### The k-sum Problem

Solutions and Applications

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Ice Break - June 8, 2013

### Talk outline



- 1. Motivation
- 2. Information-set decoding
- 3. Linearization
- 4. Generalized birthday attacks
- 5. Outlook



#### 1. Motivation


- 2. Information-set decoding
- 3. Linearization
- 4. Generalized birthday attacks
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# The *k*-sum problem



- ▶ Given k lists  $L_1, \ldots, L_k$  containing bit strings of length n.
- ▶ Find elements  $x_1 \in L_1, ..., x_k \in L_k$ :

$$x_1 \oplus \ldots \oplus x_k = 0.$$



Examples in this talk: k = 2, k = w, k = 2w, k = something related to n, k, w etc.

# The k-sum problem is well-studied



# Appears in many different fields in cryptanalysis:

- birthday attacks
- meet-in-the-middle attacks on multiple encryption
- multi-collisions
- solving knapsacks
- syndrome decoding
- attacking the learning-parity-with-noise problem (LPN)
- **.**..

#### Selected literature:

- ► Yuval (1978)
- ► Hellman–Merkle (1981)
- ► Coppersmith (1985)
- ► Camion–Patarin (1991)
- ► Coppersmith (1992)
- van Oorschot-Wiener (1996)
- Micciancio–Bellare (1997)
- ▶ Wagner (2002)
- Augot–Finiasz–Sendrier (2003)
- ► Saarinen (2007, 2009)
- ▶ Joux-Lucks (2009)
- ► Howgrave-Graham-Joux (2010)
- ► Bernstein–Lange–P.–Schwabe (2011)
- ► Becker–Coron–Joux (2011)
- ▶ Dinur-Dunkelman-Keller-Shamir (2012)

# Applications in this talk



Bellare-Micciancio (1997):

"incrementable" hash function

$$XHASH(f, m) = \bigoplus_{i=1}^{w} f(m_i)$$

Finiasz et al. (2003, 2007, 2008):

fast syndrome-based hash function

$$FSB(H, m) = \bigoplus_{i=1}^{w} H_i[m_i]$$

- ▶ Use as compression function in a Merkle–Damgård construction.
- ▶ Plus: fast, incrementable, parallelizable,...
- Minus: large matrix of random constants (fix: quasi-cyclic structure).

# A simple compression function



▶ Consider inputs of length  $w \cdot b$ :

$$m=(m_1,m_2,\ldots,m_w),$$

each  $m_i$  having b bits.

- ► Take an  $n \times w2^b$  binary (pseudo-)random matrix, consisting of w blocks with  $2^b$  columns each:  $H = (H_1, H_2, ..., H_w)$ .
- $H_1 \quad H_2 \quad H_3 \qquad \qquad H_{w-1} \quad H_w$

 $w2^b$ 

 $\triangleright$  Regard the  $m_i$  as b-bit indices and define

$$\mathsf{FSB}(H,m) = H_1[m_1] \oplus H_2[m_2] \oplus \ldots \oplus H_w[m_w].$$

### Mini example: compression function




```
sage: n=8; w=4; b=2
sage: set_random_seed(314)
sage: # compression matrix
sage: H=random_matrix(GF(2), n, w*2^b); print H
[1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0]
[0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0]
[0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1]
sage: # message m = (m[1], ..., m[w]), m[i] in [0, ..., 2^b-1]
sage: m=random_vector(IntegerModRing(2^b),w); print m
(2, 3, 3, 0)
sage: # hash
sage: x=sum([H.column(i*2^b+m[i]) for i in range(w)]); print x
(0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)
```

# FSB parameters for 128-bit security



#### FSB-256:

- FSB was a SHA-3 round-1 candidate;
- ▶ Parameters: b = 14, w = 128, n = 1024.
- ▶ FSB didn't make it to round 2.
- ► Too slow? No, sloppy security analysis. Parameters not tight. Loss in speed.



# (R)FSB parameters for 128-bit security




#### FSB-256:

- FSB was a SHA-3 round-1 candidate;
- ▶ Parameters: b = 14, w = 128, n = 1024.
- ▶ FSB didn't make it to round 2.
- ► Too slow? No, sloppy security analysis. Parameters not tight. Loss in speed.

### RFSB-509 (really fast syndrome-based):

- ► RFSB fast version of FSB by Bernstein et al.
- ▶ Parameters: b = 8, w = 112, n = 509.
- ► Fast software implementation by Bernstein and Schwabe in SUPERCOP.




