

CSC3631 Cryptography - Asymmetric Encryption II

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
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Overview

Easy Land (Polynomial-Time)			
Addition:	$a+b \pmod{N}$	Multiplication:	$a \cdot b \pmod{N}$
Inverse:	$a^{-1} \pmod{N}$	Exponentiation:	$a^b \pmod{N}$
Hard Land (Intractability)			
Factoring What are p, q st. $p \cdot q = N$?	RSA What's x st. $x^e = y \pmod{N}$?	Discrete Log What's x st. $g^x = h \pmod{p}$	Diffie-Hellman Distinguish g^{xy} from g^z
Integers	RSA Group $(\mathbb{Z}_N)^*$, $N=pq$	Subgroups of $(\mathbb{Z}_p)^*$	Subgroups of $(\mathbb{Z}_p)^*$
Easy: Multiplication $N = p \cdot q$	Easy: Exponentiation $x^e = y \pmod{N}$	Easy: Exponentiation $g^x = h \pmod{p}$	Easy: Exponentiation $K = g^{xy} \pmod{p}$
Hard: Find factors of N	Hard: Find the e^{th} root x given y .	Hard: Find the discrete logarithm x given h .	Hard: Decide whether K is DH or random

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
Pillars of Public-key Encryption




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Chosen-Plaintext Attack Security II


How can we formalize CPA indistinguishability?




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
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Roadmap

- **El Gamal Encryption**
 - Number Theory Foundations
 - Underlying Assumptions
 - El Gamal
 - Attacks on El Gamal

Goal for today:

- What is El Gamal?
- What can go wrong with El Gamal

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
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Blinding with a Random Element I Multiplication

Given a finite group G and an arbitrary element m

Choose a random g in G . Then $g' = m \cdot g$
is a **random element** of G again.

Example: $(\mathbb{Z}_7)^*$ random $g = 5$



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
[Image Wikipedia] 22

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Blinding with a Random Element II Exponentiation

Given a finite group G w/ generator g and order q .

Choose a random x in \mathbb{Z}_q . Then $g' = g^x$
is a **random element** of G again.



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[Image Wikipedia] 23

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What is the Discrete Logarithm?

Given a h in $(\mathbb{Z}_p)^*$ with generator g ,
find the x such that

$$g^x = h \pmod{p}$$

Example: $(\mathbb{Z}_{17})^*$, $g=3$

$\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16\}$

The Discrete Logarithm Assumption*

What's the basis of the DH and El Gamal crypto systems?

Setup: $((\mathbb{Z}_p)^*, q, g) \leftarrow \text{GenGroup}(1^n)$, where $q = \text{ord}(g)$

Choose h from $(\mathbb{Z}_p)^*$ by $h = g^{x'} \pmod{p}$

Input for Adversary A: $(\mathbb{Z}_p)^*, q, g, h$

Output of Adversary A: x in \mathbb{Z}_q

Adversary A success: if $g^x = h \pmod{N}$

The Discrete Logarithm problem is **hard** relative to GenGroup if all probabilistic and polynomial-time adversaries **A** only have negligible success probability.

[*] The Discrete Logarithm Assumption holds in arbitrary cyclic groups or order q .

Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption*

What's the basis of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange?

Setup: $((\mathbb{Z}_p)^*, q, g) \leftarrow \text{GenGroup}(1^n)$, where $q = \text{ord}(g)$

Compute $h_1 = g^x \pmod{p}$ and $h_2 = g^y \pmod{p}$

Input for Adversary A: $(\mathbb{Z}_p)^*, q, g, h_1, h_2, K$
 where $K = g^z$ or $K = g^{xy}$

Output of Adversary A: Decision for g^z or g^{xy}

Adversary A success: if guessed type of K

The Decisional Diffie Hellman problem is **hard** relative to GenGroup if all probabilistic and polynomial-time adversaries **A** only have negligible success probability to distinguish g^{xy} from a random number.

