




# LANDSCAPE V1

notes 1



! intelligent agent  
! host agents




# CONCEPT V1

Notes E

FN

~~Accept all kinds~~



Node → Network Group → Server


## LoC-ID

Loosely Coupled  
Intrusion Detection

⇒

≈ overlay networks

all communication  
are events.



FIN  
(small)!! ↪ rebirth  
- comm  
- auth  
- pubsub  
- correlate  
- support all

+ Supervised Server


↳ origin of "rules"  
policy

↳ pushes through network

→ dynamic / group specific

(?) ↳ real-time resp? ↪ to augment level

↳ divide network sensing  
→ special nodes

Naam Related Work 1Thesis structuur

Voorwoord / Dankwoord,

Samenvatting

Inleiding.

- Draadloze sensornetwerken
- Toepassingen ← VB !!
- Probleemstelling
- Doelstelling
- Verloop / structuur tekst

Achtergrond.

- ... → landscape, "nodes", network, contiki, (cosi)
- Generated onderzoek
  - = } major slices

Probleemstelling ← Scenario's

Bestaande Technologieën

2


Architectuur

Implementatie

Discussie

Beduidt

1  
Vaste technologieën  
of platform

Demo

+ topology + supervisor


"simulate" 3 attackers  $\leq \frac{1}{3}$  3 types

met implementatie return node app?

mind app?

→ with external interface  
→ proximity? → motion detector

↳ case "try not to be seen"



### Matrix related work

	topic	item						
✓ support for detection in accu								
✓ takes physical								
✓ papers	X	X			X			
	X	.	.	.	X	-		

## Features

- end 2 end solution
- light weight
- non-intrusive (pub sub, event, ...)

Notes 5

report

node - GW - sever  
group


configure/install

## Reasons

- not in use - not in scope  
↳ no offering

↳ Detection while "sleeping" ! ...


thesis NOT about detection = too large specific related work



# Differences "classic" IDS vs NSN-IDS

Notes 6


NIDS



HIDS




VS




→ no single instance possible

~~signatures~~  
large list of application specific events

operating system "calls"  
application specific  
→ ~~files focus change~~




notes 8



optimize multi rules (in static code this would be a no-go ⇒ microcontroller language...)

↳ functional

DSL → (language rewriting) + C...  
 ↳ direct toasm?  
 ≈ out-do compiler  
 ↳ avoid ctype type checks?



"static signatures" ↳ DSL { pattern anomaly checker  
 ↳ become event based

~~DSL~~ (Cisco  
internal = ISDN SC  
definition  
specification  
language  
:-)

minimal  
≤ 10 cmd stackups  
 ↳ no loops!  
 ↳ 1) condition  
 ↳ 2) assignments (operator)  
 ↳ 3) event trigger definition  
 ↳ 4) request set/get info

local system  
 ↳ remote  
 ↳ computed  
 ↳ messaging  
 ↳ distributed  
 ↳ implicit

node shouldn't  
know about  
others

→ "might not  
be there"

check if possible to  
implement algo's that  
do access specific other  
nodes' info.

- DSC
- Code generation
- FW + API → very low-level technical.
- Contiki (+ LooCiD)
- ↳ "or non"

how  
possibly  
justify

LooCiD FW

Loosely Coupled  
Intrusion Detection FW

① event driven? DSL

~~too much~~

(too many) → no DSC  
→ just most that  
is optimal

thesis "scope"

subset possibilities

↳ (just enough) to move overall  
possibilities

based on  
"detection"

literature

- 1) detection WSN
- 2) detection classic.
- 3) DSL → code generation

Demo

/ shows classic implementation

X 2-3 detections

versus (generated) low-level API + FW

shows / working

+ code / mem / CPU reduction

attach selection

→ "visibility" ① "Sybil" ?




⇒

② "sink hole" ?

la mama ③ "node capture" ?

anomalie

! limit max size = compiler policy.



