Chapter 4—
Rome

Roman Friendship

The earliest Latin texts that can count as literature date to the latter half of the third century BC, when Rome was already master of most of Italy, and the ruling aristocracy could look back to three hundred years or more of continuous supremacy within the state. What is more, Roman culture was already deeply indebted to Greek: the first literary work in Latin is a translation of Homer's *Odyssey*, and the earliest surviving compositions are the plays that Plautus and Terence adapted from Greek New Comedy. No original Latin text of any size written before the first century BC survives complete (a few brief epigrams and the prologues to Terence's six dramas are the exceptions). When Roman ideas on friendship become available for study, they are already the product of a complex interaction between cultures.

Unlike Greek, Latin has a word for friendship. Though *amicitia* has a certain breadth of meaning, as does the English "friendship," and may assume, especially in philosophical contexts, some of the wider connotations of *philia*, it does not normally designate love in general but rather the specific relation between friends (*amici*). The term corresponding to *philia* in the more sweeping sense is *amor*, just as *amare* is the Latin equivalent to the Greek verb *philein*, though both words may be employed also for erotic passion which in Greek is distinguished by *eros* * and its cognates.

There is thus no need to demonstrate for Latin as for Greek that the vocabulary of friendship marks off a field of relations different from kinship, ethnicity, and utilitarian associations such as business partnerships. To take a single illustration, Cicero, in his defense of Publius Quinctius, violently attacks Sextus Naevius, an in-law and associate of Quinctius, for abusing several bonds at once (*Pro*

Quinctio 26): "If friendship is fostered by veracity, partnership by good faith, and family ties by piety, then a man who has tried to strip his friend, partner, and in-law of name and fortune must confess that he is vain, faithless, and impious." The view was long prevalent, however, that *amicitia* was "the good old word for party relationships" (Taylor 1949: 8) and entailed no necessary sentiment of personal intimacy. The idea developed in reaction to the notion that factions in Roman politics, as the *populares* and *optimates* were assumed to be, worked like modern political parties that are based on allegiance to platforms and social principles. In contrast to this anachronistic image, Roman partisanship was presumed to be a function of contingent convergences of interests among the nobility in the course of their continual campaigns for office as prescribed by the traditional *cursus honorum*. The parties to these shifting alliances grounded in private favor were said to be *amici*, which captured the individual nature of such ties and at the same time reduced them to a matter of practical affiliation having nothing to do with real and lasting affection. This, moreover, was taken to be the entire content of Roman *amicitia*.[1]

The evacuation of emotional content from the concept of friendship was facilitated by the Roman concern with reciprocity. Like the Greek *kharis*, the Latin term *gratia* refers both to the return that is due for a service (*officium* or *beneficium*) one has received, and to the sense of debt or gratitude that is morally incumbent on the beneficiary; thus Cicero (*De officiis* 2.20.69) observes: "even if one cannot return *gratia*, one can certainly have it" (cf. Seneca *De beneficiis* 7.14.4–6). This ethic of obligation was assumed to be associated particularly with relations between friends, which accorded with the picture of pragmatic give and take as the foundation of personal alliances among political leaders.[2]

In an elegant and richly documented study, Peter Brunt (1988 [orig. version 1965]) challenged the assumption that "if a Roman called a man *amicus*, it meant that he was a political ally" (1988: 352). In fact, he argues (367), "complex personal relationships could cut across political discords": men remained close despite political differences, and those with no private ties are frequently aligned on the same side in political conflicts. Furthermore, Brunt adduces the many passages in the writings of Cicero in which "*amicitia* is not

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[1] No sentiment of intimacy: cf. Syme 1939: 157.

[2] On the Latin vocabulary of reciprocity, see Pöschl 1940: 97–103; Saller 1982: 15–22.

restricted to a connection founded solely on mutual services and common interests, still less to membership of the same faction" (356). The Roman word for friendship, he observes (354), derives from the verb *amare*, "to love" (Cicero, *De amic.* 26; cf. *Partitiones oratoriae* 88 on *caritas* and *amor* as the constitutive elements of *amicitia*); even the superficial connections that gentility denominated as *amicitia* "took their name by external analogy from the true affection which is the primitive significance of the word" (360). Brunt concludes (381): "The range of *amicitia* is vast. From the constant intimacy and goodwill of virtuous or at least like-minded men to the courtesy that etiquette normally enjoined on gentlemen, it covers every degree of genuinely or overtly amicable relation."

Cicero and His Friends

The correspondence and political speeches of Cicero illustrate the way friendships were negotiated among the elite classes at Rome, about which information is most abundant. Cicero is naturally at his most reflective when a relationship is under stress. Thus, in a letter of 5 December 61 BC (1.17 = 17) addressed to Atticus, Cicero is moved to an explicitness that tact usually inhibited (17.7) by a quarrel that had erupted between Atticus and Cicero's brother Quintus, who was married to Atticus' sister.[3] "Your liberality and great-heartedness are entirely clear to me," Cicero writes, in response to Atticus' mention of the profitable opportunities he had let pass in Cicero's behalf, "nor have I ever believed that anything separated you and me except for our choice of way of life" (17.5), his own being the path of political office while Atticus preferred a private status.

> In the true accomplishments of uprightness, integrity, conscientiousness, and scrupulousness, I put neither myself nor anyone else before you, while as for your love toward me, if I leave aside my brother's love and that at home, I award you first prize. For I have seen – seen and observed profoundly – your worries and your joys during my various vicissitudes. Your congratulations on my accomplishments have often been pleasurable to me and your solace of my anxiety welcome. Now, indeed, when you are absent I most miss not only the advice which is your forte but also our exchange of conversation, which is sweetest of all to me with you . . . In

[3] Alternate numbers refer to the editions of Cicero's letters to Atticus (*Ad Att.*) and to his friends (*Ad fam.*) by Shackleton Bailey, who departed from the traditional order in favor of as strict a chronological arrangement as possible; subsequent references are to these editions.

short, neither my work nor rest, business or leisure, affairs at the forum or at home, public or private, can long do without your sweet and loving advice and conversation. (17.5–6)

Cicero acknowledges the benefit he derives from Atticus' support and thus implicitly the sacrifices he has made, but he specifies also elements that are shared rather than given: their common qualities of character, Atticus' love, which is manifested in his identification with Cicero's ups and downs, and their mutual talk, on which Cicero placed high value: "What leisure activity can be more delightful or more suitable to mankind than witty and broadly cultivated conversation?," Cicero asks in his treatise *On the Orator* (1.32; cf. *Ad fam.* 9.24.3).

Atticus is a special case: toward the end of his life (46 BC), Cicero is still writing that the Isles of the Blest are not worth whole days apart from him (*Ad Att.* 12.3 = 239.1). To turn to a less close relationship, in mid-January of 62 BC, just after Cicero's consulship, Quintus Metellus Celer, who as proconsul was waging war in cis-Alpine Gaul, complained to Cicero about his attacks on Metellus' brother back in Rome (*Ad fam.* 5.1 = 1): their mutual spirit (*animus*) and restored favor (*gratia*), as well as the stature (*dignitas*) of his family and his eager services (*studium*) both toward Cicero himself and toward the republic, had led him to expect better treatment. Cicero replies (5.2 = 2): "As to the 'mutual spirit between us,' I don't know what you consider to be mutual in a friendship; I for my part believe that it is when like sentiments (*voluntas*) are received and returned" (2.3). He affirms that he had consistently supported Metellus abroad, and deserved the same treatment in his post within the city. Cicero further denies that favor has been restored, since it had never, he claims, been curtailed (2.5).