256

### **Preimages**




- A preimage of  $x \in \{0,1\}^n$  is given by w columns, exactly one per block, which add up to x.
- Note the abuse of notation: ultimately we're interested in the indices of those columns, not the columns themselves.
- A preimage here is in fact a pseudo-preimage for the actual hash function.
- ▶ In this talk we're only interested in the compression function.



### **Collisions**



- ► A collision is given by 2w columns, exactly two per block, which add up to 0.
- ► Again abuse of notation: ultimately we're interested in the column indices.
- ► Collisions are in fact pseudo-collisions for the actual hash function.
- ▶ In this talk we're only interested in the compression function.




### **Parameters**



Security obviously depends on b, w, and n.

► Larger *n* makes it harder to find collisions (but reduces compression factor)

► Smaller w or b makes it harder to find collisions (but reduces compression factor)




# Finding collisions and preimages



► Information-set decoding to find regular low-weight codewords (Augot-Finiasz-Sendrier, Bernstein-Lange-P.-Schwabe).

Linearization (Bellare–Micchiancio, Saarinen)

Generalized birthday attacks (Camion–Patarin, Wagner)






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## Information-set decoding

DTU

Finding a preimage of  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$  means finding w columns with xor x.




- ► Forget the block structure of *H* for a moment.
- "Unstructured w-sum problem"

### Information-set decoding

Finding a preimage of  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$  means finding w columns with xor x.

► Pick a set of *n* linearly independent columns.



- ► Forget the block structure of *H* for a moment.
- "Unstructured w-sum problem"

### Information-set decoding



Finding a preimage of  $x \in \{0,1\}^n$  means finding w columns with xor x.

- Pick a set of n linearly independent columns.
- Apply elementary row operations to H and x to bring H into a form  $H' = [I_n|Q]$  wrt to the selected columns.
- If x' has weight w, it is sum of w columns from the identity submatrix. Done.
- ▶ If not start with a fresh set of *n* columns (iterative algorithm).

	H'	x'
1 0 0 0 1 0 : 0 1 : 0 :	0 0	
: : : 0 0 0	: 0 : 1 0 0 1	

- ► Forget the block structure of *H* for a moment.
- ▶ "Unstructured w-sum problem"

# Cost information-set decoding

Very rough cost:

$$\mathsf{Cost}_{\mathsf{Gauss}\;\mathsf{Elim}}\,/\mathsf{Prob}_{\mathsf{success}}$$

where

$$\mathsf{Prob}_{\mathsf{success}} = \frac{\binom{n}{w}}{\binom{2^b w}{w}} \cdot \frac{\binom{2^b w}{w}}{2^n} = \frac{\binom{n}{w}}{2^n}$$

► E.g., n = 1024, w = 128, b = 14: Prob<sub>success</sub>  $\approx 2^{-472}$ .

#### Much better algorithms:

 Stern's collision decoding (birthday paradox), ball-collision decoding etc




	H'	X
1 0 0 0 1 0 : 0 1 : 0	0 0	
: : : 0 0 0	: 0 : 1 0 0 1	

- ► Forget the block structure of *H* for a moment.
- "Unstructured w-sum problem"

# Regular information-set decoding

DTU

Finding a preimage of  $x \in \{0,1\}^n$  means finding w columns, exactly one per block, with xor x.



- ▶ Don't forget the block structure of *H*.
- ▶ w-sum problem

# Regular information-set decoding



Finding a preimage of  $x \in \{0,1\}^n$  means finding w columns, exactly one per block, with xor x.

- Pick a set of n linearly independent columns, one per block.
- Apply elementary row operations to H and x to bring H into a form  $H' = ["I_n" | Q]$  where " $I_n$ " is spread over w blocks.
- If x' has weight w, it is sum of w columns from the identity submatrix. Done.
- ▶ If not start with a fresh set of *n* columns.

		H'			х
1 0	0 0 1 0 0 1	T	0	0	
:	0 0 1 0 0 1		:	:	
	į 0				
	:				
			:		
	. .		0	:   0	
0	0 0		0	$\begin{vmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{vmatrix}$	

- ▶ Don't forget the block structure of *H*.
- ▶ w-sum problem

# Cost of regular information-set decoding



Finding a preimage of  $x \in \{0,1\}^n$  means finding w columns, exactly one per block, with xor x.

