  (enMsg = Es key (SOME message))

[exercise15_6_1b_thm]
⊢ ∀ keyAlice k text.
  (deciphS keyAlice (Es k (SOME text)) =
   SOME "This is from Alice") ⇔
  (k = keyAlice) ∧ (text = "This is from Alice")
```

2.2 Proof of exercise15_6_1a_thm

2.2.1 Relevant Code

```
val exercise15_6_1a_thm =
TAC_PROOF([[]], '!'key enMsg message.(deciphS key enMsg = SOME message) <=>
(enMsg = Es key (SOME message))''),
PROVE_TAC[deciphS_one_one]
);
val _ = save_thm("exercise15_6_1a_thm", exercise15_6_1a_thm);
```

2.2.2 Session Transcript

```
val exercise15_6_1a_thm =
TAC_PROOF([[]], '!'key enMsg message.(deciphS key enMsg = SOME message) <=>
(enMsg = Es key (SOME message))''),
PROVE_TAC[deciphS_one_one]
);
val _ = save_thm("exercise15_6_1a_thm", exercise15_6_1a_thm);

# # # # <HOL message: inventing new type variable names: 'a>>
Meson search level: .....
val exercise15_6_1a_thm =
|- !(key :symKey) (enMsg :'a symMsg) (message :'a).
  (deciphS key enMsg = SOME message) <=>
  (enMsg = Es key (SOME message)):
thm
```

1

2.3 Proof of exercise15_6_1b_thm

2.3.1 Relevant Code

```
val exercise15_6_1b_thm =
TAC_PROOF([[]], ‘!keyAlice k text.(deciphS keyAlice (Es k (SOME text))) = SOME "This is from Alice"
PROVE_TAC[deciphS_one_one]
);
val _ = save_thm("exercise15_6_1b_thm", exercise15_6_1b_thm);
```

2.3.2 Session Transcript

```
> val exercise15_6_1b_thm =
TAC_PROOF([[]], ‘!keyAlice k text.(deciphS keyAlice (Es k (SOME text))) = SOME "This is from Alice"<=> ((k = keyAlice) /\ text = "This is from Alice")
PROVE_TAC[deciphS_one_one]
);
val _ = save_thm("exercise15_6_1b_thm", exercise15_6_1b_thm);

# # # Meson search level: .....
val exercise15_6_1b_thm =
|- !(keyAlice :symKey) (k :symKey) (text :string).
  (deciphS keyAlice (Es k (SOME text))) =
    SOME "This is from Alice" <=>
      (k = keyAlice) /\ (text = "This is from Alice"):
thm
```

Chapter 3

Exercise 15.6.2

3.1 Problem statement

Using properties of symmetric key encryption and decryption in *cipherTheory* to prove the following theorems:

[exercise15_6_2a_thm]

$$\vdash \forall P \text{ message.} \\ (\text{deciphP (pubK P) enMsg} = \text{SOME message}) \iff \\ (\text{enMsg} = \text{Ea (privK P) (SOME message)})$$

[exercise15_6_2b_thm]

$$\vdash \forall \text{key text.} \\ (\text{deciphP (pubK Alice) (Ea key (SOME text))} = \\ \text{SOME "This is from Alice"}) \iff \\ (\text{key} = \text{privK Alice}) \wedge (\text{text} = \text{"This is from Alice"})$$

3.2 Proof of exercise15_6_2a_thm

3.2.1 Relevant Code

```
val exercise15_6_2a_thm =
TAC_PROOF(([], ' '!P message.(deciphP (pubK P) enMsg = SOME message) <=>
(enMsg = Ea (privK P) (SOME message))''),
PROVE_TAC[deciphP_one_one]
);
val _ = save_thm("exercise15_6_2a_thm", exercise15_6_2a_thm);
```

3.2.2 Session Transcript

```
val exercise15_6_2a_thm =
TAC_PROOF(([], ' '!P message.(deciphP (pubK P) enMsg = SOME message) <=>
(enMsg = Ea (privK P) (SOME message))''),
PROVE_TAC[deciphP_one_one]
);
val _ = save_thm("exercise15_6_2a_thm", exercise15_6_2a_thm);