1. online repo
2. DSL compiler
3. policy
4. low level API implementation
5. supported API framework
6. supervision tools


+ Scope of Hardware → ATMega1284P + Contiki + Loops

notes 11

$$T_{ij} = E(R_{ij})$$

# ① RFSN

POC-1



$$R_{ij} = (R_{ij})_D + (R_{ij})_{ID}$$

$$(R_{ij})_D = f(D_{ij}, (R_{ij})_D)$$

$$(R_{ij})_{ID} = (R_{ij})_{ID} + w_{ik} * R_{kj} \\ g(R_{ik})$$

$\Rightarrow$  BRSN

$$R_{ij} = \frac{P(D_{ij} | R_{ij}) * R_{ij}}{\sum P(D_{ij} | R_{ij}) * R_{ij}}$$

$$R_{ij} = \text{Beta}(\alpha_i + 1, \beta_i + 1)$$

Gamma

$$\Gamma(x) = (x-1)!$$


Beta dist

$$P(x) = f(x, \alpha, \beta) = \frac{\Gamma(\alpha + \beta)}{\Gamma(\alpha)\Gamma(\beta)} x^{\alpha-1} (1-x)^{\beta-1}$$

$$X \sim \text{Beta}(\alpha, \beta)$$

$$T_{ij} = E(R_{ij}) = E(\text{Beta}(\alpha_{j+1}, \beta_{j+1}))$$

$$= \frac{\alpha_j + 1}{\alpha_j + \beta_j + 2}$$

UpdateAging2nd hand info

! independent Rep Infra.  
e.g.  $(R_{ij})_D$

$$\alpha_j^{\text{new}} = \alpha_j + \frac{\beta_j^{\text{new}}}{\beta_j}$$

$$\beta_j^{\text{new}} = \frac{2\alpha_k}{(\beta_k + 2)(\alpha_j^k + \beta_j^k + 2) + 2\alpha_k}$$

repulation of k  
weight

$(R_{ij})_D \rightarrow RTD_i$   
refresh (=0)  
after broadcast

propagation  
cooperative  
 $RTD_i$  TH

indirect  
observation  
through node  
about j

only propagate nodes in  $RTD_i^c$  and  $RTD_j^c$

Simulation (1,0) (0,1)  $\xrightarrow{\text{OK NOT}}$  Forwarding notes 13

accuracy = 0,98



$$TH_{\text{SHI}} = 0,9$$

Needs info on packets send by other nodes

→ on <packet> <trigger-cb> (+ promiscuous mode)

data storage for other nodes

→ variables, dynamic  $\sim \#$  neighbour nodes  
math functions ↳ max?



## POC 2 Cooperative iIDS (paper 2)

Model

→ proofs for iDP + implementation for real.

↳ if impossible  $\Rightarrow$  not realistic.  
in theory.  $\Rightarrow$  possible in reality  
= weaker

$$S = \{s_1, s_2, \dots, s_n\} \quad \text{sensors}$$

$N(s)$

Neighbours  $\Leftarrow$  static + symm.  
 $\hookrightarrow$  2-hop.

$t$  nodes attacked  $\Rightarrow$  Byzantine failure.

↳ Byz. Agreement protocol.

$|t=1| \rightarrow t > 1$  is hard  $\Rightarrow$

source(s)  $\Leftrightarrow$   $s = \text{attacker/captured node}$

honest(s)  $\Leftrightarrow \neg \text{source}(s)$

Alert Module  $\rightarrow$  alerted node  $\rightarrow$  alerted set  
 $D(s)$  suspected sensors set

$|D(s)| = 1 \rightarrow \text{attacker identified}$

honest node

$\exists s' \in D(s) : \text{source}(s')$

$s' = \text{attack} \rightarrow$  delay  $\exists s \in D(s) : s \neq s'$

$\forall s \in S : \text{honest} \Rightarrow D(s) \subseteq N(s)$

iDP


$\forall s, s' \in S : \text{honest}(s) \wedge \text{expose}_{s'}(s')$

correctness

$\Rightarrow A(s) \wedge \text{source}(s')$

termination


attack  $\Rightarrow$  after  $T$  all honest nodes have attacked in exposed.