He then comes to the quarrel with Metellus' brother: he understands fraternal loyalty very well, but begs pardon for preferring the interest of the republic, "for I am as much a friend of the republic as anyone can be." If at the personal level he defended himself, Metellus should be content that Cicero did not go further and complain to him directly of his brother's affront (*iniuria*, 2.6). Cicero alleges that he tried privately to get Metellus' wife and their sister to discourage the brother from the offense, which consisted among other things in vetoing his right to give an oration upon laying down his magistracy, and also sent common friends to reason with him (2.7–8). Given that Metellus' brother had behaved as an enemy,

Cicero had been the soul of generosity (*humanitas*, 2.9). Fraternal affection is a noble thing, but since Cicero had been attacked without provocation, Metellus should have come to his assistance, army and all. He concludes:

> I have always wished you to be friendly [or a friend: *amicus*] toward me, and I have worked hard to have you know that I am most friendly [*amicissimus*] toward you. I continue in that sentiment, and shall continue as long as you desire it, and I shall sooner cease to hate your brother out of love for you than subtract anything from our good will [*benevolentia*] out of hatred for him. (2.10)

The episode illustrates the sense of protocol that obtains between statesmen who can exploit some link of cordiality. One shows one has not been behindhand in reciprocating kindnesses; if a quarrel has arisen, one claims not to have precipitated it and to have sought arbitration to allay it. Under attack, one responds with moderation, and invokes the public interest whenever possible. Fairness should be respected, but one is willing to bury the hatchet with a declared enemy for the sake of preserving friendship with his kinsman. There is no suggestion of great intimacy between Metellus and Cicero; indeed, Cicero protests at the threatening tone of Metellus' note (2.10). But he perceives it as worth his while to maintain the forms of a personal attachment because it has value for maneuvering in the tricky terrain of republican politics (and with the Catilinaian troubles still fresh in mind).[4]

When, near the end of his life, Cicero attacked Caesar's ostensible successor Mark Antony in a series of orations known as the *Philippics* (44/3 BC), he was obliged to answer Antony's charge that he had violated their friendship. None of his former foes, he alleges at the beginning of the second *Philippic*, fell out with him deliberately; all were assailed in the interest of the republic (2.1). But Antony doubted his associates would accept him as public enemy (*hostis*) of his country unless he were a personal enemy (*inimicus*) of Cicero's (2.2). With this flourish, Cicero proceeds to the topic of *amicitia*, the betrayal of which he regards as a most serious accusation.

Antony had complained (according to Cicero) that Cicero had begun hostilities by opposing him in some legal business (the details are obscure). Cicero replies that he was defending an intimate

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[4] Public interest: cf. Brunt 1988: 368–9, 380.

against an outsider. But his opponent – evidently a tribune who had interposed a veto – had acted out of a sense of obligation (*gratia*) toward Antony that Antony had earned by means of sexual favors. Thus Cicero was in fact responding to an attack (*iniuria*) on the part of Antony which he had initiated through the services (*beneficium*) of that foul tribune (2.3). Hence it was Antony who breached the *amicitia*, and what is more did so by trading in *beneficia* and *gratia* – the coin of personal relations – of a dirty and improper sort. Cicero's skill at deploying the Roman ethical lexicon is stunning.

Cicero denies further that Antony had frequented his house and that he had yielded to him his candidacy as augur nine years earlier (2.4). He then comes to the *beneficium* for which he is supposed to be grateful (*gratus*), that Antony saved or spared his life at Brindisi – the kind of benefit bestowed by bandits, Cicero asserts (2.5). But suppose it a service, in what was he ungrateful? Ought he not to have complained about the destruction of the republic so as to appear grateful to Antony? Here again is the argument from patriotic commitment, followed by the personal justification that his first *Philippic* had in fact been temperate and indeed friendly (*amice*) in tone (9.6). Now that, says Cicero, was indeed a *beneficium*. Antony had also read aloud from some letters Cicero had sent him, which, Cicero avers, no one with the least cultivation would do, for it abolishes the communion between distant friends (2.7). What Antony sought to prove is unknown, but the trick rebounded, according to Cicero, because the letters were full of good will (*benevolentia*, 2.9). Yet Antony's letters – were Cicero to read them! – would prove that he had received a favor from Cicero himself.

The claim of a personal connection or of friendly offices evidently carried weight in public discourse, and when declared enmity was unavoidable a speaker sought to cast himself as the injured party. Cicero is thus at pains to be seen neither as defaulting on a moral debt (*ingratia*) nor as terminating an amicable association, however superficial, by a gratuitously hostile gesture that might count as *iniuria*. Reciprocity of benefits is in principle distinct from the relationship between friends, who ideally act from motives of generosity and do not require that every kindness be repaid in full. In his treatise *De beneficiis*, Seneca the younger, who had been tutor to Nero, exhaustively analyzes expectations of return on loans and favors, but rarely raises the subject of friendship; the only time he discusses *amicitia* specifically is to respond to the paradox that

friends cannot grant *beneficia* because they possess all things in common (7.12). But helpfulness is traditionally the mark of a friend and services may be interpreted as a sign of good will or amicableness. Mutual support is the point at which the vocabularies of friendship and exchange of benefits intersect, and Cicero moves naturally between the two issues, defending his integrity on both the counts of refraining from offending a supposed friend and of being conscientious in respect to any genuine debts of gratitude he may owe.[5]

Friendship in Politics

Cicero's relationship with Atticus is a world apart from those with Metellus or Antony, and Romans of his class were conscious of the difference between intimate friendships and polite or useful connections in public life. To Atticus, Cicero writes (18.1):

> those politicking and powdered-up friendships of mine have a certain brilliance in the forum but are profitless at home. Though my house is quite full [of greeters] in the morning, though I go down to the forum hemmed in by droves of "friends," I can find no one out of that great crowd with whom I can freely make a joke or sigh familiarly. That's why I am waiting for you, longing for you, even beckoning you now.

An electioneering manual attributed to Cicero's brother Quintus, and at all events written by someone "well versed in the manners of the age" (Brunt 1988: 360), coolly lays out the vote-getting meaning of friends:

> The support of friends should be acquired by benefits and services and long acquaintance and agreeableness and a pleasant personality. But this word, "friends," extends more widely in campaigning than in life generally, for whoever displays any sign of favor toward you or attends to you or visits you at home is to be considered among the circle of your friends. (16; cf. Seneca, *Ep. mor.* 3.1)

Friendship here is not wholly stripped of a personal dimension. The

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[5] Friends and *beneficia*: cf. Sen. *De ben.* 6.35 on the unseemly wish for the occasion to repay a friend's help; on *officia* and *gratia*, cf. Cicero's *Ad fam.* 5.5 = 5 to Gaius Antonius (23 December 62); on *beneficentia, De off.* 1.42–60 (discussed in Atkins 1990); Valerius Maximus 5.2–3 illustrates gratitude and ingratitude with scarcely a reference to friendship; for the widespread assumption that Sen. *De ben.* and Cic. *De off.* discuss gifts and gratitude in the context of friendship, cf. (e.g.) Dixon 1993: 452, 454; services as an expression of good will: Brunt 1988: 356; for Greek ideas of friendship and gratitude, see above, pp. 81–2.

author assures Cicero that he can win the support of anyone not already committed to his competitors if he creates the impression that he is earnest and sincere and that "his friendship will be solid and enduring, not transient and electoral [*suffragatoria*]" (26). In reference to Cicero's rival for the consulship of 63, C. Antonius, he adds: "nothing seems more stupid to me than to imagine that a person you do not know is your supporter" (28). One must know one's people by name. With this energetic method of canvassing votes through direct acquaintance with a very large constituency, Quintus (if he is the author) conveys a picture not of established networks of personal affiliation so much as of active competition among a changeable electorate at every level of the social hierarchy.