# # # # <HOL message: inventing new type variable names: 'a, 'b>>
Meson search level: .....
val exercise15_6_2a_thm =
|- !(P : 'a) (message : 'b).
  (deciphP (pubK P) (enMsg : ('b, 'a) asymMsg) = SOME message) <=>
  (enMsg = Ea (privK P) (SOME message)):
thm
```

3

3.3 Proof of exercise15_6_2b_thm

3.3.1 Relevant Code

```
val exercise15_6_2b_thm =
  TAC_PROOF(([], ' '!key text.(deciphP (pubK Alice) (Ea key (SOME text))) = SOME "This is from Alice"
    PROVE_TAC[deciphP_one_one]
  );
val _ = save_thm("exercise15_6_2b_thm", exercise15_6_2b_thm);
```

3.3.2 Session Transcript

```
val exercise15_6_2b_thm =
  TAC_PROOF(([], ' '!key text.(deciphP (pubK Alice) (Ea key (SOME text))) = SOME "This is from Alice") <=> (key = privK Alice) /\ (text = "This is from Alice")
    PROVE_TAC[deciphP_one_one]
  );
val _ = save_thm("exercise15_6_2b_thm", exercise15_6_2b_thm);

> # # # <<HOL message: inventing new type variable names: 'a>>
Meson search level: .....
val exercise15_6_2b_thm =
  |- !(key : 'a pKey) (text : string).
    (deciphP (pubK (Alice : 'a)) (Ea key (SOME text))) =
      SOME "This is from Alice" <=>
        (key = privK Alice) /\ (text = "This is from Alice"):
    thm
```

Chapter 4

Exercise 15.6.3

4.1 Problem statement

Use the properties of signature verification to prove the following theorem:

[exercise15_6_3_thm]

```
⊢ ∀ signature.
  signVerify (pubK Alice) signature
    (SOME "This is from Alice") ⇔
    (signature =
      sign (privK Alice) (hash (SOME "This is from Alice")))
```

4.2 Proof of exercise15_6_3_thm

4.2.1 Relevant Code

```
val exercise15_6_3_thm =
  TACPROOF([[]], ['!signature.signVerify (pubK Alice) signature (SOME "This is from Alice")<=>
    PROVE_TAC[signVerify_one_one]
  ]);
val _ = save_thm("exercise15_6_3_thm", exercise15_6_3_thm);
```

4.2.2 Session Transcript

```
val exercise15_6_3_thm =
  TACPROOF([[]], ['!signature.signVerify (pubK Alice) signature (SOME "This is from Alice")<=> (signature = sign (privK Alice) (hash (SOME "This is
  PROVE_TAC[signVerify_one_one]
  );
  val _ = save_thm("exercise15_6_3_thm", exercise15_6_3_thm);

> # # # <<HOL message: inventing new type variable names: 'a>>
Meson search level: .....
val exercise15_6_3_thm =
  |- !(signature :(string digest, 'a) asymMsg).
    signVerify (pubK (Alice :'a)) signature
      (SOME "This is from Alice") <=>
      (signature = sign (privK Alice) (hash (SOME "This is from Alice"))):
  thm
```

Appendix A

Source code: cipherScript

This is the code from *cipherScript.sml*

```
(*****
(* Cipher operations *)
(* Created 3 May 2014: Shiu-Kai Chin *)
(* Replaced datatype contents with HOL built-in optionTheory *)
*****)

(* Interactive mode
app load ["isainfRules","TypeBase","optionTheory"]

(* Disable Pretty-Printing *)
set_trace "Unicode" 0;
*)

structure cipherScript = struct

open HolKernel boolLib Parse bossLib
open TypeBase isainfRules optionTheory

(*****
* create a new theory
*****)
val _ = new_theory "cipher";

(*****
* THE DEFINITIONS START HERE
*****)

(*****
(* Symmetric Encryption/Decryption *)
*****)

(*****
(* Creating symmetric (secret) keys and
(* encrypted messages with symmetric keys.
*****)

val _ = Datatype `symKey = sym num`;
val _ = Datatype `symMsg = Es symKey ('message option)`;

val symKey_one_one = TypeBase.one_one_of `':symKey`
val _ = save_thm("symKey_one_one",symKey_one_one)
```