Augot et al (2003):

► The probability of finding a preimage is roughly

$$\frac{\left(\frac{n}{w}\right)^w}{2^n}$$

- ► This probability is much smaller than for the classical decoding problem (which is already NP-hard).
- ▶ Ratio  $w!/w^w$ .
- ► E.g., n = 1024, w = 128, b = 14: Prob<sub>success</sub>  $\approx 2^{-640}$ .

		H'			x'
1 0	0 0	T	0	0	
0	0 0 1 0 0 1		:	:	
	į 0				
	:				
			:		
			0	: 0	
0	i i 0 0	L	0	1	

- ▶ Don't forget the block structure of *H*.
- w-sum problem

# Cost of 2-regular information-set decoding



Find collisions, i.e., two columns per block with xor 0.

### Augot et al (2003):

► The expected number of iterations of the 2-regular syndrome-decoding algorithm is

$$\min \left\{ \frac{2^n}{\left( \binom{n/w_0}{2} + 1 \right)^{w_0}} : w_0 \in \{1, 2, \dots, w\} \right\}.$$

### Bernstein et al (2011):

- ▶ 2-regular syndrome decoding using birthday paradox.
- ▶ Faster, much more complicated.

		H'			x'
1 0	0 0 1 0 0 1	T	0	0	
:	1 1				
	:  0  :				
			:		
			0	: 0	
:	0 0	<u> </u>	0	1	

- ▶ Don't forget the block structure of *H*.
- ▶ 2*w*-sum problem




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# Preimages through linearization



Given 
$$x \in \{0,1\}^n$$
 find  $(m_1,\ldots,m_w) \in [0,2^b-1]^w$  so that  $x = H_1[m_1] \oplus \ldots \oplus H_w[m_w].$ 



▶ w-sum problem

- ▶ Restrict to messages  $m_i \in \{0, 1\}$ .
- ▶ Consider the  $n \times w$  matrix

$$\Delta = [H_1[0] \oplus H_1[1]| \cdots |H_w[0] \oplus H_w[1]].$$

Note that

$$\Delta[i] \cdot m_i \oplus H_i[0] = \begin{cases} H_i[0] & \text{if } m_i = 0 \\ H_i[1] & \text{if } m_i = 1 \end{cases}$$

▶ Hence

$$\Delta \cdot m = x \oplus \bigoplus_{i=1}^{w} H_i[0].$$

▶ [n = w]: if  $\Delta$  is invertible we can find

$$m = \Delta^{-1}(x \oplus \bigoplus_{i=1}^{w} H_i[0])$$

## Toy example: linearization




```
sage: n=4; w=4; b=2 # m=(m[1],...,m[w]), m[i] in [0,...,2^b-1]
sage: set_random_seed(0)
sage: H=random_matrix(GF(2), n, w*2^b) # FSB random matrix
sage: print H
[0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0]
[0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1]
[0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1]
[0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]
sage: c=sum([H.column(i*2^b) for i in range(w)]); print c
(0.0.0.1)
sage: Delta=column_matrix([H.column(i*2^b)+H.column(i*2^b+1)\
                           for i in range(w)]): print Delta
. . . . :
Γ1 1 0 0 ]
[1 1 1 1]
[0 1 1 1]
[1 1 1 0]
sage: Delta.det()
sage: x=sum([H.column(i*2^b+randrange(2)) for i in range(w)]);
print x
(1, 0, 0, 1)
sage: m=(Delta^(-1)*(x+c)).lift() # lift m[i] to integer value
sage: (x-sum([H.column(i*2^b+m[i]) for i in range(w)])).is_zero()
True
```

# Preimages through linearization: try again



Given 
$$x \in \{0,1\}^n$$
 find  $(m_1,\ldots,m_w) \in [0,2^b-1]^w$  so that  $x = H_1[m_1] \oplus \ldots \oplus H_w[m_w].$ 



▶ w-sum problem

- ▶ Restrict to  $m_i \in \{\alpha_i, \beta_i\}, \ \alpha_i \neq \beta_i$ .
- Consider the matrix

$$\Delta = [H_1[\alpha_1] \oplus H_1[\beta_1]] \cdots |H_w[\alpha_w] \oplus H_w[\beta_w]].$$

▶ Note that


$$\Delta[i] \cdot \gamma_i \oplus H_i[\alpha_i] = \begin{cases} H_i[\alpha_i] & \text{if } \gamma_i = 0 \\ H_i[\beta_i] & \text{if } \gamma_i = 1 \end{cases}$$

