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HISTORIES OF THE IMMEDIATE PRESENT

INVENTING ARCHITECTURAL MODERNISM

ANTHONY VIDLER

FOREWORD: [BRACKET]ING HISTORY

Of all the terms in the architectural lexicon, or, for that matter, those of painting and sculpture, the one most laden with social and political opprobrium is *formalism*. To be a formalist is to be a target for everyone who feels that architecture is a social project full of rhetorical symbolism. Yet I was struck, while on a recent jury at a prestigious East Coast architecture school, by the pervasive influence of a new, perhaps more virulent breed of formalism, more virulent because it was posed under the banner of a neo-avant-garde technological determinism. The nexus of this formalism lay in advanced computer modeling techniques generated out of complex algorithms that produced parametric processes of enormous complexity and consistency, replete with their own variability and distortion. The range, variety, and energy of this work should have appealed to me personally, not only because of my memories of that particular institution as a bastion of intellectual conservatism, but also in part because this cutting-edge-process work was close to an idea of autonomy inherent in such authorless processes. Instead, I felt that something was radically wrong, something that speaks to a more general problem of architecture today. It was an autonomy freed from any passionate or firm ideological commitment. For the sake of argument, let us say that this lack of commitment lies squarely at the doorstep of such an empty formalism, one that internally determines how its products are to be read and interpreted. Both the lack of ideological commitment and the internally determined meanings link this new formalism with an idea of autonomy. But there is a second, more problematic idea of autonomy, a disciplinary one

which is deceptively hidden, yet alluded to, in the chronological inversions of the title *Histories of the Immediate Present*.

Formalism, while seemingly emptied today of its critical and ideological power, nevertheless figured as a locus of resistance to postwar modernism. The repetitive or process-based sequencing of minimalist sculpture, of rationalist architecture, or of indexical, syntactic, linguistic analogies derived its formal bases from an internally generated system independent of social or functional concerns. In this context, the formal must be differentiated from formalism, the former having an internal value, the latter being the empty rhetoric of current shape-making. Any internally generated forms that are part of a critical system in one sense could be considered as autonomous, independent of social or market forces, while still offering a critique of these forces. It is a discussion of autonomy that animates one historian in particular in Anthony Vidler's text, and also might be said to animate the author himself. While autonomy is often understood as being implied by the formal, the distinction between the two is important, especially, today, between the terms *disciplinary autonomy* and *formal autonomy*. This difference seems important for Vidler, because it potentially allows him to confront and propose an answer to the Derridean claims against the possibility of a disciplinary autonomy.

In a first, sequential reading of this book, from the chapter on Emil Kaufmann to those on Colin Rowe, Reyner Banham, and Manfredo Tafuri, it appears that Vidler presents a narrative of architectural history-writing up to the third quarter of the last century. This in itself would be noteworthy, particularly since history today is so quickly consumed and forgotten. What is important, however, in this book is not the critical differences between these historians but how their differences reveal their arguments to be measures of the varied distances charted in architecture's disciplinary evolution, from circa 1920 until today.

Architecture's uncanny repetitions and recursions, from the formalism of Russian ideologues to that of today's expert renderers, for example, suggest that the distances mapped by such histories are anything but linear. This is revealed in a first reading of the book's title, as well as in its intellectual genealogy. However, while the sequence Rowe-Banham-Tafuri follows that genealogy, Kaufmann, positioned as originator, source, and starting point, does not. Why begin with Kaufmann, a historian of the Viennese school whose work is intellectually of another generation than that of the other three historians? Only on a close rereading of the chapter on Kaufmann does what appeared to be an anomalous inclusion (perhaps, as Vidler himself acknowledges, as a marker of the author's personal history) reveal itself to be the vehicle of a second, more important agenda. Whether Vidler intended this agenda is not at issue; rather, that it is possible to read this book in the following light.

Vidler's query is implicit in his very title: How is the history of modernism and its historians to be interpreted and written after Jacques Derrida's and other poststructuralists' critiques of disciplinary boundaries, given that it is these very boundaries that have traditionally made history's larger figures and minor movements visible? In the introduction to the chapter on Kaufmann, partial answers to the questions "why Kaufmann?" and "how, after Derrida?" are found; or, in other terms, how to see in the present moment the recursions to prior historical moments. In this sense, Vidler's *Histories* ultimately can be seen as a reply, no matter how schematic, to Derrida's critique of disciplinary boundaries.

In suggesting that the boundaries of disciplines such as architecture or history are primarily political, and therefore temporally bound if not at times even fictive, Derrida implicates the idea of disciplinary autonomy as one that relied on these fictive boundaries, and which is unsustainable in light of the contingency of

meaning. Derrida's techniques for calling attention to such contingency involved placing a given term under erasure, or in other cases, bracketing the term, that is, calling attention to both its absence and presence, yet simultaneously avoiding a dialectical relationship between an absence and a presence. It is this undecidable nature that is the essence of the idea of the bracket. It could be argued that Vidler borrows a tool from Derrida's own arsenal by bracketing history, thereby suggesting that even the immediate present can be seen as the historical past. If "history" can be seen as a bracketed term here, then this bracketing offers an alternative to the disciplinary boundaries of history and architecture, and ultimately brackets any form of autonomy. To do this, Vidler purposely reintroduces the question of autonomy as a subject through the vehicle of Kaufmann.

Vidler begins the chapter on Kaufmann with a 1960 quotation from Clement Greenberg, who identified modernism with both a self-critical capacity and a disciplinary formalism: "To criticize the means itself of criticism" suggests the ability to erect an internal boundary, as it were, enabling the critic to view his own critique, which has been seen in the ensuing years to be an unrealizable goal. In his first paragraph, Vidler creates the link between any internal critique and an idea of autonomy, describing autonomy as an "internal exploration" and a way of transforming a discipline's "own specific language." For Kaufmann, architectural autonomy involved a range of large- and small-scale formal moves. For example, in articulating the difference between Renaissance and baroque architecture, he emphasized the formal aspects of massing and style. The breakdown of baroque part-to-whole hierarchies pointed toward the free association of entities, as in Ledoux's pavilion scheme for Chaux, whose independence of part-to-whole organizations embodied a type of formal autonomy. Kaufmann suggests that the isolation of parts in Chaux, which is a revision of the hierarchical, centralized massing of the baroque, continues even into the modernism of Le Corbusier. While modernism was thought to be a social project, Kaufmann argued that any definition of autonomy does not mean isolation from the social, but rather demonstrates the relations between the social and the formal.

It is necessary to turn to Kaufmann's predecessor and mentor in Vienna, Heinrich Wölfflin, for another distinction between a formal and a disciplinary autonomy, seen in the difference between the Renaissance and the baroque. Wölfflin argues that Renaissance architecture was autonomous because it was governed by an idea of a formal beauty internal to its discipline, one not deduced from the characteristics exhibited in the works of a particular style but that exists in its own right. On the other hand, for Wölfflin the baroque could not be considered autonomous because its forms were conditioned by the political factors of the Counter-Reformation rather than by any internal aesthetic concerns. Thus Wölfflin, unlike Kaufmann, locates autonomy squarely in the sights of a disciplinary autonomy.

If Wölfflin's and Kaufmann's attempts to articulate criteria for autonomy are to be accepted, and if Derrida is correct in pointing to the ways in which disciplinary boundaries are largely fictive, then it becomes clear that the concept of autonomy post-1968, and today, must be rethought. It is this problematic that Vidler would like to provoke, first by introducing Kaufmann and the idea of autonomy and then by proposing the concept of a posthistory in his conclusion. With the idea of a posthistory, Vidler addresses one of Derrida's most challenging critiques of disciplinary autonomy. The idea of a posthistory, in Vidler's terms, implies that there is a limit to every discipline. This concept would be applicable even to Derrida's deconstruction of disciplinary autonomy. If autonomy has been seen as the basis for architecture's capacity

to enact a critical project. that is. a project that has the capacity to be critical of its own discipline. then deconstruction would hold that such a critical project remains in the realm of metaphysics. and in that sense. not autonomy. Thus. in proposing a posthistory. Vidler is himself bracketing Derrida's critique. Ultimately. this may be one way that the concept of a critical architecture can survive deconstruction.

Peter Eisenman

PREF.

These ess ·ral modernism represent
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chitectural :sign. In this sense. the
book is an set of issues that have
bound the hi f architecture together
in the assess ly twentieth-century
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studies of Enlightenment and Renaissance architecture, including an unfinished translation of Filarete's fifteenth-century text describing the ideal city of Sforzinda, a text that Kaufmann considered the true antecedent to Ledoux's Chaux. In 1953 he died in Cheyenne, Wyoming, while on his second journey to Los Angeles. It was with characteristic humility that Kaufmann admitted in his posthumously published book: "I do not believe that I have solved the momentous problem of how the architectural transformation of about 1800 came to pass."[87]

From Kaufmann to Johnson and Rossi

The cubic, "absolute" form of my glass house and the separation of functional units into two absolute shapes rather than a major or minor massing of parts comes directly from Ledoux, the Eighteenth Century father of modern architecture (see Emil Kaufmann's excellent study Von Ledoux bis Le Corbusier*). The cube and the sphere, the pure mathematical shapes, were dear to the hearts of those intellectual revolutionaries from the Baroque, and we are their descendants.*
—Philip Johnson, "House at New Canaan, Connecticut"

In retrospect, it seems neither accidental nor totally ironic that Kaufmann's belief that architecture's autonomy paralleled the emerging "autonomy" of the bourgeois (modern) individual would appeal so strongly to that paradigm of the high bourgeois architect Philip Johnson.[88] In 1940 Kaufmann had fled Austria for the United States; in August 1942 he was asked to present his work to the newly constituted American Society of Architectural Historians at the Cambridge home of Philip Johnson, whose visits to Germany with Henry-Russell Hitchcock had alerted him to the growing interest in eighteenth-century neoclassicism. The text of this talk, Kaufmann's first English-language article, was published the next year in the new *Journal of the American Society of Architectural Historians.*[89]

In this talk, prepared to introduce Ledoux and his protomodernism to an American audience for the first time, Kaufmann opened by linking the profound changes that took place in late eighteenth-century "philosophy, literature, social life and economics" to an architecture in which "even a number of twentieth century features were revealed."[90] He compared Ledoux's Panarèthéon to Le Corbusier's Mundaneum; described the residence of the River Surveyors as a representation of "man's mastery of the flood . . . presented so vividly that one might easily suppose some present-day expressionist had devised it for a hydraulic power plant"; and claimed the spherical Shelter for the Rural Guards as a model "only recently . . . revived to dominate New York's World Fair." In sum, this "early cubism" was created by Ledoux as an "architecture parlante" that pointed to the future more than to its sources in the past: "Important as it is to explain works of art by comparison and by analogies with predecessors, it is more important . . . to ask not whence they come, but whither they lead."[91]

Based on Johnson's own encounter with German history and theory, Kaufmann provided the convenient link between the neoclassicism of Schinkel, admired by both National Socialists and the then sympathetic Johnson, and the modernism of Le Corbusier and Mies. Johnson had read Kaufmann's 1933 book *Von Ledoux bis Le Corbusier*, and was easily able to reconcile Kaufmann's formal linkage of Ledoux and Le Corbusier with his own predilection for Schinkel and Mies—"von Schinkel bis Mies" seemed a natural corollary to Kaufmann's "Von Ledoux bis Le Corbusier," as was the implied extension: from Schinkel, Ledoux, Le Corbusier, Mies, to Johnson.

Writing about his Glass House in New Canaan, Connecticut, in the *Architectural Review* of 1950, Johnson specifically cited

Kaufmann's book in order to link the geometrical forms of Ledoux to his own cubic design. Indeed, the article provides an unabashed collage of Kaufmann, Le Corbusier, and Mies van der Rohe, in eight easy stages, as a justification and as authorizing sources for Johnson's design. First, Johnson illustrates Le Corbusier's 1933 plan for a village farm in order to describe the approach to his own house: "The footpath pattern between the two houses I copied from the spiderweb-like forms of Le Corbusier, who delicately runs his communications without regard for the axis of his buildings or seemingly any kind of pattern."[92]

Secondly, Mies's 1939 plan for IIT is adduced as precedent for the formal layout of the two pavilions in New Canaan. This is followed quickly by Theo van Doesburg's painting (the origin of Johnson's "asymmetric sliding rectangles"); Auguste Choisy's plan and perspective of the Athenian Acropolis (an image already commandeered by Le Corbusier to illustrate the dynamic force of nonrectilinear plans in *Vers une architecture*); Schinkel's Casino in Glienecke; and, as a prelude to Mies's glass house idea, Ledoux's spherical House of the Agricultural Guards, so loved by Kaufmann and hated by Sedlmayr. Thence Johnson passes to Kazimir Malevich and the suprematist painting that prefigured the plan of the Glass House with its circle in a rectangle, and finally returns to Mies, who concluded the eight points of Johnson's new architecture with the Farnsworth House of 1947–50.

The paradox, of course, is that Johnson, often criticized for "betraying Mies" in the obviously boxlike and nonuniversal counterhorizontal space of the Glass House, was there following Kaufmann's principles of autonomy almost to the letter. Revealing his deeper affinities with German neoclassicism and Schinkel, but disguising them by an intellectual detour to France and a liberal, idealized classicist modernism, Johnson in fact produces a transparent "Ledoux" box, that "proves" Kaufmann's thesis even more powerfully than Le Corbusier's horizontally open Domino diagram. This was the fate of many so-called late modernisms: they authorized already written history rather than making it for themselves. Certainly the rewriting of history in reverse, against the progressive movement described by the historians of Kaufmann's generation, was to be a leitmotif of "postmodernism," or what Pevsner would call a "new historicism," from the 1960s on. The "Kantian" autonomy of architecture decried by Kaufmann would here be reduced to a justification for stylistic nostalgia and the endless play of apparently signifying motifs drawn from the past.

Thirty years after Johnson completed his Glass House, the architect Aldo Rossi, also working with concepts he derived from Kaufmann's analysis of Enlightenment architecture, saw autonomy as a means of saving architecture from an increasingly disseminated field of aesthetic, social, and political authorizations. Rossi understood the word to refer to the internal structure of architectural typologies and forms, as they composed part of the sedimented structure of the historical city.

For Rossi, the idea of an *autonomous* architecture was joined to that of a *rational* architecture. Thus in 1973, when he was curator of the international section of the Milan Triennale, Rossi sought to identify those architects who, in Manfredo Tafuri's words, espoused an "autonomy of language," and collected them together under the banner of "Rational Architecture." In this Triennale, the premises of "neorationalism" became evident in the beliefs of many Italian and French designers, from Aldo Rossi to Bernard Huet and Leon Krier: that architecture was in some sense a discipline of its own, that its "language" was derived from former architectures, and that its form and role in the city were as much a product of a historical urban structure as of social or political concerns. That is, whereas in the politicized climate of the 1960s society had been seen as the generator of space and shelter, in the 1970s, perhaps in reaction to the evident loss of architecture

this implied, architecture asserted its own determinism. Fueled by Rossi's *Architecture of the City*, a kind of structuralism in urban analysis and a semiotics of architectural analysis emerged in parallel to the revival of Russian formalism, so-called Cartesian linguistics, and deconstruction in literary studies. "Autonomy" of the text and autonomy of the building were seen as complementary facets of the refusal of sociopolitical determinism, the vagaries of urban development planning, and what Pevsner had already identified in 1960 as "the return of historicism."

For Rossi, however, as evinced by his reviews and critical writings from the late 1950s on, autonomy also represented the purest heritage of the Enlightenment, and thence the modern movement, for an age that had lost its sense of roots in the eclecticism and, more to the point, in the adjustments required by the postfascist political struggles of the immediate postwar period. In this context, Rossi's fascination with the geometrical forms of late Enlightenment architecture was more than a simple attempt to recuperate the sources of modernist minimalism: it was grounded in his reading of Kaufmann, not only of *Von Ledoux bis Le Corbusier* but also of his postwar books, *Three Revolutionary Architects: Boullée, Ledoux, Lequeu* (1953) and the more general, posthumously published *Architecture in the Age of Reason: Baroque and Post-Baroque in England, Italy, and France* (1955). Rossi reviewed these books for *Casabella*, taking note of the earlier 1930s essays, and found in them a programmatic source for his "neo" rationalism, joining Ledoux and Boullée (whose *Essai sur l'architecture* Rossi translated and introduced in Italian) not only with Le Corbusier, but equally with his own modernist hero, Adolf Loos. The early critical writings of Rossi include ample evidence of his study of Enlightenment theory by way of Kaufmann, which he then translated into research on specifically Italian examples (Milizia to Antonelli) and modernist parallels (Loos).

Hubert Damisch, in his preface to the first (1981) French translation of *Von Ledoux bis le Corbusier* entitled "Ledoux avec Kant" (a title with echoes of Lacan's own aleatory preface to the Marquis de Sade's *La philosophie dans le boudoir*, "Kant avec Sade"), notes that this peculiar fascination of the 1970s with the idea of autonomy is directly linked to the continuity of Kantian thought. Damisch asks what would happen if Kant's analysis of the origins of geometry in the *Critique of Pure Reason* were coupled with the autonomous geometry of Ledoux in order to meditate on the special autonomy of architecture from Ledoux, to Le Corbusier, to Loos, and thence to the autonomies claimed by the new neorationalism of the late 1970s:

> *At our present moment, when the history of architecture hesitates between a renewed form of the history of styles and a form of institutional analysis which ignores everything that comprises the proper material of architecture, the idea of autonomy, to take it in the philosophical sense, takes on the value of a regulating concept. To think Ledoux* with *Kant is to recognize that in architecture understanding does not proceed solely from history, or in other words, with Kant, that an understanding which* subjectively *presents itself as history with respect to the way in which it has been acquired, can participate,* objectively, *in one form or another of rationality.*[4]

To think of Ledoux with Kant, Damisch concludes, is to ask what constitutes architecture as an object, not only of history, but also of thought, and thought that is constrained by conditions that are a priori formal, or in another sense, internal to the discipline of architecture.

Autonomy Revived

At the 1998 conference honoring the career of Philip Johnson, the theme of autonomy was resurrected, but in a more distant, historical sense, as one that neatly joined the trajectory of Johnson's work to a newly aroused interest in the various "modernisms" of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, and to a renewed preoccupation with the *discipline* of architecture.[74] The Johnsonian saga was presented at the conference as fundamentally reliant on autonomy, making its first appearance in the Glass House projects and building of 1948–49. This desired return to disciplinary roots, following similar calls in the humanities and social sciences in the wake of poststructuralism's interdisciplinary experiments and critical innovations, seemed to answer a number of concerns held by a generation unconvinced by the pluralism of postmodernism. A return to the fundamentals of architecture, generally represented in the modern tradition by abstraction, would, it was thought, counter the pluralism of postmodernism and architecture's always suspect relations to the "society of the spectacle" and its consumerist aftermath.

As evidenced by the papers given at the conference, historians, critics, and architects agreed generally that "modernism" in some form—whether classic "high" modernism or the less polemical but more socially present modernism of the immediate postwar period (corporate modernism, domestic modernism, suburban modernism), or even "countermodernism" of the kind posed by Kiesler—was decidedly preferable to postmodernism, and even more desirable than the "deconstructivism" that, in the Johnson itinerary, had supplanted it in the 1980s. Thus, the conference proposed to satisfy a number of problems at once: Johnson was endowed with an overarching theme that, superficially at least, made historical and critical sense of his otherwise eclectic work; postmodernism and the relativizing theories that seemed to support it were definitively abandoned; and, in a nice turn of intellectual agenda, a new post-theory, pragmatic era implicitly opened up.

Beneath this often self-contradictory trajectory of the idea of autonomy in architecture, we can trace through the twentieth century all the tensions evoked by the history of the concept of "Enlightenment." From the general assumption of "progress" and "reason" common to the Third Republic and its liberal interpretation of the Revolution, to the contested domain of social democracy after the First World War, to the defensive promodernist posture of the idealist avant-garde and its Popular Front allies in the 1930s, to the despairing and negative critique of the Enlightenment developed by Adorno and Horkheimer in exile, to the reassertion of democratic values in the postwar Frankfurt school against the pessimism of a withdrawn and posthistorical conservatism, and thence to the return of "form" and "structure" as renewal tactics for architecture in the 1970s, and finally to the quasi-nostalgic revival of the idea of autonomy itself in the 1990s: all this attests to the power of Kant's idea of autonomy, both formal and political, implying at once freedom and order, collective reason and expressed individuality.[75]

It seems to be no accident that from Jürgen Habermas's attack on postmodernism in his dramatic lecture at the Venice Biennale of 1980 entitled "Modernity: An Unfinished Project" to Fredric Jameson's studies of Adorno's "late" Marxism, Kant—and by implication, Kaufmann—have been seen as central, not only in defining the trajectory of modernity in theory and practice, but also in critically redefining the status of modernity in the present.



Matila Ghyka, "Harmonic decompositions of the φ rectangle," in Ghyka, *The Geometry of Art and Life* (1946), reprinted in Colin Rowe, "The Mathematics of the Ideal Villa" (1949)

2 MANNERIST MODERNISM

COLIN ROWE

A criticism which begins with approximate configurations and which then proceeds to identify differences, which seeks to establish how the same general motif can be transformed according to the logic (or the compulsion) of specific analytical (or stylistic) strategies, is presumably Wölfflinian in origin.
—Colin Rowe, "Addendum 1973"

In 1973 Colin Rowe wrote an addendum to his first published article, "The Mathematics of the Ideal Villa" (1947), admitting the "limitations" to what he terms its "Wölfflinian" approach—its difficulty with iconographical content and its demanding (for both reader and author) "close analysis."[1] However accurate it might be to characterize the method of "The Mathematics of the Ideal Villa" as Wölfflinian (and we shall find other, more powerful influences at work in its argument), the assumption of such a paternity indicates the still pervasive force of the late nineteenth-century German school of architectural history in England in the years after the Second World War.

The formal analysis of architecture, as developed out of Heinrich Wölfflin's work and advanced by the Vienna school, emerged in Britain with a slightly different history from that of the Kaufmann-inspired influences in the United States and

Italy. In the 1920s, the force of Wölfflin's typologies of form were joined to the postcubist analyses of Roger Fry and Clive Bell and the psychological interpretations of Adrian Stokes. The English translation of Wölfflin's early work, *Klassische Kunst* (1899), had been introduced into British circles by Fry as early as 1903; and Wölfflin's influence had been reinforced by Geoffrey Scott's *Architecture of Humanism* in 1914 and the translation of Wölfflin's methodological treatise *Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe* (1915) as *The Principles of Art History* in 1932. Yet the real impact of the German formal method on professional art history arrived with the art historical emigration, albeit in a fundamentally transformed guise, of the Warburg historians Fritz Saxl and Rudolf Wittkower, who had both studied under Wölfflin. The combined impact of these multiple but overlapping traditions formed a generation of architectural historians, critics, and architects, including Colin Rowe, Robert Maxwell, and James Stirling in Liverpool; Alan Colquhoun and Sam Stephens at the Architectural Association School in London; and the London-based architects Alison and Peter Smithson, John Voelcker, and Ruth Olitsky.