The broad participation of different classes in the campaign process has a democratic ring, and Fergus Millar has indeed argued that politics in republican Rome resembled that of classical Athens more than scholars commonly suppose; Polybius, he notes (1986: 3), assumed that "the categories of political analysis relevant to Greek cities could be applied to Rome" (Polybius, writing for a Greek audience, may not be an entirely reliable reporter). On the one hand, the popular vote mattered; otherwise, it would not have been courted so systematically through oratory, not to mention bribery. Traditional patronage was a lesser factor. On the other hand, personal obligations among the nobility did not determine the distribution of power. Friendships and enmities might have an effect on senatorial decision-making, but this does not demonstrate the existence of "larger groupings" or factions. Where relatives and friends did count was precisely in the solicitation of mass support through the ballot; thus Cicero writes to Atticus (2.1.9): "Favonius carried my tribe with even more credit than his own, but lost that of Lucceius" (trans. Yakobson 1992: 46). In the contentious arena of "open, mass politics" (Millar 1995: 103), moreover, issues were as important as personalities.[6]

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[6] Rome resembles Athens: Millar 1984: 2; cf. 14; popular vote matters: Millar 1984: 2; courted through oratory: Millar 1995: 103; through bribery: Yakobson 1992: 32–5; vs. patronage: Yakobson 1992: 34; vs. personal obligation: Millar 1986: 2, criticizing Gelzer 1969; friendship in senatorial decisions: Millar 1984: 15, citing Livy 39.4.1–6, 40.45.6–46.15, on the enmity between M. Aemilius Lepidus and M. Fulvius Nobilior and their formal reconciliation; support of relatives: Millar 1984: 13; campaigns for the ballot: Yakobson 1992: 36, citing Cicero, *Pro Murena* 72 for role of friends in providing spectacles, etc.; cf. *Comm. pet.* 44; also Cicero, *Planc.* 45 on *amici* helping to secure their tribes in an election; issues in elections: Millar 1995: 99–100.

Cicero on Friendship

In a youthful rhetorical treatise (*c.* 84 BC), Cicero had defined friendship in Aristotelian terms (*EN* 8.2, 1155b31–1156a5) as "the willing good things to another person for the own sake of him whom one loves, together with the same will on his part towards you" (*De inventione* 2.166, trans. Stock 1913: 137, modified).[7] Shortly afterwards (80 BC), in a speech which established his reputation as an orator, Cicero describes good faith in friendship as crucial to human affairs (*Pro Roscio Amerino* 111):

> in matters to which we cannot ourselves attend, the delegated trust [*fides*] of friends is substituted for our own labors; whoever damages this trust attacks the common safeguard of all and, to the extent he can, disrupts the sociability of life.

Cicero goes on to say that friendships are formed for the sake of dependable partnerships: "For we are not able to do all things by ourselves: one is more useful in one business, another in another. Hence friendships are acquired, so that a common advantage [*commodum*] may be driven by mutual services." These rather abstract reflections are designed to magnify the perfidy of his opponent; *amici* were undoubtedly relied upon for the faithful execution of a commission (112), but Cicero is here explaining the social function of friendship in general, not reducing particular attachments to utilitarian motives.

When in the last year of his life (44–43 BC), marked by the assassination of Julius Caesar and the outbreak of civil war, Cicero meditated in earnest on friendship, he defined it (*De amic.* 6.20) as "nothing other than the agreement over all things divine and human along with good will and affection [*caritas*]." To a certain extent, the view was a commonplace. Sallust (*Catiline* 20.4) had remarked: "to want and not want the same things – that is firm friendship."[8] But the coincidence of tastes or desires is less than the rigorous intellectual accord that Cicero prescribes. Cicero himself, as a thoroughly political man, had long regarded a community of views and values as a basis for friendship; in his letter to Appius Pulcher (*Ad fam.* 3.13 = 76.2), written in 50 BC, he affirms that their friendship is its own

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[7] Cf. also 2.167–8 for the role of advantage versus friendship for its own sake; Brunt 1988: 353–4.

[8] Cit. Powell 1990 ad loc.; cf. Plautus *Persa* 489 with Woytek 1982; Plautus *Rudens* 1045; Aristotle *NE* 9.4, 1166a7.

reward, above all for the common pursuits by which they are bound: "for I pronounce you my ally [*socius*] in the republic, concerning which we think alike, and my colleague in daily life, which we nourish with these studies and interests" (cf. *Against Verres* 2.3.6, delivered in 70 BC; *Pro Plancio* 5 on friendship as "consensus and partnership of counsel and will").[9] But in the crisis leading up to and following Caesar's assassination, Cicero seems to have been especially preoccupied with the relationship between friendship and political allegiance.[10]

Friends vs. Country

In his discussion of the grounds on which a friendship may be dissolved, Cicero follows Aristotle (*EN* 9.3, 1165b13–22) in identifying "a change in character or interests"; he adds to these motives, however, a "disagreement over sides [*partes*] in respect to the republic" (21.77). The most telling indication, however, of Cicero's concern with patriotism is the vigor with which he denies that loyalty to friends can ever justify rebelling against the state: "Coriolanus had friends; should they have borne arms along with him against their country?" (11.36). Laelius, Cicero's spokesman in the dialogue, professes horror at Gaius Blossius Cumanus' confession that at the command of his friend Tiberius Gracchus he would have set fire to the Capitol (11.37): "it does not excuse a crime that you committed it for the sake of a friend."[11]

Critics differ over whether Cicero followed a specific Greek model in composing *De amicitia*; Fritz-Arthur Steinmetz, who has argued that Cicero's immediate source was the Stoic Panaetius, nevertheless considers that the section devoted to violence against the state (36–44) is Cicero's own, inspired by contemporary events and, more particularly (70–6), by his correspondence with Gaius Matius, a partisan of Caesar's, who remarks, apropos his grief at the death of Caesar (11.28 = 349.2; *c.* October 44 BC), that people "say that one's country [*patriam*] should be put ahead of friendship, as though they

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[9] In rather an extreme vein, Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote to Bertrand Russell early in 1914: "I can see perfectly well that your value-judgments are just as good and just as deep-seated in you as mine in me, and that I have no right to catechize you. But . . . for that very reason there cannot be any real relation of friendship between us" (trans. Wright 1974: 50).

[10] Cf. *De off.* 3.43–6; Brunt 1988: 381.

[11] Fuller discussion of the Blossius episode in Konstan 1994/5: 1–2; cf. Klein 1957: 1–23; contrast Appian *Mithr. Wars* 101, where Mithridates slays his treacherous friends but spares his son's because they were obliged personally to the latter.

had already proved that his death was good for the republic." This commonplace in itself, however, is unlikely to have made much of an impression on Cicero.[12]

That Cicero was worrying about the issue at this time is evident from the second *Philippic* (15.38, delivered in December 44), where he explains that he and Pompey succeeded in remaining friends even though they "disagreed concerning the highest matters in the republic (*de summa re publica dissentientis*)." Cicero adds that each knew the view of the other, and suggests that they differed over priorities more than aims, thus rendering their dissension more endurable (two decades earlier, in April 62, Cicero had aspired to play Laelius to Pompey's Scipio: *Ad fam.* 5.7 = 3.3).

