



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON, DC

AFMAN 11-2HH-60WV2_AFGM2024-01
14 MARCH 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION C
MAJCOMs/FLDCOMs/FOAs/DRUs

FROM: HQ USAF/A3
1630 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330-1630

SUBJECT: Department of the Air Force Guidance Memorandum to Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 11-2HH-60W Volume 2, *HH-60W Aircrew Evaluation Criteria*

1. By Order of the Secretary of the Air Force, this Air Force Guidance Memorandum (AFGM) immediately implements changes AFMAN 11-2HH-60W Volume 2, *HH-60W Aircrew Evaluation Criteria*. Compliance with this Memorandum is mandatory. To the extent its directions are inconsistent with other Department of the Air Force publications, the information herein prevails, in accordance with Department of the Air Force Instruction (DAFI) 90-160, *Publications and Forms Management* and Department of the Air Force Manual (DAFMAN) 90-161, *Publishing Processes and Procedures*. This guidance is applicable to Air Force civilian employees and military personnel to include the Regular Air Force, the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard.
2. Change both paragraph 1.10.4.2 T-2 waiver authorities to T-3.
3. Ensure all records generated as a result of processes prescribed in this publication adhere to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, and are disposed in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule, which is located in the Air Force Records Information Management System.
4. This Memorandum becomes void after one year has elapsed from the date of this Memorandum, or upon incorporation by interim change to, or rewrite of AFMAN 11-2HH-60WV2, whichever is earlier.

ADRIAN L. SPAIN
Lt Gen, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

Attachment:
Guidance Changes

Guidance Changes

1.10.4.2. For Combat Mission Ready aircrew to complete an evaluation, all areas in the crew position event tables (**Table 2.1** and **Table 3.1**), annotated with an “R” must be accomplished. **(T-3)** Basic Mission Capable aircrew will only be evaluated on those missions routinely performed and in those areas that they are qualified to perform unsupervised. **(T-3)** Only those areas in which the examinee is current and qualified/certified may be evaluated.

**BY ORDER OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE**

**AIR FORCE MANUAL 11-2HH-60W,
Volume 2**



4 MARCH 2024

Flying Operations

***HH-60W AIRCREW EVALUATION
CRITERIA***

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

ACCESSIBILITY: Publications and forms are available for downloading or ordering on the e-Publishing web site at www.e-Publishing.af.mil

RELEASABILITY: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication.

OPR: ACC/A3TV

Certified by: AF/A3T
(Maj Gen Albert G. Miller)

Pages: 53

This publication implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 11-2, *Aircrew Operations*; and is consistent with Air Force Instruction (AFI) 11-200, *Aircrew Training, Standardization/Evaluation, and General Operations Structure*, and Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 11-202V2, *Aircrew Standardization and Evaluation Program*. It establishes Air Force standards for basic qualification, mission qualification, and evaluation of personnel performing aircrew duties in HH-60W aircraft. This publication applies to all civilian employees and uniformed members of the Regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard. This publication does not apply to United States Space Force. This manual requires the collection and or maintenance of information protected by the Privacy Act of 1974 authorized by Title 37 United States Code (USC) 301a, *Incentive Pay: aviation career*; Public Law (PL) 92-204, *Appropriations Act for 1973*; Section 715 PL 93-570, *Appropriations Act for 1974*; PL 93-294, *Aviation Career Incentive Act of 1974*; DoD Instruction (DoDI) 7730.67, *Aviation Incentive Pays and Bonus Program*; and Executive Order (EO) 9397 *Numbering for Federal Accounts Relating to Individual Persons*, as amended. The applicable System of Records Notice *F011 AF XO A, Aviation Resource Management System (ARMS)* is available at: <http://dpclo.defense.gov/Privacy/SORNs.aspx>. Ensure all records generated as a result of processes prescribed in this publication adhere to AFI 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, and are disposed in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule, which is located in the Air Force Records Information Management System. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the office of primary responsibility (OPR) using the AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route AF Forms 847 from the field through Stan/Eval channels to the OPR. This publication may be supplemented at any level, but all supplements must be routed to

the OPR of this publication for coordination prior to certification and approval. Parent major commands (MAJCOMs)/direct reporting units (DRUs)/forward operating agencies (FOAs) are to forward proposed supplements to this publication to lead MAJCOM OPR: Air Combat Command (ACC), Standardization and Evaluation Branch (ACC/A3TV), for proper coordination prior to certification and approval. **Note:** The terms DRU and FOA as used in this paragraph refer only to those that report directly to Headquarters Air Force (HAF). The authorities to waive wing/unit level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier (“T-0, T-1, T-2, T-3”) number following the compliance statement. See DAFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*, for a description of the authorities associated with the Tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval authority, or alternately, to the requestor’s commander for non-tiered compliance items. The use of the name or mark of any specific manufacturer, commercial product, commodity, or service in this publication does not imply endorsement by the Air Force.

Attachment 1 is for reference and not for compliance.

Chapter 1—GENERAL GUIDANCE	4
1.1. Purpose.....	4
1.2. Applicability.	4
1.3. Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Terms.	4
1.4. Administration.	4
1.5. Roles and Responsibilities.	4
1.6. Multiple Series Certifications.	4
1.7. Evaluation Procedures.	4
1.8. Grading Systems.	5
1.9. Ground Phase Requisites.	6
1.10. Evaluations.....	7
1.11. Instructor Evaluation.....	8
1.12. Flight Examiners (FEs).....	9
1.13. Alternate Evaluation of Sub-Areas.	9
1.14. Evaluation Documentation.....	10
Chapter 2—PILOT EVALUATIONS	11
2.1. Crew Positions.	11
2.2. Evaluation Event Requirements.....	11
2.3. Pilot Evaluation Event Requirements.	12
Table 2.1. Pilot Evaluation Event Requirements.	12

2.4.	Pilot Flight Evaluation Criteria.....	14
2.5.	General Phase.	14
2.6.	Qualification Phase.	19
2.7.	Instrument Phase.....	23
2.8.	Mission Phase.	26
2.9.	Instructor Phase.....	32
Chapter 3—SPECIAL MISSION AVIATION (BASIC QUALIFIED FLIGHT ENGINEER (FF)/MISSION QUALIFIED FLIGHT ENGINEER (MF)/ INSTRUCTOR FLIGHT ENGINEER (IF) EVALUATIONS)		34
3.1.	Crew Positions.	34
3.2.	Evaluation Event Requirements.....	34
3.3.	Special Mission Aviator (FF/MF/IF) Evaluated Event Requirement Table.	35
Table 3.1.	Special Mission Aviator (FF/MF/IF) Evaluation Event Requirements.	35
3.4.	SMA (FF/MF/IF) Flight Evaluation Criteria.	37
3.5.	General Phase.	37
3.6.	Qualification Phase.	42
3.7.	Mission Phase.	44
3.8.	Instructor Phase.....	47
Attachment 1—GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION		49

Chapter 1

GENERAL GUIDANCE

1.1. Purpose. This publication establishes requirements for all HH-60W Standardization/Evaluation (Stan/Eval) flight evaluations and outlines aircrew Stan/Eval grading criteria. Conduct all evaluations in accordance with the provisions of AFMAN 11-202V2, *Aircrew Standardization/Evaluation Program*, and MAJCOM supplements.

1.2. Applicability. Policy and requirements established in this AFMAN apply to Air Force civilian and military personnel to include the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard.

1.3. Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Terms. See [Attachment 1](#).

1.4. Administration.

1.4.1. Changes/Revisions. Submit changes/recommendations to this publication on an AF Form 847 through Stan/Eval channels to ACC/A3TV.

1.4.2. Waivers. Waiver authority for this publication is delegated to MAJCOM/A3 or equivalent in accordance with Table 1.1 of DAFI 33-360. Forward waiver requests through appropriate channels to the applicable MAJCOM/A3 or equivalent for approval. USAF/A3O is the waiver authority for basic Stan/Eval policy as contained in AFMAN 11-202V2. Post all waivers in accordance with AFMAN 11-202V2 and DAFI 33-360.

1.4.3. Supplements/Interim Changes (ICs). USAF/A3 approves all interim changes to this instruction. Units are encouraged to supplement this instruction with standard evaluation profiles that best fit the unit's mission, equipment, and location. MAJCOMs will forward a copy of MAJCOM supplements to USAF/A3O-AI, through MAJCOM Stan/Eval, for coordination. Units below MAJCOM level will forward one copy of each supplement to their MAJCOM OPR for pre-publication review.

1.5. Roles and Responsibilities.

1.5.1. Air Combat Command (ACC).

1.5.1.1. ACC Director of Air and Space Operations (A3) is designated as the responsible agency for this volume in accordance with ACPD 11-2, and will process all change requests.

1.5.1.2. Provide applicable guidance and oversight in accordance with AFMAN 11-202V2.

1.5.2. MAJCOMs, NAFs, Wings/Groups. Provide applicable guidance and oversight in accordance with AFMAN 11-202V2. **(T-2)**

1.6. Multiple Series Certifications. Aircrew certified in the HH-60G, and qualified in the HH-60W will accomplish evaluations in the HH-60W. **(T-2)** All requisites, Emergency Procedures Evaluations (EPEs), and evaluations will be conducted and documented in accordance with AFMAN 11-202V2 and this publication. **(T-2)**

1.7. Evaluation Procedures.

1.7.1. Flight Examiners (FEs) will use the evaluation criteria contained in each crew position chapter for conducting all flight and EPEs. **(T-2)**

1.7.2. Prior to the aircrew briefings, the FE will brief the examinee on specific evaluation areas, purpose and conduct of the evaluation, and, if applicable, will inform the Aircraft Commander of special requirements. **(T-2)** The examinee will accomplish appropriate flight planning/mission preparation. FEs will be furnished copies of mission materials to include necessary maps, flight logs, etc. **(T-2)**

1.7.3. Unless specified, the examinee or FE may fly in any seat (within their crew qualification), to include the cabin, that will best enable the FE to conduct a thorough evaluation. **Exception:** Student pilot evaluations will have either a qualified instructor pilot (IP) or FE at a set of controls. **(T-2)**

1.7.4. At the unit commanders discretion, evaluators will use AF Form 4038W, *HH-60W Evaluation Worksheet*, to aid in administering flight evaluations and EPEs. The completed AF Form 4038W, with evaluator's signature, shows completion of required evaluation requirements until the AF Form 8 is complete.

1.7.5. During an actual emergency, the FE will determine when to terminate an evaluation. **(T-2)**

1.7.6. The FE will thoroughly debrief all aspects of the evaluation. **(T-2)** This debrief will include the overall rating, specific deviations, area grades assigned (if other than qualified), and required additional training (if applicable). **(T-2)**

1.8. Grading Systems.

1.8.1. Grading instructions and performance criteria are contained in AFMAN 11-202V2 and crew position chapters in this publication.

1.8.2. Critical grading areas have been established for all flight evaluations in accordance with AFMAN 11-202V2. Critical areas are defined as those core areas, which if not performed to the "Qualified" level, could result in loss of life or damage to equipment.

1.8.3. Boldface procedures, crew/flight discipline, situational awareness (SA), safety/judgment/airmanship are considered critical. If one of these areas is graded U, then the overall grade for the evaluation will be Q-3. **(T-2)** **Note:** Boldface is required if applicable to the crew position. **(T-2)**

1.8.4. Areas not applicable to the unit or mission need not be performed; however, all areas performed will be graded. **(T-2)**

1.8.5. Do not consider momentary deviations from tolerances, provided the examinee applies prompt corrective action and such deviations do not jeopardize flight safety. **(T-2)** The FE will consider cumulative deviations when determining the overall grade. **(T-2)** However, a grade of Q-3 shall not be given based on unsubstantiated FE opinion. **(T-2)**

1.8.6. When grading criteria specifies that airspeed be evaluated and the flight manual lists only a minimum/maximum/recommended airspeed for that area, the examinee will brief the desired airspeed. **(T-2)**

1.8.7. The FE will compare examinee performance for each required area accomplished during the evaluation with the evaluation criteria provided in each crew position chapter and assign an appropriate grade. **(T-2)** Derive the overall flight evaluation grade from the area grades based on observed events and tasks in accordance with this publication.

1.8.8. FEs will use the grading criteria in this volume to determine individual area grades. **(T-2)** FE judgment must be exercised when the wording of areas is subjective and when specific situations are not covered. FE judgment is the determining factor in arriving at the overall grade.

1.9. Ground Phase Requisites.

1.9.1. Qualification (QUAL) (All): Open Book exam, Closed Book exam, Boldface/Critical Action Procedures (CAPs) exam, and EPE.

1.9.2. Instrument (INSTM) (Pilots): Instrument exam.

1.9.3. Mission (MSN) (All): Boldface/CAPs exam and EPE.

1.9.4. Aircrew Examinations. Manage and conduct examinations in accordance with AFMAN 11-202V2 and MAJCOM Supplements. Minimum number of test questions are:

1.9.4.1. QUAL Open Book (All)—40 questions.

1.9.4.2. QUAL Closed Book (All)—40 questions.

1.9.4.3. INSTM Exam (Pilots): In accordance with AFMAN 11-202V2 and AFMAN 11-210, *Instrument Refresher Program*—50 questions.

1.9.5. Publications Check. The following publications will be checked for currency and proper posting during all flight evaluations:

1.9.5.1. Technical Order (T.O.) 1H-60(H)W-1CL-1, *Flight Crew Checklist* (All). **(T-2)**

1.9.5.2. T.O. 1H-60(H)W-1CL-2, *Gunner/Hoist Operator Checklist* (SMAs). **(T-2)**

1.9.5.3. AFMAN 11-2HH-60WV3, *HH-60W Operations Procedures* (All). **(T-2)**

1.9.5.4. Access to local in-flight guide (All). **(T-2)**

1.9.5.5. Any additional publication specified in the unit supplement to AFMAN 11-202V2 (All). **(T-2)**

1.9.5.6. **Note** : If electronic flight bags (EFBs) are authorized for use, publications check will confirm updated/current publications, current flight information publications (FLIP) applicable to the sortie, and all other requirements from MAJCOM and other local directives in place. **(T-2)**

1.9.6. Boldface Exam. In accordance with AFMAN 11-202V2 and MAJCOM Supplements.

1.9.7. EPE. EPEs should be performed as a crew in a simulator. If simulator is unavailable, EPEs may be performed individually or as a crew verbally, but will not be performed in flight. **(T-2)** The FE will assign an overall grade (1, 2, or 3) in accordance with the standards established in this instruction. **(T-2)**

1.9.7.1. EPEs should be scenario driven with an emphasis on EPs, special interest items and systems knowledge. FEs may use one continuous scenario throughout the EPE or different scenarios for each EP.

