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# The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description

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*Dealing with questions of war and peace and understanding the causes of interstate conflict is a primary goal of the field of international relations. In order to study interstate conflict in a rigorous manner, scholars have relied on established rules and procedures for gathering information into coherent data sets. Among those data sets is the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data. In this paper we first outline the data-collection process for the MID3 data. Second, we introduce two new data sets emerging from the project, "MID-I" and "MID-IP." Third, we present relatively small changes in coding rules for the new MID3 data and some descriptive statistics. The statistics indicate that the MID3 data are remarkably similar to the MID2.1 version, varying in some minor and predictable ways.*

**Keywords**    MID, militarized interstate dispute, conflict, data set

Questions of war and peace form the heart of analyses of international relations, and understanding the causes of interstate conflict is the main objective of the field. In order to study interstate conflict rigorously, scholars have relied on established rules and procedures for gathering information into coherent data sets that can be used to address a number of different questions. Data sets that comprise instances of conflict are the beginning point for serious study in the discipline. Among those data sets, the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data "is widely used by the scholarly community . . . and now clearly surpasses all other international conflict data sets combined. . . . MID data has also been a central part of a wide variety of studies, many of these central to the key theoretical debates in international relations research" (Diehl et al., 1999).

Two previous versions of the data set (referred to as "MID1" and "MID2.1") were compiled for disputes that occurred from 1816 to 1976 and from 1816 to 1992, respectively (see Gochman & Maoz, 1984; Jones, Bremer, & Singer, 1996). The newest version, MID3, extends the dispute data from January 1, 1993 through December 31, 2001. MID3 also

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provides two new data sets that were unavailable in the previous versions. Specifically, the newest data provide information on the militarized incidents that comprise disputes as well as information on the participants in those incidents.

This paper has three goals. First, we want to outline the data-collection process for the MID3 data. Second, we present relatively small changes in coding rules for the new MID3 data and some descriptive statistics. The statistics indicate that the MID3 data is remarkably similar to the MID2.1 version, varying in some minor and predictable ways. Third, we introduce two new data sets emerging from the project, "MID-I" and "MID-IP." The first of these contains records of the militarized incidents that comprise MIDs, while the second consists of information on the participants in those incidents.

## The MID3 Project: An Overview

The aim of the MID3 project was to develop and disseminate two basic sets of data. The first set was the update of the militarized interstate disputes from 1993 through the end of 2001. This dispute data, as was the case for MID2.1, consisted of two data sets, the dispute data (MIDA) and the participant data (MIDB). The second major data set is new to this update and consists of the incidents that make up the MIDs. This data, again, is made up of two data sets, the incident data (MID-I) and the participant data (MID-IP).

The MID3 Project that gathered the information for the data sets was a unique arrangement. It was supported by eleven individual but coordinated grants from the National Science Foundation to co-Principal Investigators (PIs) at different research centers. The director of the overall project, Stuart A. Bremer, was located at Penn State University, at what was referred to as "MID Central."[1] Bremer and his research assistants (Archana Bhandari and Faten Ghosn) were responsible for processing and aggregating the data gathered by the research centers. They also ran the MID3 website, which operated a forum for discussion among the researchers concerning issues that emerged during the project.[2] Additionally, Scott Bennett at Penn State did much of the work preparing the data for public dissemination, for constructing the dyadic MID data set, and for coordinating much of the research into problematic disputes that led to slight revisions of the MID prior to 1993.[3]

Eleven co-PIs were responsible for gathering and coding information on militarized interstate action in specific geographical regions. These researchers and their areas of responsibility were: Paul Diehl (Far East); Daniel Geller (South Asia); Doug Gibler (Saharan Africa); Charles Gochman (Middle East); Paul Hensel (Central and South America); Zeev Maoz (Middle East); Glenn Palmer (Central and Eastern Europe); Brian Pollins (North America); James Lee Ray (Sub-Saharan Africa); Patrick Regan (Oceania); and

[1]It is impossible to exaggerate Stuart Bremer's importance to the MID3 project. It is fair to say that without his careful preparation of the project, direction in the construction of the coding rules, creation of the computer software that managed the data, guidance in the processing of the data, and leadership in virtually all phases, the project would never have been attempted, much less completed. Bremer's death in October 2002, as the project was reaching its conclusion, deprived him of the opportunity of seeing his central professional concern of several years come to fruition. All users of the MID3 data set are in his debt.

[2]This forum was open to the public during the project. An abbreviated version of the forum will be made available at a later date.

[3]Bennett was assisted by Hilde Ravlo and Faten Ghosn. The updated and corrected set of disputes from 1816–2001 is available on the COW2 website in version 3.021.

Richard Stoll (Western Europe).[4] These colleagues, along with their research assistants, were responsible for gathering information about militarized incidents involving states in their regions. In cases where incidents occurred between states in different regions, the PIs from all involved regions coded the incidents.

After receipt of the grant, an initial organizing meeting was held in Champaign-Urbana, Illinois in the summer of 2000. Procedures were established for collecting, coding, and managing the information regarding the incidents. Work to gather the data began almost immediately thereafter.

The main search engine used was the Academic Universe (Lexus/Nexus) database, which provided a variety of news sources (general news, world news, and wire services) that were used to code the incidents. The main sources that were utilized were the *New York Times* index and *Facts on File*. The main procedure adopted by each region was to first enter into the search engine a dyad or state name along with the date range, and to then scan the headlines to identify those that appeared to be about possible militarized incidents. The next step was to review and print the selected stories in order to complete an incident coding form for each action. The information gathered included the actor(s) and target, the incident date and type, as well as issue type, location description, fatalities of actor(s) and target, and source information. Generally speaking, after completing the incident code sheets, coders met with their PIs to discuss the incidents. The coded incidents were then entered into a data archive through the MID3 website.

The next step was for MID Central to review the incidents that had been entered. When reviewing the incidents, MID Central generally looked first at the summary description of the action to check if the action qualified as a militarized incident. Also checked were such things as whether the incident type and issue type that were coded were consistent with the history of the events as provided. MID Central also sought to determine that the start dates and end dates of the incident, as well as the actor(s) and target, corresponded to the source information. After review, the incidents were categorized as either "OK Incidents" or "Incidents under Revision." Incidents in the latter category were investigated further by the regions to provide answers to specific questions or suggestions from MID Central. Examples of questions that were frequently asked by MID Central were related to start dates and end dates of incidents; whether or not the target protested a border violation or an attack by one state on rebels in their territories; whether nominal threats were specific enough to be coded; what the estimated fatality range might be; and whether there were revisionist issues. After each region reviewed the questions, the incidents were sent back to MID Central to be approved.