If the ambience of civil war and tyrannicide helps account for Cicero's politicized definition of friendship, he found philosophical precedent for an analysis of the tension between loyalty to friends and duty in Theophrastus' treatise *On Philia*. According to Aulus Gellius (*Attic Nights* 1.3.9), "whether one ought to assist a friend contrary to what is just, and to what extent and in what ways" was a popular subject in the philosophical schools, and Theophrastus dealt minutely with it in book 1 of his tractate. Gellius adds that Cicero abbreviated Theophrastus' technical discussion, simply allowing that one may, in matters of life and death, support a friend's unjust aspirations provided that serious disgrace will not ensue (Cic. *De amic.* 17.61, cit. Gell. 1.3.13). Gellius complains that this advice is too vague. That one must not bear arms against one's country (*contra patriam*: Cic. *De amic.* 11.36, cit. Gell. 1.3.19) for a friend is obvious. Pericles, Gellius continues, put the limit at swearing falsely.[13] Theophrastus, for his part, calculated that moderate dishonor might be balanced by an important service to a friend (1.3.21–6).

There is nothing in Aristotle's analysis of *philia* comparable to Theophrastus' punctilious examination of the conflict between morality and obligation to friends. The suggestion that one ought not to require anything bad of friends (*EN* 8.8, 1159b5) finds an echo in

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[12] Sources of *De amic.*: cf. Powell 1990: 20–1; influence of Panaetius: Steinmetz 1967: 191, 199; cf. Fortenbaugh 1984: 111–13, 288–9; of contemporary events: Steinmetz 1967: 66–76 (Clark and Reubel 1985 argue that after events in the early 50's altered Cicero's views on political violence he sought support in Stoic theories); of Matius: cf. Kytzler 1960: 109–10, who suggests that Matius is appealing to Cicero's own principles; also Heuss 1956; Klein 1957: 126–52.

[13] Cf. Plut. *Reg. et imperat. apophthegm.* 186c; *De vitioso pudore* 531c; Stobaeus 27.10 Meineke (under *Peri horkou*), where the thought is attributed to Lycurgus.

Cicero's essay (13.44), but the Greek thinkers of the fourth century BC did not usually fear that a virtuous disposition such as *philia* might demand the transgression of what is just or honorable. Theophrastus did, however, and if he was not just filling in a gap in his teacher's exposition he may have been responding to changed political conditions in Athens following the conquests of Alexander the Great. In particular, Theophrastus was intimate with the philosophically minded regent of Athens, Demetrius of Phalerum (in power 317–07 BC): perhaps the imposition of a regime backed by Macedonian military power set the climate for concern about the ethical limits of personal allegiances, whether in the circle of the ruler or among a possibly restive citizen body. Although it is only conjecture, I am inclined to see in Theophrastus' anxiety over friendship versus right a symptom of a new extrinsic sense of public responsibility, represented and enforced by state institutions, that dissolved the unquestioned compatibility between personal and civic life projected by the democratic ideology.[14]

There is a reflection of Theophrastus' theme in Cicero's dictum, cited above, concerning a crime committed for a friend (11.37), but Cicero gives the argument a further twist when he specifies the offense of waging war against one's country (*contra patriam*). Whether this issue too is Hellenistic in provenience is difficult to determine. The Greek historian and critic Dionysius of Halicarnassus, writing at Rome some years after the death of Cicero, expatiates rhetorically on the example of Gnaeus Marcius Coriolanus mentioned in *De amicitia* (11.36). In defense of his support of the Volscians in their war with Rome, Coriolanus lectures his friend Marcus Minucius, who had pleaded with him to assist his own people:

> When you still call those my friends, Minucius, who banished me, and that my country [*patris*] which has renounced me, when you appeal to the laws of nature and discourse about sacred matters, you seem to me to be alone ignorant of the most common things, of which no one else is ignorant: that neither the nature of one's appearance nor the imposition of a name defines what is friendly [*to philion*] or inimical [*polemion*], but both are revealed by services [*khreiai*] and deeds, and that we all love [*philoumen*] what does us good and hate what does us harm . . . For this reason we renounce friends when they wrong us and make friends of our enemies when some favor [*kharis*] is done for us by them; and we cherish [*stergomen*] the city that gave

[14] *Philia* does not entail transgression: cf. Klein 1957: 72; Kraut 1989: 125; Bodéüs 1993: 42–6; but note Lysias 12.51; Lycurgus 1.6; democratic ideology: cf. Osborne 1985: 7–8.

> us birth when it helps us, but abandon it when it harms us, liking [*agapontes* *] it not for the place, but for advantage's sake. (*Roman Antiquities* 8.34.1–3; trans. Cary 1945, modified)

Coriolanus is made to articulate a view of friendship based on reciprocity and apply it both to personal associates and loyalty to homeland. Having denied that ethnic characteristics ("appearance") and the appellation "Roman" ("name") constitute a basis for civic allegiance, Coriolanus concludes that Romans generally may be treated as inimical if the city has wronged him, and those who have given him shelter are by the same token friends. In reducing patriotism to the status of an individual bond Coriolanus exploits the convention by which states and peoples are described as friends and enemies (cf. Alcibiades' speech defending his desertion to the Spartans in Thucydides 6.92.3–4, which is likely to have been one of Dionysius' models; Dionysius wrote a treatise on the Athenian historian). But by having Coriolanus prefer friends at war with Rome to Rome itself, Dionysius has articulated the reverse of the principle that the republic takes precedence over all claims of friendship. He is clearly alert to the issue. Whether he is elaborating on a Roman problem, or has drawn upon Hellenistic sources (in which case, perhaps Cicero's own), is uncertain.

Patriotism was construed by Cicero and his contemporaries as loyalty to the republic, and with the coming of the empire, the theme lost its immediacy. Valerius Maximus, who composed a collection of edifying anecdotes during the reign of Tiberius (early first century AD), adduces the case of Blossius' fidelity to Tiberius Gracchus to illustrate the virtue of *amicitia*, despite the fact that he was an enemy of his nation (*inimicus patriae*, 4.7 Romans 1). The next vignette tells of the dedication of two friends to Tiberius' brother Gaius, after his revolutionary plans had been foiled and his confederates were being hunted down; one of them, Laetorius, gave his life so that Gaius might escape, standing guard for friendship's sake over the very bridge Horatius Cocles had defended out of love of country. Another story tells of Rheginus, who released his friend Caepio from prison and fled with him into exile. Finally, Valerius recounts an example of friendship "without any harm to the republic": Titus Volumnius stayed by the body of Lucullus, who had been a partisan of Brutus and Cassius, rather than flee the sword of Mark Antony. Volumnius' gesture might be read as republican in the sense of anti-Caesarian, a risky posture under Tiberius, but Valerius seems oblivious to the

subversive innuendo. Friendship proves itself in adversity, as he says, and fidelity in defeat entails defiance of the victors. The Ciceronian anxiety over seditious constancy to friends has evanesced.

Status and the Question of Patronage

Rome was a profoundly stratified society, and Cicero's Laelius (*De amic.* 19.69) is at pains to insist that "in a friendship it is crucial to be a peer to one's inferior. For there are often certain outstanding cases, like Scipio in our pack, if I may put it so: never did he put himself above Philus, or Rupilius, or Mummius, or friends of lower rank [*ordo*]." Cicero further cautions (20.71) that "just as those who are superior in a relationship of friendship and association should equalize themselves to their inferiors, so too inferiors ought not to take it ill that they are surpassed in ability or fortune or station." Though Cicero alludes to stories of princely foundlings who retain, when their identity becomes known, an affection (*caritas*) for the shepherds who raised them (19.70), he is not contemplating friendships over such social distances. Later, Laelius mentions the comic playwright Terence, said to have been brought to Rome from Carthage as a slave (Suetonius, *Life* 1), as his *familiaris* (24.89), a vague word that refers to anyone who is deemed part of the household, and hence may signify "intimate" (e.g. *Ad fam.* 13.50 = 266.1); by itself, however, it does not convey the model of equality implied by the word *amicus*.

