CCNx Key Exchange

v5

Motivation and Goals

- We need a way to establish session keys between consumers and producers that makes use of CCN properties
 - Follow (D)TLS and QUIC as closely as possible
- Session keys must be forward secure
 - Compromising long-term secrets does not put session keys at risk
- Server-side DOS prevention (think SYN flooding)
- At most 2 RTTs to establish a session key, with the possibility for session resumption in 0 RTT
- Possible extensions for client authentication in addition to server authentication

CCNx Key Exchange Assumptions


 Consumers know the prefix of the target producer, e.g., /prefix/

• ... that's it!

Protocol Overview


- Round 1: Obtain the server config (if not available or it has expired)
- Round 2: HELLO handshake and establish ephemeral keys
- Round 3: Final exchange to derive forward-secure secrets for all subsequent communication

Sketch of the Full Protocol




Interest[/prefix/nonce1] payload: (HELLO) CO[/prefix/nonce1] payload: Config, nonce2, salt, prefix2 Interest[/prefix2/nonce2] 3 payload: ClientShare1, {AlgorithmOptions, ClientShare2}_SS CO[/prefix2/nonce2] payload:[SessionID, ({RC}_TK-P), 4 {ACK, ServerShare2}_SS | {REJ, Reason}_SS] Interest[/prefix2/SessionID/{...}_TK-C] 5 payload: {ConsumerData}_TK-C CO[/prefix2/SessionID/{...}_TK-C] 6 payload: {ProducerData}_TK-P


Option #2: Final prefix redirection



Option #3: Resumption Cookie Echo



(New) Key Material Generation



Client Authentication

- Approach 1: Provide certificate and signature in Full HELLO message
- Approach 2: Challenge-response (challenge provided in the FULL HELLO response)
- Approach 3: Plug in existing approaches (e.g., EAP)

New Material

- Optional consumer-provided prefix (and session ID) in Round 2 interest
- Optional client authentication
 - Happens after server authentication
 - Server challenge (contained in the Round 2 Content Object) must be fresh
- Updated key derivation procedure to support rekeying (based on TLS 1.3)

Session Rekeying

- Consumer or producer generates a KeyUpdate message in an interest or content after Round 3 is finished
- Upon receipt of a re-key message, the traffic secret is incremented by 1 and the keys are re-derived according to section 7.3 of TLS 1.3.

Open Issues

- Identifying the minimal producer routable prefix
- Balancing consumer/producer work for the Round 2 Interest

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