- ▶ Hence  $\Delta \cdot \gamma = x \oplus \bigoplus_{i=1}^{w} H_i[\alpha_i]$ .
- ▶ [n = w]: if  $\Delta$  is invertible, compute the  $\{0, 1\}$ -vector  $\gamma$ .
- ► Then  $x = \bigoplus H_i[m_i] = \bigoplus H_i[\alpha_i + \gamma_i(\beta_i \alpha_i)].$

# Preimages through linearization w < n



Given 
$$x \in \{0,1\}^n$$
 find  $(m_1,\ldots,m_w) \in [0,2^b-1]^w$  so that  $x = H_1[m_1] \oplus \ldots \oplus H_w[m_w].$ 



▶ w-sum problem

- ▶ The main obstacle to this attack is that if w < n then rank  $\Delta$  is at most w (and sometimes less),
- ▶ Under suitable randomness assumptions the desired linear relation exists with probability at most  $2^w/2^n$ .


The expected number of iterations is therefore at least  $2^n/2^w$ ; e.g., approximately  $2^{0.75n}$  if  $w \approx n/4$ .

### Collisions through linearization for n = 2w



Find 
$$(m_1, \ldots, m_w), (m'_1, \ldots, m'_w) \in [0, 2^b - 1]^w$$
 so that

$$\bigoplus_{i=1}^{w} (H_i[m_i] \oplus H_i[m_1']) = 0.$$



▶ 2*w*-sum problem

### Saarinen (2007):

- ► Compute two  $n \times w$  matrices  $\Delta = [H_1[\alpha_1] \oplus H_1[\beta_1]| \cdots |H_w[\alpha_w] \oplus H_w[\beta_w]]$ and  $\Delta' = [H_1[\alpha'_1] \oplus H_1[\beta'_1]| \cdots |H_w[\alpha'_w] \oplus H_w[\beta'_w]].$
- Find solutions to  $\gamma, \gamma'$  to  $\Delta \cdot \gamma \oplus \bigoplus_{i=1}^{w} H_i[\alpha_i] = \Delta' \cdot \gamma' \oplus \bigoplus_{i=1}^{w} H_i[\alpha'_i]$ .
- ▶ n = 2w: if  $(\Delta | \Delta')$  is invertible, we find

$$(\Delta|\Delta')^{-1} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \gamma \\ \gamma' \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \bigoplus_{i=1}^w H_i[\alpha_i] \\ \bigoplus_{i=1}^w H_i[\alpha'_i] \end{bmatrix}.$$

▶ Solution  $(\gamma, \gamma')$  exists with probability  $2^{2w}/2^n$ .

# **Implications**



Old FSB parameters: n = 1024, w = 1024, b = 8, i.e., a compression matrix H with  $w \cdot 2^b = 262144$  columns.

- Originally claimed to provide 128-bit security against information-set decoding.
- Saarinen found collisions and preimages in under a second on a low-end pc.

#### Newer parameters:

▶ Very rough: ensure w < n/4 (reduced compression factor).



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
# Birthday Paradox



- ▶ Given two lists L, L' containing bit strings of length n.
- ▶ Find collision  $(x, x') \in L \times L'$ : x = x'

### Applications:

- Collisions in hash functions
- Any kind of meet-in-the-middle attack



▶ Cost:  $O(2^{n/2})$  time and space.



# Birthday attack in practice

# DTU

#### Straight-forward:

- Sort list L' and then check for each  $x \in L$  if  $x \in L'$ .
- Alternative: use hash tables.

#### Space-efficient:

▶ Use Pollard variant (functional graph).



[http://cryptojedi.org/misc/data/pollard.tex]


### 4-sum problem



Consider 4 lists  $L_1, L_2, L_3, L_4$  containing uniform random n-bit strings.

▶ Goal: find at least one tuple  $(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4)$  with  $x_i \in L_i$  such that

$$x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_4 = 0.$$



### Merge operation




 $\blacktriangleright$  Given two lists L, L' containing bit strings of length n.

### Merge L and L' on $\ell$ bits:

- ▶ For all pairs  $(x, x') \in L \times L'$ :
- ▶ If x and x' are equal on their *left-most*  $\ell$  *bits* compute  $x'' = x \oplus x'$  and store x'' in a new list L''.


Note that all elements in L'' have their left-most bits set to 0.