Cicero extols honest criticism (*monitio*), which is proper to true friendship, in the measure that he detests flattery (*adsentatio, De amic.* 24.89), and, like Plutarch, he advises (25.91) that it be applied candidly (*libere*), not harshly. Again, the adulator is condemned for having no character of his own but adapting himself to another's every whim (25.93; cf. Juvenal *Sat.* 3.100–8). Comic parasites like Terence's Gnatho are dismissed as having no bearing on the issue of friendship, but upper-class and clever flatterers are a genuine menace, and it takes diligence to distinguish the ingratiating friend from the true (25.95; cf. 26.99).[15] One give-away is comportment when addressing the populace (25.95–6), and here Cicero, drawing

[15] Cicero in *Pro Quinctio* caricatures Sextus Naevius as a toady or *scurra* who depends upon influence (*gratia*, 1, 93) with powerful friends (96, 98; cf. Damon 1996: part 3, ch. 1), while his client Quinctius has only "a slender supply of friends" (2). It serves Cicero's rhetorical purposes to suggest that Naevius has won allies through depravity, but his friendships are evidently reciprocal and reliable.

on Roman examples, develops the Greek democratic topos of the toady to the *demos* * or people. For friends to rejoice in vain praise, however, exposes them to deception and mockery (26.98–9). Although Cicero shares some themes with Plutarch's essay on discerning friends from flatterers, his treatment is not adapted to a world of courtiers but to friendships between equals or else those who woo the favor of the masses.

Relations between superiors and inferiors at Rome were governed by an etiquette that is commonly described in the language of patronage, according to which a powerful benefactor (*patronus*) lent protection and support to his dependents or *clientes*, who are supposed to have owed him the more humble services of obeisance and allegiance in return. Clientship in the strict and archaic sense of obligatory fealty has little or no bearing on historical friendships of which we have knowledge in the last century of the Roman republic or the first two centuries of the empire; the 500 "clients [*pelatai*] and friends" that the young Scipio collected as part of his private militia in 134 BC (Appian, *Roman History* 6.14.84) were presumably distinct groups, though Scipio is said to have applied the label "troop of friends" to the entire company of 4000. Interpreted more broadly, however, as an asymmetrical personal relationship involving expectations of reciprocal exchange with a potential for exploitation, patronage certainly played a role in Roman social life, as it did in Greek hierarchies as well. Friendships between people of different social stations were embedded in a culture of authority and deference entirely different from that of classical Athens. Moreover, the role of personal status assumed a new and more intense form with the emergence of the principate, under which enormous power was concentrated in the hands of the emperor and his associates.[16]

Historians have sometimes concluded, accordingly, that friendships between superiors and inferiors under the empire are euphemisms for relations of dependency that in truth are better called patronage, whether or not they were sustained by a formal code of

[16] Decline of clientship: see Rouland 1979; Brunt 1988: 382–442; *patronus* remains the term for a legal advocate, who might also be a friend: e.g. Tacitus, *Dialogus* 9.4; Statius, *Silv.* 4.5.50–2; patronage as asymmetrical relationship: Saller 1989: 49; cf. Saller 1982: 8–11; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984: 2; exploitation: Millett 1989: 16; patronage in Greece: cf. Cartledge 1987: 140–2 on Sparta, though the connection with friendship is more doubtful; patronage in general: Wolf 1966: 16; cf. Pitt-Rivers 1954: 140 for the definition of patron-client relations as "lop-sided friendship"; contrast with Athens: Strauss 1986: 22–3; Millett 1989: 16; Gallant 1991: 145; status under the principate: Brunt 1988: 440.

clientela. Thus, Barbara Gold (1987: 134) writes: "The word *amicus* . . . is a nicely ambiguous word which applies equally well to political allies or personal intimates, to the patron or the client."[17] Richard Saller (1989: 57) states in turn:

> To discuss bonds between senior aristocrats and their aspiring juniors in terms of "friendship" seems to me misleading, because of the egalitarian overtones that the word has in modern English. Though willing to extend the courtesy of the label *amicus* to some of their inferiors, the status-conscious Romans did not allow the courtesy to obscure the relative social standings of the two parties. On the contrary, *amici* were subdivided into categories *superiores, pares* and *inferiores* (and then lower down the hierarchy, humble *clientes*). Each category called for an appropriate mode of behaviour, of which the Romans were acutely aware (Pliny, *Ep.* 7.3.2, 2.6.2; Seneca, *Ep.* 94.14). Resemblances between the behaviour of aristocratic *amici inferiores* and *clientes* suggest that *amici inferiores* can appropriately be analysed under the heading of patronage.

Saller's description collapses unequal *amicitia* into clientship. However, even though the snobbery of the prosperous and social climbing among their lessers may compromise the quality of an association, friendship as a bond of generous affection, loyalty and intimacy can coexist with the recognition that degree must receive its due. Once the reduction of *amicitia* to a purely practical quid-pro-quo exchange of services is abandoned, there is no prima-facie reason to doubt that Roman writers who speak of friendship intend a relationship of mutual fondness and commitment, whatever the rank of the partners. To put it differently, not *every* connection between patrons and protégés is described as *amicitia*; when it is, it may be supposed that the pair also are, or wish to be thought of as, friends.

The Dinner-Party Scene

One context in which expectations of equality characteristic of friendship might clash with protocols of rank was the Roman dinner party. John D'Arms (1990: 318) observes: "Unlike the practice at the early Greek sympotic gatherings . . . Roman convivial equality can never have been other than a very fragile kind." D'Arms vividly evokes the upper-class fixation on prestige, to which munificence was handmaiden. Individuals of lower station might further their ambitions at such parties: "*clientela* and *amicitia* linked together and

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[17] Cf. Gold 1987: 40, 71, 104; Strauss 1986: 22.

integrated persons of varied rank, origins, and status, inside as well as outside the dining-room," and "the brisk exchange of *officia* and *beneficia* can be assumed to have flowed continuously, along with the wine and the conversation" (319). However, in "a world where a host might appoint a slave to keep watch on the behaviour of guests of different ranks" (318), the comfortable and egalitarian social ambience of the symposium was out of the question.

That a great man's table might be the scene of humiliating condescension is true, but the Romans do not normally represent such relations as friendship. It is Seneca (*Ep. mor.* 47.8) who provides the detail about a slave assigned to report on guests whose "flattery and exorbitance of gullet or tongue will get them invited on the morrow." This is revealing, but Seneca's concern here is with the abuse of the slave. The letter compliments Lucilius for dining together with his slaves, who are, Seneca insists (47.1), "human beings – tent-mates – humble friends – fellow slaves!" It is his character (*mores*) that makes a slave or free man worthy of one's table (47.15): "There is no reason, my dear Lucilius, to seek a friend only in the forum and senate house; if you look closely, you will find one at home as well" (47.16). Supping with such friends is just the opposite of the hierarchical banquets at which adulators are scrutinized for their comportment. Even allowing for Stoic didacticism, Seneca is contrasting, not assimilating, the treatment of friends and sycophants (cf. Epictetus, *Disc.* 4.1.48).

Juvenal's fifth satire wittily portrays the mortification of lesser guests at the kind of dinner party Seneca decries. Because Juvenal ridicules the pretensions of Trebius, a middling aristocrat, to friendship with the wealthy Virro, the poem is sometimes cited as testimony for the equation of friendship and clientship. Juvenal warns:

> Consider in the first place that when you've been summoned to take your seat you've received the full value for your former services. The reward for your great friendship [or friendship with the great: *magna amicitia*] is a meal . . . If after two months it pleases him to beckon his forgotten client so that the third cushion won't go vacant on an empty couch, he says: "Let's get together." (5.12–18)

Having demeaned Trebius with the appellation *cliens*, Juvenal goes on to imagine him among the common greeters at Virro's door each morning.

