

4040-849 OPTIMIZATION METHODS

OPTIMIZING CRYPTOGRAPHIC STRENGTH OF SUBSTITUTION

LAYERS IN SYMMETRIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEMS

Christopher Wood

May 12, 2012

Abstract

The cryptographic security of symmetric-key block ciphers and other related primitives is based upon their adherence to Shannon's principles of confusion and diffusion [1]. Confusion can be defined as the statistical relationship between the ciphertext and private key of a cipher, while diffusion refers to the statistical redundancy of plaintext bits in the ciphertext bits. Consequently, it is increasingly important to optimize these characteristics in order to make them less susceptible to attacks based on linear and differential cryptanalysis. S(ubstitution)-boxes are the most traditional mathematical structures that are used to improve the levels of diffusion and confusion within symmetric-key cryptographic algorithms. Recent research efforts have revealed practical measurements of S-box constructions that indicate their susceptibility to linear and differential cryptanalysis. In this work, we attempt to formulate the problem of cryptographically strong substitution layers in symmetric-key block ciphers with S-box designs into a mixed integer programming problem that can be optimized to yield the high diffusion and confusion dividends in resulting cipher implementations.

1 Problem Description

The strength of cryptographic algorithms is commonly measured by their resilience to common cryptanalysis attacks, such as linear and differential cryptanalysis. Linear cryptanalysis is an attack that attempts to take advantage of high probability occurrences of linear expressions involving plaintext bits, ciphertext bits, and subkey bits. Mathematically, the attack is based on the idea of approximating the operation of a portion of the block cipher in question with an expression that is linear in terms of the input (X) and output (Y) bits involved, as shown below [2]:

$$X_{i_1} \oplus X_{i_2} \dots \oplus X_{i_r} \oplus Y_{j_1} \oplus Y_{j_2} \dots \oplus Y_{j_s} \oplus 0$$

Using this expression, attackers can gauge the amount of randomness introduced by the cipher. That is, if such an expression is satisfied frequently (with a relatively high probability), then we know that the probability of the expression holding for any two values $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ is approximately $\frac{1}{2}$. However, when this probability shifts away from $\frac{1}{2}$, the amount of known plaintexts required to determine the key (or key block) that was used to reproduce the output goes down dramatically. Such a deviation from the expected probability of $\frac{1}{2}$ for any expression of the form above, which is

referred to as the *linear bias*, determines the susceptibility of the block cipher to known plaintext attacks. Therefore, it is important to introduce non-linearity into the block cipher in order to defend against such attacks.

Differential cryptanalysis is a very powerful attack technique that attempts to break symmetric key ciphers by exploiting high probability of certain occurrences of plaintext differences and ciphertext differences [2]. To illustrate this attack technique, consider the input of a block cipher to be represented by the vector $[X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n]$ and the corresponding output to be $[Y_1, Y_2, \dots, Y_n]$, where each element X_i and Y_i corresponds to a single bit in the input and output, respectively. With this definition, we can represent the input difference of any two input vectors (ΔX) and any two output vectors (ΔY) as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta X &= [\Delta X_1 \oplus \Delta X_2 \oplus \dots \oplus \Delta X_n] \\ \Delta Y &= [\Delta Y_1 \oplus \Delta Y_2 \oplus \dots \oplus \Delta Y_n]\end{aligned}$$

where $\Delta X_i = X_{i,1} \oplus X_{i,2}$ and $\Delta Y_i = Y_{i,1} \oplus Y_{i,2}$. It is an ideal block cipher the output different ΔY for a specific input different ΔX will occur with a probability of approximately $\frac{1}{2^n}$ (i.e. it produces random output based on every input block). Note that it is common to represent the input and output difference pairs as $(\Delta X, \Delta Y)$ (which are referred to as differentials).

With the idea of differential pairs in mind, we define differential cryptanalysis as the process of finding differentials that occur with a probability much higher than $\frac{1}{2^n}$, which subsequently gives rise to a statistical correlation between the relationship between the input and output of a block cipher and can allow one to deduce the private key used in the cipher. Therefore, it is ideal to maximize the amount of randomness introduced by the block cipher through each iteration. Clearly, this necessity can be traced back to the need for high diffusion and confusion levels in block ciphers.