1.9.7.2. Examinees may use publications that are normally available in flight and must recall boldface items from memory. **(T-2)**

1.9.7.3. The following graded areas are required on all EPEs:

1.9.7.3.1. Boldface Procedures.

1.9.7.3.2. Aircraft General Knowledge.

1.9.7.3.3. Cockpit/Crew Resource Management (CRM).

1.9.7.3.4. EPs/Aircraft Malfunctions.

1.9.7.3.4.1. The FE will evaluate a minimum of two EPs per phase of flight - ground operations, takeoff, and enroute. **(T-2)**

1.9.7.3.4.2. The FE will evaluate a minimum of three EPs during the terminal operations/landing phase commensurate with the type of evaluation being flown. **(T-2)**

1.9.7.3.5. Checklist Usage.

1.9.7.4. Mission EPEs should be tailored to unit tasking and current special interest items and will include the following items:

1.9.7.4.1. Mission specific EPs/scenarios, equipment, and systems knowledge. **(T-2)**

1.9.7.4.2. Evasive action/threat reaction. **(T-2)**

1.9.7.5. FEs will annotate how the EPE was performed (Simulator, Verbally, etc.) and provide a brief description of events included in the additional comments of the examiner's remarks section of the AF Form 8, *Certificate of Aircrew Qualification*. **(T-2)**

1.10. Evaluations. Conduct flight evaluations in accordance with AFMAN 11-202V2, MAJCOM/Local supplements, and guidance contained in this instruction. **(T-2)**

1.10.1. General.

1.10.1.1. Evaluations administered during exercises or non-contingency deployments are encouraged. Evaluations administered to maintain mission qualification status during contingency/combat deployments should be given as a last resort.

1.10.1.2. Examinees will be evaluated in the position of their highest qualification. **(T-2)** If briefed, and at the FEs discretion, portions may be flown in another position, but the emphasis is to have examinees evaluated at their highest qualification level.

1.10.1.3. All evaluations (except SPOT evaluations) will include the "General" area from **Table 2.1** and **Table 3.1** as applicable. **(T-2)**

1.10.2. QUAL Evaluations.

1.10.2.1. Initial (INIT), Requalification (RQ) and QUAL evaluations will be accomplished in the aircraft. **(T-3)**

1.10.2.2. Periodic QUAL evaluations may be accomplished in MAJCOM approved H-60 simulator. Two consecutive QUAL evaluations will not be conducted in a simulator. **(T-3)**
Exception: The Squadron Commander (SQ/CC) may approve a current and qualified aircrew member to accomplish multiple consecutive periodic QUAL evaluations in the simulator based on operational requirements. The AF Form 8, will be documented to capture reasons for the deviation in the additional comments of the examiner's remarks section. **(T-2)**

1.10.3. INSTM Evaluations. Instrument evaluations may be accomplished in MAJCOM approved H-60 simulator.

1.10.4. MSN Evaluations. MSN evaluation profiles/scenarios should be based on unit taskings. Evaluation profiles will be designed to evaluate the training/flight position/special certifications as well as basic airmanship of the examinee and be flown using unit formations and tactics. **(T-3)**

1.10.4.1. Initial (INIT), RQ and Periodic MSN evaluations will be accomplished in the aircraft, at night, utilizing Night Vision Goggles (NVG). **(T-3)** Formation will be evaluated on all INIT, RQ, and Periodic evaluations. **(T-3)** INIT and RQ evaluations will include Formation when evaluating Gunnery and Terminal Area Operations. **(T-3)** Non-consecutive Periodic pilot MSN evaluations may be conducted in MAJCOM approved H-60 simulator with SQ/CC approval. **Exception:** SQ/CC may approve a current and qualified aircrew member to accomplish a Periodic MSN evaluation during the day. SQ/CC may approve a current and qualified aircrew member to accomplish a Periodic MSN evaluation single-ship. If the SQ/CC approves one of the situations in this exception, the subsequent MSN evaluation will be conducted as directed in [paragraph 1.10.4.1](#) and the AF Form 8, will be documented to capture reasons for the deviation in the additional comments of the examiner's remarks section. **(T-3)**

1.10.4.2. For Combat Mission Ready aircrew to complete an evaluation, all areas in the crew position event tables ([Table 2.1](#) and [Table 3.1](#)), annotated with an "R" must be accomplished. **(T-2)** Basic Mission Capable aircrew will only be evaluated on those missions routinely performed and in those areas that they are qualified to perform unsupervised. **(T-2)** Only those areas in which the examinee is current and qualified/certified may be evaluated.

1.10.5. Formal Course Evaluations.

1.10.5.1. Conduct evaluations in accordance with syllabus mission profile guidelines, or on a mission profile developed from syllabus training objectives. Formal course guidelines may be modified based on local operating considerations or FE judgment. Grading will be in accordance with performance criteria established in this instruction. **(T-2)** Pilot and copilot INIT or RQ evaluations will have a qualified instructor or FE in a seat with a set of controls. **(T-2)**

1.10.5.2. Helicopter Air-to-Air Refueling (HAAR) and weapons employment operations may be evaluated in conjunction with the last formal training unit (FTU) training flight. The unit operations officer must pre-approve this method. **(T-3)** The FE will make it clear to the student when the training period ends and when the evaluation begins.

1.11. Instructor Evaluation. Instructor evaluations do not have any requisites and will be conducted in accordance with AFMAN 11-202V2, [Table 2.1](#) and [Table 3.1](#) of this AFMAN, and the following:

1.11.1. RQ Instructor evaluations should be combined with RQ QUAL, INSTM and/or MSN evaluations.

1.11.2. SQ/CC approval is required to conduct an Initial (INIT) Instructor (INSTR) evaluation in conjunction with a Periodic evaluation. **(T-2)**

1.11.3. Units may request that periodic evaluations be accomplished at the FTU in conjunction with an INIT INSTR evaluation at the owning SQ/CC's request and training SQ/CC's approval. Route cross-command evaluation requests in accordance with AFMAN 11-202V2. (T-2)

1.11.4. Should a student receive a Q3 on their INIT INSTR evaluation while also re-accomplishing their periodic evaluation, the student retains their basic qualification so long as the failure was specific to the instructor section of the evaluation. If the failure was due to any critical evaluation item(s) they will become unqualified. (T-2) At the FTU SQ/CC's discretion, the FTU can develop a CC directed requalification syllabus and re-accomplish both evaluations or remove the student from the Instructor course until training can be accomplished at the member's home station.

1.11.5. Instructor candidates must be current and qualified on events which they will be evaluated during the INIT INSTR evaluation. (T-2)

1.11.6. Instructor evaluations will evaluate instructor performance per the Instructor sub-areas and any additional required sub-areas for the sortie profiles listed in [Table 2.1](#) and [Table 3.1](#). (T-2)

1.11.7. Events certified after the initial instructor evaluation do not require additional instructor evaluations. Certification of the new event will be done to the instructor level. (T-2)

1.11.8. SQ/CCs may designate and qualify instructors at varying levels of qualification depending on the evaluations they have successfully completed. Example: If only the QUAL evaluation was completed to the INSTR level that instructor would be a basic instructor only; if a QUAL and INSTM evaluation was completed to the INSTR level, that instructor would be a basic and instrument instructor, but not allowed to instruct mission events.

1.12. Flight Examiners (FEs).

1.12.1. FEs must be current in a given event prior to acting as an evaluator in the event. (T-2) At SQ/CC discretion, FEs may conduct periodic MSN evaluations of flight lead certified pilots from another aircraft in the formation. If conducting a pilot MSN evaluation from another aircraft, the FE should utilize all available resources to include crew member input and, if available, conduct a thorough review of the examinee's mission data recordings to grade areas that are not observable from another aircraft.

1.12.2. FEs who subsequently add other certifications are automatically certified to evaluate these new certification events.

1.13. Alternate Evaluation of Sub-Areas.

1.13.1. For INIT and RQ evaluations, all required items must be performed by actual demonstration. (T-2)

1.13.2. For periodic evaluations, when it is impossible or impractical to evaluate a required area in flight, the FE may elect to evaluate the area(s) by an alternate method (simulator, procedural trainer, or verbal examination). Document why required area(s) were not evaluated in flight and the alternate method of evaluation used in the additional comments paragraph of the examiner's remarks section of the AF Form 8. If, in the FE's judgment, a required item cannot be adequately evaluated, complete the evaluation on an additional flight.

1.13.3. The unit Chief of Stan/Eval, FE, or SQ/CC decides if the evaluation is complete.

1.14. Evaluation Documentation. AF Form 8 documentation will be in accordance with AFMAN 11-202V2, MAJCOM/Local supplements and the following:

1.14.1. HH-60W AF Form 8 mission descriptions will be of sufficient content to verify that the required areas for the evaluation were completed. **(T-3)** The examples below are provided as a guide and are not all inclusive.

1.14.1.1. QUAL and INSTM evaluation example: This INSTM/QUAL evaluation was performed in the local VFR and IFR patterns at [location(s)]. Sortie consisted of normal transition maneuvers and degraded aircraft procedures to include [describe maneuvers and procedures] and autorotations. (Pilot) Examinee performed a precision Instrument Landing System (ILS)/Precision Approach Radar (PAR) approach to [insert runway] followed by a non-precision VOR/Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN)/RNAV/ASR approach to [insert runway]. (Pilot) Examinee used the Flight Director (FD) on the [list where FD was used]. Instructional abilities were demonstrated through all phases of flight to include [list specifically what was instructed]. The examinee performed all required maneuvers in a [describe ability] manner in accordance with AFMAN 11-2HH-60WV2 Table [2.1 or 3.1]. The [Unit] RQS/CC was debriefed on the results of this evaluation.

1.14.1.2. MSN evaluation example: This MSN evaluation was performed in the [location] area, [name of range] gun range, and [track number] HAAR track. Sortie consisted of NVG low-level, NVG formation, evasive maneuvers that consisted of [missile in flight, air defense artillery, and radar threat], and terminal area operations with the following Alternate Insertion/Extraction (AIEs) [hoist, rope ladder, fast rope, rappel]. (Pilot) Examinee used the FD on the [list where FD was used]. (SMA) Weapons Employment was evaluated with the [list weapon system fired]. The [list weapon system(s)] was/were verbally evaluated. Instructional abilities were demonstrated through all phases of flight to include [list specifically what was instructed]. The examinee performed all required maneuvers in a [describe ability] manner in accordance with AFMAN 11-2HH60WV2, Table [2.1 or 3.1]. The [Unit] RQS/CC was debriefed on the results of this evaluation.

1.14.1.3. EPE example for a QUAL and INSTM evaluation: The INSTM/QUAL EPE was completed in the OFT simulator at [location] with a crew consisting of [total crewmembers]. The scenario included flight in the IFR structure from [location] to [location] with a divert to [location] due to [list reason for divert]. EPs covered included [list EPs]. All events were performed in a [describe ability] manner in accordance with AFMAN 11-2HH60WV2.

1.14.2. "RQ INSTR" will not be used for loss of qualification due to expiration of required periodic evaluation or loss of currency. **(T-2)** Only annotate RQ INSTR if requalification is required due to a failure of instructor area(s). For all other RQ evaluations, annotate as RQ QUAL, RQ INSTM or RQ MSN as well as the appropriate aircraft/crew position (ex. HH-60W/IP or HH-60W/IF) in each respective section of the AF Form 8.

Chapter 2

PILOT EVALUATIONS

2.1. Crew Positions. Evaluation standards will be administered in accordance with the individual's crew position as listed below. (T-2)

2.1.1. First Pilot (FP). Pilots that have successfully completed an INIT and have a current periodic evaluation covering the General, QUAL and INSTM requirements of [Table 2.1](#). to Pilot (P) criteria.

2.1.2. Mission Copilot (MC). Pilots that have successfully completed an INIT and have a current periodic evaluation covering the General and MSN requirements of [Table 2.1](#) to (MC) criteria. **Note:** It is possible for a pilot to be an FP and an MC depending on the level of evaluations they have successfully completed.

2.1.3. Mission Pilot (MP). Pilots that have successfully completed an INIT and have a current periodic evaluation covering the General, QUAL, INSTM and MSN requirements of [Table 2.1](#) to (P) criteria.

2.1.4. IP. Pilots that have successfully completed an INIT INSTR evaluation and have a current periodic QUAL, INSTM and/or MSN evaluation that included the Instructor areas of [Table 2.1](#).

2.1.5. Evaluator Pilot (EP). EP selection, upgrade and objectivity evaluations will be in accordance with AFMAN 11-202V2, MAJCOM supplements and local directives. (T-2) An EP is evaluated as an IP during normal periodic evaluations.

2.2. Evaluation Event Requirements. Refer to [Table 2.1](#) for required events.

2.2.1. Qualification Evaluations. QUAL profiles require demonstrated proficiency in transition maneuvers and degraded aircraft procedures. The FE determines the appropriate amount of coupled FD) versus manually flown maneuvers for the evaluation. QUAL evaluations include the General and Qualification areas of [Table 2.1](#).

2.2.2. Instrument Evaluations. INSTM profiles require demonstrated proficiency in all instrument maneuvers and operations in actual or simulated Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). INSTM evaluations include the General and Instrument areas of [Table 2.1](#).