The original plan was for one year to be spent on the first phase of the project, gathering information on militarized incidents. The second phase, which was also to last one year, was to aggregate the incidents into disputes. As it happened, the initial phase took longer than anticipated and the regions completed their tasks at different times. Some regions witnessed comparatively fewer militarized incidents, while others frequently observed several conflicts simultaneously. Table 1 shows the geographic region of the militarized disputes between 1993 and 2001. As can be seen, there were more disputes in Asia (71) than in any other region. Two parts of the world that are often viewed as particularly volatile saw fewer interstate

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[4]The PIs were more than ably aided by their research assistants. They were: J. Michael Greig (for Diehl); Zhang Wanfa, Randolph Jones, Samuel Nailling, and James Carruth (for Geller); John Cotter (for Gibler); Burcu Savun, Liying Ren, and June Park (for Gochman); Michael Allison and Kursad Turan (for Hensel); Lesley Terris (for Maoz); Dennis Foster, Diane Dutka, and David Sobek (for Palmer); Kevin Sweeney and Amy Oakes (for Pollins); Greg Casteel, Brandon Valeriano, Karen Petersen, and Hilde Ravlo (for Ray); Odul Celep (for Regan); and Navin Bapat, Xiang Zhou, Alistair Baldwin, and Eric Carr (for Stoll).

**TABLE 1**  Distribution of MIDs by region

| Region | # of MIDs |
| --- | --- |
| Africa | 63 |
| Europe | 65 |
| Asia | 71 |
| Western Hemisphere | 40 |
| Middle East | 52 |
| Oceania | 5 |

disputes. Africa had the third most interstate disputes (63), followed by the Middle East (52). Oceania, as expected, experienced the smallest number of disputes (about 1%).[5]

As a result of this regionally unequal distribution of interstate conflict, the aggregation of incidents into disputes began later than was initially anticipated, though the process went quickly. Much of the aggregation was completed by the summer of 2002, though difficulties with specific and complex cases delayed completion of the aggregation of the MID data until March 2003. Checking and cleaning of the incident data were completed in August of that year.

## The Updated MIDs

In this section we outline the MID data sets. We do so by presenting the changes in coding rules from the previous MID data set, clarifying some of the implications of the coding rules, presenting the new variables in the data set, and, last, providing some descriptive statistics of the new data set.

### Coding Rules Changes

There were several changes to the coding rules adopted for the MID3 Project. Unless otherwise noted, the dispute coding rules discussed in the Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996) (henceforth, JBS) paper obtain.

A new type of action, "threat to join an ongoing war," was added. This is defined as "the threat by one state to join the opposing side of an inter-, extra-, or intra-state war in which another state is currently involved" (Incident Coding Manual, 5).[6]

The MID2.1 data set coded a "threat to use nuclear weapons." That has been replaced by a "threat to use CBR," which is "the threat by one state to use chemical, bacteriological, and/or radiological weapons against the territory, or forces of another state" (ICM, 5). There are, in actuality, no recorded instances of either of these actions in the MID3 data sets.

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[5]A few pairs of states account for a good portion of the interstate disputes in these regions. The majority of the Asian disputes are between North Korea, South Korea, and the United States; China, Taiwan, and the United States; Japan and North Korea; and India and Pakistan. European disputes mainly involved NATO allies and Yugoslavia, as well as disputes between Greece and Turkey. In the Middle East, disputes involving Iraq, Kuwait, and the Western allies represent the majority of the disputes, followed by disputes between Turkey and Iraq. As for Africa, Sudan and Uganda as well as Rwanda and Uganda witnessed the largest number of disputes. The majority of disputes in the Western Hemisphere (about 85%) were in Latin America; disputes between Honduras and Nicaragua were particularly numerous.

[6]We refer to the Incident Coding Manual as "ICM," and the Dispute Coding Manual as "DCM" hereafter.

**TABLE 2** Changes in outcome coding rules

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**Victory**. A victory is defined by the favorable outcome achieved by one state through the use of militarized action that imposes military defeat upon the opponent. It denotes either the attainment or the protection through direct force of a tangible piece of territory; or a change in, or protection of, a specific policy, political regime, or some other goal. A victory can be identified whenever one or more state(s) are able to secure a favorable outcome through the direct application of successful military actions.

**Yield**. A yield is defined by the submission by one state to the demands made by another state, other than those directly attributable to the threat, display, or use of military force. As an outcome of a MID, a yield can be identified whenever one state capitulates by offering concessions that appease the demands of another state before the militarized forces of either state have secured any substantial tactical gains on the battlefield.

**Stalemate**. A stalemate is defined by the lack of any decisive changes in the predispute status quo and is identified when the outcome does not decisively favor either side in the dispute. Stalemates may occur even if the status quo has changed so long as net balance results in an approximate draw.

**Compromise**. A compromise is defined as a situation in which each side in the dispute agrees to give up some demands or make concessions to the other. A compromise is identified whenever actors on both sides of a dispute agree to divide the spoils roughly equally, and hence redefine the status quo, or agree to settle their differences amicably and accept the current status quo.

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In MID2.1, distinctions were made between shows of troops, ships, and planes. This distinction was discarded in MID3, as troop, ship, and plane displays in combination are frequently encountered, and the distinction is not terribly meaningful in any event.

MID2.1 coded the "use of regular armed forces of a state to fire upon the armed forces, population or territory of another state" as "Raids." This action is now referred to, more accurately, as an "Attack."

There are some minor changes in coding rules for the "Outcome" variable. The definitions of four outcomes have been changed slightly and are reported in Table 2. The idea underlying these alterations is to make changes in the *status quo ante* less central to identifying the "winning" side. A reinforcement of the *status quo ante* may be sufficient for one side's victory. As an example, MID 3957, the first Gulf War, started as a dispute in May 1990 between Iraq (as the initiator) and Kuwait. That disputed ended on March 3, 1991, with a victory for Side B, a group that consisted of twenty-three countries. The *status quo ante* of an independent Kuwait was reinforced and protected in the outcome. This is distinguishable from a "stalemate" where the outcome may be similar to the *status quo ante*, but neither side can be said to be favored by the outcome.[7]

### *Coding Rule Clarifications*

There were no significant changes made in coding rules regarding the "settlement type." We want to stress, however, that the settlement type is generally restricted to the termination of

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[7]There are numerous examples of stalemates, but a typical one is MID 4332. In February 1994, Hungary put its border guards on alter, fearing a reprisal from neighboring Yugoslavia in reaction to the anticipated bombing campaign against that country by Western forces. No action by Yugoslavia against Hungary occurred, however, thus leading to the dispute being coded a stalemate.

**TABLE 3** Revisionist and Side A states

| | Revisionist | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | No | Yes |
| State on Side B | 287 | 93 |
| State on Side A | 185 | 232 |

the militarized dispute, not necessarily to the resolution of the underlying issue or issues. Negotiations may have been ongoing at the termination of militarized activity (that is, at the end of the MID), but unless those negotiations either directly led to the cessation of militarized incidents or were successfully concluded within six months of the last such incident, those negotiations were not reflected in the "settlement type" variable. Thus, for instance, 79% of the MIDs since 1992 are coded as having no settlement (the figure from the MID2.1 data set is 74%) and 9% are coded as having a negotiated settlement.

