



Systems for Secure Computation

1. End-To-End Data protection



a.


2. Use Cases: Secure Collaborative Analytics



a.

3. Approaches to secure Collaborative analytics

a. Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)



b.

c. Security via homomorphic encryption (very high computational cost)


d. Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC)



e.

f. Security via decentralized trust (high communication cost)


g. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)



h.

i. Security via physically protected HW (prone to side-channel attacks)

4. Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC)



a.

b. Any number of parties

c. Protection against external adversaries

d. Protection against malicious parties


e. Arbitrary computations

f. Easy to explain


i. But not easy to make it practical

5. Example: Secure Addition

- a. Arithmetic sharing: $x = x_1 + x_2 + x_3 \pmod{2^{64}}$




b.




c.


d. 3 parties




e.



f.




g.



h.


6. Example: Secure multiplication

a. Arithmetic sharing: $x = x_1 + x_2 + x_3 \pmod{2^{64}}$




b.

$$\vdash x_3 \pmod{2^{64}}$$



c.




d.


7. Example: Secure XOR


a. Boolean Sharing: $x = x_1 \text{ XOR } x_2 \text{ XOR } x_3$

b.




c.






d.



e.


8. Example: Secure AND

a. Boolean Sharing: $x = x_1 \text{ AND } x_2 \text{ AND } x_3$



b.

9. From Secure Primitives to Complex Computations



a.

10. Oblivious Computation

- To prevent information leakage, the computing parties perform an identical computation that is data-independent
 - Data access patterns do not depend on the actual shares
 - No conditionals (if-then-else)
 - No data reduction

For 3-bit numbers: $a : a_2a_1a_0$ $b : b_2b_1b_0$

If $(a > b) \{ \dots \} \Rightarrow \phi = a > b = (a_2 \oplus b_2) \wedge a_2 \oplus (a_2 \oplus b_2 \oplus 1) \wedge (a_1 \oplus b_1) \wedge a_1 \oplus (a_2 \oplus b_2 \oplus 1) \wedge (a_1 \oplus b_1 \oplus 1) \wedge ((b_0 \oplus 1) \wedge a_0)$

"If the most significant bits are not the same then a is greater than b when a_2 is set"

b. Cleartext

Oblivious

Numbers: $a : a_2a_1a_0$ $b : b_2b_1b_0$

"Else, a is greater than b when the second most significant bits are not the same and a_1 is set"


$(a_2 \oplus b_2) \wedge a_2 \oplus (a_2 \oplus b_2 \oplus 1) \wedge (a_1 \oplus b_1) \wedge a_1$

c.

$\phi = a > b = (a_2 \oplus b_2) \wedge a_2 \oplus (a_2 \oplus b_2 \oplus 1) \wedge (a_1 \oplus b_1) \wedge a_1 \oplus (a_2 \oplus b_2 \oplus 1) \wedge (a_1 \oplus b_1 \oplus 1) \wedge ((b_0 \oplus 1) \wedge a_0)$




"Else, a is greater than b when a_0 is set and b_0 is not set"


d.

R	Employee	Salary	$\sigma(\text{Salary} > 3000)$		R'	Employee	Salary	ϕ
	Kim	2000				Kim	2000	0
	Jane	1500				Jane	1500	0
	Alex	4500				Alex	4500	1


e.

11. The Security project @BU - secrecy as a service






d.



e.



Semi-honest model

(parties are "honest but curious")

Honest majority

(can tolerate one compromised party)

f.