2.2.3. Mission Evaluations. MSN profiles require demonstrated proficiency in maneuvers and operations in a tactical environment. Administer evaluations based on examinee's qualification and experience level as well as certifications listed in AFMAN 11-2HH-60WV1, *HH60W Aircrew Training*. The FE determines the appropriate amount of coupled FD versus manually flown maneuvers for the evaluation. MSN evaluations to include the following:

2.2.3.1. General and Mission areas of [Table 2.1](#).

2.2.3.2. Mission Systems Operations/Employment. To ensure maximum application to real world missions, evaluations should include live survivor

2.2.3.3. Survival radio interaction

2.2.3.4. Live tactical data link

2.2.3.5. Data passage with aircraft/asset outside the formation

2.2.3.6. Live (inject) of common integrated broadcast (CIB)

2.2.3.7. Threat reaction to actual emitter or threat simulator to the maximum extent possible.

2.2.4. IP Evaluations. Instructor evaluations evaluate instructional proficiency while accomplishing all sub-areas of **Table 2.1** as applicable (e.g., Qualification, Instrument) plus the Instructor areas of **Table 2.1**. Instructors do not need to demonstrate every event, but should be able to effectively instruct where necessary by whatever means are most appropriate.

2.3. Pilot Evaluation Event Requirements. Reference **Table 2.1**.

Table 2.1. Pilot Evaluation Event Requirements.

PILOT/COPILOT	Initial	Periodic	Requalification
GENERAL			
93. Knowledge of Directives and Forms	R	R	R
51. Publications Check	R	R	R
1. General Mission Planning/Weight and Balance/TOLD	R	R	R
58. Energy Management	R	R	R
2. Briefings	R	R	R
29. Systems Knowledge	R	R	R
302. Use of Checklists	R	R	R
48. Preflight/Aircraft Run-Up	R	R	R
79. ATC Procedures	R	R	R
855. Flight Director Operations	R	R	R
13. Crew Coordination	R	R	R
37. Crew Resource Management	R	R	R
32. Crew/Flight Discipline (CRITICAL)	R	R	R
30. Situational Awareness (CRITICAL)	R	R	R
31. Safety, Judgment, Airmanship (CRITICAL)	R	R	R
54. Boldface Emergencies (CRITICAL)	R	R	R
26. After Landing/Engine Shutdown/Post-Flight	R	R	R
28. Debriefing	R	R	R
QUALIFICATION			

856. Uncoupled Hovering Maneuvers	R	R	R
4. Takeoff	R	R	R
851. Autorotations	R	R	R
70. Simulated Single Engine Approach/Roll-on Landing	R	R	R
596. SAS/Boost Off Approach/Landing	R	R	R
597. Manual Stabilator Operations	R	(2)	R
565. Manual EDECU Operations	R	(2)	R
23. Traffic Patterns	R	R	R
25. Approaches and Landings	R	R	R
INSTRUMENTS			
15. Unusual Attitudes	(1)	(1)	(1)
6. Instrument Departure/Climb/Level-Off	R	R	R
12. Navigation Use of NAVAIDS/RNAV	R	R	R
61. Holding Procedures	R		R
64. Non-Precision Approach	R	R	R
66. Precision Approach	R	R	R
67. Missed Approach/Climb-Out	R	R	R
MISSION			
81. Tactical Mission Planning	R	R	R
83. Mission Execution	R	R	R
857. Tactical Employment Procedures	R	R	R
88. Terrain/Flight Navigation	R	R	R
9. Formation	R	(3)	R
94. Threat ID/Countermeasure Procedures	R	R	R
858. Mission System Operations/Employment	R	R	R
852. Terminal Area Operations	R	R	R
853. AIE Operations	R	R	R
280. HAAR	R		R
INSTRUCTOR			See Paragraph 1.14.2.
47. Briefings/Debriefings /Critiques	R	R	R
56. Demo-Performance	R	R	R

55. Instructor Knowledge	R	R	R
33. Instructional Ability	R	R	R
50. Training Documentation Procedures	R	R	R
	Note 1. Will not be evaluated in actual IMC conditions. (T-2) If INSTM evaluation is conducted in IMC conditions, Unusual Attitudes will be evaluated in the simulator or verbally and annotated on an AF Form 8. (T-3)		
	Note 2. Not required in-flight during periodic evaluations if accomplished during the EPE in a simulator.		
	Note 3. Refer to paragraph 1.10.4.1.		

2.4. Pilot Flight Evaluation Criteria. This section contains evaluation criteria for conducting HH-60W pilot flight evaluations. This criterion serves as a grading guide for evaluators. If a crew position is listed, then that criterion is applicable only to that crew position. The absence of a crew position indicates that the criterion is applicable to all crew positions.

2.5. General Phase.

2.5.1. Area 93—Knowledge of Directives/Forms:

2.5.1.1. Q. Knowledgeable of all applicable directives: both higher headquarters (HHQ) and local. Familiar with proper forms completion.

2.5.1.2. Q-. Knowledge of capabilities, approved operating procedures, and rules are marginal in some areas but did not impact safe/effective mission accomplishment. Minor errors in forms completion.

2.5.1.3. U. Major errors or omissions in knowledge of operating capabilities or procedures that would preclude safe/effective mission accomplishment. Major errors in forms completion. Regulations/directives were intentionally violated.

2.5.2. Area 51—Publications Check: Conduct a thorough review of publications in accordance with **paragraph 1.9.5.**

2.5.2.1. Q. Publications are current, contain all supplements/changes, and are properly posted.

2.5.2.2. Q-. Publications contain deficiencies which would not impact flight safety or mission accomplishment.

2.5.2.3. U. Publications are outdated and/or contain deficiencies which would impact flight safety or mission accomplishment.

2.5.3. Area 1—General Mission Planning/Weight and Balance/Takeoff and Landing Data (TOLD) (Take-off, In-flight, Landing):

2.5.3.1. Q. (P) Developed a sound plan to accomplish the mission. Coordinated with all players involved to ensure adequate preparation for the sortie. Ensured all factors applicable to flight (i.e., weather, notices to airmen (NOTAMs), alternate landing sites, flight logs, weight and balance, performance data, fuel requirements, maps, airspace, etc.) were completed in accordance with applicable directives. Ensured the crew was aware of

special requirements/equipment necessary for the flight. Loaded data transfer device (DTD) properly to enable proper aircraft initialization and mission accomplishment.

2.5.3.2. Q-. (P) Same as above except for multiple minor errors or omissions that could degrade mission effectiveness. Committed minor errors in loading DTD causing aircraft to initialize improperly and/or did not ensure that all required data transferred correctly, but it did not jeopardize safety or mission accomplishment.

2.5.3.3. U. (P) Major errors or omissions that would preclude safe and effective mission accomplishment. Committed errors in loading DTD causing aircraft to initialize improperly and or missing data was a causal factor that the mission could not be accomplished and/or jeopardized safety.

2.5.3.4. Q. (MC) Assisted the pilot as requested in developing a sound plan to accomplish the mission. Assisted the pilot as requested in checking all factors applicable to flight (i.e., weather, NOTAMs, alternate landing sites, flight logs, weight and balance, performance data, fuel requirements, maps, airspace, etc.) in accordance with applicable directives. Assisted as directed to load DTD appropriately.

2.5.3.5. Q-. (MC) Same as above except for minor errors or omissions that could degrade mission effectiveness.

2.5.3.6. U. (MC) Major errors or omissions that would preclude safe and effective mission accomplishment.

2.5.4. Area 58—Energy Management:

2.5.4.1. Q. Satisfactory knowledge of Energy Maneuverability (EM) charts. During aircraft maneuvering, airspeeds and bank angles were consistent with awareness of energy state. Onset of blade stall was recognized.

2.5.4.2. Q-. Knowledge of EM charts marginal in some areas and some aircraft maneuvers performed in a manner inconsistent with awareness of aircraft energy state, but did not affect safe/effective accomplishment of mission. Slow to recognize and correct exceeding blade stall criteria.

2.5.4.3. U. Unfamiliar with EM charts. Displayed a lack of awareness of aircraft energy state during aircraft maneuvering which impacted the safe/effective accomplishment of the mission. Allowed aircraft to enter severe blade stall.

2.5.5. Area 2—Briefings:

2.5.5.1. Q. Briefer. Well organized and professionally presented in a logical sequence. Effective use of training aids. Presented the required events and allowed for an effective discussion for accomplishing the mission. Concluded the briefing in time to allow for a thorough preflight of personal equipment, aircraft, and mission equipment. Considered the abilities/limitations of all crew and flight members. Passengers were thoroughly and professionally briefed in accordance with applicable regulations and directives. Inflight briefings completed at the appropriate time to enhance mission effectiveness.

2.5.5.2. Q-. Briefer. Events were out of sequence, redundant, and difficult to understand. Did not effectively use training aids. Focused on nonessential items and omitted minor details. Did not consider all crew/flight members' abilities. Poor time management.

Passenger briefing lacked sufficient information. In-flight briefings incomplete, questions not completely resolved, or timing did not provide crew adequate time to prepare for event.

2.5.5.3. U. Briefer. Disorganized sequence. Presentation omitted major details that caused confusion. Did not allow sufficient time for preflight of personal equipment, aircraft, and mission equipment. Ignored crew and flight members' abilities, limitations, and/or questions. Passengers were not briefed. Omitted inflight briefings or failed to address questions, or timing prevents crew from performing event.

2.5.5.4. Q. Receiver. Actively participated and provided input when required. Fully understood the briefing and followed instructions.

2.5.5.5. Q-. Receiver. Did not fully understand duties and lack of action/input created minor problems that did not affect safe mission accomplishment.

2.5.5.6. U. Receiver. Missed the briefing. Not prepared or did not actively participate when requested. Did not fully understand duties, and lack of action/input created problems that impacted safe mission accomplishment.

2.5.6. Area 29—Systems Knowledge:

2.5.6.1. Q. Demonstrated a thorough knowledge of applicable aircraft and aircraft related systems and limitations. Ensured satisfactory operation within limits.

2.5.6.2. Q-. Limited knowledge of systems, procedures, and operational limits.

2.5.6.3. U. Demonstrated an unsatisfactory knowledge of systems, procedures, or operating limits. Operated the aircraft or systems outside applicable limits.

2.5.7. Area 302—Use of Checklists:

2.5.7.1. Q. Effectively used the appropriate checklists with accurate and timely responses. Familiar with checklists and contents.

2.5.7.2. Q-. Used the appropriate checklists, but was slow to respond and/or had difficulty locating proper procedures.

2.5.7.3. U. Failed to use the proper checklists or was not adequately familiar with their contents.

2.5.8. Area 48—Preflight/Aircraft Run-Up:

2.5.8.1. Q. (P) Established and adhered to station, engine start, and taxi times. Ensured a thorough preflight, check of personal equipment, etc. Fully aware of aircraft readiness and proper configuration for the mission. Thorough knowledge of the information contained in the aircraft forms and correctly determined aircraft status. Performed all procedures prior to takeoff in accordance with applicable directives.

2.5.8.2. Q-. (P) Same as above except for minor procedural deviations which did not degrade mission effectiveness.

2.5.8.3. U. (P) Major deviations in procedure which would preclude safe mission accomplishment. Failed to accurately determine readiness of aircraft for flight or proper configuration to perform the mission.

2.5.8.4. Q. (MC) Adhered to station, engine start, and taxi times. Assisted the pilot, as directed, in ensuring a thorough preflight, check of personal equipment, and aircraft runup.

2.5.8.5. Q-. (MC) Same as above except for minor procedural deviations which did not degrade mission effectiveness.

2.5.8.6. U. (MC) Major deviations in procedure which would preclude safe mission accomplishment. Failed to accurately determine readiness of aircraft for flight or proper configuration to perform the mission.

2.5.9. Area 79—ATC Procedures:

2.5.9.1. Q. Promptly complied with all controlling agency instructions and reporting requirements. Obtained the proper clearance from the applicable controlling agency. Complied with all national airspace requirements.

2.5.9.2. Q-. Slow to comply with controlling agency instructions or unsure of the reporting requirements.

2.5.9.3. U. Failed to comply with controlling agency instructions or accepted a clearance for which they could not comply. Entered controlled airspace without proper clearance.

2.5.10. Area 855—Flight Director Operations

2.5.10.1. Q. Programed Flight Management System (FMS) and Flight Director/Display Control Panel (FD/DCP) and employed coupled FD operations in order to reduce pilot and aircrew work load. Employed the FD en-route, on approach, and/or in a hover as briefed and expected, recognized and engaged FD within appropriate envelopes in order to accomplish desired operation in a timely manner.

2.5.10.2. Q-. Minor unrecognized errors in programing or employment that resulted in unintentional uncoupling of the FD but did not jeopardize safety or mission accomplishment.

2.5.10.3. U. Gross errors in programming or employment that caused unrecognized deviations that resulted in increased crew workload, loss of SA, or jeopardized safety.

2.5.11. Area 13—Crew Coordination:

2.5.11.1. Q. Coordinated and communicated effectively with other crew members to the maximum extent possible. Recognized and corrected communication errors.

2.5.11.2. Q-. Minor unrecognized or uncorrected errors in crew coordination occurred which did not affect safe/effective mission accomplishment.

2.5.11.3. U. Improperly or ineffectively coordinated or communicated with other crew members causing delays or confusion which did, or could have, adversely affected safety or mission accomplishment.

2.5.12. Area 37—Crew Resource Management:

2.5.12.1. Q. Managed resources and duties effectively to minimize task saturation, channelized attention, and distractions among crew members. Met requirements in accordance with AFMAN 11-290, *Cockpit/Crew Resource Management and Threat and*

Error Management Program and AF Form 4031, CRM Skills Criteria Training/Evaluation.

2.5.12.2. Q-. Minor errors in managing resources and duties which did not affect safe/effective mission accomplishment.

2.5.12.3. U. Improperly or ineffectively managed resources and/or duties which caused task saturation, channelized attention, and distractions among crew members which impacted safety or mission accomplishment.

2.5.13. Area 32—Crew/Flight Discipline (Critical):

2.5.13.1. Q. Demonstrated strict, professional aircrew discipline throughout all phases of the mission. Promoted effective coordination and communication with other crew members.

2.5.13.2. U. Failed to exhibit strict aircrew discipline. Intentionally violated rules or regulations. Improperly or ineffectively coordinated or communicated with the other crew members causing delays or confusion which did, or could have, adversely affected safety or mission accomplishment.