$D(p) = \{q\} \rightarrow$  knows it's honest  $\Rightarrow$  discard

$\Rightarrow \text{expose}_p(q)$

$$D(2) = \{p, q\}$$



notes 15

$$D(q) = \{p, r\}$$

p

$$D(p) = \{r, q\}$$

not solvable

necessary

(what is) sufficient

$$AN(s) = \{t \mid A(t) \wedge t \in N(s)\}$$

$$\tilde{AN}(p, q) = AN(p) \setminus \{q\} \quad (= \text{valuable to } q)$$

iBC

(pos)

(not necessary)


NC

and

$NC_1$  all neighbours of attacker are alerted

$NC_2$  ~~& or more suspects by majority~~

$\Rightarrow$  honest suspect nodes have non-alerted neighbours



Byzantine

att

$$n > 3t + 1$$

$$t+1 \quad n > 4$$

## Algorithm

1) init phase      a) <sup>before deploy</sup> preload one way key chain length  $L$

$(K_0, \dots, K_{L-1})$  ~~unique per node~~

short short short

unique per node

b) discover all neighbours  
c) 2-hop neighbour hood  $TTL=2$   
   ↳ table

d) announce  $K_0$  to 1-hop

- 1) honest/alerted  
neighbour of attacker  
share views
- 2) agree on some id.
- 3) expose it

## 2) voting phase

+ timer

$$M_0(s) = D(s)$$

$$MAC_{K_j}(M_0(s))$$

### 3) publish key phase

newest committed key. notes 16

$$R_{j-1} = \text{share}(k_j)$$

if check is work

else check authority voter

### 4) exposing the attacker phase

### 5) external ring reinforcement phase

$$\text{NC holds } P = \{ p_1, \dots, p_k \}$$

non-alerted neighbours of alerted node

→ request by alerted region with  $P$

→ reply with "favor" for  $e \in P$

honest nodes have majority  
⇒ non alerted neighbours

### Needs

[storage keys ( $\rightarrow$  flash)]


storage key / neighbour

) send packet with TIL  
respond to ↑

iDC calculation

timer callback.

SMA1 function



(1)  
b

a

(1)  
c

IDC

Notes 17

$$\begin{aligned}\sim \bar{AN}(a, b) &= \{c\} = \sim \bar{AN}(b, a) = \{c\} \\ \sim \bar{AN}(c, b) &= \{a\} = \sim \bar{AN}(b, c) = \{a\}\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\sim \bar{AN}(a, c) &= \{b\} = \sim \bar{AN}(c, a) = \{b\} \\ \sim \bar{AN}(b, c) &= \{a\} = \sim \bar{AN}(c, b) = \{a\}\end{aligned}$$

$$D(a) = AN(a) = \{b, c\}$$


$$D(b) = \{a\} \quad \bar{AN}(b) = \{\textcircled{2} c\}$$

$$D(c) = \{a\} \quad \bar{AN}(c) = \{\textcircled{2} b\}$$

NC

NC<sub>1</sub> ok

NC<sub>2</sub> holds want geen 2 of meer  
 $\Rightarrow$



$$AN(s) = \{q\}$$

$$AN(q) = \{s, r, \cancel{p}\}$$

$$AN(r) = \{q, \cancel{p}\}$$

$$AN(p) = \{q, r\}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\sim \bar{AN}(q, r) &= \{s\} \\ \sim \bar{AN}(r, q) &= \{\cancel{s}\}\end{aligned}$$

OK

ioc holds.  
 $\Rightarrow$  p of 2 is aandela

$$\begin{aligned}\sim \bar{AN}(p, r) &= \{\cancel{s}\} \\ \sim \bar{AN}(r, p) &= \{q\}\end{aligned}$$

