



# Defensive Control Mapping

Break → Expand → Ascend → Rule

Defensive Control Mapping by

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**Standards Referenced:**

NIST CSF 2.0 | ISO 27001:2022 | CIS Controls v8 | MITRE ATT&CK v14

BEAR Framework Concept by Ivan Novikov (Wallarm)

# What is BEAR?

*A practitioner's model for when speed matters*

## The Problem

MITRE ATT&CK is perfect for building detections. Lockheed Kill Chain is great for campaign analysis. But in the heat of an engagement or incident — they're overhead, not guidance. Too many boxes. Not enough focus.

## The Solution

BEAR cuts through the noise with four questions that matter:

|   | Phase  | Key Question             | Transition       |
|---|--------|--------------------------|------------------|
| B | BREAK  | Did they get in?         | Outside → Inside |
| E | EXPAND | How far did they move?   | One → Many       |
| A | ASCEND | Did they get real power? | User → Admin     |
| R | RULE   | What can they do now?    | Access → Impact  |

## When to Use

| Scenario           | How BEAR Helps  |
|--------------------|---|
| Active Incident    | Quickly assess where the attacker is and what's at risk |
| Red Team Debrief   | Structure findings by impact, not just technique        |
| Control Validation | Test defenses at each phase, find the gaps              |
| Executive Briefing | Translate technical status into business risk           |

## Where BEAR Sits vs MITRE and Lockheed

BEAR is not a replacement for MITRE ATT&CK or the Lockheed Kill Chain — it's a complement. Use MITRE for describing techniques and building detections. Use Kill Chain for thinking about campaigns and defense in depth. Use BEAR when you're in the middle of the action and need to cut through the noise fast.

| BEAR   | MITRE ATT&CK Tactics                     | Lockheed Kill Chain        |
|--------|--|----------------------------|
| Break  | Initial Access, Execution                | Exploitation, Installation |
| Expand | Discovery, Lateral Movement, Persistence | Installation, C2           |
| Ascend | Privilege Escalation, Credential Access  | C2, Actions on Objectives  |
| Rule   | Collection, Exfiltration, Impact         | Actions on Objectives      |

# Quick Reference

| Phase                         | Key Question             | Primary Focus                         | Top Controls               |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| <b>BREAK</b> Outside → Inside | Did they get in?         | Initial AccessExecution               | MFA, Patching, WAF         |
| <b>EXPAND</b> One → Many      | How far did they move?   | Lateral MovementPersistence           | Segmentation, EDR, ZTNA    |
| <b>ASCEND</b> User → Admin    | Did they get real power? | Privilege EscalationCredential Access | PAM, AD Tiering, LAPS      |
| <b>RULE</b> Access → Impact   | What can they do now?    | CollectionExfiltrationImpact          | Immutable Backups, DLP, IR |

## Control Prioritization by Phase

| Phase         | Focus                  | Top 3 Controls                                |
|---------------|------------------------|---|
| <b>BREAK</b>  | Prevent initial access | MFA everywhere, vulnerability management, WAF |
| <b>EXPAND</b> | Slow lateral movement  | Network segmentation, EDR, Zero Trust         |
| <b>ASCEND</b> | Limit blast radius     | PAM, AD tiering, credential protection        |
| <b>RULE</b>   | Minimize impact        | Immutable backups, DLP, incident response     |

## ● Phase: BREAK

*"The moment outside becomes inside"*

### Attacker Objectives

- Exploit web/API vulnerabilities
- Abuse broken authentication flows
- Leverage misconfigured edge services
- Compromise forgotten or legacy VPNs
- Achieve initial code execution

### Defensive Controls

#### Attack Surface Management

| Control                           | NIST CSF 2.0     | ISO 27001 | CIS v8   |
|-----------------------------------|------------------|-----------|----------|
| External asset inventory          | ID.AM-1, ID.AM-2 | A.5.9     | 1.1, 2.1 |
| Continuous vulnerability scanning | ID.RA-1          | A.8.8     | 7.1, 7.2 |
| Attack surface monitoring         | ID.RA-2          | A.5.7     | 7.7      |
| Shadow IT discovery               | ID.AM-1          | A.5.9     | 1.1, 2.1 |