[*] In the key exchange lecture, we only considered the Computational Diffie-Hellman, as simplification.

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El Gamal Key Generation

How to create a strong setting for El Gamal?

GenElGamal(1^n)

Input: key length n

Create a cyclic group G (e.g. in $(\mathbb{Z}_p)^*$)
with order q and generator g .

Choose random x in \mathbb{Z}_q

Compute $h = g^x \pmod{q}$

Output: $pk=(G, q, g, h), \quad sk=(G, q, g, x)$

El Gamal Encryption (e.g. in $(\mathbb{Z}_p)^*$)

KeyGen: $pk=(G, q, g, h), sk=(G, q, g, x) \leftarrow \text{GenElGamal}(1^n)$

Enc: Given $pk=(G, q, g, h)$ and a message m :
Choose random y in \mathbb{Z}_q

Ciphertext: $(c_1=g^y, c_2=h^y \cdot m)$

Dec: Given $sk=(G, q, g, x)$ and ciphertext (c_1, c_2) :
 $m = c_2 \cdot (c_1^x)^{-1}$

Correctness of El Gamal

Ciphertext: $(c_1=g^y, c_2=h^y \cdot m)$ **Message:** $m = c_2 \cdot (c_1^x)^{-1}$

Correctness of El Gamal

Ciphertext: $(c_1=g^y, c_2=h^y \cdot m)$ **Message:** $m = c_2 \cdot (c_1^x)^{-1}$

$$\begin{aligned}
 c_2 \cdot (c_1^x)^{-1} &= (h^y \cdot m) \cdot (c_1^x)^{-1} && \mid \text{Subst. } c_2=h^y \cdot m \\
 &= ((g^x)^y \cdot m) \cdot (c_1^x)^{-1} && \mid \text{Subst. } h = g^y \\
 &= (g^{xy} \cdot m) \cdot (c_1^x)^{-1} \\
 &= (g^{xy} \cdot m) \cdot ((g^y)^x)^{-1} && \mid \text{Subst. } c_1 = g^y \\
 &= (g^{xy} \cdot m) \cdot (g^{yx})^{-1} && \mid \text{Exp. commute} \\
 &= g^{xy} \cdot m \cdot (g^{xy})^{-1} \\
 &= \cancel{g^{xy}} \cdot m \cdot (\cancel{g^{xy}})^{-1} = m && \mid \text{Mult. inverse}
 \end{aligned}$$

Example of El Gamal

GenElGamal: prime $p = 2357$, generator $g = 2$ of $(\mathbb{Z}_{2357})^*$
 Private key $x = 1751$.
 Public key $h = g^x \pmod{p} = 2^{1751} \pmod{2357} = 1185$

Encryption: Message $m = 2035$, select random $y = 1520$

$$c_1 = g^y \pmod{p} = 2^{1520} \pmod{2357} = 1430$$


$$c_2 = h^y \cdot m \pmod{p} = 1185^{1520} \cdot 2035 \pmod{2357} = 697$$

Decryption: Ciphertext $c_1 = 1430$, $c_2 = 697$


$$m = c_2 \cdot c_1^{-x} \pmod{p} = 697 \cdot (1430^{1751})^{-1} \pmod{2357} = 2035$$

[Example adapted from Menezes et al., Handbook of Applied Cryptography]

El Gamal Encryption Graphically



El Gamal Decryption Graphically



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Attacks on Weak Randomness

Critical to use **different** y in each encryption.

What can go wrong?

Comparison RSA and El Gamal

RSA

El Gamal

Deterministic

Randomized

$(\mathbb{Z}_N)^*$, $N=pq$

$(\mathbb{Z}_p)^*$

Enc: 1 exp, Dec: 1 exp

Enc: 2 exp, Dec: 1 exp

Factoring
RSA Problem

Discrete Log Problem
Diffie-Hellman Problem