2.5.14. Area 30—SA (Critical):

2.5.14.1. Q. Executed the assigned mission in a timely, efficient manner. Conducted the flight with a sense of understanding and comprehension even as the environment or situation changed. Ensured all aspects of the mission were accomplished with regard to the safety of crew, passengers, ground personnel, and aircraft.

2.5.14.2. U. Decisions, or lack thereof, resulted in the failure to accomplish the assigned mission. Demonstrated poor judgment to the extent safety could have been compromised. Lacked understanding/comprehension of events occurring in and around the aircraft/flight.

2.5.15. Area 31—Safety/Judgment/Airmanship (Critical):

2.5.15.1. Q. Aware of and complied with all safety factors required for safe aircraft operation and mission accomplishment. Sound judgment enhanced mission accomplishment and was evident in the decision-making process.

2.5.15.2. U. Was not aware of, or did not comply with, all safety factors required for the safe operation of the aircraft or mission accomplishment. A clear lack of judgment hampered or precluded mission accomplishment. Did not adequately clear the aircraft. Allowed a dangerous situation to develop without taking proper corrective action.

2.5.16. Area 54—Boldface Emergencies (Critical):

2.5.16.1. Q. Correct and immediate response. Satisfactory performance of the corrective action. The crewmember pointed without hesitation to, and knew the function of, all switches and controls required for all critical action EPs for his/her crew position.

2.5.16.2. U. Incorrect sequence, unsatisfactory/untimely response, or unsatisfactory performance of the corrective action. The crewmember could not, without hesitation, identify or explain the function of all switches and controls required for all critical action EPs for his/her crew position.

2.5.17. Area 26—After Landing/Engine Shutdown/Post-Flight:

2.5.17.1. Q. (P) Safely maneuvered the helicopter to the appropriate parking location in accordance with the flight manual and applicable directives. Performed proper aircraft and equipment postflight and/or reconfiguration. Correctly determined the condition and status of the aircraft after shutdown. Completed all applicable aircraft forms correctly and briefed maintenance personnel as required.

2.5.17.2. Q-. (P) Same as above except for minor deviations or omissions.

2.5.17.3. U. (P) Major deviations or omissions during hover and/or ground operations including postflight procedures which could have jeopardized safety. Failed to perform the aircraft and equipment postflight and/or reconfiguration. Failed to complete the aircraft forms or brief maintenance personnel as required.

2.5.17.4. Q. (MC) Assisted in accomplishment of appropriate actions during post mission hover and/or ground operations and assigned postflight procedures in accordance with the flight manual and applicable directives. Performed proper aircraft and equipment postflight and/or reconfiguration.

2.5.17.5. Q-. (MC) Same as above except for minor deviations or omissions.

2.5.17.6. U. (MC) Major deviations or omissions during the After Landing checklist, aircraft taxi, engine shutdown, or post flight procedures which could have jeopardized safety. Failed to perform the aircraft and equipment postflight and/or reconfiguration. Failed to complete the aircraft forms or brief maintenance personnel as required.

2.5.18. Area 28—Debriefing:

2.5.18.1. Q. Briefer. Thoroughly debriefed the mission or actively participated in the debriefing. Discussed mission accomplishment and debriefed noteworthy (positive or negative) mission events. Provided instruction as appropriate for all crew members to improve performance on future sorties.

2.5.18.2. Q-. Briefer. Incomplete debriefing. Did not actively participate in the debriefing or thoroughly discuss the mission, deviations, or corrective guidance.

2.5.18.3. U. Briefer. Did not debrief mission, deviations, or offer corrective guidance.

2.5.18.4. Q. Receiver. Actively participated and provided input when required. Fully understood the briefing.

2.5.18.5. Q-. Receiver. Did not fully understand discussion, interfered with mission reconstruction and/or others' participation or learning.

2.5.18.6. U. Receiver. Missed the debriefing. Not prepared or did not actively participate when requested. Did not fully understand lessons learned, counterproductive during discussions, or impeded others' participation or learning.

2.6. Qualification Phase.

2.6.1. Area 856—Uncoupled Hovering Maneuvers:

2.6.1.1. Q. Able to hover/recover the aircraft in the event of a FD failure. Aircraft control was smooth and positive. Maintained altitude/position/ground track, as applicable.

2.6.1.2. Q-. Same as Q except for minor deviations in altitude/position/ground track which did not compromise safety.

2.6.1.3. U. Performance not in accordance with procedures outlined in the flight manual and other published directives. Aircraft control/position/ground track/altitude was erratic. Performance was unsafe.

2.6.2. Area 4—Takeoff (All will be performed: Normal, Marginal Power, Maximum Performance): **(T-3)**

2.6.2.1. Q. Smooth, positive aircraft control throughout the takeoff. Maintained the proper power setting (+/-5% Q) and heading (to maintain desired ground track). Performed the takeoff in accordance with flight manual and other published directives. Performed the departure as published/directed and complied with all restrictions. Visually cleared the area.

2.6.2.2. Q-. Minor flight manual procedural deviations. Some under- or over-control on lift-off. Maintained the proper power setting (+/-10% Q) and heading (significant deviations from briefed or erratic ground track). Performed the departure as published/directed and complied with all restrictions/published directives. Visually cleared the area.

2.6.2.3. U. Lift-off was potentially dangerous. Exceeded aircraft/systems limitations. Failed to establish proper aircraft attitude. Over-controlled the aircraft resulting in excessive deviations and unsafe flight path. Failed to comply with the published/directed departure instructions or exceeded the limits of Q-. Level off was erratic and exceeded above limits. Failed to establish the proper cruise airspeed. Failed to adequately clear the area.

2.6.3. Area 851—Autorotations (**Note:** Both Straight Ahead and Low Altitude will be performed): **(T-3)**

2.6.3.1. Q. (Aircraft) Airspeeds, altitudes, and procedures were in accordance with the flight manual and other published directives. Safely entered the autorotation, controlled the rotor revolutions per minute (RPM) throughout maneuver, and flared appropriately to put the aircraft in a position from which it could be safely landed within the desired area. Safely conducted a power recovery out of the flare. If the maneuver is terminated in a cushion/hover (at the FE's discretion), examinee is able to terminate no lower than 15 feet with no more than 30 knots ground speed.

2.6.3.2. Q. (Simulator) Airspeeds, altitudes, and procedures were in accordance with the flight manual and other published directives. Controlled the rotor RPM throughout maneuver. Landed safely and within the desired area.

2.6.3.3. Q-. (Aircraft) Same as Q except for deviations which would not have compromised safety.

2.6.3.4. Q-. (Simulator) Same as Q except for deviations which would not have compromised safety.

2.6.3.5. U. (Aircraft) Major deviations from the procedures outlined in the flight manual and other published directives. Failed to control rotor RPM. Would not have landed safely or within the desired area. Failed to maintain proper aircraft control.

2.6.3.6. U. (Simulator) Major deviations from the procedures outlined in the flight manual and other published directives. Failed to control rotor RPM. Did not land safely or within the desired area. Failed to maintain proper aircraft control.

2.6.4. Area 70—Simulated Single Engine Approach/Roll-on Landing:

2.6.4.1. Q. Established aircraft on desired approach path at desired airspeeds. Controlled power application in accordance with simulated single engine power available. Performed the approach and landing in accordance with procedures outlined in the flight manual and other published directives. Aircraft control was smooth and positive. Touchdown was within the desired area. Aware of and abided by minimum safe single engine airspeed and the existing power available/required while simulating single engine performance.

2.6.4.2. Q-. Same as Q except for deviations which did not compromise safety.

2.6.4.3. U. Performance was not in accordance with procedures outlined in the flight manual or other directives. Aircraft control was erratic/unsafe. Failed to touchdown within the desired area. Unaware of minimum safe single engine airspeed and/or existing power available/required.

2.6.5. Area 596—SAS/Boost Off Approach/Landing:

2.6.5.1. Q. Properly established aircraft in appropriate configuration in accordance with flight manual and other directives. Pattern, approach, and landing accomplished safely with adequate consideration of degraded aircraft performance. Aircraft control was smooth and positive.

2.6.5.2. Q-. Same as Q except for deviations which did not compromise safety.

2.6.5.3. U. Major deviations to the procedures outlined in the flight manual and other published directives. Did not adequately adjust for degraded aircraft performance in a way that could jeopardize safety. Aircraft control was erratic/unsafe.

2.6.6. Area 597—Manual Stabilator Operations:

2.6.6.1. Q. Properly established aircraft in appropriate configuration in accordance with flight manual and other directives. Pattern, approach, and landing accomplished safely with adequate consideration of degraded aircraft performance. Aircraft control was smooth and positive.

2.6.6.2. Q-. Same as Q except for deviations which did not compromise safety.

2.6.6.3. U. Major deviations to the procedures outlined in the flight manual and other published directives. Did not adequately adjust for degraded aircraft performance in a way that could jeopardize safety. Aircraft control was erratic/unsafe.

2.6.7. Area 565—Manual Enhanced Digital Electronic Control Unit (EDECU) Operations:

2.6.7.1. Q. Properly established aircraft in appropriate configuration in accordance with flight manual and other directives. Correctly entered and exited lockout condition, as required. Controlled engine and rotor RPM in safe operating parameters throughout the maneuver. Pattern, approach, and landing accomplished safely with adequate consideration of degraded aircraft performance. Aircraft control was smooth and positive.

2.6.7.2. Q-. Same as Q except for deviations which did not compromise safety.

2.6.7.3. U. Major deviations to the procedures outlined in the flight manual and other published directives. Consistently failed to control engine and rotor RPM. Did not adequately adjust for degraded aircraft performance in a way that could jeopardize safety. Aircraft control was erratic/unsafe.

2.6.8. Area 23—Traffic Patterns:

2.6.8.1. Q. Performed traffic patterns in accordance with the procedures outlined in the flight manual, operating procedures, and local directives. Aircraft control was positive and smooth. Constantly cleared the area of intended flight.

2.6.8.1.1. Altitude. +/-100 feet

2.6.8.1.2. Airspeed. +/-10 Knots Indicated Airspeed (KIAS)

2.6.8.1.3. Ground Track. +/-5 degrees

2.6.8.2. Q-. Performed traffic patterns with minor deviations to the procedures outlined in the flight manual, operating procedures, and local directives. Aircraft control was not consistently smooth, but safe. Constantly cleared the area of intended flight.

2.6.8.2.1. Altitude. +/-150 feet

2.6.8.2.2. Airspeed. +/-15 KIAS

2.6.8.2.3. Ground Track. +/-10 degrees

2.6.8.3. U. Traffic patterns were not performed in accordance with the procedures outlined in the flight manual, operational procedures, and local directives. Erratic aircraft control. Exceeded the Q- parameters.

2.6.9. Area 25—Approaches/Landings (All will be performed: Normal/Shallow/Steep): **(T-3)**

2.6.9.1. Q. Performed the approaches and landings in accordance with the procedures outlined in the flight manual and published directives. Aircraft control was smooth and positive. Started the final descent on the desired approach angle. Demonstrated satisfactory control to maintain/correct to the desired rate of descent and approach angle. Touchdown/termination was within the desired area or examinee adjusts intended spot/goes around as required.

2.6.9.1.1. Entry Airspeed. +/-5 knots

2.6.9.1.2. Entry Altitude. +/-50 feet

2.6.9.1.3. Landed to intended spot. +/- ½ Rotor Disc

2.6.9.2. Q-. Same as Q except for minor deviations to procedures outlined in the flight manual and published directives.

2.6.9.2.1. Entry Airspeed. +/-10 knots

2.6.9.2.2. Entry Altitude. +/-100 feet

2.6.9.2.3. Landed to intended spot. +/- 1 Rotor Disc

2.6.9.3. U. Major deviations to the procedures outlined in the flight manual and published directives. Aircraft control was erratic/unsafe. Consistently overshoot/undershot final.

Failed to recognize/maintain the correct or desired rate of descent and approach angle.
Failed to touchdown or terminate within the desired area. Exceeded the limits of Q-.

2.7. Instrument Phase.

2.7.1. Area 15—Unusual Attitudes:

2.7.1.1. Q. Smooth, positive recovery to level flight using the correct recovery procedures. Demonstrated a satisfactory knowledge of procedures.

2.7.1.2. Q-. Slow to analyze or erratic in recovery to level flight. Correct recovery procedures used.

2.7.1.3. U. Unable to determine attitude or used improper recovery procedures. Inadequate knowledge of proper procedures.

2.7.2. Area 6—Instrument Departure/Climb/Level Off:

2.7.2.1. Q. Smooth, positive aircraft control throughout the takeoff. Performed in accordance with flight manual procedures. Performed the departure as published/directed and complied with all restrictions. Crossing/intermediate altitudes were +/-200 feet. Maintained course/heading and recognized deviations of +/-5 degrees or less and applied corrections promptly. Leveled off smoothly at the specified altitude within +/-200 feet. Promptly established the proper cruise airspeed.

2.7.2.2. Q-. Minor flight manual procedural deviations. Some under- or over-control on lift-off. Performed the departure as published/directed and complied with all restrictions. Crossing/intermediate altitudes were +/-300 feet. Maintained course/heading and recognized deviations of +/-10 degrees or less and applied corrections promptly. Level off was erratic, maintained altitude within +/-300 feet. Slow in establishing the proper cruise airspeed.

2.7.2.3. U. Lift off was potentially dangerous. Exceeded aircraft/systems limitations. Failed to establish the proper aircraft attitude. Over-controlled the aircraft resulting in excessive deviations from the intended flight path. Failed to comply with the published/directed departure instructions or exceeded the limits of Q-. Level off was erratic, or exceeded the limits of Q-. Excessive delay or failed to establish the proper cruise airspeed.

2.7.3. Area 12—Navigation/Use of Navigation Aids (NAVAIDS):

2.7.3.1. Q. Demonstrated a satisfactory capability to navigate. Used appropriate navigation procedures. Ensured radio NAVAIDS were properly tuned, identified, monitored, and selected; RNAV is loaded/configured properly, receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) checked/monitored, proper airways/procedures selected and input into route. Complied with clearance instructions. Aware of position at all times.