```

val symMsg_one_one = TypeBase.one_one_of ‘ ‘:’ message symMsg ‘ ‘
val _ = save_thm("symMsg_one_one", symMsg_one_one)

(*****)
(* Deciphering with symmetric keys *)
(* Define with pattern matching. If the key *)
(* matches then we can retrieve the plain text. *)
(* No definition is offered for the result if *)
(* the key in the message doesn't match the key *)
(* that is supplied. *)
(*****)
val deciphS_def =
  Define
    ‘(deciphS (k1:symKey) (Es k2 (SOME (x:’message))) =
      if (k1 = k2) then (SOME x) else (NONE:’message option)) /\
      (deciphS (k1:symKey) (Es k2 (NONE:’message option)) = NONE)’;

(*****)
(* Creating asymmetric public and private keys. *)
(* As these keys are created using a common *)
(* parameter, we will model this parameter with *)
(* the principal with whom the keys are *)
(* associated. *)
(*****)
val _ = Datatype ‘pKey = pubK ’princ | privK ’princ ‘;
val _ = Datatype ‘asymMsg = Ea (’princ pKey) (’message option)’;

val pKey_one_one = TypeBase.one_one_of ‘ ‘:’ princ pKey ‘ ‘
val _ = save_thm("pKey_one_one", pKey_one_one)

val pKey_distinct_clauses = distinct_clauses ‘ ‘:’ princ pKey ‘ ‘
val _ = save_thm("pKey_distinct_clauses", pKey_distinct_clauses)

val asymMsg_one_one = TypeBase.one_one_of ‘ ‘:(’ princ , ’message) asymMsg ‘ ‘
val _ = save_thm("asymMsg_one_one", asymMsg_one_one)

(*****)
(* Deciphering with asymmetric keys *)
(* Define with pattern matching. If the *)
(* corresponding keys match then the text is *)
(* recovered. In all other cases NONE is *)
(* returned. *)
(*****)
val deciphP_def =
  Define
    ‘(deciphP (key:’princ pKey) (Ea (privK (P:’princ)) (SOME (x:’message))) =
      if ((key:’princ pKey) = (pubK (P:’princ))) then (SOME (x:’message)) else (NONE:’message option)) /\
      (deciphP (key:’princ pKey) (Ea (pubK (P:’princ)) (SOME (x:’message))) =
      if ((key:’princ pKey) = (privK (P:’princ))) then (SOME (x:’message)) else (NONE:’message option)) /\
      (deciphP (k1:’princ pKey)(Ea (k2:’princ pKey) (NONE:’message option)) = (NONE:’message option))’;

```

```

(*****)
(* Message digests are cryptographic hashes of *)
(* messages. *)
(*****)
val _ = Datatype 'digest = hash ('message option)';
val digest_one_one = TypeBase.one_one_of '':'message digest';
val _ = save_thm("digest_one_one", digest_one_one);

(*****)
(* Signatures are digests encrypted by the *)
(* private key of the sender. *)
(*****)
val sign_def =
  Define
    'sign (pubKey:'princ pKey) (dgst:'message digest) = Ea pubKey (SOME dgst)';

(*****)
(* Integrity checking of messages is checking *)
(* the hash of the received message equals the *)
(* signature decrypted with the sender's public *)
(* key. *)
(*****)
val signVerify_def =
  Define
    'signVerify (pubKey:'princ pKey)(signature:( 'message digest , 'princ)asymMsg)(msgContents:
    ((SOME (hash msgContents)) = (deciphP pubKey signature)))';

(*****)
(* A theorem to make sure that our integrity *)
(* checking function works with the way we *)
(* create digital signatures. *)
(*****)
val signVerifyOK =
  save_thm
    ("signVerifyOK",
    TAC_PROOF(
      ([], '!(P:'princ)(msg:'message).signVerify (pubK P) (sign (privK P) (hash (SOME msg))))(
      (REWRITE_TAC [signVerify_def, sign_def, deciphP_def])));

val th1 =
  TAC_PROOF(
    ([], '!(P text.((deciphP (pubK P)(Ea (privK P) (SOME text))) = (SOME text))) /\
    (deciphP (privK P)(Ea (pubK P) (SOME text))) = (SOME text)))',
    (REPEAT STRIP_TAC THEN
      REWRITE_TAC [deciphP_def]));

val option_distinct =
  save_thm("option_distinct", TypeBase.distinct_of (Type 'a option'));

val th2a =
  TAC_PROOF(
    ([], '!(k P text.
      (deciphP k (Ea (privK P) (SOME text))) = (SOME text))) ==> (k = pubK P)',

```

