

Development via Administrative Redistricting: Evidence from Brazil*

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October 23, 2022

Abstract

We study the role of administrative redistricting in promoting local economic development. Exploiting the largest redistricting episode in Brazil, we leverage a unique policy change curbing the creation of new municipalities. Using a rich panel of administrative and spatial data, we implement a difference-in-differences approach comparing municipalities whose requests to split were approved to those with unapproved requests. We find that splitting leads to an expansion of the public sector and improvements in public service delivery in new municipalities without generating significant spillover effects on the formal local economy. The results are consistent with two main mechanisms: reduced remoteness to the new headquarters and increased political accountability. Our findings illustrate that decentralization in form of administrative redistricting can improve public service delivery in disadvantaged and remote areas.

*Ricardo thanks Seema Jayachandran, Nancy Qian, and Chris Udry for their invaluable advice. We also thank Lori Beaman, Nicola Bianchi, Prashant Bharadwaj, Leah Boustan, Mariana Carvalho, Alexandra Cirone, Henry Farber, Thomas Fujiwara, David Lee, Riccardo Marchingiglio, Alexandre Mas, Ameet Morjaria, Joris Mueller, Christopher Neilson, Paul Niehaus, Jacopo Ponticelli, Miguel Talamas, Edoardo Teso, Owen Zidar, referees from Brown University, and participants at the NU Development Lunch, Princeton University, EMCON 2017, MIEDC 2018, UCSD (OMG, Joint Lunch, and GSRs), UCB, DEVPEC 2020, UEA 2020, NEUDC 2020, PUC-Rio, NES, Universidad del Rosario, and University of Mannheim for comments and suggestions. We thank Renan Holanda and Cláudio Júnior for excellent research assistance, and Rudi Rocha for kindly sharing data.

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1 Introduction

Administrative redistricting has been widely implemented worldwide, particularly in developing countries (Bardhan, 2002; World Bank, 2004). A vast literature has argued that the creation of smaller administrative units via splits¹ can fuel local economic development in disadvantaged geographic areas due to, for instance, increasing competition across areas, placing pressures on the provision of local public goods to attract residents (Tiebout, 1956), and due to higher autonomy to better serve local populations with heterogeneous preferences (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997). Yet, new administrative units can also be costly due to losses of economies of scale and incentives for self-interested rent-seeking politicians to run into office (Oates, 1972; Boffa et al., 2016).

In settings with intergovernmental transfers to local governments, another relevant consequence of splitting is the reallocation of fiscal resources across space (Oates, 1999). Revenues are automatically channeled toward new administrative units and often used to cover the duplicated costs of a local bureaucracy and infrastructure. Despite expensive and sometimes inefficient, such reallocation of resources may also allow disadvantaged and under-served areas to develop. Quantifying the consequences of splitting and identifying the exact mechanisms at work are key for understanding the role of administrative redistricting in boosting economic development, especially in low-income and transition economies (Treisman, 2007).

This paper exploits a large episode of splitting across municipalities in Brazil to assess if, and how, administrative redistricting promotes local economic development. The country provides a compelling setting for studying this question for at least three reasons. First, it is a large developing country composed of municipalities holding substantial administrative, fiscal, and political decision making power, and each municipality is formed by at least one district with no political or administrative autonomy. Municipalities are responsible for providing a wide range of public services, hold discretion to collect local taxes and manage revenues, and have the same horizontal structure. In other words, the splitting process redistributes administrative, fiscal, and political autonomy to newly created municipalities, often viewed as a form of decentralization. Second, our context allows us to use plausibly exogenous variation in municipality splits. In the first half of the 1990s, Brazil experienced a 23 percent increase in the number of new municipalities,

¹Other terms used in the literature for this particular process are “administrative unit proliferation” (Grossman and Lewis, 2014; Pierskalla, 2019) and “government fragmentation” (Grossman et al., 2017).

followed by an abrupt reform in 1996 that sharply reduced the ability of municipalities to split. This process offers a unique opportunity to empirically assess the consequences of splitting. Third, the availability of high-quality and extensive data allows us to characterize the short- and long-term impacts of splitting on multiple outcomes capturing fiscal performance, public service delivery, and economic activity.

To construct our estimation sample, we collect and classify historical archives on splitting requests from 11 states initiated between 1989 and 1996, covering 42 percent of all states and 58 percent of the total population. We link these split requests to other sources of spatial and administrative data. Using information from years prior to splitting, we show that requests to split are concentrated in underdeveloped areas displaying worse economic conditions, are located farther away from the town hall, and are more likely to experience larger gains in transfers from the federal government.

We estimate the causal effects of splitting using a difference-in-differences strategy comparing areas whose requests to split were approved to those whose requests were not. Because they also applied to split, these areas that *almost split* form an arguably valid counterfactual to those that split. Several of them ultimately failed to split due to either political reasons or the 1996 reform that left outstanding requests open. We show that municipalities with approved and unapproved requests to split exhibit similar levels and trends in outcomes prior to their initial year of splitting, corroborating the causal interpretation of the difference-in-differences estimates. We also document that splitting is difficult to predict based on municipality baseline characteristics.

Our analysis yields five main results. First, in our preferred specification, we find that, after splitting, municipalities experience increases of around 36 percent in federal transfers per capita in comparison to almost split municipalities as a result of a reallocation of resources due to a population-based rule that disproportionately benefits small municipalities.² Second, consistent with [Lima and Silveira Neto \(2018\)](#), we show that splitting increases capital and current expenditures, which cover capital purchases and costs to maintain and operate the public sector, grow about 22 and 12 percent up to 15 years following splitting. Third, we document that municipalities that split experience some improvements in the delivery of public services, particularly those for which they are, by law, responsible. In a cohort-level analysis exploiting variation in splitting across

²This rule guarantees a floor to revenues from federal transfers for municipalities below a certain population threshold, which implies higher gains per capita the smaller an area is. We provide more details in [Section 2.3](#).

cohorts and municipalities, we find increases in school attendance ranging between 4 to 6 percentage points for cohorts up to age 15 by the time of changes in boundaries. We also document positive effects on public services such as household access to piped water, trash collection, electricity, and sewage, ranging from 2.5 to 7 percent. Despite improvements in public service delivery and a larger bureaucracy, our fourth set of results suggests no spillovers to the activity in the formal local economy. We find no impacts of splitting on local tax revenues, the number of establishments, and formal employment in the private sector. Fifth, we take advantage of the granular and spatial structure of the nighttime luminosity data to further investigate which districts within a municipality drive the main findings. We document that districts applying to split entirely explain the effects on luminosity, whereas other districts in the municipality remain unaffected. Together, our results indicate that splitting generates a reallocation of fiscal revenues, expands the size of bureaucracy, and leads to improvements in public service delivery without significantly creating positive spillover effects on the formal local economy. Due to data limitations, we cannot rule out spillover effects on the informal sector.

We probe the robustness of our main findings in several ways. First, we show that the conclusions are not sensitive to alternative definitions of outcomes, samples, and specifications. We also report that our estimates are similar when restricting observations to requests submitted right before the 1996 reform halting splits. Second, to address concerns related to unobserved factors affecting our estimates, we conduct a complementary empirical exercise exploiting an important rule to split before 1996: districts requesting to split to become municipalities are required to conduct local referendums and obtain approval from at least half of voters. Exploiting this discontinuity for a representative state, *Minas Gerais*, where information on referendum results are publicly available, we document that the difference-in-discontinuities estimates on luminosity qualitatively follow the difference-in-differences results.

Having shown that splitting promotes an expansion of the public sector and improvements in public service delivery and children's educational attainment in new municipalities, we next turn to an interpretation of the empirical findings guided by a simple model of public goods provision under redistricting. In particular, we discuss the roles of administrative remoteness, politics, and fiscal gains in driving our results, though we are not able to rule out other channels due to data limitations. We first investigate whether the physical distance between areas and their headquarters, which proxies for administrative remoteness, constitutes an important friction for state capacity. We show that the gains

in luminosity are higher in areas experiencing larger reductions in distance from their town halls after splitting. Second, we find that the gains in luminosity are higher in areas that voted to split in higher percentages in local referendums, and that, in most cases, areas that split elect mayors from different parties, suggesting the importance of politics in shaping the redistricting process. Lastly, we assess whether the expansion of the public sector and the improvements in public service delivery are simply driven by mechanical increases in local revenues. We find little evidence supporting this explanation.

Our results have several policy implications. We interpret our findings as evidence that higher administrative, fiscal, and political autonomy obtained after splitting may allow disadvantaged and remote areas to reduce administrative remoteness and better adapt policies to local preferences through an expansion of the public sector and improvements in the delivery of public services, consistent with decentralization as fundamental to improving the public sector in developing countries (Gadenne and Singhal, 2014). To the extent that that splitting improves public services, it is not the case that it generates output multipliers via the formal private sector in the long-term. Policymakers should incorporate these findings when weighing the costs and benefits of administrative redistricting.

This paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, we contribute in several ways to the extensive literature studying the causes and consequences of multi-level government, federalism, and decentralization.³ As opposed to studies of unit amalgamations (Fox and Gurley, 2006; Barankay and Lockwood, 2007; Reingewertz, 2012; Weese, 2015; Blom-Hansen et al., 2016; Egger et al., 2018), municipal cooperation (Ferraresi et al., 2018; Tricaud, 2019), or splits but with harmonized borders (Lima and Silveira Neto, 2018), the data granularity allows us to separately track the effects of voluntary splits for applicant, headquarters, and remaining areas (Gendźwiłł et al., 2020). In contrast to prior literature that relies on cross-country or cross-section variation, our identification strategy has the advantage of using almost split municipalities as a control group (Treisman, 2002; Gross-

³The literature may be grouped by the aspect studied and terms used, such as decentralization (Oates, 1972, 1999; Bardhan, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Treisman, 2007; Faguet, 2004, 2014; Gadenne and Singhal, 2014; Mookherjee, 2015; Rodden and Wibbels, eds, 2019); the size of nations (Bolton and Roland, 1997; Alesina and Spolaore, 1997, 2003; Lassen and Serritzlew, 2011); administrative unit proliferation (Green, 2010; Pierskalla, 2016; Grossman and Lewis, 2014; Grossman et al., 2017; Pierskalla, 2019); border reforms (Coate and Knight, 2007; Boffa et al., 2016; Schönholzer, 2018; Gendźwiłł et al., 2020); amalgamations (Fox and Gurley, 2006; Barankay and Lockwood, 2007; Weese, 2015; Egger et al., 2018); and municipal cooperation (Ferraresi et al., 2018; Tricaud, 2019)

man and Lewis, 2014).⁴ The richness of our data allows us to test for mechanisms and to disentangle the roles of autonomy and reallocation of fiscal resources in explaining our findings. In particular, we also complement Asher et al. (2018) by exploiting new variation to show that administrative remoteness represents an important friction to local development.⁵

Second, this paper speaks to the literature on promoting regional development and decreasing inequality between rich and poor regions within a country, such as increases in public spending (Litschig, 2012; Brollo et al., 2013; Litschig and Morrison, 2013; Gadenne, 2017; Corbi et al., 2019), fiscal decentralization (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2017), and place-based policies (Kline and Moretti, 2014; Shenoy, 2018). Our main contribution is twofold. First, we exploit administrative redistricting via splitting to understand the mechanisms through which this policy instrument can impact local development. Second, we provide a comprehensive picture of the long-term effects of administrative redistricting on local economy over at least 15 years. Our findings indicate that administrative redistricting and the subsequent decentralization can promote local development through higher public investments, which do not translate into lasting increases in productivity in the private and formal sector.

We also contribute to the broad literature on state capacity (Besley and Persson, 2009; Khemani, 2019) and the personnel economics of the state (Evans and Rauch, 1999; Finan et al., 2017; Pepinsky et al., 2017; Akhtari et al., 2020). This paper confirms theoretical predictions from the literature, which argues that both the state and a capable bureaucracy matter for local development. We provide suggestive evidence from a developing country that a growing bureaucracy may ultimately result in improvements in public service delivery. Our results also suggest that allowing for new administrative units may serve the dual purpose of raising state capacity in the periphery and freeing these areas from captured former local governments (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000; Mansuri and Rao, 2013; Alatas et al., 2019).

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the institutional background

⁴Closer to our identification strategy, Lima and Silveira Neto (2018) focus on fiscal outcomes, whereas our work incorporates other dimensions to provide a comprehensive picture of the consequences of splitting.

⁵In the particular case of Brazil, our results also contribute to the policy debate on the optimal number and size of municipalities, often deliberated upon in the Brazilian National Congress (Gomes and MacDowell, 2000; Tomio, 2002, 2005; Cachatori and Cigolini, 2012, 2013; Mattos and Ponczek, 2013; Lipscomb and Mobarak, 2017; Lima and Silveira Neto, 2018).

in Section 2. Section 3 delineates our data sources, sample selection, and empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the main results, followed by a discussion of interpretation in Section 5. We offer concluding remarks in Section 6.

2 Institutional Background

2.1 The Role of Municipal Governments

Brazil has three tiers of government with fiscal, administrative, and political responsibilities: federal, state, and municipality governments. In 1988, the country had 4,124 municipalities, which are also the smallest units of government carrying decision-making power.⁶ For organizational purposes, municipalities are divided into districts, which have no political or administrative autonomy. One municipality may consist of one or more districts, although no district belongs to two different municipalities.

The enactment of the Federal Constitution in 1988 represents the country's most important step towards federalism and decentralization of political power and financial resources (Arretche, 2000; Favero, 2004), granting additional administrative, fiscal, and political responsibilities to municipalities.⁷ Since 1988, municipalities are responsible for providing a wide range of public goods, including primary education, basic health care, water, sanitation, trash collection, and street lighting services.⁸ Fiscal autonomy includes the power to collect and manage local taxes, like property and service taxes, and the discretion to administer their own revenues, including inter-governmental transfers and local revenues. In Appendix Figure D.3a, we show that, on average, federal transfers account for between 30 and 60 percent of total municipal revenue, while local taxation and fees account for 5 percent.⁹

⁶Municipalities in Brazil are *type-1* jurisdictions, which hold a large range of functions, are durable in the sense that adjusting new jurisdictions is costly and rare, and are characterized by non-intersecting boundaries (Hooghe and Marks, 2003).

⁷In general, administrative decentralization implies that different government tiers execute various functions and policies. Superior tiers may reverse and overrule decisions made by lower ones. Political decentralization includes *appointment* decentralization, *decision-making* decentralization, or *constitutional* decentralization. Fiscal decentralization involves decision-making decentralization on matters of taxation and expenditure (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002; Treisman, 2007).

⁸Municipal, state, and federal governments coordinate to provide certain public goods, such as sanitation and health care. Yet, municipalities are exclusively responsible for providing other public goods such as primary education.

⁹While no reliable data exists about local tax rates and how often they change in the 1990s, anecdotal

Municipal elections are held every four years in October to elect the mayor and municipal councillors. In municipalities with less than 200,000 registered voters, mayors are elected through a single-round system in which the candidate with the majority of votes wins. Larger municipalities have a two-round system: if no candidate gets at least 50 percent of vote share, there is a second round between the two most voted first-round candidates. The candidate who receives most valid votes wins. Municipal councillors are elected through an open list proportional representation system.¹⁰ In January after elections, elected mayors and councillors take office.