2.7.3.1.1. Course. +/-half dot

2.7.3.1.2. Altitude. +/-200 feet

2.7.3.1.3. Airspeed. +/-5 KIAS

2.7.3.2. Q-. Minor errors in the procedures/use of navigation equipment. Some deviations in tuning, identifying, monitoring, and selecting radio NAVAIDS; improper RNAV use

that did not jeopardize safety. Slow to comply with clearance instructions. Had some difficulty in establishing exact position.

2.7.3.2.1. Course. +/-1 dot

2.7.3.2.2. Altitude. +/- 300 feet

2.7.3.2.3. Airspeed. +/-10 KIAS

2.7.3.3. U. Major errors in the procedures/use of navigation equipment. Could not establish position. Failed to recognize checkpoints or adjust for deviations in time and course. Exceeded the parameters for Q-.

2.7.4. Area 61—Holding Procedures:

2.7.4.1. Q. Entry and holding procedures were in accordance with applicable directives. Holding pattern limits were exceeded by not more than:

2.7.4.1.1. Timed. +/-15 seconds (after established in the pattern)

2.7.4.1.2. Distance Measuring Equipment (DME). +/-0.5 mile

2.7.4.1.3. Heading/Course. +/-1/2 dot (on inbound leg)

2.7.4.1.4. Altitude. +/-200 feet

2.7.4.1.5. Airspeed. +/-10 KIAS

2.7.4.2. Q-. Entry and holding procedures were in accordance with applicable directives. Holding pattern limits were exceeded by not more than:

2.7.4.2.1. Timed. +/-30 seconds (after established in the pattern)

2.7.4.2.2. DME. +/-1 mile

2.7.4.2.3. Heading/Course. +/-1 dot (on inbound leg)

2.7.4.2.4. Altitude. +/-300 feet

2.7.4.2.5. Airspeed. +/-15 KIAS

2.7.4.3. U. Entry and/or holding procedures were not in accordance with applicable directives. Exceeded the criteria for Q-.

2.7.5. Area 64—Non-Precision Approach (**Note:** During INIT and RQ evaluations an RNAV approach should be evaluated):

2.7.5.1. Q. Performed the approach/pattern as published/directed and in accordance with the flight manual and other directives. Complied with all clearances and restrictions. Made smooth/timely corrections. Position at the missed approach point (MAP) would have permitted a safe landing.

2.7.5.1.1. Altitude. +/-100 feet

2.7.5.1.2. Airspeed. +/-5 KIAS

2.7.5.1.3. Heading/Course. +/-5 degrees

2.7.5.1.4. TACAN ARC. +/-0.5 mile

- 2.7.5.1.5. Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA). -0/+100 feet
- 2.7.5.2. Q-. Performed the procedures with minor deviations. Slow to make corrections. Position at the MAP would have permitted a safe landing.
 - 2.7.5.2.1. Altitude. +/-150 feet
 - 2.7.5.2.2. Airspeed. +/-10 KIAS
 - 2.7.5.2.3. Heading/Course. +/-10 degrees
 - 2.7.5.2.4. TACAN ARC. +/-1 mile
 - 2.7.5.2.5. MDA. -50/+150 feet
- 2.7.5.3. U. Performed the procedures with major deviations. Erratic corrections were made. Exceeded the limits of Q-. Maintained steady state flight below MDA. Position at the MAP would not have permitted a safe landing.
- 2.7.6. Area 66—Precision Approach:
 - 2.7.6.1. - ILS
 - 2.7.6.1.1. Q. Performed the approach/pattern as published/directed and in accordance with the flight manual and other directives. Complied with all clearances and restrictions. Made smooth and timely corrections to azimuth and glide slope. Complied with the decision altitude (DA) and the position at DA would have permitted a safe landing.
 - 2.7.6.1.1.1. Airspeed. +/-5 KIAS
 - 2.7.6.1.1.2. Heading/Course. +/-5 degrees
 - 2.7.6.1.1.3. Glide Slope/Azimuth. Within 1 dot
 - 2.7.6.1.2. Q-. Performed the procedures with minor deviations. Slow to make corrections or initiate procedures. Position at the DA would have permitted a safe landing.
 - 2.7.6.1.2.1. Airspeed. +/-10 KIAS
 - 2.7.6.1.2.2. Heading/Course. +/-10 degrees
 - 2.7.6.1.2.3. Glide Slope. Within one dot low/two dots high
 - 2.7.6.1.2.4. Azimuth. Within two dots
 - 2.7.6.1.3. U. Performed the procedures with major deviations. Erratic corrections were made. Exceeded the limits of Q-. Did not comply with the DA or the position at DA would not have permitted a safe landing.
 - 2.7.6.2. PAR:
 - 2.7.6.2.1. Q. Performed the approach/pattern as published/directed and in accordance with the flight manual and other directives. Made smooth and timely corrections to the controller's instructions. Complied with the DA and the position at DA would have permitted a safe landing.
 - 2.7.6.2.1.1. Airspeed. +/-5 KIAS

2.7.6.2.1.2. Heading/Course. Within 5 degrees of controller's instructions

2.7.6.2.2. Q-. Performed the procedures with minor deviations. Slow to make corrections or initiate procedures. Position at the DA would have permitted a safe landing.

2.7.6.2.2.1. Airspeed. +/-10 KIAS

2.7.6.2.2.2. Heading/Course. Within 10 degrees of controller's instructions

2.7.6.2.3. U. Performed the procedures with major deviations. Erratic corrections were made. Exceeded the limits of Q-. Did not respond properly to the controller's instructions. Did not comply with the DA and/or the position at DA would not have permitted a safe landing.

2.7.7. Area 67—Missed Approach/Climb Out:

2.7.7.1. Q. Executed the missed approach/climb out as published/directed. Completed all procedures in accordance with the flight manual and other directives.

2.7.7.1.1. Level Off Altitude. +/-200 feet

2.7.7.1.2. Maneuvering Airspeed. +/-5 KIAS

2.7.7.1.3. Heading/Course. +/-5 degrees

2.7.7.2. Q-. Executed the missed approach/climb out with minor deviations. Slow to comply with the published procedures/directives, controller's instructions, or flight manual.

2.7.7.2.1. Level Off Altitude. +/-300 feet

2.7.7.2.2. Maneuvering Airspeed. +/-10 KIAS

2.7.7.2.3. Heading/Course. +/-10 degrees

2.7.7.3. U. Executed the missed approach with major deviations. Failed to comply with the published procedures/directives, controller's instructions, or flight manual. Exceeded the limits of Q-.

2.8. Mission Phase.

2.8.1. Area 81—Tactical Mission Planning:

2.8.1.1. Q. (P) Applied the appropriate tactics to the mission scenario. Followed guidance contained in Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTPs), Special Instructions (SPINS), Air Tasking Orders (ATO), and Concept of Operations (CONOPS). Displayed good judgment. Mitigated the threat to an acceptable level based on mission requirements. Thoroughly planned all aspects of the mission using the crew concept. Updated the intelligence situation prior to the briefing. Loaded DTD properly to enable proper aircraft initialization and mission accomplishment.

2.8.1.2. Q-. (P) Marginally planned all aspects of the mission. Partial application of the approved guidance to the scenario given. Possessed a limited knowledge of approved tactical guidance. Limited utilization of planning resources (i.e., intelligence, crew expertise, etc.). Committed minor errors in loading DTD causing aircraft to initialize

improperly and/or did not ensure that all mission data transferred correctly, but it did not jeopardize safety or mission accomplishment.

2.8.1.3. U. (P) Mission planning was based upon unapproved/unrealistic tactics. No plan to degrade the threat to the lowest level possible. Did not utilize crew inputs/considerations. Ignored numerous aspects of the mission. Possessed a poor knowledge of approved tactical guidance. Failed to update the intelligence situation prior to the briefing. Committed errors in loading DTD causing aircraft to initialize improperly and or missing data was a causal factor that the mission could not be accomplished and/or failed.

2.8.1.4. Q. (MC) Adequately assisted the pilot in planning the mission and loading DTD. Actively involved in the mission planning process. Familiar with and able to locate information contained in the appropriate tactical guidance. Assisted the pilot in updating the intelligence situation prior to the briefing.

2.8.1.5. Q-. (MC) Provided marginal assistance in the mission planning process. Limited knowledge of the location of approved tactical guidance.

2.8.1.6. U. (MC) Did not assist the pilot in mission planning. Not actively involved in the planning process. Unfamiliar with the information contained in approved tactical guidance publications. Failed to update the intelligence situation prior to the briefing.

2.8.2. Area 83—Mission Execution:

2.8.2.1. Q. (P) Successful execution of the mission plan. Enhanced others' ability to contribute to mission completion. Adhered to the mission plan until the tactical situation required otherwise. Accomplished planned mission objectives.

2.8.2.2. Q-. (P) Poor execution of the mission plan. Slow to adjust to changes in the tactical situation. Abandoned the mission plan. Did not interfere with others' ability to contribute to mission completion.

2.8.2.3. U. (P) Did not execute mission plan. Unable to adjust to changes in the tactical situation. Detracted from others' ability to contribute to mission completion.

2.8.2.4. Q. (MC) Effectively performed required duties in support of mission tasks.

2.8.2.5. Q-. (MC) Marginal performance of required duties.

2.8.2.6. U. (MC) Poor performance of required duties. Unable to accomplish required tasks.

2.8.3. Area 857—Tactical Employment Procedures:

2.8.3.1. Q. (P) Planned and applied tactics consistent with AFTTPs, SPINS, ATO, CONOPS, other directives, and good judgment. Developed a tactical plan and successfully completed it to the maximum extent possible. Adjusted to the tactical situation.

2.8.3.2. Q-. (P) Knowledge of tactics was adequate, but the mission plan contained minor deviations from good tactical considerations. Slow to make adjustments to the tactical situation.

2.8.3.3. U. (P) Did not develop a tactical plan for the mission. Tactics used were ineffective in countering the threat and/or accomplishing the mission.

2.8.3.4. Q. (MC) Possessed knowledge of tactical considerations commensurate with experience and was able to assist the pilot in executing the tactical plan.

2.8.3.5. Q-. (MC) Possessed a limited knowledge of tactical considerations and was unable to assist the pilot in executing the tactical plan.

2.8.3.6. U. (MC) Did not employ the briefed tactical plan for the mission. Tactics used were ineffective in countering the threat and/or accomplishing the mission. Interfered with the pilot in executing the tactical plan.

2.8.4. Area 88—Terrain/Flight Navigation:

2.8.4.1. Q. (P) Could accurately determine position when map reading or when operating the geosituational awareness system (GEOSIT). Recognized all check/turn points. Remained within 1 nautical mile (NM) of planned course unless deviating for unanticipated obstacles/threats, and stayed within range/area boundaries. Altitude, route of flight, and use of supporting assets reflected consideration of enemy threats. Demonstrated the capability to quickly adjust for deviations in timing and course. If the scenario required a Time on Target (TOT), the examinee arrived at the target within +/-30 seconds of the TOT.

2.8.4.2. Q-. (P) Slow to determine the position when map reading or using GEOSIT. Slow to recognize check/turn points. Remained within 2 NMs of planned course unless deviating for unanticipated obstacles/threats, and stayed within range/area boundaries. Altitude, route of flight, and use of supporting assets contributed to limited/preventable exposure to enemy threats. Slow to recognize and adjust for deviations in timing and course. If a TOT was required, the examinee arrived at the target within +/-1 minute of the TOT.

2.8.4.3. U. (P) Could not establish position. Failed to recognize check/turn points or adjust for deviations in timing and course. Exceeded the parameters for Q-. Flew outside the established range/area boundaries. Altitude, route of flight, and/or use of supporting assets resulted in dangerous/unnecessary exposure to enemy threats.

2.8.4.4. Q. (MC) Able to determine position when map reading or using GEOSIT. Able to recognize all check/turn points. Remained within 1 NM of planned course unless deviating for unanticipated obstacles/threats, and stayed within range/area boundaries. Altitude, route of flight, and use of supporting assets reflected consideration of enemy threats. Recognized and adjusted for deviations in timing and course. If a TOT was required, the examinee arrived at the target within +/-1 minute of the TOT. Informed the crew of route progress using leg and threat briefs.

2.8.4.5. Q-. (MC) Slow to determine position when map reading or using GEOSIT. Slow to recognize check/turn points. Remained within 2 NMs of planned course unless deviating for obstacles/threats and stayed within the range/area boundaries. Altitude, route of flight, and use of supporting assets contributed to limited/preventable exposure to enemy threats. Slow to recognize and adjust for deviations in timing and course. If a TOT was required, the examinee arrived at the target within +/-1.5 minutes of the TOT. Leg and/or threat briefs were delayed, incomplete, or inaccurate.

2.8.4.6. U. (MC) Could not establish position. Failed to recognize check/turn points or adjust for deviations in timing and course. Exceeded the parameters for Q-. Flew outside the established range/area boundaries. Altitude, route of flight, and/or use of supporting

assets resulted in dangerous/unnecessary exposure to enemy threats. Leg and/or threat briefs detracted from crew SA with regards to route or mission progress.

2.8.5. Area 9—Formation:

2.8.5.1. Formation Lead

2.8.5.1.1. Q. (P) Established appropriate formations. Effectively directed the flight to accomplish mission objectives. Good SA and wingman consideration. Positive control of the flight/element. Smooth on the controls. Planned ahead and made timely decisions. Complied with established procedures.

2.8.5.1.2. Q-. (P) Adequate flight management. Fair SA and wingman consideration. Control inputs were not unsafe, but made it difficult for wingman to maintain position. Did not always plan ahead and/or hesitant in making decisions. Minor deviations in established procedures.

2.8.5.1.3. U. (P) Did not establish the appropriate formations. Poor SA and wingman consideration. Rough on the controls. Major deviations in established procedures. Indecisive.

2.8.5.1.4. Q. (MC) Smooth on the controls with minor deviations. Good SA and wingman considerations. Planned ahead and made timely decisions. Complied with established procedures and flight lead's direction.

2.8.5.1.5. Q-. (MC) Adequate flight management as directed by pilot/flight lead. Fair SA and wingman consideration. Control inputs were not unsafe, but made it difficult for wingman to maintain position. Did not always plan ahead and/or hesitant in making decisions. Minor deviations in established procedures and/or flight lead's direction.