```

(REPEAT GEN_TAC THEN
  REWRITE_TAC [deciphP_def] THEN
  BOOL_CASES_TAC ‘‘k = (pubK P)‘‘ THEN
  REWRITE_TAC [option_distinct]));

val th2b =
TAC_PROOF(
  ([],
  ‘‘!k P text.
    (k = pubK P) ==> (deciphP k (Ea (privK P) (SOME text)) = (SOME text))‘‘),
  PROVE_TAC[deciphP_def])

val th2 =
TAC_PROOF(
  ([], ‘‘!k P text.
    (deciphP k (Ea (privK P) (SOME text)) = (SOME text)) = (k = pubK P)‘‘),
  PROVE_TAC[th2a, th2b])

val th3a = TAC_PROOF(
  ([], ‘‘!k P text.
    (deciphP k (Ea (pubK P) (SOME text)) = (SOME text)) ==> (k = privK P)‘‘),
  (REPEAT GEN_TAC THEN
    REWRITE_TAC [deciphP_def] THEN
    BOOL_CASES_TAC ‘‘k = (privK P)‘‘ THEN
    REWRITE_TAC [option_distinct]));

val th3b = TAC_PROOF(
  ([],
  ‘‘!k P text.
    (k = privK P) ==> (deciphP k (Ea (pubK P) (SOME text)) = (SOME text))‘‘),
  PROVE_TAC[deciphP_def])

val th3 = TAC_PROOF(
  ([],
  ‘‘!k P text.
    (deciphP k (Ea (pubK P) (SOME text)) = (SOME text)) = (k = privK P)‘‘),
  PROVE_TAC[th3a, th3b])

val th4 =
GEN_ALL
(REWRITE_RULE[pKey_distinct_clauses]
  (ISPECL
    [‘‘pubK (P1:’b)‘‘, ‘‘P2:’b‘‘]
    (GENL [‘‘key:’ princ pKey‘‘, ‘‘P:’ princ ‘‘](CONJUNCT2 (SPEC_ALL deciphP_def)))))

val th5 =
GEN_ALL
(REWRITE_RULE[pKey_distinct_clauses]
  (ISPECL
    [‘‘privK (P1:’b)‘‘, ‘‘P2:’b‘‘]
    (GENL [‘‘key:’ princ pKey‘‘, ‘‘P:’ princ ‘‘](CONJUNCT1 (SPEC_ALL deciphP_def)))))

val deciphP_clauses =

```

```

    save_thm("deciphP_clauses", LIST_CONJ [th1, th2, th3, th4, th5]);

val th1 =
  TACPROOF(
    ([], '!(k text.(deciphS k (Es k (SOME text))) = (SOME text))'',
    (REPEAT STRIP_TAC THEN
      REWRITE_TAC [deciphS_def]));

val th2a =
  TACPROOF(
    ([], '!(k1:symKey) (k2:symKey) text.
      (deciphS k1 (Es k2 (SOME text))) = (SOME text)) ==> (k1 = k2)'',
    (REPEAT GEN_TAC THEN
      REWRITE_TAC [deciphS_def] THEN
      BOOL_CASES_TAC ''k1:symKey = k2:symKey'' THEN
      REWRITE_TAC [option_distinct]));

val th2b =
  TACPROOF(
    ([], '!(k1:symKey) (k2:symKey) text.
      (k1 = k2) ==> (deciphS k1 (Es k2 (SOME text))) = (SOME text))'',
    PROVE_TAC[deciphS_def])

val th2 =
  TACPROOF(
    ([], '!(k1:symKey) (k2:symKey) text.
      (deciphS k1 (Es k2 (SOME text))) = (SOME text)) = (k1 = k2)'',
    PROVE_TAC[th2a, th2b])