A revisionist state in a dispute "must demonstrate through its behavior a desire to change the status quo in a significant way. It is possible for there to be no revisionist states in a dispute, and it is also possible for revisionist states to be on both sides of a dispute" (DCM, 6). Identification of the revisionist state is not based on judgments regarding the "aggressor" in the dispute or the state that raised the political issue under discussion, but is based on the behavior of the states in the related militarized incidents. Both sides in a dispute can be coded as revisionist states. However, for each state to qualify as a revisionist state it must openly attempt to challenge the predispute conditions by (1) making claims to a specific territory, (2) attempting to overthrow a regime, or (3) changing or not abiding by another state's policy (JBS, 178). While revisionist states tend to be on "Side A"—the side that took the first militarized action—that is not always the case. Table 3 shows the breakdown of the 797 participants in the MIDs since 1993 according to whether they were on Side A and whether they are coded as "revisionist." As the table shows, 55.6% (232/417) of the Side A states were revisionist, while about 24% (93/380) of the states on Side B were revisionist.

At the MID level, of course, there may be situations where only Side A is coded as revisionist, only Side B is so coded, both sides are identified as revisionist, or neither is revisionist. An example of a dispute where neither side is revisionist is MID 4005, which took place between Bangladesh and India on June 25, 1996. While a repair crewman from India was working on the embankment of the Muhari River he was fired upon by Bengali troops on the opposite riverbank. Indian border security forces returned gunfire, and the exchange between the two troops lasted for about two hours. This MID was coded as having no revisionist issue since there was no apparent issue involving territorial control, regime policy, or any other issue for which one side is challenging the other. Table 4 shows the number and percentage of MIDs that are in each of these four categories for the 1816–1992 and 1993–2001 periods. As can be seen, the percentage of disputes where only Side A is revisionist is lower in the latter period than in the former.

The revisionist variable is sometimes used in conjunction with the Side A variable to identify which side was responsible for "initiating" the dispute. We wish to caution against misinterpretations of identification of the "initiator."[8] The state or states on Side A on the first day of the dispute are simply the first states to take codeable military action. They

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[8]"Initators" are commonly identified as being on Side A on a dispute's first day, though the stipulation that Side A be the revisionist side is at times added.

**TABLE 4** Revisionists and sides

|  | Revisionist side | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | Side A | Side B | Neither | Both |
| 1993–2001 | 144 | 45 | 63 | 43 |
|  | (49%) | (15%) | (21%) | (15%) |
| 1816–1992 | 1240 | 206 | 366 | 224 |
|  | (61%) | (10%) | (18%) | (11%) |

should not be interpreted to be the states that "started" the conflict, or that are responsible for the conflict. For instance, in MID 61 (Cuban Missile Crisis) the United States is coded as the initiator of the dispute because on January 28, 1962 (and continuing through until December of that year), it engaged in a show of planes against Cuba and the Soviet Union. This incident was followed by a Soviet show of troops on July 29, a use of force by Cuba on August 30, leading up to the U.S. blockade on October 24. (The deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba is not considered a militarized action under the coding rules.) Since these incidents involve the same set of actors, are within a six-month period of each other in the same location, and concern the same issue, they are aggregated into the same dispute. Another example is MID 258 (which culminated in WWII), in which Poland is coded as the initiator, since on March 25, 1939 it mobilized its troops against Germany. This incident was followed by a threat from the United Kingdom and France against Germany on March 31, a mobilization of German troops against Poland in July, ultimately leading to war in September.

Frequently, uncoded statements and/or actions may precede the beginning of the militarized dispute. To make this point, we provide an only slightly fictionalized version of an international experience between two states, with the actions presented chronologically. Consider the following set of interactions:

(a) Country A alleges that Country B has developed territorial designs on an uninhabited island located between them that A claims and that B had not previously sought. A says that B intends to use military force to occupy the island and that A will protect the island from outside aggression.
(b) B denies the allegation and says that any territorial disagreement should be brought before an international tribunal. B says it will rebuff aggression from any state against its interests.
(c) A tests a missile capable of reaching B from A's homeland. The test is a success. B denounces the test and calls it provocative.
(d) B counters with a successful test of its own missile that can reach A from B's homeland. A calls the test an "act of war."
(e) A says it will not allow B to establish hegemony in the region. Such an attempt would result in "unimaginable devastation."
(f) A undertakes planned *routine* military maneuvers in the waters separating it from B.
(g) B sends a ship to the island. A issues a formal protest.
(h) A lands troops on the island, unopposed.

The MID data set codes act (g) as the first militarized action in this dispute, so that B is the "initiator." The last act, A's show of force, is also a codable militarized action. None of the others are. (Weapons tests and routine maneuvers do not count as militarized actions, and threats must be specific regarding the threatened response and the action to

be deterred before they are coded.) B would also be coded as revisionist, as its militarized action indicated dissatisfaction with the status quo that existed prior to the onset of the dispute. While it is true that B is the "initiator" of the dispute (in that it took the first militarized action), one must take care not to infer from that designation that B was the state that "started it all." Further, several disputes began with a "clash"; in such cases it is often difficult or even impossible to determine which state acted first, and the assignment of one state to Side A is arbitrary. In sum, one must be cautious when using the "initiator" variable, for it may be misleading to assume that the state that took the first codable militarized action is in fact the instigator of that MID.

### New Variables

There are three sets of new variables coded in the new MIDA (dispute) data, and two sets in the MIDB (participant) data. First, in MIDA and MIDB, the precise number of military fatalities is recorded, if known. Second, MIDA has three "link" variables, which record the ID numbers of the three most temporally proximate related MIDs. Of the MIDs since 1992, 80% have at least one linked MID, 60% have at least two, and almost 45% have three. Last, MIDA includes a variable that indicates whether a dispute was ongoing as of December 31, 2001. There are three such disputes: 4182 (ISR-LEB), 4277 (IND-PAK), and 4320 (GRC-TUR).

The MIDB data set now records the two types of revisions sought by the participants in a dispute, where "Revision Type #1" records the state's most important revision, in the coder's judgment. (The types of revisions are unchanged from MID2.1.) With respect to the ordering of the revisionist issues, each coder made a judgment, based on the incidents involved in the MID and their knowledge of the dispute, as to which issue was the most prominent in the dispute. Of the 797 recorded MID participants since 1992, 59% are coded as seeking no revisions and about 7% are coded as seeking two types of revisions. The most common types of revisions sought are in policy and in territory (54% and 33% of existing first revision types, respectively). A common type of "policy" revision merits particular mention. There are several instances in the data of State A fighting rebels located in State B's territory, where the rebels do not enjoy support of State B and may in fact be operating contrary to the wishes of State B. If State B protests A's incursion, we code State A as taking the first militarized action and as revisionist, with its revision type as "policy." Under the coding rules, A is attempting to alter B's policy of tolerating the presence of rebels on its soil. This coding rule is consistent with the prior MID data set, though the frequency of its occurrence may be higher than previously observed.