2.2 The Creation of New Municipalities

In addition to expanding the role of municipalities, the 1988 Federal Constitution granted to states the authority to establish their own rules and criteria regarding the creation and amalgamation of municipalities (Brandt, 2010). The requirements varied across states and generally involved territorial contiguity, a minimum population, and some level of urban development for new municipalities. The process of creating a new municipality consisted of multiple stages: (1) local leaders or state politicians had to formally request the creation of a new municipality to state assembly; (2) a state legislative committee responsible for evaluating this request approved it; (3) the state legislature authorized a local referendum in the applicant area, though the state governor could veto it; (4) if the majority of voters in the referendum voted for splitting, the request was put forward for voting in the state legislature; (5) thereafter, the state and federal governments had to approve it, although both of them had the discretion to veto it (Tomio, 2002). In practice, these vetoes were rare. The country experienced an unprecedented increase in the number of districts requesting to split and breaking off to become municipalities in the first half of the 1990s.

In 1996, the National Congress curbed the creation of new municipalities by enacting the Constitutional Amendment 15/1996 (henceforth "1996 CA"). It removed from states and assigned to the federal government the authority to regulate splits and amalgamations. The process to create a new municipality returned to the pre-1988 system except for three major changes. First, districts requesting to split have to conduct a referendum involving the entire municipality, not only the applicant district (or districts), and obtain

evidence suggests that changes in local tax rates are rare and not large.

¹⁰In this system, voters can vote either on individual candidates or party coalitions. Then, within coalition, candidates are ordered by vote share and receive seats up to the number of seats the coalition gets. Seats are allocated to coalitions following the D'Hondt method.

approval from the majority of voters. Second, the federal government requires evidence that the applicant district (or districts) would be financially viable as a municipality in terms of fiscal sustainability (Klering et al., 2012). Third, splitting would depend on further federal legislation, which was never enacted since then. The 1996 CA, therefore, *de facto* induced a halt in the creation of new municipalities and led to various open and unapproved districts' requests.

Once the splitting request is approved, the applicant district (or group of applicant districts) is established as a new municipality after municipal elections, when the elected mayor and municipal councillors take office. Figure 1 displays a 34 percent increase in the number of municipalities between 1988 and 1997, jumping from 4,124 to 5,507. We observe two main waves of splitting approved before the 1996 CA, concentrated in 1993 and 1997, the years immediately after municipal elections. The splitting process leads to an extensive devolution of administrative, fiscal, and political power to new municipalities, also viewed as a form of decentralization.¹¹

2.3 The Reasons for Splitting

Among the most common factors contributing to boundary changes in Brazil, we highlight two of them: neglect from the headquarters and fiscal incentives. Several studies suggest that large disparities in the provision of public goods across districts within a municipality play an important role in the decision to request to split (de Mello, 1992; Cachatori and Cigolini, 2012). In a survey carried out with a representative sample of mayors in 1992, Bremaeker (1993) shows that the majority of respondents reported neglect by local governments (63 percent) and physical distance to administrative headquarters (24 percent) as the main reasons for splitting.

Because splitting affects the distribution of federal transfers, particularly the *Fundo de Participação dos Municípios* (henceforth "FPM"), fiscal incentives are also relevant in this context. FPM is the main source through which the federal government provides monetary transfers to municipalities, accounting for around 80 percent of all federal transfers and 31 percent of municipal revenues (Corbi et al., 2019). Municipalities must spend 15 percent of FPM transfers on education and health separately, and there is no restriction for the remainder (Brollo et al., 2013).

¹¹This is an example of *horizontal* decentralization process. It differs from *vertical* decentralization, which refers to the creation of new tiers of government or to transfer of functions from a higher tier to a lower one.

The 1988 Federal Constitution established the current allocation mechanism of the funds. Every year, 22.5 percent of total revenues from federal income and industrial product taxes are reserved for FPM. Each state receives a block grant to be shared among its municipalities so that transfers are zero-sum within state. Each municipality's share is determined by a concave step-wise population-based formula. This formula assigns each population bracket a coefficient and disproportionately benefits small municipalities: revenues per capita are larger in lower population brackets.¹² Municipalities in the same state and population bracket obtain the same amount of transfers. In sum, as illustrated in Appendix Figure D.3a, the FPM share in a municipality's total revenue shrinks non-linearly with population size.¹³

When splits occur, new municipalities start receiving FPM transfers. Most splits are concentrated in small municipalities, suggesting that gains in FPM transfers may constitute an important driver for splitting requests. Yet, the direction of change in FPM transfers for headquarters and remaining areas is unclear, depending on a combination of factors: the allocation of funds within municipality prior to splitting, the curvature of the FPM curve and the quantity of splits within the state.¹⁴

To evaluate the different forces at play and provide empirical predictions, in Appendix Section A, we outline a simple conceptual framework in which the municipality headquarters chooses the allocation of public goods to districts forming the municipality. The model illustrates two key predictions to motivate our empirical analysis. First, dis-

¹²Litschig (2012); Brollo et al. (2013); Litschig and Morrison (2013); Gadenne (2017) and Corbi et al. (2019) exploit discontinuities in population brackets to estimate the effects of federal transfers on multiple economic outcomes.

¹³In the aggregate, however, smaller municipalities account for small share of total transfers. For instance, Appendix Figure D.3b indicates that the bottom half of municipalities receive only 26 percent of all FPM transfers.

¹⁴To illustrate this point, consider the following framework. Suppose a municipality is composed of two districts, A and B , with population of sizes α_A and α_B , respectively. District B considers splitting into a new municipality. Before the split, FPM revenues are $R_A = w_A T(\alpha_A + \alpha_B)$ and $R_B = w_B T(\alpha_A + \alpha_B)$, where $w_A + w_B = 1$. Weights w_A and w_B are shares of total revenue received by each district, which may be proportional to population (i.e. $w_A = \frac{\alpha_A}{\alpha_A + \alpha_B}$) or not. Splitting generates higher revenues for A if $w_A > \frac{T(\alpha_A)}{T(\alpha_A + \alpha_B)}$, and for B if $w_B > \frac{T(\alpha_B)}{T(\alpha_A + \alpha_B)}$. We first conclude that total revenues likely increase (because $T(\alpha_A) + T(\alpha_B) > T(\alpha_A + \alpha_B)$), and that revenues for B also increase (because w_B is small and T is increasing and concave around small α_B). Revenues for A may increase if w_A is sufficiently low and if $\frac{T(\alpha_A)}{T(\alpha_A + \alpha_B)}$ is sufficiently high; and vice-versa. Since municipalities receive constant amounts within state and population bracket, the latter comparison depends on whether district A moves to a lower bracket after the split. Lastly, changes in T also depend on the total number of splits within state because one split lowers the total amount available to every other municipality.

districts who apply to split are more likely to benefit from splitting if they are neglected by the headquarters or experience larger fiscal gains through transfers. Second, the consequences of splitting for headquarter districts and the rest of the country may be negligible. We empirically test these predictions.

3 Data and Empirical Strategy

3.1 Data

3.1.1 Splitting Requests

We catalog all splitting requests from two sources. First, we gather information from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) on the dates municipalities were officially created, and who their parent municipalities were before the split. Second, we manually collect and classify historical archives on splitting requests. Prior to the 1996 CA, state assemblies set their own rules for evaluating splitting requests, implying that the availability, level of detail, and quality of these archives vary across states. The final data contain splitting requests initiated by districts from 11 states (42 percent of all states, covering 58 percent of the country's population in 1991) between 1989 and 1996, regardless of whether requests were approved. Information on splitting requests are available for the following states: *Amapá, Espírito Santo, Goiás, Mato Grosso, Minas Gerais, Pará, Paraná, Rio Grande do Sul, Rondônia, Santa Catarina, and São Paulo*. The remaining states do not provide public records on requests. Section C of the Appendix describes the final data in detail.

We manually scrape legislative reports about referendum results for the state of *Minas Gerais*, one of the few for which reliable records are available, including information on turnout and percentage of valid votes and voters in favor of splitting. We validate information from reports by cross-checking them with our data on split requests.

3.1.2 Outcome Data

We combine different sources of spatial and administrative data to examine whether and how splitting affects public revenues and expenses, local development, and public service

delivery. We describe these sources in detail below.¹⁵

Public Finance. We collect information on revenues and expenditures at the municipality level from the Brazilian National Treasury (Finbra). Available since 1989, the data contain details on revenue sources (e.g., local taxation and intergovernmental transfers) and expenditure categories (e.g., capital and current expenses).

Demographic Census. We use decennial census data in 1991, 2000, and 2010 sourced from IBGE and the Atlas of Human Development in Brazil ([United Nations Development Programme, 2013](#)) to recover demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, including population size, urbanization rate, education, health, household access to public services such as trash collection or sewage, and income. For our baseline specification, we aggregate data at the municipality level because district identifiers are not available. We also use individual-level microdata on literacy and school attendance when exploiting variation across birth cohorts.

Formal Labor Market. We draw labor market information from the annual matched employer-employee data, the *Relação Anual de Informações Sociais* (RAIS), carried out by the Brazilian Ministry of Economy. The data cover the formal sector ([Dix-Carneiro, 2014](#); [Alvarez et al., 2018](#)) between 1995 and 2018 and include a rich set of worker, job, and establishment characteristics. We use worker-level data to generate information on the total number of employees and establishments in the public and private sectors at the municipality level. We also generate these variables by economic sector (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, retail, and services) and areas (e.g., education and health).

Night Lights. We use satellite imagery of night-time lights organized by the U.S. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the National Geophysical Data Center (NGDC).¹⁶ The data consist of grids with integer values spanning from 0 (no light) to 63 that record the intensity of lights for every year between 1992 and 2013.¹⁷ We construct district-level data containing annual information on both the intensive and extensive margins of luminosity, measured by the weighted average of lights across grids within a district and whether this average is above zero. To capture regional inequality,

¹⁵Unfortunately, we are not aware of data collecting information on housing prices.

¹⁶Intensity of night lights measures both outdoor and some indoor use of lights. [Henderson et al. \(2012\)](#) and [Henderson et al. \(2018\)](#) show that night lights are a good proxy for long-term GDP growth. This is useful in our context because information on economic activity is not collected at the district level and data on electricity consumption are only available for more recent years.

¹⁷A grid cell captures a 30 arc-second output pixel, equivalent to about 0.86 square kilometers at the Equator.

we calculate a luminosity Gini index from variation across pixels within each district.¹⁸

Elections. We collect data on municipalities' electoral outcomes from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE). Available every four years since 1988, the information richness grows over time. Between 1988 and 1996, we observe only the elected mayor's name and party. The list of candidates and vote shares of municipal elections, along with other information, are reported since 2000.

Our analysis also includes minor data sources capturing geographic characteristics, such as soil suitability from FAO-GAEZ and terrain ruggedness from [Carter \(2018\)](#).

3.1.3 Sample Selection

We take several steps to build our estimation sample. Starting from a universe of 4,298 municipalities from the 1991 census,¹⁹ we keep municipalities meeting the following criteria: (1) municipalities that belong to one of eleven states with records on split requests; (2) municipalities with a single split event or with districts having split requests between 1989 and 1996, the period before 1996 CA; and (3) municipalities that do not belong to state capitals since they are the headquarters of state governments. The restrictions yield a final sample of 448 municipalities.

While we mostly perform our analysis at the municipality level due to data availability, several data are also available at the district level, allowing us to gain insights on differences within and across municipalities. Therefore, we apply similar restrictions to districts to construct a secondary sample. Starting from a sample of 8,855 districts from the 1991 census, we first restrict it to districts meeting the following criteria: (1) districts from 11 states with records on split requests; (2) districts that do not belong to state capitals; (3) districts in municipalities where split requests are started by districts²⁰; and (4)

¹⁸We caution against a strong interpretation of results on luminosity Gini index due to potential measurement error caused by pixel sizes being large (about a 0.86 squared kilometer at the Equator). For instance, if rich and poor households are uniformly distributed across the pixel space, then luminosity Gini index would be zero.

¹⁹Changes in municipality boundaries are generally not nested. To account for them, we adopt the standard procedure of harmonizing boundaries between 1991 and 2010 into *minimum comparable areas*, as done in [Lipscomb and Mobarak \(2017\)](#) and [Lima and Silveira Neto \(2018\)](#). This approach yields a sample of 4,298 minimum comparable areas, which we refer to as municipalities throughout this paper, instead of using the list of 5,565 original municipalities in 2010, keeping the spatial units constant over time. We use the material publicly provided by [Ehrl \(2017\)](#).

²⁰Several split requests are initiated by areas smaller than districts, such as neighborhoods or parks, so we exclude these cases from the estimation sample.

districts in municipalities with a single split event or split requests between 1989 and 1996 to avoid multiple events. These restrictions combined leave us with a sample of 1,281 districts. We then classify them into three groups: (1) *applicants*, corresponding to periphery districts that requested to split; (2) *remaining*, containing periphery districts that did not request to split themselves, but were located in municipalities where some district did so; and (3) *headquarters*, including headquarter districts in municipalities with a district requesting to split. This division leads to 560 applicants, 331 remaining, and 390 headquarter districts.

3.2 Who Applies to Split?

Before outlining our empirical strategy, we discuss how municipalities select into splitting and how districts select into applying to split. Table 1 presents summary statistics for baseline municipality characteristics in 1991 levels. Overall, municipalities in our final estimation sample containing an applicant district (Column (1)) are comparable to municipalities without split requests (Column (3)) in various dimensions, except for population size, area, and amount of federal transfers as share of total revenues, consistent with fiscal incentives from splitting. Municipalities in both groups display similar population composition and measures of education, health, public services, and income prior to splitting. In addition, unlike other countries, such as Indonesia (Pierskalla, 2016; Bazzi and Gudgeon, 2020) or India (Dunning, 2019), differences in racial and religious composition are small in magnitude across both groups. For this reason, unlike the literature studying drivers of splits, we do not incorporate social fragmentation into our analysis.

Our institutional context suggests that districts requesting to split are more likely to be less developed than other parts of the country. Our data generally corroborate this prediction. In Appendix Table D.1, we compare the average mean district characteristics in the baseline period, before the waves of splitting, between applicants (Column (1)) and headquarters (Column (5)). On average, applicant districts display worse economic and demographic conditions. They are smaller in total population and area, are less urban, and exhibit lower levels of public service delivery. As expected, they are also located farther from their parent town halls. Yet, applicant districts are larger and more developed than remaining districts (Column (3)).²¹

²¹For completeness, Columns (7)–(10) display summary statistics for districts outside our estimation sample. We see that districts not involved in splits are similar to those that are across most dimensions besides

3.3 Empirical Strategy

3.3.1 Identification

In order to identify the causal effects of splitting, we classify our final sample of 448 municipalities into two groups: *split* (324) and *almost split* (124). As the denomination suggests, almost split municipalities contain a district that applied and failed to split into a new municipality. They form a credible counterfactual to split municipalities because they attempted to split and had a good chance of having their requests accepted, mitigating concerns related to selection into application that could affect our estimates. Requests could ultimately fail due to a variety of reasons. For example, they may be left open after the enactment of the 1996 CA, which left those initiated by 1994 or 1995 with not enough time to go through all the required steps described in Section 2.2. Alternatively, legislative commissions may refuse it, the referendum may not return a majority, or the state governor may veto the request.²² Similar reasoning applies to districts. The new division leads yields samples of 560 applicants (441 split and 119 almost split); 331 remaining (261 split and 70 almost split); and 390 headquarter districts (292 split and 98 almost split).