val th3 =
  TACPROOF(
    ([], '!(k1:symKey) (k2:symKey) text.
      (deciphS k1 (Es k2 (SOME text))) = NONE) = (k1 <> k2)'',
    REPEAT STRIP_TAC THEN
    Cases_on 'k1 = k2' THEN
    EQ_TAC THEN
    ASM_REWRITE_TAC[deciphS_def, NOT_SOME_NONE])

val th4 =
  TACPROOF(
    ([], '!(k1:symKey) (k2:symKey).
      deciphS k1 (Es k2 NONE) = NONE'',
    REWRITE_TAC[deciphS_def])

val deciphS_clauses =
  save_thm("deciphS_clauses", LIST_CONJ [th1, th2, th3, th4]);

val option_one_one = TypeBase.one_one_of ':' a option ''
val _ = save_thm("option_one_one", option_one_one)

val option_distinct_clauses = CONJ (distinct_of ':' a option '') (GSYM(distinct_of ':' a option ''

val signlemma1 =

```

```

GEN_ALL(TAC.PROOF(
  ([],
    ‘‘(sign pubKey1 (hash m1) = sign pubKey2 (hash m2)) ==> ((pubKey1 = pubKey2) /\ (m1 = m2))
  REWRITE_TAC[sign_def, pKey_one_one, option_one_one, asymMsg_one_one, digest_one_one]))

val signlemma2 =
GEN_ALL(TAC.PROOF(
  ([],
    ‘‘((pubKey1 = pubKey2) /\ (m1 = m2)) ==> (sign pubKey1 (hash m1) = sign pubKey2 (hash m2))
  PROVE_TAC[]))

val sign_one_one =
TAC.PROOF(
  ([],
    ‘‘!pubKey1 pubKey2 m1 m2.
      (sign pubKey1 (hash m1) = sign pubKey2 (hash m2)) = ((pubKey1 = pubKey2) /\ (m1 = m2)) ‘‘,
  PROVE_TAC[signlemma1, signlemma2]))

val _ = save_thm("sign_one_one", sign_one_one)

val lemma1a =
GEN_ALL(TAC.PROOF(
  ([], ‘‘(deciphS k1 (Es k2 (SOME text2)) = SOME text1) ==> ((k1 = k2) /\ (text1 = text2)) ‘‘,
  (REWRITE_TAC [deciphS_def] THEN
  COND_CASES_TAC THEN
  REWRITE_TAC[option_distinct_clauses, option_one_one] THEN
  PROVE_TAC[])))

val lemma1b =
TAC.PROOF(
  ([],
    ‘‘((k1 = k2) /\ (text1 = text2)) ==> (deciphS k1 (Es k2 (SOME text2)) = SOME text1) ‘‘,
  PROVE_TAC[deciphS_clauses]))

val lemma1 =
TAC.PROOF(
  ([], ‘‘!k1 k2 text1 text2.(deciphS k1 (Es k2 (SOME text2)) = SOME text1) = ((k1 = k2) /\ (text1 = text2)) ‘‘,
  PROVE_TAC[lemma1a, lemma1b]))

val lemma2 =
TAC.PROOF(
  ([], ‘‘!(enMsg:'message symMsg) text key.(deciphS key enMsg = (SOME (text:'message))) = (enMsg = SOME (text:'message)) ‘‘,
  Cases_on 'enMsg' THEN
  REWRITE_TAC[deciphS_def, symMsg_one_one] THEN
  REPEAT GEN_TAC THEN
  EQ_TAC THEN
  REPEAT(DISCH.THEN (fn th => ASSUME_TAC th THEN ONCE_REWRITE_TAC[th])) THEN
  REWRITE_TAC[deciphS_clauses] THEN
  UNDISCH_TAC
    ‘‘deciphS (key :symKey) (Es (s :symKey) (o' :'message option)) =
      SOME (text :'message) ‘‘ THEN
  Cases_on 'o' THEN
  REWRITE_TAC[deciphS_def, option_CLAUSES] THEN

```

```
COND_CASES_TAC THEN
PROVE_TAC[option_CLAUSES])
```

```
val deciphS_one_one = CONJ lemma1 lemma2
val _ = save_thm("deciphS_one_one", deciphS_one_one)
```