### Descriptive Statistics

The project coded 296 MIDs that began between January 1, 1993 and December 31, 2001. The coding rules that guided the gathering and aggregation of information were, for the most part, identical to the coding rules used in the construction of MID2.1. (See JBS for a full description of those coding rules.[9]) A look at some of the descriptive statistics of the two data sets supports the contention that the new MID data set and the older version are very comparable. First, as can be seen from the distribution of the disputes across the time period shown in Table 5, the disputes are relatively evenly distributed across time, with the exception of 1998. The mean number of new MIDs per year is 32.9, very similar to

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[9]We have included in the Appendix a list of candidate disputes that for one reason or another were not included in the final set of MIDs. That list is meant to provide a better understanding of the implementation of the coding rules.

**TABLE 5** Distribution of MIDs
by beginning year

| Start year | # of MIDs |
| --- | --- |
| 1993 | 35 |
| 1994 | 37 |
| 1995 | 36 |
| 1996 | 34 |
| 1997 | 37 |
| 1998 | 21 |
| 1999 | 34 |
| 2000 | 28 |
| 2001 | 34 |

the mean number for the previous ten years (32.7), though with a much smaller standard deviation (1.7 vs. 4.6).

About 44% of the MIDs since 1992 were reciprocated, that is, the initially targeted side subsequently took a militarized action, compared to about 50% prior to 1993. Of the disputes since 1993, 89% were bilateral; 84% of the MIDs before 1993 were bilateral. About 84% of the dispute participants in the new data set are coded as having suffered no fatalities; the comparable number for the MID participants from 1816–1992 is 71.5%. Each of these descriptive statistics indicates, as one might expect, that the new MID data are capturing a slightly higher proportion of less intense militarized interaction than was the MID data set for the period 1816–1992. This conclusion is supported by a comparison of the proportion of MIDs that achieved various levels of hostility, as shown in Table 6. As one can see, the new data set codes a slightly higher proportion of "no militarized action" and displays of force, while having relatively fewer uses of force and war participation. This, again, is what one would expect, given that the coding of the older MIDs is reliant on historical records that may selectively emphasize more distant events.[10]

The duration of the disputes in the MID3 data set is similar to the duration of disputes in the older data. Table 7 shows the distribution of disputes in the two data sets according to their duration. The distributions are quite similar, though the percentages of disputes that are short tend to be greater for the more recent disputes, unsurprisingly. About 61% of the recent disputes last a month or less; about 51% the disputes from 1816 to 1992 lasted that long.

The MID3 data set also allows us to explore whether there is a relationship between the type of revision sought by participants in the disputes and the level of fatalities suffered. Past work has shown that the existence of territorial claims increases the likelihood of militarized confrontation and that disputes involving territorial issues are more likely to escalate (Vasquez, 1993; Senese, 1996; Hensel, 1996; Vasquez & Henehan, 2001; Senese & Vasquez, 2003). We are not able, within the confines of the data set, to address whether territorial claims increase the likelihood of MIDs, but we can do a simple analysis to see whether the relationship between the goals of the dispute participants is related to the severity of their disputes. It would be useful to see whether the pattern that has been found up to 1992 has support for the 1993–2001 period as well.

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[10]It is, of course, possible, that conflict in the 1993–2001 period differs from that in the previous era for a variety of reasons. For instance, the collapse of the Soviet Union conceivably altered the nature of some interstate conflict sufficiently for there to be a change in the descriptive statistics as we have presented them. Investigating such hypotheses goes beyond the scope of the current article.

**TABLE 6** Hostility levels and dispute participants

|  | Proportion of participants, 1993–2001 (%) | Proportion of participants, 1816–1992 (%) |
|---|---|---|
| No militarized action | 29.7 | 24.6 |
| Threat of force | 3.9 | 4.9 |
| Display of force | 30.1 | 19.8 |
| Use of force | 34.3 | 44.4 |
| War | 2.0 | 6.3 |

*Note*: We have taken the MID2.1 coding of missing data to mean "no militarized action." There is no direct coding in that data set for "no militarized action."

To identify the most important issue for a state involved in a dispute, we ran two identical analyses, one for the 1816–1992 data and one using the 1993–2001 disputes. We used the Revision Type (REVTYPE1) variable from the new MID data set to identify the issue that was of greatest importance to the MID participant; we identified the issue of importance to the dispute participants in the 1816–1992 period using the "Revision type" variable in the MID2.1 data set. We used this information to create two dummy variables. The first, Territory, is coded 1 if the issue thus defined was territorial, and zero otherwise; a second variable, Policy, was similarly coded if the issue at stake was policy.[11] Disputes with other or no revision types are in the excluded category. Our dependent variables are the "Fatality"[12] variables in the MIDB2.1 and MIDB3 data sets. As this variable has seven ordered categories,[13] we used ordered probit in the analysis. The results are shown in Table 8.

As the negative coefficients on the Policy variable show, dispute participants that have policy goals are likely to suffer fewer fatalities than if they do not have such goals. On the other hand, states involved in militarized conflict and that have territorial goals are likely to incur greater fatalities. The precise effects of these variables are difficult to see from the coefficients, however, and so we present the predicted probabilities of a disputant with different goals falling into the various categories for the two data sets in Table 9.

As the table shows, disputants that have territorial goals are significantly more likely to suffer fatalities than are disputants with policy goals or no goals of either type, and this is true for both periods investigated. To highlight just a couple of points, in the 1816–1992 and 1993–2001 periods, disputants with territorial revisions are, respectively, about 3.5 and 2.7 times more likely to suffer any fatalities in a dispute than are those with policy goals. In those two periods, states acting toward territorial goals are, respectively, about 6.5 and 5 times more likely to suffer more than 1,000 fatalities than disputants pursuing policy revisions. The strength of the overall effect of territorial goals may be somewhat less in the more recent period (though much more sophisticated analysis will be needed to determine that conclusively), but territory remains an issue that greatly increases the severity of militarized conflict.

[11]In the 1816–1992 data, about 16.2% of the states involved in MIDs had "territorial" goals, while 22.3% had "policy" goals. In the 1993–2001 data, about 13.6% of the participants had revision types that were territorial, and 22.1% were coded as having policy goals.

[12]Cases in which concrete numbers were not available for both sides an estimate of the range was provided.

[13]The seven categories are: (1) No fatalities; (2) 1–25 fatalities; (3) 26–100 fatalities; (4) 101–250 fatalities; (5) 251–500 fatalities; (6) 501–999 fatalities; and (7) more than 999 fatalities. We excluded from analysis the cases where fatality estimates were missing.

**TABLE 7** Dispute duration

|  | Proportion of MIDs, 1993–2001 (%) | Proportion of MIDs, 1816–1992 (%) |
|---|---|---|
| One week or less | 50.7 | 39.5 |
| 8–31 days | 10.1 | 11.2 |
| 32–61 days | 7.4 | 8.1 |
| 62–100 days | 5.4 | 7.4 |
| 101–365 days | 19.3 | 23.5 |
| More than 365 days | 7.1 | 10.1 |

*Note*: The table uses the estimated "minimum duration" from the MID2.1 and MID3 data sets.