OK

Stel 1 en 2 neighbours

$$\Rightarrow AN(s) = \{r, q\}$$

$$AN(r) = \{s, q, \cancel{p}\}$$

$$AN(q) = \{s, r, \cancel{p}\}$$

$$\bar{AN}(s, q) = \{\cancel{p}\}$$


$$\sim \bar{AN}(q, s) = \{\cancel{p}\}$$

een van de twee is al dan  
x IDC

~~Not 1:  $\text{source}(a) \wedge \text{agent}(a)$~~   $\Rightarrow A(a)$

~~Not 2:  $\exists s_1 s_2 \dots$~~


$$\begin{aligned}
 D(s) &= \{q\} \\
 D(q) &= \{s, r, p\} \quad \text{not neighbour} \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{stel } s \text{ honest} \\ \Rightarrow \text{source } \in D(s) \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{se} \\ D(s) \cap D(a) \\ = \{q\} \end{array} \\
 D(r) &= \{q, p\} \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{stel } q \text{ honest} \\ \Rightarrow \dots \in D(a) = \{p\} \end{array} \\
 &\quad \text{intersection.} \\
 &\quad \text{en } t=1. \quad \text{q en } r \text{ neighbour.}
 \end{aligned}$$



$$\begin{aligned}
 AN(s) &= \{q\} \\
 AN(r) &= \{q\}
 \end{aligned}$$

stel  $s = \text{attach}$

$$\begin{aligned}
 &\cancel{s \in D(r)} \\
 &q \in D(r) \\
 &q \in D(r)
 \end{aligned}$$



## Software Attestation

### ① short comings.

base station performs SA

- \* Tamper-resistant HW  
*COST!!*
- \* challenge-response

① Rootkit based on ROP Hash

② code comprehension.

Adversary + situation

get full control

2) during SA : not full


3) injection + "buffer overflow" (softwar vulnerability)

4) no network interaction

5) X HW change


6) verifier knows HWS + config.

stel :-)



go

- 1) extract challenge
- 2) pre compute



## challenge / response

$H(\cdot)$  + nonce

pseudo-random  $\rightarrow$  selection of mem words.  
to seed from verifier

SWATT  
software  
Attestation

→ timing  
redirection  
↳ delays

limited to program memory  
not data / external .

rootkit

Fill empty program memory

↳ compression

only program memory

~~Self-modifying code based att.~~

→ difficult.

for us

ICE

indisputable code execution

→ SAKF

↳ program counter needed → ↗ RIP

Attestation on attestation

modified on different mem. location .

Rootkit

- modify attestation code

not timing

- jump to hide function

complete needed

- ROP to "replace

bootloader

Compression Attack

room for

memory shadowing

compress + on the fly decompression  
program mem.

## Time-based $\leftrightarrow$ SWATT

↳ avoid using redirection  
= introduces delay



e.g. alteration 23 cycles  
+ redirection 3 cycles =

13%

can be noticed

1) empty mem redirecting using bitflip


0xFF

0x1xxxx...x

0x11xx...x

= 2 instructions

= 7,4% = 43% faster than



## Data memory alteration


→ data memory is unpredictable




ice

displacement  $\Rightarrow$  MSB of PC.

malicious ice



original ice



altered program.

ICE


$T$  function  $\rightarrow$  random permutations of mem. locations.

Mem loc  $\rightarrow$  160 bit checksum  $C$  of 10 16bit registers,  $C_j$

$$C = [C_0, \dots, C_9]$$


program counter.

$$C_j = C_{j-1} + PC \oplus \text{mem[current\_address]}$$



$\oplus$  = 16 bit XOR

$+$  = 16 bit SUM (no carry)



aschenbrenner  
Categories

in/out-sider attack  
mote/laptop class

bleib

Goals  
(of attack)

- manipulate data
- eavesdrop (EE)
- ↳ ROM/RAM dump
- drop data.
- network access.
- Integrity
- Confidentiality
- Availability

threat analysis

Methods

- rushing
- DOS

Situation

- resource constraint (energy)
- physical access (node capture)
- in-network process (no end-to-end encryption)

valores



Attacks

prepare

- \* jamming
- \* Sinkhole → false ETX count → attack data and dead
- \* wormhole → fast redundant connection cross network = replay attack
- \* Sybil
- \* selective forwarding

Goals

eavesdropping  
traffic Analysis

Disruption

Hijacking

Physical attacks

✓

(blibat)

## WSN Properties

- 1) Aggregation → Tree structured routing
- 2) Tolerable failure
- 3) In network processing
- 4)
- 5) Sensor = router
- 6) Phased transmission periods.