```
val lemma1a =
GEN_ALL(TAC_PROOF(
([], ' '(deciphP (pubK P1)(Ea (privK P2) (SOME text2)) = SOME text1) ==> ((P1 = P2) /\ (text1 = text2))'
(REWRITE_TAC[deciphP_def] THEN
COND_CASES_TAC THEN
REWRITE_TAC[option_distinct_clauses, option_one_one] THEN
PROVE_TAC[pKey_one_one])))
```

```
val lemma1b =
TAC_PROOF(
([],
' '!P1 P2 text1 text2.
((P1 = P2) /\ (text1 = text2)) ==> (deciphP (pubK P1)(Ea (privK P2) (SOME text2)) = SOME text1)'
PROVE_TAC[deciphP_def])
```

```
val lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
([],
' '!P1 P2 text1 text2.
(deciphP (pubK P1)(Ea (privK P2) (SOME text2)) = SOME text1) = ((P1 = P2) /\ (text1 = text2))'
PROVE_TAC[lemma1a, lemma1b])
```

```
val lemma2a =
GEN_ALL(TAC_PROOF(
([], ' '(deciphP (privK P1)(Ea (pubK P2) (SOME text2)) = SOME text1) ==> ((P1 = P2) /\ (text1 = text2))'
(REWRITE_TAC[deciphP_def] THEN
COND_CASES_TAC THEN
REWRITE_TAC[option_distinct_clauses, option_one_one] THEN
PROVE_TAC[pKey_one_one])))
```

```
val lemma2b =
TAC_PROOF(
([],
' '!P1 P2 text1 text2.
((P1 = P2) /\ (text1 = text2)) ==> (deciphP (privK P1)(Ea (pubK P2) (SOME text2)) = SOME text1)'
PROVE_TAC[deciphP_def])
```

```
val lemma2 =
TAC_PROOF(
([],
' '!P1 P2 text1 text2.
(deciphP (privK P1)(Ea (pubK P2) (SOME text2)) = SOME text1) = ((P1 = P2) /\ (text1 = text2))'
PROVE_TAC[lemma2a, lemma2b])
```

```

val lemma3a =
TACPROOF(
  ([], ‘!(p:’b pKey)(c:’a option).(deciphP(pubK (P:’b))(Ea p c) = SOME (msg:’a)) ==> (p = pri
  Cases THEN
  Cases THEN
  REWRITE_TAC[deciphP_def, pKey_distinct_clauses, deciphP_clauses, option_distinct_clauses, lemma
  PROVE_TAC[COND.ID, option_distinct_clauses])

```

```

val lemma3b =
TACPROOF(
  ([],
  ‘!(p:’b pKey)(c:’a option).
    ((p = privK P) /\ (c = SOME msg)) ==> (deciphP(pubK (P:’b))(Ea p c) = SOME (msg:’a)) ‘‘),
  PROVE_TAC[deciphP_def])

```

```

val lemma3 =
TACPROOF(
  ([],
  ‘!(p:’b pKey)(c:’a option) P msg.
    (deciphP(pubK (P:’b))(Ea p c) = SOME (msg:’a)) = (p = privK P) /\ (c = SOME msg) ‘‘),
  PROVE_TAC[lemma3a, lemma3b])

```

```

val lemma4a =
TACPROOF(
  ([], ‘!(enMsg:(’a, ’b)asymMsg).(deciphP(pubK (P:’b))enMsg = SOME (msg:’a)) ==> (enMsg = Ea
  Cases THEN
  REWRITE_TAC[asymMsg_one_one, lemma3])

```

```

val lemma4b =
TACPROOF(
  ([], ‘!(enMsg:(’a, ’b)asymMsg).(enMsg = Ea (privK P) (SOME msg)) ==> (deciphP(pubK (P:’b))en
  PROVE_TAC[deciphP_def])

```

```

val lemma4 =
TACPROOF(
  ([],
  ‘!(enMsg:(’a, ’b)asymMsg) P msg.
    (deciphP(pubK (P:’b))enMsg = SOME (msg:’a)) = (enMsg = Ea (privK P) (SOME msg)) ‘‘),
  PROVE_TAC[lemma4a, lemma4b])

```