#### Perimeter Hardening

| Control                        | NIST CSF 2.0 | ISO 27001 | CIS v8   |
|--------------------------------|--------------|-----------|----------|
| Web Application Firewall (WAF) | PR.DS-1      | A.8.20    | 13.10    |
| API gateway security           | PR.DS-1      | A.8.20    | 13.10    |
| Edge configuration hardening   | PR.PT-3      | A.8.9     | 4.1, 4.2 |
| VPN hardening & MFA            | PR.AC-7      | A.8.5     | 6.3, 6.4 |

#### Authentication Controls

| Control                          | NIST CSF 2.0 | ISO 27001 | CIS v8        |
|----------------------------------|--------------|-----------|---------------|
| Multi-factor authentication      | PR.AC-7      | A.8.5     | 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 |
| Conditional access policies      | PR.AC-4      | A.8.2     | 6.7           |
| Password policy enforcement      | PR.AC-1      | A.5.17    | 5.2           |
| Brute force protection           | PR.AC-7      | A.8.5     | 6.3           |
| Authentication anomaly detection | DE.AE-1      | A.8.16    | 8.11          |

#### Detection Opportunities

| Indicator                    | Data Source        | Detection Logic              |
|------------------------------|--------------------|------------------------------|
| Failed authentication spikes | IAM logs, VPN logs | Threshold alerting by source |
| Anomalous geographic access  | Auth logs          | Impossible travel detection  |
| Exploit signature matches    | WAF, IDS/IPS       | Signature-based detection    |

|                           |                  |                    |
|---------------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| Unusual API call patterns | API gateway logs | Baseline deviation |
|---------------------------|------------------|--------------------|

## Key Metrics

- Mean Time to Patch (MTTP) for external-facing systems
- Percentage of external assets with MFA enforcement
- External vulnerability scan coverage
- Time from vulnerability disclosure to remediation

## ● Phase: EXPAND

*"Turn one foothold into many options"*

### Attacker Objectives

- Move to internal applications
- Access file shares and data repositories
- Pivot to cloud resources (Azure, AWS, GCP)
- Compromise Kubernetes clusters
- Access SaaS admin panels
- Establish persistence mechanisms

### Defensive Controls

#### Network Segmentation

| Control                          | NIST CSF 2.0 | ISO 27001 | CIS v8 |
|----------------------------------|--------------|-----------|--------|
| Network segmentation             | PR.AC-5      | A.8.22    | 12.2   |
| Micro-segmentation               | PR.AC-5      | A.8.22    | 12.2   |
| Zero trust network access (ZTNA) | PR.AC-5      | A.8.22    | 12.8   |
| East-west traffic inspection     | DE.CM-1      | A.8.16    | 13.3   |

#### Behavior Drift Detection

| Control                     | NIST CSF 2.0 | ISO 27001 | CIS v8 |
|-----------------------------|--------------|-----------|--------|
| User behavior baselining    | DE.AE-1      | A.8.16    | 8.11   |
| Anomalous access detection  | DE.CM-3      | A.8.16    | 8.11   |
| Peer group analysis         | DE.AE-1      | A.8.16    | 8.11   |
| Session behavior monitoring | DE.CM-3      | A.8.16    | 8.11   |
| Lateral movement scoring    | DE.AE-1      | A.8.16    | 8.11   |

#### Endpoint Controls

| Control                  | NIST CSF 2.0 | ISO 27001 | CIS v8   |
|--------------------------|--------------|-----------|----------|
| EDR deployment           | DE.CM-4      | A.8.7     | 10.1     |
| Host-based firewall      | PR.PT-4      | A.8.20    | 13.1     |
| Application whitelisting | PR.PT-3      | A.8.19    | 2.5, 2.6 |
| Endpoint hardening       | PR.PT-3      | A.8.9     | 4.1      |

