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1. [FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316](#)

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FTC v. Brown Shoe Co.

Supreme Court of the United States

April 25, 1966, Argued ; June 6, 1966, Decided

No. 118

Reporter

384 U.S. 316 *; 86 S. Ct. 1501 **; 16 L. Ed. 2d 587 ***; 1966 U.S. LEXIS 2948 ****; 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) P71,785

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. BROWN SHOE CO., INC.

Prior History: [****1] CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

Disposition: [339 F.2d 45](#), reversed.

Core Terms

shoes, unfair, franchise, dealers, retail, customers, franchise agreement, practices, declare, Federal Trade Commission Act, competitors, lines

Case Summary

Procedural Posture

Certiorari was granted to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which set aside an order of petitioner Federal Trade Commission. Petitioner had ordered respondent shoe manufacturer to cease and desist from the use of a contract program on the grounds that it was an unfair method of competition within the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act, [15 U.S.C.S. § 45 \(a\)\(6\)](#).

Overview

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed a judgment setting aside petitioner Federal Trade Commission's order, which had required respondent shoe manufacturer to cease and desist from use of what petitioner had found to be a restrictive contract program amounting to an unfair method of competition within the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act (Act), [15 U.S.C.S. § 45 \(a\)\(6\)](#). The Supreme Court found that petitioner had broad powers to declare trade practices unfair, particularly, trade practices which conflicted with the

basic policies of the antitrust laws. The record showed that respondent's contract program effectively foreclosed respondent's competitors from selling to a substantial number of shoe dealers in conflict with the policies of [§ 1](#) of the Sherman Act, [15 U.S.C.S. § 1](#), and [§ 3](#) of the Clayton Act, [15 U.S.C.S. § 14](#). Because petitioner had the power under the Act to arrest trade restraints in their incipiency without proof that they amounted to an outright violation of any specific **antitrust law**, it acted well within its authority in declaring respondent's franchise program unfair whether it was completely full blown or not.

Outcome

The Supreme Court reversed a judgment setting aside petitioner Federal Trade Commission's order to respondent shoe manufacturer to cease and desist from its use of certain franchise agreements, because petitioner was within its authority to declare such a practice an unfair method of competition.

LexisNexis® Headnotes

Antitrust & Trade Law > Public Enforcement > US Federal Trade Commission Actions > General Overview

Banking Law > Federal Acts > Federal Trade Commission Act > Unfair Competition & Practices

Antitrust & Trade Law > Federal Trade Commission Act > General Overview

Antitrust & Trade Law > ... > US Federal Trade Commission Actions > Remedial Powers > General Overview

[HN1](#) **Public Enforcement, US Federal Trade**

Commission Actions

Section 5(a)(6) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, [15 U.S.C.S. § 45 \(a\)\(6\)](#), empowers and directs the Federal Trade Commission to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations from using unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce. [15 U.S.C.S. § 45\(a\)\(6\)](#).

Antitrust & Trade Law > Regulated Practices > Trade Practices & Unfair Competition > Federal Trade Commission Act

Banking Law > Federal Acts > Federal Trade Commission Act > Unfair Competition & Practices

Antitrust & Trade Law > Federal Trade Commission Act > General Overview

Antitrust & Trade Law > Federal Trade Commission Act > Scope

Antitrust & Trade Law > Regulated Practices > Trade Practices & Unfair Competition > General Overview

[HN2](#) Trade Practices & Unfair Competition, Federal Trade Commission Act

See [15 U.S.C.S. § 45\(a\)\(1\)](#).

Antitrust & Trade Law > ... > US Federal Trade Commission Actions > Remedial Powers > General Overview

[HN3](#) US Federal Trade Commission Actions, Remedial Powers

The Federal Trade Commission (Commission) has broad powers to declare trade practices unfair. This broad power of the Commission is particularly well established with regard to trade practices which conflict with the basic policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts even though such practices may not actually violate these laws.