Among these, Rowe in particular would develop a coherent and powerful model of modern architectural history that was to influence generations of architects and subsequent historians and critics. Fundamentally opposed to the technological and progressive vision of his contemporary Reyner Banham, Rowe's interpretation of modernism was self-reflexive and sought formal precedents in history. But rather than proposing sources that were, in some post-Hegelian sense, genetic or formative, as Giedion saw the baroque and cubist traditions, Rowe understood them as in some way homologous, structural, and parallel—paradigmatic formal *procedures* allowing for deeper interpretation of difference and similarity. As he understood Wölfflin, the method involved a study of "configurations," or what he was fond of calling *partis*, that were then to be compared (like the side-by-side images from Wölfflin's lantern projector) to discover difference, and thus to trace transformations in the organizations, seen as impelled by cultural or stylistic force. Despite his later reservations, Rowe deployed such an approach for much of his career, convinced of the efficacy of an immediate *visual* analysis that was primary to perception and any iconographic or historical framing. "If normal intuition might suggest so much," he concluded his "Addendum," "a Wölfflinian style of critical exercise (though painfully belonging to a period *c.* 1900) might still possess the merit of appealing primarily to what is visible, and of, thereby, making the minimum of pretences to erudition and the least possible number of references outside itself."[2] Such a claim for accessibility, cultivated by the English school and championed by Bernard Berenson, perhaps indicates from the outset Rowe's ambiguous relationship to "professional" art history, as represented by Wittkower and the Warburgians, and his fondness for a more "amateur," if not "gentleman amateur," stance, characteristic of Fry and Bell and Evelyn Waugh (another favorite author of Rowe). It was also a clear statement of his insider approach to architecture as a trained designer, and of his desire to reconstrue the formal method with three-dimensional specificity. As he noted somewhat ruefully, his two years with Wittkower made of him an "architect manqué."[3]

For after completing his architectural degree at Liverpool University in 1945, Rowe had enrolled as a master's student at the University of London under the direction of Rudolf Wittkower. Wittkower had joined the newly established Warburg Institute in 1934, and had become a founder-editor of the *Journal of the Warburg Institute* in 1937 (to become the *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* in 1940). Ten years later, he was appointed a Reader when the Institute was officially incorporated into the

University. Rowe's thesis subject, "The Theoretical Drawings of Inigo Jones," was in his own words "just what those Warburgians wished to receive."[4]

An English Palladio

The immediate impetus for Rowe's master's thesis came from Wittkower himself, who noted this fact later in his 1953 article "Inigo Jones, Architect and Man of Letters." Wittkower's essay studies Jones's intellectual development through such a close analysis of his extant drawings that the author claims he takes "a leaf out of Scotland Yard's book" in his recognition of the importance of the almost invisible pinpricks of the dividers. Wittkower posits that the architect had been preparing a theoretical treatise, along the lines of his Renaissance predecessors Palladio and Scamozzi, left unfinished at his death: "We know that there exist about 200 theoretical drawings coming from Inigo's office and mainly drawn by John Webb, probably during the 1640s. For a good many years I believed that the puzzle of these drawings becomes intelligible if one assumes that they were made in preparation for an architectural thesis. Now a pupil of mine, Colin Rowe, has substantiated this assumption in a brilliant but not yet published thesis."[5] This "brilliant" thesis, 330 pages long, had been submitted by Rowe in November 1947 to the University of London for a master's degree in the history of art, awarded in 1948.[6] There was no preface or acknowledgments, but we know that in 1945 he was "Wittkower's only student," and that Saxl and Gertrude Bing were also involved. Saxl and Bing were, in Rowe's own words, "highly impressed by it."[7] From the evidence of Rowe's footnotes, he had also discussed aspects of the thesis with Frances Yates, another member of the Warburg Institute.

Wittkower himself had laid the groundwork for such a cross-national study in an exhibition of photographs he had curated in 1941 with Saxl, then director of the Warburg Institute. In the accompanying catalog, *England and the Mediterranean Tradition* (1945), Wittkower published his article "Pseudo-Palladian Elements in English Neoclassicism," raising the question of transmission and transformation as a legitimate field.[8] Although Wittkower did not publish his studies on Inigo Jones until after Rowe's thesis was complete, it is clear from this exhibition that, influenced by Saxl's work on the migration of classical symbols, his inquiry had already begun, utilizing the comparative method to study the influence of Italian works on English examples of painting, sculpture, and architecture from early times to the present.

Given its title, "The Theoretical Drawings of Inigo Jones: Their Sources and Scope," the structure of Rowe's thesis appears simple enough. After a brief introduction to Jones, his biography, architectural formation, and "stylistic development," it is divided into three main parts: an essay on the "English Architectural Treatise" in relation to its Italian and English antecedents; a central section on what Rowe considers to be Jones's own treatise; and a third, which catalogs Jones's and Webb's drawings "arranged," as Rowe puts it, "as a Treatise."

This was the "architectural treatise" referred to by Wittkower, one that Jones himself did not write—indeed, Jones left little writing besides his marginal annotations to his copy of Palladio's *Quattro libri* and his posthumously published examination of Stonehenge reconstructed as an antique Roman temple. But the burden of Rowe's thesis is "that there exists a corpus of drawings, some by Jones himself, some by John Webb in Jones's office, that represent the work in preparation for the publication of a major theoretical treatise on architecture, along the lines of those previously written and drawn by Serlio, Scamozzi, Palladio, et al.," a treatise left incomplete and unpublished at Jones's death: "The content and schematic feeling of the drawings [of this group] recall irresistibly the characteristics of the Renaissance

architectural treatise." Rowe claimed, and "it is the object of this thesis to establish that these drawings represent the preliminary studies for such a theoretical work on architecture."[9]

In other words, Rowe's own master's thesis consists of a theoretical argument for a theoretical treatise for which no written evidence exists, the planned existence of which relies on visual identification alone. It is, he allows, visual inspection that "suggests a preconceived system" comparable to those already developed by earlier architects of the Renaissance. Rowe, who was never to sustain the writing of a complete and fully developed treatise of his own, thus began his career as "a didactic exponent of architectural education" (as he characterized Jones) by completing (if not inventing) Inigo's own treatise for him. Such an exercise, however, went far beyond the Scotland Yard detective work of his supervisor.

Completed in 1947, the same year that Rowe published his first and seminal article, "The Mathematics of the Ideal Villa," and three years before "Mannerism and Modern Architecture," the thesis gives us a precise understanding of the development of his idea of modern "Palladianism" in its first iteration.[10] Indeed, the true subject of the thesis might be seen as Palladio rather than Jones, or more specifically, Jones as the eponymous hero of English "Palladianism," heir to the mannerism of the late Renaissance, precursor of Burlington and Kent, and perhaps even the first "neoclassicist."

The thesis, though hardly acknowledged by Rowe in his later career, was an extraordinary synthesis of historical interpretation derived from Wittkower and formal analysis derived from Wölfflin. It still remains one of the most succinct studies of the nature and role of the Renaissance treatise in Italy and England. Two aspects of the work, however, stand out as informing the two articles published by Rowe shortly after. The first is his construction of Palladio—Jones's model and standard—as a theoretician and, above all, as a systematizer of the Renaissance tradition: "In the school of Palladio the diverse elements [of Renaissance architecture] become classicized, and absorbed into an academic repertoire, which was to provide a European model."[11] In his "architectural conservatism" and his Neoplatonic sympathies, Palladio "prolonged the Renaissance urge toward scientific clarity, reinforced his archeological preoccupations with a persuasive emotional depth, and a serious reserve of looseness and flexibility."[12] More interested in ideal harmonies than antique remains, Palladio found in the printed treatise a perfect vehicle for his own project. According to Rowe, the *Quattro libri dell'architettura* was the most influential of all treatises, as "those accurate, and austerely programmatic pages" provided an "intelligible architecture, and the apparatus of artistic judgment for the Protestant world":[13] "It [Palladio's treatise] is a methodical conception of the ancient world, which combines the dramatic qualities of Mannerism, with that voluntary sense of abstraction and balance, which Alberti had shown. . . . Palladio always proceeds by way of the specific, to his generalization; and it is in this quality of rational embodiment that his compelling power seems always to lie. The particular admirations of Mannerism are reduced to a scheme analogous to that order which the Renaissance had postulated."[14] Here we might note a formulation of the general and the particular, the idiosyncratic embedded in the universal, that would act for Rowe as a theoretical bridge to the language of Le Corbusier. Each work of Palladio represents "a fragment of the universal order," at the same time encapsulating an "emotional suggestiveness" of the antique world that invites the viewer to reflect on the "consonance and measure," the "stoicism and control" of a synthesized classicism.[15]

Second, if Palladio was the synthesizer, Jones emerges as the transmitter and historicizer of Palladio for an English audience. Eclectic in the face of what Rowe characterizes as the "ambiguous

inheritance of Rome and Venice." Jones used his edition of the *Quattro libri* as model, standard, and commonplace book, jotting in the margins his observations of Palladio's buildings as he visited them, as well as daily notes and notes on his own projects. For Jones, "the Palladian villa system offered a focus for the development of a whole complex of outside ideas." References to the antique and its mannerist reconstructions, to Scamozzi's classicism, to the restrained expansion of early baroque, were all "regulated by a continual reference to Palladian ideals of scale and intelligibility."[14] For this, "Palladio's treatise seems to have provided Inigo, less with a model, than with a standard, around which his own impressions could cohere."[15]

By a careful formal analysis of Jones's designs beginning with the Banqueting House, Rowe demonstrates the emergence of a gradual academicism, tracing the appearance of Inigo's developed style of historicism, intellectualism, and academic correctness: "An eclectic with a natural restraint and classical bias, he evolved from a decorative and graceful early style, through a period of historicism, in which a Mannerist element is implicit, to a final period, where a classicism is imposed upon this Mannerist basis."[16] We are thus presented with a thesis that construes Jones, systematizer of the systematizer, as he builds up a collection of more than 200 plates in readiness for their publication as the first English equivalent of Palladio's *Quattro libri*.

Modern Palladianism

That the immediate postwar period, especially in England, saw a revival of interest in what was called Palladianism is now a commonplace of intellectual history—indeed, the phenomenon itself was almost immediately historicized. Banham's 1955 article "The New Brutalism" is usually cited as a reference. Here he pointed not only to the prevailing tendency for naming movements along the lines of art historical styles ("The New Empiricism," "The New Humanism," "The New Brutalism"), but also to the recent interest in Palladio and Palladianism stimulated by Wittkower's *Architectural Principles in the Age of Humanism*, published in 1949, and informing the Smithsons' entry for the Coventry Cathedral competition.[17] Looking back on this period ten years later, Banham wrote:

> *One can safely posit the interference of historical studies again, for, though the exact priority of date as between the Smithsons' design and the publication of Professor Wittkower's* Architectural Principles of *[sic]* the Age of Humanism *is disputed (by the Smithsons) it cannot be denied that they were in touch with Wittkowerian studies at the time, and were as excited by them as anybody else.*
>
> *The general impact of Professor Wittkower's book on a whole generation of post-war architectural students is one of the phenomena of our time. Its exposition of a body of architectural theory in which function and form were significantly linked by the objective laws governing the Cosmos (as Alberti and Palladio understood them) suddenly offered a way out of the doldrum of routine-functionalist abdications, and neo-Palladianism became the order of the day. The effect of* Architectural Principles *has made it by far the most important contribution—for evil as well as good—by any historian to English architecture since* Pioneers of the Modern Movement, *and it precipitated a nice disputation on the proper uses of history. The question became: Humanist principles to be followed? or Humanist principles as an example of the kind of principles to look for? Many students opted for the former alternative, and Routine-Palladians soon became as thick on the ground as Routine-Functionalists.*

The Brutalists, observing the inherent risk of a return to pure academicism—more pronounced at Liverpool than at the AA—sheered off abruptly in the other direction and were soon involved in the organization of Parallel of Life and Art.[20]

Banham was well aware that by 1955 any "Palladianism" in British modern architecture had already been cast aside. As he noted, Peter Smithson had introduced an AA student debate with the words, "We are not going to talk about proportion and symmetry"—what Banham described as the architect's "declaration of war on the inherent academicism of the neo-Palladians" and "crypto-academicism" in general.[21] Banham's own purpose in his "New Brutalism" essay was similar, as he worked to identify a new "aformalism" emerging in the Hunstanton School, Sheffield University, and the Golden Lane project, all departing from the "formalism" of Palladian reference. Banham described this as a movement from modernist/structuralist "typology" to a new modernist/visual "topology." In retrospect, Banham summarized the mood of this period:

What this generation sought was historical justification for its own attitudes, and it sought them in two main areas of history—the traditions of Modern Architecture itself, and the far longer traditions of classicism. . . . Their degree of sophistication about the history of Modern Architecture was remarkable by world standards at the time; their sophistication about classicism was remarkable for its peculiar interests rather than its extent. Most of this generation had passed through some form of run-down Beaux-Arts training . . . all had had their interest in classicism confirmed by their readings in Le Corbusier, but all came under the influence of the brilliant revival of Palladian studies in England in the late Forties, either directly through Rudolf Wittkower and his book "Architectural Principles in the Age of Humanism," or through the teaching of his outstanding pupil, Colin Rowe. Like many others among them, Colin Rowe believed that there was a direct architectural relevance between the classical past and the work of twentieth-century masters. . . . Somewhere in this amalgamation of ancient and modern exemplars of architectural order, there was thought to lie the one real and true architecture implied in the title of Le Corbusier's first book "Vers une architecture," the image of a convincing and coherent architecture that their elders had lost, and their teachers could no longer find.[22]

In *Architectural Design* of October 1954, Banham had called this movement "New Formalism," mentioning John Voelcker and Ruth Olitsky; in 1966 he delineated its principles: "In the British view, the importance of that tradition ['Classical'] lay in its abstract intellectual disciplines (proportion, symmetry) and habits of mind (clarity, rationalism) far more than matters of detailed style. . . . The Palladianism was restricted [in Voelcker's plans for electrical engineering stations] to an abstract planning diagram, and did not involve even room-shapes, let alone the detailing of the elevations."[23]

But the historicization of neo-Palladianism had in fact been accomplished in 1957 in a debate at the RIBA around the motion "that Systems of Proportion make good design easier and bad design more difficult." Nikolaus Pevsner's defense of the motion had been countered by Misha Black and Peter Smithson himself. Certainly, Smithson conceded, the issue "was important to architects as a matter of tooth and claw debate, in 1947 and 1948," when Palladian buildings were understood as "something to believe in . . . something that stood above what they were doing

themselves," but in 1957 the issue was "passé": "The right time for the Palladian revival was 1948." All the rest was no more than an "academic post-mortem" of the European postwar impulse, "as is also this debate at the RIBA."[24]

Smithson's suggestion that 1948 signaled the *high* point of English neo-Palladianism is interesting, for the often cited source of such principled Palladianism, Wittkower's *Architectural Principles in the Age of Humanism*, had not yet been published.[25] It appeared in 1949, to decidedly negative reviews. A. G. Butler, for example, writing in the *RIBA Journal* in 1951, found Wittkower's book "exhausting," "unintelligible," and "almost a bore." Yet a group of young architects were already prepared for its arguments: the Smithsons, Colquhoun, Banham, and Rowe were enthusiastic. In protest against Butler, Smithson attested: "Dr. Wittkower is regarded by the younger architects as the *only* art historian working in England capable of describing and analyzing buildings in spatial and plastic terms and not in terms of derivation and dates." For them, Smithson stated, *Architectural Principles* was "the most important work on architecture published in England since the War."[26] This response, however, was written in 1951. Although Wittkower's central essay, "Principles of Palladio's Architecture," had been published in two parts in the *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* in 1944 and 1945, these articles were not generally circulated to the architectural public; thus another catalyst for the young architects' interest in Palladian principles must be sought. It was not the publication of Wittkower's book that started the trend, nor the earlier publication of its chapters, but rather the enormous impact of his student Colin Rowe in the circle around Banham. It was Rowe who had, in 1947, coopted Wittkower's historical analysis for a sweeping comparison of form and principle with the modern movement, and, by implication, with the demand for "principles" in the extension of a truly modernist architecture for the present.

Thence came Smithson's sense of 1948 as the year of Palladianism, poised between Rowe's publication of his first article and his teacher's publication of *Architectural Principles*, between 1947 and 1949.

Diagramming Palladio

Wittkower's analysis of Palladio did not, at least initially, imply any such relationship to contemporary design. As he writes in his conclusion, his aim was to provide an account of Renaissance proportional systems that, "though limited in scope, aims at being less speculative than some previous writings." This was, he noted, a "subject which had become historical."[27] But from Wittkower's two articles on Palladio's principles, Rowe was able to seize on three concepts that, while apparently innocent of modernity in Wittkower, took on an entirely new significance in juxtaposition with those of Le Corbusier. First was the idea of architectural principles in itself. Wittkower had made it clear that his thesis was directly opposed to those of writers in the British historical tradition who associated the Renaissance with individual taste and inspiration, rather than with systematic thought and proportional theory. His critiques of Ruskin and Geoffrey Scott resonated for a postwar generation seeking what Alina Payne, speaking of Wittkower's intentions, has termed "a conscious intellect-driven will to form aimed at conveying meaning, and hence, aimed at the mind rather than the senses."[28] Second was the detailed analysis of proportion and geometry as it revealed a constructive principle in Palladio's work. The third, and perhaps most important, concept was derived from a page of diagrammatic plans of Palladio's villas demonstrating their reliance on a common schema of spatial distribution, modified and elaborated in each example.

The section in which this last diagram appeared, "Palladio's Geometry: The Villas," is barely three pages long, but its

influence would be formidable. Wittkower's purpose was to demonstrate Palladio's adherence to the "precepts of art," to "that which reason dictates," to "some universal and necessary rules of art."[29] One example that carried out these precepts was "a hall in the central axis and absolute symmetry of the lesser rooms on both sides," the insistence on which showed Palladio creating a "complete break with the older tradition" through the "systematization of the ground plan."[30] Thus, Wittkower argues, Palladio had adhered to a typical plan, with "loggias and a large hall in the central axis, two or three living-rooms or bedrooms of various sizes at the sides, and, between them and the hall, space for small spare rooms and the staircases." Wittkower ranges some eleven "schematized plans" of villas built after the late 1540s, finding that they were "all different statements of the same geometrical formula," "all generated from the same fundamental principle," and concludes his geometrical summary with a typical plan incorporating the fundamental "Geometrical Pattern of Palladio's Villas."[31] Beginning with the Villa Godi Porto at Lonedo, and continuing with the Villa Thiene at Cicogna, the Villa Sarego at Miega, the Villa Pojana, the Villa Badoer at Fratta, the Villa Zeno at Cesalto, and the Villa Cornaro at Piombino, the variations of this plan circulated, so to speak, around the "type" of the Villa Malcontenta, and found their ultimate model in the Villa Rotonda, "the most perfect realization of the fundamental geometrical skeleton."[32] In sum, Wittkower considers the villas as "archetypes," "variations on a basic geometric theme, different realizations, as it were, of the Platonic idea of the villa." As Wittkower reconstructs Palladio's design method: "What was in Palladio's mind when he experimented over and over again with the same elements? Once he had found the basic geometric pattern for the problem 'villa,' he adopted it as clearly and as simply as possible to the special requirements of each commission. He reconciled the task at hand with the 'certain truth' or mathematics which is final and unchangeable. This geometrical keynote is, subconsciously rather than consciously, perceptible to everyone who visits Palladio's villas and it is this that gives his buildings their convincing quality."[33] Such an approach, Wittkower advances, similarly informed the composition of Palladio's villa facades. Again Wittkower treats the three dimensions of the villas as a geometrical abstraction—solid three-dimensional blocks, they take the form of cubes. These, in turn, "had to be given a facade" that was "grafted" onto its front—most notably, in Palladio's innovative move, as a temple front. Wittkower describes the process:

> *The facades of Palladio's villas present us with a problem essentially similar to that of the plans. In contrast to French and English, most Italian monumental architecture is cubic and conceived in terms of a solid three-dimensional block. Italian architects always strove for an easily perceptible ratio between length, height, and depth of a building, and all villas by Palladio have that block-like quality. The cube had to be given a facade. He found his motive in the classical temple front. . . . The idea that the temple is a magnified house throws an interesting light on Palladio's own crystalline conception of architecture. He cannot think in terms of evolution, but envisages ready-made units which may be extended or contracted.*[34]

These themes, not unnaturally, formed the foundation of Rowe's master's thesis. In the bibliography he lists the three articles that Wittkower published in the *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* on Palladio's "principles" and English neoclassical architecture; further, he notes that his "resumé of Barbaro's theory" is indebted to Wittkower, quoting Barbaro from "Principles," and cites his teacher again "for Palladio's

conception of the temple springing from the forms of the ancient house." But beyond this, the qualities of Rowe's own formal analysis indicate that the debt between advisor and student might well have been reciprocal. Wittkower had closed "Principles of Palladio's Architecture" with a purely historical statement—"While thus the harmonic mathematical conception of architecture was philosophically overthrown in the age of 'nature and feeling' and disappeared from the practical handling of proportion, scholars began investigating a subject which had become historical"[35]—but his conclusion to *Architectural Principles* four years later ended in the present: "Les proportions c'est l'infini:—this terse statement [of Julien Guadet] is still indicative of our approach. That is the reason why we view researches into the theory of proportion with suspicion and awe. But the subject is again very much alive in the minds of young architects today, and they may well evolve new and unexpected solutions to this ancient problem."[36]

The double inheritance of the Renaissance from Palladio through Jones would be of simply academic interest if it did not form the basis of Rowe's own historical view of architecture in general, and of the modern movement in particular. For as Rowe elaborated in the London essays "Mathematics" and "Mannerism" (1947–50) and later reinforced in articles of his Texas period (1954–56), "modernism" for him referred directly to the "Palladianism" of this first iteration in two fundamental respects: its crystallization in the work of a single "systematizer," in this case Le Corbusier; and its propagation through a central written treatise, *Vers une architecture*. Rowe's modernism relied on the initial experiments of two generations of multiple innovators from the Arts and Crafts movement to expressionism, and on the completion of a few synthetic, paradigmatic works that encapsulated its ideals and their formal representation—the villas Stein and Savoye. For its assumptions of coherence and periodization, it also relied, apparently paradoxically for one opposed to the very notion of "progress" in history, on a coherent theory of the historical zeitgeist. Rowe expressed this view in comments he drafted in 1954 for the use of Harwell Harris, chair of the department of architecture at the University of Texas: "It cannot be assumed that the present day is without an overt artistic urge, will, volition. No earlier time has been without one and there is no reason to believe that we are exempted from what has so far been universal. That modern architecture is not merely a negative rationalism, that it embodies a positive will, is proved by evidences which are daily before our eyes."[37] This, then, was the basis for Rowe's incisive, brief (only four of the celebrated "blue" pages, dedicated to theory and sometimes to history, of the *Architectural Review*), but extraordinarily influential, first essay.

