

AWS Security

1. Get Rid of Static, Long-Lived Credentials 1.1. By use-case 1.1.1. For Humans 1.1.1.1. :no_entry_sign: Don't use IAM users 1.1.1.2. :white_check_mark: Enforce temporary credentials 1.1.1.2.1. AWS SSO 1.1.1.2.2. Identity federation with external identity provider Link: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id roles providers.html 1.1.1.3. :railway_track: Guardrails 1.1.1.3.1. SCP to block the creation of IAM users **Link:** https://asecure.cloud/a/scp_deny_iam_user_creation/ 1.1.1.3.2. SCP to block the creation of IAM access keys **Link:** https://asecure.cloud/a/scp_deny_iam_user_creation/ 1.1.1.4. :wrench: aws-vault **Link:** https://github.com/99designs/aws-vault 1.1.1.4.1. encrypts credentials on disk 1.1.1.4.2. supports AWS SSO 1.1.2. For Workloads 1.1.2.1. :no_entry_sign: Don't use IAM users 1.1.2.2. ... running on AWS 1.1.2.2.1. :white_check_mark: Use a platform-provided identity 1.1.2.2.1.1. EC2 instance roles Link: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/iam-roles-for-amazon-ec2.html 1.1.2.2.1.2. Lambda execution roles **Link:** https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/lambda-intro-execution-role.html 1.1.2.2.1.3. EKS IAM roles for service accounts Link: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/eks/latest/userguide/iam-roles-for-service-accounts.html 1.1.2.2.1.4. ECS task execution roles **Link:** https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/task_execution_IAM_role.html 1.1.2.3. ... running outside AWS 1.1.2.3.1. :white_check_mark: Use a credentials broker to exchange temporary AWS credentials 1.1.3. For SaaS integrating with AWS 1.1.3.1. :no_entry_sign: Don't use IAM users 1.1.3.2. :white_check_mark: Create a dedicated IAM role 1.1.3.2.1. ... that can be assumed from the provider's AWS account 1.1.3.2.2. ... with a unique external ID **Link:** https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_create_for-user_externalid.html 1.1.3.2.3. ... and minimal permissions 1.1.3.2.3.1. :wrench: cloudsplaining Link: https://github.com/salesforce/cloudsplaining 1.2. Scanning for exposed credentials 1.2.1. When 1.2.1.1. Locally using pre-commit hooks **Link:** https://pre-commit.com/ 1.2.1.2. On CI/CD 1.2.2. What 1.2.2.1. Source code 1.2.2.2. Configuration files 1.2.2.3. Container images 1.2.3. How 1.2.3.1. :wrench: truffleHog **Link:** https://github.com/trufflesecurity/truffleHog 1.2.3.2. :wrench: detect-secrets **Link:** https://github.com/ibm/detect-secrets 1.2.3.3. :wrench: gitleaks **Link:** https://github.com/zricethezav/gitleaks 1.2.3.4. :wrench: ggshield Link: https://github.com/GitGuardian/ggshield 1.2.3.5. :wrench: SecretScanner

Link: https://github.com/deepfence/SecretScanner

1.2.3.6. :wrench: Gitlab secret scanning

Link: https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/user/application_security/secret_detection/

1.2.3.7. :wrench: Github secret scanning

Link: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/secret-scanning/about-secret-scanning

2. Avoid Misconfigured S3 Buckets

2.1. :walking: Basics

2.1.1. Scan your AWS accounts for misconfigured S3 buckets

2.1.1.1. :wrench: Prowler

Link: https://github.com/prowler-cloud/prowler

2.1.1.2. :wrench: ScoutSuite

Link: https://github.com/nccgroup/ScoutSuite

2.1.1.3. :wrench: AWS Config Rules

Link: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/config/latest/developerguide/s3-bucket-public-read-prohibited.html

2.1.1.4. :wrench: AWS IAM Access Analyzer

Link: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/access-analyzer.html

2.1.1.5. :wrench: Commercial CSPM

2.1.2. Protect the S3 Public Access Block setting with an SCP

Link: https://asecure.cloud/a/scp_s3_block_public_access/

2.1.3. Enable account-wide S3 Public Access Block

Link: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/configuring-block-public-access-account.html

2.1.3.1. ... make it part of your AWS account provisioning process

2.1.4. Scan your infrastructure-as-code for S3 misconfigurations

Link: https://blog.christophetd.fr/shifting-cloud-security-left-scanning-infrastructure-as-code-for-security-issues/

2.2. :runner: Hardening

2.2.1. Restrict access through a VPC endpoint

Link: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/example-bucket-policies-vpc-endpoint.html

2.2.2. Encrypt with a customer-managed KMS key

Link: https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/s3-bucket-access-default-encryption/

2.2.3. Turn on CloudTrail S3 Data Events

Link: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/logging-data-events-with-cloudtrail.html

2.2.4. Review who can access data

2.2.4.1. :wrench: PMapper

Link: https://github.com/nccgroup/PMapper

3. Securing the Instance Metadata Service

3.1. :shield: Prevent: Use IMDSv2

Link: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/configuring-instance-metadata-service.html

3.1.1. Enforce IMDSv2 with an SCP

Link: https://github.com/nccgroup/PMapper

3.1.2. Identify workloads not using IMDSv2

3.1.2.1. :wrench: metabadger

Link: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/configuring-instance-metadata-service.html

3.1.3. :book: Latacora guide

 $\textbf{Link:} \ https://docs.google.com/document/d/1X737xoQviufdxZk_l33bnpp6noOmNIYvMilQCdhtwoY/editalloor. A state of the control of the contro$

3.2. EKS: Block pod access to the IMDS

3.2.1. :book: Privilege Escalation in EKS by compromising the instance role of worker nodes

Link: https://blog.christophetd.fr/privilege-escalation-in-aws-elastic-kubernetes-service-eks-by-compromising-the-instance-role-of-worker-nodes/

3.3. :mag_right: Detect: Identify credentials stolen through the IMDS

3.3.1. :wrench: GuardDuty

 ${\it 3.3.1.1.}\ Instance Credential Exfiltration. Outside AWS$

 $\textbf{Link:} \ \text{https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/guardduty_finding-types-iam.html} \\ \text{\#unauthorizedaccess-iam-instancecredentialexfiltrationoutsideaws} \\ \text{\#unauthorizedacces} \\ \text{\#unauthoriz$

 ${\it 3.3.1.2.}\ Instance Credential Exfiltration. Inside AWS$

Link: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/guardduty_finding-types-iam.html#unauthorizedaccess-iam-instancecredentialexfiltrationinsideaws