Considering these new classifications, Figure 2 plots split and almost split municipalities using the Brazilian map.²³ Two relevant patterns emerge: split requests are geographically scattered and, despite some clustering due to the state rules for splitting, there is a large geographical variation in split and almost split events.

population, area, urbanization and terrain ruggedness.

²²Tomio (2005) provides a detailed account of municipality splits in the state of *Rio Grande do Sul* and statistics on at what point of the legislative process were requests denied (Table 5). By 2002, out of 398 requests, a total of 64 percent had ultimately passed. 10 percent were still left open, 13 percent were rejected in legislature commissions, 5 percent were rejected by the legislature's plenary, 6 percent had a governor's veto stand, and 2 percent had a referendum majority vote against the split.

²³Figure 2 also presents a diagram illustrating the simple comparison between split (in blue areas) and almost split (in orange) municipalities. Each municipality is divided into districts classified as applicant, remaining, and headquarter districts.

3.3.2 Regression Specifications

To understand how splitting affects municipalities, we estimate the following difference-in-differences model:

$$y_{mt} = \alpha_m + \alpha_{s(m)t} + X_m^{1991} \alpha_t + \sum_{\tau=-\underline{\tau}}^{\bar{\tau}} \beta_{\tau} \text{Split}_m \mathbf{1}[t - W_m = \tau] + \gamma \text{Post}_{mt} + \varepsilon_{mt} \quad (1)$$

in which y_{mt} represents outcomes for municipality m in year t ; α_m are municipality fixed effects; $\alpha_{s(m)t}$ controls for any state-by-time fixed effects; and X_m^{1991} are baseline variables extracted from Appendix Table 1 interacted with time fixed effects. Split_m is an indicator variable for whether the municipality m ever split; and $\mathbf{1}[t - W_m = \tau]$ are dummies indicating year relative to the wave-year W_m when municipality m split (either 1993 or 1997). The choices of start time $\underline{\tau}$ and end time $\bar{\tau}$ are a function of the data and depend on the outcome of interest y_{mt} . The variable $\text{Post}_{mt} \equiv \mathbf{1}[t \geq W_m]$ indicates time periods after the municipality's wave-year. Standard errors are clustered at the microregion level.²⁴

In Equation (1), we normalize $\beta_{-1} = 0$ so that our estimates are relative to the year before splitting, 1992 or 1996. The post-event coefficients of interest, β_{τ} , capture the dynamics effects of splitting relative to that year. The main identification assumption relies on the timing of splitting being uncorrelated with the outcomes of interest, conditional on our set of fixed effects and controls. In particular, outcomes for treated and control municipalities would have followed parallel trends in $\tau \geq 0$ if no splitting had occurred. We test this assumption by assessing whether the pre-event coefficients of interest are statistically indistinguishable from zero. We find no evidence of pre-trends in Section 4.²⁵

Our empirical strategy contrasts municipalities that split to those that applied for splitting but did not receive an approval. Having some sense of what predicts approval is an useful exercise. In Table 2, we display least squares estimates of the probability of splitting as a function of baseline characteristics at the municipality level in 1991. Columns (1) and (2) show estimates without and with state fixed effects to account for state-specific

²⁴As of 2017, the country is divided into 558 microregions, equivalent to commuting zones in the U.S. Each microregion contains a cluster of municipalities with similarities in socioeconomic and historical characteristics. For more details, see <https://www.ibge.gov.br/en/geosciences/territorial-organization/regional-division/21536-regional-divisions-of-brazil.html>.

²⁵To further validate our findings, we complement our difference-in-differences results with an RD approach embedded in local referendums — districts with at least half of voters in favor of splitting are more likely to split — and find that the RD estimates qualitatively follow the difference-in-differences results. We describe this strategy in Section 4.6.

splitting policies and geographic clustering of splitting decisions. In both specifications, we document that most baseline covariates do not predict splitting in standard levels of statistical significance. The exceptions are log distance to state capital, years of education, share of preschool attendance, and shares of households with access to piped water and trash collection. We notice that the point estimates are predominantly small in magnitude and the statistical significance is sensitive to the inclusion of state fixed effects. To be conservative, we saturate all our estimates of Equation (1) with interactions of these baseline characteristics with time dummies to capture differential trends in these dimensions. We also emphasize that our identification strategy does not require balance on pre-splitting covariates in levels. It relies only on parallel trends between split and almost split municipalities before splitting.

4 Main Results

This section presents the main results in parts. First, we show that splitting generates a reallocation of federal transfers. Second, we find that both the size of bureaucracy required to run a municipality and the public service delivery increase after splitting. Third, we document that the local formal economy is unaffected. We also probe the robustness of our results.

4.1 Impacts on Reallocation of Federal Transfers

Our institutional context, described in Section 2, suggests that gains in federal transfers are larger for municipalities with smaller populations, constituting relevant incentives for districts to request to split. Using public finance data, we estimate Equation (1) for log federal transfers per capita. Figure 3 presents the annual point estimates along with 95 percent confidence intervals. Pre-event coefficients are statistically close to zero, lending support to the parallel trends assumption from our identification strategy. Immediately after splitting, on average, municipalities that split experience a 36.3 percent increase in federal transfers per capita relative to almost split municipalities. Considering municipal revenues per capita as the outcome variable, Column (1) of Appendix Table D.3 indicates an 11.6 percent increase. These coefficients suggest that splitting generates substantial reallocation of local revenues.

4.2 Impacts on Public Expenditures and Personnel

We next examine whether these extra revenues are converted into growth of the size of the public sector. Based on Equation (1), Panel (a) of Figure 4 shows annual coefficients for capital expenditures per capita, which refer to purchases of machinery, vehicles, buildings, and the like (Lima and Silveira Neto, 2018), and account for 16 percent of municipal expenditures. There is a spike at around 50 percent in the year of splitting, followed by an increase of 22 percent over the next 15 years (Appendix Table D.3).

Panel (b) of Figure 4 reports the results for current expenditures, equivalent to maintenance and operation costs of public services, such as payrolls and administrative costs. These costs represent 84 percent of municipal expenditures. We find that, after splitting, municipalities experience an increase of about 12 percent in current expenditures. Lima and Silveira Neto (2018) argue that capital expenditure tends to be initially higher than current expenditures due to installation and entrance costs. Current expenditures, however, are mostly payroll with fixed contracts. Regulation also inhibits indiscriminate hiring in the public sector, explaining the stable trends one year after splitting.

We also validate the above results using the matched employer-employee RAIS data. The goal is to gauge the effects on the size of the public sector considering the number of municipal public employees and total payroll as outcome variables. Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 4 and Appendix Table D.3 document that splitting is associated with an average increase of around 18 percent in both outcomes. We do not find impacts on federal or state public employment, reassuring that the growth in bureaucracy exclusively comes from municipal governments. We next examine whether this growth in bureaucracy translates into greater provision of public goods.

4.3 Impacts on Public Service Delivery

We investigate whether and how splitting affects public service delivery using two complementary approaches. First, we leverage individual-level information from the Census data to conduct a cohort-level analysis exploiting differential exposure to splitting across birth cohorts. Second, we take advantage of the richness of the municipality-level Census data to provide a comprehensive picture of the consequences of splitting on educational

attainment, public infrastructure, and poverty.²⁶

4.3.1 Cohort-Level Analysis

We ideally would like to have data on the total amount of public goods, such as public schools and hospitals, to capture responses along this margin. Such data from the years before splitting, the early 1990s, are unavailable in Brazil. To overcome this limitation, we propose an indirect test in the spirit of [Duflo \(2001\)](#), exploiting variation in splitting across birth cohorts and municipalities. Intuitively, if additional schools generate an increase in educational attainment, younger cohorts more exposed to splitting should experience higher levels of schooling than older and less exposed cohorts.

Using the Census data, we exploit three sources of variation: (1) municipalities that split versus almost split; (2) periods before and after splitting; and (3) age of individuals when surveyed. We then estimate the following triple-differences model:

$$y_i = \alpha_{m(i)k(i)} + \alpha_{m(i)t(i)} + \alpha_{s(i)k(i)t(i)} + \sum_{\tau=5}^{31} \beta_{\tau} \text{Split}_{m(i)t(i)} \mathbf{1}[t(i) - k(i) = \tau] + X_i \lambda + \varepsilon_i, \quad (2)$$

in which y_i represents outcomes for person i in municipality m , birth cohort k and year t ; $\alpha_{m(i)k(i)}$, $\alpha_{m(i)t(i)}$, and $\alpha_{s(i)k(i)t(i)}$ are municipality-by-cohort, municipality-by-year and state-by-cohort-by-year fixed effects; $\text{Split}_{m(i)t(i)}$ is an indicator variable for whether the municipality m split, and takes values equal to zero for $t = 1991$ and equal to one for years $t \in \{2000, 2010\}$ in municipalities that split; and $\mathbf{1}[t(i) - k(i) = \tau]$ are dummies indicating years relative to the year of splitting request for municipality m , similar to Equation (1). The term X_i refers to a vector of individual controls, such as gender, race, religion, and nationality. We cluster standard errors ε_i at the microregion level. We normalize $\beta_{31} = 0$ so that our estimates are relative to individuals aged 31, the oldest age in our sample. The identification assumption for this exercise is that, absent splitting, birth cohorts would have followed the same educational trends in split and almost split municipalities.

Figure 5 presents our results for school attendance and literacy rates. Gray areas represent 95 percent confidence intervals. We display the raw data in Appendix Figure D.4. Panel (a) documents increases ranging between 4 and 6 percentage points in school

²⁶We also complement the literature studying impacts of decentralization on public service delivery. For instance, [Bianchi et al. \(2020\)](#) show that fiscal decentralization led to the expansion of municipal services, such as nursery schools, in Italy.

attendance for cohorts up to age 15 relative to those aged 31 when splitting occurred. The gains in school attendance concentrated among younger cohorts are consistent with the government division of roles in education: municipalities are responsible for providing preschool and primary education, whereas state governments are in charge of high schools. Panel (b) shows imprecise, albeit positive, effects on literacy rates.²⁷ We notice that, in the 2000s, Brazil achieved universal enrollment of primary and lower secondary education, particularly after the introduction of conditional cash transfers. While attendance rates increased, the quality of public schools still remains low, consistent with the modest impacts on literacy we find.

4.3.2 Municipality-Level Analysis

We further shed light on how splitting affects public service delivery using additional measures available at the municipality level from the Census data. Although the data contain various outcomes to study additional margins of response, it does not allow us to report pre-event coefficients because 1991 is the first and only wave before the 1996 CA we can use. Figure 6 and Appendix Table D.4 report coefficients after estimating Equation (1) for main outcomes related to education, access to public services, and poverty.

In Panel (a), we observe that the average impacts on preschool and middle school attendance rates are 3.9 and 2.3 percentage points, equivalent to 30 and 2.5 percent increases. In line with the placebo check from Section 4.3.1, high school attendance does not change, consistent with municipalities providing education up to middle school. In addition, literacy rates for both children ages 11-14 and for adults increase by 1.8 and 1.3 percent, and the small magnitudes corroborate our cohort-level results.²⁸

In Panel (b), we show estimates for public goods provision. We document positive impacts on household access to piped water, trash collection, electricity, and sewage, ranging from 2.5 to 7 percent. Only the coefficients associated with trash collection and sewage are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Interestingly, the effects are weaker for

²⁷The effects are likely not bounded by top censoring of attendance or literacy rates. To put the numbers into perspective, the average school attendance and literacy rates for the omitted group, formed by individuals aged 31 in 1991 are 2.6 and 85 percent, respectively. For individuals age 15 or younger, these numbers are 61.6 and 62 percent, respectively.

²⁸In Appendix Figure D.5, we show other pieces of evidence supporting increasing local public provision of education through higher public investments: after splitting, there is a crowd-out of employment from non-profits to government organizations in the education sector.

services for which other levels of government share responsibility, creating uncertainty about the role attributed to each government level, such as water and sanitation (Kresch, 2017). Lastly, we find negative and imprecise estimates for poverty and extreme poverty rates, which fall by around 1.7 and 4.2 percent.

4.4 Impacts on the Formal Local Economy

The previous findings point to large growth of the public sector at the municipality level. We are further interested at how much splitting impacts the local economy and aggregate income beyond generating improvements in the public sector. In particular, we are interested in understanding whether the growth in public infrastructure spilled over into the private sector, yielding a sustained and persistent productivity gains over time. To explore this question, we use revenues from local taxes and on formal employment in the private sector as observable measures capturing spillover effects. Based on Equation (1), Panel (a) of Figure 7 and Appendix Table D.3 indicate that, after splitting, municipalities experience a small and imprecise raise of 5 percent in revenues from local taxes.²⁹ Because changes in tax rates are unusual and there are little differences in local taxes across municipalities (de Carvalho, 2008), the lack of effects on tax revenues indirectly suggests that tax base does not change after splitting.

Panels (b)-(d) of Figure 7 display annual estimates for capital and labor activities in the formal private sector, summarized by a log of the total number of establishments and employment. The number of establishments grow around 5 percent up to 15 years later, although the coefficient is only marginally significant at the 10 percent level. Turning to formal employment, we do not find significant impacts on the number of private jobs and total payroll. These findings combined suggest that large investments in public infrastructure through higher administrative, fiscal and political autonomy, and extra revenues do not spill over to the formal private sector labor market. Due to data limitations, our estimates do not rule out spillover effects of splitting on the informal economy.³⁰

²⁹Local revenues from local taxes include ISS (tax on services); IPTU (property tax); IBTI (property transfer tax); and fees, like public lighting fees.

³⁰In 1992, the Brazilian informal labor market was estimated to account for 56 percent of total employment (Ipeadata, *Grau de informalidade - definição I*).

4.5 Nighttime Luminosity

The previous municipality-level impacts potentially mask substantial heterogeneity across districts within municipalities, which can help us to understand potential distributional implications of administrative redistricting. The spatial granularity in nighttime luminosity data has the additional advantage of allowing us to closely look into districts and distinguish between applicant, remaining, and headquarters districts in order to identify who drive the gains in luminosity, known as a strong correlate of local development (Henderson et al., 2012). To that end, we use annual night-time lights data from 1992 to 2013 and run the following difference-in-differences regression separately for each of the three district samples:

$$y_{dt} = \alpha_d + \alpha_{s(d)t} + X_d^{1991} \alpha_t + \sum_{\tau=-\bar{\tau}}^{\bar{\tau}} \beta_{\tau} Split_{m(d)} \mathbf{1}[t - W_d = \tau] + \gamma Post_{dt} + \varepsilon_{dt}, \quad (3)$$

in which subscripts d , m , s , and t stand for district, municipality, state, and year; α_d are district fixed effects; $\alpha_{s(d)t}$ control for state-by-time fixed effects. We add a vector of baseline controls X_d^{1991} consisting of all baseline variables from Appendix Table D.2 interacted with time fixed effects. The remaining variables are similar to Equation (1) except that subscripts represent districts. Standard errors ε_{dt} are clustered at the microregion level.