The publication of "Mathematics of the Ideal Villa: Palladio and Le Corbusier Compared" had been to some extent prepared by the growing interest of the *Architectural Review* in the relation of proportional geometries to design. Wittkower himself, in a review of a "primer of proportion" the year before, had been less than enthusiastic for the contemporary fate of proportion, concluding, "In the last hundred years we have seen too many systems of proportion from which their authors expected salvation. They have all been passed by by the artists. The old universality has irrevocably gone, and Ruskin's conviction that it must be left to the inspiration of the artist to invent beautiful proportions is for better or for worse still our own."[38] But Rowe's article captured the cover of the journal, represented by a black-and-white reverse drawing from a 1920 treatise on historical proportions, illustrating the west elevation of Notre Dame in Paris, superimposed with lines indicating the supposed use of the Golden Section rectangle. The editors noted that whether or not the Gothic use of this system could be proved, "it is certain that in more modern times a great many architects have consciously employed the science: on pages 101–104 in this issue Colin Rowe compares

Palladio's Villa Malcontenta and Le Corbusier's Villa at Garches, showing that both are based on the belief that right proportions may be expressed in mathematical terms."[9]

Mathematics

There are two causes of beauty—natural and customary. Natural is from geometry, consisting in uniformity, that is equality, and proportion. Customary beauty is begotten by the use, as familiarity breeds a love to things not in themselves lovely. Here lies the great occasion of errors, but always the test is natural or geometrical beauty. Geometrical figures are naturally more beautiful than irregular figures; the square, the circle are the most beautiful, next the parallelogram and the oval. There are only two positions of straight lines, perpendicular and horizontal; this is from Nature, and consequently necessity, no other than upright being firm.

These words, attributed to Christopher Wren and published in the mid-eighteenth century in his posthumous fragments titled *Parentalia*, appear as an epigraph to Rowe's "The Mathematics of the Ideal Villa," framing a discussion of the comparative uses of geometry and associative form in Palladio and Le Corbusier.[10] Wren's lapidary formulation—which paralleled a similar distinction drawn between "absolute" and "arbitrary" beauty by Claude Perrault at almost the same moment—was developed in relation to a social and historical approach emerging from the comparative study of languages that attempted to explain shifts in style, even within the classical (antique) and revived classical (Renaissance) periods. This formulation allowed Wren to postulate a fundamental order for all architecture based on pure geometry and a changing outer form dependent on social and cultural custom, and enabled his calibration of the appropriate style for different, historically meaningful institutions. Thus, his projects in quasi-Gothic style for St. Paul's, both before and after the fire, and his neo-Gothic entry gate for Christ Church, Oxford, were designed following a "judgment" of architecture's "political Use," its role as "Ornament" of a country.[11]

For Rowe, Wren's didactic statement implied an opposition between a radical "autonomous" architecture internally considered to derive its formal condition *as* architecture from geometry, whether typological or topological, and an architecture deriving its authority from an evaluation of its social and cultural symbolism, drawn back from the Arts and Crafts to the classical. In purely visual terms, this opposition manifested itself as between abstract and realist; in historical terms, it might be seen as between an architecture that extended the abstract formalism of the 1920s avant-gardes and one that returned to a restatement of the literal forms of classical tradition. On an ideological plane, we might say it stood as a contest between posthumanist modernism and retrohumanist postmodernism: between an assumption of a humanist subjectivity disseminated and perhaps irrevocably lost, and one precariously surviving, perhaps to be regained.

Out of Wittkower's observations on Palladio, Rowe derives a founding concept—the ideal villa—and its principles of form—geometry—joining them to a comparison of Palladio's villas and Le Corbusier's modernist counterparts. In the formal tradition of Wölfflin, the argument works more by juxtaposition and comparison than by derivation. Rowe was not proposing any direct filiation between the late Renaissance architect and the modernist architect; he admits that the villas of Palladio and Le Corbusier were "in different worlds," and insists that "the world of classical Mediterranean culture, on which Palladio drew so expressively, is closed for Le Corbusier."[12]

The structure of this short essay is simple enough. Rowe begins with a comparison of Palladio's Villa Capra or Rotonda with Le Corbusier's Maison Savoye at Poissy, based on Palladio's eloquent description of his villa's rural surroundings and Le Corbusier's similar description of his villa's site as "un rêve virgilien": "It would have been, perhaps, the landscape of Poussin that Palladio would have longed to penetrate, to roam among the portentous apparitions of the antique . . . and if the contemporary pastoral is not yet sanctified by conventional usage, apparently the Virgilian nostalgia is still present."[43] Rowe's evocation of arcadia as the imaginary site of Palladio's Villa Rotonda and his connection of the villa to Poussin's arcadian landscapes echo another Warburgian influence: Erwin Panofsky's essay "'Et in Arcadia Ego.'" Panofsky cited Virgil as the originator of the myth of Arcadia, a region formerly understood as wild and inhospitable but endowed by Virgil with the bucolic landscape of Sicily in a utopian myth of elegiac force, later to be adopted by the Renaissance as "an enchanting vision" and studied by Saxl, among many others.[44]

Whereas this reference to the Warburgian version of arcadia might represent a progressive, modernizing side of Rowe's analysis, the same reference, employed as the title of Book I of Evelyn Waugh's *Brideshead Revisited*—cited by David Watkin as the novel that had the greatest influence on the immediate postwar consciousness of architectural history—signals another, more conservative side of Rowe's affections. In his lectures, Rowe would quote ad lib from Waugh as frequently as he would from Auden. In Waugh's novel, the notion of "Et in Arcadia Ego" signifies at once the prewar idyll of life at the great house of Brideshead and its inevitable death as a boarded-up mansion requisitioned by the army. The opening line of Book I—"I have been here before"[45]—echoes throughout the emerging sense of historical heritage that was to engulf post-1945 England, the England of John Betjeman and John Piper, of Nikolaus Pevsner's county guides and Gordon Cullen's "Townscape." Waugh's narrator, an architectural artist-reader of Roger Fry's *Vision and Design* and Clive Bell's *Art*, was every artist and architect demobilized—immersed in the memories of an imaginary lost paradise and the realities of a rapidly disappearing landscape of rural rides and stately seats. Set in its "secret landscape," "prone in the sunlight, grey and gold amid a screen of boskage," Brideshead was constructed out of a veritable "collage" architecture of suspended history, with its dome said to be by Inigo Jones, its "Soanesque" library, Chinese drawing-room, Chippendale fretwork, Pompeian parlor, colonnaded terrace, and fountain "as one might expect to find in a piazza of Southern Italy."[46] Waugh's languishing prose, his close reading of every sign of the past as contrasting with the present, his continuous intimation of transience countered by a resolute facing of present and future, resonated in Britons confronted with the task of rebuilding amid the ruins.

Refusing to be trapped in arcadia and the shifting ground of customary beauty, Rowe turned to a "more specific comparison" between Palladio's Villa Foscari, or Malcontenta, and Le Corbusier's house for M. de Monzie at Garches, based on their geometrical and proportional structures: the foundation of architecture's "natural" beauty. In each of these comparisons, the influence of Wittkower is clear in Rowe's treatment of Palladio and, by association, of Le Corbusier, and is fundamental to his analysis of the plans and their geometrical properties. Drawing on Wittkower's comparison of Palladian plan types, Rowe develops what he calls "a diagrammatic comparison" to reveal the "fundamental relationships" between Garches and Malcontenta: in both, he claims, the "system is closely similar," and he proceeds to elaborate on Wittkower's identification of "six

'transverse' lines of support, rhythmically alternating double and single bays."[47] Rowe cites the quotation used by Wittkower in support of Palladio's adherence to symmetry, follows Wittkower's analysis of musical and geometrical harmonies, agrees with his teacher in seeing Palladio's study of public buildings resonate in the private realm, and picks up on Wittkower's mention of Matila Ghyka's *The Geometry of Art and Life* to the extent of reproducing a page of diagrams analyzing the Golden Section rectangle. Finally, throughout the essay, Rowe insists that the architecture of both Palladio and Le Corbusier is a result of mental energy, "an intellectual feat which reconciles the mind to the fundamental discrepancy of the programme."[48]

The debt to Wittkower is even more pronounced in Rowe's choice of illustrations. The diagrams of the "modular grid" of the plans, the first-floor plans, and the elevations of Malcontenta and Garches are ranged vertically side by side in columnar comparison (an effect lost in the republication of the essay in *Mathematics of the Ideal Villa and Other Essays*), in a direct adumbration of Wittkower's own diagrams. All of these parallels, it must be said, occur without a single reference to Wittkower or his articles. Charitably, one might argue that articles for the *Architectural Review* were regularly published without footnotes, but this fact, of course, does not preclude citing attributions in the text itself.

Inventing Modernism

After the act of Revolution, therefore—which is largely iconoclastic in character—comes the process of building anew.
—Architectural Review, editorial, 1947

It is significant in retrospect that Rowe's first article was published in the third number of the *Architectural Review* of 1947. In January of that year, to celebrate the magazine's fiftieth year of publication, the editorial board joined together for the first time in many years to issue a statement of policy and to review the past fifty years of architectural development. Their "manifesto," mild enough by early twentieth-century standards, was titled "The Second Half Century," and looked toward a future both short-term and long-term in which the *Review* would play an important role in the architectural education of the profession and the general public."[49] J. M. Richards, Pevsner, Osbert Lancaster, and Hubert de Cronin Hastings pronounced themselves antirevolutionaries: their journal "does not set out to lead a political and moral or even a social revolution": they were determined to be more open-minded than their modern movement predecessors and dedicated to "the cause of visual culture" in general, on a mission no more nor less than to "re-educate the eye" of the *Review*'s readers. In this task they were determined not only to continue the "Third Programme" pieces of high criticism ("scholar's table-talk conducted in public") and the normal process of publishing contemporary architecture, but also to open up to a wide range of cultural artifacts not necessarily high architectural in form."[50] Indeed, they had a "call" "of quite a low-class, evangelical kind," no doubt influenced by Pevsner's own Lutheranism and Hastings's populism, that was to sponsor the well-known investigations into pub architecture, townscape, and popular design that characterized the *Architectural Review* for the next two decades.[51] But this call also had an aesthetic side directed to the supposedly dogmatic modernism of the prewar years: "The obvious short-term objective must consist in getting back some of the scope and richness that the Act of Revolution discarded." This task demanded a "new humanism" for architecture, seeking "more direct contact with human aspirations," architecture "becoming more and more a vehicle for humanity's aspirations."[52]

Such a program involved discarding many of the modern movement's doctrines that in the light of experience had become "negative characteristics" and could be changed only through reactivation of the arts of expression. The editors listed: "a new richness and differentiation of character, the pursuit of differences rather than sameness, the re-emergence of monumentality, the cultivation of idiosyncracy and the development of those regional dissimilarities that people have always taken a pride in."[53] This goal perfectly matched Pevsner's call for a return to the great English tradition of the picturesque, but, as would be demonstrated by Colquhoun's stern rebuke to Pevsner in 1954, many in Rowe's circle were ready to combat the incipient "historicism" embedded in picturesque (and townscape) ideology. Yet in 1947, these "dangers" to modern movement orthodoxy were not so evident, and it is easy to trace elements of this new "freedom" announced by the editors of the *Review* in Rowe's own embrace of Pevsner's (and Wittkower's) "mannerism," as well as in his visual approach to the conceptual, intellectual "rules" of the modernist game.

For, convinced, like many of his generation—Banham and Colquhoun in Britain, Greenberg and later Leo Steinberg in the United States—that the first era of the modern avant-gardes was historically complete, Rowe saw his task with respect to the postwar practice of architecture and architectural history as defined on the one hand by the ideological and formal residue of avant-gardism, and on the other by the much longer trajectory of architectural tradition since the Renaissance. In the process, he constructed a formulation of a more or less unified "modernism" that served him as a critical armature for the rest of his life. Like Clement Greenberg, who sought to invent a similar "modernism" for painting and countered the modern movement's own myth of the "end of history," Rowe turned to history as a key to the isolation of specifically modernist moves in architecture, as well as more traditional survivals. Like Greenberg's approach to the canvas, Rowe's architectural analysis, growing out of Wölfflin, Wittkower, and Pevsner, was neo-Kantian. Whereas Greenberg sought to identify the roots and definition of modernism in the emerging "flatness" of painting after Manet, Rowe turned back further, to the Renaissance (as Manfredo Tafuri was to do later) as the touchstone of a developed architectural manner. The "modernism" thus defined by both Rowe and Greenberg, from their quite different perspectives, was parallel to that of T. S. Eliot, as Terry Eagleton has characterized it, founded on a "Janus-faced temporality, in which one turns to the resources of the pre-modern in order to move backwards into a future that has transcended modernity altogether."[54]

In this context, Rowe's initial comparison of Palladio and Le Corbusier was in no way simply the arbitrary result of applying the idea of mannerism to modernism, nor was it a fashionable conceit adopted by a few young members of Team X and the Independent Group out of a casual reading of Wittkower, or a Sunday conversation with Rowe at Banham's house. Rather, by 1930 Le Corbusier had emerged, for Rowe, as *the* Palladio of modernity. In a 1959 meditation entitled "Le Corbusier: Utopian Architect," Rowe describes Le Corbusier's influence, like Palladio's, as "principally exercised through the medium of the illustrated book; and if we wish to understand its nature, it is to his early treatise, *Towards a New Architecture*, and to the publication of his buildings and projects as his *Oeuvre Complète* that we must look. For in these books he evolves a frame of reference, persuades us to accept it, poses the problems, and answers them in his own terms; so that, like the great system makers of the Renaissance, Le Corbusier presents himself to us as a kind of living encyclopaedia of architecture, or as the index to a world where all experience is ordered and all inconsistency eradicated."[55]

In Rowe's argument, however, the comparison of Palladio and Le Cobusier remains at this level, as a comparison between architects who produced books. As filtered through Wittkower, Palladio's role is clearly as a foil through which to construct a specific form of modernism in Le Corbusier. Here, as Guido Zuliani has observed in a recent article, we should distinguish carefully between the nature and roles of the two diagrams, Wittkower's and Rowe's. The diagrams represent two different bay rhythms—Wittkower's ABCBA and Rowe's ABABA—that in turn indicate entirely divergent strategies on the part of the two historians: "Wittkower's diagram describes the structure of internal relations, that, for him, constitute the signifying content of Palladian villas, whereas Rowe's diagram is a paradigmatic configuration, a guarantor of structure, in his view, of the correct relations and hierarchies against which to evaluate the proper and improper nature of specific design choices."[56] One might go further, and state that such "design choices" would be those Rowe considered "modernist" and saw against the backdrop of a parallel set of design choices established by Palladio. In the case of Wittkower, however, the diagram is meant as an analytical reinforcement of the historian's description of Palladian spatial layout; for Rowe, the adoption of this diagram and its overlaying on the Corbusian "villa" is at once a strategy to demonstrate the shifts, inversions, and transformations of the centralized classical model, and an invitation to read, if not produce, all modern architecture according to the same method.[57] The influence of this reading method has been so strong as to inflect several generations of late modernist work, standing both as the model for design approach, as in the work of the New York Five, and as the paradigm for contemporary formalism to work against, as in the digital practices of Greg Lynn.

Mannerism

It is perhaps inevitable that Mannerism should come to be isolated and defined by historians, during those same years of the nineteen-twenties, when modern architecture feels most strongly the demand for inverted spatial effects.
—Colin Rowe, "Mannerism and Modern Architecture"

Wittkower's influence is even more present in the second of Rowe's *Architectural Review* articles, "Mannerism and Modern Architecture," published a year after *Architectural Principles*. Nevertheless, Wittkower's fundamental work on mannerism in the articles on Michelangelo's Laurentian Library in the *Art Bulletin* of 1934, and in his analysis of Palladio's Palazzo Thiene, Palazzo Valmarana, and the Loggia del Capitanato in the first part of "Palladio's Principles," is still unacknowledged. Indeed, the summary of Rowe's article offered by the editors (presumably by Pevsner, but some of it probably written by Rowe himself) mentions only Pevsner and Anthony Blunt as precedents:

> *Mannerism in architecture, using the term Mannerism as it was defined by art historians in the early twenties, has only recently received the kind of attention which used to be given to the Baroque. Indeed, general attempts to define the term in relation to architecture have, in England, so far been limited to two—Nikolaus Pevsner's article in* The Mint *for 1946, and Anthony Blunt's lecture at the RIBA in 1949. Yet the conception of Mannerism is one which promises much for the better understanding of the art and architecture of more periods and places than one. In March Nikolaus Pevsner showed how it might be used to throw light on the fascinating enigma of the English*

Elizabethan style: in this article Colin Rowe applies it to the architecture of the Modern Movement. In doing so he breaks completely new ground, and reaches conclusions which may startle those who have been content to accept the Modern Movement's account of itself at its face value.

The Author: C. F. Rowe, MA, architect, is at present lecturing at the Liverpool School of Architecture. Is convinced that analogies between the architecture of the sixteenth and the present century cannot be ignored in any attempt to formulate a consistent theory for contemporary architecture.[58]

Of the two sources mentioned here, Blunt's lecture at the RIBA, published as "Mannerism in Architecture" in March 1949, was the most directly concerned with applying the concept of mannerism to contemporary architecture.[59] He began with an attempt to define the word, which he insisted for his architectural audience was no mere "affectation" but a distinct style in itself, first noted by art historians in painting around 1900. His prime example, following Wittkower, was Michelangelo's Laurentian Library, where "all the principles which were manifest in Brunelleschi [were] taken and . . . simply inverted." Columns were set into the wall, there was a visual impression of great weight but with small consoles; columns were treated in "a wanton manner"; the wall was interrupted "with brutality."[60] Such inversions were, he noted, "visible in even so apparently classical an architect as Palladio," illustrating the point by using Wittkower's diagram of the facade of San Francesco della Vigna.[61]

Blunt described mannerism as more than a period style; it is, rather, a phenomenon common to other times and places, from the rock tombs of Petra to the watercolors of Blake and the architecture of the late eighteenth century, from Ledoux to Soane, which is characterized by "distortion of proportions, overcrowding of the space, and the extreme exaggeration, used to produce dramatic effect. One can find corresponding elements in certain architecture of the period also, for example in the work of Frenchmen like Ledoux. . . . In his architecture we can see an arbitrary juxtaposition of elements which is strictly Mannerist, and in some cases direct borrowing from Mannerist architects like Giulio Romano."[62] In the context of Rowe's interpretation, however, it is Blunt's direct attribution of mannerist elements to Le Corbusier that resonates. For Blunt, Le Corbusier's treatment of interior space was key, "in the sense that he frequently seems deliberately to avoid any completely closed form, and allows, on the contrary, the maximum degree of interpenetration, deliberate uncertainty, if you like, in the definition of the space."[63] And he ended his lecture with a direct quotation from Le Corbusier's *Vers une architecture* praising Michelangelo's St. Peter's.[64]

The second of Rowe's acknowledged sources after Blunt's lecture was Pevsner's article "The Architecture of Mannerism" in *The Mint: A Miscellany of Literature, Art and Criticism*, edited by the critic Geoffrey Grigson and including pieces by W. H. Auden, Seán O'Casey, and Graham Greene. Written as if it were the first English exposition of the subject, this brief introduction to mannerism is also written to correct an empirically minded England that "distrusts generalizations" and leaves "the perfection and codes of law to more logical and less practical nations."[65] Pevsner argues in favor of the word "style," introduced by German and Austrian art historians, to establish a more precise understanding of the terms of the field. "Fixed terms for styles of ages," he writes, "are there to keep a host of data in reasonable order," to help in "tidying up" works of art, and to distinguish Renaissance from baroque, which would be (in his Wölfflinian terms) to separate "the static from the dynamic, the compact from the

expansive, the finite from the infinite, the ideal from the over-real or over-expressive."[16] Before considering what "mannerism" might refer to in architecture, he notes the clarifying effect of its "discovery" in 1924–25, and outlines the term's first application to painting.[17] His discussion of the "formal and emotional character" of the post-Counter-Reformation buildings by Sanmicheli, Giulio Romano, Peruzzi, Michelangelo, Pirro Ligorio, Ammanati, Vignola, Palladio, and Serlio places these works and their authors in the quickly established canon of mannerism as it was received in England after the Second World War. Throughout, Pevsner uses terms like "uncomfortable balancing" (applied to the facade of Sanmicheli's Palazzo Bevilacqua); "lack of clarity," "dissonance," "precarious instability," "restlessness," "incongruous proximity" (applied to Giulio Romano's Palazzo del Te); "unstable relations" (applied to Peruzzi's Palazzo Massimi); "preciosity" (applied to Pirro Ligorio's Casino of Pius); all add up to his characterization of the style as "self-conscious," "dissenting," and "frustrated," prone to "excess within rigid boundaries"—a style "with the aim of hurting, rather than pleasing, the eye."[18]

Pevsner's article, with its range of reference, its careful formal analyses, its explanation of mannerism as a style peculiar to an age of asceticism, of the rigorism of Pius V and Loyola, a "cheerless style, aloof and austere," with "no faith in mankind and no faith in matter," evidently had a huge influence on the enlightened elite of England, and especially on Colin Rowe and his circle.[19] Pevsner's digs at English pragmatism, at "modern architects" who "suffer from . . . lack of visual discrimination" and at criticism that "suffers from it too," naturally appealed to a generation anxious to reformulate the terms of theory and criticism developed by a connoisseurial class before the war. Finally, his recognition that mannerism was not just an application of a painterly vision to facades, but rather a spatial problem, was in tune with modernist ideas of architecture in general: "Architecture is not all a matter of walls and wall patterns. It is primarily organized space," he remarked, admitting that it was "much harder to write of space than of walls," because it demanded to be "wandered through" "at least with one's eyes," in a filmic manner.[20]

While he cursorily cites Wittkower on Michelangelo, Pevsner is not entirely generous to his fellow-exile and University of London colleague: he prefaces his long analysis of Michelangelo's Laurentian Library with the flat statement that no one previously had thought of Michelangelo in the terms of mannerism as he defined it. While many scholars, from Burckhardt to Schmarsow, had noticed "incongruities" in the building, these had been interpreted as marks of "struggle," rather than the "paralysed, frozen" architecture Pevsner envisaged.[21] Not incidentally, Pevsner passes over Wittkower's in-depth analysis of the Laurenziana.