The efficiency of both of these attacks relate to the measures of confusion and diffusion within a cipher and the extent to which they can be exploited. Confusion is typically referred to as the complexity of the relationship between the secret-key and ciphertext, and diffusion is commonly referred to as the degree to which the influence of a single input bit is spread throughout the resulting ciphertext. In the context of cryptographic algorithms, these characteristics are usually realized through a unique combination of linear and nonlinear operations. It is clear that the nonlinear operations in the algorithms contribute more to the security of the corresponding algorithm than the other components. The most common source of nonlinearity in symmetric-key cryptographic algorithms is from a S(ubstitution)-box, which is a function with an equal sized domain and range that is configured to yield optimal confusion and diffusion between each input and output pair. As such, S-boxes (as the substitution layer in cryptographic algorithms) will be the focus of this project.

1.1 Cryptographic Strength of Substitution Layers

Mathematically, an S-box can be represented as a function f that maps input values a to output values b such that $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$. In the context of cryptographic applications, such a function f should be bijective in order to avoid bias towards any specific output element in the field. We now present a series of definitions that are pertinent to the design of cryptographically strong S-Boxes [3].

Definition 1. The *Hamming weight* of an element $x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ is defined as $\text{wt}(x) = \sum x_i$, where x_i refers to the i th bit in x .

Definition 2. Let f be a bijective function with range \mathbb{R}^* , where $|\mathbb{R}^*| = m$. Let n be the number of elements x that satisfy $f(x \oplus \Delta_i) = f(x) \oplus \Delta_o$. Then, $\frac{n}{m}$ is the *differential probability* p of the characteristic $f_D(\Delta_i \rightarrow \Delta_o)$.

Definition 3. The *branch number* of an $n \times n$ -bit S-Box is

$$BN = \min_{a, b \neq a} (\text{wt}(a \oplus b) + \text{wt}(S(a) \oplus S(b))), \quad (1)$$

where $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$.

Definition 4. A function $f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$ exhibits the *avalanche effect* if and only if

$$\sum_{x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n} \text{wt}(f(x) \oplus f(x \oplus c_i^n)) = n2^{n-1}, \quad (2)$$

for all $i(1 \leq i \leq n)$, where $c_i^n = \langle 0, 0, \dots, 1, \dots, 0 \rangle$ (where a 1 is in the n th position of the vector of cardinality n).

Definition 5. A function $f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$ satisfies the *Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC)* if for all $i(1 \leq i \leq n)$ the following equations hold:

$$\sum_{x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n} f(x) \oplus f(x \oplus c_i^n) = (2^{n-1}, 2^{n-1}, \dots, 2^{n-1})$$

This simply means that $f(x) \oplus f(x \oplus c_i^n)$ is balanced for every element in \mathbb{F}_2^n with Hamming distance of 1.

Definition 6. The *degree of nonlinearity* of an $n \times n$ -bit S-Box from $\mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$ can be measured by

$$P_S = \max_{0 \neq a, b} |\{x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n : S(x+a) - S(x) = b\}| \quad (3)$$

where $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$, and a low measure for P_S indicates a high degree of nonlinearity.

Designers of cryptographically secure cryptographic primitives (e.g. block ciphers, hash functions, etc) use all of these measurements as a basis for the degrees of confusion and diffusion within

a cipher, and thus for their susceptibility to linear and differential cryptanalysis (among other attacks). Specifically, it has been shown that cryptographically secure symmetric-key algorithms utilize substitution layers that provide the following characteristics:

1. Low differential propagation probability
2. High branch number
3. High satisfaction of the SAC criterion
4. High degree of nonlinearity

However, in practice the additional constraints that fast and simple mathematical operations must be used to emulate represent such a bijective function f that exhibits ideal values for all of these measurements.

2 Optimization Candidate and Problem Formation

Due to the application of S-boxes inside cryptographic algorithms, it is ideal that such function configurations exhibit the globally maximum values for each of these metrics. The best way to achieve this assurance is to perform an exhaustive search over the S-box design space (i.e. consider all possible input and output values and find the one that yields the optimum results). The results from an exhaustive search for a 2-bit S-box are shown in Figure 2

Such exhaustive searches have a worst case time complexity of $O(n^n)$ and thus are only feasible for very small order S-boxes. However, recent research efforts have advanced the upper bound on these exhaustive searches to include 4-bit S-boxes, which were run in TODO: DETAILS (CITE cryptanalysis of 4x4 bit sboxes). However, measurements for each of the aforementioned metrics were not provided. Furthermore, due to the instability of each function over the design variable permutation space, it is clear that a probabilistic optimization algorithm would be best suited to optimizing each of these metrics.

Before such an algorithm can be applied, however, we must formalize each objective function for these metrics as standard optimization problems. Treating each objective function as a mixed-integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) problem yields the following problem definitions.