The new MIDA and MIDB data sets are very comparable to the older versions, and researchers should not be hesitant to use the MID3 data set, which consists of the entire period from 1816–2001, and to draw inferences from the combined periods. The comparability of the data sets applies to both the coding rules and the procedures that led to the gathering and aggregation of information as well as to the distribution of cases across values of the variables.

One should not conclude from this that the period since 1992 is identical in all respects to what came before. Analysis of the MID3 data may tell us, most particularly, what changes have resulted in a variety of international conflict patterns since the fall of the Soviet Union.

**TABLE 8** Effect of revision type on fatality levels (ordered probit)

|  | Coefficients | |
|---|---|---|
| Variables | 1993–2001 | 1816–1992 |
| Policy | −0.144 | −0.493 |
|  | (.168) | (.062) |
| Territory | 0.426 | 0.376 |
|  | (.163) | (.055) |
| Cut1 | 1.34 | 0.864 |
|  | (.080) | (.028) |
| Cut2 | 1.99 | 1.27 |
|  | (.109) | (.031) |
| Cut3 | 2.21 | 1.47 |
|  | (.127) | (.034) |
| Cut4 | 2.37 | 1.55 |
|  | (.145) | (.035) |
| Cut5 | 2.48 | 1.63 |
|  | (.159) | (.037) |
| Cut6 | 2.73 | 1.7 |
|  | (.204) | (.038) |
| N | 745 | 4231 |
| Log-likelihood | −304.62 | −3105.23 |
| Chi-square(2) | 8.64 | 147.02 |

**TABLE 9** Predicted probabilities of fatality levels and revision types

| Fatality level | Dispute years | Revision type | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Territory | Policy | Neither |
| No fatalities | 1816–1992 | 0.687 | 0.912 | 0.806 |
| | 1993–2001 | 0.821 | 0.931 | 0.91 |
| 1–25 | 1816–1992 | 0.126 | 0.048 | 0.091 |
| | 1993–2001 | 0.120 | 0.052 | 0.066 |
| 26–100 | 1816–1992 | 0.049 | 0.014 | 0.031 |
| | 1993–2001 | 0.022 | 0.007 | 0.01 |
| 101–250 | 1816–1992 | 0.018 | 0.005 | 0.011 |
| | 1993–2001 | 0.011 | 0.003 | 0.005 |
| 251–500 | 1816–1992 | 0.015 | 0.004 | 0.009 |
| | 1993–2001 | 0.006 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| 501–999 | 1816–1992 | 0.013 | 0.003 | 0.007 |
| | 1993–2001 | 0.009 | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| More than 999 | 1816–1992 | 0.092 | 0.014 | 0.044 |
| | 1993–2001 | 0.011 | 0.002 | 0.003 |

The new data set, for instance, may be used to help determine whether the likelihood of conflict between civilizations is affected by the end of the Cold War (Huntington, 1993; Henderson, 1997; Bolks & Stoll, 2003; Russett, Oneal, & Cox, 2000) or whether the process of democratization increases the likelihood of a state's involvement in conflict (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995; Enterline, 1998; Ward & Gleditsch, 1998). It may also be useful to determine the extent to which the role of violent nonstate actors affects the relationship between and among states.

The main additions of the MID3 Project are two data sets containing information on the militarized incidents between and among states from 1993–2001. These new data sets contain much the same information as is provided in MIDA and MIDB, though the cases, coding rules, and interpretation of the data is different. We turn now to a discussion of those data sets.

## Incident Data

The incident data consists of two distinct data sets, which are analogous to MIDA and MIDB. The first, referred to as "MID-I," is the incident-level data, which provides information about the specific militarized interactions between members of the state system. The second data set, "MID-IP," contains records for each of the participants in each of the incidents. In the next section we define incidents and then move on to discuss how incidents were aggregated to MIDs. We then move on to provide some descriptive statistics of the incident data set.

### *Defining Incidents*

In this section we provide definitions for incidents as well as the coding rules for the variables in the data sets. Many of the definitions that directed the MID3 coding of incidents were set out in the MID2.1 data set, and we begin by summarizing the relevant sections of JBS.

A "militarized incident is defined as a single military action involving an explicit threat, display, or use of force by one system member state towards another system member state"

(JBS, 169). Incidents are the militarized acts that take place between states and that make up an interstate dispute: "Militarized incidents provide the building blocks from which each MID is constructed" (JBS, 169). Each dispute consists of at least one and often several incidents. Therefore, MIDs are a collection of one or more incidents.

Several criteria are involved in determining whether a particular action qualifies as an incident. For instance, a militarized incident must occur among two or more interstate system members. Generally, actions between a system member and the forces of a nonsystem member are not included; if, however, "another system member undertakes a militarized action or diplomatically protests actions taken by another state against a nonsystem member within its boundaries, a militarized incident between the two system members is said to exist" (JBS, 169). Moreover, a militarized incident is an overt action taken by the official military forces or government representatives of a state (head of state, foreign minister, etc.). Cases in which the military forces are disguised as nonregular forces or operate without the authorization of the government "are excluded unless and until further militarized incidents involving official forces take place, or when the targeted state responds—militarily or diplomatically—to the act in question" (JBS, 169–170).

Incidents are defined by the particular action that was undertaken by interstate members. These actions are divided into three main categories: threats of force, displays of force, and uses of force (Table 10). For each incident there is only one type, and if an event involves

**TABLE 10**  Incident types

| Action type |
| --- |
| Threats of force |
|    No militarized action |
|    Threat to use force |
|    Threat to blockade |
|    Threat to occupy territory |
|    Threat to declare war |
|    Threat to use CBR weapons |
|    Threat to join war |
| Displays of force |
|    Show of force |
|    Alert |
|    Nuclear alert |
|    Mobilization |
|    Border fortification |
|    Border violation |
| Uses of force |
|    Blockade |
|    Occupation of territory |
|    Seizure |
|    Attack |
|    Clash |
|    Declaration of war |
|    Use of CBR weapons |
|    Begin interstate war |
|    Join interstate war |
| Unsure |

two or more types of incidents, each is coded as a separate incident. For example, Croatian and Yugoslav soldiers clashed between October 20 and October 28, 1992, approximately 60 miles northwest of Bosnia's capital. Additionally, on October 28, Bosnia fortified its border with Croatia. Each of these two incidents (the clash and the border fortification) was coded separately.

Incidents are also defined by location. If, for example, two simultaneous clashes between A and B occur at different locations, the two events would be coded as separate incidents. As an example, on May 22, 1995 Israeli artillery bombarded villages in southern Lebanon, and on the same day Lebanese and Syrian army units fired antiaircraft guns at Israeli warplanes flying over the Baalbek in the eastern Bekka valley. Each incident was coded separately.

Incidents may overlap in time. For instance, an incident that is a clash may take place over several days, during which one of the participants may issue a threat; both clash and threat will be coded.