Wittkower's own idea of mannerism did not, in fact, precisely agree with those of his art historical rivals. As elaborated in his 1934 article on Michelangelo, his concept of the style was derived from a meticulous study of the reconstructed stages of design for the Laurenziana, concerned, as Margaret Wittkower noted in 1977, "with proving the existence of a 'Mannerist' style in architecture," because the term as introduced by earlier historians, such as Voss, Dvořák, Frey, and Friedländer, had emerged from a study of painting, and was not specific to architecture and its deployment of elements.[22] Reinforcing this specificity, the article was to have been prefaced by a lost section titled "Das Problem manieristischer Architektur."[23]

For Wittkower, mannerism in architecture was first and foremost to be identified in what he termed "an irreconcilable conflict, a restless fluctuation between opposite extremes." He saw this as the "governing principle of the whole building" of the Laurenziana, as supposedly load-bearing orders are recessed behind the

wall they would normally articulate and support, thus reversing the usual status of wall and orders. Equally, a stair that purports to climb upward is given a cascading downward movement at its center: the stair itself fills a vestibule that properly would articulate a moment of rest for the visitor. Similarly, the details exhibit "the same theme of insoluble conflict," with inner and outer door frames given "two different and irreconcilable meanings," triglyphs hanging like "dewdrops below the pilasters," and each element neutralizing the other ad infinitum: "every attempt to work out the architecture according to one system immediately leads to the other," to the point where "ambivalence" is the dominant impression. The observer is "plunged, without being aware of it, into a situation of doubt and uncertainty."[74] As opposed to the Renaissance sense of "self-sufficiency," stability, and lack of movement, and the baroque exhibition of unequivocal, dynamic movement, mannerism subsists on a "*duality of function*," "one of the fundamental laws of Mannerist architecture."[75]

If conflict is the first law of mannerism, then the second law Wittkower identifies is "the principle of *inversion*."[76] As demonstrated by the facade of S. Giorgio de' Greci in Venice, with its pilasters piled on top of one another, foiling any attempts to find vertical axes, "inversion forbids an unequivocal reading of the facade: the eye is led to wander from side to side, up and down, and the movement thus provoked can again be called ambiguous." Such a principle, Wittkower claims, is entirely foreign to both the Renaissance and the baroque, demonstrating the existence of the style called mannerism, of which the Biblioteca Laurenziana is the "supreme representation."[77]

Wittkower did not confine his analysis to the historical period between 1520 and 1600 that he had identified as mannerist. Already in 1934 he was developing a tentative theory for the entire modern period, seen as an overall unity from the early fifteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century. "Mannerism" then became a generic term for architecture that was neither entirely static nor unequivocally dynamic: while art history "habitually" thought of the development of a sequence from static Renaissance to dynamic baroque, Wittkower saw the concept of mannerist ambiguity as one that could be "applied to both static and dynamic buildings," to the extent that mannerism often appears at different scales throughout the period. For Wittkower the true break was effected by the introduction in the mid-nineteenth century of modern steel construction which, like the flying buttress of the Gothic period before the Renaissance, produced structures that had no need for walls. Between the fourteenth century and the nineteenth, however, walls were the primary element, and allowed for the variegated play of the orders on and within their surfaces with no functional or structural impediment. Here, of course, Wittkower was following the general consensus, established by Giedion, that modern architecture was founded on the principles of the skeleton and the "functional" demand for honesty in its representation. Wittkower did leave one loophole for modernist criticism, however, one that Rowe would eagerly exploit, in his characterization of the Laurenziana as "the beginning of a completely new approach to architecture . . . the key to a wide area of unexplored or misinterpreted architectural history, and the explanation of much that was to happen in the next two centuries and beyond."[78] And if Wittkower himself could extend the period through to the ninteenth century, why should not an architecture dedicated no longer to the clarity of the Chicago frame, but rather to the ambiguity between surface and structure, historical tradition and modernity, be subject to analysis according to the same principles?

Rowe—despite his assertion that "the only general attempts [to apply the term 'mannerism' to architecture] in English" were those of Blunt and Pevsner, and ignoring Wittkower's magisterial essay on Michelangelo—assimilates Wittkower's entire discourse

into his treatment of modern architecture. The entry facade of Le Corbusier's Villa at La Chaux-de-Fonds is compared to the facade of the Casa di Palladio in Vicenza, Zuccheri's Casino in Florence, and to a Georgian house in Suffolk Street, London. Picking up on Blunt's characterization of Soane as mannerist, Rowe even points to the reemphasis on mannerist motifs in Soane's delineation of Zuccheri for his lecture illustrations to the Royal Academy in the early nineteenth century. Rowe's reliance on Blunt reappears at the close of the essay when he quotes liberally from Le Corbusier on Michelangelo.

The center of "Mannerism and Modern Architecture," though, is an elaborate but succinct reformulation of the history of architecture since the Renaissance in terms that pit the rationalism of structure and the moral ethic of the program against the visual qualities of the eclectic and the picturesque, a tension traced through to the modern movement, split between the demands of reason and the satisfaction of the eye. Rowe finds this entire development, together with its tensions, to culminate in Le Corbusier, whose *Oeuvre complète* is framed as "a production as developed and as theoretically informed as any of the great architectural treatises of the sixteenth century."[79] But the real dilemma facing Le Corbusier—and, one supposes, Rowe and his circle, following the evident success of "Mathematics of the Ideal Villa"—was Corbusier's "incapacity to define an attitude to sensation."[80] With mathematics operating as an "absolute value," a reinforcement of "universal and comforting truths," the question arises as to the "sensuous appreciation" to be devoted to the resulting "cubes, spheres, cylinders, cones and their products."[81] In this ascription, the celebrated phrase "the masterly, correct, and magnificent play of masses brought together in light" opens up what Rowe sees as a "self-division" within Le Corbusier that was never to be closed: that between the "correctness" of an intellectual idea infusing the object from outside and the correctness of a visual attribute of the object itself. Here Rowe is set to make the parallel between the post–World War I world of Le Corbusier and the world of the Counter-Reformation, both contexts rendering balance and harmony impossible: "If, in the sixteenth century, Mannerism is the visual index of an acute spiritual crisis, the recurrence of similar attitudes at the present day should not be unexpected, and corresponding conflicts should scarcely require indication."[82]

In this way Rowe systematically compares the disturbances and exaggerations common to mannerism and to modernism: plans that are both central and peripheral, works that visually demand intellectual confirmation from the abstract perspective of the aerial view; deliberate and insoluble spatial complexities in Michelangelo and Mies alike; ambiguous spatial organizations in Vignola and Mies; and, finally, the intensity of discordant elements at different scales represented in St. Peter's and in Le Corbusier's Salvation Army Building. This comparison allows Rowe to "really measure the production of our own day": "In a composition of aggressive and profound sophistication, plastic elements of a major scale are foiled against the comparatively minor regulations of the glazed wall. Here again the complete identity of discordant elements is affirmed; and, as at St. Peter's, in this intricate and monumental conceit, there is no release and no permanent satisfaction for the eye. Disturbance is complete."[83] Rowe is, then, not so much comparing Palladio and Le Corbusier, as in the first essay, as now comparing Michelangelo and Le Corbusier. In this sense the argument is not so much about mannerism *and* modern architecture, but about Le Corbusier as "Michelangelesque" and modern architecture as "mannerist." Of course neither mannerists nor modernists were setting out with the primary goal to *be* "mannerist"—to the contrary, both envisaged themselves as the bold contrarians of their age. The supposedly blank panels of the Casa di Palladio and the Villa

Schwob were construed respectively, and respectfully, within the codes of "the architectural traditions of Renaissance humanism" and modernism.[84] What Rowe identified as "Palladio's inversion of the normal" and Le Corbusier's "formal ambiguity" were intended deliberately to "disrupt the inner core" of classical and modernist coherence, respectively. But equally, as Dvořák, Pevsner, and Wittkower had suggested, such disruption was far from classical in its historical implications: rather, it was a sign of what Rowe termed a "universal *malaise*," and of the fundamental "inner contradictions" that afflicted classicism and modernism alike.

Given such a historical sense of beginning, middle, and academic end, the slipping of modernism into neoclassicism, even as Palladianism slipped into late eighteenth-century neoclassicism, was both inevitable and a sign of decline. In this ascription it would be not Wittkower but Emil Kaufmann who, following the posthumous publication of *Architecture in the Age of Reason* in 1955, would be Rowe's guide to the eighteenth century. For Rowe viewed post-Corbusianism and post-Micsianism as moments of formal crystallization bereft of the ideological content that had (falsely but energetically) inspired modern architecture: the revolution had failed. As he concluded his review of the 1959 exhibition of Le Corbusier at the Building Center, "The success of any revolution is also its failure." Modern architecture was now ubiquitous, an "official art": rather than "the continuing *symbol* of something new, Modern architecture has recently become the *decoration* of everything existing."[85] Even as the neo-Palladian villa "at its best, became the picturesque object in the English park," so Le Corbusier, "source of innumerable pastiches and of tediously amusing exhibition techniques," is rendered empty as "le style Corbu."[86] As Rowe concluded somewhat despondently in "Mathematics of the Ideal Villa": "It is the magnificently realizable quality of the originals which one fails to find in the works of neo-Palladians and exponents of 'le style Corbu.'" But for Rowe in 1947, the distinction was clear: "The difference is that between the universal, and the decorative or merely competent; perhaps in both cases it is the adherence to rules which has lapsed."[87]

Here then, and as early as Rowe's first essays of 1947 and 1950, we can identify that sense of exhaustion, of the already seen, of the endlessly repeated formulae, that pervades his assessments of contemporary work, as if the critic/historian is, Spengler-like, already wasted by the ennui of living at the end of history. In this wasteland, as we shall see, only his former student and friend James Stirling would be exempt from criticism as having surmounted the transition from mannerism to neoclassicism, like some latter-day John Soane, eclectic and combinatory, abstract and symbolic, developing whatever *virtù* might be salvaged from a formalism without ideology, a rhetoric without content, from the very force of its jangled inversions in order to invent a late-modern institutional typology.

The End of Modernism

This sense of the fatigued, detached observer is confirmed when we read Colin Rowe on the subject of the New York Five. Here there is no clear sense of critical authorization of the kind offered, for example, by Giedion in support of Le Corbusier or, alternatively, by Pevsner against Le Corbusier, no hint of that "instrumental" criticism so castigated by Tafuri as implicating the critic in the practice of the architect. While Tafuri himself at one point in his career was keen to engage the American five, and certainly registered (though in a fundamentally critical vein) the impact of Rossi's neorationalist typology on Krier and others, Rowe seems to have wanted to escape from any firm judgment on the issues raised. Thus, the better part of Rowe's introduction to *Five Architects* (1972) is taken up more with an autopsy of modern architecture's failure in the face of its ubiquitous success than with any

extended discussion of the contents of the book. The burden of the argument rests on the disappearance of the moral and utopian impetus in European modernism, the seemingly nonideological modern architecture of the United States, and the opening left for the recuperation of historical "meaning" through the resurrection and extension of modernist codes—in his words, Eisenman "seems to have received a revelation in Como; Hejduk seems to wish affiliation both to synthetic Cubist Paris and Constructivist Moscow," and Graves, Gwathmey, and Meier have an "obviously Corbusian orientation." His conclusion that the argument posed by the Five was "largely about the physique of building and only indirectly about its morale" avoided any confrontation with the nature of this new formalism, qua architecture as meaningful language.[88] Even in the two-paragraph erratum added as a loose page in the 1975 Oxford University Press edition, Rowe vouchsafes little more in the way of appreciation than an extremely contorted assessment of the "bourgeois," "cosmopolitan erudition" and "belligerently second hand" character of the work. Its only merit, apparently, resides in the fact that "it is what *some* people and *some* architects want," and thus difficult to fault, "in *principle*" at least.[89]

In the end, and despite the ultimate brilliance of Rowe's analytical vision, we are faced with a critic who believed that everything had already happened, one who might well be placed among those of the generation of 1945 who, fatalistically or dispassionately, found solace in the belief that the epoch of history had ended in *posthistoire* repetition and impasse.

Modernist Mannerism: Stirling

Robert Maxwell has surmised that the two essays published by James Stirling at the beginning of his career in the *Architectural Review* in 1955–56, "Garches to Jaoul" and "Ronchamp," were consciously modeled on Rowe's first two articles in the same journal."[90] Certainly Stirling, as Rowe's thesis student at Liverpool and a close member of his circle in London after 1951, was deeply influenced by Rowe in his support of the "conversion" to modernism recently effected at the Liverpool School of Architecture. But a reading of Stirling's essays reveals a strategy that goes beyond emulation and toward a fundamental reevaluation of Corbusian modernity, which was only later assumed openly by Rowe. First on Stirling's agenda is the need to shift attention from the canonical Garches to the still misunderstood Maisons Jaoul. Using the comparative method preferred by Rowe, Stirling sees the two as posed at "the extremes" of Le Corbusier's vocabulary, the "rational, urbane, programmatic" versus the "personal and anti-mechanistic."[91] Garches remained the standard, at once the "masterpiece of Neo-Palladianism" and the epitome of Le Corbusier's version of high modernism. Axial and cubic, it demands to be entered frontally, and the play of spatial movement is tightly enclosed on the interior. The Jaoul houses, by contrast, present no main facade, and are spatially active on the outside and static on the inside. Most striking, however, is the difference between the smooth, white, machine aesthetic of Garches and the rough concrete and brick construction of Jaoul: in both cases, the garden is on the roof, but one is an elegant solarium, the other an untended roof of sod and earth. One is polished, the other primitive: one a villa, the other recalling Provençal or traditional Indian farmhouses. Stirling asks: If, in some way, style is "the crystallization of an attitude," then what might account for this apparently radical shift? He answers his question in social rather than aesthetic terms, characterizing the radical, revolutionary, avant-garde, and elitist nature of Garches in contrast to the homely and potentially ubiquitous Maisons Jaoul: Garches is (properly) "Utopian" in that it anticipated "the progress of twentieth-century emancipation." This achieved, it remained for the Jaoul houses to respond to the new "status quo," to be

"inhabited by any civilized family, urban or rural."[92] Two pages of photographs continue the contrast in materials and spatial organization, and directly anticipate the presentation of Stirling's own first housing project, the flats at Ham Common, a project almost literally based on the Jaoul houses, in the *Architectural Review*. The "monument, not to an age which is dead, but to a way of life which has not generally arrived" has been superseded by the livable, domestic house, constructed with traditional materials and in an informal aesthetic that is (literally and figuratively) approachable, presenting no singular and hierarchical front to the view. Reyner Banham, who would characterize this new style as the "New Brutalism" in an article published in the *Review* three months later, would similarly adopt the perambulating vision, the walk around the house, as a photographic technique for the publication of the Smithsons' school at Hunstanton.

The emergence of such a new perspective is confirmed by Stirling's second essay, "Ronchamp: Le Corbusier's Chapel and the Crisis of Rationalism." Building on the perception of a schism between Europe and the United States, as later epitomized by Rowe in his essay "The Chicago Frame,"[93] Stirling opens by contrasting the Lever House by Gordon Bunshaft of SOM and the Unité d'Habitation in Marseilles by Le Corbusier. Here the opposition is between technology and art, or the "functionalism" of industrial processes and products versus the "essentially humanist method of designing to a specific use."[94] Stirling holds that both versions were fundamentally challenged by the appearance of Ronchamp, which extends an architecture of pure space and form to an extreme "plasticity" that assumes the qualities of a "pure expression of poetry" and apparently abandons functional concerns.[95] Such plasticity can, he argues, be understood only by moving around the outside of the building; such movement is enforced by the route up the hill to the entrance, and emphasizes

the semblance of a work that is both unique and personal. Art here has conquered technique.

Yet Stirling mediates the apparent divorce between aesthetics and technology by a third term, one generally refused by Rowe, of "regional" and anonymous architecture. In Le Corbusier such architecture is represented by Mediterranean references, and in Stirling by his early interest in the neoclassical docks of Liverpool. As is well known, Stirling's Fifth Year thesis, developed under the tutelage of the young Rowe, concerned the planning of a central zone of community facilities for a new town, one building of which, the community center, was developed in detail. In his thesis, Stirling documents his research: his reading (in planning and architectural sources) and his travels—to the United States, France, and through Britain, in search of an architecture for "community." He visited the Unité d'Habitation in Marseilles and the Pavillon Suisse in Paris, both by Le Corbusier; Impington Village College, Cambridgeshire, by Gropius; the Peter Cooper Union in New York; and closer to home, the East Wavertree Association in Liverpool. The overall plan for Stirling's community center evidently takes its inspiration from Le Corbusier's plan for the Mundaneum of 1929, including the "regulating lines" that proportion the siting of individual buildings. The community center is equally, on the surface, Corbusian, as it is raised up on pilotis. Critics have noted this Corbusian influence on the basis of a commonly reproduced facade drawing, and have traced it both to Rowe and to Stirling's fellow student Robert Maxwell. In his text Stirling develops an aesthetic theory for pilotis buildings, under the heading "Aesthetics of Structural Form": "The natural outcome of placing a building on stilts is to make it hover, that is if the object on the posts has direction horizontal—outwards all round. To put a box on edge (that is with greater height than breadth) on stilts is to contradict its verticality, this form should

plunge into the ground like a spear. To place it on posts is against its direction. Only forms like a slab on its side, a table top, or a lying book, can be placed on posts and hover."[96] Here, Stirling, in words that not accidentally echo the speaking tone of Rowe, explains his decision to place his projected community center on pilotis, in a similar fashion to Le Corbusier at the Pavillon Suisse and Marseilles. This much is clear.

But amid a set of pages on which were glued small photographs of precedents and his own models, one page is missing a photo, which has been discovered in another folder: it is a picture of the Liverpool dock buildings, brick neoclassical structures raised up on Doric pilotis, and photographed from a perspective that is exactly similar to that of Stirling's design for his community center. Whether or not the "losing" of this photograph from the thesis book was deliberate, its first inclusion provides a clue to the foundational character of what we might call Stirling's double allegiance: to modernism on the one hand, but also to the functional roots of modernism, themselves forged out of traditional building modes—whether the Mediterranean of Le Corbusier or the more industrial forms of nineteenth-century Britain—and "classicism"—the "natural" style, so to speak, of rational architecture, whether in Le Corbusier's canon from the Parthenon to the Louvre, or in Loos's sense of a "Vitruvian" lore. In Stirling's case, the classical motifs of the British functional tradition allowed him to join these strands together, sustaining the thoroughly modern character of the thesis while giving it a classical/traditional root. In any event, the photo supports the notion that Stirling was interested in regional and regional-classical architecture from the outset and was not, as the myth would have it, drawn into it by the young Leon Krier.

From the outset, Stirling was Rowe's antidote to a more resigned Spenglerianism and nostalgic aristocratism. Indeed, Rowe's description of Stirling and Gowan's Leicester University Engineering Laboratories (1959–1963) is equal to Waugh's description of Brideshead: a marriage of the Castle of Udolpho in *Wuthering Heights* to Decimus Burton's greenhouses, with a nod to Soane's *lumière mystérieuse*.[97]

In this context, Stirling might be seen as consistently exploring all the dimensions of modernism, and pressing their implications into service as a source of invention that signaled a generalized acceptance of the modern, while simultaneously recognizing the traditional "classical" roots of locality—glass houses and docks in Britain, classical museums and historical events in Germany. Perhaps the most exemplary project demonstrating this complex dance of history and modernity, high classicism and vernacular, was the Staatsgalerie, Stuttgart. There, in a tour de force of the "collage" demanded by Rowe's historicism, Stirling transformed the precedent, Schinkel's Altes Museum, into a composition that combined a memory—the open ruin of the central "Pantheon"—with a modernity—the brightly colored steel and refractive glass lights—by means of a thoroughly traditional modern device, the *promenade architecturale*.[98] But although Rowe was able to accept the filiation between the Altes Museum and Le Corbusier's Palace of the Assembly at Chandigarh as "a conventional classical *parti* equipped with traditional *poché* and much the same *parti* distorted and made to present a competitive variety of local gestures—perhaps to be understood as compensations for traditional *poché*,"[99] he was unable, finally, to reconcile himself to Stuttgart. In the end, his overriding predilection for the classical, and by extension the classical modern, refused the absence that both Palladio's villas and Le Corbusier's Carches had in common: a facade. Without a face or facade, Rowe believed a building lost any frontality, and thus any "metaphorical plane of intersection between the eyes of the observor and what one might dare to call the *soul* of the building (its condition of internal animation)."[100] Stirling's use of the axonometric ("which will,

never, yield a prime face") acts to render obsolete the one-point perspective—the revelation of facade—that, for Rowe, is the key to transparency, layering, and the animation of walls.

Stirling's double adherence to both modernism and traditional classicism was, in retrospect, not at all opposed to the main thrust of modernism itself, as delineated in the 1920s and 1930s by architects like Le Corbusier and Marcel Breuer. For, as projected by Le Corbusier and others in the 1920s, the modern movement was a double-edged machine. On the one hand, it was committed to a modernism of form, embracing all the techniques of collage, montage, and formalism in general in the service of the ideology of the avant-garde, whereby a formal strategy should serve a new social order. On the other hand, such a modernism sought a "timeless" relationship with society, based on an abstraction of traditional, nonarchitectural construction: this was seen to go hand in hand with a universalization of the inherited principles of classicism, minus their representation in the classical orders. Thus, it was not seen as a contradiction that a villa might find its *parti* in a transformation of a Palladian type, its formal language in the evocation of Mediterranean peasant houses, and its iconography in motifs taken from ships, planes, and cars. If this double vision between the new and the eternal, modern and classic, technological and traditional was not entirely clear to its protagonists in the 1920s (despite the majority of Corbusier's writings in *Vers une architecture*), it was made crystal clear to Stirling's generation by, among others, the criticism of Rowe—in the essays on "The Mathematics of the Ideal Villa" and "Mannerism and Modern Architecture"—and by the interest in local versions of the classical and functional traditions espoused by Pevsner and his colleagues in the immediate postwar issues of the *Architectural Review*.