## Security goals

auth., access control, confidentiality, integrity, authentication, anonymity, non-repudiation, freshness, availability; resilience

## Security in WSN

~~perig~~

High level

1) Secure group mgmt

2) iOS

in case of failure

3) Secure data aggregation

Fundamental issues

1) node capture


2) physical tampering

3) DDoS

IDS

= "Capturing audit data and reasoning about the evidence in the data to determine whether the system is under attack".

2 hang 2009  
intranet



definition in conclusion

IDS arch should be

- distributed / cooperative
- statistical anomaly
- cross ~~player~~ NW

aschenbuch

heartbeat → node removal

↳ interrupted working

anomaly → requires "central"↳ distributed all nodes  
| neighbours.movement → HW : e.g. | accelerometer,  
| PIRanomalyevent

Carrier Sense Time

~~OKR~~ ~~CST~~ <sup>dt.:</sup>

→ jamming detection.

agency

$$t_n = (1-\alpha) t_0 + \alpha s$$

anomaly thresholdalarm if  $s > t_0 + w$ dd sample  
std dev. overall  
samplesOTAP

: reprogram

| protocol + ECC


Tiny ECC

padmarathi 2008

Attack

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Passive  $\leftrightarrow$  Privacy



Active

Routing

GOAL  
EFFECT

DOS

x attack  
x attack

- 1) selective forwarder, greyhole
- 2) sinkhole blackhole
- 3) sybil.
- 4) wormhole
- 5) hello flood

1) jamming  
2) tampering

phy

3) collision  
4) exhaustiveness  
5) unfairness

link  
MAC

6) neglect

7) greed

8) homing

Network

9) misdirection

10) blackholes

11) flooding { compat

12) desync.

- Node
- 1) capture
  - 2) malfunction
  - 3) outage
  - 4) physical
  - 5) replication.

Message      1) corruption/alteration

information gathering

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Traffic analysis

sniffing, jamming

Pассив

monitor eavesdrop

Актив

= change

no physical

physical access

= node capture / move / remove

reprogram node

OTAP

Soft vulnerability

access node memory

or

"hard" buffer overflow + code to send.

Normal physical access  
e.g. RS232

JTAG, ...

insert node

physical logical

capture network key info

network access

introduce hardware

↑↑

sybil = not in itself, but base for actual attacks  
= ability to create nodes

wormhole

→ no actual participation, just mirror

sinkhole

participate

a) laptop

b)

c)

d)



rushing

attract traffic

- ignore delays / timeouts
- for control packets


denial-of-service

replication → base for e.g. sybil



	goal.	strategy	methods	technique
attack				

# ARCHITECTURE



ATTACKS~~corruption~~

Sinkhole  
 Wormhole  
 Sybil  
 selective forwarding  
 (↳ cooperative ("anomaly"))  
 hello flood  
Node dislocate }  
 remove }  
 insert }  
 replication }

~~access memory~~  
 reprogram as "anomaly" / (SA)

cooperative decisions → generic FW?

"HIDS" sanity checks (combo ICE-style)

Malfunction!?

~~sniffing~~  
 jamming → anomaly  
 rushing → anomaly  
 Denial-of-Sleep → anomaly  
 → more accelerometer (HW)

# ERLANG (-style) DSL

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## communication

receive loop ( ) →

Receive

{ onAny, Pid } →

% actions

{ } →

% actions.

after 5000 →



% timeout action

end.

Pid ! { onAny, self() }

process

Spawn ( module , function )

example heartbeat

# example heartbeat "pseudo code"

Strategy event driven

↳ event table

process events → "near" realtime  
 (very near:-))

{ event "wait for heartbeat from  $\text{Pcd}$ , timeout, epoch"

event "heartbeat from  $\text{Pcd}$ ,  $\text{time}$ , epoch"  
 ↳ serial synchronisation

→ process stack style → pop, merge, ...

↳ VM