While each incident may have more than one actor, each incident may contain only one target. Thus, if A threatens B and C, two incidents would be coded, one between A and B and one between A and C. To illustrate this point, we provide the following examples. On June 18, 1998, six Turkish F-16 jet fighters flew over Southern Cyprus and landed at a Turkish air base in Northern Cyprus in response to the dispatch of four Greek fighter jets to Southern Cyprus two days earlier. The Turkish action is coded as two separate incidents: a show of force by Turkey against Cyprus and a show of force by Turkey against Greece.

Incidents are also characterized by the issue(s) involved. Issue types are classified into four categories for both incidents and disputes: (1) territorial issues, which are situations where the actor is attempting to gain control over a piece of territory that it claims but does not possess; (2) policy issues, which are cases when the actor seeks to change the policy behavior of the target; (3) regime issues, which center on the desire of the actor to change the government of the target; and (4) other, which includes any other major issue (ICM, 7). It is possible to have more than one issue type per incident, in which case the issues are ranked by their importance to the participants.[14]

The process of identifying the issues is somewhat different in MID2.1 and MID3. In the earlier data set, the apparent issue(s) at stake in a dispute were related to the goals of the revisionist state(s) and were coded only with respect to the participant's goal in the dispute. In MID3 there was an attempt to identify the main issue(s) that appeared to underlie each incident (ICM, 6). The revisionist state and issue(s) at stake were also identified at the MID level, though the coding at the incident and dispute level may be somewhat different. For instance, in MID 4092, both Greece and Turkey are coded as being revisionist, with policy being the primary revisionist issue followed by territory, since they were primarily clashing over maritime issues (which are defined as policy issues) in the Aegean Sea. However, some incidents within that dispute were only concerned with territorial claims over islets in the Aegean Sea. Therefore, a specific incident may involve an issue that differs from the primary issue for the dispute in which it is located.

A new coding rule was developed to cover those instances where international organizations or alliances were involved. In some cases, primarily involving Yugoslavia, for instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was active. There were occasional threats delivered on behalf of the entire organization and directed against Yugoslavia regarding its behavior in Kosovo. As threats require the unanimous agreement of the NATO membership, it was decided by the project that the threat would be coded as being made

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[14]To be consistent with MID2.1, fishing rights, oil rights, and other issues pertaining to water are classified as policy issues and not territorial.

by each of the member states. Occasionally, military actions (such as a blockade or an air strike) were carried out in NATO's name; in those instances, only those countries that directly participated in the action were coded as actors. Similarly, some actions (such as the 1991 war against Iraq) were taken under the auspices of the United Nations, and only those countries that directly participated are coded as actors. Resolutions regarding the threat or use of force passed in the United Nations, on the other hand, are not coded as militarized actions, as the UN does not have its own forces and is dependent on voluntary contributions and actions by its members. Further, unanimous agreement among the members of the UN is not required for such threats or uses in any event.

In MID2.1, only those incidents that represented "an escalation of hostility over their previous actions (in terms of the threat-display-use-war ladder)" (JBS, 1996, 172) were coded. In MID3, on the other hand, all militarized actions were coded, whether they were escalatory or de-escalatory. So for instance, in MID 4124 the highest action between Eritrea and Sudan was a clash and took place on the first day of the disputes. In MID2.1, no further actions would have been coded; in the 3.0 version, subsequent actions, such as the ensuing border fortification, were also coded.

An important aside is required here: this change in procedure for recording incidents does not alter coding of disputes. In MID2.1, to be specific, only the first instance of an action at each level of hostility is recorded. So, for instance, a mobilization (a display of force) may be followed by a border fortification (another display of force); only the first display is recorded (see JBS, 174, for an example). The second incident, even if uncoded, may nonetheless affect the coding of the dispute as a whole. This would happen in MID2.1 if the ending date of that second display comes to define the ending date of the dispute as a whole, which would be the case if the second display were to become the last militarized action in the dispute to end. In MID3, on the other hand, both displays are recorded. The ending date of the second display, for both MID2.1 and MID3, determines the ending date for the dispute. In other words, despite this change in the coding of incidents, dispute end dates are determined identically in the MID2.1 and MID3.

### Aggregating Incidents into Militarized Disputes

A MID is "a sequence of militarized incidents, each of which can be said to be potentially an outgrowth of, or a response to, one or more previous incidents" (JBS, 174). Several rules were employed in order to identify which incidents were part of a given MID. Essentially, all incidents within a dispute must involve the same or an overlapping set of interstate members, must be over the same issue or set of issues, must take place within the same set of geographic area (unless there was information that led us to believe that seemingly unconnected issues and locations were actually linked to one another), and must occur within a six-month period of each other (JBS, 175).

Table 11 shows the distribution of MIDs according to the number of incidents that comprise them. As the table shows, almost exactly one-half of the MIDs contain only one incident each, while slightly more than two-thirds have three incidents or fewer; about 11% of the disputes have more than ten incidents.

The start date of each MID is determined by the start date of the first militarized incident that occurred between the participants of the MID. The end date, on the other hand, is determined in several ways, mainly depending on the context of the termination and on whether the MID escalated into a war. First, most incidents end without an agreement between the participants. In these cases, if there was no other militarized incident for a period of six months, the end date of the MID is the end date of the last incident. Any subsequent incident between the same two participants would constitute a new dispute. Second are

**TABLE 11** Number of incidents per MID

| Number of incidents | Number of MIDs | Percentage |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 147 | 49.66 |
| 2 | 36 | 12.16 |
| 3 | 28 | 9.46 |
| 4 | 14 | 4.73 |
| 5 | 16 | 5.41 |
| 6 | 4 | 1.35 |
| 7 | 2 | 0.68 |
| 8 | 7 | 2.36 |
| 9 | 4 | 1.35 |
| 10 | 3 | 1.01 |
| 12 | 1 | 0.34 |
| 13 | 7 | 2.36 |
| 14 | 4 | 1.35 |
| 15 | 3 | 1.01 |
| 16 | 1 | 0.34 |
| 19 | 2 | 0.68 |
| 21 | 1 | 0.34 |
| 22 | 1 | 0.34 |
| 23 | 2 | 0.68 |
| 25 | 1 | 0.34 |
| 27 | 1 | 0.34 |
| 30 | 2 | 0.68 |
| Number of incidents >30 | 9 | 3.04 |
| Total | 296 | 100 |

disputes settled by a formal resolution. In these instances, the dispute is coded as ending on the ending date of the last incident if there are no further militarized interactions within one month of the resolution. If, however, another incident occurs within that one-month period, the dispute is continuing. Third, if an incident is settled by a cease-fire or mutual troop withdrawal and no subsequent militarized actions take place in the next three months, the end date of the MID is that of the cease-fire or withdrawal incident. The only exceptions to these are MIDs that contain incidents which could be considered as ongoing actions, such as a continuing blockade, occupation, or holding of seized personnel. Seizures are coded if they are either seizures of government material/property or seizures of private property only if the government of the seized private property protests the seizure. In such situations the coders look for the end date of the incident, but if that date is not discernable the incident is coded as lasting for six months. Seizures provide an exception: they are coded as lasting three days in the absence of further information. As for MIDs that end in a war, the end date of these MIDs is the end date of the war. Incidents, however, are not coded once a war has begun.