At the meal itself, Virro, as Juvenal depicts him, openly displays

his contempt for guests like Trebius by serving them inferior wine and food, and subjecting them to the abuse of slaves who are "indignant at serving an old client" (64). Juvenal attacks his stinginess: "No one's asking for what Seneca used to send to his modest friends . . . We just request that you dine in a civil manner" (108–9, 112). The sole question is money, according to Juvenal; if Trebius were suddenly made rich, "what a great friend of Virro's you would become!" (134) – if there are no heirs: "A sterile wife makes for a charming and dear friend" (140). With roles reversed, Virro becomes the fawning legacy-hunter.

Trebius imagines himself to be free and equal as a guest, but Virro, says Juvenal, "thinks you've been caught by the aroma of his kitchen." "Not a bad guess, either" (162–3), Juvenal comments, assimilating Trebius to the comic parasite. The diatribe concludes: "One of these days you're going to let him shave your head and pound it, you'll lose all fear of submitting to the stinging whip – you'll be worthy of these feasts and such a friend" (171–3).

The point of Juvenal's irony is that, whatever Trebius imagines, he is not Virro's friend. Trebius' own motives are exposed as no less calculating than Virro's show of power and disdain. That his abjection gains him no reward in wealth or influence only proves that Trebius is foolish as well as servile. The meaning of the satire depends precisely on the difference between friend and toady (the latter rudely equated with client, parasite, and even slave), which Juvenal does everything to expose. Juvenal's sarcasm would be otiose if the humbler nobility never masked the status-coded formalities of the *convivium* as friendship, but it would be futile if the two relationships were not understood to be distinct.[18]

Martial exposes the reverse side of purchased friendship in his epigrammatic quip (9.14) addressed to a naive patron: "The man your table, your dinners have made your friend, do you suppose he is the soul of faithful friendship? He loves boar and mullet and udder and oysters, not you. If I should give such nice dinners, he'll be my friend." In the game of cadging a meal, however – at least as it is represented in Martial's lampoons – hosts are not normally identified as friends. Indeed, the two categories may implicitly be contrasted:

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[18] Contrast LaFleur 1979: 171, who takes *amicus* as "equivalent to either *cliens* or *patronus*"; Cloud 1989: 208 remarks that "Juvenal . . . uses *amicus* in a consistently derogatory or ironic manner" in *Satires* 1 – but always in reference to pretenders masquerading as friends; for fuller discussion, see Konstan 1995: 336–8.

thus, if Selius is depressed, it is not, says Martial (2.11), on account of a friend or brother, wife or slaves, but rather because he finds himself obliged to dine at home.[19]

Seneca reports (*De ben.* 6.34) that the regal practice of ranking masses of friends by allowing them differential access to one's house was introduced to Rome by Gaius Gracchus and Livius Drusus, and indignantly denies that the crowds of greeters who attend notables in the streets deserve the name *amicus*. No one who must wait his turn at the morning salutation, he says, can attain frankness (*libertas*). Among the retinues of the rich, the vocabulary of friendship evidently was debased, and Trebius' pretensions were no doubt encouraged by this semi-formal usage. Moralists and satirists assumed the responsibility of reanimating the true meaning of the word, but it is unwise always to take literally the sketches that lend bite to their irony.

Great Friends

In the following century, Lucian composed a caustic exposé of Greeks who took hired positions as resident professors or philosophers in the houses of rich Romans. They are seduced not only by the attractions of wealth and distinction, but also by the prospect of counting the best of the Romans as their friends (*philoi*, 3). In fact, the conditions of their employment amount to voluntary servitude rather than *philia* (1, 5): they gain neither fortune nor favor (5–9), but are subject to the whim of the doorman and nomenclator (10). Lucian conjures up the anxiety of the first dinner party, where everything is unfamiliar (on the unequal treatment of guests, cf. 26); what is more, the grandee's old *philoi* (15, 17) will be resentful of the newcomer. Since he too is a "friend," the saw that all is common between friends is exploited to shame him into accepting meager wages (19–20).

Lucian is playing on the classical Greek analogy between labor for wages (*misthos*) and slavery (23–4), as well as on the contrast between the free man and the flatterer, who lives his life for another (30; Cf. 28, 38). The friendship to which his addressee aspires is incompatible with both these demeaning roles: as a paid purveyor of culture in Roman mansions, the title "friend" only renders him vulnerable to further manipulation and abuse. Crossing the familiarity and affec-

[19] Cf. Martial 2.55, 10.58 on the difference between affection [*amare*] and paying court [*colere*]; also Damon 1966: part 2, ch. 4.

tion appropriate to friendship with the regard for status increasingly characteristic of the Roman nobility was a tricky business, and the satirist took advantage of this tension (contrast Plutarch's endorsement of friendly association between philosophers and men in power, in an essay devoted to the topic: *Mor.* 778a–b).

Horace was particularly sensitive to the pressures that result from relations with figures in power, and he prescribes a simple life as a way of escaping dependency (cf. *Ep.* 1.7 to Maecenas; 1.17 to Scaeva). In his epistle to Lollius (1.18), Horace takes up the particular problem of unequal friendships. Lollius is a man of an exceptionally free or independent temper (*liberrime*, 1), and Horace reminds him that friendship is a mean between flattery and boorishness, which poses as freedom (*libertas*, 8). The doctrine derives from Aristotle, who defines friendship – or rather, a sociable disposition that resembles friendship but has no name of its own (4.6, 1126b20, 1127a11; cf. 2.13, 1108a27–30) – as midway between flattery and surliness or quarrelsomeness. But mention of *libertas* evokes the contrast between frank speech (*parrhesia* *) and flattery elaborated outside the democratic discourse of classical Athens. Rude or excessive candor in this tradition is also a flaw in relations between friends, as Plutarch makes clear ("How to Distinguish" 66a, 66e). As one who is *liber* in the extreme, Lollius must guard against coarse forthrightness (for the meaning of *liber*, cf. *Sat.* 1.3.51–2: "rather crusty [*truculentior*] and immoderately *liber*").[20]

Horace accordingly recommends a more accommodating manner: a rich friend (*dives amicus*, 24), whatever his own vices, rightly reproves one who has ruined himself by love affairs or gambling, for he can afford what the other cannot (Plutarch had cautioned against answering frankness with frankness: 72e). "Yield to the gentle commands of your powerful friend [*potens amicus*]" (44–5), Horace counsels: if he wants to hunt, do not stay home writing poetry; do not fall in love with his household slaves, and be cautious about introducing others into his company. "Cultivating a powerful friend seems nice to those who have not experienced it; one who has fears it" (86–7), and Horace reminds Lollius once again that he will have to be compliant: "Sad types hate a cheerful fellow, jocular types hate a sad sack; fast people hate a sedentary fellow, relaxed types hate one

[20] Aristotle: cf. Hunter 1985: 483–4; above, p. 102; excessive candor: cf. Philodemus, *On Frankness* cols. IV–VII; De Witt 1935; Michels 1944; *liber*. not quite "irrational behavior" (Kilpatrick 1986: 29); cf. Bowditch 1994: 411; Gold 1987: 130; Cicero, *Pro Plancio* 33; *Pro Quinctio* 11.

quick and clever" (89–90). In curbing Lollius' tendency to gruffness, Horace comes near to endorsing the assumed expressions and attitudes characteristic of the flatterer.[21]