For the ease of comparison, we start by displaying the municipality-level estimates from Equation (1) in Panel (a) of Figure 8. We find that luminosity grows in the first 5 years after splitting and stabilizes at around 10 percent afterwards. Turning to the district-level estimates from Equation (3), Panel (b) of Figure 8 shows the estimates for applicant (blue), remaining (red), and headquarters (green) districts. We notice three striking patterns. First, all pre-event coefficients are statistically close to zero. Second, for applicant districts, there is rapid growth immediately after splitting, peaking 5–8 years later at about 40 log points. The coefficients remain stable, suggesting a 33 log points, or 39 percent, increase 15 years after splitting. Third, for remaining and headquarter districts, both involved in non-voluntary splits, we observe no statistically significant effect on luminosity 15 years after a split.³¹ We interpret these results altogether as suggestive evidence that the effects

³¹Appendix Table D.5 reports the aggregate estimates for log of average luminosity considering different specifications. In addition, we follow Oster (2019) to assess potential bias due to unobservable factors using the sensitivity of the treatment to additional controls. Under the assumption of proportional selection, Appendix Table D.6 reports that selection in unobservables would need to be about 12 percent of selection in observables to explain our baseline estimate for applicant districts.

on luminosity are driven exclusively by applicant districts. These differences illustrate how non-voluntary and voluntary splits set lower and upper bounds of the expected impacts of splitting, ranging from zero to 39 percent. In addition, given the lack of effects on the formal local economy in Section 4.4, we interpret that the gains in luminosity are driven by larger public investments, including electricity, though we are not able to rule out the influence of the informal sector.

We are also interested in understanding to what extent the impacts on luminosity are driven by extensive or intensive margins, and whether spatial inequality within municipality declines. We use two measures described in Section 3.1 as outcomes: the share of lit pixels and luminosity Gini index. Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 8 plot the coefficients. We find a 7 percent increase in lit pixels, which captures pixels with any luminosity above zero, and a 4 percent decline in luminosity Gini index for applicant districts. While spatial inequality decreases slightly in these areas, consistent with our previous results, we do not find any impact for remaining districts and only smaller effects for headquarters districts.

4.6 Robustness Checks

We probe the robustness of our results at the district level to alternative definitions of outcomes, samples, and specifications in Appendix Table D.7. For brevity, we report the results of Equation (3) on log luminosity only for applicant districts.³² Column (1) reproduces our benchmark result from Column (1) of Appendix Table D.5. In Column (2), we estimate Equation (3) without the controls interacted with time fixed effects. Column (3) does not add 0.1 to the average luminosity so that its log is not defined for all districts. To investigate if the results differ when we restrict attention to the wave of splits affected by the 1996 CA, we present estimates only for the 1997 wave in Column (4). Because the process to split is lengthy, sometimes taking years, the timing of the 1996 CA is likely to be exogenous to our outcomes for the 1997 wave, whose sample mostly consists of requests initiated between 1994 and 1996. We find that the coefficient is similar in magnitude to Column (1). To control for geographic shocks to economic activity in microregions, Column (5) includes microregion-by-year fixed effects, yielding similar conclusions. Because our main specifications include state-by-year fixed effects, we alternatively cluster standard errors at the state level in Column (6). Standard errors are more conservative, about

³²Results for remaining and headquarter districts as well as other outcomes are available upon request.

30 percent larger, although the statistical significance remains the same.

Two additional issues could bias our estimates. First, shocks may differentially hit split and almost split municipalities in timing coinciding with event years (1993 or 1997). For example, split municipalities could be affected by specific government programs starting after the split, affecting our outcomes of interest. To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of such shocks in our context. Second, our results could be positively biased if there is a positive district selection into splitting along unobservable characteristics, such as growth potential, better organizational capacity, or connections with the state legislature. To alleviate this concern, we develop a complementary empirical strategy exploiting variation in local referendum vote shares and focusing on luminosity as the main outcome. We describe it below.

Prior to 1996, to become a municipality, the district applying to break off needed to conduct a local referendum and obtain approval from at least half of voters. We exploit the 50 percent cutoff to perform a difference-in-discontinuities (RD-DD) exercise (Grembi et al., 2016). We restrict our analysis to a large and representative state, *Minas Gerais*,³³ for which data on referendum results are available, and estimate the following RD-DD specification in two stages:

$$Split_{m(d)} = \psi + \phi \mathbf{1}[V_d \geq 50\%] + \kappa g(V_d) + X_d \omega + \eta_d \quad (4)$$

$$y_{dt} = \alpha_d + \alpha_t + \beta Split_d Post_{w(d)} + \gamma g(V_d) Post_{w(d)} + X_{dt} \lambda + \varepsilon_{dt} \quad (5)$$

in which, from the first-stage Equation (4), $Split_{m(d)}$ is an indicator variable for whether the municipality m with district d split after the referendum; V_d represents the referendum vote share in favor of splitting in district d ; and $\mathbf{1}[V_d \geq 50\%]$ is an indicator for whether district d had at least half of votes. Following Gelman and Imbens (2019), we define $g(V_d)$ as a linear distance from the cutoff. In our second-stage Equation (5), we include district and year fixed effects, α_d and α_t . We control for $Post_{w(d)}$, which is an indicator variable for the years after the wave-year w of splitting request for municipality $m(d)$, and the vector of time-varying controls X_{dt} is the same as in Equation (3). Our coefficient of interest β captures the effect of splitting. To keep our estimation comparable and account for fewer observations on the left side of the cutoff, our preferred specification considers a 15 percent bandwidth.

³³With an area larger than France, *Minas Gerais* is the second most populous and third richest state in Brazil. The state's ethnic composition and geography closely resemble the country's averages.

We validate our strategy by showing no significant discontinuities in pre-referendum observable district characteristics around the cutoff in Appendix Table F.9.³⁴ Turning to the main results, Appendix Figure F.9a provides a visual evidence of the first-stage, from which we notice that splitting is an almost deterministic function of reaching a majority vote. Figure F.10 displays the reduced-form estimates for log luminosity among applicant districts and documents a clear jump around the cutoff. We report all point estimates for applicant districts in Appendix Table F.10. In Column (2), we find that districts above the cutoff experience an increase of 50 percent in luminosity relative to those below it. Column (3) refers to the second-stage estimate. For a more meaningful interpretation, the Wald estimate points to a coefficient of log luminosity of 0.23 ($= 0.22/0.96$). It is slightly larger than our benchmark difference-in-differences estimate in Column (4) for a sample restricted to *Minas Gerais*. While any comparison in magnitude between these coefficients should be taken with a grain of salt due to differences in sample size and composition, we interpret them as qualitatively similar results.

5 Interpretation

Together, our main results suggest that the redistribution of autonomy and fiscal resources after splits led to growth of the public sector and improvements in public service delivery. We next investigate to what extent these findings can be attributed to more autonomy, through reductions in administrative remoteness and through better adaptation to local preferences, or to increasing federal transfers to new municipalities. We interpret the results from Section 4 guided by our framework in Appendix Section A and to the extent that the data allow.

5.1 Administrative Remoteness

The physical distance between a municipality's headquarters and its other districts, or *administrative remoteness*, may constitute an important friction for the provision of public services and for development more broadly (Bardhan, 2002; Mansuri and Rao, 2013; Krishna and Schober, 2014; Asher et al., 2018; Brinkerhoff et al., 2018). For instance, it

³⁴We measure baseline covariates in 1991. Appendix Figure F.9b depicts the distribution of vote shares around the 50 percent cutoff and confirms that very few districts had less than half of voters agreeing to split.

may reduce the amount and quality of information that headquarters has on local needs, leading to fewer public investments (Oates, 1999). High transportation costs may induce bureaucrats to travel less often to remote areas or create additional barriers for citizens to manifest their preferences to politicians located in the town hall. Therefore, headquarters may be more likely to neglect remote districts when choosing levels of public goods to provide, as discussed in Section 2 and Appendix Section A.

We exploit our context to test this prediction. In particular, we ask whether the gains in luminosity are higher in areas experiencing larger reductions in distance from their town halls after splitting. Once new municipalities are established, they are required to build a new town hall, reducing the physical distance from their headquarters. Figure 9a presents binned scatter plots of luminosity growth between averages pre- and post-split versus reduction in distance to town hall after splitting.³⁵ We find that districts having larger reductions in distance grow more in luminosity, suggesting administrative remoteness constitutes a relevant friction for applicant districts.

We complement this analysis by assessing heterogeneous effects. Using a sample of applicant districts, we add to Equation (3) an interaction term between splitting coefficient and different proxies for administrative remoteness, such as distance to parent town hall, distance to state capital, and fraction of rural population. Column 4 of Table 3 shows that an extra percentage point increase in distance to the parent town hall increases the effect of splitting by about 30 percent, confirming larger gains for remote areas.

5.2 Local Politics

We also investigate the role of politics in explaining our results. Administrative redistricting may also spur development by allowing public policies to be better tailored to local needs (Oates, 1972). Districts forming new municipalities may elect new leaders and convey their preferences to the new administration, which may not be politically aligned with its former headquarters'. We offer two indirect empirical tests.

First, building on the anecdotal evidence about reasons for splitting in Section 2.3, we

³⁵We control for state fixed effects, all baseline characteristics shown in Table D.1, and changes in federal transfers at the municipality level. We also notice that our effect may be spurious if areas where distance to town hall decreases more are also municipalities with higher increases in federal transfers. In Appendix Figure D.6 we show the opposite happens: on average, federal transfers grow less where distance to town hall decreases more.

examine whether gains in nighttime luminosity are larger in areas where vote shares in favor of splitting are higher. We employ manually collected data on vote shares in favor of splitting in referenda held at applicant districts in the state of *Minas Gerais*, where data is available, and estimate the following regression:

$$y_{dt} = \alpha_d + \alpha_{s(d)t} + X_d^{1991} \alpha_t + \sum_{q=1}^5 \beta_q Post_{dt} V_d^q + \gamma Post_{dt} + \lambda \ln(T)_{m(d)t} + \varepsilon_{dt}, \quad (6)$$

in which subscripts d , s , and t stand for district, state, year; α_d are district fixed effects; and $\alpha_{s(d)t}$ control for state-by-time fixed effects. We add a vector of baseline controls X_d^{1991} consisting of all baseline variables from Appendix Table D.2 interacted with time fixed effects. We categorize referendum vote shares V into quintiles q and estimate coefficients separately. We control for $Post_{dt}$, which is an indicator variable for years after the wave event a district d is a part of, and $\ln(T)_{m(d)t}$ as the log of federal transfers per capita in municipality m and year t . Standard errors ε_{dt} are robust to heteroskedasticity. The coefficients β_q are our parameters of interest.

We present results in Panel (b) of Figure 9 and Table 4. Among districts that split, we find that the effects splitting on log luminosity are monotonically larger in areas with higher referendum vote shares. While the average effect of splitting is 18 log points in Column (1), districts in the 3rd, 4th, and 5th quintiles of vote shares experience a growth luminosity in 17, 28, and 31 log points, indicating that areas with stronger preferences for splitting benefit from it more substantially, even accounting for changes in revenues.

Second, in a separate descriptive exercise, we leverage the limited data on elections available for the 1990s to show that applicant and headquarter districts elect mayors from different parties in large share after splitting. The pattern documented in Appendix Figure D.7 starts at about 75 percent immediately after a split, and grows to about 85 percent over two decades. These findings relate to the strand of literature examining how decentralization is influenced and shapes the political processes.³⁶ Our results are consistent with basic models of representative politics where elected officials reflect local preferences for policy (Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Unlike our context, in which districts can

³⁶For instance, Myerson (2006) argues that decentralization may increase yardstick competition between jurisdictions, thus increasing the talent pool for national leadership and improving the chances of selecting capable administrators. Boffa et al. (2016) argue that centralization has an important advantage: by combining regions with diverse numbers of informed voters, the average level of information increases, which limits rent-seeking. For a review of the literature, see Grossman et al. (2017) and Pierskalla (2019).

unilaterally request to split, [Hassan \(2016\)](#) and [Gottlieb et al. \(2019\)](#) model splitting as an endogenous distributive policy chosen by the incumbent. Since local elections are single-district, incumbents may benefit electorally from splits only to the extent that voters within the applicant district were in the opposition. Due to data limitations, we do not observe vote shares (either at municipality or district levels) or how competitive elections were at the time, implying that we cannot directly test their theory.

5.3 Federal Transfers

An important question in our context is to what extent our findings are mechanically driven by the growth in government revenue through federal transfers as shown in [Section 4.1](#). To identify the first-order effects of transfers on our outcomes of interest, ideally there would be enough variation in transfers among municipalities that split or almost split. This would allow for a difference-in-differences comparison among the two groups. However, as shown in [Appendix Figure D.3d](#), there is little variation in transfers among almost split municipalities. Instead, we propose two alternative empirical exercises to test this relationship.

First, to assess the extent federal transfers explain our main results, we control for total revenues in [Equation \(1\)](#). This “horse-race” approach holds federal transfers constant when comparing split and almost split municipalities, and the coefficient associated with $Post_{mt} \times Split_m$ would approach zero if federal transfers entirely explain our outcomes. [Table 5](#) reports the coefficients for selected outcomes without and with controls for federal transfers in odd and even columns. The estimates are similar in both specifications.

In a second exercise in the spirit of [Litschig \(2012\)](#), [Brollo et al. \(2013\)](#), and [Corbi et al. \(2019\)](#), we exploit the allocation mechanism of federal transfers to assess the direct impacts of federal transfers on our outcomes of interest in our sample. The design of the revenue-share mechanism generates exogenous discontinuities in the amount of federal transfers: municipalities in the same population bracket obtain the same amount of federal transfers in a given year and state, and municipalities with a few inhabitants above a population threshold receive, on average, more transfers. Because federal transfers to municipalities change discontinuously at certain population thresholds, we can compare the main outcomes above and below these thresholds using our estimation sample.³⁷ Any

³⁷In particular, due to a higher frequency in our data, we compare municipalities above and below the

observed impact can be interpreted as the causal effects of additional federal transfers on economic development.

Appendix Table E.8 reports the reduced-form estimates. Consistent with the transfer rules, Column (1) indicates that municipalities above the cutoff receive, on average, 13 percent more federal transfers. Yet, we do not find impacts on public and private jobs, number of establishments, and average luminosity.³⁸ Although imperfect, these exercises provide suggestive evidence that our main findings are not particularly driven by fiscal windfalls. Instead, our results point toward the importance of higher autonomy as the main channel through which new municipalities are affected by splitting.