### Descriptive Statistics

We want to be careful about the distinctions between the incident and the dispute data sets. While the fact that disputes comprise incidents should present no conceptual difficulties,

**TABLE 12**  Dispute and incident Side A

| | Participant dispute Side A | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | Yes | No |
| Participant incident Side A | | |
| Yes | 2,111 | 568 |
| No | 559 | 1,568 |

some of the variables in the incident data set that are similar to the dispute may benefit from further explanation. A primary example of this regards the "Side A" variables in the two data sets.

The dispute and incident Side A variables are distinct. The dispute Side A variable indicates whether the state is on the side that took the first militarized action in the dispute. The incident Side A variable reflects whether the coded state was on the initiating side of the *incident*. There is, nonetheless, an empirical relationship between the two variables, as is shown in Table 12. As can be seen, almost 79% (2,111/2,679) of the incident Side A participants were on Side A of the dispute, though there are 568 cases (21%) where the initiator of the incident was not on the side of the dispute initiator. Certainly one reason for this strong relationship is that fully half (148 of 296) the disputes comprise a single incident. Nonetheless, researchers may find it useful to look at the behavior of the dispute Side B participants in subsequent incidents as an indication of dispute escalation. (See Palmer, London, and Regan, 2004, for an example of this.)

The actions that are coded in the incident data are the same as in the dispute data. The distribution of those actions differs across the two data sets, however. Table 13 shows the distribution of the incidents from 1993–2001 by the action taken and of the disputes in that same period by the highest action taken during the dispute. As the table shows, the modal action for the incidents is the "attack," with "show of force" and "border violations" next. The modal action for the disputes is a "clash," with "attack" a close second. Comparing the distribution of incidents to disputes, one sees that disputes are more hostile, exactly as one would expect given the coding rules. There are noticeably higher proportions of clashes, seizures, and occupations of territory among the disputes when compared to the incidents.

Which states were the most involved in militarized interstate incidents from 1993–2001? Table 14 shows these most "incidentious" states. The first three columns of the table contain the twelve states most involved in militarized incidents, number of incidents in which those states were involved, and the percentage of incidents in the data set that saw involvement by those states. Not surprisingly, Israel is involved in the most incidents. Lebanon is second, involved in 374 incidents, all of which are in a single militarized dispute with Israel, stretching from April 6, 1993 through December 18, 2001; indeed, all but one of Israel's 393 incidents were in that same dispute. The United States, perhaps unsurprisingly, is involved in a relatively large number of incidents; the same can be said for Iraq and Yugoslavia. The last three columns list the twelve states that most often *initiated* the incidents.[15] Israel by itself initiated more than 14% of the total incidents recorded, while the United States initiated more than 10% of the incidents. France and Armenia also initiated more incidents than one might have expected.

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[15]It is important to bear in mind that each incident has only one target state, so that a single action directed against more than one state is coded as multiple incidents.

**TABLE 13** Distribution of incidents and disputes by action

| Action | Number of incidents (Percentage) | Number of disputes (Percentage) |
|---|---|---|
| Threat to use force | 172 | 6 |
| | (8.1) | (2.0) |
| Threat to occupy territory | 3 | None |
| | (0.1) | None |
| Threat to declare war | 25 | 1 |
| | (1.2) | (0.3) |
| Show of force | 370 | 41 |
| | (17.5) | (13.9) |
| Alert | 145 | 18 |
| | (6.8) | (6.1) |
| Mobilization | 16 | 2 |
| | (0.8) | (0.7) |
| Fortify border | 174 | 32 |
| | (8.2) | (10.8) |
| Border violation | 369 | 29 |
| | (17.4) | (9.8) |
| Blockade | 6 | 1 |
| | (0.3) | (0.3) |
| Occupation of territory | 27 | 12 |
| | (1.3) | (4.1) |
| Seizure | 81 | 36 |
| | (3.8) | (12.2) |
| Attack | 406 | 54 |
| | (19.2) | (18.2) |
| Clash | 317 | 61 |
| | (15.0) | (20.6) |
| Begin interstate war | 4 | 2 |
| | (0.2) | (0.7) |
| Join interstate war | 3 | 1 |
| | (0.1) | (0.3) |

By comparing across columns, one can see that Israel initiated about 97% (382/393) of the incidents in which it was involved; the United States initiated 82% (278/338) of its incidents, Turkey about 76% (172/226), and Britain almost 93% (126/136) of its incidents, while Iraq initiated just 19% (58/300) of its incidents. Iraq is much more frequently a target than an initiator of its international militarized incidents. Lebanon, similarly, initiated five incidents, a little more than 1% of the incidents in which it was involved.

Last, we use the incident data to examine an issue addressed earlier: Is the type of revision sought by participants in incidents likely to affect the level of fatalities suffered? We perform the analysis similarly to that done for the disputes.[16] Two variables (Policy and Territory) are coded from the "Issue1" variable, which describes the most important

[16]No incident participants were coded as suffering between 501 and 999 fatalities in one incident. We therefore did the analysis with six categories of fatalities (omitting 501–999) rather than seven, as we did in the prior analyses.

**TABLE 14** Most incidentious states (ranked by number of incidents in which they were involved)

| Country | Number of incidents involved | Percentage of incidents involved | Country | Number of incidents initiated | Percentage of initiated incidents |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Israel | 393 | 8.18 | Israel | 382 | 14.26 |
| Lebanon | 374 | 7.78 | USA | 278 | 10.38 |
| USA | 338 | 7.03 | Turkey | 172 | 6.42 |
| Iraq | 300 | 6.24 | Yugoslavia | 158 | 5.90 |
| Yugoslavia | 245 | 5.10 | UK | 126 | 4.70 |
| Turkey | 226 | 4.70 | Russia | 116 | 4.33 |
| Russia | 159 | 3.31 | Greece | 69 | 2.58 |
| UK | 136 | 2.83 | Iraq | 58 | 2.16 |
| Greece | 123 | 2.56 | China | 57 | 2.13 |
| China | 112 | 2.33 | North Korea | 52 | 1.94 |
| Afghanistan | 102 | 2.12 | France | 47 | 1.75 |
| North Korea | 98 | 2.04 | Armenia | 43 | 1.61 |

**TABLE 15** Effect of revision type on fatality levels (ordered probit)

| Variables | Coefficients |
|---|---|
| Policy | −0.135 (.172) |
| Territory | 0.579 (.174) |
| Cut1 | 1.7 (.157) |
| Cut2 | 2.37 (.172) |
| Cut3 | 2.66 (.186) |
| Cut4 | 2.96 (.214) |
| Cut5 | 3.25 (.264) |
| N | 1795 |
| Log-likelihood | −458.62 |
| Chi-square(2) | 49.44 |

**TABLE 16** Predicted probabilities of fatality levels and revision types in incidents

| Fatality level | Revision type | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Territory | Policy | Neither |
| No fatalities | 0.869 | 0.967 | 0.956 |
| 1–25 | 0.094 | 0.027 | 0.035 |
| 26–100 | 0.018 | 0.004 | 0.006 |
| 101–250 | 0.010 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| 251–500 | 0.005 | >0.001 | 0.001 |
| More than 999 | 0.004 | >0.001 | >0.001 |

revision, if any, sought by the participant in the incident.[17] Each is coded 1 if the revision sought is that of policy or territory, respectively. The dependent variable is the "Fatality level," and we conducted an order probit to discern the relationship. The results of that analysis are presented in Table 15.

