

Post-Quantum Crypto

Today's defense against tomorrow's quantum hacker *gnomes*



Christian Paquin

 @chpaquin


Principal Program Manager



Microsoft Research



SHM  CON 2019

Turns out the underpants business isn't great



The Quantum Revolution

- Quantum computers use the properties of quantum mechanics (entanglement, superposition) to implement algorithms not possible on classical computers
 - Nice math on paper, hard to build in practice
 - Years away, but...
- A lot of investment\$
 - All around the world
 - My colleagues are building the full stack: from the chip to the SDK
<https://www.microsoft.com/quantum/>





$$|\psi\rangle = \alpha|0\rangle + \beta|1\rangle$$




The Quantum Menace

- Quantum is great for computing, but bad news for cryptography!
 - Shor (1994) solves the factoring (breaks RSA) and discrete log (breaks DSA, Diffie Hellman, and elliptic curve variants) problems in polynomial time
 - Grover (1996) speeds up function inversion; need to double the size of hash functions (SHA) and block ciphers (AES)
- Breaks ~~most~~ all the asymmetric crypto in use today




Hacker gnomes have a new business model



Tic toc...



- Michele Mosca (Waterloo):
“1/7 chance of breaking RSA-2048 by 2026, 1/2 chance by 2031” (2015)
“1/6 chance within 10 years” (2017)
- Simon Benjamin (Oxford):
“maybe 6-12 years if someone is willing to go Manhattan project”
- My colleagues estimate 2030



We need *quantum-safe* alternatives soon: *post-quantum cryptography*!


Why PQC today?

- Capture now, decrypt later
- Updating standards is loooooong
 - TLS, SSH, IKE, PKI, S/MIME, ...
- Unknown impact on code base
 - Longer key/message/sig sizes
 - Slower running times
 - Code agility

Do your apps protect data that needs to be kept secret for more than 10 years?

NIST competition

- The National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST) started the process to specify Post-Quantum Cryptography



- Looking for signatures, encryption, and key establishments schemes
 - Five levels, corresponding to breaking AES-128/192/256 and SHA-256/384
- 64 submissions remaining (from 69 valid submissions)
 - 19 signature schemes, 45 KEM/encryption schemes
- <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography>

Many new proposals

- From various math families
 - Lattices, error-correcting codes, multivariate systems, hash functions, isogenies, zero-knowledge proofs
- Our submissions
 - FRODO (KEM)
 - Learning With Error problem
 - <https://frodokem.org/>
 - SIKE (KEM)
 - Supersingular Isogeny elliptic curves
 - <https://sike.org/>
 - Picnic (sig)
 - Zero-knowledge proofs, hash, and block ciphers
 - <https://microsoft.github.io/Picnic/>
 - qTesla (sig)
 - Ring Learning with Error problem
 - <https://qtesla.org>





I can't deal with all
that PQC!?!

OPEN QUANTUM SAFE

- C library created to simplify integration of PQC into applications
- Multi-org dev team



SRI International


Radboud University



- Master branch (for integration) and NIST branch (for experimentation)
- Shipped integrations with OpenSSL (TLS 1.2, 1.3) and OpenSSH
- Language wrappers (Python, upcoming: Java & C#)
- <https://openquantumsafe.org/>


TLS integration

- Integrated OQS in OpenSSL 1.0.2 (TLS 1.2) and 1.1.1 (TLS 1.3)
- Added PQC key exchange (KEX) and authentication (1.1.1 only)
- Supports hybrid mode
 - Combines classical and PQC (today's security + quantum-proof)
- Tested with apache and nginx
- <https://github.com/open-quantum-safe/openssl/wiki/PQC-integration-into-TLS-1.3>



TLS 1.3 Perf

Measurements with client/server on localhost (no network delay)




Classical ■ PQC ■

July 15th built of OQS/OpenSSL
Azure Standard D4s v3 VM, Ubuntu OS

SSH integration

- Integrated OQS in OpenSSH 7.7
 - KEX algs from master branch
- Supports PQC and hybrid modes
 - Shared secret = concatenation of classical & PQC shared secrets


```
C:\Users\mirabel>bash
mirabel@KHAN:/mnt/c/Users/mirabel$ cd /usr/local/bin
mirabel@KHAN:/usr/local/bin$ ./ssh mira@192.168.7.35 -p 4600 -2
OpenSSH_7.4p1, OpenSSL 1.0.1f  Jan 2014
debug1: Reading configuration data /usr/local/etc/ssh_config
debug1: Connecting to 192.168.7.35 [192.168.7.35] port 4600.
debug1: Authenticating to 192.168.7.35:4600 as 'mira'
debug1: SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT sent
debug1: SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received
debug1: kex: algorithm: rlwe-bcns15-sha512
debug1: kex: host key algorithm: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256
debug1: kex: server->client cipher: chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com MAC: <implicit> compression: none
debug1: kex: client->server cipher: chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com MAC: <implicit> compression: none
debug1: sending SSH2_MSG_KEX_OQS_INIT
debug1: expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_OQS_REPLY
```



<https://github.com/open-quantum-safe/openssh-portable>

OpenVPN

- Integration in OpenVPN 2.4.4
 - Uses OQS-OpenSSL to protect TLS key establishment
 - Uses RSA or Picnic auth
- Easy way to achieve PQC tunnel to the cloud even if applications haven't been updated
 - Good for backward compatibility




- Tested with Raspberry Pi and Windows clients, and Azure Linux VM service
- <https://github.com/Microsoft/PQCrypto-VPN>

HSM integration



- Integrated Picnic into an Utimaco HSM (Security Server Se50 LAN v4)
- Experiment consisted of
 1. Picnic key generation and signing in HSM (using reference implementation)
 2. Generated self-signed root Picnic cert
 3. Issued end-user RSA certs using the Picnic cert
- <https://microsoft.github.io/Picnic/>





TLS Demo

The road ahead

- Start planning transition to PQC
- Make sure your apps/services are crypto agile
- Consider deploying hybrid solutions for long-lived, high-value data
- Consider wrapping long-tail apps/services in a PQC-VPN tunnel



<https://openquantumsafe.org/>

What do we
do now?



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