Manfredo Tafuri, *Teorie e storia dell'architettura* (1970), cover

4 RENAISSANCE MODERNISM

MANFREDO TAFURI

What is commonly meant by operative criticism *is an analysis of architecture (or of the arts in general) that has as its object, not an abstract survey, but rather the "projection" of a precise poetic direction, anticipated in its structures, and originating in programmatically finalized historical analyses.*
—Manfredo Tafuri, *Teorie e storia dell'architettura*

Since the publication of his *Teorie e storia dell'architettura* in 1968, the historian Manfredo Tafuri has been characterized as a stubborn opponent of what he called "operative" history and criticism—the kind that reached back into the past in order to justify and project present practice, and in so doing distorted the historical record. "It could be said," he wrote, "that operative criticism designs past history in order to project it towards the future"; "its verification does not rely in the abstraction of principles; it measures itself each time against the results it obtains."[1] Under this rubric Tafuri included the historians Max Dvořák, Emil Kaufmann, Sigfried Giedion, and Bruno Zevi; the critics Edoardo Persico and P. Morton Shand; and the architects Adolf Behne, Bruno Taut, Le Corbusier, and Ernst May. By implication, indeed, almost none of the historians and critics of the modern

movement escaped—from Pevsner to Banham, all were complicit in a mode of historical analysis that overtly or covertly pointed toward a present and future architecture. Such operative historiography was not a modern invention, however: Tafuri saw its origin in the Neoplatonic criticism of Bellori and, later, the polemical positions of academicians like François Blondel, philosophers like Marc-Antoine Laugier, and practicing architects like Pierre Patte. These critics would be followed by those historians who, like Viollet-le-Duc, James Fergusson, and Camillo Boito, "precipitate[d] the impatient demand for a new architecture in the second half of the nineteenth century."[2]

This apparently intransigent opposition to the architect-historian, or the critic-enthusiast, has been seen as a major rupture in Tafuri's work, coming at a time when, withdrawing from practice and active criticism, he joined the department of architecture at the University of Venice, to subject himself and his colleagues to a rigorous review of the history of modernity, an outcome of archival research, teamwork, and a fundamental revision of the commonplaces of modern movement ideology. But a closer reading of his prior excursions into historical research, carried on side by side with his work with planners and architects in various studies for the redevelopment of Rome and other cities, reveals a Tafuri who had not only established a mode of historical analysis before the move to Venice that exhibits many continuities with his subsequent studies, but whose training as an architect with a sensitivity to space and modulation, language and style, would continue to inform his historical reconstructions and interpretation.

Architect and Historian

Only an adequate historical preparation of the architectural student will be able to furnish the instruments to interpret correctly the phenomena of the past and to make them active elements of the present without easy transpositions and anachronistic returns.

—Manfredo Tafuri and Massimo Teodori, letter on behalf of the Association of Students and Architects' Association of Rome, 1960

In the last year of his studies at the University of Rome, responding to a debate in *Casabella* over the divide between education in architecture and the profession itself, Tafuri pointed to the rigid academicism of university education and what the editor of *Casabella*, Ernesto Rogers, had termed the "intellectual and moral poverty of Italian university life." Tafuri and fellow-student Massimo Teodori called for the renewal of the curriculum to include research and experiment in the urgent social, economic, and cultural questions that would "contribute to the vast problems of our country."[3] The curriculum they desired would coordinate between urban and architectural planning so that the division between urban and rural would be addressed, and it would end the "pseudo-specialization of single problems." In sum, they called for a return—or an advance—to the ideal unity of practice proposed by the modern movement but now fragmented and disintegrated. As for the question of "architectural expression," Tafuri and Teodori found that "the absence of ideological commitment and of democratic customs and the partialization of the problem leads architectural expression to fall back on the grammar of the styles, whether antique, modern, or revivalist, since exclusive interest in the formal aspects of the architectural problem

disregards the fact that such forms originally expressed the reality or the aspirations of a certain period."[1] Only deep historical research could, they argued, combat what, one year later, Pevsner would illustrate as a symptom of the "return to historicism," the neoliberty movement that Banham would criticize.

Thus Tafuri, both before and immediately after graduation, was working to demonstrate the value of an integrated approach to urban and architectural problems founded on meticulous historical research. His first published articles on urbanism included studies on the post-1871 Via Nazionale in Rome;[5] a comprehensive analysis (with Giorgio Piccinato) of the plan for central Helsinki, which set the postwar schemes in the framework of the historical development of the city after the eighteenth century;[6] and his summary of a survey of the baroque extension of the medieval town of San Gregorio da Sassola, near Rome, with its long axis leading to an oval piazza.[7] Giorgio Ciucci has noted the way in which these studies, illustrated with many of Tafuri's own drawings, were from the outset concerned with the history of large-scale planning and urban structure, in contrast with the increasing tendency of intellectuals like Paolo Portoghesi, and even Tafuri's own teacher and later collaborator, Ludovico Quaroni, to look at "minor" architecture as a paradigm of popular building.[8]

In his report on the baroque expansion of Sassola, Tafuri asserts that the geometrical coherence of the facades surrounding the piazza and the standardization of the housing types along the axis made this "an exceptional intervention in planning, among the most unified examples of seventeenth-century urbanism in Lazio," carried out with such "a rigor of conception that . . . it requires a critical interpretation which will easily demonstrate the vacuity of folkloristic interpretations or romantic attitudes unfortunately so common with regard to so much architecture considered 'minor,' that, without an understanding of its innermost causes, is all too often proposed as an example, degenerating in practice into deplorable architectural populisms."[9]

Here, what Jean-Louis Cohen characterized as "the resolving power of the architect's eye [that] is different from the historian's" allowed Tafuri to investigate the history of the "*material production* of cities and buildings" (my emphasis).[10] The meticulous drawings made for this survey, reconstituting the plan, the housing typologies, and the elevations of the baroque village, share an interest in the advent of modern urbanism, its ability to cut through a medieval fabric and establish its operative geometries. Tafuri similarly prepared drawings for his articles on Helsinki and Rome, and, most importantly for his developing historical method, for his survey of the Palazzo Duca di Santo Stefano and the Badia Vecchia, or "old" abbey, in Taormina, Sicily.[11] Unlike previous historians, who had proposed various dates for the Palazzo ranging from the time of the Norman invasion to the fifteenth century, Tafuri boldly argues that it was one of a series of military constructions completed by Frederick II between his return to Sicily in 1220 and his death in 1250. Tafuri interprets the Palazzo as one of a group of typologically linked buildings, "a more or less homogeneous group of monuments, an extremely unified spatial conception: both of interior space, unified by a particular figurative expression of the rib vault, and the external space, characterized by a volumetric syncretism and a rural definition of the masses."[12] Such a typological analysis, influenced by the formal method of Giulio Carlo Argan, then professor of art history at the University of Rome, led Tafuri to posit the Palazzo as a specific architectural event that in some way precipitated a crisis, or shift, in Sicilian architecture, generated by the geometrical regularity of its plan and massing that "was antithetical to the traditional architectural taste of Norman Sicily" with its "exuberant plasticity" and "the figurative values of its structural

frame." Added to this, Tafuri notes the decorative program of the Palazzo, which "inside and out, informed . . . a dualism between the two different spatial qualities, at the same time informing a not infrequent and highly expressive severity."[13] What would become a watchword of Tafuri's analytical approach—the uncovering of moments of "crisis" in history that ruptured seemingly fundamental continuities—is clearly developed here:

> *There exist, in the history of architecture and art, in general, particular moments or singular "cases" that assume a critical determining value for the comprehension of entire cultural cycles. We intend to speak of buildings, or of productions that are stylistically unified, that seem to mark a point of passage, a moment of crisis in a culture that has arrived at a high degree of maturity and that, precisely in its moment of maximum intensity, perceives in a confused way the need to go beyond itself, feels the need to verify its own historical coherence, thus giving rise to works that recapitulate in themselves, through their characteristics, the complementary horizons of diverse experiences, of cultures often distant despite their continuity.*[14]

Tafuri would bring this approach to bear on contemporary architecture in his 1963 monographic article on Ludovico Quaroni, published as a book later in the same year. In his work on Quaroni, Tafuri distinguishes between "continuity" and "crisis"—a question sharply posed in the immediate postwar period in Italy—in terms of an architect who "had recognized experimentalism as typical of the cultural adventures of these last sixteen years" and had shown himself "the most experimental," if not the "master" of experimental architecture:[15] "And in consequence he became a symbol of the tormented destiny of architecture in Italy, a paradigmatic reference, whether as one deeply immersed in an ambience that reflected his work with extreme accuracy, or as representative or not (and this was the case more frequently), initiator of approaches, of methods, of operative models."[16] Tafuri was conscious of not wishing to publish a monograph in "the form of a *medal*," prefering to see Quaroni as a microcosmic synthesis of Italian development in general; the methodological problem was thus one of mediating "between the history of a cultural cycle and the personal history of a protagonist."[17] In a passage that was, significantly, omitted from the published book, Tafuri begins the difficult negotiation, to be resolved partially in *Teorie e storia* five years later, between "critical history" and "operative criticism": he had tried, he explains, "to give to the research an operative dimension, not to the utopian end of annulling any distance between criticism and operation, but to establish this very criticism within an active process, in continual support of the operation, as its continuous verification and overcoming, and, in a certain way, in symbiosis with it."[18]

Tafuri's essay on Quaroni opens with a long quotation from Edoardo Persico's critical assessment of Italian art in 1930, and closes with a similarly long quotation from Giulio Carlo Argan's seminal 1957 article on architecture and ideology.[19] In this way Tafuri establishes his intellectual and architectural debts, clearing the way for a radically revised assessment of the field, historically and critically. Characteristic of his postwar moment, Quaroni the experimental eclectic is thus bracketed between Persico's disenchanted reflection on the reasons for Italian artistic decadence in the 1930s and its lack of a specific "European" historicity—its isolation from the great moral and political movements of modernism—and Argan's historical examination of the fate of the prewar avant-gardes, and their postwar effects. For Argan, the problem of the modern movement was not simply linguistic, "rational" or not, but an issue of ideology and politics.

The idea of rational architecture was in this context too simple, an attempt to solve a problem on a cultural rather than a political level. Thus, the question revolved around the definition of the "liberty" called for by the modern movement. In the epilogue to the Quaroni article, Tafuri quotes Argan: "Every liberty is always liberty *from* something; and the definition of that *from* is the most difficult moment in the road toward liberty. It is very probable that the architects of the first half of our century, in Europe and America, had defined that *from* imperfectly; and from that stems the fact that the architects of today, attempting to go beyond the experience of that architecture, overcome the limits or inhibitions that will prevent them from realizing its programs, including that which was the most authentic and vital of its moral impulses."[20] For Tafuri, Quaroni had at least recognized in his early neorealism the "cultural tragedy noted by Argan," attempting to readdress the question of architectural morality in its social context.

The question of ideology now firmly on his agenda, Tafuri began to examine historically a movement that, in its own imperfect histories from Giedion to Pevsner, had tended to repeat its own myths. In a review article of Mario Manieri-Elia's 1963 anthology of William Morris, Tafuri first took on the question of the "origin" of avant-garde ideology, locating it in the very moment where Pevsner had placed it some thirty years before.[21] The merit of Manieri-Elia's introduction and selection lay, Tafuri claims, in its reinsertion into the historical understanding of the modern movement of the ideological battles of nineteenth-century England, the contradictions between the economics of the class struggle and their cultural sublimation in the neomedieval "socialism" of a Ruskin or Morris. If the task of architectural criticism was at once to *anticipate*, testing operations and methodologies hitherto unexplored, and to "*verify the historical heredity of the modern movement*" through a "systematic reexploration of the rich and fundamental material that constitutes the theoretical foundation of the modern movement," then this anthology initiated an entire project.[22] Tafuri locates its importance not merely in the way in which Manieri-Elia revealed the complexity of such foundations, but in the anthology's reminding the present anti-ideological epoch of "the first great ideology of the modern movement" that held "the cause of art to be the cause of the people."[23]

Revising History

As Tafuri began his inquiry into the apparent roots of modernist ideology, he also started to push back modernity, first to the eighteenth century, with studies of the late baroque in Rome and the symbolism of the Enlightenment, and then to the period called "mannerist," a term that he questioned early on. In these articles, Tafuri moved away from the active, operative criticism of the Quaroni article and book, working simultaneously on the history of ideology and on the first of the meticulous "close readings" of architectural projects and their archival evidence that would be a continuous staple of his research. While in later essays he would bring together ideological critique and object analysis in a coherent narrative, in these preliminary studies the two domains are largely separate—although in the brief introductions and footnotes to his archival research there are indications of a future synthesis.

In a 1994 interview, Tafuri recalled the Michelangelo exhibition mounted in 1964 by Bruno Zevi and Paolo Portoghesi as confirming what had become a dominant theme of Italian historical-contemporary discourse since the publication of Argan's *L'architettura barocca in Italia* in 1956: the identification of the baroque, and especially of Michelangelo and Borromini, as "*the exemplum* for contemporary architecture."[24] But it is significant that the example Tafuri selected in a 1964 article to illustrate the fundamental idea of Roman "baroque"

was concerned not with the conventional "high" baroque of Bernini but with a late survival, and one designed not by an Italian but by an architect from Lisbon: the church of the Trinity in the Largo Goldoni, designed by Emanuel Rodriguez Dos Santos, a mid-eighteenth-century work representing a "particular type of continuity with seventeenth-century baroque."[25] In this *tardo barocco*, Tafuri detected the crisis that would ultimately lead to the "revolution" of the Enlightenment; its "fire," announced in the title of his article, was precipitated by both the urban context of the church and the exacerbation of architectural language as Dos Santos drew on two centuries of post-Renaissance revivals.[26] Using the project drawings in the State Archives, Tafuri reconstructed the process of design through its different stages, the method of composition and construction, from the preexisting condition of 1733 to Dos Santos's insertion of an oval church into the existing convent complex, which was then developed in three successively more elaborate versions. This represented Dos Santos's "methodological rationalization" of the interior of the church, a rationalization that was also apparent at the exterior, with its concave entrance facade set into the solid mass of the convent. For Tafuri, the "rationalization" in plan, allied with the "flexible" handling of the architectural language, was not so far from the "rationalism" of the later eighteenth century; the analytical "furor" and linguistic fantasy were realized through a "rational principle, where mathematics and geometry were no longer instruments of control, but rather elements inherent to the imagination of [the architect's] work."[27] And in a significant nod to Emil Kaufmann, he suggests: "Whence, if you wish, if also lightly—but with enormous caution—the initiation of that investigation based on the isolation of the elements, both spatial and structural, that Kaufmann, perhaps oversimplifying, wished to see take the form of *welding together* of rule and ideation in the historical meaning of his *revolutionary architects*."[28]

A cautious reader of Kaufmann, but appreciative of his attempts to draw larger conclusions from the piecemeal evidence under study and of his pioneering work in the late eighteenth-century archive, Tafuri was to "correct" Kaufmann's theses over the next few years, first in a 1964 article on Enlightenment symbolism, and then in a ground-breaking study in 1969 of the linguistic foundations of the late seventeenth-century theories of Claude Perrault and Christopher Wren, in which he examines the confrontation between architectural values and the philosophical investigation of linguistic conventions as a function of Port Royal linguistics and the Lockean theory of knowledge.[29] More importantly, in an advance on Kaufmann's arguments for autonomy, Tafuri traced the ascendency of geometry to Wren's theories of the two foundations of beauty—natural or geometrical, and customary or social taste. Kaufmann's proposition of a "geometrical" and abstract Enlightenment was undermined, Tafuri believed, by the construction of geometry acting not as a unifying element but as the initial, and fatal, stage in the development of a stylistic eclecticism, manipulated according to taste, and instrumental in the social and cultural establishment of institutions as historical signifiers.

However, Tafuri's most significant early foray into the revision of architectural history was his investigation of mannerism, or rather—given his later refusal of the term (as well as his rejection of the book he had published on the topic in 1966)—the specificity of sixteenth-century experiments in architectural language. Again these were approached, not from a rehearsal of previous theories of mannerism from Pevsner and Wittkower to Blunt, but directly, through a comparative reading of the treatises and an equally close reading of the work of Vignola.[30] The methodological problems associated with analyzing a self-conscious and critical art were formidable; their "solution" led to Tafuri's assumption that self-criticality is a modern characteristic par excellence:

For an artistic culture as intensely critical as that of mannerism, the problem of the relations between operative practice and theoretical speculation cannot but assume problematic aspects of the highest kind. When art, in fact, initiates itself as a problem for itself, when through an organization of form it wishes to achieve autocritical excavations, when, finally, the process of configuration tends to substitute itself for the critical process, it is inevitable that theory finds itself in a "difficult" if not ambiguous situation. And this is the paradoxical event that develops over the course of the great stage of mannerism.[31]

Such a characterization of "mannerism" as a critical, self-reflective culture would, over the next decades, develop into a more totalizing thesis that would parallel Tafuri's observation on the contemporary condition which opened his last book, *Interpreting the Renaissance*: "For some time now the culture of architecture, reflecting on itself, has sensed the presence of an original sin that demands exculpation."[32]

The Eclipse and Rise of History

Despite Tafuri's close relations with and critical assessments of contemporary architects and planners, the tension between his critical review of historical evidence and his critical support of contemporary practice inevitably developed into an intellectual confrontation, if not self-critique. The publication in 1968 of *Teorie e storia dell'architettura* has been seen as a major rupture with his previous thought, and, largely as a result of the vagaries of translation, this book has been taken as a starting point for the "real" Tafuri. Yet a reading of the earlier essays and books, and their sources, demonstrates more of a continuity than a crisis. Tafuri's omnivorous capacity to work on the entire period from the fifteenth century to the present continued unabated until his death, and his patient research in the archives continued to reveal aspects of the Venetian, Mantuan, and Roman renaissances side by side with analyses of the twentieth-century avant-gardes and neo-avant-gardes, their theories, projects, and urban plans.

But *Teorie e storia* was in one respect a cathartic work. Summing up the work of the previous ten years; reassessing his contemporaries, both historians and architects; reviewing the nature of modernity, and of the more ideological "modernism," it marked a moment of comprehensive articulation of half-hidden thoughts. It was also, although no doubt unconsciously, a programmatic setting-out of work for the future, one that would be gradually filled in by collective and individual research in the IUAV and by Tafuri himself over the next twenty-eight years.

In this context, it was not accidental that Tafuri began his discussion of architectural history and its relations to theory and criticism with the two events that might be posited as turning points for Anglo-American thought in the 1960s: Pevsner's 1961 lecture "Modern Architecture and the Historian, or the Return of Historicism," and its transatlantic sequel, the AIA-ACSA Teacher Seminar at the Cranbrook Academy of Art in Michigan three years later. At the Cranbrook symposium the issues latent in Pevsner's lecture came to the forefront in the confrontation between Reyner Banham and Bruno Zevi.[33] Zevi, the newly appointed chair of architectural history at the reformed University School of Architecture in Rome following the student sit-ins of 1963, struck out passionately in favor of "history as a method of teaching architecture," speaking of the techniques of abstraction, spatial analysis, model-making, and quasi-laboratory "research" that would take teaching history out of the realm of the styles and put it into the service of contemporary design as an instrument of linguistic freedom.[34] Reyner Banham was equally outspoken, accusing Colin Rowe of holding on to an academic/Beaux-Arts idea of theory and claiming that the entire category "theory of

architecture" had become "vacuous, empty of formal content and devices." He traced this to the "absence of those particular reasons which cause buildings to be created and cause buildings to be the precise way they are."[35]

Those "reasons" were, for Banham as for John Summerson earlier, summed up in the general word "program." Banham's argument could be seen as the last-ditch appeal of an old-guard modernist, as was that of Pevsner, were it not for the example Banham cited. This took the form of an elaboration of a quotation from the philosopher of aesthetics Susanne Langer: "'a virtual environment, the creative space of architecture, is a symbol of functional existence.' This does not mean, however, that signs of important activities, hooks for implements, convenient benches, well-planned doors, play any part in its significance. In that thought's assumption lies the error of functionalism. Symbolic expression is something miles removed from provident planning or good arrangement."[36] For Banham, symbolic expression—especially in "pop" environments—was an integral part of what he understood as architecture. He took Langer to be referring to a kind of "Shaker" or "Norwegian" environment, and he outlined the plan of a Norwegian farmhouse, containing both ritual and functional elements. He especially stressed a tree-branch that served as a hanger for the cooking pot over the hearth, an "element of random geometry" that intruded into the otherwise rigorously geometrical interior. He ended with a "confession" that Saarinen's TWA Terminal at Idlewild (now Kennedy) Airport in New York, which had seemed to him on first sight a "grotesque" "piece of formalism," had emerged through experience and use as far superior to the endless corridors of O'Hare International, Chicago; and from here he admitted to a final acceptance of Le Corbusier's Ronchamp.[37]

For Tafuri, the debates at these events, which resumed the various strains of and between contemporary historical interpretation, all in some way "operative" in his terms, pointed to the fundamental difficulties of writing the history of "the radically *anti-historical* phenomenon" that is modern architecture.[38] Participants at the AIA conference, including Sibyl Moholy-Nagy, Bruno Zevi, and Banham, all agreed, from their very different standpoints, that the historical revivalism emerging after the collapse of the International Style—and practiced by Saarinen, Johnson, Rudolph, Kahn, Johansen, Yamasaki, and even Gropius—was a slight affair, a superficial resurrection of the styles. But Tafuri believed this was too simple a response: the architects' apparently "historical" answer to supposed "anti-historical" international modernism seemed to him to obscure the fundamentally antihistorical nature of the "new historicism"; the fundamental problem was the very antihistoricism attributed to the avant-gardes of the 1920s in the first place. Tafuri argues in *Teorie e storia*, "It would be better to trace the process of development synthetically, returning to its true origin: to the very revolution of modern art in the work of the Tuscan humanists of the fifteenth century."[39] Here, at the outset of Tafuri's career as a critical historian, was introduced the premise that would be the foundation of his modern history: that the real break came not with the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, nor with the industrial and political revolutions of the nineteenth, nor again with the avant-garde revolts of the early twentieth, but rather with those two emblematic figures of rupture with the medieval past, Brunelleschi and Alberti. Between this opening salvo in *Teorie e storia* and his last book, *Ricerca del Rinascimento*, the consistent focus of Tafuri's inquiry was to elucidate the complex filiations and deformations of an avant-garde tradition that was, in his terms, at least six centuries old.