```

val lemma5a =
TACPROOF(
  ([], ‘!(p:’b pKey)(c:’a option).(deciphP(privK (P:’b))(Ea p c) = SOME (msg:’a)) ==> (p = pu
  Cases THEN
  Cases THEN
  REWRITE_TAC[deciphP_def, pKey_distinct_clauses, deciphP_clauses, option_distinct_clauses, lemma
  PROVE_TAC [COND.ID, option_distinct_clauses])

```

```

val lemma5b =
TACPROOF(
  ([],
  ‘!(p:’b pKey)(c:’a option).
    ((p = pubK P) /\ (c = SOME msg)) ==> (deciphP(privK (P:’b))(Ea p c) = SOME (msg:’a)) ‘‘),

```

```
PROVE_TAC [deciphP_clauses])
```

```
val lemma5 =
TAC_PROOF(
  ([],
   ‘!(p:’b pKey)(c:’a option) P msg.
    (deciphP(privK (P:’b))(Ea p c) = SOME (msg:’a)) = (p = pubK P) /\ (c = SOME msg)‘),
  PROVE_TAC [lemma5a, lemma5b])
```

```
val lemma6a =
TAC_PROOF(
  ([], ‘!(enMsg:(’a,’b)asymMsg) P msg.(deciphP(privK (P:’b))enMsg = SOME (msg:’a)) ==> (enMsg = SOME (msg:’a))‘),
  Cases THEN
  REWRITE_TAC[asymMsg_one_one, lemma5])
```

```
val lemma6b =
TAC_PROOF(
  ([],
   ‘!(enMsg:(’a,’b)asymMsg) P msg.
    (enMsg = Ea (pubK P) (SOME msg)) ==> (deciphP(privK (P:’b))enMsg = SOME (msg:’a))‘),
  PROVE_TAC[deciphP_def])
```

```
val lemma6 =
TAC_PROOF(
  ([],
   ‘!(enMsg:(’a,’b)asymMsg) P msg.
    (deciphP(privK (P:’b))enMsg = SOME (msg:’a)) = (enMsg = Ea (pubK P) (SOME msg))‘),
  PROVE_TAC[lemma6a, lemma6b])
```

```
val deciphP_one_one = LIST_CONJ [lemma1, lemma2, lemma3, lemma4, lemma5, lemma6]
```

```
val _ = save_thm("deciphP_one_one", deciphP_one_one)
```

```
val lemma1a =
TAC_PROOF(
  ([], ‘!P m1 m2.signVerify (pubK (P:’a)) (Ea (privK P) (SOME (hash (SOME (m1 :’b)))))
    (SOME (m2:’b)) ==> (m1 = m2)‘),
  PROVE_TAC[signVerify_def, deciphP_def, option_one_one, digest_one_one])
```

```
val lemma1b =
TAC_PROOF(
  ([], ‘!(P:’a) (m1:’b) (m2:’b).
    (m1 = m2) ==>
    signVerify
    (pubK (P:’a)) (Ea (privK P) (SOME (hash (SOME (m1 :’b)))))
    (SOME (m2:’b))‘),
  PROVE_TAC[signVerify_def, deciphP_def])
```

```
val lemma1 =
TAC_PROOF(
  ([], ‘!P m1 m2.signVerify (pubK (P:’a)) (Ea (privK P) (SOME (hash (SOME (m1 :’b)))))
    (SOME (m2:’b)) = (m1 = m2)‘),
```

```
PROVE_TAC[lemma1a, lemma1b])
```

```
(* Start here *)
val lemma2 =
TAC.PROOF(
  ([], ‘!signature P text.signVerify (pubK (P:’ princ)) signature (SOME (text:’message)) = (signVerify (pubK P) (sign (privK P) (hash (SOME text))) (SOME text))’
  let val [-, -, lemma3, -, -, -] = CONJUNCTS deciphP_one_one
  in
    Cases_on ‘signature’ THEN
    REWRITE_TAC[signVerify_def] THEN
    REWRITE_TAC[sign_def] THEN
    REWRITE_TAC[asymMsg_one_one] THEN
    REPEAT STRIP_TAC THEN
    EQ_TAC THEN
    DISCH_TAC THEN
    ASM.REWRITE_TAC[deciphP_clauses] THEN
    PAT_ASSUM‘x‘ (‘fn th => ASSUME_TAC(SYM th)) THEN
    IMP_RES_TAC lemma3 THEN
    (* The ASM.REWRITE_TAC appears to go on forever *)
    (* PROVE_TAC [] *)
    PROVE_TAC[]
  end)
```