Antitrust & Trade Law > ... > US Federal Trade Commission Actions > Remedial Powers > Federal Trade Commission Act

Antitrust & Trade Law > Federal Trade Commission Act > General Overview

Antitrust & Trade Law > Federal Trade Commission Act > Remedies > Injunctions

Antitrust & Trade Law > Public Enforcement > US Federal Trade Commission Actions > General Overview

Antitrust & Trade Law > ... > US Federal Trade Commission Actions > Remedial Powers > General Overview

[HN4](#) Remedial Powers, Federal Trade Commission Act

The Federal Trade Commission has power under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, [15 U.S.C.S. § 45](#), to arrest trade restraints in their incipency without proof that they amount to an outright violation of [§ 3](#) of the Clayton Act, [15 U.S.C.S. § 14](#), or other provisions of the antitrust laws.

Antitrust & Trade Law > ... > US Federal Trade Commission Actions > Remedial Powers > General Overview

Business & Corporate Law > Distributorships & Franchises > Causes of Action > Restraints of Trade

[HN5](#) US Federal Trade Commission Actions, Remedial Powers

The Federal Trade Commission acted well within its authority in declaring a franchise program unfair whether it was completely full blown or not.

Lawyers' Edition Display

Summary

The Federal Trade Commission enjoined a large manufacturer of shoes from entering into franchise contracts with retail shoestore operators which obligated the manufacturer to give to the dealer, but not to the manufacturer's other customers, valuable services, and in return required the dealers not to purchase conflicting lines of shoes from the manufacturer's competitors. On review, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit set

aside the Commission's order on the ground that the manufacturer's practice was not an unfair method of competition in violation of 5 of the [Federal Trade Commission Act. \(339 F2d 45.\)](#)

On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed. In an opinion by Black, J., expressing the unanimous view of the Court, it was held that the Commission acted well within its authority in declaring the manufacturer's franchise program unfair.

Headnotes

PRACTICES §56 > order of FTC -- review of findings --

> Headnote:

[LEdHN\[1\]](#) [1]

A general conclusionary statement--made by a Court of Appeals in setting aside an order of the Federal Trade Commission which enjoined, as an unfair method of competition, a shoe manufacturer's entering into franchise contracts with retail shoestores requiring them not to purchase conflicting lines of shoes from competitors--that there was a complete failure to prove an exclusive dealing agreement which might be held violative of 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ([15 USC 45](#)) cannot be treated by the Supreme Court of the United States as intended to be a rejection of the Commission's findings of fact, where neither this statement nor any other statement in the opinion of the Court of Appeals indicates a purpose to hold that the evidence failed to show an exclusive dealing agreement as alleged in the complaint of the Commission, and moreover the crucial facts were admitted in the manufacturer's formal answer to the complaint.

PRACTICES §48 > unfair methods of competition -- powers of FTC -- > Headnote:

[LEdHN\[2\]](#) [2]

Subject to judicial review, the Federal Trade Commission has power to find a shoe manufacturer guilty of an unfair method of competition in violation of 5(a)(6) of the Federal Trade Commission Act ([15 USC 45 \(a\)\(6\)](#)) upon a record showing that the manufacturer admitted to have entered into exclusive franchise agreements with a substantial number of retail

shoestore operators and that the trial examiner found that the manufacturer's franchise program effectively foreclosed its competitors from selling to a substantial number of retail shoe dealers.

PRACTICES §44 > powers of FTC -- > Headnote:

[LEdHN\[3\]](#) [3]

The Federal Trade Commission has broad powers to declare trade practices unfair, including trade practices which conflict with the basic policies of the Sherman ([15 USC 1 et seq.](#)) and Clayton ([15 USC 14](#)) Acts, even though such practices may not actually violate these laws.

MONOPOLIES §54 > PRACTICES §48 > exclusive franchise agreements -- > Headnote:

[LEdHN\[4\]](#) [4]

A shoe manufacturer's program of making exclusive franchise agreements with retail shoestore operators requiring them not to purchase conflicting lines of shoes from the manufacturer's competitors, while conflicting with the central policy of both 1 of the Sherman Act ([15 USC 1](#)) and 3 of the Clayton Act ([15 USC 14](#)) against contracts which take away freedom of purchasers to buy in an open market, can be enjoined under 3 of the Clayton Act only upon proof by the government that the effect of the program may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly; however, no such proof is necessary where the government proceeds to enjoin this program as an unfair method of competition under 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ([15 USC 45](#)).