5.4 Long-Term Spillover Effects on Non-Split Municipalities

Given the allocation mechanism of federal transfers described in Section 2, municipalities that did not split lose transfers when new municipalities are created within a state. To understand if non-split municipalities ultimately display worse outcomes due to loss in revenues brought by reallocation of grants from the rest of the state to new municipalities, we exploit variation in the number of municipalities that split across states. As shown in Appendix Figure D.3, a one percentage point in population residing in new municipalities implies a loss to non-split municipalities of approximately 2.1 percentage points in federal transfers. Using a sample of municipalities that did not split, we regress percentage point changes in public and private jobs, number of establishments, and average luminosity 15 years after the 1997 wave of splitting on state-level percentage point changes in federal transfers.

We report the coefficients in Table 6 and scatter plots in Appendix Figure D.8. Overall, except for a small decline in the number of establishments, we find no evidence that a decrease in transfers is associated with significant impacts on labor market outcomes and luminosity. We interpret the lack of spillover effects as consistent with decreasing returns to spending. When the expected revenues decrease, municipalities may be less likely to engage in wasteful spending, in which the marginal value is below the social costs of funds (Liebman and Mahoney, 2017), without significantly affecting economic outcomes.

first population bracket of 10,188 inhabitants. Appendix Section E describes the rules and empirical strategy in detail.

³⁸These results differ from others in the literature (Litschig, 2012; Brollo et al., 2013; Corbi et al., 2019). Nonetheless, we use a different sample, which may explain these differences.

6 Conclusion

This paper provides an empirical account of the long-term economic effects of a large administrative redistricting event in Brazil. Exploiting a window of time of exceptionally low requirements for municipality splits, during which Brazil experienced a 23 percent growth in number of units, we estimate the impacts of the creation of new municipalities. We manually collect data on the universe of split requests and assemble a rich panel of municipalities and districts over time. New municipalities gain new autonomy and substantial inflows of federal transfers. Our estimates suggest that municipalities convert the new resources to physical public investments and in growing their public sector. Despite improving public service delivery along some margins, these changes do not spill over into the broader formal local economy and labor market or into other municipalities that did not split.

Our findings have relevant policy implications for countries weighing the equity-efficiency trade-off when choosing how much autonomy and fiscal resources to decentralize to poor and remote areas. While administrative redistricting could in principle come at a high price to the rest of the country with losses in revenues, we find no evidence that this is the case in Brazil. Therefore, we cannot reject that the reform was a net positive to the country. Our findings shine a positive light on decentralization reforms, often classified as “cautionary tales” in recent decades (Kremer et al., 2003).

This paper leaves various interesting paths open for future research. A next natural step is to formally study distributional impacts and address the equity-efficiency trade-off in a general equilibrium framework (Kline and Moretti, 2014; Fajgelbaum and Gaubert, 2020; Gaubert et al., 2020). Relating our estimates to structural parameters would allow for welfare calculations and comparisons to counterfactual redistricting policies. Second, if higher quality political data become available covering the 1990s, future research could study whether a political resource curse impacts our estimates (Brollo et al., 2013). The literature has shown that windfalls of government revenue exacerbate the political monitoring problem and deteriorate the quality of political candidates. Understanding whether this also happens in our context of administrative splits would shed light on the efficiency of the observed changes in public policies. Lastly, fleshing out exactly how governments are formed in new municipalities, what specific promises and investments they make, and how splits affect political yardstick competition and representation (Grossman et al., 2017) would give this story a new level of detail.

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7 Tables

Table 1: Baseline Descriptive Statistics in Levels - Municipalities

| | Contains Applicant | | Rest | | <i>Differences</i> | |
|-------------------------|--------------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|--------------------|----------------|
| | Mean (1) | SD (2) | Mean (3) | SD (4) | Diff. (5) | p-value (6) |
| Number of Districts | 3 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 1 | 1.4 | <0.01 |
| Population (000's) | 40.5 | 71.8 | 21.7 | 75.3 | 18.8 | <0.01 |
| Area (000's km2) | 2.5 | 10.3 | .9 | 2.7 | 1.6 | <0.01 |
| % Urban Population | 58.5 | 23.8 | 59.2 | 22.8 | -.7 | 0.54 |
| % Population 14- | 22.9 | 3.1 | 22.2 | 2.9 | .7 | <0.01 |
| % Population 15-24 | 19.4 | 1.4 | 19.3 | 1.4 | .1 | 0.34 |
| % Population 25-34 | 15.8 | 1.9 | 15.9 | 1.8 | -.1 | 0.55 |
| % Population 65+ | 4.9 | 1.4 | 5.4 | 1.5 | -.5 | <0.01 |
| Years of Education | 8.8 | 1.4 | 8.8 | 1.4 | .1 | 0.41 |
| % Literacy 11-14 | 91.6 | 8.9 | 92.3 | 8 | -.7 | 0.12 |
| % Literacy 25+ | 74.7 | 12.9 | 74.2 | 10.6 | .5 | 0.43 |
| Preschool Attnd. | 13.1 | 9.7 | 17.4 | 14 | -4.3 | <0.01 |
| Middleschool Attnd. | 88.1 | 10.7 | 89.7 | 11.5 | -1.7 | <0.01 |
| High School Attnd. | 28.1 | 14.4 | 28.3 | 14.1 | -.1 | 0.87 |
| Life Expectancy | 66.8 | 2.7 | 66.8 | 2.6 | 0 | 0.83 |
| Child Mortality 1- | 32.3 | 9.7 | 32.3 | 9 | 0 | 0.92 |
| Child Mortality 5- | 38.6 | 12.8 | 39 | 11.8 | -.4 | 0.55 |
| % Piped Water | 71.2 | 24.2 | 74.9 | 21.8 | -3.7 | <0.01 |
| % Trash Collection | 63.5 | 27.3 | 67.3 | 29.4 | -3.8 | 0.01 |
| % Electricity | 81.3 | 20 | 83.8 | 18.9 | -2.5 | 0.01 |
| % Sewage | 96.1 | 7.7 | 96.8 | 8 | -.7 | 0.12 |
| HHI Race | 64.3 | 13.9 | 62.2 | 14.9 | 2 | <0.01 |
| HHI Religion | 75.8 | 12.2 | 79.3 | 12 | -3.5 | <0.01 |
| ln(Dist. State Capital) | 5.4 | .8 | 5.3 | .8 | .1 | 0.09 |
| ln(Income p.c.) | 5.7 | .5 | 5.6 | .4 | 0 | 0.23 |
| % Extreme Poverty | 19.6 | 14.9 | 17.6 | 13.6 | 2.1 | <0.01 |
| % Poverty | 42.8 | 20.6 | 42.3 | 19.2 | .6 | 0.59 |
| % Federal Transfers | 37.2 | 17 | 43.6 | 18.5 | -6.4 | <0.01 |
| N = 448 | | | N = 1925 | | | |

Notes: Table reports characteristics from various data sources at municipality level (1991 Demographic Census, and *Finanças Brasileiras*). Samples are defined in Sections 2 and 3.1.

Table 2: Predicting Splitting at Baseline - Municipalities

| | Split | |
|---------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) |
| Number of Districts | 0.009 (0.012) | 0.011 (0.011) |
| Population (000's) | -0.000 (0.000) | -0.000 (0.000) |
| Area (000's km2) | 0.001 (0.001) | 0.001 (0.001) |
| % Urban Population | -0.002 (0.002) | -0.002 (0.002) |
| ln(Dist. State Capital, km2) | 0.072* (0.036) | 0.077** (0.035) |
| Years of Education | -0.087** (0.040) | -0.071* (0.041) |
| % Literacy 11-14 | -0.007 (0.007) | -0.005 (0.006) |
| % Literacy 25+ | -0.000 (0.005) | 0.003 (0.004) |
| % Preschool Attendance | -0.004 (0.003) | -0.006** (0.003) |
| % Middleschool Attendance | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.002 (0.003) |
| % High School Attendance | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) |
| % Piped Water | 0.005 (0.003) | 0.004* (0.003) |
| % Trash Collection | -0.002* (0.001) | -0.004*** (0.001) |
| % Electricity | -0.000 (0.003) | -0.002 (0.003) |
| % Sewage | -0.004 (0.004) | 0.000 (0.003) |
| HHI Race | 0.003 (0.002) | 0.004* (0.002) |
| HHI Religion | -0.001 (0.002) | -0.002 (0.002) |
| % Extreme Poverty | -0.005 (0.005) | -0.008 (0.005) |
| % Poverty | 0.002 (0.005) | 0.005 (0.004) |
| % Federal Transfers in Revenues | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.001 (0.002) |
| Observations | 431 | 431 |
| R-squared | 0.173 | 0.122 |
| State FE | - | ✓ |
| Controls | ✓ | ✓ |
| Mean | 0.72 | 0.72 |
| SD | 0.45 | 0.45 |

Notes: This table reports results from an OLS regression at the municipality level estimating the relationship between there being a split in the municipality and observable characteristics from the baseline period. Standard errors clustered at the microregion level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 3: Mechanism: Administrative Remoteness

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Post x Split | 0.33*** (0.07) | 1.55*** (0.43) | 0.51 (0.67) | 0.51 (1.02) |
| Post x Split x ln(Pop. 1991) | | -0.07 (0.05) | -0.01 (0.06) | -0.05 (0.06) |
| Post x Split x ln(Area) | | -0.09** (0.05) | -0.22*** (0.07) | -0.21*** (0.06) |
| Post x Split x % Urban 1991 | | -0.00* (0.00) | -0.00* (0.00) | -0.00 (0.00) |
| Post x Split x ln(Dist. Parent Townhall) | | | 0.23** (0.12) | 0.30*** (0.11) |
| Post x Split x ln(Dist. State Capital) | | | 0.10 (0.07) | 0.00 (0.07) |
| Post x Split x % Literacy 1991 | | | | -0.00 (0.01) |
| Post x Split x % Piped Water 1991 | | | | 0.01** (0.00) |
| Post x Split x % Sanitation 1991 | | | | 0.01 (0.01) |
| Post x Split x % Trash Collection 1991 | | | | -0.01** (0.00) |
| Observations | 10,122 | 10,122 | 10,122 | 10,122 |
| R-squared | 0.97 | 0.97 | 0.97 | 0.97 |
| District FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| State-Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Controls-Time FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Mean Pre-Split | -0.761 | -0.761 | -0.761 | -0.761 |
| SD Pre-Split | 1.525 | 1.525 | 1.525 | 1.525 |

Notes: Table reports point estimate results from Equation (3). All Columns include district and state-year fixed effects, and restrict observations to applicant districts as defined in Sections 2 and 3.1. Controls interacted with time fixed effects include ln(area), ln(distance to parent townhall), ln(distance to state capital), soil suitability for maize, wet rice, soybean, and wheat, terrain ruggedness, ln(luminosity) in 1992, land use shares in 1991 for urban, agriculture, pasture and forest. Standard errors clustered at the microregion level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 4: Mechanism: Local Preferences

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
|---------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| Post | 0.17*** (0.05) | -0.28 (0.53) | |
| Post x % In Favor | | 0.00 (0.01) | |
| Post x % In Favor Q1 | | | 0.09 (0.10) |
| Post x % In Favor Q2 | | | 0.09 (0.07) |
| Post x % In Favor Q3 | | | 0.15** (0.07) |
| Post x % In Favor Q4 | | | 0.19** (0.08) |
| Post x % In Favor Q5 | | | 0.30*** (0.08) |
| Observations | 2,069 | 2,069 | 2,069 |
| R-squared | 0.98 | 0.98 | 0.98 |
| District FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| State-Time FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Baseline Chars. x Time FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

Notes: Coefficients from Equation (6). Observations are restricted to districts with data available for referendum vote shares, as described in Section 3.1. Controls contain the list above, plus fixed effects for district, state-year and controls interacted with time. Standard errors clustered at the microregion level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 5: Horse-Race Between Splitting and Federal Transfers

| | ln(Public Jobs) | | ln(Establishments) | | ln(Private Jobs) | | ln(Luminosity) | |
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Post x Split | 0.25*** (0.08) | 0.23*** (0.08) | 0.05** (0.02) | 0.04* (0.02) | -0.03 (0.06) | -0.03 (0.06) | 0.06** (0.03) | 0.06** (0.03) |
| ln(Revenues p.c.) | | 0.15*** (0.04) | | 0.03 (0.02) | | 0.04 (0.04) | | 0.03* (0.02) |
| Observations | 7,033 | 6,922 | 7,086 | 6,970 | 7,086 | 6,970 | 7,583 | 7,464 |
| R-squared | 0.87 | 0.87 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.98 | 0.98 | 0.99 | 0.99 |
| State-Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Controls-Time FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Mean Pre-Split | 5.98 | 5.99 | 5.40 | 5.40 | 7.17 | 7.16 | -0.08 | -0.08 |
| SD Pre-Split | 1.35 | 1.35 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 2.02 | 2.04 | 1.65 | 1.65 |

Notes: Results from estimation of Equation (1) in Section 5. Controls interacted with time fixed effects include number of districts in 1991, ln(population) in 1991, % urban in 1991, ln(area), ln(distance to state capital), ln(income p.c.) in 1991, and HHI for race and religion in 1991. Standard errors clustered at the microregion level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.


Table 6: Long-Term Spillovers on Non-Split Municipalities

| | Public Jobs | Private Jobs | Establishments | Luminosity |
|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------------|----------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Federal Transfers | -5.86 (5.83) | -9.73 (6.08) | -4.00** (1.66) | 1.23 (1.00) |
| Observations | 25 | 25 | 25 | 25 |
| R-squared | 0.38 | 0.48 | 0.71 | 0.54 |
| Region FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Split Wave | 1997 | 1997 | 1997 | 1997 |
| Mean | 226.7 | 366.4 | 189.8 | 117.4 |
| SD | 403.9 | 442.5 | 133.7 | 59.62 |

Notes: Table reports OLS correlations between percentage point changes in federal transfers and percentage point changes in outcomes for non-split municipalities at the state level. Outcomes are measured 15 years after the split wave. Samples exclude the states *Distrito Federal* and *Roraima*.


8 Figures

Figure 1: Evolution of Total Number of Municipalities




Notes: Graph shows how the total number of municipalities evolved in Brazil between 1970 and 2010. New municipalities are established in the beginning of election terms after obtaining approval to split. The gray area highlights our period of study, between the enactments of the 1988 Federal Constitution and the 1996 Constitutional Amendment. Information is obtained from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).

Figure 2: Split Diagram and Map of Brazil



Notes: The diagram on the left illustrates the structure of split requests in our sample. Municipalities are divided into applicant, remaining and headquarters district. We color green applicant districts that succeed at splitting. More details can be found in Section 3.2. The map on the right represents Brazil in 1991. Municipalities that split are colored blue, while municipalities that almost split are colored orange. Our samples are defined in Section 3.1.3.