```
val lemma3a =
GEN_ALL(TAC.PROOF(
  ([], ‘signVerify (pubK P1) (sign (privK P2) (hash (SOME text2)))(SOME text1) ==> ((P1 = P2) /\ (text1 = text2))’
  (REWRITE_TAC[signVerify_def, sign_def] THEN
  DISCH_TAC THEN
  PAT_ASSUM‘a = b‘ (‘fn th => ASSUME_TAC (SYM th)) THEN
  IMP_RES_TAC deciphP_one_one THEN
  PAT_ASSUM‘hash a = hash b‘ (‘fn th => ASSUME_TAC (REWRITE_RULE[digest_one_one, option_one_one] th)) THEN
  ASM.REWRITE_TAC[])))
```

```
val lemma3b =
GEN_ALL(TAC.PROOF(
  ([],
  ‘((P1 = P2) /\ (text1 = text2)) ==> signVerify (pubK P1) (sign (privK P2) (hash (SOME text2)))(SOME text1) = ((P1 = P2) /\ (text1 = text2))’
  PROVE_TAC[signVerifyOK]))
```

```
val lemma3 =
GEN_ALL(TAC.PROOF(
  ([],
  ‘signVerify (pubK P1) (sign (privK P2) (hash (SOME text2)))(SOME text1) = ((P1 = P2) /\ (text1 = text2))’
  PROVE_TAC[lemma3a, lemma3b]))
```

```
val signVerify_one_one = LIST_CONJ [lemma1, lemma2, lemma3]
val _ = save_thm("signVerify_one_one", signVerify_one_one)
```

```
(* ===== start here =====
===== end here ===== *)
```

```
(*****
(* Print and export the theory *)
```

```
(*****)  
val _ = print_theory "-";  
  
val _ = export_theory ();  
  
end;
```

Appendix B

Source code: cryptoExercisesScript

```

(***** *)
(* Chirag Sachdev *)
(* Ex. 15.6.1, 15.6.2, 15.6.3 *)
(***** *)

structure cryptoExercisesScript = struct
open HolKernel Parse boolLib bossLib ;
open TypeBase isainfRules optionTheory cipherTheory stringTheory
val _ = new_theory "cryptoExercises";

(* 15.6.1a *)

val exercise15_6_1a_thm =
TACPROOF([[]], '!'key enMsg message.(deciphS key enMsg = SOME message) <=>
(enMsg = Es key (SOME message)) ' '),
PROVE_TAC[deciphS_one_one]
);
val _ = save_thm("exercise15_6_1a_thm", exercise15_6_1a_thm);

(* 15.6.1b *)

val exercise15_6_1b_thm =
TACPROOF([[]], '!'keyAlice k text.(deciphS keyAlice (Es k (SOME text))) = SOME "This_is_from_")
PROVE_TAC[deciphS_one_one]
);
val _ = save_thm("exercise15_6_1b_thm", exercise15_6_1b_thm);

(* 15.6.2a *)

val exercise15_6_2a_thm =
TACPROOF([[]], '!'P message.(deciphP (pubK P) enMsg = SOME message) <=>
(enMsg = Ea (privK P) (SOME message)) ' '),
PROVE_TAC[deciphP_one_one]
);
val _ = save_thm("exercise15_6_2a_thm", exercise15_6_2a_thm);

(* 15.6.2b *)

val exercise15_6_2b_thm =
TACPROOF([[]], '!'key text.(deciphP (pubK Alice) (Ea key (SOME text))) = SOME "This_is_from_")
PROVE_TAC[deciphP_one_one]
);
val _ = save_thm("exercise15_6_2b_thm", exercise15_6_2b_thm);

```

(15.6.3 *)*

```
val exercise15_6_3_thm =  
TACPROOF([[] , ‘ ‘!signature.signVerify (pubK Alice) signature (SOME "This_⊔_from_⊔_Alice")<=>  
PROVE_TAC[signVerify_one_one]  
);  
val _ = save_thm("exercise15_6_3_thm", exercise15_6_3_thm);  
  
val _ = export_theory();  
val _ = print_theory "-";  
end (* structure *)
```