2.8.5.1.6. U. (MC) Did not establish the directed formations. Poor SA and wingman consideration. Rough on the controls. Major deviations in established procedures. Indecisive.

2.8.5.2. Formation Wingman:

2.8.5.2.1. Q. (P) Maintained position with only momentary deviations. Made smooth and immediate position corrections. Maintained safe separation and complied with established procedures. Smooth, timely join-up. Good SA.

2.8.5.2.2. Q-. (P) Varied position, but within limits. Minor over-controlling. Minor procedural deviations. Slow join-up. Fair SA.

2.8.5.2.3. U. (P) Unable to maintain a formation position. Abrupt position corrections. Significant over-controlling requiring assistance from other pilot. Did not maintain safe separation. Unsafe join-up or formation procedures. Poor SA.

2.8.5.2.4. Q. (MC) Maintained position with only minor deviations. Made position corrections as necessary or when directed by the pilot/flight lead. Maintained safe separation and complied with procedures. Positive join-up. Good SA.

2.8.5.2.5. Q-. (MC) Varied position considerably, but within limits. Over-controlled. Minor procedural deviations. Slow join-up. Fair SA.

2.8.5.2.6. U. (MC) Unable to maintain a formation position. Abrupt position corrections. Significant over-controlling requiring assistance from other pilot. Did not maintain safe separation. Unsafe join-up or formation procedures. Poor SA.

2.8.6. Area 94—Threat Identification/Countermeasure Procedures:

2.8.6.1. Q. Threat reactions were timely and correct in accordance with TTPs. Accomplished appropriate countermeasures and performed maneuvers to counter the threat within safe operating parameters.

2.8.6.2. Q-. Threat reactions were slow or inconsistent with TTPs. Slow to accomplish appropriate countermeasures or perform maneuvers to counter threat. Temporarily exceeded operating limits.

2.8.6.3. U. Failed to take the appropriate evasive action or activate the appropriate countermeasures. Exceeded the aircraft limitations during evasive maneuvering. Improper threat call and/or clearing/scanning procedures. Flew back through the threat area after completion of the evasive maneuver. Did not place the helicopter in a position to apply suppressive fire, if appropriate.

2.8.7. Area 858—Mission Systems Operations/Employment:

2.8.7.1. Q. Loaded and employed systems (ex. CIB, tactical data link (TDL), personnel locator system (PLS), etc.) to exchange digital information/build SA and uses information appropriately to conduct mission accomplishment.

2.8.7.2. Q-. Loading and employment of equipment resulted in delays or minor errors that do not affect overall mission accomplishment.

2.8.7.3. U. Failed to load or employ mission equipment resulting in significant delays and/or uncorrected errors that result in mission failure.

2.8.8. Area 852—Terminal Area Operations:

2.8.8.1. Q. Performance in accordance with the procedures outlined in current HH-60W AFTTP, flight manual, operational manuals, and other published directives. Aircraft control was smooth and positive. Thoroughly aware of power and EM requirements/limitations and the appropriate site restrictions. Proper consideration and use of terrain features and wind conditions. Performed a thorough site evaluation. Appropriate approach path/angle used for the given terrain features, wind, and landing zone (LZ) conditions. Rate of descent during the approach was within limits. If acting as the non-flying pilot, closely monitored the aircraft systems/instruments and aircraft flight path/position. Assisted the flying pilot as briefed/required.

2.8.8.2. Q-. Same as Q except for minor deviations which did not affect safety/mission accomplishment.

2.8.8.3. U. Major deviations to the procedures outlined in current HH-60W AFTTP, the flight manual, operational manuals, and/or other published directives. Aircraft control was erratic/unsafe. Failed to consider power and EM requirements/limitations, site training restrictions, terrain features, or wind conditions. Failed to perform a thorough site evaluation. If acting as the non-flying pilot, failed to monitor aircraft systems/instruments and/or aircraft flight path/position. Did not assist the pilot flying as briefed/required.

2.8.9. Area 853—AIE Operations (**Note:** Uncoupled hover is not required for evaluation; aircrew can elect to use coupled FD for AIE operations):

2.8.9.1. Q. Performance was in accordance with the procedures outlined in the flight manual and other published directives. Aircraft control was smooth and positive during the reconnaissance, approach, hover, and takeoff. Thoroughly aware of the power requirements/limitations. Proper consideration and use of the terrain features and wind conditions. Displayed the proper consideration of the AIE device length versus the altitude of deployment. Approach facilitated AIE with minimal delays. Minor drift tendencies were promptly corrected. Good SA. If acting as the non-flying pilot, closely monitored and called out aircraft systems/instruments and aircraft flight path/position. Assisted the pilot flying as briefed/required.

2.8.9.1.1. Maintain Hover Altitude. +/-5' of intended altitude

2.8.9.1.2. Maintain Heading. +/-10 degrees

2.8.9.2. Q-. Same as Q except for minor deviations which did not affect safety/mission accomplishment. Approach and/or hover did not jeopardize safety, but prevented the operation from being promptly accomplished.

2.8.9.2.1. Maintain Hover Altitude. +/-10' of intended altitude

2.8.9.2.2. Maintain Heading. +/-15 degrees

2.8.9.3. U. Major deviations to the procedures outlined in the flight manual, and other published directives. Aircraft control was erratic/unsafe. Failed to consider power requirements/limitations, device length versus deployment altitude, use of terrain features, and wind conditions. Poor SA. If acting as the non-flying pilot, failed to monitor and call out aircraft systems/instruments and/or aircraft flight path/position. Did not assist the pilot flying as briefed/required. Exceeded the parameters of Q-.

2.8.10. Area 280—Helicopter Air-to-Air Refueling:

2.8.10.1. Q. Performance in accordance with the procedures outlined in the flight manual and other published directives. Aircraft control was smooth and positive during the rendezvous, join-up, contact, disconnect and crossover. Contacts were accomplished in a safe/timely fashion with controlled misses (if applicable). When not flying, closely monitored fuel management, aircraft systems/instruments, and lighting. Assisted the pilot flying as briefed/required.

2.8.10.1.1. Join-up Airspeed. +/-10 KIA

2.8.10.1.2. Join-up Altitude (Receiver High). +100 feet/-50

2.8.10.1.3. Join-up Altitude (Receiver Low). -100 feet/+50

2.8.10.2. Q-. (P and Plug-Qualified MC) Same as Q except for minor deviations which did not affect safety/mission accomplishment.

2.8.10.2.1. Join-up Airspeed. +/-15 KIAS

2.8.10.2.2. Join-up Altitude (Receiver High). +150 feet/-50

2.8.10.2.3. Join-up Altitude (Receiver Low). -150 feet/+50

2.8.10.3. U. (P and Plug-Qualified) Major deviations to the procedures outlined in the flight manual and other published directives. Aircraft control was erratic/unsafe. Unable to perform contacts and/or misses were dangerous. When not flying, failed to monitor fuel management, aircraft systems/instruments, and/or aircraft flight path/position. Did not assist the pilot flying as briefed/required. Exceeded the parameters of Q-.

2.8.10.4. Q. (Non-plug Qualified MC) Able to maintain the observation position (or the wingman position) and perform a crossover with only minor deviations. When not flying, closely monitored fuel management, aircraft systems/instruments, and lighting. Assisted the pilot flying as briefed/required.

2.8.10.4.1. Join-up Airspeed. +/-10 KIAS

2.8.10.4.2. Join-up Altitude (Receiver High). +125 feet/-50

2.8.10.4.3. Join-up Altitude (Receiver Low). -125 feet/+50

2.8.10.5. Q-. (Non-plug Qualified MC) Same as Q except for minor deviations which did not affect safety/mission accomplishment.

2.8.10.5.1. Join-up Airspeed. +/-15 KIAS

2.8.10.5.2. Join-up Altitude (Receiver High). +175 feet/-50

2.8.10.5.3. Join-up Altitude (Receiver Low). -175 feet/+50

2.8.10.6. U. (Non-plug Qualified MC) Major deviations to the procedures outlined in the flight manual and other published directives. When not flying, failed to monitor fuel management, aircraft systems/instruments, and/or aircraft flight path/position. Did not assist the pilot flying as briefed/required. Exceeded the parameters of Q-.

2.9. Instructor Phase.

2.9.1. Area 47—Instructor Briefings/Debriefings/Critique:

2.9.1.1. Q. Briefings/debriefings were well organized, accurate, and thorough. Clearly defined the mission's objectives. Ability to reconstruct the flight, offers mission analysis, and provides corrective guidance where appropriate. Pre-briefed the student's next mission.

2.9.1.2. Q-. Minor errors or omissions in briefings and/or debrief that did not affect safety or mission effectiveness. Occasionally unclear in analysis of events or procedures.

2.9.1.3. U. Briefings were ineffective or non-existent. Major errors or omissions in briefings/debriefings. Analysis of events or procedures was incomplete, inaccurate, or confusing. Failed to define the mission's objectives. Vague or nonexistent pre-briefing of the student's next mission.

2.9.2. Area 56—Demonstration of Performance:

2.9.2.1. Q. Effectively demonstrated procedures and techniques as required per student needs on the ground and in flight effectively and within prescribed parameters. Provided concise, meaningful commentary.

2.9.2.2. Q-. Demonstrated procedures and techniques (fewer than two) with minor deviations from prescribed parameters. Commentary was sometimes unclear.

2.9.2.3. U. Did not demonstrate correct procedures or techniques. Did not provide commentary or commentary was consistently unclear and/or incorrect.

2.9.3. Area 55—Instructor Knowledge:

2.9.3.1. Q. Demonstrated a thorough knowledge of all applicable aircraft procedures, requirements, systems/performance characteristics, techniques, and missions to be performed. Demonstrated a thorough knowledge of all applicable publications and regulations.

2.9.3.2. Q-. Demonstrated minor errors in the above areas that did not affect safety or mission accomplishment.

2.9.3.3. U. Failed to demonstrate an adequate knowledge of aircraft procedures, requirements, systems/performance characteristics, techniques, and missions performed. Knowledge of publications and/or regulations was inadequate. Lack of knowledge in certain areas seriously detracted from instructor effectiveness.

2.9.4. Area 33—Instructional Ability:

2.9.4.1. Q. Demonstrated the ability to communicate effectively. Provided the appropriate corrective guidance when necessary. Planned ahead and made timely decisions. Identified and corrected potentially unsafe maneuvers/situations.

2.9.4.2. Q-. Accomplished the above tasks with minor discrepancies that did not affect safety or mission accomplishment.

2.9.4.3. U. Demonstrated an inability to effectively communicate and provide timely feedback. Did not provide corrective actions when necessary. Did not plan ahead or anticipate student problems. Did not identify unsafe maneuvers/situations in a timely manner.

2.9.5. Area 50—Training Documentation Procedures:

2.9.5.1. Q. Demonstrated an accurate review and completion of the appropriate training/evaluation records. Accurately assessed and documented student performance. Comments were clear and pertinent.

2.9.5.2. Q-. Demonstrated minor errors or omissions in the review and completion of training/evaluation records that did not adversely affect effectiveness of the mission. Comments were incomplete or slightly unclear.

2.9.5.3. U. Did not review and/or complete the required forms or records. Comments were invalid and/or unclear. Did not accurately assess or document the student's performance.

Chapter 3

SPECIAL MISSION AVIATION (BASIC QUALIFIED FLIGHT ENGINEER (FF)/MISSION QUALIFIED FLIGHT ENGINEER (MF)/ INSTRUCTOR FLIGHT ENGINEER (IF) EVALUATIONS)

3.1. Crew Positions. Evaluation standards will be administered in accordance with the individual's crew position as listed below. **(T-2)**

3.1.1. Basic Qualified SMA (FF). SMAs that have successfully completed an INIT and have a current periodic evaluation covering the General and QUAL requirements of **Table 3.1**. Normally, this position is not intended to be used as a permanent qualification but for members in positions where it does not make sense to maintain a Mission Qualification. Unit commanders or equivalent will decide when it is appropriate to have a SMA Basic Qualified only.

3.1.2. Mission Qualified SMA (MF). SMAs that have successfully completed an INIT and have a current periodic evaluation covering the General, QUAL and MSN requirements of **Table 3.1**. It is intended for this evaluation to be completed in one sortie but may be conducted on multiple flights if required.

3.1.3. Instructor SMA (IF). SMAs that have successfully completed an INIT INSTR evaluation and have a current periodic QUAL and/or MSN evaluation that included the Instructor areas of **Table 3.1**.

3.1.4. Evaluator SMA Evaluator Flight Engineer (EF). EF selection, upgrade and objectivity evaluations will be in accordance with AFMAN 11-202V2, MAJCOM supplements and local directives. **(T-2)** An EF will be evaluated as an IF during normal periodic evaluations.

3.2. Evaluation Event Requirements. Refer to **Table 3.1** for required events.

3.2.1. Qualification/Mission Evaluations. Qualification/Mission (QUAL/MSN) profile requires demonstrated proficiency in qualification and mission events per unit taskings and examinee's qualification, experience level and certifications listed in AFMAN 11-2HH-60WV1. Mission events, as outlined in **Table 3.1**, must be accomplished in-flight. **(T-3)** Some Qualification sub-areas, as outlined in **Table 3.1**, should be evaluated in approved training devices during the EPE, however they may be evaluated in-flight if required due to simulator unavailability or per the FE's discretion, and may be accomplished simultaneously with the mission events. Evaluations may be accomplished with the examinee on the left or right side of the aircraft.

3.2.1.1. Engine Run Operations. At the discretion of the examiner, if the examinee is certified in engine run operations, this may be evaluated. FEs may evaluate these tasks in either a MAJCOM approved H-60W simulator or in the aircraft.