# Tree algorithm (1)

DTU

- 1. Generate lists  $L_i$  with each  $\sim 2^{n/3}$  bit strings of length n.
- 2. Merge lists  $L_1$  and  $L_2$  on left-most n/3 bits.
- 3. Similarly create a list  $L_6$  by merging the lists  $L_3$  and  $L_4$  on n/3 bits.
- 4. Merge  $L_5$  and  $L_6$  on the remaining 2n/3 bits.




# Tree algorithm (2)



- ▶ If  $|L_i| \sim 2^{n/3}$  for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 then we can expect that the merged lists  $L_5, L_6$  also have  $\sim 2^{n/3}$  elements.
- Apply birthday trick to remaining 2n/3 bits to find collision.

#### Camion-Patarin (1991), Wagner (2002):

• expect to find one collision in  $O(2^{n/3})$  time and space.





- ightharpoonup n = 9,  $|L_i| = 8$  for i = 1, 2, 3, 4:
- ▶ Find one column per list whose xor is 0.



- $n = 9, |L_i| = 8 \text{ for } i = 1, 2, 3, 4:$
- ightharpoonup Consider lists  $L_1$  and  $L_2$ .



- ightharpoonup n = 9,  $|L_i| = 8$  for i = 1, 2, 3, 4:
- ▶ Consider lists  $L_1$  and  $L_2$  on 3 bits.

```
| 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 | 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 |
| 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 | 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 |
| 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 | 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 |
```



- ightharpoonup n = 9,  $|L_i| = 8$  for i = 1, 2, 3, 4:
- ▶ Look for matches between elements of  $L_1$  and  $L_2$ .

```
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 | 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 |
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 | 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 |
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 | 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 |
```



- ightharpoonup n = 9,  $|L_i| = 8$  for i = 1, 2, 3, 4:
- ▶ Look for matches between elements of  $L_1$  and  $L_2$ .

```
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 | 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 |
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 | 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 |
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 | 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 |
```



- ightharpoonup n = 9,  $|L_i| = 8$  for i = 1, 2, 3, 4:
- ▶ Look for matches between elements of  $L_1$  and  $L_2$ .

```
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 | 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 |
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 | 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 |
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 | 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 |
```



- ightharpoonup n = 9,  $|L_i| = 8$  for i = 1, 2, 3, 4:
- ▶ Store positions of matching columns in  $L_1$  and  $L_2$  in  $L_5$ .

$$L_5:[1,1],[1,4],[2,3],[4,2],[4,5],[4,6],[5,2],[5,5],[5,6],[6,7],[7,1],[7,4]$$



- $n = 9, |L_i| = 8 \text{ for } i = 1, 2, 3, 4:$
- ▶ Look for matches between elements of  $L_3$  and  $L_4$  on 3 bits.

 $L_5:[1,1],[1,4],[2,3],[4,2],[4,5],[4,6],[5,2],[5,5],[5,6],[6,7],[7,1],[7,4]$ 



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 $L_5:[1,1],[1,4],[2,3],[4,2],[4,5],[4,6],[5,2],[5,5],[5,6],[6,7],[7,1],[7,4]$ 



- ightharpoonup n = 9,  $|L_i| = 8$  for i = 1, 2, 3, 4:
- ▶ Store positions of matching columns in  $L_3$  and  $L_4$  in  $L_6$ .

 $L_5:[1,1],[1,4],[2,3],[4,2],[4,5],[4,6],[5,2],[5,5],[5,6],[6,7],[7,1],[7,4]$  $L_6:[0,0],[1,7],[3,2],[3,4],[5,6],[6,6],[7,6]$ 



- ightharpoonup n = 9,  $|L_i| = 8$  for i = 1, 2, 3, 4:
- ► Candidate columns after Level 1.

$$L_5:[1,1],[1,4],[2,3],[4,2],[4,5],[4,6],[5,2],[5,5],[5,6],[6,7],[7,1],[7,4]$$
  
 $L_6:[0,0],[1,7],[3,2],[3,4],[5,6],[6,6],[7,6]$ 



- ightharpoonup n = 9,  $|L_i| = 8$  for i = 1, 2, 3, 4:
- ▶ Merge: take the xor of those candidate columns.

$$L_5$$
: [1, 1], [1, 4], [2, 3], [4, 2], [4, 5], [4, 6], [5, 2], [5, 5], [5, 6], [6, 7], [7, 1], [7, 4]  
 $L_6$ : [0, 0], [1, 7], [3, 2], [3, 4], [5, 6], [6, 6], [7, 6]