Figure 1: The results for the branch number, avalanche, and nonlinearity measurements for a 2-bit S-box over all possible permutations in the design variables.

Branch Number - Minimize

$$BN'(X) = -BN(X) = -\min_{i,j \neq i} (\text{wt}(i \oplus j) + \text{wt}(X(i) \oplus X(j))),$$

subject to the constraints

$$\begin{aligned} 0 \leq X(i) &\leq 2^n - 1 \\ \min_{i,j \neq i} (\text{wt}(i \oplus j) + \text{wt}(X(i) \oplus X(j))) - n2^{n-1} &\leq 0 \end{aligned}$$

where n is the number of bits needed to represent the design variables.

Avalanche Number - Minimize

$$A'(X) = -A(X) = - \sum_{x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n} \text{wt}(f(x) \oplus f(x \oplus c_i^n)),$$

subject to the constraints

$$0 \leq X(i) \leq 2^n - 1,$$

where n is the number of bits needed to represent the design variables.

Nonlinearity Measurement - Minimize

$$P_S(X) = \max_{0 \neq a, b} |\{x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n : S(x+a) - S(x) = b\}|,$$

subject to the constraints

$$0 \leq X(i) \leq 2^n - 1,$$

where n is the number of bits needed to represent the design variables.

It is important to note that the lack of additional constraints on these objective functions is intentional. Due to the nature of S-boxes and their application inside cryptographic algorithms, additional constraints might serve as additional information for attackers to exploit.

3 Candidate Optimization Algorithms

3.1 Genetic Algorithm

Given the instability of each of these functions over the permutation design variable space, it is natural to solve these MINLP problem using a probabilistic optimization algorithm. For the purposes of this project, the main results were derived using a highly probabilistic genetic algorithm that attempts to explore the permutation design space as much as possible in search for the global optimum values. Genetic algorithms are commonly utilized in the context of cryptography to explore the design space for cryptographic functions. They serve as an intelligence optimization method that can ease the computational efforts of performing brute force searches among the design space, which is crucial for functions with larger domains. (CITE SHA-3 CANDIDATE UPDATE).

Since each of the aforementioned objective functions exhibit the same instable behavior, it is possible to apply the same genetic algorithm structure to solve each one of these. In particular, the

Algorithm option	Configuration
Population creation function	TODO: describe
Population mutation function	TODO: describe
Generations	500
Tolerance Function limit	1×10^{-6} from last function value change
Stall generation limit	2^n identical function values
Initial population	S-box configuration $\langle 0, 1, \dots, n \rangle$

genetic algorithm configuration for each of these problems used the following parameters.

3.2 Non-Probabilistic Optimization Algorithms

The *Branch and Bound* algorithm is another optimization algorithm commonly used to solve MINLP problems. However, this algorithm is not suitable in the context of this problem for a variety of reasons, as shown below.

1. The branch and bound algorithm is greedy, in that it selects the appropriate decision branch to take to proceed towards the optimal value based on the current configuration. While this leads the algorithm towards an optimum value, it is usually a locally optimal solution. Furthermore, there is no penalty applied to the decision process that enables the design variables to change.
2. As shown in Figure 2, there are many locally optimum values for each objective function even with small order S-boxes. The usefulness of the BNB algorithm will surely degrade as larger order S-boxes are considered, because the number of intermediate local optimum values will increase significantly as well. This would cause the algorithm to converge to an optimal value too quickly and terminate with very few iterations.
3. TODO: what else

OQNLP: stochastic process that relies on smoothness of function to approximate

4 Optimization Results

We now present the optimization results for the three objective functions listed in the Section 2 for 3- and 4-bit S-box configurations. Each objective function is first optimized individually and then they are joined together as a multi-objective MINLP problem.

Also, since the genetic algorithm solver is a probabilistic algorithm that randomizes the population at each generation, it is important to note that each algorithm was run many times to obtain the optimal results. Due to the highly instable objective functions, it is not enough to run the algorithm once and conclude that the results are optimum.