Tafuri's strategy in returning the origins of the modern to the Renaissance was both historical, in the sense that only such a move would allow for an open reinterpretation of both the Renaissance

and the modern, and polemical, in that it directly countered the critique of the 1960s "return to historicism" itself. For how could Pevsner advance all the authenticity of avant-garde modernism against historicism if modernism could be seen in the context of a fundamental "de-historicization" (*de-storicizzazione*) of architecture beginning with Brunelleschi?[40] In this strategy Brunelleschi and Alberti played, according to Tafuri, a paradigmatic role, the one breaking radically with the medieval past in order to construct a "linguistic code and a symbolic system" based on the ancients, the other attempting to construct the rational syntactic form of this system literally to "actualize" historical values. In his characterization of this revolution, Tafuri presciently (and deliberately) formulates it in such a way as to provide a radical critique of 1960s historiography, enmeshed as it was in the (false) dialectic of "historicism" versus "modernism":

> *Between a lexicon, such as that of Brunelleschi, based on the fragments of the classical world . . . and the philological recuperation of that classicism (as that documented by the* De re aedificatoria *of Alberti, the studies of Giuliano da Sangallo, and the complex activity of Bramante in Rome), there exists the same distance as that between those who deploy the evocative power of* citations *and* allusions *to substantiate an independent discourse in order to* construct *a new reality and those who are absorbed in recuperating the exact significance of these citations to cover the provocative delusions of reality, in order to revoke the structures of a heroic past in their concreteness, contrasting them polemically to contemporary hypocrisies, to defend an artistic revolution that feels itself in danger, locking it up in the ivory tower of a historicism that has become an end in itself.*[41]

For Brunelleschi, Tafuri argues, the invention of a new symbolic system and its investment in autonomous objects laid open the medieval town as a site for intervention, architectural structures inserted as critical ruptures with the past and shifters of significance for the present. By contrast, Tafuri casts Alberti as a "restorer" seeking to reinvent the code of antique unity, who nevertheless compromises with the preexisting system. In this way Tafuri characterizes the double allegiance of the Renaissance as caught between two potentially opposed strategies that will resonate throughout the next three centuries:

> *On the one hand, the will to establish historically an* anti-historical code, *like the one of the revived classicism; on the other, the temptation—repressed, but continuously cropping up—to compromise and dirty one's hands with the very medieval and Gothic languages disempowered by the entire of classicism, in its apodictic declarations, inasmuch as they were guilty of betraying the givens of the* true *and* beautiful *of the* Antique, *elected to a* second and truer Nature.[42]

The "ghost of the Middle Ages," whether posturing as repressed history or possible revival, haunts the experimentalism of mannerism and the "bricolage" of Borromini, to the point that Tafuri can see the eclecticism of the late baroque, and the intrusion of the non- and anticlassical into the classical, as "a prophetic anticipation of the attitudes typical of the twentieth-century avant-gardes: the *collage* of *memories* extrapolated from their historical contexts [that] finds structure and a semantic location within the frame of an organic space autonomously constructed."[43] Hence the importance of Perrault, and even more of Wren, as Tafuri sought a "natural" geometric unifier for the eclecticism of his historico-political languages.

In this analysis, paradoxically enough, it is the Enlightenment, site of Kaufmann's abstract modernism, that prepared architecture for the dominance of historicism. Once separated from any remaining vestige of an "organic" classicism, and supported by the archaeological recovery of a "real" history, architecture is now open to the play of historical revival as having an absolute value in itself, calibrated according to the demands of a new civic order. Marx's celebrated analysis of the role of history in revolution is enacted here in architectural terms: the history that "weighs like an alp upon the brain of the living" now "glorified new struggles," enacting "a new historic scene in such time-honored disguise and with such borrowed language."[44] Tafuri separates architecture from history and offers two solutions: the one exemplified by the "eclecticism" of Piranesi; the other by the antisymbolism of a Durand. In both, the unity of the "classical" object is broken, either through a rejection of symbolism in favor of a desperate clinging to the signs of a lost past, or through the deliberate ignoring of history altogether in favor of a combinatorial, compositional logic based on geometry. In this way, finally, Tafuri joins the "eclipse of the *object*" to Hegel's declaration of the "death of art," and thence to the "crisis of historicity" manifested by modernism, as in the work of Mondrian, van Doesburg, Dada, and Sant'Elia.

Tafuri's semantic analysis of the contradictions inherent in historical revival since the Renaissance, setting the roots of modernist antihistoricism in the first attempts to authorize the "invention" of a new antiquity, thus formed the foundation of his research into the Renaissance, allowing him the freedom to investigate its crises and continuities as if it were an integral and, more importantly, foundational moment in the history of the avant-gardes. Against the (then) contemporary preoccupation with the post-Giedion understanding of architecture as space, Tafuri took note of the various structuralisms, from semiology

to information science, that were proposing a more "scientific" observation of the architectural object. Opposing a history that, in its very narrative forms, supported a supposedly organic idea of progress and sustained "modernity" in architecture in a seamless conjunction with the ideology of capitalist development as a whole, Tafuri saw in semiology, at least, a means of cutting through the ceaseless flow of criticism in the service of architecture and of producing the outlines of an "operative" criticism that would reendow history with an objective and materialist basis. And while he was to react equally strongly against the subsequent mythologies of "architecture *as* language," the terms of semiological critique were present in his work to the end. Indeed, in *Teorie e storia* the issue of language, applied to the theorization and interpretation of architecture itself, emerges as a leitmotif of Tafuri's analysis as a "scientific" counter to either the neo-Kantian formalist tradition that culminated in Wölfflin, or the neo-Hegelian tradition that culminated in Riegl.

Tafuri found support on this point in Sergio Bettini's analysis of architectural history as semantic criticism. Bettini, in an article published in 1958 in the second volume of *Zodiac*, titled "Semantic Criticism and the Historical Continuity of European Architecture," had written: "Whoever exercises the practice of criticism of art or architecture sooner or later recognizes the opportunity for an attentive semantic control of the language adopted: that is to say, of the instrument which serves them to practice their own criticism."[45] Tafuri cites this article in *Teorie e storia* to confirm his belief that architecture might in fact be a language, subject to its laws and its critical examination: "Art is not representation but it is, itself, the formal structure of history. This is true even if we assume art is a language: we can then say that the language of art is the morphology of culture."[46] He also cites Bettini's introduction to the prescient 1953 Italian translation of Alois Riegl's *Spätrömische Kunstindustrie* (Late Roman art industry), in which

Bettini suggests that the "language" of architecture is not simply a symbolic or iconographic system in the terms of Panofsky, but rather a language in its own right; and more importantly, is, as far as history was concerned, *the* language:

> *In Bettini's fundamental introduction to the Italian translation (1953) of Riegl's* Spätrömische Kunstindustrie, *the structuralist tone takes on the aspect of a precisely calibrated critical method. Bettini (and not only in this essay) demonstrates his assimilation—almost alone in the Italian cultural scene of this time—of the contributions of the Anglo-Saxon semantic schools, from Tarski to Carnap, and to the* Meaning of Meaning *by Ogden and Richards, but has explicitly recognized the linguistic character of artistic production, linking the problem of criticism to what he terms the "paradox of metalanguage."*[44]

That language is the internal explication of architecture, and that this language is in turn "history" as construed by society, might well be seen as the intellectual premise of Tafuri's formal analysis of architecture for the rest of his career.

But *Teorie e storia*—the combined result of having punctured the balloon of "history in the service of architecture" and the mediated assessments of the ruling "scientific" methodologies—while preparing the ground for Tafuri's preferred "instrumental criticism," does not necessarily provide a clear picture of what a nonoperative history might be, in either narrative or subjective terms. Indeed, the obvious influence of structuralist and poststructuralist theories on history seems, for Tafuri, to lead to a kind of stasis where the rejection of the overarching narrative leaves no narrative in its place. Caught, like Nietzsche, in the endless relays between "monumental," "antiquarian," and "critical" history, Tafuri embraces the third, but at the same time inherits its dangers—as Nietzsche put it, while bringing the past "before the tribunal [of history], scrupulously examining it and finally condemning it," unmitigated critique "takes the knife to its roots."[45] The gradual resolution of this tension, or rather its empirical and conceptual testing over many years and in different contexts at diverse scales, is the subsequent history of Tafuri's own practice.

Ideology and Utopia

Just as it is not possible to establish a Political Economy based on class, but only a class critique of Political Economy, so it is not given to "anticipate" a class architecture (an architecture "for a liberated society") but only possible to introduce a class critique of architecture. *Nothing beyond this from the—sectarian and partial—point of view of a rigorous Marxism.*
—Manfredo Tafuri, *Teorie e storia*

In the late 1960s and 1970s in Italy and from the 1980s in the United States, it became commonplace to believe that Tafuri was a Marxist, and to see his contributions to history as a model of a rigorous "Marxist" historiography, albeit of the special kind understood as Marxist in post-1968 Italy. This view of Tafuri emerged most strongly after the publication of his seminal essay "Per una critica dell'ideologia architettonica" in 1969, and was reinforced in his preface to the second edition of *Teorie e storia* a year later.[19] Through his implied reference to Marx's *Critique of Political Economy* and *German Ideology* in the essay's title, Tafuri evidently wished to reinforce his claims for a "scientific" and therefore critical history as against the operative criticism

that tended to support architectural production, and further to encourage the idea of a critical, or even revolutionary, architecture. As he remarks, "Any attempt to overthrow the institution [of architecture], the discipline, leading us into the most heightened negations or the most paradoxical ironies—as the case of Dada and surrealism teaches us—is destined to see itself overturned into a positive contribution, into a 'constructive' avant-garde, into an ideology all the more positive because all the more dramatically critical and self-critical."[50] But in this passage we can understand architecture not simply as a case of the design of buildings or the planning of towns, but rather as an institution. And as an institution, as a "discipline," subject to all the regulations of bourgeois society and the capitalist state, "architecture" is a fundamentally modern phenomenon, one born with, and in support of, all the advanced institutions of developed capitalist societies. In this sense, "architecture"—the totality of structures, systems, ideas, practices that are bound up with buildings designed and built by architects—is an ideology. It takes its place beside law, religion, and the rest as the mystification of material practice. In this assertion, as he wrote in the preface to the English translation of *Progetto e utopia* in 1976, Tafuri thought he would have avoided subsequent claims that he had produced "an apocalyptic prophecy, 'the expression of renunciation,'" leading to "the ultimate pronouncement of the 'death of architecture.'"[51] In his mind, from the Marxist position of the journal *Contropiano*, all this was evident. But his readers in architecture, separating his essay from this context, simply found him to be "against" architecture purely and simply.

Tafuri also made it clear that as a work of ideological criticism, "Per una critica dell'ideologia architettonica" had to be placed within the wider context of political theory in Marxist thought from 1960 to 1969: the studies of Fortini (*Verifica dei poteri*), Tronti, and above all of his friends Alberto Asor Rosa and Massimo Cacciari. From the standpoint of 1969, then, Tafuri was proclaiming not a death of architecture but a conscious recognition of "architecture's" role as an ideology, and with this a recognition of the fading of this role, its developing uselessness for capitalist development. What interested him was not any revolutionary role for a new or radical architecture, but "the precise identification of those tasks which capitalist development [had] taken away from architecture." The drama of contemporary architecture, rather than being located in its search for a new ideological, reformist, utopian, or developmental role, lay in its "sublime uselessness," leading to its recourse in "form without utopia." For this uselessness Tafuri had no nostalgia or regret ("because when the role of a discipline ceases to exist, to try and stop the course of things is only regressive utopia, and of the worst kind"), nor was he making a prophecy ("because the process is actually taking place daily before our very eyes"). And neither capitalism nor any existing postrevolutionary society had yet found a replacement—an "institutionally defined role for the technicians charged with building activity."[52]

What Tafuri is calling "architectural ideology" is that definition of architecture, current since at least the late eighteenth century, as something above and beyond mere building. The philosopher d'Alembert had said it in his introduction to the *Encyclopédie*: "Architecture in the eyes of a philosopher is but the embellished mask of one of man's greatest needs."[53] That is, in the eyes of a philosopher dedicated to the eradication of masks and embellishment in favor of naked truth, architecture is a rhetorical cover for what later architects were to call function. Ruskin repeated this definition in a more idealist sense when he distinguished between building as shelter and a work of architecture that raised the soul; or Pevsner in his notorious "Lincoln cathedral is a work of architecture; a bicycle shed is a building."[54] Hence the "ideology" of architecture is precisely what distinguishes itself from its

own material practice. In this sense, Tafuri logically calls for a scientific analysis of building practices as a preliminary for establishing what might emerge as a role for the "technicians of building activity" after the revolution. The role of the historian is then to trace the complicated evolution of architecture as an ideology from the Renaissance on, in Tafuri's time frame, and to demonstrate all the contradictions embodied and exploded along the way. And first in line were the contradictions of so-called radical or avant-garde experiments to invent "other" architectures, which had turned so quickly into regressive utopias or new forms of ideology.

Anxiety

To dispel anxiety by understanding and internalizing its causes: this would seem to be one of the principal ethical imperatives of bourgeois art.
—Manfredo Tafuri, "Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology"

The words "anxiety" and "anguish" recur throughout Tafuri's writing. "To dispel anxiety by understanding and internalizing its causes," ran the opening lines of *Progetto e utopia* as of the essay "Per una critica dell'ideologia architettonica": "this would seem to be one of the principal ethical imperatives of bourgeois art" (*Allontare l'angoscia comprendendone e introiettandone le cause: questo sembra essere uno dei principali imperativi etivi dell'arte borghese*).[55] Later in the same essay, Tafuri, as if citing himself in quotation marks, will use the same phrase—"dispelling anxiety by internalizing its causes"—with reference to Le Corbusier's Obus project for Algiers.[56] The same preoccupation reappears in mature form in the foreword to *Ricerca del Rinascimento*: "The theoretical anxieties [*ansie*] of the nineteenth century already expressed a sort of anguish [*angoscia*] when confronted by an architecture that was becoming increasingly self-referential." Tafuri asks: "If the origins of the aforementioned 'anguish' [*agonia*] are to be located in the humanist affirmation of the subject, how can one hope for a recovery based on subjective volition?"[57]

What is being registered in these quasi-nostalgic terms—anguish and decline—is, according to Tafuri, no less than the crumbling of the a priori foundations of referentiality seen to have been established so firmly in Renaissance and baroque art—the era of the "triumph of linear perspective" and "naturalism." In his argument, the "anguish" already being exhibited during the nineteenth century was seen by the twentieth-century avant-gardes as a form of liberation, even as their opponents were casting the notion of "loss" and "decline" in terms that, as Tafuri remarks, seemed to register the "aesthetic equivalent of a homicide or a mass catastrophe."[58] Yet, considered from the point of view of a historian rather than that of a nostalgic memory artist, such terms would seem to "exhibit a surfeit of meaning." Instead, Tafuri suggests that one replace the term "anguish" with the more neutral term "accomplishment": thus the "accomplishment" of the "referent"—the very triumph of the so-called Renaissance would also be accompanied by its successive displacement. Modernism, then, would be a displacement of referentiality, rather than a loss.

In this way, Tafuri counters the "foundationalist nostalgia" common to modernists—who would celebrate this "loss"—and their opponents. The commonplaces of postmodernism—such as the "compulsion to quote" that results in the fragmentation of language—are seen to be only part of a more general reflection on the "eclipse" of totality and plenitude that was the object also of high modernism: and thus Le Corbusier's and Mies van der Rohe's "interrogations of the very principles of European

rationality" join James Stirling's "ironies" as symptoms of the same "displacement" of the referent.[59]

Against this "horizon," Tafuri situates his researches on the Renaissance: "Formulated in the space where the present finds its problems, they attempt a dialogue with the 'era of representation.'"[60] But, in distinction to former historians of the Renaissance from Wölfflin to Wittkower, themselves largely taken up with the myth of "decline" and "eclipse," of "anguish" and "loss," Tafuri offers no preconceived version of this "representation" nor of the "Renaissance" that previously characterized this period. What he does offer is a series of investigations of considerable narrative complexity into the debates that swirled around referentiality at the moment when they were not yet conscious of being debates in a postconceived "humanism" or "perspectivity." Their politics and aesthetics are presented, so to speak, in the raw; their shifts and turns of individual and group position analyzed in terms that at once join them to economic, opportunistic, and intellectual power struggles. History in this sense, and compared to the grand universal historicisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, is seen as a "weak power" that, rather than resolving the problems of the past in a momentarily satisfying solution, leaves them "living and unresolved, unsettling our present."[61]

This is the question Tafuri addresses in the foreword to the *Ricerca*, where the question of "perspectivity" becomes activated not simply as an analogue to the historian's method, but in terms of its own history: precisely, the relations between perspective theory and practice and the question of referentiality. Tafuri's meditation on perspective is set in a dense, two-page summary of the "project" that had marked his entire career, which he attempts to bind to the contents of the *Ricerca*. On the surface, it is at once a diagnosis of contemporary and modern architectural culture and a hypothesis for its historical reformulation. For Tafuri, in 1992 as in 1968, the problem is signaled by a "culture of architecture reflecting on itself," an internalized discourse of meaning that continuously identifies a "crisis" but fails to comprehend the way in which the nature of this so-called crisis is linked to culture as a whole, and equally refuses to acknowledge the unoriginality of its call to arms. But where in 1968 this crisis was characterized under the semiotic sign of "meaning," in 1992 the question is raised in the context of the postmodern (what Tafuri calls the "hypermodern"). Tafuri argues that "the current theoretical *habitus* does not differ considerably from others that have determined twentieth-century aesthetic choices; in fact, it reproduces the familiar compulsion to overturn the dominant order"[62]—replicating the sense of crisis felt by the historical avant-gardes as a function of a break from history itself, accompanied by a critical awareness of an "anguish of the referent," or, in Walter Benjamin's terms, the "decline of the aura."

Certainly in the *Ricerca* Tafuri seems to "accomplish" what he had set out as the historical project in *Teorie e storia*—to counter the avant-garde "myth is against history" (as Barthes put it) with history against myth, to "rescue historicity from the web of the past," where modernism "from the very beginning, in the European avant-garde movements [presented itself] as a true challenge to history."[63] Uniting Dada and de Stijl, Kahn and Rietveld, under this antihistorical umbrella—all movements that attempted to substitute the "myth of Order" for historicism—Tafuri acted to reinstate history, to resist the "eclipse" of history that had been the dream of modernism. In this way the studies in *Venezia e il Rinascimento* (1985) and *Ricerca del Rinascimento* work toward a redefinition of architectural history on multiple levels: interdisciplinary and interinstitutional, they study "the nodes where events, times, and mentalities intersect," calibrating the ways in which "political decisions, religious anxieties, the arts and sciences, and the *res aedificatoria* become irrevocably interwoven."[64]

Disenchantments

Total disenchantment produces great historians. And Manfredo Tafuri was a great historian of this kind.
—Alberto Asor Rosa, "Critique of Ideology and Historical Practice"

Despite Tafuri's apparent accomplishment of his historical project, embedded in his examination of the notion of "loss" and consequent "anguish" is a sense that the historian too is implicated: that the "loss" spoken of with such rhetorical surfeit also haunts him in such a way as to raise difficult questions of interpretation and historical distance. While in his early works, such as *Progetto e utopia*, Tafuri makes it clear that the "loss" or "disenchantment" he speaks of is one construed by bourgeois ideology, and stems from what social scientists like Max Weber understood as the *Wertfreiheit* or value-free liberal ideal, in the foreword to *Ricerca* his historical perspective has shifted somewhat. In 1968, to take one example, Tafuri claimed Walter Benjamin, in his recognition of Baudelaire's experience of the city as "shock," to be a companion in the struggle to define the historical parameters of modernity and the modernism that was its representation. In 1992, however, Tafuri groups Benjamin with other nostalgic bourgeois theorists of loss, including some who seem ideologically opposed. Thus in his discussion of the myths that have surrounded modernity and its "decline," Tafuri states: "Fortunately for us, the reception of specific moments in the history of modern criticism permits a 'bracketing off' of the ideological sign originally stamped on them. For example, it is difficult indeed not to sense the close affinity between Sedlmayr's intuition of loss, Walter Benjamin's concept of the 'decline of the aura,' and Robert Klein's reflections on the 'anguish of the referent.'"[65] Such a "bracketing off" certainly allows Tafuri to construe a more generalized version of the modern anguish complex, even to trace it to the Renaissance; but in a deliberately shocking way, it also ignores historical distinctions of an "ideological" nature that are not as simple as the quoted "slogans" imply. In relation to the received history of political ideas, Tafuri's "bracketing" begs the question: Is it indeed possible, or intellectually responsible, to bring together, except on a purely linguistic level, the nostalgic despair of a National Socialist ideologue, the resigned modernism of a German Jewish Marxist, and the phenomenological disquiet of a Romanian Jewish exile in Paris—the first, a melancholic survivor but unrepentant conservative; the second, an exile on the run from the Nazis; the third, a survivor of, in his own words, "compulsory labor for Jews," and a refugee from dictatorship after the war? Or, for that matter, can one join the sense of Sedlmayr's "loss of center," which is tied to a prognosis of doom, to that of Benjamin's loss of "aura," tied to a materialist understanding of the media and its political potential, and that of Klein's perspective theory, which traced the "agony" of the disappearance of reference (in the emergence of abstract art) to the problems raised by a subject with a fixed point of view? It is interesting in this regard that Tafuri himself, perhaps for reasons of rhetorical symmetry, translates what Klein actually calls an "agony of reference" into an "anguish of the referent," thus shifting the entire argument from the subjective process of referentiality to the object of signification and historically reifying what in Klein's terms was a living process activated by human subjects.