The threatened collapse of the distinction between polite but honest speech and sly adaptability generates a discursive crisis in the poem, which abruptly takes a different tack: Horace urges Lollius to study philosophy and learn to live in peace, free from desire, fear, and the hope of vain things, to discover what eradicates anxiety (*curas*), "what will restore you as a friend to yourself" (*te tibi reddet amicum*, 101), and whether it is fame and money or rather quietude that confers tranquility. The latter, Horace assures his friend (*amice*, 106), is his own way: he prays to retain what little he possesses and to live "for myself" (*mihi uiuam*, 107). It is for Jupiter to bestow wealth and years, but it lies within ourselves to achieve a calm mind.[22]

This Epicurean turn is in accord with Philodemus' doctrine that only a wise or realized (*teleios*) person is in a position to employ frankness properly (*On Frankness* cols. IV, VII). When Lollius is at peace with himself, he will be able to be candid with others without giving needless offense. The wise man can thus enjoy a relation of true friendship with a social superior, as Philodemus himself presumably did with Piso. Otherwise, *libertas* or *parrhesia* * is bound to be misapplied, erring in the direction of unseemly and perhaps risky brusqueness or else giving the appearance of an ingratiating complaisance.[23]

Given the pitfalls involved in friendship with the rich and powerful, Lollius is best off eschewing it: the necessary delicacy and courteous dissimulation, which in themselves are honorable and necessary among friends (cf. *Sat.* 1.3.41–4, 54–6), run counter to his spirited nature, and Horace's account is designed to discourage him and to lead him to philosophy instead, which will also purge him of any element of ambition in the formation of such ties. Then he will be prepared to befriend great men.[24]

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[21] Accommodating manner: Hunter 1985: 481; attitude of the flatterer: cf. Plutarch "How to Distinguish" 51a; Hunter 1985: 484; cf. *Latin Anthology* 403 Shackleton Bailey.

[22] Friend to yourself: cf. Gantar 1976, and contrast *Sat.* 1.2.20; "live for myself": cf. *Ep.* 1.7; Ovid, *Trist.* 3.4.5–6: "live for yourself and steer clear of great names"; also vv. 43–4 on acquiring "equal friendships."

[23] For Horace's possible debt to Philodemus in the *Art of Poetry*, see Armstrong 1994.

[24] Cf. Konstan 1995: 338–41 for a somewhat different analysis.

Patrons and Poets

The question of patronage and friendship has attracted special attention in connection with relations between poets and sponsors such as Maecenas and Messalla, in part because of who the characters are, in part also because the term patronage is still alive in this sphere and evokes modern controversies over the freedom of the artist. In the last century, Theodor Mommsen complained in a lecture transcribed by his students:

> That this age is justly called "The Age of Maecenas" is a damning criticism. It is Maecenas, Asinius Pollio, Valerius Messalla, etc., who produce literature – more accurately, who cause it to be produced. The industrious composition and recitation of verse are everywhere dependent on orders from above (trans. Armstrong and Calder 1994: 88; orig. Mommsen 1992 [1882/6]).

Nicholas Horsfall (1981: 5) comments in a similar vein on Horace's introduction to the circle of Maecenas (Sat. 1.6): "The line between *amicus*-'friend' and *amicus*-'client' should not be drawn, now or at any point later in the relationship."[25]

As an Epicurean and composer of convivial love lyrics, verse epistles, and chatty "conversations" (*sermones*), Horace was disposed to prefer private friendships to public life, and his poetry is rich in tender expressions of affection, of which the description of Virgil as "half my soul" (*Odes* 1.3.8) is the most memorable (cf. Ovid, *Ep. Pont.* 1.8.2: "great part of my soul"; Statius, *Silvae* 3.2.6–7). His version of a dinner party that includes Maecenas (*Sat.* 2.8) is correspondingly genial, and though there are touches of comedy, as the genre requires, it exhibits the "freedom for frank exchange that obtains between friends" (Baker 1988: 229). Horace was secure enough in his intimacy with Maecenas to publish what are ostensibly personal letters and small talk between them, thus exposing their confidential exchanges to the gaze of the greater world.[26]

Was he also in any sense Maecenas' client? The commentator Porphyrio (third century AD), in a note on Horace's use of *amicus* in the first *Epode* (189.12–13 Holder), remarks: "It does not seem to suit Horace's modesty that he calls himself the friend of Maecenas when he ought to call himself his client." Peter White (1993: 32) comments: "Porphyrio clearly conceives of the word 'client' not as an eccentric

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[25] Cf. White 1978: 81–2; Konstan 1995: 328–9.

[26] For the paradox, cf. Oliensis 1995.

or invidious substitute for 'friend,' but as the proper name for the relationship." Perhaps the more rigid social stratification of the later empire made Horace's claim to friendship with Maecenas seem presumptuous; alternatively, Porphyrio is conscious that at the writing of this early poem Horace has not yet achieved the familiarity implied by the word *amicus*.

Though Horace calls himself Maecenas' friend, it does not follow that he would refuse the label "client." In a late ode (4. 12), Horace invites to a symposium a certain Virgil, whom he identifies as "a client of noble young men" (15). A majority of the manuscripts identify the man as a banker, which sits well with the description of him as having an "interest in profit" (25); on the other hand, this seems rude in reference to the poet, now dead. Timothy Johnson (1994: 62) suggests, however, that the formula is typical of Horace's invitations; as for *cliens*, Virgil "is a poet with patrons, and his patrons are the leading men of Rome." The gift that Horace demands is, indeed, as Johnson notes (63), a poem. If Virgil is Virgil, then it was no insult to be called a client of such sponsors.[27]

Peter White (1993: 14) captures the nuanced quality of such asymmetrical friendships in Augustan Rome:

> It is in terms of social and cultural affinities that poets can count as the equals of great men like Maecenas and Messalla and can practice the kind of reciprocity which we associate with friendship. Thus a genuine ground of rapport does exist between them, and the affect-laden language which pervades their discourse is probably to be interpreted as an effort by both parties to neutralize those status differences which do still stand between them.

Statius enjoyed celebrating the beneficence of wealthy hosts – he seems to have been the first poet to eulogize gorgeous villas. He was also accommodating toward the difficult Domitian: his poems provide an early example of the use of the term *dominus*, "master," in addressing the emperor (e.g. *Silv.* 4 praef. 27; 4.2.6; Suetonius records in his *Life of Domitian* 13.2 that the emperor expected to be addressed as *dominus et deus*). This combination has cast suspicion on the nature of his friendships; one commentator (Van Dam 1984: 2) sums up his situation:

> In Rome he earned his living as a poet . . . St[atius] never employs the word *patronus*, for to him his rich protectors are *amici*: the old interpretation of one kind of *amicitia* as the devoted attachment of a poorer man to a rich one also

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[27] Putnam 1986: 206 allows that "Virgil" may be the poet.

applied to the poet and his Maecenas. *Amicitia* in this sense is a career or a vocation.[28]

Another (Coleman 1988: 177) treats an expression of gratitude (*Silv.* 4.6.1–4) as subtly disingenuous, for Statius' "phrasing disguises the fact that, by the operation of *amicitia* fundamental to his livelihood, he was obliged to accept an invitation to dinner." However, this same poem concludes (4.6.89–93, as transposed):

> Now too, if the gods are concerned to know the character and hearts of mankind, it is not your mansion, Tirynthian, nor its royal splendor that favors you, but the pure and guiltless mind of their master, with his austere fidelity and everlasting covenant of friendship, once begun.

Loyalty to friends is not inflected here according to rank.