- $n = 9, |L_i| = 8 \text{ for } i = 1, 2, 3, 4:$
- ▶ Ignore first three rows (zero after first round).

```
      1
      1
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      0
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```

```
L_5: [1, 1], [1, 4], [2, 3], [4, 2], [4, 5], [4, 6], [5, 2], [5, 5], [5, 6], [6, 7], [7, 1], [7, 4]

L_6: [0, 0], [1, 7], [3, 2], [3, 4], [5, 6], [6, 6], [7, 6]
```



- $n = 9, |L_i| = 8 \text{ for } i = 1, 2, 3, 4:$
- ▶ Look for matches on the remaining 6 bits.

Notice the square root coming from the birthday paradox. Lists of size  $\sim 2^3$  containing elements of  $2 \cdot 3$  (nonzero) bits.

#### Example: Match



- $n = 9, |L_i| = 8 \text{ for } i = 1, 2, 3, 4:$
- ▶ Columns indexed by "[7,1]" in  $L_5$  and "[6,6]" in  $L_6$  yield a collision.


Notice the square root coming from the birthday paradox. Lists of size  $\sim 2^3$  containing elements of  $2 \cdot 3$  (nonzero) bits.

#### The *k*-sum problem



- ▶ Given k lists  $L_1, \ldots, L_k$  containing bit strings of length n.
- ▶ Find elements  $x_1 \in L_1, ..., x_k \in L_k$ :

$$x_1 \oplus \ldots \oplus x_k = 0.$$



#### We've seen the generalized birthday algorithm for k = 4

- ▶ Let's move on to bigger *k*.
- ▶ Keep *k* a power of 2, so the computation can be organized using binary trees.

#### *k*-tree algorithm (1)




Goal: Find collision among  $k = 2^i$  lists.

For 
$$j = 1, ..., i - 1$$
:

▶ Merge lists on level j by comparing elements on left-most  $j \cdot n/(i+1)$  bits.

#### Level j = i:

• merge remaining two lists on 2n/(i+1) bits.



# k-tree algorithm (2)




▶ If  $|L_i| \sim 2^{n/(i+1)}$  on level j we expect that the merged lists also have  $\sim 2^{n/(i+1)}$  elements.

Level i: list elements coincide on (i-1)n/(i+1) bits.

Apply birthday trick to remaining 2n/(i+1) bits.

Camion–Patarin (1991), Wagner (2002):

expect to find one collision in  $O(k2^{n/(i+1)})$  time and  $O(2^{n/(i+1)})$  space.



#### Finding collisions using GBA



- Find collisions in the FSB compression function n = 160, w = 64, b = 8.
- ▶ 2w-sum problem

#### **Exercises**

- Try to determine cost of an collision attack against FSB parameters
  - n = 288, w = 128, b = 6
  - n = 224, w = 96, b = 8

- ► Each of the w = 64 matrix blocks contains  $2^b = 256$  columns.
- ▶ Build w = 64 lists by generating all  $\binom{256}{2} \approx 2^{15}$  possible xors of two columns.
- ► Can we expect a collision on n = 160 bits using the generalized birthday attack using these 64 lists?
- ▶ No since  $n = 160 > (\log_2(w) + 1) \cdot 15$ .

#### Finding collisions using GBA



- Find collisions in the FSB compression function n = 160, w = 64, b = 8.
- ▶ 2*w*-sum problem

#### **Exercises**

- Try to determine cost of an collision attack against FSB parameters
  - n = 288, w = 128, b = 6
  - n = 224, w = 96, b = 8

- ► Each of the w = 64 matrix blocks contains  $2^b = 256$  columns.
- ▶ Build 32 lists from two blocks by generating all possible  $\binom{256}{2}^2 \approx 2^{30}$  possible xors of four columns.
- ► Can we expect a collision on n = 160 bits using the generalized birthday attack using these 32 lists?
- Yes. Expect to find a collision in time  $w2^{30} = 2^{36}$  since  $n = 160 < \log_2(w) \cdot 30$ .

Attack due to Coron and Joux (2004).



- 1. Motivation
- 2. Information-set decoding
- 3. Linearization
- 4. Generalized birthday attacks
- 5. Outlook

#### Todo



#### Difficult to choose parameters:

► Automated tool taking different approaches for the *k*-sum problem into account?

#### Further cryptanalysis needed:

- Asymptotic analysis for different w/n ratios
- ► Space-efficient variants?

Thanks.