Figure 3: Reallocation of Federal Transfers




Notes: This figure reports point estimates of the annual effects of splitting on log federal transfers per capita after estimating Equation (1). We use information from the *Finanças Brasileiras* (Finbra) data between 1989 and 2018. The omitted category is the year before splitting. Bars represent the 95%-confidence intervals.

Figure 4: Public Expenditures and Personnel




Notes: This figure reports point estimates of the annual effects of splitting on log capital expenditures per capita, log current expenditures per capita, log total number of public municipal jobs, and log public municipal wages after estimating Equation (1). We use information from Finbra (1989 – 2018) and RAIS (1995 – 2018) data. The omitted category is the year before splitting. Bars represent the 95%-confidence intervals.

Figure 5: Education Outcomes from Triple-Differences




Notes: This figure reports results after estimating the triple-differences (DDD) Equation (2). We normalize $\beta_{31} = 0$ so that the estimates are relative to individuals aged 31. We use information from the 1991, 2000, and 2010 Demographic Census data. Gray areas represent the 95%-confidence intervals. We display raw data in Appendix Figure D.4.

Figure 6: Public Service Delivery




Notes: This figure reports the aggregate effects of splitting on public service delivery using different educational, infrastructure and poverty measures after estimating a modified version of Equation (1). In Panel A, the educational variables are literacy rates for individuals aged between 11 and 14 and above 25; preschool, middle school and high school attendance rates; and total years of education. In Panel B, we report both the infrastructure and poverty outcomes. The infrastructure variables are shares of households with piped water, trash collection services, electricity, and sewage. Poverty outcomes are shares of household living in extreme poverty and poverty conditions. We use information from the 1991, 2000, and 2010 Demographic Census data. Bars represent the 95%-confidence intervals. Further details can be found in Appendix Table D.4.

Figure 7: The Local Formal Economy




Notes: This figure reports point estimates of the annual effects of splitting on log local tax revenue per capita, log total number of establishments, log total number of private jobs, and log private wages after estimating Equation (1). We use information from Finbra (1989 – 2018) and RAIS (1995 – 2018) data. The omitted category is the year before splitting. Bars represent the 95%-confidence intervals.

Figure 8: Nighttime Luminosity



Notes: This figure reports point estimates of the annual effects of splitting on luminosity. We use information from the night lights data (1992–2013). Figure 8a reports results for $\ln(0.1 + \text{luminosity})$ at the municipality level after estimating Equation (1). Figures 8b – 8d report results for $\ln(0.1 + \text{average luminosity})$, share of pixels lit, and luminosity Gini at the district level after estimating Equation (3). We display coefficients separately for three sets of groups: applicant (blue), remaining (red), and headquarters (green) districts. Bars represent the 95%-confidence intervals. Further details can be found in Appendix Table D.5

Figure 9: Mechanisms



Notes: Figure 9a plots a binned scatter across (i) % growth in luminosity between periods before and after the split and (ii) % reduction in distance to town hall after split. We control for state fixed effects, $\ln(\text{area})$, $\ln(\text{distance to state capital})$, soil suitability for maize, wet rice, soybean, and wheat, terrain ruggedness, $\ln(\text{baseline luminosity in 1992})$, and growth in federal transfers at the municipality level. Panel (b) reports coefficients after estimating Equation (6). The sample is restricted to districts with information on referendum vote shares. See Section 3.1 for details on data.

Appendices

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A Conceptual Framework

This Section sketches a simple model to illustrate how administrative unit splits affect the provision of public services and to guide our empirical analysis. Our model incorporates several features from our context and highlights the mechanisms, including neglect from the headquarters and federal transfers (Bolton and Roland, 1997; Dur and Staal, 2008). We present further details of the model and formal proofs in Appendix Section B.

We work with a one-period model. We assume there is a municipality composed of two districts, A and B . The municipal population is immobile and divided into districts A and B , each having population α_A and α_B , respectively. There is no income heterogeneity within the district so that all residents have *per capita* income y . Two sources of municipal revenues finance public goods g : income taxes τ and federal transfers $T(\cdot)$. To map our model on to the Brazilian context as described in Section 2, $T(\cdot)$ depends on population size. In addition, we assume that federal transfers $T(\cdot)$ are weakly increasing and concave, while *per capita* federal transfers are weakly decreasing and convex in population size. The utility takes a quasi-linear form, $U_i = \theta_i \ln(g_i) + (1 - \tau)y_i$, where θ_i captures local preferences for public goods in district i . We normalize the price of public goods to one.

District A contains the municipality headquarters and, for this reason, holds decision-making power, including the responsibility of choosing the allocation of public goods in both districts. When districts A and B are united and form a municipality, district A chooses the levels of public goods in districts A and B , g_A^U and g_B^U , that maximizes a Pareto weighted sum of utilities subject to a budget constraint. Put differently, district A solves the following maximization problem:

$$\max_{g_A, g_B, \tau} (1 - \lambda)\alpha_A U_A + \lambda\alpha_B U_B \quad \text{subject to} \quad g_A + g_B \leq \tau y + T(\alpha_A + \alpha_B), \quad (7)$$

where $y \equiv \alpha_A y_A + \alpha_B y_B$ and λ is the intra-municipality Pareto weight capturing the relative welfare strength of the two districts in deciding over the amount of public goods.

In the case of splitting, district B becomes a municipality and is granted decision-making power to decide the level of public goods g_B^S . We characterize the maximization

problem as follows:

$$\max_{g_B, \tau} \quad \alpha_B U_B \quad \text{subject to} \quad g_B \leq \tau \alpha_B y_B + T(\alpha_B), \quad (8)$$

where $T(\alpha_B)$ represents the amount of federal transfers that the new municipality receives. The parent municipality, now comprising only district A , solves for g_A and τ through an analogous maximization problem.

Solving the above maximization problems and comparing the solutions, we can state the following proposition:

Proposition 1. *District B is more likely to split if:*

1. **(Neglect)** *Its welfare was neglected by the headquarters (lower λ);*
2. **(Fiscal Incentives)** *It is small in population size (lower α_B) and there are*
 - (A1) *a high comparative gain in transfers if split $\left(\frac{T(\alpha_A + \alpha_B)}{y} \leq \frac{T(\alpha_B)}{\alpha_B y_B} \right)$; and*
 - (A2) *a high comparative tax base $\left(\frac{\theta_B}{\theta_A} \leq \frac{y_B}{y_A} \right)$.*

Proof. See Appendix Section B.1. □

To understand the distributional effects of splitting, we extend our framework to introduce a second municipality with population α_2 .³⁹ To illustrate the redistribution of federal transfers after a split, define T_i^U as the amount in transfers area i receives when municipality 1 is united, and let T_i^S be the transfers when municipality 1 splits.

To match the Brazilian context, we assume that transfers are zero-sum, always summing to a constant \bar{T} . We also assume that $T_A^S + T_B^S \geq T_{A+B}^U$ and $T_2^U \geq T_2^S$. We define the indirect utility of transfers for each area i when united as V_i^U and when split as V_i^S . We can express the changes in indirect utility for area i after a split as $\Delta V_i \equiv V_i^S - V_i^U$. Our next proposition details what determines changes in total welfare after a split.

Proposition 2. *If district B is relatively small $\left(\frac{\alpha_B}{\alpha_A} \rightarrow 0 \right)$ and neglected by its parent district $(\lambda \rightarrow 0)$, and if municipality 2 is relatively large $\left(\frac{\alpha_2}{\alpha_A + \alpha_B} \rightarrow \infty \right)$, then (i) ΔV_A is small, (ii) ΔV_B is positive and large, and (iii) ΔV_2 is negative and small.*

³⁹For the sake of simplicity we introduce a single new municipality to represent the rest of the state. Introducing a set of municipalities would be appropriate if the model was to fit the data directly.

Proof. See Appendix Section B.2. □

The intuition behind Proposition 2 is straightforward. Because of decreasing returns to spending, for a given configuration of population sizes and neglect by the headquarters district, the transfers moved from municipality 2 to district B may do little harm to the former and substantially benefit the latter. District A 's welfare changes little, either positively or negatively, depending on whether its transfers change or not.⁴⁰ We directly test these predictions in Section 4 by separately evaluating the consequences of splitting for headquarter and non-headquarter districts.

We highlight that, despite being outside the scope of this paper, the model can be extended to incorporate specific features from other contexts. For example, it is possible to allow for individuals "voting with their feet" (Tiebout, 1956) with adjustments in population shares after policy choices. Ethnic divisions between areas (Pierskalla, 2016; Bazzi and Gudgeon, 2020) or municipality mergers (Weese, 2015; Blom-Hansen et al., 2016) are also potential extensions of the model.

B Proofs of Propositions

B.1 Proof of Proposition 1

Proof. In order to approximate the Brazilian context, we assume throughout that $\lambda \leq 0.5$, $\alpha_B < \alpha_A$, and $y_B < y_A$. We also highlight two conditions which come up in the proofs below:

(A1) a high comparative gain in transfers if split $\left(\frac{T(\alpha_A + \alpha_B)}{y} \leq \frac{T(\alpha_B)}{\alpha_B y_B} \right)$; and

(A2) a high comparative tax base $\left(\frac{\theta_B}{\theta_A} \leq \frac{y_B}{y_A} \right)$.

From the unified policy choice problem (7), assuming there exists an interior optimum, we can solve the First Order Condition (FOC) for

$$\frac{g_B^U}{g_A^U} = \frac{\lambda}{1 - \lambda} \frac{\alpha_B}{\alpha_A} \frac{\theta_B}{\theta_A} \quad (9)$$

⁴⁰In a setting allowing for agglomeration effects, this result could be further exacerbated (Kline and Moretti, 2014).

The agent's private spending is $c_i = (1 - \tau)y_i$. We can solve for a closed-form levels of public good provision and taxation under unification:

$$g_A^U = (1 - \lambda)\alpha_A\theta_A\frac{y}{\bar{y}} \quad g_B^U = \lambda\alpha_B\theta_B\frac{y}{\bar{y}} \quad \tau^U = \frac{\bar{\theta}}{\bar{y}} - \frac{T(\alpha_A + \alpha_B)}{y} \quad (10)$$

where $\bar{y} \equiv (1 - \lambda)\alpha_A y_A + \lambda\alpha_B y_B$, $y \equiv \alpha_A y_A + \alpha_B y_B$, $\bar{\theta} \equiv (1 - \lambda)\alpha_A\theta_A + \lambda\alpha_B\theta_B$, and $\theta \equiv \alpha_A\theta_A + \alpha_B\theta_B$.

Under the same functional-form assumptions, from problem (8), it is straightforward to show that

$$g_A^S = \alpha_A\theta_A \quad g_B^S = \alpha_B\theta_B \quad \tau_A^S = \frac{\theta_A}{y_A} - \frac{T(\alpha_A)}{\alpha_A y_A} \quad \tau_B^S = \frac{\theta_B}{y_B} - \frac{T(\alpha_B)}{\alpha_B y_B} \quad (11)$$

Thus, district B unilaterally chooses to split if $U_B^S \geq U_B^U$. Substituting in Equations (10) and (11), we express the surplus condition as:

$$\begin{aligned} G(\lambda, \alpha_A, \alpha_B, \theta_A, \theta_B, y_A, y_B, T) &\equiv U_B^S - U_B^U \\ &= \theta_B [\ln(g_B^S) - \ln(g_B^U)] + (\tau^U - \tau_B^S)y_B \\ &= \theta_B \ln\left(\frac{\bar{y}}{\lambda y}\right) + \left(\frac{\bar{\theta}}{\bar{y}} - \frac{\theta_B}{y_B} + \frac{T(\alpha_B)}{\alpha_B y_B} - \frac{T(\alpha_A + \alpha_B)}{y}\right)y_B \\ &\geq 0 \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

With simple algebra we can show that

1. $\frac{\partial G}{\partial \lambda} = -\frac{\alpha_A}{\lambda \bar{y}^2} [(1 - \lambda)\alpha_A\theta_B y_A^2 + \lambda\alpha_B\theta_A y_B^2] \leq 0$.
 2. $\frac{\partial G}{\partial \alpha_B} = -y_B \left[\frac{(1-2\lambda)\alpha_A\theta_B y_A}{\lambda y \bar{y}} + \frac{(1-\lambda)\lambda\alpha_A(\theta_A y_B - \theta_B y_A)}{\bar{y}^2} + \frac{T'(\alpha_A + \alpha_B)y - T(\alpha_A + \alpha_B)y_B}{y^2} \right] + \frac{\alpha_B T'(\alpha_B) - T(\alpha_B)}{\alpha_B}$
- After more algebra we conclude that $\frac{\partial G}{\partial \alpha_B} \leq 0$ if conditions (A1) and (A2) hold.
3. $\frac{\partial G}{\partial \theta_A} = \frac{(1-\lambda)\alpha_A y_A}{\bar{y}} \geq 0$
 4. $\frac{\partial G}{\partial \theta_B} = \ln\left(\frac{\bar{y}}{\lambda y}\right) - \frac{(1-\lambda)\alpha_A y_A}{\bar{y}} \leq 0$.
 5. $\frac{\partial G}{\partial y_A} = -\frac{\alpha_A y_B}{y^2 \bar{y}^2} [\bar{\theta} y [(1 - \lambda)y - (1 - 2\lambda)\alpha_B\theta_B] - T(\alpha_A + \alpha_B)\bar{y}^2] \leq 0$

$$6. \frac{\partial G}{\partial y_B} = \frac{\alpha_A y_A}{y^2 \bar{y}^2} [y((1-\lambda)\bar{\theta}y + (1-2\lambda)\alpha_B \theta_B) - T(\alpha_A + \alpha_B)\bar{y}^2] \leq 0$$

To further understand how choices of public goods provision and local taxation change with a split, we derive similar calculations for g_B and τ_B . If district B splits, it increases its provision of public goods ($g_B^S \geq g_B^U$) if, and only if

$$\begin{aligned} H(\lambda, \alpha_A, \alpha_B, \theta_A, \theta_B, y_A, y_B) &\equiv g_B^S - g_B^U \\ &= \alpha_B \theta_B - \frac{\lambda \alpha_B \theta_B y}{\bar{y}} \\ &= \frac{(1-2\lambda)\alpha_A \alpha_B \theta_B y_A}{\bar{y}} \geq 0 \end{aligned} \tag{13}$$

With simple algebra we can show that

$$\begin{aligned} 1. \frac{\partial H}{\partial \lambda} &= -\frac{\alpha_A \alpha_B \theta_B y_A y}{\bar{y}^2} \leq 0 \\ 2. \frac{\partial H}{\partial \alpha_B} &= -\frac{(1-2\lambda)\theta_B y_A [\lambda \alpha_B^2 y_B - (1-\lambda)\alpha_A^2 y_A]}{\bar{y}^2} \geq 0. \\ 3. \frac{\partial H}{\partial \theta_A} &= 0 \\ 4. \frac{\partial H}{\partial \theta_B} &= \frac{(1-2\lambda)\alpha_A \alpha_B y_A}{\bar{y}} \geq 0. \\ 5. \frac{\partial H}{\partial y_A} &= \frac{(1-2\lambda)\lambda \alpha_A \alpha_B^2 \theta_B y_B}{\bar{y}^2} \geq 0. \\ 6. \frac{\partial H}{\partial y_B} &= -\frac{(1-2\lambda)\lambda \alpha_A \alpha_B^2 \theta_B y_A}{\bar{y}^2} \leq 0. \end{aligned}$$

Moreover, district B changes local tax rates from τ^U to τ_B^S after a split. Substituting in all terms and rearranging, this is equivalent to

$$\begin{aligned} \tau_B^S - \tau^U &= \frac{\theta_B}{y_B} - \frac{\bar{\theta}}{\bar{y}} + \frac{T(\alpha_A + \alpha_B)}{y} - \frac{T(\alpha_B)}{\alpha_B y_B} \\ &= \frac{(1-\alpha)\alpha_A \alpha_B y [\theta_B y_A - \theta_A y_B] + \bar{y} [\alpha_B y_B T(\alpha_A + \alpha_B) - y T(\alpha_B)]}{\alpha_B y_B y \bar{y}} \end{aligned} \tag{14}$$

We conclude that local tax rates after a split are lower than when districts are united, i.e. $\tau_B^S \leq \tau^U$, if conditions (A1) and (A2) hold.