The pervasive sense of anguish that Tafuri descries in modern bourgeois society is, as he makes explicit, intimately connected to what Max Weber termed the "disenchantment" of the world as experienced by the modern intellectual. Pervasive throughout all of Weber's writing, this theme was summarized succinctly in

his late lecture "Wissenschaft als Beruf" (Science as a vocation) of 1919: "The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and, above all, by the 'disenchantment of the world'" (*Entzauberung der Welt*).[66] This disenchantment—a consequence of the stripping away of the "mythical" in the modern, a mythical that for Weber gave the human condition a "genuine plasticity"—was, as Tafuri illustrates in the third chapter of *Architecture and Utopia*, a logical result of the triumph of rationalism, the "freedom from values" inherent in the acceptance of science as the dominating force in the world. Tafuri's historical project, on this level, was to reveal this disenchantment for what it was, and to see, with all the veils of ideology stripped away, the various avant-garde attempts to mirror this crisis of values as so many buffers against the anguish and shock of their disappearance. "Disenchantment," whether Weberian or later, thence became a leitmotif of Tafuri's analysis. To take only one example from *Theories and History*, Tafuri labels the late work of Paul Rudolph as disenchanted: "the 'signs' used by Rudolph . . . [are] disquieting for their skeptical disenchantment."[67] Tafuri here seems to be echoing Weber's observation that "disenchantment" had produced a situation, for better or for worse, where "our greatest art is intimate rather than monumental," leading to Weber's conclusion that "if we try to compel and to 'invent' a monumental sense of art, lamentable monstrosities will be produced."[68]

But the "disenchantment"—literally "demythologization"—described by Tafuri seems also to have had deeper roots: if, as Weber remarked, a world without myths was the common inheritance of postrationalist intellectuals, Tafuri himself can hardly be exempted from the group. As he revealed in an interview with Françoise Véry in 1976, reflecting on the writing of *Theories and History*, he was far from having a critical distance from his own version of disenchantment. At the time of writing, he states: "We were locked in a castle under a spell, the keys were lost, in a linguistic maze—the more we looked for a direction, the more we entered magic halls full of tortured dreams. . . . Once you entered the maze, Ariadne's thread was broken, and to go on from there you simply had to ignore Ariadne's thread."[69] The book was written in the space of what Tafuri called "magic halls full of tortured dreams," where Sade and Piranesi conjured their visions against those of Enlightenment reason, in a contemporary context that seemed to echo that of the late eighteenth century—Tafuri cites Godard's *Une femme est une femme* and Peter Weiss's *Marat/Sade*. Indeed, disenchantment was, as Asor Rosa points out, a fundamental characteristic of Tafuri's stance as historian:

> *Once the phase of the "critique of architectural ideology" came to a close, this left behind in the mind of its theoretician a sense of total disenchantment, as if he had become a total stranger from the mechanism of values, procedures and connivance embedded in any discipline with an academic status. . . . Leaving the "critique of ideology" behind did not mean returning to architectural ideology, not even to the discipline closer to architectural historiography: rather it meant understanding that in this field too one should come as close as possible to the certainty of the datum, resisting both for the present and the past, all ideological seductions. . . . There is a link between the . . . inexorable demolition of all present and past structures of self-illusion and self-mystification—and the full revelation of a . . . political vocation. . . . Once no veil any longer exists, all that remains is to study, understand, and represent the mechanisms of reality [with the instruments of objective inquiries]. Total disenchantment produces great historians.*[70]

The historian of disenchantment, himself disenchanted, thus is enabled to enter the disenchanted realm of history without ideology. Perhaps it is here, imbricated with the stance of the historian without ideology, that Tafuri finds himself on the interior of a discourse for which he stands not only as its historian but as its exemplary figure. In this sense, within the "bracketing" of the anguish and loss of a Sedlmayr, a Benjamin, and a Klein, and despite his understandable desire to restrain the "surfeit" of meaning they disclose, might we not now include Tafuri himself?

And by the time Tafuri wrote the foreword to *Ricerca* in 1992, the historian of disenchantment was sufficiently identified with the disenchanted historian to enable these strange combinations, the result, it seems, of Tafuri's sense of a more urgent and general purpose that called for a consideration of the century's disenchantment "as a whole," and no longer concerned with small discrimination on behalf of a "good" or a "bad" kind. Thus Benjamin is paired with his apparent opposite, Sedlmayr, and Tafuri is enabled to push back to the Renaissance what had seemed to him in the first place the provisional origins of the crisis of modernity. The "long Renaissance" is given an overarching position above the successive "modernisms" that it houses: the collapse of perspective certainty as a guarantee of the central position of the humanist subject is identified as a direct outcome of, and contemporaneous with, the verification of the perspective rule itself.

Thus, in the first chapter of the *Ricerca*, the fiction of the "humanist" Brunelleschi is unmasked in the retelling of the "cruel and unreal comedy" that reveals the architect-perspectivist as an unscrupulous manipulator of human "identities" in the service of destabilizing identity itself. Similarly we realize, in Tafuri's early essays on Alberti, that it is the troubled, nightmare-ridden figure of a sociopath attempting to use architecture to steer his way through imminent chaos that takes hold over the serene mathematical and harmonious visions of a Wittkowerian analysis. In this unnerving vision of architecture as experiment conceived as a metaphoric game with human subjects (and for Tafuri, all designs are experiments in the real, scientific sense), the calculated "shocks" of the modernist avant-garde, the ruptures of Piranesian space, and the anamorphoses of the late baroque take their place within the same frame and as symptomatic events in the same systemic history of perspectivism. On these grounds, it is true that, whatever the motives or conclusions of the analyses, Sedlmayr, Benjamin, and Klein agree, as pathologists studying the same corpse may agree on the symptoms but vehemently reject the others' diagnoses. Tafuri's historical "bracketing," then, does not refuse political or ideological distinctions, but rather understands all such distinctions as pertinent to an autopsy of the age as a whole. For such a task, a Weber has to be accompanied by his Spengler; a Sedlmayr by his Benjamin; a Klein by his Tafuri.

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NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Fredric Jameson, *A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present* (London: Verso, 2002), 169. Jameson characterizes Greenberg as "that theoretician who more than any other can be credited as having invented the ideology of modernism full-blown and out of whole cloth" (ibid.).
2. Reyner Banham, "The New Brutalism," *Architectural Review* 118, no. 708 (December 1955): 355.
3. Adolf Behne, *Der moderne Zweckbau* (Munich: Drei Masken Verlag, 1926); Gustav Adolf Platz, *Die Baukunst der neuesten Zeit* (Berlin: Propyläen Verlag, 1927); Sigfried Giedion, *Bauen in Frankreich, Bauen in Eisen, Bauen in Eisenbeton* (Leipzig: Klinkhardt & Biermann, 1928); Bruno Taut, *Modern Architecture* (London: The Studio, 1929); Walter Curt Behrendt, *Modern Building: Its Nature, Problems, and Forms* (London: Martin Hopkinson, 1937); Henry-Russell Hitchcock, *Modern Architecture: Romanticism and Reintegration* (New York: Payson and Clarke, 1929); Nikolaus Pevsner, *Pioneers of the Modern Movement from William Morris to Walter Gropius* (London: Faber and Faber, 1936); Sigfried Giedion, *Space, Time and Architecture: The Growth of a New Tradition* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941).
4. See the excellent analysis by Panayotis Tournikiotis, *The Historiography of Modern Architecture* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), which must form the basis of any serious study of the works of Pevsner, Zevi, Benevolo, Hitchcock, Collins, and Tafuri. Influenced by the semiotic structuralism of his thesis advisor Françoise Choay, Tournikiotis restricts his analysis to the structural comparison of key texts, deliberately removing any discussion of context or authors, in the belief that "the context . . . and the personalities . . . have nothing to tell us about the nature of the *written discourse per se*" (5–6). The present work, however, studies these relations specifically, understanding the writing of history, whether or not under the guise of objectivity, to form a practice immersed in the theory

and design of architecture at any one moment, within a comprehensive practice that, as it embraces all aspects of the architectural field, might properly be called its "discourse." A less "structuralist" and analytical introduction to the field is Demetri Porphyrios, ed., "On the Methodology of Architectural History," special issue of *Architectural Design* 51, no. 7 (1981), which, in its range of critical essays by historians on historians, represents an important snapshot of the field in the late 1970s.

5. The first book to use "history" in its title was in fact Bruno Zevi's *Storia dell'architettura moderna* (Turin: Einaudi, 1950); the first in English was Jurgen Joedicke's *A History of Modern Architecture*, translated by James Palmes (London: Architectural Press, 1959) from his *Geschichte der modernen Architektur: Synthese aus Form, Funktion und Konstruktion* (Stuttgart: Gerd Hatje, 1958). It is interesting to consider that both are postwar reflections on a modernity already in the past and subject to serious critique, the one written in exile in the United States, and at Harvard, where the International Style was already academicized, the other in Germany on the wreckage of modernity's darker follies; but both are by authors who sought to rescue the ideals and formal premises of modernism and set them on new democratic bases.

6. Alois Riegl, *Stilfragen: Grundlegungen zu einer Geschichte der Ornamentik* (Berlin: G. Siemens, 1893), and *Die spätrömische Kunst-Industrie nach den Funden in Österreich-Ungarn im Zusammenhange mit der Gesammtentwicklung der bildenden Künste bei den Mittelmeervölkern* (Vienna: K. K. Hof- und Staats-druckerei, 1901); Heinrich Wölfflin, *Prolegomena zu einer Psychologie des Architektur* (Munich: Dr. C. Wolf & Sohn, 1886), and *Renaissance und Barock: Eine Untersuchung über Wesen und Entstehung des Barockstils in Italien* (Munich: Theodor Ackermann, 1888); August Schmarsow, *Das Wesen des architektonischen Schöpfung* (Leipzig: Karl W. Hiersemann, 1894).

7. Adolf von Hildebrand, *Das Problem der Form in der bildenden Kunst* (Strasbourg: Heitz and Mündel, 1893), trans. Max Meyer and Robert Morris Ogden as *The Problem of Form in Painting and Sculpture* (New York: G. E. Stechert, 1907); retranslated in Harry Francis Mallgrave and Eleftherios Ikonomou, eds., *Empathy, Form, and Space: Problems in German Aesthetics, 1873–1893* (Santa Monica: Getty Center for the History of Art and the Humanities, 1994), 227–279.

8. Paul Frankl, *Die Entwicklungsphasen der neueren Baukunst* (Stuttgart: Verlag B. G. Teubner, 1914).

9. Robert Vischer, *Über das optische Formgefühl: Ein Beitrag zur Aesthetik* (Leipzig: Hermann Credner, 1873).

10. See Mallgrave and Ikonomou, introduction to *Empathy, Form, and Space*, 1–85; and Michael Podro, *The Critical Historians of Art* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

11. Paul Frankl, *Principles of Architectural History: The Four Phases of Architectural Style, 1420–1900*, trans. and ed. James F. O'Gorman, foreword by James Ackerman (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1968). The new title is an evident reference to the English translation of Wölfflin's *Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe* as *Principles of Art History*.

12. Heinrich Wölfflin, *Renaissance and Baroque*, trans. Kathrin Simon, introduction by Peter Murray (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964), 87.

13. Nikolaus Pevsner, *Leipziger Barock: Die Baukunst der Barockzeit in Leipzig* (Dresden: Wolfgang Jess, 1928). In the foreword, Pevsner thanks "Wilhelm Pinder und Franz Studniczka, Rudolf Kautzsch und Leo Bruhns, denen ich vielleicht, wenn auch nicht mehr auf Grund persönlich genossener Ausbildung, so doch auf Grund seiner für die ganze wissenschaftliche Methode dieses Buches vorbildlichen Arbeiten über das Wesen des Barockstiles, August Schmarsow anfügen darf," and refers to August Schmarsow's *Barock und Rokoko: Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung über das malerische in der Architektur* (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1897), vol. II of Schmarsow's *Beiträge zur Aesthetik der bildenden Künste*.

14. Manfredo Tafuri, *Teorie e storia dell'architettura* (Rome and Bari: Edizioni Laterza, 1968; 3rd ed., 1973).

15. Ibid. (1973), 266; my translation. The English translation of the fourth (1976) edition of *Teorie e storia*, translated by Giorgio Verrecchia with a foreword by Dennis Sharp (London: Granada Publishing, 1980), is thoroughly unreliable and filled with omissions and mistakes. The present citation is an example, where "esperienzi 'informali,'" referring to avant-garde experiments in the *informe* or "nonformal" as they had been tied back to prehistoric architectures, is rendered meaningless by the phrase "some abstract experiences."

61. Ibid., 62: quoting Richard J. Neutra, *Wie baut Amerika?* (1927).
62. Kaufmann, *Von Ledoux*, 62: quoting Stonorov and Boesiger, *Le Corbusier et Pierre Jeanneret* (Zurich: Girsberger, 1930), 27, 23. See also Ledoux, *L'architecture*, 135.
63. Kaufmann, *Von Ledoux*, 62.
64. Ibid., 63.
65. Schapiro, "The New Viennese School," 258–267.
66. Ibid., 265.
67. Ibid.
68. Sedlmayr had written his dissertation on the Viennese architect and early architectural historian Fischer von Erlach and gained his *Habilitation* in 1933 with a thesis on Bruegel. After the war, he joined the editorial board of the Catholic review *Wort und Wahrheit* and, rehabilitated in 1951, took up the position of professor at Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich, the chair once held by Wölfflin and Pinder, finally to teach in Austria between 1964 and 1969 at Salzburg.
69. Wood, *The Vienna School Reader*, 25.
70. Sedlmayr, *Art in Crisis*, 117.
71. Ibid., 4.
72. Ibid., 107.
73. Ibid., 101.
74. Ibid., 256.
75. Ibid., 256.
76. Kaufmann, *Architecture in the Age of Reason*, 266, n. 439.
77. Emil Kaufmann, review of Marcel Raval and J.-Ch. Moreux, *Claude-Nicolas Ledoux* (Paris, 1945), *Art Bulletin* 30, no. 4 (1948): 289, n. 3. Following a long list of phrases from his earlier articles compared with those in Raval and Moreux, Kaufmann concludes: "Whereas Horst Rieme recopied a large part of my 1929 essay word by word (cf. *Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte*, 1935, p. 159), Raval and Moreux (and likewise Gertrude Rosenthal in the *News of the Baltimore Museum of Art*, November 1947) have appropriated a large part of my concepts." Kaufmann's review details how a new work should have remedied the deficits of the 1934 biography by C. Levallet-Haug. The authors, he states, "knew that they had to avoid the gravest shortcomings of the Levallet biography: that they had to deal with Ledoux's historical position and to interpret his performances. They are apparently not up to their task" (288).
78. Kaufmann, *Architecture in the Age of Reason*, 265, n. 481: "the Lequeu documents of the Bibliothèque Nationale escaped her attention, so she could discuss Lequeu merely in a general way."
79. Philipp Fehl, review of *Das Menschenbild in unserer Zeit* by Hans Sedlmayr (Darmstadt: Neue Darmstaedter Verlagsanstalt, 1951), *College Art Journal* 13, no. 4 (Winter 1954): 145–147.
80. Emil Kaufmann, "Claude-Nicolas Ledoux, Inaugurator of a New Architectural System," *Journal of the American Society of Architectural Historians* 3, no. 3 (July 1943): 13.
81. Ibid.
82. Kaufmann, review of Raval and Moreux, 289.
83. Kaufmann, "Claude-Nicolas Ledoux, Inaugurator," 17–18.
84. Ibid., 18.
85. Emil Kaufmann, "Nils G. Wollin: 'Despréz en Suède,'" *Art Bulletin* 28 (1946): 283.
86. Ibid., 284.
87. Kaufmann, *Architecture in the Age of Reason*, x.
88. I outlined the connection between Kaufmann and Johnson in "From Ledoux to Le Corbusier to Johnson, to . . . ," *Progressive Architecture* (May 1991): 109–110. Since then the argument has been significantly elaborated by Detlef Mertins in "System and Freedom: Sigfried Giedion, Emil Kaufmann, and the Constitution of Architectural Modernity," in Robert E. Somol, ed., *Autonomy and Ideology: Positioning an Avant-Garde in America* (New York: Monacelli Press, 1997), 212–231.
89. Kaufmann, "Claude-Nicolas Ledoux, Inaugurator," 12–20. Published along with John Coolidge's call for "The New History of Architecture," *Journal of the American Society of Architectural Historians* 3, no. 3 (July 1943): 3–11. Kaufmann's text was both a summary of his ground-breaking work on Ledoux and a methodological polemic on behalf of his personal interpretation of the concept of "system" developed in the Vienna school and applied to architecture in the "abstract" work of the late eighteenth century.
90. Kaufmann, "Claude-Nicolas Ledoux, Inaugurator," 12.
91. Ibid., 18.
92. Philip Johnson, "House at New Canaan, Connecticut," *Architectural Review* 108, no. 645 (September 1950): 153.
93. Damisch, "Ledoux avec Kant," 20

94. See Somol, ed., *Autonomy and Ideology*.

95. Whereas Kaufmann gave credit due to Ledoux for exploring Kant's concept of autonomy and Johnson and Rossi elaborated the premise, it is perhaps only Le Corbusier who remains unexamined as the modernist neo-Kantian architect par excellence. In the spirit of the idea "from Ledoux to Le Corbusier," I hope soon to complete research on Le Corbusier in terms that construe his aesthetic politics within the neo-Kantian revival of the first quarter of the twentieth century between Victor Basch, Elie Faure, and Henri Focillon.

2 MANNERIST MODERNISM: COLIN ROWE

This chapter was originally developed in response to an invitation to speak on the relations between Peter Eisenman and Leon Krier at the Yale University School of Architecture in November 2002. A shorter version was published as "Colin Rowe," in Cynthia Davidson, ed., *Eisenman/Krier: Two Ideologies: A Conference at the Yale School of Architecture* (New York: Monacelli Press, 2004), 52–61.

1. Colin Rowe, "Addendum 1973" to "The Mathematics of the Ideal Villa," in *The Mathematics of the Ideal Villa and Other Essays* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1976), 16.
2. Ibid.
3. Colin Rowe, *As I Was Saying: Recollections and Miscellaneous Essays*, ed. Alexander Caragonne, vol. 1 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 2.
4. Ibid.
5. Rudolf Wittkower, "Inigo Jones, Architect and Man of Letters," *Journal of the Royal Institute of British Architects* 60 (1953); reprinted in Wittkower, *Palladio and English Palladianism* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1974), 60.
6. Colin F. Rowe, "The Theoretical Drawings of Inigo Jones, Their Sources and Scope" (M.A. thesis in the History of Art, University of London, November 1947). This thesis is also referred to by Margaret Whinney, "Inigo Jones: A Revaluation," *Journal of the Royal Institute of British Architects* 59, no. 8 (June 1952): 288: "It has recently been shown that Jones meant to do more than instruct by example alone, for a careful example by Mr Colin Rowe, of the great number of drawings not related to executed buildings has revealed that a treatise on architecture was in preparation though the book may never have been written [Note 6. I am very grateful to Mr. Rowe for permission to refer to his unpublished thesis. *The Theoretical Drawings of Inigo Jones, their sources, and scope*, University of London, 1947.]"
7. Rowe, *As I Was saying*, 1: 2.
8. Fritz Saxl and Rudolf Wittkower, *England and the Mediterranean Tradition*, exh. cat. (London: Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 1945). This was later reissued as Saxl and Wittkower, *British Art and the Mediterranean* (London: Oxford University Press, 1948). Wittkower contributed the second part of the book, which emphasized the eighteenth century. In his consideration of Lord Burlington's house at Chiswick, for example, he stressed the free adaptation of the Palladian model by the English architect, who drew equally on Scamozzi and Inigo Jones. See Wittkower, "The English Interpretation of Palladio," *England and the Mediterranean*, 54.
9. Rowe, "Theoretical Drawings," 2.
10. Colin Rowe, "The Mathematics of the Ideal Villa: Palladio and Le Corbusier Compared," *Architectural Review* 101, no. 603 (March 1947): 101–104; "Mannerism and Modern Architecture," *Architectural Review* 107, no. 641 (May 1950): 289–300.
11. Rowe, "Theoretical Drawings," 17.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 18.
14. Ibid., 64–65.
15. Ibid., 65–66.
16. Ibid., 27.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 45.
19. Reyner Banham, "The New Brutalism," *Architectural Review* 118, no. 708 (December 1955): 354–361.
20. Ibid., 358–361.
21. Ibid., 361.
22. Reyner Banham, *The New Brutalism* (London: Architectural Press, 1966), 14–15.
23. Ibid., 15.
24. Peter D. Smithson, response "Against the Motion" to Nikolaus Pevsner in "Report of a Debate on the Motion 'that Systems of Proportion Make Good Design Easier and Bad Design More Difficult.' Held at the R.I.B.A., 18 June, 1957," *RIBA Journal* 64, no. 11 (September 1957): 461

25. Rudolf Wittkower, *Architectural Principles in the Age of Humanism* (London: Warburg Institute, 1949). The text was made up of articles previously published in the *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*: "Alberti's Approach to Antiquity in Architecture," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 4 (1940–1941): 1–18; "Principles of Palladio's Architecture," part I, *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 7 (1944): 102–122, and part II, *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 8 (1945): 68–106. As noted by Alina A. Payne, Wittkower added chapter 1, "The Centrally Planned Church in the Renaissance," and a section on Palladio's optical and psychological concepts for publication in the book. Payne, "Rudolf Wittkower and Architectural Principles in the Age of Modernism," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 53 (September 1994): 322–342.
26. Peter Smithson, letter, *RIBA Journal* 59 (1952): 140–141, cited in Henry Millon, "Rudolph Wittkower, *Architectural Principles in the Age of Humanism*: Its Influence on the Development and Interpretation of Modern Architecture," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 31 (1972): 89.
27. Wittkower, "Principles of Palladio's Architecture," II, 103. For a full discussion of Wittkower's analytical method in the context of modernist art theory, see Payne, "Rudolf Wittkower," and for an account of the reception of *Architectural Principles*, see Millon, "Rudolph Wittkower."
28. Payne, "Rudolf Wittkower," 325.
29. Wittkower, "Principles of Palladio's Architecture," I, 108–109, citing Palladio, *Quattro libri*, I, chapter 20, 48.
30. Wittkower, "Principles of Palladio's Architecture," I, 109.
31. Ibid., 109–110.
32. Ibid., 111.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., II, 103.
36. Wittkower, *Architectural Principles*, 135.
37. Quoted in Rowe, *As I Was Saying*, 1: 47.
38. Rudolf Wittkower, "Safety in Numbers," review of R. W. Gardner, *A Primer of Proportion in the Arts of Form and Music* (New York: William Helburn, 1945), *Architectural Review* 100, no. 596 (August 1946): 53.