PRACTICES §44 > powers of FTC -- > Headnote:

[LEdHN\[5\]](#) [5]

Under 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ([15 USC 45](#)), dealing with unfair methods of competition and unfair trade practices, the Federal Trade Commission has power to arrest trade restraints in their incipiency without proof that they amount to an outright violation of 3 of the Clayton Act ([15 USC 14](#)) or other provisions of

the antitrust laws.

PRACTICES §43 > Trade Commission Act -- function --

> Headnote:

[LEdHN\[6\]](#) [6]

The Federal Trade Commission Act is designed to supplement and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act by stopping incipient acts and practices which when full blown would violate those acts, as well as to condemn as "unfair methods of competition" existing violations of them.

PRACTICES §48 > unfair methods of competition --

> Headnote:

[LEdHN\[7\]](#) [7]

The Federal Trade Commission acts well within its authority in declaring that a shoe manufacturer's franchise program is an unfair method of competition violating 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ([15 USC 45](#)), where under that program the manufacturer entered into franchise contracts with retail shoestore operators which obligated the manufacturer to give to the dealer, but not to the manufacturer's other customers, valuable services, and in return require the dealers not to purchase conflicting lines of shoes from the manufacturer's competitors.

Syllabus

The FTC filed a complaint against respondent, the country's second largest shoe manufacturer, under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, charging unfair trade practices by the use of a "Franchise Stores Program" through which respondent sells its shoes to more than 650 retail stores. In return for special benefits from Brown Shoe Company, the franchise stores agree to buy Brown shoe lines and to refrain from buying competitive lines. After hearings the FTC concluded that the restrictive contract program was an unfair method of competition and ordered respondent to cease and desist from its use. The Court of Appeals set aside the FTC's order, holding that there was "complete failure to prove an exclusive dealing agreement"

violative of § 5 of the Act. *Held*: The FTC acted well within its authority under the Act in declaring respondent's franchise program an unfair trade practice. Pp. 319-322.

(a) On this record the FTC has power to find [****2] such anticompetitive practice unfair. [Federal Trade Comm'n v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421](#), relied on by the Court of Appeals, has been rejected by this Court. Pp. 320-321.

(b) The franchise program conflicts with the policy of [§ 1](#) of the Sherman Act and [§ 3](#) of the Clayton Act against contracts which remove freedom of purchasers to buy in an open market. P. 321.

(c) Under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act the FTC has power to arrest restraints of trade in their incipency without proof that they are outright violations of [§ 3](#) of the Clayton Act or other antitrust provisions. [F. T. C. v. Motion Picture Adv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-395](#). Pp. 321-322.

Counsel: Ralph S. Spritzer argued the cause for petitioner. On the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Robert S. Rifkind, Howard E. Shapiro, Milton J. Grossman, James Mcl. Henderson, Thomas F. Howder and Gerald J. Thain.

Robert H. McRoberts argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Gaylord C. Burke and Edwin S. Taylor.

Judges: Warren, Black, Douglas, Clark, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White, Fortas

Opinion by: BLACK

Opinion

[*317] [***589] [****3] [**1502] MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 5 (a)(6) of the Federal Trade Commission Act [HN1](#) empowers and directs the Commission "to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce."

¹ [****6] Proceeding under the authority of § 5, the

¹ 38 Stat. 719, as amended, [15 U. S. C. § 45 \(a\)\(6\) \(1964 ed.\)](#).

Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint against the Brown Shoe Co., Inc., one of the world's largest manufacturers of shoes with total sales of \$ 236,946,078 for the year ending October 31, 1957. The unfair practices charged against Brown revolve around the "Brown Franchise Stores' Program" through which Brown sells its shoes to some 650 retail stores. The complaint alleged that under this plan Brown, a corporation engaged in interstate commerce, had "entered into contracts or franchises with a substantial number of its independent retail shoe store operator customers which require said customers to restrict their purchases of shoes for resale to the Brown lines and which prohibit them from purchasing, stocking or reselling shoes manufactured by competitors of Brown." Brown's customers who entered into these restrictive [****4] franchise agreements, so the complaint charged, were given in return special treatment and valuable benefits which were not granted to Brown's customers who [*318] did not enter into the agreements. In its answer to the Commission's complaint Brown admitted that approximately 259 of its retail customers had executed written franchise agreements and that over 400 others had entered into its franchise program without execution of the franchise agreement. Also in its answer Brown attached as an exhibit an unexecuted copy of the "Franchise Agreement" which, when executed by Brown's representative and a retail shoe dealer, obligates Brown to give to the dealer but not to other customers certain valuable services, including among others architectural plans, costly merchandising records, services of a Brown field representative, and a right to participate in group insurance at lower rates than the dealer could obtain individually. In return, according to the franchise agreement set out in Brown's answer, the retailer must make this promise:

"In return I will:

"1. Concentrate my business within the grades and price lines of shoes [**1503] representing Brown Shoe Company Franchises [****5] of the Brown [***590] Division and will have no lines conflicting with Brown Division Brands of the Brown Shoe Company."

Brown's answer further admitted that the operators of

"such Brown Franchise Stores in individually varying degrees accept the benefits and perform the obligations contained in such franchise agreements or implicit in such Program," and that Brown refuses to grant these benefits "to dealers who are dropped or voluntarily withdraw from the Brown Franchise Program" The foregoing admissions of Brown as to the existence and operation of the franchise program were buttressed by many separate detailed fact findings of a trial examiner, one of which findings was that the franchise program [*319] effectively foreclosed Brown's competitors from selling to a substantial number of retail shoe dealers.² Based on these findings and on Brown's admissions the Commission concluded that the restrictive contract program was an unfair method of competition within the meaning of § 5 and ordered Brown to cease and desist from its use.

On review the Court of Appeals set aside the Commission's order. In doing so the court said:

"By passage of the Federal Trade Commission Act, particularly § 5 thereof, we do not believe that Congress meant to prohibit or limit sales programs such as Brown Shoe [****7] engaged in in this case. . . . The custom of giving free service to those who will buy their shoes is widespread, and we cannot agree with the Commission that it is an unfair method of competition in commerce." [339 F.2d 45, 56.](#)

[LEdHN\[1\]](#)[↑] [1] [LEdHN\[2\]](#)[↑] [2] In addition the Court of Appeals held that there was a "complete failure to prove an exclusive dealing agreement which might be held violative of § 5 of the Act." We are asked to treat this general conclusion as though the court intended it to be a rejection of the Commission's findings of fact. We cannot do this. Neither this statement of the court

² In its opinion the Commission found that the services provided by Brown in its franchise program were the "prime motivation" for dealers to join and remain in the program; that the program resulted in franchised stores purchasing 75% of their total shoe requirements from Brown -- the remainder being for the most part shoes which were not "conflicting" lines, as provided by the agreement; that the effect of the plan was to foreclose retail outlets to Brown's competitors, particularly small manufacturers; and that enforcement of the plan was effected by teams of field men who called upon the shoe stores, urged the elimination of other manufacturers' conflicting lines and reported deviations to Brown who then cancelled under a provision of the agreement. Compare *Brown Shoe Co. v. United States*, 370 U.S. 294.

Section 5 (a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides that [HN2](#)[↑] "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful."

nor any other statement in the [*320] opinion indicates a purpose to hold that the evidence failed to show an agreement between Brown and more than 650 franchised dealers which restrained the dealers from buying competing lines of shoes from Brown's competitors. Indeed, in view of the crucial admissions in Brown's formal answer to the complaint we cannot attribute to the Court of Appeals a purpose to set aside the Commission's findings [****8] that these restrictive agreements existed and that Brown and most of the franchised dealers in varying degrees lived up to their obligations. Thus the question we have for decision is whether the Federal Trade Commission can declare it to be an unfair practice for Brown, the second largest manufacturer of shoes in the Nation, to pay a valuable consideration to hundreds of retail [***591] shoe purchasers in order to secure a contractual promise from them that they will deal primarily with Brown and will not purchase conflicting lines of shoes from Brown's competitors. We hold that the Commission has power to find, on the record here, such an anticompetitive [**1504] practice unfair, subject of course to judicial review. See *Atlantic Rfg. Co. v. FTC*, 381 U.S. 357, 367.