□

B.2 Proof of Proposition 2

Proof. Assume that district B is relatively small $\left(\frac{\alpha_B}{\alpha_A} \rightarrow 0\right)$ and neglected by its parent district ($\lambda \rightarrow 0$), and if municipality 2 is relatively large $\left(\frac{\alpha_2}{\alpha_A + \alpha_B} \rightarrow \infty\right)$. Moreover, simplifying notation from Section B.1 gives us

$$\Delta V_A = \theta_A \ln \left(\frac{\bar{y}}{(1-\lambda)y} \right) + \left(\frac{\bar{\theta}}{\bar{y}} - \frac{\theta_A}{y_A} + \frac{T(\alpha_A)}{\alpha_A y_A} - \frac{T(\alpha_A + \alpha_B)}{y} \right) y_A \quad (15)$$

$$\Delta V_B = \theta_B \ln \left(\frac{\bar{y}}{\lambda y} \right) + \left(\frac{\bar{\theta}}{\bar{y}} - \frac{\theta_B}{y_B} + \frac{T(\alpha_B)}{\alpha_B y_B} - \frac{T(\alpha_A + \alpha_B)}{y} \right) y_B \quad (16)$$

$$\Delta V_2 = \frac{T^S(\alpha_2) - T^U(\alpha_2)}{\alpha_2} \quad (17)$$

Given our assumptions, it is straightforward to show that $\Delta V_A \rightarrow 0$, $\Delta V_B \rightarrow \infty$, $\Delta V_2 \rightarrow 0$.

□

C Data Construction

C.1 Splitting Requests

This appendix contains a detailed description of the data on split requests used in this paper. As previously explained, we construct a novel data set containing all requests to split made by districts during the years between 1989 and 1996 from historical archives. Prior to the enactment of the 1996 Constitutional Amendment (CA), each state assembly had discretion to set its own rules to regulate over splitting, leading to substantial variation in local legislation and records on split requests.

Brazil has 26 state legislative assemblies.⁴¹ For each state assembly, we search for digitized historical records on split requests from the first half of the 1990s. We find records for twelve states: Amapá, Amazonas, Espírito Santo, Goiás, Mato Grosso, Minas Gerais, Pará, Paraná, Rio Grande do Sul, Rondônia, Santa Catarina, and São Paulo. The availability and quality of the data widely vary across states. We exemplify the online material we have access to in Figure C.1 below.

In what follows, we list the variables we construct from the records for each state:

Amapá. indicator for whether district has requested to split; indicator for whether district has the request approved; id of the split process; date when the process began; date when the referendum was approved; and result of the referendum.

Amazonas. indicator for whether district has requested to split; indicator for whether district has the request approved; and result of the referendum.

Espírito Santo. indicator for whether district has requested to split; indicator for whether district has the request approved; date when the process began; date when the referendum was approved; and result of the referendum.

Goiás. indicator for whether district has requested to split; indicator for whether district has the request approved; indicator for whether the request was archived; id of the split process; date when the referendum was approved; and result of the referendum.

Mato Grosso. indicator for whether district has requested to split; indicator for whether district has the request approved; id of the split process; date when the process began;

⁴¹The country has 27 federal units, encompassing 26 states and the Federal District. The Federal District does not have a state assembly. Instead, it has a legislative chamber.

and result of the referendum.

Minas Gerais. indicator for whether district has requested to split; indicator for whether district has the request approved; indicator for whether the request was archived; date when the request was archived; id of the split process; date when the process began; date when the referendum was approved; and result of the referendum.

Pará. indicator for whether district has requested to split; indicator for whether district has the request approved; id of the split process; date when the process began; date when the referendum was approved; and result of the referendum.

Paraná. indicator for whether district has requested to split; indicator for whether district has the request approved; indicator for whether the request was archived; id of the split process; date when the process began; and result of the referendum.

Rio Grande do Sul. indicator for whether district has requested to split; indicator for whether district has the request approved; indicator for whether the request was archived; id of the split process; date when the process began; date when the referendum was approved; and result of the referendum.

Rondônia. indicator for whether district has requested to split; indicator for whether district has the request approved; indicator for whether the request was archived; date when the request was archived; id of the split process; date when the referendum was approved; and result of the referendum.

Santa Catarina. indicator for whether district has requested to split; indicator for whether district has the request approved; indicator for whether the request was archived; date when the request was archived; id of the split process; date when the process began; date when the referendum was approved; and result of the referendum.

São Paulo. indicator for whether district has requested to split; indicator for whether district has the request approved; indicator for whether the request was archived; id of the split process; date when the process began; date when the referendum was approved; and result of the referendum.

Figure C.1: Examples of Raw Material for Split Request Data Collection

(a) São Paulo


| | |
|---|--|
| Resolução - ALESP nº 762, de 25/07/1994 | |
| Ementa | Solicita ao TRE a realização de plebiscito referente à emancipação do Distrito de Jumiirim, pertencente ao Município de Tietê. |
| Projeto/Autoria | PR 15/1993 - Comissão de Assuntos Municipais |
| Promulgação | Executivo |
| Publicação | Diário Oficial - Executivo, 30/07/1994, p.73 Texto Original |
| (*) Os textos contidos nesta base de dados têm caráter meramente informativo. Somente os publicados no Diário Oficial estão aptos à produção de efeitos legais. | |
| Situação Atual | Sem revogação expressa |
| Temas | Desenvolvimento Urbano e Divisão Territorial Poder Legislativo e Tribunal de Contas |
| Palavras-Chave | PLEBISCITO / EMANCIPAÇÃO / DISTRITO / JUMIRIM / TIETÊ |

(b) Rio Grande do Sul


| | |
|------------------------|---|
| Detalhes da Proposição | |
| Proposição: | PL 250 1995 |
| Proponente: | Comissão de Constituição e Justiça |
| » Situação: | Sancionado(a) em 12/07/1995 |
| » Tramitação: | PROTOCOLO - envio em 07/06/1995 |
| Legislação | Tipo: Lei |
| Número do processo: | 20729.01.00/95-0 |
| Assunto: | PLEBISCITO VESPASIANO CORREA EMANCIPACAO |
| Ementa: | AUTORIZA A REALIZACAO DE CONSULTA PLEBISCITARIA PARA EMANCIPACAO DA LOCALIDADE DE VESPASIANO CORREA, PERTENCENTE AO MUNICIPIO DE MUCUM. |
| Votação: | |
| Proposição Referida: | |
| » Texto | |
| » Justificativa | |

Figure C.2: Histograms of Event Years

(a) Year of *Request* for Almost Split-Applicants



(b) Year of *Split* for Split-Applicants



D Additional Results

Table D.1: Baseline Descriptive Statistics in Levels - Districts

| | In Sample | | | | | | Rest | | | | | | Differences | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------|-----------|--|-------------|-----------|--|--------------|-----------|--|-------------|-----------|--|--------------|------------|--|---------------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|
| | Applicant | | | Remaining | | | Headquarters | | | Periphery | | | Headquarters | | | (1)-(3) | | (1)-(5) | |
| | Mean (1) | SD (2) | | Mean (3) | SD (4) | | Mean (5) | SD (6) | | Mean (7) | SD (8) | | Mean (9) | SD (10) | | Diff. (11) | p-value (12) | Diff. (13) | p-value (14) |
| Population (000's) | 5.8 | 14.1 | | 3.1 | 5.4 | | 31.6 | 63.5 | | 3.6 | 13.1 | | 17.9 | 48.9 | | 2.6 | <0.01 | -25.8 | <0.01 |
| % Urban Population | 38.9 | 26.6 | | 27.7 | 24.6 | | 67.9 | 22.4 | | 32.4 | 24.8 | | 61.9 | 22.6 | | 11.1 | <0.01 | -29.1 | <0.01 |
| % Male | 51.8 | 1.3 | | 52.3 | 1.8 | | 50.3 | 1.2 | | 52.3 | 1.9 | | 51 | 1.3 | | -5 | <0.01 | 1.5 | <0.01 |
| % Literacy | 65.8 | 11.6 | | 64.9 | 12.3 | | 70.2 | 9.6 | | 64.3 | 11.2 | | 68.9 | 8.6 | | .9 | .3 | -4.4 | <0.01 |
| % Piped Water | 44.9 | 33 | | 46.3 | 32 | | 54.1 | 35.8 | | 47.8 | 31.7 | | 53 | 35.6 | | -1.4 | .53 | -9.1 | <0.01 |
| % Sanitation | 60.2 | 35.1 | | 64.8 | 31.7 | | 62 | 36.5 | | 63.2 | 32.7 | | 60.6 | 36.5 | | -4.6 | .05 | -1.8 | .45 |
| % Trash Removal | 9.9 | 18.4 | | 7.3 | 16.3 | | 34.4 | 28.6 | | 7.1 | 16.2 | | 29 | 26.7 | | 2.6 | .03 | -24.5 | <0.01 |
| Avg. Luminosity | 1.9 | 6.2 | | 1.3 | 5.2 | | 3.1 | 6.5 | | 1.9 | 8.1 | | 2.5 | 7.3 | | .5 | .19 | -1.2 | <0.01 |
| Area (000's km2) | .6 | 1.8 | | .3 | .6 | | 1 | 3.3 | | .3 | .9 | | .6 | 1.5 | | .3 | <0.01 | -4 | <0.01 |
| ln(Distance to Parent Townhall) | 3 | .7 | | 2.8 | .6 | | 1.5 | 1 | | 2.7 | .6 | | 1.4 | .9 | | .1 | <0.01 | 1.4 | <0.01 |
| ln(Distance to State Capital) | 5.5 | .8 | | 5.4 | .7 | | 5.4 | .8 | | 5.2 | .9 | | 5.3 | .8 | | .1 | .09 | 0 | .35 |
| ln(Maize Suitability) | 8.7 | .3 | | 8.7 | .3 | | 8.6 | .3 | | 8.5 | .3 | | 8.5 | .2 | | 0 | .98 | 0 | .06 |
| ln(Wet Rice Suitability) | 8.6 | .8 | | 8.6 | .5 | | 8.7 | .5 | | 8.6 | .9 | | 8.6 | .8 | | 0 | .58 | 0 | .42 |
| ln(Soybean Suitability) | 7.7 | .4 | | 7.7 | .2 | | 7.7 | .2 | | 7.6 | .8 | | 7.7 | .7 | | 0 | .47 | 0 | .67 |
| ln(Wheat Suitability) | 6.5 | 3 | | 6.7 | 2.9 | | 6.5 | 2.9 | | 6.5 | 3 | | 6.5 | 2.9 | | -2 | .35 | 0 | .85 |
| Terrain Ruggedness | 82.6 | 78 | | 72.9 | 68.3 | | 75.7 | 72.4 | | 68.6 | 71.7 | | 68.7 | 71.4 | | 9.7 | .06 | 6.9 | .17 |
| | N = 560 | | | N = 331 | | | N = 390 | | | N = 916 | | | N = 1783 | | | | | | |

Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for districts using information from 1991 Demographic Census, 1992 night lights, MapBiomass, FAO-GAEZ soil suitability, and [Carter \(2018\)](#)'s terrain ruggedness data. The variables are: total population (in thousands), shares of urban and male population, literacy rate, share of households with access to piped water, sanitation and trash removal, average luminosity, total area (in thousands km²), log distance to town hall, log distance to state capital, log soil suitability for different crops (maize, wet rice, soybean and wheat), and log terrain ruggedness. See Sections [2](#) and [3.1](#) for further details on sample construction.

Table D.2: Predicting Splitting at Baseline - Districts

| | Applicants | Remaining | Headquarters |
|---------------------------------|------------|-----------|--------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| ln(Population) | 0.068* | -0.030 | -0.014 |
| | (0.038) | (0.040) | (0.039) |
| % Urban Population | 0.001 | 0.001 | -0.002 |
| | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| % Male | -0.026* | -0.013 | -0.045 |
| | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.031) |
| % Literacy | -0.003 | 0.002 | -0.004 |
| | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.006) |
| % Piped Water | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.006* |
| | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.003) |
| % Sanitation | 0.004*** | 0.000 | -0.002 |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.004) |
| % Trash Removal | -0.001 | -0.002 | 0.000 |
| | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| ln(Avg. Luminosity) | -0.014** | -0.011 | -0.015 |
| | (0.007) | (0.011) | (0.018) |
| ln(Area) | 0.097*** | 0.026 | 0.042 |
| | (0.029) | (0.042) | (0.042) |
| ln(Distance to Parent Townhall) | 0.072* | 0.071 | -0.023 |
| | (0.043) | (0.068) | (0.030) |
| ln(Distance to State Capital) | 0.043 | 0.101 | 0.005 |
| | (0.036) | (0.070) | (0.049) |
| Observations | 560 | 326 | 389 |
| R-squared | 0.245 | 0.228 | 0.179 |
| State FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Controls | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Mean | 0.79 | 0.79 | 0.75 |
| SD | 0.41 | 0.41 | 0.43 |

Notes: This table reports results from an OLS regression at the municipality level estimating the relationship between splitting and observable characteristics from the baseline period. of there being a split in the municipality on baseline characteristics from various data sources at the district level. Controls include measures of soil suitability and terrain ruggedness. Standard errors clustered at the microregion level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table D.3: Difference-in-Differences Results for Public Finance and the Local Economy

| | ln(Rev. p.c.) (1) | ln(Exp. p.c.) (2) | ln(Federal Transfers p.c.) (3) | ln(Capital Exp. p.c.) (4) | ln(Current Exp. p.c.) (5) | ln(Public Municipal Jobs) (6) |
|------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Post x Split | 0.11*** (0.02) | 0.13*** (0.03) | 0.31*** (0.03) | 0.20*** (0.07) | 0.12*** (0.02) | 0.18** (0.08) |
| Observations | 7,819 | 7,819 | 7,795 | 7,814 | 7,818 | 7,010 |
| R-squared | 0.94 | 0.94 | 0.90 | 0.75 | 0.94 | 0.87 |
| State-Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Controls-Time FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

| | ln(Public Municipal Wages) (7) | ln(Local Taxation Revenues p.c.) (8) | ln(Establishments) (9) | ln(Private Jobs) (10) | ln(Private Wages) (11) |
|------------------|--------------------------------------|--|---------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| Post x Split | 0.17*** (0.06) | 0.05 (0.04) | 0.05* (0.03) | 0.01 (0.07) | 0.06 (0.07) |
| Observations | 7,010 | 7,818 | 7,086 | 7,086 | 7,086 |
| R-squared | 0.91 | 0.92 | 0.99 | 0.98 | 0.98 |
| State-Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Controls-Time FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