Silvae 4.9 is a droll complaint addressed to Plotius Grypus for having sent Statius an inferior collection of writings as a gift on the Saturnalia – just as slim as Statius' present to him but penned on poorer paper. Statius concludes (46–55) with a series of contrasts between the favors appropriate to friends of different social station (49–52): if he saluted Grypus in the morning, would Grypus return the greeting at Statius' door? Having dined Statius magnificently, would Grypus expect like entertainment in return? The premise is that "*amicitia* between social unequals precludes strictly reciprocal behaviour" (Coleman 1988: 238), but Statius gives the argument a twist by extending it to poetry, on the one hand flattering Grypus by suggesting that he ought to have given better than he got, on the other hand tempering the compliment by restricting the comparison to the packaging, where Grypus' wealth might indeed have shown itself. Statius in fact does not mention *amicitia* in this poem, perhaps just because the representation of exchange is too economic: Cicero (*De amic.* 9.31) had observed that

> we are not beneficent and generous in order to demand recompense [*gratia*], for we do not make a loan of our benefits, but are disposed by nature to generosity; so too in the case of friendship we are not drawn by the hope of profit but believe that it is to be sought because its entire reward resides in the love itself.

But the ease with which Statius acknowledges the gap in social position between himself and Grypus while playfully intimating their equality in the realm of art suggests that common tastes were the basis of a frank and jocular amity as genuine and intimate as any.

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[28] Cf. Coleman 1988: xxiv–xxv.

Friendship between Men and Women

The phrase "everlasting covenant of friendship" (*perenne foedus amicitiae*) with which *Silvae* 4.6 concludes clearly echoes Catullus' prayer (109.6) for an "eternal covenant of sacred friendship" (*aeternum sanctae foedus amicitiae*) with his mistress, Lesbia, instead of the pleasant love-affair (*iucundus amor*) that she promises him. Catullus' appropriation of friendship as an image for an enduring relationship between a man and woman is striking. The term *amica* or "girlfriend" had pejorative connotations, and husband and wife were no more likely to be described as friends in Latin than in Greek. Cicero (*Pro Caecina* 14) suggests that there is something suspicious about a man who makes himself the friend (*voluntarius amicus*) of a widow, without having been the friend of her father or husband.[29]

The abstract noun may indeed be used to describe a non-sexual relationship between the sexes: Ovid recommends feigning *amicitia* as a means of seduction (*Art of Love* 1.720–2; cf 579–80, where Ovid suggests making friends with the husband). Statius, however, returns to the model of Catullus in order to represent as friendship the bond between a married couple, Pollius Felix and Polla (*Silv.* 2.2.154–45, as transposed):

> No other hearts adhere under a better divinity, no other minds has Concord instructed. Learn from her in security: your marriage torches, intertwined in your hearts, have coalesced forever, and a sacred love [*sanctus amor*] preserves the laws of chaste friendship [*pudicae amicitiae*].

Concord and partnership (*societas*) are central themes in the Roman conception of marriage, but the reference to friendship is unusual. Statius has reverence enough for the quality of *amicitia* to invoke it as the name of an equal and loving alliance between spouses.[30]

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[29] *Amica* pejorative: for example, Plautus, *Bacchides* 193, *Curculio* 593, *Epidicus* 702; Terence, *Andria* 216, *Self-Tormentor* 328, also 911–12 for the contrast between *amica* and *amicus*; Catullus 110.1–2; Martial 11.49(50).10; Greek usage: cf. above, p. 91; note too the story (Val. Max. 4.4 Romans 4) that when Marcus Plautius slew himself at the funeral of his wife, his friends raised a tomb for the couple with the inscription *ton * philounton**, "of the lovers"; they would not have written *philoi*; in Lucian, *Toxaris* 61 a Scythian prefers a friend to a wife; cf. Konstan 1994: 4–5, and King Arthur in Thomas Malory's *Morte Darthur*. "And much more I am soryar for my good knyghtes losse than for the losse of my fayre quene; for quenys I myght have inow, but such a felyship of good knyghtes shall never be togydirs in no company" (Vinaver, 1990: 1184 = 20.9 in the Caxton numeration).

[30] Roman conception of marriage: Treggiari 1991: 249–53; Van Dam 1984: 279 suggests that Statius may be alluding to Pollius' Epicureanism.

Friendship in Imperial Society

Friendship among the Romans was a voluntary bond of mutual devotion. A fragment of a declamation attributed to Quintilian (308.21–3 Winterbottom) explicitly mentions the role of choice (a friend is contesting an inheritance claimed by kinsmen of the deceased): "The name of friend in itself seems to me even holier [than that of relative]. For the one comes from the intellect, comes from a decision; the other chance bestows, a circumstance of birth and things that are not elected by our will." The stratification of Roman society threatened at times to render hollow the intimacy and affection associated with friendship as the term was used for relations marked by hierarchical display and dependency, but the strong sense of *amicitia* remained available as a means of unmasking such appropriations.

In the palace milieu, the problem of friendship was complicated by the absolute authority of the emperor and the proud tradition of the senatorial class. With distrustful rulers such as Nero or Domitian, deference amounting to sycophancy was perceived to be imperative, and insincerity touched the sense of friendship as it did other ideals such as liberty. Tacitus (*Hist.* 1.15) has Galba, who was to be emperor for half a year in AD 69, say to Gaius Calpurnius Piso, the leader of the failed conspiracy against Nero in 65, whom he plans to adopt:

> You to be sure will preserve with the same constancy good faith, freedom of speech [*libertas*], and friendship, the outstanding values of the human soul, but others will erode them through obsequiousness; adulation will break through, and flattery, and the worst poison to true affection, each man's own interest.

The term of art for the pretense of friendship in Tacitus is *species*, and it is part of a systematic staging of experience, as Tacitus represents it, that puts in jeopardy the line between reality and playacting.[31]

Even when the compulsion to counterfeit admiration abated under regimes more hospitable to the senate, the heritage of hyperbole abided in expressions of good will and gratitude addressed to the emperor. In his panegyric to Trajan in 100 AD – close to the time of Dio Chrysostom's third discourse on kingship (see above, pp. 107–8) – Pliny the Younger declaims (85.8): "So great a capacity

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[31] On liberty under the empire: cf. Roller 1994; on hypocrisy: Bartsch 1994: 24–5; *species*: Seager 1977; staging of experience: Bartsch 1994: 1–35; cf. Rudich 1993: xxii–xxxii on *dissimulatio*.

do you have for putting your friends under obligation that no one but an ingrate could fail to love you more." Hannah Cotton (1984: 266) comments: "the over-embellished argument is its own undoing; it destroys the very relationship it set out to establish."[32] But Pliny also implies (44.7) that friendship with Trajan depends on the moral equality between the emperor and those who are, by reason of their virtue, similar (*similes*) to him.

Personal ties within the aristocracy and between political candidates and their followers in the Roman republic furnished new contexts for friendship; under the empire, conditions again altered, as vertical relations among the nobility became more openly hierarchical. Ideas of friendship were adapted to different practices, but the core sense of a private bond based on mutual affection, esteem, and liberality – within the capabilities of the respective partners – abided. Extreme differences in wealth and power inspired a tendency to classify friends by social station, but also provoked a more radical sense of moral egalitarianism, exemplified in Seneca's injunction to take meals together with the virtuous among one's slaves, that transcends Aristotle's vision. The distance between inner worth and outer position was perhaps one of the factors contributing to a new interest in sincerity as opposed to services between friends, exhibited also in the concern with candor and flattery both among political commentators and in the pedagogical therapies of the philosophical schools.

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[32] Cf. Bartsch 1994: 148–87; Wallace-Hadrill 1982: 40 is more positive; on imperial *amici*, see also Crook 1955: 23–7 and Rudich 1993: xxvii.