Table 1: TODO

S-Box Configuration	Optimal Function Value	Generations Produced
6 1 3 6 3 6 4 1	26	57
0 7 7 4 6 1 1 2	20	51
5 3 2 5 2 5 5 2	30	59
6 1 1 6 1 4 6 1	30	51
6 1 5 6 1 6 2 1	28	58
1 2 6 1 7 0 1 6	22	58
1 6 6 1 6 5 1 6	30	51
3 4 7 1 6 3 1 6	20	51
6 3 3 4 2 5 5 2	22	63
6 1 1 2 1 6 6 1	30	63

4.1 Avalanche Number

Based on Equation 2 from Section 1.1, we can easily tell that the optimal value for the avalanche number is exactly $n2^{n-1}$, where n is the number of bits needed to store the S-box values. Therefore, for 3- and 4-bit S-boxes, we conclude that the optimal values are $3 \cdot 3(2^2) = 3 \cdot 12 = 36$ and $4 \cdot 4(2^3) = 4 \cdot 32 = 128$, respectively, since we are concerned with the avalanche effect over every single bit. Now, compare these optimal values against those obtained from the optimization algorithm. Table 4.1 contains the optimal results for a 3-bit S-box configuration that were collected over a variety of optimization runs, and Figure 4.1 contains an illustration of the iteration pattern of the algorithm for a higher order 4-bit S-box configuration.

Based on these results we can see that

4.2 Branch Number

<http://www.iacr.org/archive/fse2006/40470042/40470042.pdf> - shows that branch number is maximum if $q+1$ (order of field + 1?) Give the equation and then show that this does not produce optimal results.

[4]

4.3 Nonlinearity Measurement

TODO: cite Nydberg FSE 2012, this is Almost Perfect Nonlinear ($\epsilon = 2$), very good result. [5]

4.4 Multi-Objective Optimization

Based on the fact that cryptographers and mathematicians attempt to optimize all of these measurements together, it is ideal to find an optimal value among all of the objective functions simultaneously. The most common way to solve this is to re-write the optimization problem as a linear combination of all three objective functions. The benefit of this approach is that we can




Figure 2: The results for the branch number, avalanche, and nonlinearity measurements for a 2-bit S-box over all possible permutations in the design variables.

Table 2: TODO

S-Box Configuration	Optimal Function Value	Generations Produced
3 4 0 7 5 2 6 1	3	500
3 6 4 1 5 0 2 7	3	500
4 7 6 1 2 1 5 6	2	500
5 3 1 5 6 5 0 7	2	500
1 3 0 2 7 2 6 3	2	500
6 3 4 1 5 6 0 4	2	500
3 1 5 4 2 6 4 1	2	500
6 5 5 4 4 3 2 6	2	500
2 6 6 2 4 3 2 1	2	500
4 3 1 2 6 7 5 6	2	500

Table 3: TODO

S-Box Configuration	Optimal Function Value	Generations Produced
4 2 1 4 1 1 5 4	2	51
6 3 6 5 1 5 5 1	2	51
0 3 3 6 7 6 2 2	2	51
3 4 1 5 4 0 6 6	2	51
4 4 7 2 4 1 5 6	2	51




Figure 3: The results for the branch number, avalanche, and nonlinearity measurements for a 2-bit S-box over all possible permutations in the design variables.





Figure 4: The results for the branch number, avalanche, and nonlinearity measurements for a 2-bit S-box over all possible permutations in the design variables.

Table 4: TODO

Avalanche Weight	Branch Weight	Nonlinearity Weight	S-Box Configuration	Function Value Tuple
1	2^8	2^8	5 6 2 5 5 6 2 5	TODO
1	2^4	2^8	4 3 3 6 2 5 5 4	TODO
1	2^8	2^4	2 5 2 2 2 5 2 2	TODO
1	2^4	2^4	3 5 4 2 3 5 4 2	TODO

Figure 5: Weights: $1, 2^8, 2^8$

prioritize the influence that each objective function has on the overall solution by assigning weights to each value in this linear combination. For the purposes of this project, the following linear combination was used to construct the multi-objective MINLP problem.

TODO: write the stuff here

5 Conclusions and Future Work

References

- [1] K. Kim, "A study on the construction and analysis of substitution boxes for symmetric cryptosystems," 1990.
- [2] H. M. Heys, "A tutorial on linear and differential cryptanalysis," Tech. Rep., 2001.
- [3] P. P. Mar and K. M. Latt, "New analysis methods on strict avalanche criterion of s- boxes."

- [4] “On feistel structures using a diffusion switching mechanism.” in *Fast Software Encryption, 13th International Workshop, FSE 2006*, 2006, pp. 41–56. [Online]. Available: <http://www.iacr.org/cryptodb/archive/2006/FSE/3254/3254.pdf>
- [5] “”Provable” security against differential and linear cryptanalysis,” in *Fast Software Encryption, 19th International Workshop, FSE 2012*, 2012.