



# SEC-205: Distributed Ledger and Blockchain

## Lecture 4: Consensus Mechanisms

Instructed By:

Dr. Charnon Pattiyanon

Assistant Director of IT and Instructor  
CMKL University

Artificial Intelligence and Computer  
Engineering (AICE) Program

# Today's Agenda

- In today's lecture, we will explore and learn about:
  - Recapitulation of Byzantine Generals Problem.
  - Consensus Protocol for Byzantine Broadcast
  - Attacks for Consensus Protocols
  - Proof-of-Stake

# Recap of the Byzantine Generals Problem


- Byzantine Generals Problem was introduced by Lamport et al., 1982, to demonstrate the problem of reaching consensus between distributed entities.

- **Problem Statement:**

- There are  $n$  generals (where  $n$  is fixed), one of which is the *commander*.
- Some generals are *loyal*, and some of them can be *traitors* (including the commander).
- The commander sends out an order that is either *attack* or *retreat* to each general.
- If the commander is *loyal*, it sends the same order to all generals.
- All generals take an action after some time.

# Recap of the Byzantine Generals Problem

- Goals:
  - **Agreement:** No two *loyal* generals take *different* actions.
  - **Validity:** If the commander is *loyal*, then all *loyal* generals must take the action *suggested by the commander*.
  - **Termination:** All *loyal* generals must eventually take some action.



# From Generals to Nodes

- Solutions to the Byzantine Generals Problem is a consensus protocol.
- In the network environment, when we modelling the consensus protocol:
  - Generals → Nodes
  - Commander → Leader
  - Loyalty → Honest, Traitor → Adversary
    - What can the adversary nodes do?

# Adversary in Consensus Protocols

- The *adversary* can corrupt nodes, after which they are called adversarial.

- Crash faults** if the adversarial nodes do not send or receive any messages.



- Omission faults** if the adversarial nodes can selectively choose to drop or let through each messages sent or received.



- Byzantine faults (Byzantine Adversary)** if the adversarial nodes can deviate from the protocol arbitrarily.



# Assumption on Adversarial Nodes

- We typically bound the adversary's power by assuming an upper bound ( $f$ ) on the number of nodes ( $n$ ) that can ever be adversarial.
  - E.g.  $f < n$ ,  $f < \frac{n}{2}$ ,  $f < \frac{n}{3}$ , ...

# Consensus Protocol for Byzantine Broadcast

- There are  $n$  nodes (where  $n$  is fixed), one of which is the leader.
- For a public  $f$ , a subset of  $f$  nodes is adversarial, and all other nodes are honest.
- The leader has an input value 0 or 1.

## Byzantine Broadcast Constraints:


- **Agreement:** No two honest nodes output different values. (Even when the leader is adversarial!)
- **Validity:** When the leader is honest  $\Rightarrow$  All the honest nodes output the value input from the leader.
- **Termination:** All honest nodes eventually output some value.



# Consensus Protocol for Byzantine Broadcast


- Denote the nodes by the indices  $i = 0, 1, 2, \dots, n$
- Node 0 is the leader. Let  $v$  denotes its value.
- Let  $V_i$  denote the set of values received by node  $i$ .
- Time moves in *lock-step*.

- Let  $\langle v': i \rangle$  denotes the value  $v'$  signed by node  $i$ .
- Let  $\langle v': i, j, k, \dots, y, z \rangle$  denotes a signature chain signed by nodes  $i, j, k, \dots, y, z$ .
  - Recursive Definition:  $\langle v': i, j, k, \dots, y, z \rangle = \langle \langle v': i, j, k, \dots, y \rangle : z \rangle$



# Consensus in the Internet Setting

- How to select nodes to participate in the consensus protocol?




- **Two variants:**

- Permissioned: There are *fixed set of nodes* that can participate in the consensus.
- Permissionless: Anyone is *free to join* the protocol at any time.

**Question:** Can we accept any node that has a signing key to participate in consensus?

# Consensus in the Internet Setting

- How to select nodes to participate in the consensus protocol?



- In a **Sybil Attack**, a single adversary impersonates many different nodes, outnumbering the honest nodes and potentially disrupting consensus.

# Consensus Protocols in Sybil Resistance

- Consensus protocols with Sybil resistance are typically based on a bounded resource:

	Resource Dedicated to the Protocol	Some Examples Blockchain
<b>Proof-of-Work</b>	Total Computational Power	Bitcoin, PoW Ethereum, etc.
<b>Proof-of-Stake</b>	Total Number of Coins	Algorand, Cardano, Cosmos, PoS Ethereum, etc.
<b>Proof-of-Space/Time</b>	Total Storage Across Time	Chia, Filecoin, etc.

## How does Proof-of-Work prevent Sybil attacks?

We assume that the adversary controls a **small fraction** of the scarce resource!  
Resource gives the power to influence the protocol.  
Adversary has less influence than honest nodes.

# Quick Introduction to Proof-of-Stake

In a Proof-of-Stake protocol, nodes lock up (i.e., stake) their coins in the protocol to become eligible to participate in consensus.


The more coins staked by a node...

- **Higher** the probability that the node is elected as a leader.
- **Larger** the weight of that node's actions.


If a node is caught doing an adversarial action (e.g., sending two values), it can be punished by burning its locked coins (stake)! This is called *slashing*.

Thus, in a Proof-of-Stake protocol, nodes can be held *accountable* for their actions (unlike in Bitcoin, where nodes do not lock up coins).

# A Simple (PBFT-Style) Proof-of-Stake Protocol




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


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





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
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
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


# A Simple (PBFT-Style) Proof-of-Stake Protocol





# A Simple (PBFT-Style) Proof-of-Stake Protocol



# Today's Agenda

- Upon successful of today's lecture, we have learned about:
  - Recapitulation of **Byzantine Generals Problem**, including the problem statement, the network node analogy.
  - Consensus Protocol for **Byzantine Broadcast**, including the common constraints, and the procedure to ensure consensus.
  - Attacks for Consensus Protocols, such as **Sybil attacks**.
  - Proof-of-Stake as **a simple PBFT-style PoS protocol**.

# End of the lecture! 🎉

Please feel free to ask any questions.

If you need further discussion, please contact me:

- Email me at [charnon@cmkl.ac.th](mailto:charnon@cmkl.ac.th)
- Appoint me for 1-on-1 discussion during the office hours.