3.2.1.2. AIE. Examinee should be evaluated as Hoist Operator/AIE Safety person in the aircraft cabin.

3.2.1.2.1. For INIT and RQ QUAL/MSN evaluations, accomplish one of each event:

3.2.1.2.2. Fast rope

3.2.1.2.3. Rappel

3.2.1.2.4. Rope ladder

3.2.1.2.4.1. Hoist insertion/extraction. **Note:** AIE and hoist operations will be evaluated using actual equipment for each event. **(T-3)**

3.2.1.2.4.2. Live AIEs should be accomplished for INIT and RQ QUAL/MSN evaluations. Failure to complete live AIE certification requirements will be documented in the remarks section on the AF Form 8. **(T-2)**

3.2.1.2.4.3. For periodic QUAL/MSN evaluations accomplish a minimum of one hoist insertion or extraction. AIE and hoist operations will be evaluated using actual equipment for each event. **(T-3)** FEs will annotate in the remarks section of the AF Form 8 whether or not live AIEs were accomplished. **(T-3)**

3.2.1.3. Weapons Employment. Once trained and evaluated on one gun system (GAU-21, GAU-18, GAU-2 or other fielded weapon), training and certification on additional systems are in accordance with AFMAN 11-2HH-60WV1, and a separate qualification is not required. During Periodic evaluations, SMAs may be evaluated on any gun system in which they are qualified. Evaluation should be done on the weapon system most appropriate for the assigned unit's current operations taskings. The system(s) not evaluated by actual demonstration may be evaluated verbally at the EF's discretion.

3.2.2. Basic Qualification Evaluations. Basic Qualification (Basic QUAL) profiles require demonstrated proficiency in transition maneuvers and degraded aircraft performance. Qualification events, as outlined in **Table 3.1** will be accomplished in the aircraft. **(T-3)** Evaluations may be accomplished with the examinee on the left or right side of the aircraft.

3.2.3. Instructor Evaluations. Instructor evaluations evaluate instructional proficiency while accomplishing all sub-areas of **Table 3.1** as applicable (e.g., Qualification, Mission) plus the Instructor areas of **Table 3.1**. Instructors do not need to demonstrate every event, but should be able to effectively instruct where necessary by whatever means are most appropriate. The instructor/examinee should monitor all phases of flight from an advantageous position and be prepared to demonstrate or explain any area or procedure as required.

3.2.4. Instructor flight evaluations should be conducted on instructional missions with a student. When students are not available or mission/crew composition requirements prevent the inclusion of students, another qualified crewmember or the evaluator will serve as the "student" and performs those duties prescribed by the instructor/evaluator for the mission being accomplished. **(T-3)**

3.3. Special Mission Aviator (FF/MF/IF) Evaluated Event Requirement Table. FF, MF and IF evaluation requirements are listed in **Table 3.1**.

Table 3.1. Special Mission Aviator (FF/MF/IF) Evaluation Event Requirements.

SMA	Initial	Periodic	Requalification
GENERAL			
93. Knowledge of Directives and Forms	R	R	R
51. Publications Check	R	R	R

38. General Mission Planning/Weight and Balance/TOLD	R	R	R
58. Energy Management	R	R	R
2. Briefings	R	R	R
29. Systems Knowledge	R	R	R
302. Use of Checklists	R	R	R
220. Ground Handling/Support Equipment	R	R	R
231. Internal Cargo Loading/Off-Loading	R	R	R
48. Preflight/Aircraft Run-Up	R	R	R
13. Crew Coordination	R	R	R
37. Crew Resource Management	R	R	R
32. Crew/Flight Discipline (CRITICAL)	R	R	R
30. Situational Awareness (CRITICAL)	R	R	R
31. Safety, Judgment, Airmanship (CRITICAL)	R	R	R
50. Boldface Emergencies (CRITICAL)	R	R	R
26. After Landing/Engine Shutdown/Post-Flight	R	R	R
221. Aircraft Servicing	R	(1)	R
28. Debriefing	R	R	R
QUALIFICATION			
850. Hovering Maneuvers	R	R	R
4. Takeoff	R	R	R
851. Autorotations	(4)	(4)	(4)
70. Simulated Single Engine Approach/Roll-on Landing	(4)	(4)	(4)
596. SAS/Boost Off Approach/Landing	(4)	(4)	(4)
597. Manual Stabilator Operations	(4)	(4)	(4)
565. Manual EDECU Operations	(4)	(4)	(4)
25. Approaches and Landings	R	R	R
MISSION			
81. Tactical Mission Planning	R	R	R
857. Tactical Employment Procedures	R	R	R
88. Terrain Flight/Navigation	R	R	R
9. Formation	R	(3)	(2)
858. Mission System Operations/Employment	R	R	R

94. Threat ID/Countermeasure Procedures	R	R	R
852. Terminal Area Operations	R	R	R
853. AIE Operations	R	R	R
280. HAAR	R		(2)
854. Weapons Employment	R	R	R
INSTRUCTOR			See Paragraph 1.14.2
47. Briefings/Debriefings/Critiques	R	R	R
56. Demo-Performance	R	R	R
55. Instructor Knowledge	R	R	R
33. Instructional Ability	R	R	R
50. Training Documentation Procedures	R	R	R
Note 1. AFRC will incorporate as mandatory requirement for periodic Basic QUAL evaluations.			
Note 2. Not applicable for ARC units if requalification is completed within six months of qualification lapse.			
Note 3. Refer to paragraph 1.10.4.1 .			
Note 4. Not required in-flight during periodic QUAL/MSN evaluations if accomplished during the EPE in a simulator.			

3.4. SMA (FF/MF/IF) Flight Evaluation Criteria. This section contains evaluation criteria for conducting HH-60W Aerial Gunner (MF) flight evaluations. Evaluations may be administered in the left or right seat in accordance with [paragraph 3.2](#), as long as all evaluation requirements are met. This criterion serves as a grading guide for evaluators.

3.5. General Phase.

3.5.1. Area 93—Knowledge of Directives/Forms:

3.5.1.1. Q. Knowledgeable of all applicable directives, both HHQ and local. Familiar with proper forms completion.

3.5.1.2. Q-. Knowledge of capabilities, approved operating procedures, and rules are marginal in some areas but did not impact safe/effective mission accomplishment. Minor errors in forms completion.

3.5.1.3. U. Major errors or omissions in knowledge of operating capabilities or procedures that would preclude safe/effective mission accomplishment. Major errors in forms completion. Regulations/directives were intentionally violated.

3.5.2. Area 51—Publications Check: Conduct a thorough review of publications required by [paragraph 1.9.5](#).

3.5.2.1. Q. Publications are current, contain all supplements/changes, and are properly posted.

3.5.2.2. Q-. Publications contain deficiencies which would not impact flight safety or mission accomplishment.

3.5.2.3. U. Publications are outdated and/or contain deficiencies which would impact flight safety or mission accomplishment.

3.5.3. Area 38—General Mission Planning/Weight and Balance/TOLD (Take-off, In-flight, Landing):

3.5.3.1. Q. Checked all factors applicable to the flight. Ensured the crew was aware of special requirements/equipment necessary for the flight. Had a satisfactory knowledge of weight and balance. Computed the DD Form 365-4, *Weight and Balance Form F – Transport*, and TOLD within the following specified tolerances and in a timely manner:

3.5.3.1.1. Weight. +/-200 pounds

3.5.3.1.2. Center of Gravity. +/-0.5 inches

3.5.3.1.3. Power Available/Required. +/-2 percent

3.5.3.1.4. Maximum Endurance Airspeed. +0/-2 knots

3.5.3.1.5. Minimum/Maximum Safe Single Engine Airspeed. +2/-2 knots

3.5.3.1.6. VNE/VH. +0/-5 knots

3.5.3.1.7. Onset of Blade Stall. +/-2 degrees

3.5.3.2. Q-. Same as above except for minor errors or omissions that could degrade mission effectiveness. . Computed the DD Form 365-4 and TOLD within the following specified tolerances and in a timely manner:

3.5.3.2.1. Weight. +/-300 pounds

3.5.3.2.2. Center of Gravity. +/-0.7 inches

3.5.3.2.3. Power Available/Required. +/-3 percent

3.5.3.2.4. Maximum Endurance Airspeed. +2/-4 knots

3.5.3.2.5. Minimum/Maximum Safe Single Engine Airspeed. +4/-4 knots

3.5.3.2.6. VNE/VH. +2/-7 knots

3.5.3.2.7. Onset of Blade Stall. +/-5 degrees

3.5.3.3. U. Major errors or omissions that would preclude safe and effective mission accomplishment. Exceeded the limits of Q-.

3.5.4. Area 58—Energy Management:

3.5.4.1. Q. Satisfactory knowledge of EM charts. Monitored aircraft flight parameters during maneuvering. Gave clear and concise indications of climbs, descents, and approach to blade stall.

3.5.4.2. Q-. Same as above except minor deviations occurred which did not affect safe/effective mission accomplishment.

3.5.4.3. U. Unsatisfactory knowledge of EM charts. Failed to monitor aircraft flight parameters. Did not give indications of climbs, descents, or approach to blade stall.

3.5.5. Area 2—Briefings:

3.5.5.1. Q. Briefer. Well organized and professionally presented in a logical sequence. Effective use of training aids. Presented the required events and allowed for an effective discussion for accomplishing the mission. Concluded the briefing in time to allow for a thorough preflight of personal equipment, aircraft, and mission equipment. Considered the abilities/limitations of all crew and flight members. Passengers were thoroughly and professionally briefed in accordance with applicable regulations and directives.

3.5.5.2. Q-. Briefer. Events were out of sequence, redundant, and difficult to understand. Did not effectively use training aids. Focused on nonessential items and omitted minor details. Did not consider all crew/flight members' abilities. Poor time management. Passenger briefing lacked sufficient information.

3.5.5.3. U. Briefer. Disorganized sequence. Presentation omitted major details that caused confusion. Did not allow sufficient time for preflight of personal equipment, aircraft, and mission equipment. Ignored crew and flight members' abilities, limitations, and/or questions. Passengers were not briefed.

3.5.5.4. Q. Receiver. Actively participated and provided input when required. Fully understood the briefing and followed instructions.

3.5.5.5. Q-. Receiver. Did not fully understand duties and lack of action/input created minor problems that did not affect safe mission accomplishment.

3.5.5.6. U. Receiver. Missed the briefing. Not prepared or did not actively participate when requested. Did not fully understand duties, and lack of action/input created problems that impacted safe mission accomplishment.

3.5.6. Area 29—Systems Knowledge:

3.5.6.1. Q. Demonstrated a thorough knowledge of applicable aircraft systems and limitations. Ensured satisfactory operation within limits.

3.5.6.2. Q-. Limited knowledge of systems, procedures and operational limits. Safety was never compromised.

3.5.6.3. U. Demonstrated an unsatisfactory knowledge of systems, procedures, or operating limits. Allowed the aircraft or systems to be operated outside applicable limits.

3.5.7. Area 302—Use of Checklists:

3.5.7.1. Q. Effectively used the appropriate checklists with accurate and timely responses. Familiar with checklists and contents.

3.5.7.2. Q-. Used the appropriate checklists, but was slow to respond and/or had difficulty locating proper procedures.

3.5.7.3. U. Failed to use the proper checklists or was not adequately familiar with their contents.

3.5.8. Area 220—Ground Handling/Support Equipment:

3.5.8.1. Q. Familiar with the necessary ground handling/support equipment (Simple Key Loader (SKL), DTDs, Ground Cart, etc.) and knowledgeable of its safe operations.

3.5.8.2. Q-. Demonstrated a need for additional training in some ground handling and support equipment areas.

3.5.8.3. U. Displayed an unacceptable level of knowledge in the operation of necessary ground handling and support equipment.

3.5.9. Area 231—Internal Cargo Loading/Off-Loading:

3.5.9.1. Q. Satisfactorily loaded/off-loaded the aircraft in accordance with the flight manual and other applicable directives. Satisfactory knowledge of restraint equipment/requirements, weight limitations, and safety precautions.

3.5.9.2. Q-. Same as above except for minor deviations which did not affect safe/effective mission accomplishment.

3.5.9.3. U. Major deviations which would affect safe/effective mission accomplishment. Unsatisfactory knowledge of restraint equipment/requirements, weight limitations, and safety precautions.

3.5.10. Area 48—Preflight/Aircraft Run-Up:

3.5.10.1. Q. Accomplished all required aircraft/equipment inspections in accordance with the flight manual and applicable directives in a timely manner. Correctly configured the aircraft for the assigned mission. Had a thorough knowledge of information contained in the aircraft forms and correctly determined aircraft status. Adhered to station times and used all appropriate checklists correctly.

3.5.10.2. Q-. Same as above except for minor procedural deviations which did not degrade mission effectiveness.

3.5.10.3. U. Did not use the checklist or omitted major item(s). Major deviations in procedures which would preclude safe mission accomplishment. Failed to accurately determine readiness of aircraft for flight or proper configuration to perform the mission.

3.5.11. Area 13—Crew Coordination:

3.5.11.1. Q. Coordinated and communicated effectively with other crew members. Performed proper clearing and scanning procedures in accordance with current HH-60W AFTTPs.

3.5.11.2. Q-. Minor errors in crew coordination occurred which did not affect safe/effective mission accomplishment. Slow to accomplish proper clearing/scanning procedures in accordance with current HH-60W AFTTPs without compromising safety.

3.5.11.3. U. Improperly or ineffectively coordinated or communicated with other crew members causing delays or confusion which did, or could have, adversely affected safety or mission accomplishment. Failed to clear/scan. Improper clearing/scanning procedures allowed the aircraft to enter an unsafe situation.

3.5.12. Area 37—Crew Resource Management:

3.5.12.1. Q. Managed resources and duties effectively to minimize task saturation, channelized attention, and distractions among crew members. Met requirements in accordance with AFMAN 11-290 and AF Form 4031.

3.5.12.2. Q-. Minor errors in managing resources and duties which did not affect safe/effective mission accomplishment.

3.5.12.3. U. Improperly or ineffectively managed resources and/or duties which caused task saturation, channelized attention, and distractions among crew members which impacted safety or mission accomplishment.

3.5.13. Area 32—Crew/Flight Discipline (Critical):

3.5.13.1. Q. Demonstrated strict, professional aircrew discipline throughout all phases of the mission. Coordinated and communicated effectively with other crew members.

3.5.13.2. U. Failed to exhibit strict aircrew discipline. Intentionally violated rules or regulations. Improperly or ineffectively coordinated or communicated with the other crew members causing delays or confusion which did, or could have, adversely affected safety or mission accomplishment.