#### Cloud Security

| Control                            | NIST CSF 2.0 | ISO 27001 | CIS v8 |
|------------------------------------|--------------|-----------|--------|
| Cloud Security Posture Mgmt (CSPM) | ID.AM-5      | A.5.23    | 3.1    |
| Cloud workload protection (CWPP)   | DE.CM-4      | A.8.7     | 10.1   |

|                            |         |        |     |
|----------------------------|---------|--------|-----|
| Kubernetes security (KSPM) | ID.AM-5 | A.5.23 | 3.1 |
| Cloud IAM hygiene          | PR.AC-4 | A.5.18 | 5.4 |

## Detection Opportunities

| Indicator                     | Data Source         | Detection Logic                |
|-------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|
| Lateral movement patterns     | EDR, network flow   | SMB/WinRM/RDP unusual hosts    |
| Internal reconnaissance       | DNS, LDAP logs      | LDAP enum, port scanning       |
| New persistence mechanisms    | EDR, Windows Events | Scheduled tasks, services      |
| Unusual cloud API calls       | Cloud audit logs    | First-time API by principal    |
| Behavioral baseline deviation | Behavior analytics  | Anomaly score threshold breach |

## Key Metrics

- Segmentation effectiveness score
- Mean dwell time (detection to containment)
- Lateral movement detection rate
- Percentage of hosts with EDR coverage
- Behavior drift alert-to-investigation ratio

# ● Phase: ASCEND

*"Get real power"*

## Attacker Objectives

- Local privilege escalation (LPE) to root/SYSTEM
- Domain Admin compromise
- Kubernetes cluster-admin access
- Powerful cloud IAM roles (Azure Contributor, AWS Admin)
- CI/CD pipeline control
- Certificate authority compromise

## Defensive Controls

### Privileged Access Management

| Control                               | NIST CSF 2.0 | ISO 27001 | CIS v8   |
|---------------------------------------|--------------|-----------|----------|
| Privileged Access Workstations (PAWs) | PR.AC-4      | A.8.2     | 12.6     |
| Privileged Identity Management (PIM)  | PR.AC-4      | A.5.18    | 5.4, 6.1 |
| Just-in-time elevation                | PR.AC-4      | A.5.18    | 6.1      |
| Credential vaulting                   | PR.DS-5      | A.5.17    | 5.2      |

### Credential Protection

| Control               | NIST CSF 2.0 | ISO 27001 | CIS v8 |
|-----------------------|--------------|-----------|--------|
| LAPS / Windows LAPS   | PR.DS-5      | A.5.17    | 5.2    |
| Credential Guard      | PR.DS-5      | A.8.9     | 10.5   |
| Protected Users group | PR.DS-5      | A.5.17    | 5.4    |
| Kerberos hardening    | PR.DS-5      | A.5.17    | 5.4    |

### Active Directory Security

| Control                  | NIST CSF 2.0 | ISO 27001 | CIS v8 |
|--------------------------|--------------|-----------|--------|
| AD tiering model         | PR.AC-4      | A.8.2     | 5.4    |
| AdminSDHolder monitoring | DE.CM-3      | A.8.16    | 5.4    |
| DCSync attack detection  | DE.CM-3      | A.8.16    | 8.5    |
| GPO change monitoring    | DE.CM-3      | A.8.16    | 8.5    |

### Privileged Behavior Analytics

| Control                            | NIST CSF 2.0 | ISO 27001 | CIS v8 |
|------------------------------------|--------------|-----------|--------|
| Admin activity baselining          | DE.AE-1      | A.8.16    | 8.11   |
| Abnormal privilege usage detection | DE.CM-3      | A.8.16    | 8.11   |
| First-time elevation alerting      | DE.AE-1      | A.8.16    | 8.11   |

|                                     |         |        |      |
|-------------------------------------|---------|--------|------|
| Service account behavior monitoring | DE.CM-3 | A.8.16 | 8.11 |
|-------------------------------------|---------|--------|------|