38. Editors' note, *Architectural Review* 101, no. 603 (March 1947): the cover illustration was taken from Fredrick Macody Lund's *Ad Quadratum: A Study of the Geometrical Bases of Classic and Medieval Religious Architecture* (London: Batsford, 1921).
40. Colin Rowe, "The Mathematics of the Ideal Villa: Palladio and Le Corbusier Compared," *Architectural Review* 101, no. 603 (March 1947): 101; citing Christopher Wren, *Tract I*, on architecture, in Christopher Wren, Jr., *Parentalia: or Memoirs of the Family of the Wrens* (London, 1750), 351–352. As transcribed by Lydia Soo, the full text (I have added Rowe's excisions in square brackets) reads:

> *There are two causes of Beauty, natural and customary. Natural is from Geometry, consisting in Uniformity (that is Equality) and Proportion. Customary Beauty is begotten by the Use [of our Senses to those Objects which are usually pleasing to us for other Causes, [as Familiarity [or particular Inclination] breeds a Love to Things not in themselves lovely. Here lies the great occasion of errors[: here is tried the Architect's Judgment:] but always the [true] Test is natural or geometrical Beauty. Geometrical Figures are naturally more beautiful than [other] irregular[: in this all consent as to a Law of Nature. Of geometrical Figures,] the Square and the Circle are most beautiful; next the Parallelogram and the Oval. [Strait Lines are more beautiful than curve; next to strait Lines, equal and geometrical Flexures; an Object elevated in the Middle is more beautiful than depressed. Position is necessary for perfecting Beauty.] There are only two [beautiful] Positions of strait lines, perpendicular and horizontal: this is from Nature, and consequently Necessity, no other than upright being firm. [Oblique Positions are Discord to the Eye, unless answered in Pairs as in the Sides of an equicrural triangle.]*

See *Wren's "Tracts" on Architecture and Other Writings*, ed. Lydia M. Soo (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), "Tract I," 154.

41. Wren, "Tract I," 153.
42. Rowe, "Mathematics," 103–104.
43. Ibid., 100.

44. Erwin Panofsky, "'Et in Arcadia Ego': On the Conception of Transience in Poussin and Watteau," in Raymond Klibansky and H. J. Paton, eds., *Philosophy and History: Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), 223–254.
45. Evelyn Waugh, *Brideshead Revisited: The Sacred and Profane Memories of Captain Charles Ryder* (New York: Little, Brown, 1999), 21.
46. Ibid., 35, 80
47. Rowe, "Mathematics," 101.
48. Ibid., 104; the illustration "Harmonic decompositions of the ϕ rectangle" is taken from Matila Ghyka, *The Geometry of Art and Life* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1946), 132.
49. J. M. Richards, Nikolaus Pevsner, Osbert Lancaster, and Hubert de Cronin Hastings, editorial, *Architectural Review* 101, no. 601 (January 1947): 36.
50. Ibid., 22–23. For a detailed study of this period of the *Architectural Review*'s policies toward planning and popular culture, see the excellent thesis by Erdem Erten, "Shaping 'The Second Half Century': *Architectural Review*, 1947–1971" (PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004).
51. Richards et al., editorial, 23.
52. Ibid., 36
53. Ibid.
54. Eliot was, of course, a central reference for both Rowe and Greenberg. For Rowe he represented a position dedicated to the essential roots of talent in tradition, and was a champion of the virtues and values of the ambiguous and the difficult; for Greenberg Eliot was an opponent worthy of Greenberg's most lucid and extended essay from the 1950s. "The Plight of Our Culture," yet Eliot's essay "Definition of Culture," however elitist and conservative, tested the limits of Greenberg's own definition of modern cultural production as "kitsch."
55. Rowe, *As I Was Saying*, 1: 137.
56. Guido Zuliani, "Evidence of Things Unseen," in Cynthia Davidson, ed., *Tracing Eisenman* (New York: Rizzoli International, 2006), 319–348.
57. And this method is indeed seductive—as a student, I carefully traced each and every Corbusian house plan, finding the hidden Palladian structure that would reveal its modernist mechanisms, and finally applying the approach to my diploma written thesis on the specifically modern classicism of McKim, Mead and White in the late nineteenth century. Unpublished Cambridge diploma thesis, 1965.

58. Editor's comment, *Architectural Review* 107, no. 641 (May 1950), contents page. Pevsner understandably wishes to point to his own publications on mannerism and refers to his article "Double Profile: A Reconsideration of the Elizabethan Style as Seen at Wollaton," *Architectural Review* 107, no. 639 (March 1950): 147–153, where he develops the themes "Mannerism and Mediaevalism," and "Mannerism and the Elizabethans." The phrase opening with "Is convinced" is pure Rowe, however, and suggests that he wrote the copy *for* this summary.
59. Anthony Blunt, "Mannerism in Architecture," *Journal of the Royal Institute of British Architects* 56, no. 5 (March 1949): 195–200.
60. Ibid., 197.
61. With so much of his material drawn from Wittkower without direct attribution, it is not surprising that in the discussion following the lecture, and after a comment from Wittkower himself in the audience, Blunt confesses: "I think I ought to reveal what an embarrassment it has been to find Dr. Wittkower here, because after all he invented, or as he puts it, discovered Mannerism! Therefore it has been extremely embarrassing to speak in front of such an expert on the subject" ("Mannerism," 200).
62. Ibid., 198–199.
63. Ibid., 199.
64. Among the responses to Blunt's talk, Wittkower, generously enough in the circumstances, tried to allay the questions of skeptics who might see mannerism as simply degeneration. John Summerson protested the characterization of Soane as a mannerist, and Peter Smithson wondered whether those with academic training who then inverted the system nevertheless retained something of their original academicism. This last remark, anticipating Banham's tracing of the academic origins of modernism ten years later, also seems to prefigure Rowe's sense of the academic nature of mannerism in Le Corbusier.
65. Nikolaus Pevsner, "The Architecture of Mannerism," in Geoffrey Grigson, ed., *The Mint: A Miscellany of Literature, Art and Criticism* (London: Routledge and Sons, 1946), 116.
66. Ibid., 117.
67. On mannerism in painting Pevsner cites Dvořák, Friedländer, Panofsky, and, of course, himself, writing between 1920 and 1926, and in architecture Panofsky, Gombrich, Coolidge, and Wittkower between 1930 and 1943.

68. Pevsner, "The Architecture of Mannerism," 120–132.
69. Ibid., 135.
70. Ibid., 126.
71. Ibid., 125.
72. Rudolf Wittkower, "Michelangelo's Biblioteca Laurenziana," *Art Bulletin* 16 (1934), republished in Wittkower, *Idea and Image: Studies in the Italian Renaissance* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978), 10–71.
73. Margaret Wittkower, foreword to Wittkower, *Idea and Image*, 8. The lost manuscript is listed in "The Writings of Rudolf Wittkower," in Douglas Fraser, Howard Hibberd, and Milton J. Lewine, eds., *Essays in the History of Architecture Presented to Rudolf Wittkower* (London: Phaidon Press, 1967), 378, as "'Das Problem der Bewegung innerhalb der manieristischen Architektur,' *Festschrift für Walter Friedländer zum 60. Geburtstag am 10.3.1933* (unpublished typescript), 192 ff."
74. Wittkower, *Idea and Image*, 60–61.
75. Ibid., 63.
76. Ibid., 65.
77. Ibid., 66.
78. Ibid., 67.
79. Rowe, "Mannerism," 295.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid., 296.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid., 299.
84. Ibid., 290.
85. Rowe, *As I Was Saying*, 1:136.
86. Rowe, "Mathematics," 104.
87. Ibid., 104.
88. Colin Rowe, introduction to Arthur Drexler, ed., *Five Architects: Eisenman, Graves, Gwathmey, Hejduk, Meier* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 5.
89. Colin Rowe, erratum to introduction to *Five Architects*, reprint (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), n.p.
90. Robert Maxwell, "James Stirling: Writings," introduction to *Stirling: Writings on Architecture*, ed. Robert Maxwell (Milan: Skira, 1998), 26. The two articles by James Stirling are "Garches to Jaoul: Le Corbusier as Domestic Architect in 1927 and 1953," *Architectural Review* 118, no. 705 (September 1955): 145–151, and "Ronchamp: Le Corbusier's Chapel and the Crisis of Rationalism," *Architectural Review* 119, no. 711 (March 1956): 155–161.
91. Stirling, "Garches to Jaoul," 145.
92. Ibid., 151.
93. Colin Rowe, "Chicago Frame," *Architectural Review* 120, no. 718 (November 1956): 285–289.
94. Stirling, "Ronchamp," 155.
95. Ibid., 161. It is interesting in the light of Rowe's influence that Stirling sees Ronchamp as an example of "the initial ideology of the modern movement . . . being mannerized" (ibid.).
96. James Stirling, "Thesis for the Liverpool School of Architecture" (1950), 1.
97. Colin Rowe, "James Stirling: A Highly Personal and Highly Disjointed Memoir," in Peter Arnell and Ted Bickford, eds., *James Stirling: Buildings and Projects* (New York: Rizzoli, 1984), 15.
98. This comparison was also belatedly admitted by Rowe in his reprinting of "The Mathematics of the Ideal Villa" in 1974.
99. Rowe, "Addendum 1973."
100. Rowe, "James Stirling," 23.

3 FUTURIST MODERNISM: REYNER BANHAM

Preliminary versions of sections of chapter 3 were published as "Toward a Theory of the Architectural Program," *October* 106 (Fall 2003): 59–74; "Still Wired after All These Years?" *Log*, no. 1 (Fall 2003): 59–63; and as part of the introduction to the reprint of Reyner Banham, *Los Angeles: The Architecture of Four Ecologies* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), xvii–xxxiii.

1. Reyner Banham, "A Black Box: The Secret Profession of Architecture," *New Statesman and Society* (12 October 1990): 22–25. In this article, published two years after his death, Banham came to the conclusion, always implicit in his criticism, that there was indeed a distinction to be drawn between what Le Corbusier had described as the "Engineer's Aesthetic" and "Architecture." The distinction was "between fundamental modes of designing," between Wren and Hawksmoor, for example; and he issued a deeply felt plea to architects to recognize the limits and nature of "architecture" in the Western tradition, in order then to open it

and Tradition that Isn't 'Trad. Dad.'" in Marcus Whiffen, ed., *The History, Theory and Criticism of Architecture* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964).

101. The four pieces in *The Listener* were Reyner Banham, "Encounter with Sunset Boulevard," *The Listener* 80 (22 August 1968): 235–236; "Roadscape with Rusting Rails" (29 August 1968): 267–268; "Beverly Hills, Too, Is a Ghetto" (5 September 1968): 296–298; "The Art of Doing Your Thing" (12 September 1968): 330–331.
102. Banham, "Roadscape with Rusting Rails," 268.
103. Banham, "Beverly Hills, Too, Is a Ghetto," 296.
104. Ibid., 298.
105. Banham, "The Art of Doing Your Thing," 331.
106. Reyner Banham, "LA: The Structure behind the Scene," *Architectural Design* 41 (April 1971): 227–230.
107. For an account of this exhibition and the pop movement in general, see Lawrence Alloway et al., *Modern Dreams: The Rise and Fall of Pop* (London: Institute of Contemporary Art, 1988).
108. Banham, *Theory and Design*, 220.
109. Ibid., 222–223.
110. Ibid., 13.
111. Anton Wagner, *Los Angeles: Werden, Leben und Gestalt der Zweimillionstadt in Südkalifornien* (Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1935). A manuscript translation of this work by Gavriel O. Rosenfeld, entitled *Los Angeles: The Development, Life, and Form of the Southern Californian Metropolis*, was commissioned by the Getty Research Institute in the History of Art and the Humanities, Los Angeles, 1997. Quotations are from this translation. Wagner, whose uncle had settled in Santa Monica in 1878, had been guided in his search for a topic by his advisor at the University of Leipzig, the urban geographer O. Schneider, who had himself published a work on "Traces of Spanish Colonization in the American Landscape" (*Spuren spanischer kolonisieren in US-amerikanischen Landschaften* [Berlin, 1928]).
112. Wagner, *Los Angeles: The Development, Life, and Form of the Southern California Metropolis*, 1.
113. Ibid., 7.
114. Ibid., 6.
115. Ibid., 207.
116. Ibid., 166.
117. Ibid., 168, 169, 172.
118. Ibid., 207.
119. Banham, *Los Angeles*, 247.
120. Banham, "L.A.: The Structure behind the Scene," 227.
121. Banham, *Los Angeles*, 23.
122. Reyner Banham, *Scenes in America Deserta* (Salt Lake City: Gibbs M. Smith, 1982).
123. Banham, "The New Brutalism," 355.

4 RENAISSANCE MODERNISM: MANFREDO TAFURI

A first version of part of chapter 4 was published as "Disenchanted Histories: The Legacies of Manfredo Tafuri," *ANY* 25/26 (2000): 29–36.

1. Manfredo Tafuri, *Teorie e storia dell'architettura*, 2d ed. (1968; Bari: Edizioni Laterza, 1970), 165. Translation slightly emended from Manfredo Tafuri, *Theories and History of Architecture*, ed. Dennis Sharp, trans. Giorgio Verrecchia (London: Granada, 1980), 141.
2. Tafuri, *Theories and History*, 149.
3. Manfredo Tafuri and Massimo Teodori, letter in "Un dibattito sull'architettura e l'urbanistica italiane: Lettere di studenti," *Casabella* 214 (July 1960), 56.
4. Ibid.
5. Manfredo Tafuri, "La prima strada di Roma moderna: Via Nazionale," *Urbanistica* 27 (June 1959): 95–109.
6. Giorgio Piccinato and Manfredo Tafuri, "Helsinki," *Urbanistica* 33 (April 1961): 88–104.
7. Manfredo Tafuri, with Salvatore Dierna, Lidia Soprani, Giorgio Testa, and Alessandro Urbani, "L'ampliamento barocco del commune di S. Gregorio da Sassola," *Quaderni dell'Istituto di Storia dell'Architettura* (Facoltà di Architettura, Università di Roma) 31 (1961): 360–380.
8. Giorgio Cucci, "The Formative Years," in "The Historical Project of Manfredo Tafuri," special issue, *Casabella* 619/620 (January–February 1995): 13–25. This article, the best of all those making up this special double issue of *Casabella* on Tafuri, traces his intellectual career and influences in detail from the 1950s to 1968. Tafuri's articles on the planning of Rome—"Il problema dei parchi pubblici in Roma e l'azione di 'Italia Nostra,'" *Urbanistica* 34 (Summer 1961): 105–111;

"Studi e ipotesi di lavoro per il sistema direzionale di Roma." *Casabella* 264 (June 1962): 27–35; "Un'ipotesi per la città-territorio di Roma. Strutture produttive e direzionali nel comprensorio Pontino" (with Enrico Fattinnanzi for the studio AUA), *Casabella* 274 (April 1963): 26–37—all share this analytical approach to large-scale planning. Tafuri wrote, "The present historical moment of the modern movement is certainly characterized by an effort to widen its critical and operative themes: toward the definition of a new dimension of urban space, which corresponds to a new dimension in the very methods of planning." Tafuri, "Studi e ipotesi," 27.

9. Tafuri et al., "L'ampliamento barocco," 369.
10. Jean-Louis Cohen, "Ceci n'est pas une histoire," special issue on Tafuri, *Casabella* 619–620 (1995): 53.
11. Manfredo Tafuri with Lidia Sopriani, "Problemi di critica e problemi di datazione in due monumenti taorminesi: Il Palazzo dei Duchi di S. Stefano e la 'Badia Vecchia,'" *Quaderni dell'Istituto di Storia dell'Architettura* 51 (1962): 1–13.
12. Ibid., 4.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., 1; also cited in English in Cinici, "The Formative Years," 17; translation slightly altered.
15. Manfredo Tafuri, *Ludovico Quaroni e lo sviluppo dell'architettura moderna in Italia* (Milan: Edizioni di Comunità, 1963).
16. Manfredo Tafuri, "Ludovico Quaroni e la cultura architettonica italiana," *Zodiac* 11 (1963): 133. This article served as the introduction to the book published in the same year: Tafuri, *Ludovico Quaroni*.
17. Tafuri, "Ludovico Quaroni," 137.
18. Ibid.
19. Tafuri cites the polemical fragment of Edoardo Persico, "Sull'arte italiana," first published in 1930, and republished in Persico, *Scritti critici e polemici*, ed. Alfonso Gatto (Milan: Rosa e Ballo, 1947), 311–313; and Giulio Carlo Argan, "Architettura e ideologia," *Zodiac* 1 (1957): 49–51, reprinted in Argan, *Progetto e destino* (Milan: Mondadori, 1965), 82–90.
20. Argan, "Architettura e ideologia," cited by Tafuri in "Ludovico Quaroni," 144; also in *Progetto e destino*, 90.
21. Manfredo Tafuri, "Architettura e socialismo nel pensiero di William Morris," *Casabella* 280 (October 1963): 35–39.
22. Ibid., 35; italics in source.
23. Ibid.
24. Manfredo Tafuri, "For a Historical History," interview with Pietro Corsi, special issue on Tafuri, *Casabella* 619/620 (1995): 147; reprinted from *La Rivista dei Libri* (April 1994).
25. Manfredo Tafuri, "Un 'fuoco' urbano della Roma barocca," *Quaderni dell'Istituto di Storia dell'Architettura* 61 (1964): 1–20.
26. Tafuri would develop this analysis of the interaction of urban context and architectural language in "Borromini in Palazzo Carpegna: Documenti inediti e ipotesi critiche," *Quaderni dell'Istituto di Storia dell'Architettura* (1967): 85–107.
27. Tafuri, "Un 'fuoco,'" 16.
28. Ibid., 17.
29. Manfredo Tafuri, "Simbolo e ideologia nell'architettura dell'Illuminismo," *Comunità* 124/125 (November–December 1964): 68–80; "'Architectura artificialia': Claude Perrault, Sir Christopher Wren e il dibattito sul linguaggio architettonico," in *Barocco europeo, barocco italiano, barocco salentino (Atti del Congresso Internazionale sul Barocco, Lecce, 21–24 settembre, 1969)* (Lecce: L'Orsa Maggiore, 1969), 374–398.
30. Manfredo Tafuri, "L'idea di architettura nella letteratura teorica del manierismo," and "J. Barozzi da Vignola e la crisi del manierismo a Roma," *Bollettino del C.I.S.A. Andrea Palladio* 9 (1967): 369–384, 385–399. Tafuri's *L'architettura del manierismo nel '500 europeo* (Rome: Officina, 1966) resumed these theses in a book he would later repudiate for what he felt was its oversimplified analysis and conclusions.
31. Tafuri, "L'idea di architettura," 369.
32. Manfredo Tafuri, *Interpreting the Renaissance: Princes, Cities, Architects*, trans. Daniel Sherer, foreword by K. Michael Hays (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), xxvi.
33. The proceedings of the AIA-ACSA Teacher Seminar on "The History, Theory and Criticism of Architecture," held at the Cranbrook Academy of Art in 1964, were published in Marcus Whiffen, ed., *The History, Theory and Criticism of Architecture* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965).

34. Bruno Zevi, "History as a Method of Teaching Architecture," in Whiffen, ed., *The History, Theory and Criticism of Architecture*, 11–21.
35. Reyner Banham, "Convenient Benches and Handy Hooks: Functional Considerations in the Criticism of the Art of Architecture," in Whiffen, ed., *The History, Theory and Criticism of Architecture*, 93.
36. Cited in ibid., 96.
37. Ibid., 96–97.
38. Tafuri, *Teorie e storia*, 19, my translation.
39. Ibid., 24.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., 25. The English translation, *Theories and History of Architecture* (London: Granada, 1980), is consistently unreliable; a single example among many would be this passage, which translates *ipocrisie* as "disappointments."
42. Ibid., 27.
43. Ibid., 34.
44. Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, cited in Tafuri, *Teorie e storia*, 39.
45. Sergio Bettini, "Critica semantica e continuità storica dell'architettura europea," *Zodiac* 2 (1958): 7.
46. Ibid., 12; cited in Tafuri, *Teorie e storia*, 209.
47. Tafuri, *Teorie e storia*, 208.
48. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 76.
49. Manfredo Tafuri, "Per una critica dell'ideologia architettonica," *Contropiano* 1 (January–April 1969): 31–79; translated by Stephen Sartorelli as "Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology," in K. Michael Hays, ed., *Architecture Theory since 1968* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 6–35.
50. Tafuri, *Teorie e storia*, preface to the second edition, 3.
51. Manfredo Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia: Design and Capitalist Development* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1976), viii.
52. Ibid., ix–x.
53. Jean Le Rond d'Alembert, *Discours préliminaire de L' 'Encyclopedie'* (1750) (Paris: Editions Gonthier, 1965), 39.
54. Nikolaus Pevsner, *An Outline of European Architecture* (1943; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), xix.
55. Tafuri, "Per una critica dell'ideologia architettonica," *Contropiano* 1, cited in *Casabella* 619/620, 31. This phrasing did not change in the book *Progetto e utopia* (Bari: Laterza, 1973).
56. Tafuri, "Toward a Critique of Architectural Ideology," 27. See also Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia: Design and Capitalist Development*, trans. Barbara Luigia La Penta (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1976), 131. Here, and in *Theories and History*, *angoscia* is translated as "anguish," intimating a more "romantic" and individualistic emotionalism than Tafuri's "anxiety," which is deliberately related to the Marxist concept of alienation, and to Freud's construction of anxiety as a modern neurosis.
57. Tafuri, *Interpreting the Renaissance*, xxviii. I have inserted the significant terms from the Italian edition, *Ricerca del Rinascimento* (Turin: Einaudi, 1992).
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., xxix.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Manfredo Tafuri, "A Search for Paradigms: Project, Truth, Artifice," trans. Daniel Sherer, *Assemblage* 28 (December 1995): 47. This is the first version of Sherer's translation of the foreword as *Ricerca*, and is closer to the original Italian than that translated in *Interpreting the Renaissance*, xxvii.
63. Tafuri, *Theories and History of Architecture*, 7–8.
64. Manfredo Tafuri, *Venice and the Renaissance* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), x.
65. Tafuri, *Interpreting the Renaissance*, xxviii.
66. Max Weber, cited in Lawrence A. Scaff, *Fleeing the Iron Cage: Culture, Politics, and Modernity in the Thought of Max Weber* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 224.
67. Tafuri, *Theories and History*, 156.
68. Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," in Peter Lassman and Irving Velody, eds., *Max Weber's 'Science as a Vocation'* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 30.
69. Manfredo Tafuri, "Entretien avec Françoise Véry," *Architecture, Mouvement, Continuité* 39 (June 1976): 37.
70. Alberto Asor Rosa, "Critique of Ideology and Historical Practice," special issue on Tafuri, *Casabella* 619/620 (1995): 33. He notes, "the work of Tafuri in the