[LEdHN[3][↑]] [3] [LEdHN[4][↑]] [4] [LEdHN[5][↑]] [5] [LEdHN[6][↑]] [6] [LEdHN[7][↑]] [7] In holding [****9] that the Federal Trade Commission lacked the power to declare Brown's program to be unfair the Court of Appeals was much influenced by and quoted at length from this Court's opinion in *Federal Trade Comm'n v. Gratz*, 253 U.S. 421. That case, decided shortly after the Federal Trade Commission Act was passed, construed the Act over a strong dissent by Mr. Justice Brandeis as giving the Commission very little power to declare any trade practice unfair. Later cases of this Court, however, have rejected the *Gratz* view and it is now recognized in line with the dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis in *Gratz* that [HN3[↑]] the Commission has [*321] broad powers to declare trade practices unfair.³ This broad power of the Commission is particularly well established with regard to trade practices which conflict with the basic policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts even though such practices may not actually violate these laws.⁴ The

record in this case shows beyond doubt that Brown, the country's second largest manufacturer of shoes, has a program, which requires shoe retailers, unless faithless to their contractual obligations with Brown, substantially to limit their trade [****10] with Brown's competitors. This program obviously conflicts with the central policy of both § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act against contracts which take away freedom of purchasers to buy in an open market.⁵ [****12] Brown nevertheless contends that the Commission had no power to declare the franchise program unfair without proof that its effect "may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly" [*322] which of course would have to be proved if the Government were proceeding against Brown under § 3 of the Clayton Act rather than § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. We reject the argument that proof of this § 3 element must be made for as we [***592] pointed out above our cases⁶ hold that [HN4[↑]] the Commission has power under § 5 to arrest trade restraints in their incipency without proof that they amount to an outright violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act or other provisions of the antitrust laws. This power of the Commission was emphatically stated in *F. T. C. v. Motion Picture Adv. Co.*, 344 U.S. 392, at pp. 394-395:

"It is . . . clear that the Federal Trade Commission Act was designed to supplement and bolster [****11] the Sherman [**1505] Act and the Clayton Act . . . to stop in their incipency acts and practices which, when full blown, would violate those Acts . . . as well as to condemn as 'unfair methods of competition' existing violations of them."

⁵ Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1964 ed.), declares illegal "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations . . ."

Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. § 14 (1964 ed.), provides in relevant part:

"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to . . . make a . . . contract for sale of goods . . . for . . . resale within the United States . . . on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the . . . purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods . . . of a competitor or competitors of the . . . seller, where the effect of such . . . condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."

⁶ See cases cited in note 4, *supra*.

³ See, e. g., *Federal Trade Comm'n v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., Inc.*, 291 U.S. 304, 310; *Trade Comm'n v. Cement Institute*, 333 U.S. 683, 693; *Atlantic Rfg. Co. v. FTC*, 381 U.S. 357, 367.

⁴ See, e. g., *Fashion Guild v. Trade Comm'n*, 312 U.S. 457, 463; *Atlantic Rfg. Co. v. FTC*, 381 U.S. 357, 369.

384 U.S. 316, *322; 86 S. Ct. 1501, **1505; 16 L. Ed. 2d 587, ***592; 1966 U.S. LEXIS 2948, ****11

We hold that the [HNS](#)  Commission acted well within its authority in declaring the Brown franchise program unfair whether it was completely full blown or not.

Reversed.

References

Annotation References:

Validity and construction of statute creating Federal Trade Commission. 6 ALR 366, 11 ALR 797, 18 ALR 549, 30 ALR 1129, 32 ALR 792, 51 ALR 331, 68 ALR 847, 79 ALR 1200.

What constitutes false, misleading, or deceptive advertising or promotional practices subject to action by Federal Trade Commission. 65 ALR2d 225.

Validity, under 3 of the Clayton Act ([15 USC 14](#)), of contract by purchaser of goods to take his entire requirements from the seller. 5 L ed 2d 1105.

Contract by one party to sell his entire output to or to take his entire requirements of a commodity from the other party as contrary to public policy or anti-monopoly statute . 83 ALR 1173.

Right to enjoin business competitor from illegal acts or practices. 90 ALR2d 7.