## Detection Opportunities

| Indicator                     | Data Source         | Detection Logic                |
|-------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|
| Privilege escalation attempts | EDR, Windows Events | Token manipulation, UAC bypass |
| Sensitive group modifications | AD audit logs       | DA, EA, Schema Admin changes   |
| Kerberoasting activity        | AD logs             | Unusual TGS requests for SPNs  |
| DCSync indicators             | AD logs             | Replication from non-DC        |

## Key Metrics

- Number of standing privileged accounts
- Privileged access review frequency
- Mean time to detect privilege escalation
- Percentage of admins using PAWs

## ● Phase: RULE

*"Use that power to shape reality"*

### Attacker Objectives

- Establish quiet persistence (survive detection/remediation)
- Own production environments
- Stage future extortion capability
- Data exfiltration
- Destructive capability (ransomware, wiper)
- Supply chain compromise

### Defensive Controls

#### Data Protection

| Control                       | NIST CSF 2.0     | ISO 27001 | CIS v8     |
|-------------------------------|------------------|-----------|------------|
| Data classification           | ID.AM-5          | A.5.12    | 3.1, 3.7   |
| Data Loss Prevention (DLP)    | PR.DS-5          | A.8.12    | 3.13       |
| Encryption at rest/in transit | PR.DS-1, PR.DS-2 | A.8.24    | 3.10, 3.11 |
| Database activity monitoring  | DE.CM-7          | A.8.16    | 3.14       |

#### Backup & Recovery

| Control                       | NIST CSF 2.0 | ISO 27001 | CIS v8 |
|-------------------------------|--------------|-----------|--------|
| Immutable backups             | PR.IP-4      | A.8.13    | 11.2   |
| Air-gapped backup copies      | PR.IP-4      | A.8.13    | 11.4   |
| Backup integrity verification | PR.IP-4      | A.8.13    | 11.3   |
| Recovery time testing         | RC.RP-1      | A.5.30    | 11.5   |

#### Data Access Analytics

| Control                     | NIST CSF 2.0 | ISO 27001 | CIS v8 |
|-----------------------------|--------------|-----------|--------|
| Data access baselining      | DE.AE-1      | A.8.16    | 8.11   |
| Bulk download detection     | DE.CM-3      | A.8.16    | 8.11   |
| Anomalous data movement     | DE.AE-1      | A.8.16    | 8.11   |
| After-hours access alerting | DE.CM-3      | A.8.16    | 8.11   |

#### Resilience & Business Continuity

| Control                      | NIST CSF 2.0 | ISO 27001 | CIS v8    |
|------------------------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| Business continuity planning | RC.RP-1      | A.5.30    | 11.1      |
| Disaster recovery testing    | RC.RP-1      | A.5.30    | 11.5      |
| Incident response plan       | RS.RP-1      | A.5.24    | 17.1-17.9 |

|                     |         |        |      |
|---------------------|---------|--------|------|
| Communication plans | RS.CO-2 | A.5.24 | 17.3 |
|---------------------|---------|--------|------|

## Detection Opportunities

| Indicator                    | Data Source         | Detection Logic                |
|------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------|
| Large data transfers         | Network flow, proxy | Volume anomaly external        |
| DNS tunneling                | DNS logs            | High entropy subdomains        |
| Shadow admin accounts        | IAM logs            | New accounts with admin rights |
| Backup deletion/modification | Backup system logs  | Unusual backup operations      |

## Key Metrics

- Data exfiltration detection rate
- Backup recovery success rate (tested)
- Mean time to recover (MTTR)
- Percentage of critical data classified

### Change Log:

| Version | Change        | By:            |
|---------|---------------|----------------|
| v1.0    | Base Document | C. Six         |
| v1.1    | Added         | Behavior Drift |
|         |               |                |
|         |               |                |

### Change Rational:

Behavior drift (think UBEA, UBA) is a cross-cutting capability that spans all four BEAR phases.. It has been placed in "expand" as that's where dwell time detection matters most, with callouts in other phases.

BEAR is the “cut through the noise” layer and MITRE is where you go for the comprehensive mapping.

The framework’s value is in the speed and focus, not exhaustive coverage.