Notes: Point estimates for Figure 7. Results from estimation of Equation (1) in Section 4. Main data sources are the *Finanças Brasileiras* (Finbra) data set for 1989 to 2018 and RAIS for 1995 to 2018. We classify jobs and establishments according to sector with information from the *Classificação Nacional de Atividades Econômicas* (CNAE) and *Classificação Brasileira de Ocupações* (CBO). Controls interacted with time fixed effects include number of districts in 1991, ln(Population) in 1991, % Urban in 1991, ln(area), ln(distance to state capital), ln(Income p.c.) in 1991, and HHI for race and religion in 1991. Standard errors clustered at the micro-region level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D.4: Difference-in-Differences Results for Education and Public Services Delivery

| | Attn. Preschool (1) | Attn. Middle School (2) | Attn. High School (3) | % Literacy 11-14 yr. (4) | % Literacy 25+ yr. (5) | Years of Educ. (6) |
|--------------|------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|
| Post x Split | 3.92*** (1.47) | 2.25** (1.10) | -0.23 (1.12) | 1.68*** (0.58) | 0.95** (0.43) | 0.12* (0.07) |
| Observations | 1,344 | 1,344 | 1,344 | 1,344 | 1,344 | 1,344 |
| R-squared | 0.91 | 0.80 | 0.91 | 0.85 | 0.97 | 0.89 |
| Mean | 13.11 | 88.07 | 28.13 | 91.64 | 74.65 | 8.83 |
| SD | 9.68 | 10.73 | 14.44 | 8.94 | 12.86 | 1.44 |
| | % Piped Water (7) | % Trash Collection (8) | % Electricity (9) | % Sewage (10) | % Extreme Poverty (11) | % Poverty (12) |
| Post x Split | 1.77 (1.24) | 4.42*** (1.59) | 2.50 (1.60) | 1.00* (0.60) | -1.33 (1.08) | -1.77 (1.24) |
| Observations | 1,344 | 1,344 | 1,344 | 1,344 | 1,344 | 1,344 |
| R-squared | 0.89 | 0.87 | 0.83 | 0.89 | 0.89 | 0.94 |
| Mean | 71.18 | 63.51 | 81.33 | 96.10 | 19.62 | 42.81 |
| SD | 24.17 | 27.35 | 20.03 | 7.66 | 14.86 | 20.6 |

Notes: Point estimates for Figure 6. Results from estimation of a simplified version of Equation (1) in Section 4. Each coefficient is calculated from a regression with 1344 observations on the given standardized outcome. Main data sources are the Demographic Census of 1991, 2000 and 2010. Standard errors clustered at the microregion level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D.5: Difference-in-Difference Estimates for Districts

| | ln(0.1 + Luminosity) | | |
|----------------|----------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| | Applicants (1) | Remaining (2) | Headquarters (3) |
| Post x Split | 0.33*** (0.07) | 0.03 (0.07) | 0.05 (0.04) |
| Observations | 10,122 | 5,893 | 6,947 |
| R-squared | 0.97 | 0.97 | 0.99 |
| Mean Pre-Split | -0.761 | -0.856 | 0.183 |
| SD Pre-Split | 1.525 | 1.433 | 1.432 |

| | % Pixels Lit | | |
|----------------|-------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| | Applicants (1) | Remaining (2) | Headquarters (3) |
| Post x Split | 0.07*** (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) | 0.02** (0.01) |
| Observations | 10,122 | 5,893 | 6,947 |
| R-squared | 0.97 | 0.95 | 0.98 |
| Mean Pre-Split | 0.176 | 0.158 | 0.244 |
| SD Pre-Split | 0.289 | 0.260 | 0.290 |

| | Luminosity Gini | | |
|----------------|--------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| | Applicants (1) | Remaining (2) | Headquarters (3) |
| Post x Split | -0.04*** (0.01) | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.01** (0.01) |
| Observations | 9,616 | 4,976 | 6,918 |
| R-squared | 0.97 | 0.95 | 0.98 |
| Mean Pre-Split | 0.835 | 0.838 | 0.842 |
| SD Pre-Split | 0.236 | 0.208 | 0.183 |

Notes: Table reports point estimate results from Equation (3) in Section 4 plotted in Figure 8. All Columns include district and state-time fixed effects. Controls interacted with time fixed effects include ln(area), ln(distance to parent town hall), ln(distance to state capital), soil suitability for maize, wet rice, soybean, and wheat, terrain ruggedness, and ln(Luminosity) in 1992. Standard errors clustered at the microregion level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D.6: Oster (2019) Correction

| | Baseline | β | | | δ |
|-----------------------------------|----------|---------|------|------|----------|
| Applicant: Post \times Split | .33 | .17 | .17 | .18 | .12 |
| Remaining: Post \times Split | .007 | -4.63 | -.99 | -.54 | -.03 |
| Headquarters: Post \times Split | .014 | -.03 | -.08 | 1.06 | .38 |
| δ | | 1 | 2 | 5 | |
| β | | | | | 0 |
| R_{max} | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Notes: Results from the procedure proposed by Oster (2019) for estimates from Equation (3).


Table D.7: Robustness for Applicant Districts

| | Baseline (1) | No Controls (2) | ln(Luminosity) (3) | Only 97 Wave (4) | More FEs (5) | Cluster at State (6) |
|---------------------|-------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|
| Post x Split | 0.33*** (0.07) | 0.34*** (0.05) | 0.33*** (0.10) | 0.34** (0.13) | 0.23*** (0.07) | 0.33*** (0.08) |
| Observations | 10,122 | 10,122 | 9,616 | 4,920 | 10,122 | 10,122 |
| R-squared | 0.97 | 0.96 | 0.96 | 0.97 | 0.98 | 0.97 |
| State-Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | - | ✓ |
| Controls-Time FE | ✓ | - | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Microregion-Year FE | - | - | - | - | ✓ | - |
| Mean Pre-Split | -0.76 | -0.76 | -1.02 | -0.69 | -0.76 | -0.76 |
| SD Pre-Split | 1.52 | 1.52 | 2.09 | 1.51 | 1.52 | 1.52 |


Notes: Table reports point estimate results from Equation (3). All Columns include district fixed effects. Controls interacted with time fixed effects include ln(area), ln(distance to parent town hall), ln(distance to state capital), soil suitability for maize, wet rice, soybean, and wheat, terrain ruggedness, and ln(luminosity) in 1992. Standard errors clustered at the microregion level in parentheses, except when stated otherwise. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure D.3: Distribution of Federal Transfers


(a) % Transfers from Municipality Revenues 1991




(b) Transfers Gini 1991 (bottom 50% get $\approx 26\%$)




(c) Group Shares After Split Waves



(d) Federal Transfers Change by Group




(e) Federal Transfers Change for Non-Split Municipalities, 1997 Wave Split, State Level




Notes: Figures describing patterns of revenues from federal transfers (*Fundo de Participação dos Municípios*) over time, as described in Section 2. Panel (a) describes the disproportionate share of municipal revenues from federal transfers for small municipalities in 1991. Panel (b) plots the distribution of federal transfers in 1991. Panel (c) plots the reallocation of law-implied federal transfers after the 1993 and 1997 split waves. Panel (d) shows how the gains in revenues from federal transfers accrue particularly to small new municipalities. Panel (e) shows the within-state reallocation of federal transfers from non-split to new municipalities after the 1997 split wave.

Figure D.4: Education Outcomes - Raw Data




Notes: Panels (a) and (b) display the raw data, relative to Figure 5, by treatment (split) vs. control (almost split), year and age group. Main data sources are the Demographic Census microdata from of 1991, 2000 and 2010. Questions about educational attainment are only asked for individuals age 5 or older.

Figure D.5: Crowd-out of Nonprofit Jobs in Education




Notes: Results from estimation of Equation (1) in Section 4. Main data source is the *Relação Anual de Informações Sociais* (RAIS) data set for 1995 to 2018. We classify jobs and establishments according to sector with information from the *Classificação Nacional de Atividades Econômicas* (CNAE) and *Classificação Brasileira de Ocupações* (CBO). Controls interacted with time fixed effects include number of districts in 1991, $\ln(\text{population})$ in 1991, % urban in 1991, $\ln(\text{area})$, $\ln(\text{distance to state capital})$, $\ln(\text{income p.c.})$ in 1991, and HHI for race and religion in 1991. Bars represent the 95%-confidence intervals.

Figure D.6: Change in Federal Transfers x Distance to Town Hall




Notes: Figure plots a binned scatter across (i) % growth in luminosity over 15 years and (ii) % reduction in distance to town hall after split. Controls include state fixed effects, $\ln(\text{area})$, $\ln(\text{distance to state capital})$, soil suitability for maize, wet rice, soybean, and wheat, terrain ruggedness, $\ln(\text{luminosity})$ in 1992.

Figure D.7: Divergent Political Preferences



Notes: Figure plots the percentage of municipalities where applicant and headquarters districts elected mayors from different parties after the split. Data on elections is only available at the municipality level. Therefore, we only plot trends for municipalities that split.

Figure D.8: Long-Term Within-State Spillovers



Notes: Figure reports correlations between changes in federal transfers and outcomes for non-split municipalities at the state level after residualizing for region dummies. Outcomes are percentage changes 15 years after the split wave. Samples exclude the states *Distrito Federal* and *Roraima*.

E Details for Regression-Discontinuity in Federal Transfers

As we described in Section 2, the FPM revenues are first given in fixed blocks to states and, second, allocated to municipalities within state through a coefficient rule based on population size. More precisely, define FPM_m^s as the amount of federal transfers received by municipality m in state s in a given year. The allocation mechanism formula is the following:

$$FPM_m^s = FPM^s \frac{\lambda_m}{\sum_{m \in s} \lambda_m},$$

in which FPM^s is the amount of federal transfers allocated to state s . λ_m is the FPM coefficient of municipality m based on its population. The fraction $\frac{\lambda_m}{\sum_{m \in s} \lambda_m}$ is the share of state FPM transfers (FPM^s) allocated to municipality m in state s in a given year.

The coefficients λ_m mark a series of population cutoffs. For simplicity, we restrict our attention the first discontinuity (10,189 inhabitants) since it closely approximates the bracket in which the majority of our sample of new municipalities are located. Using a sample of municipalities described in Section 3.1.3, we estimate a regression discontinuity for selected outcomes expressed in log: total number of public jobs, establishments, total number of private jobs, and average luminosity. We compare municipalities barely located to the left (receive less federal transfers) and barely to the right (more transfers) of the population threshold. In particular, we consider the following specification:

$$y_{mt} = \alpha_m + \alpha_t + g(P_{m,t-1}) + \beta T_{mt} + \varepsilon_{mt} \quad (18)$$

in which y_{mt} represents outcomes for municipality m in year t . We include municipality and year fixed effects α_m and α_t . The function $g(\cdot)$ controls for linear polynomials of lagged population $P_{m,t-1}$, and T_{mt} indicates whether a municipality is treated for being located to the right of the population cutoff. Standard errors ε_{mt} are clustered at the microregion level.


Table E.8: Effects of Federal Transfers - Regression Discontinuity

| | ln(Transfers) (millions) (1) | ln(Public Jobs) (2) | ln(Estab.) (3) | ln(Private Jobs) (4) | ln(Luminosity) (5) |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|
| RD Estimate | 0.13*** (0.03) | 0.06 (0.10) | -0.04 (0.11) | -0.15 (0.15) | -0.00 (0.16) |
| Observations | 1,741 | 1,964 | 2,044 | 2,042 | 2,357 |
| State-Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Optimal Bandwidth (%) | 4 | 4.9 | 6.2 | 3.5 | 3.8 |

Notes: Results from estimation of Equation (18) in Section 5.3. Standard errors clustered at the microregion level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

F Details for Difference-in-Discontinuities in Luminosity

Figure F.9: Referendums in *Minas Gerais*




Notes: This figure plots data at the district level with the sample restricted to applicants. Panel (a) plots the binned first stage of referendum votes on likelihood of splitting. Panel (b) plots the frequency of referendum vote shares. As described in Section 2, districts required a unilateral referendum with at least 50% turnout and votes in favor as one of necessary steps for splitting.

Table F.9: Discontinuity Test on Covariates

| VARIABLES | (1) ln(Population) | (2) ln(Area) | (3) ln(Luminosity) | (4) ln(Dist. Parent TH) |
|----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|
| Referendum Vote \geq 50% | 0.57 (0.44) | 0.18 (0.75) | 1.87 (2.57) | -0.05 (0.53) |
| Observations | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 |
| R-squared | 0.48 | 0.23 | 0.26 | 0.13 |
| Mean | 3.120 | 5.706 | -4.102 | 3.120 |
| SD | 0.631 | 0.947 | 3.311 | 0.631 |

Notes: Estimates from Equation (4) in Section 4.6. Standard errors clustered at the microregion level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure F.10: Difference-in-Discontinuities



Notes: Results from estimation described in Section 4.6. Panel (a) plots the growth in $\ln(0.1 + \text{Luminosity})$ for applicant districts below and above the plebiscite approval cutoff of 50%. Panel (b) plots the Differences-in-Discontinuities results. Each set of coefficients is from one differences-in-differences equation, one for applicant and another for remaining districts. Controls interacted with time fixed effects include $\ln(\text{area})$, $\ln(\text{distance to parent town hall})$, $\ln(\text{distance to state capital})$, soil suitability for maize, wet rice, soybean, and wheat, terrain ruggedness, and $\ln(\text{Luminosity})$ in 1992. Bars represent the 95%-confidence intervals clustered at the microregion level.

Table F.10: Fuzzy Difference-in-Discontinuities on $\ln(0.1 + \text{Luminosity})$

| | First Stage (1) | Reduced Form (2) | Second Stage (3) | DD (4) |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| Referendum Vote $\geq 50\%$ | 0.96*** (0.18) | | | |
| Post x Referendum Vote $\geq 50\%$ | | 0.16*** (0.05) | | |
| Post x Split | | | 0.22*** (0.05) | 0.17*** (0.02) |
| Observations | 50 | 985 | 985 | 2,422 |
| R-squared | 0.64 | 0.98 | 0.98 | 0.98 |
| District FE | - | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Controls-Year FE | - | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Mean | 0.88 | -0.82 | -0.82 | -0.6 |
| SD | 0.39 | 1.83 | 1.83 | 1.94 |

Notes: Estimates from Equations (4) and (5) in Section 4.6. Standard errors clustered at the microregion level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.