As the table shows, there is a positive and significant coefficient on the Territory variable, while the Policy variable has a negative but statistically insignificant coefficient. This indicates that incidents over territorial issues are likely to result in more fatalities than those involving policy issues. Interpretation of the precise meaning of the table's results is difficult, however, and so we present the predicted probabilities derived from these results in Table 16.

As we can see from the table, there is a high probability that participants in incidents will suffer no fatalities, regardless of the type of revision sought. Having said that, note that participants seeking territorial revisions are almost four times more likely to suffer some fatalities than are those states seeking policy revisions (0.131 vs. 0.033), and the probability that a participant will suffer between 251 and 500 fatalities is about five times greater if territorial revisions are sought than if they are not. The findings we saw at the dispute level hold as well at the incident level: states are more likely to incur fatalities if they are fighting over territory.

## Conclusion

Our main aim in this paper has been not only to lay out the collection process for the MID3 data, but also to put forth the changes that have been made and present some of the patterns that emerged from this data set. The new MIDA and MIDB data sets are very similar to the older versions in MID2.1, not only in terms of the coding rules and procedures but also in terms of the distribution of cases across the variables. In addition to the dispute data, we have introduced the new data sets, MID-I and MID-IP, that have been generated. These data sets promise to allow researchers to engage in more detailed analyses of interstate conflict for a variety of purposes. We hope that other researchers will find them as useful as we believe them to be.

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[17]The excluded category, as before, contains those instances where the desired revision was either "not applicable," "regime/government," or "other."

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## Appendix

This appendix provides a short description of some of the international actions for which information was collected but that were not deemed to have met the coding rules for a Militarized Interstate Dispute. We briefly outline the reasons for excluding each of the specific cases. The purpose of this exercise is to provide some indication as to how the coding rules were applied to specific cases.

*Iran and Azerbaijan, 9/1–9/3/1993*. Iranian forces crossed into Azerbaijan to take control of two hydroelectric installations and a vital railhead. Iran may have been attempting to secure a safe haven for Azeris fleeing from fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The action was not aimed at Azerbaijan and was meant to protect Azeri citizens. In any event, there was no Azeri protest and some indication that the action was desired by Azerbaijan.

*Sudan and Uganda, 12/9/1993*. Sudanese military aircraft bombed one or two villages in northwest Uganda, near the Sudan border. There were apparently no casualties, nor was property damaged. Sudan was probably aiming at forces of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Uganda said there were no SPLA forces in the area. Uganda, though, apparently did not protest the Sudanese action. Because, in such circumstances, an official protest is required for the action to be coded as a militarized act, this action does not constitute an incident.

*Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 7/17/1994*. Artillery shells were fired from Rwanda and hit the Goma airport in the eastern part of the DRC. The shells were probably fired by Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) rebels at retreating Rwandan regulars. The RPF had captured Kigali the previous month and was consolidating its victory. The RPF, however, was not the government of Rwanda and so its firing upon DRC territory is not an act by a member of the interstate system.

*Saudi Arabia and Qatar, June–October, 1994*. In November 1994, Qatar alleged that there had been five "armed incidents" along its border with Saudi Arabia between June and October. In one incident, according to Qatar, one Qatari citizen was wounded by Saudi border guards. There is no specific information supplied about when or where the incidents took place, what forces were involved, who initiated the actions, etc. Saudi Arabia denied that any such incidents occurred and said the Qatari claims were an excuse not to attend the

November 1994 meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council. In the absence of more precise and credible information regarding these alleged incidents, they were deemed not codeable.

*Afghanistan and Iran, 11/5/1996*. The Taliban warned of military action if Iran did not cease its interference in the Afghan civil war. The Taliban was the official government of Afghanistan at the time. Reports, however, were unclear regarding what official in Afghanistan offered the warning. Only statements by high-ranking officials with the recognized authority to speak on behalf of the state in its international dealings are coded, and for that reason the Afghan warning is not sufficient to be coded as a threat.

*Taiwan and China, January, 1997*. Taiwan deployed Hsiung Feng II missiles (capable of reaching the Chinese mainland) along its coast. This action was originally coded as a "border fortification." Border fortifications, however, are attempts to demonstrate "control over a border area through the construction or reinforcement of military outposts to defend or claim territory" (JBS, 172). This deployment, however provocative, does not constitute a militarized act as it was not demonstrating control over a border. The action is also not a "show of force," as weapon deployments generally are not codable actions.

*Pakistan and India, 5/28/1998*. Pakistan conducted five nuclear tests in response to India's nuclear tests two weeks earlier. The Pakistani Prime Minister explicitly tied his country's actions to India's previous tests. The nuclear tests were certainly taken seriously by India, as they had been intended to be, and tension between the two countries was high both before and subsequent to the tests. Nonetheless, weapons tests do not constitute militarized actions under the MID coding rules, and thus the incident was not coded. Whether and how to code this event may have been the most widely debated single issue during the MID3 project, and it is fair to acknowledge that not all participants in the project concurred with the eventual decision. Some felt that the Pakistani action was clearly and provocatively directed toward India, was meant to increase international tension, and should be viewed within the context of the Pakistan–India conflict. The decision to exclude the case, however, is clearly in keeping with the MID coding rules, and to include some weapons tests, however provocative, while excluding others (such as U.S. nuclear testing during the Cuban Missile Crisis) would be inconsistent.

*Honduras and Nicaragua, 9/17/1998*. Honduras seized a U.S. fishing boat in the Gulf of Fonseca, where Honduras and Nicaragua had long-standing disagreements over fishing rights. Nicaragua said it had issued a permit for the U.S. vessel to fish in the area where it had been seized, protested the seizure, and demanded the boat's immediate release. As the boat was American, however, Nicaragua is not viewed as the potential target of the seizure. There was no U.S. protest. Had the United States protested, the Honduran action would count as a militarized incident with the United States as target.

*Russia and United States, September 2001*. An American P-3, flying in international airspace, reported that it was targeted by a Russian MiG 31. The event occurred in proximity to a Russian military exercise. The Russians denied that the MiG targeted the American plane, said it was on a regular training mission and was unarmed. Russia called Western reports that the P-3 was targeted "absurd." As there was no official American protest recorded, the incident was not coded.