3.5.14. Area 30—SA (Critical):

3.5.14.1. Q. Executed the assigned mission in a timely, efficient manner. Conducted the flight with a sense of understanding and comprehension even as the environment or situation changed. Ensured all aspects of the mission were accomplished with regard to the safety of crew, passengers, ground personnel, and aircraft.

3.5.14.2. U. Decisions, or lack thereof, resulted in the failure to accomplish the assigned mission. Demonstrated poor judgment to the extent safety could have been compromised. Lacked understanding/comprehension of events occurring in and around the aircraft/flight.

3.5.15. Area 31—Safety/Judgment/Airmanship (Critical):

3.5.15.1. Q. Aware of and complied with all safety factors required for safe aircraft operation and mission accomplishment. Sound judgment enhanced mission accomplishment and was evident in the decision-making process. Adequately cleared the aircraft.

3.5.15.2. U. Was not aware of, or did not comply with, all safety factors required for the safe operation of the aircraft or mission accomplishment. A clear lack of judgment hampered or precluded mission accomplishment. Did not adequately clear the aircraft. Allowed a dangerous situation to develop without taking proper corrective action.

3.5.16. Area 50—Boldface Emergencies (Critical): (**Note:** may be evaluated in flight or in a static aircraft.)

3.5.16.1. Q. Correct and immediate response. Satisfactory performance of the corrective action. The crewmember pointed without hesitation to, and knew the function of, all switches and controls required for all critical action EPs for his/her crew position.

3.5.16.2. U. Incorrect sequence, unsatisfactory/untimely response, or unsatisfactory performance of the corrective action. The crewmember could not, without hesitation, identify or explain the function of all switches and controls required for all critical action EPs for his/her crew position.

3.5.17. Area 26—After Landing/Engine Shutdown/Post-Flight:

3.5.17.1. Q. Accomplished the appropriate after landing, taxi, and shutdown checklists in accordance with the flight manual and applicable directives. Performed proper aircraft and equipment postflight and/or reconfiguration. Correctly determined the condition and status of the aircraft after shutdown. Completed all applicable aircraft forms correctly and briefed maintenance personnel as required.

3.5.17.2. Q-. Same as above except for minor deviations or omissions.

3.5.17.3. U. Major deviations or omissions during the after landing, aircraft taxi, engine shutdown, or post flight procedures which could have jeopardized safety. Failed to perform the aircraft and equipment postflight and/or reconfiguration. Failed to complete the aircraft forms or brief maintenance personnel as required.

3.5.18. Area 221—Aircraft Servicing:

3.5.18.1. Q. Satisfactory knowledge/performance of aircraft servicing. Thoroughly familiar with the proper types of fuels/lubricants and aircraft refueling checklists. Correctly completed the required forms. Adhered to all safety precautions.

3.5.18.2. Q-. Same as above except for minor deviations which would not affect safe/effective mission accomplishment.

3.5.18.3. U. Unsatisfactory knowledge/performance of aircraft servicing. Unfamiliar with the proper fuels/lubricants. Major deviations in completing the required forms. Failed to take all safety precautions.

3.5.19. Area 28—Debriefing:

3.5.19.1. Q. Thoroughly debriefed the mission or actively participated in the debriefing. Discussed mission accomplishment and debriefed deviations. Offered correct guidance as appropriate.

3.5.19.2. Q-. Incomplete debriefing. Did not actively participate in the debriefing or thoroughly discuss the mission, deviations, or corrective guidance.

3.5.19.3. U. Did not debrief mission, deviations, or offer corrective guidance.

3.6. Qualification Phase.

3.6.1. Area 850—Hovering Maneuvers:

3.6.1.1. Q. Provided pilot flying with drift/altitude deviation/correction calls. Provided proper direction to crew in order to position the aircraft as required. Used standard/correct terminology.

3.6.1.2. Q-. Same as Q except for minor deviations.

3.6.1.3. U. Did not provide drift/altitude deviation calls. Failed to provide correct drift correction instructions. Did not use standard terminology resulting in confusion.

3.6.2. Area 4—Takeoffs (As determined by FE: Normal, Marginal Power, Maximum Performance):

3.6.2.1. Q. Accomplished all required checklists. Monitored aircraft systems/instruments and fuel status as required. Understands take off abort criteria and power requirements. Understands correct power and/or airspeeds necessary.

3.6.2.2. Q-. Same as above except for minor deviations which did not degrade safe/effective mission accomplishment.

3.6.2.3. U. Major deviations which affected safe/effective mission accomplishment. Failed to monitor aircraft systems/instruments and fuel status. Failed to complete checklists. Failed to identify abort point or when aircraft was out of parameters. Failed to understand correct power and/or airspeed.

3.6.3. Area 851—Autorotations (As determined by FE: Straight Ahead and/or Low Altitude):

3.6.3.1. Q. Monitored aircraft systems/instruments as briefed. Gave clear/concise indications of rotor, engine, aircraft parameters, and limits. Able to execute duties for training autorotation conducted in the aircraft or autorotations conducted in the simulator taken to the ground.

3.6.3.2. Q-. Same as Q except for deviations which would not have compromised safety. Understands duties with minor deficiencies.

3.6.3.3. U. Failed to monitor aircraft systems/instruments as briefed. Did not give indications of rotor, engine, aircraft parameters, and limits. Unable to differentiate duties between training autorotations and autorotations taken to the ground.

3.6.4. Area 70—Simulated Single Engine Approach/Roll-on Landing:

3.6.4.1. Q. Completed checklists and confirmed single engine performance/parameters as required/briefed. Monitored systems/instruments.

3.6.4.2. Q-. Same as Q except for deviations which did not compromise safety.

3.6.4.3. U. Failed to complete the checklist or did not compute single engine performance as required/briefed. Did not monitor aircraft systems/instruments or assist the pilot as briefed/required.

3.6.5. Area 596—SAS/Boost Off Approach/Landing:

3.6.5.1. Q. Completed the checklists correctly and assisted the pilot as briefed/required. Correctly briefed the crew on restrictions/limitations.

3.6.5.2. Q-. Same as Q except for deviations which did not compromise safety.

3.6.5.3. U. Failed to complete the checklists correctly or did not assist the pilot as briefed/required. Did not brief the crew on restrictions/limitations

3.6.6. Area 597—Manual Stabilator Operations:

3.6.6.1. Q. Completed the checklists correctly and assisted the pilot as briefed/required. Correctly briefed the crew on restrictions/limitations.

3.6.6.2. Q-. Same as Q except for deviations which did not compromise safety.

3.6.6.3. U. Failed to complete checklists correctly or did not assist the pilot as briefed/required. Did not brief the crew on restrictions/limitations.

3.6.7. Area 565—EDECUC Operations:

3.6.7.1. Q. Completed the checklists correctly and assisted the pilot as briefed/required. Correctly briefed the crew on restrictions/limitations. Monitored engine instruments.

3.6.7.2. Q-. Same as Q except for deviations which did not compromise safety.

3.6.7.3. U. Failed to complete checklist correctly or did not assist the pilot as briefed/required. Did not brief the crew on restrictions/limitations. Failed to monitor engine instruments.

3.6.8. Area 25—Approaches/Landings (As determined by FE: Normal/Shallow/Steep):

3.6.8.1. Q. Monitored aircraft systems/instruments. Made effective approach calls to facilitate aircraft landing in intended spot.

3.6.8.2. Q-. Same as above except for minor deviations which did not affect safety/effective mission accomplishment.

3.6.8.3. U. Major deviations which affected safe/effective mission accomplishment.

3.7. Mission Phase.

3.7.1. Area 81—Tactical Mission Planning:

3.7.1.1. Q. Adequately assisted the pilot in planning the mission for a tactical scenario. Actively involved in the mission planning process. Familiar with and able to locate information contained in the appropriate tactical guidance. Assisted in the update of the intelligence/tactical situation if requested prior to the briefing.

3.7.1.2. Q-. Provided marginal assistance in the mission planning process.

3.7.1.3. U. Did not assist the pilot in mission planning. Not actively involved in the planning process. Unfamiliar with the information contained in approved tactical guidance publications. Failed to update the intelligence/tactical situation if requested prior to the briefing.

3.7.2. Area 857—Tactical Employment Procedures:

3.7.2.1. Q. Knowledge of tactics was adequate. Applied tactics consistent with current HH-60 AFTTPs, SPINS, ATO, CONOPS, and other directives. Worked well with the tactical plan and successfully completed it to the maximum extent possible. Adjusted to the tactical situation.

3.7.2.2. Q-. Knowledge of tactics was adequate, but failed to notice/verbalize the mission plan contained minor deviations from good tactical considerations. Slow to make adjustments to the tactical situation.

3.7.2.3. U. Knowledge of tactics was inadequate/unsatisfactory. Did not participate in the tactical plan for the mission. Failed to notice adjustments were needed. Tactics used were ineffective in countering the threat and/or accomplishing the mission.

3.7.3. Area 88—Terrain Flight/Navigation:

3.7.3.1. Q. Assisted the pilot with navigation by identifying navigational cues. Appropriate/timely calls identifying obstacles, threats, hazards, etc.

3.7.3.2. Q-. Same as above except for minor deviations which did not affect safe/effective mission accomplishment.

3.7.3.3. U. Major deviations which affected safe/effective mission accomplishment. Did not assist with navigation.

3.7.4. Area 9—Formation:

3.7.4.1. Q. Provided timely/accurate inputs on the wingman's position in the formation. Recognized closure and took proper action to correct. Understood Tactical Formation Maneuvering (TFM) and formation employment procedures.

3.7.4.2. Q-. Minor lapses in informing the crew on the wingman's position. Closure recognized, but was slow to verbalize. Displayed some TFM and formation weapons employment knowledge.

3.7.4.3. U. Consistently failed to update the crew on the wingman's position. Failed to recognize or verbalize closure. Displayed no TFM or formation weapons employment knowledge.

3.7.5. Area 858—Mission Systems Operations/Employment:

3.7.5.1. Q. Loads and employs systems (ex. CIB, TDL, PLS, GEOSIT etc.) to exchange digital information, builds SA, and identifies terrain/obstacles/threats. Uses available information appropriately to conduct mission accomplishment.

3.7.5.2. Q-. Loading and employment of equipment resulted in delays or minor errors that negatively affected overall mission accomplishment.

3.7.5.3. U. Failed to load or employ mission equipment resulting in significant delays and/or uncorrected errors that severely affected mission accomplishment.

3.7.6. Area 94—Threat Identification/Countermeasure Procedures:

3.7.6.1. Q. Threat reactions were timely and correct in accordance with current HH-60W AFTTPs. Timely and appropriate weapons/countermeasure employment.

3.7.6.2. Q-. Threat reactions were slow or inconsistent. Slow to employ weapons/countermeasures or employed when not tactically sound. Safety was never compromised.

3.7.6.3. U. Failed to verbalize/take the appropriate evasive action or activate the appropriate countermeasures. Allowed the aircraft limitations to be exceeded during evasive maneuvering. Improper threat calls. Failed to stop the aircraft from flying back through the threat area after completion of the evasive maneuver. Failure to employ weapons when tactically appropriate or formation safety and/or mission accomplishment is jeopardized.

3.7.7. Area 852—Terminal Area Operations:

3.7.7.1. Q. Satisfactory performance in accordance with current HH-60W AFTTPs, the flight manual, operational manuals, and other applicable directives. Provided clear, concise, and positive direction to the pilot during the reconnaissance, approaches, landings, and departure. Thoroughly aware of the power margin/limitations and the appropriate site restrictions.

3.7.7.2. Q-. Same as Q except for minor deviations which did not severely affect safety/mission accomplishment.

3.7.7.3. U. Major deviations to the procedures outlined in current HH-60W AFTTPs the flight manual, operational manuals, and other directives. Was unaware of the power

requirements/limitations and site restrictions. Failed to provide clear, concise, and positive direction/inputs to the pilot flying.

3.7.8. Area 853—AIE Operations:

3.7.8.1. Q. Performed in accordance with the procedures outlined in the flight manual, operational manual, and other published directives. Aware of power requirements/limitations. Adequate knowledge of all cable/hoist limitations (i.e., shock loading, birdcaging, kinks). Provided clear and concise direction during the approach, pickup, and departure. Provided the pilot flying with timely and accurate drift corrections. Equipment malfunctions were dealt with effectively while maintaining SA and crew coordination.

3.7.8.2. Q-. Same as Q except for minor deviations which did not affect safety/mission accomplishment. Slow to provide the pilot flying with drift corrections.

3.7.8.3. U. Major deviations to the procedures outlined in the flight manual and other published directives which affected safe/effective mission accomplishment. Unaware of the proper AIE methods or the EPs associated with the method used. Unaware of computed power requirements/limitations. Poor knowledge of cable/hoist limitations (i.e., shock loading, birdcaging, kinks). Failed to provide the pilot flying with proper drift corrections. Equipment preparation was not accomplished in a timely manner or in accordance with published directives. Did not correct equipment malfunctions and failed to maintain SA and crew coordination.

3.7.9. Area 280—HAAR:

3.7.9.1. Q. Observed and correctly identified all light signals. Closely monitored fuel management, aircraft systems/instruments, and lighting. Assisted the crew as briefed/required.

3.7.9.2. Q-. Did not recognize/know all light signals and failed to closely monitor systems/instruments and lighting. Assistance lacking. Safety and mission accomplishment was never jeopardized.

3.7.9.3. U. Failed to recognize/know any light signals. Failed to monitor fuel management, aircraft systems/instruments, and lighting. Did not assist the crew as briefed/required. Jeopardized safety or mission accomplishment.

3.7.10. Area 854—Weapons Employment:

3.7.10.1. Q. Demonstrated the ability to preflight, arm, acquire, effectively engage the target, and de-arm the weapon. Able to identify and clear weapons malfunctions in a timely manner in accordance with the appropriate operating manuals. Kept crew advised of other aircraft/team/survivor/target during employment. Demonstrated the ability to direct the aircraft into tactically advantageous positions using established TTPs in a timely manner. Safety was never compromised.

3.7.10.2. Q-. Minor deviations in preflight procedures. Minor procedure errors and/or was slow to arm/de-arm the weapon. Target acquisition was slow/inaccurate and engagement limited in its effectiveness. Slow to identify and/or clear weapons malfunctions in accordance with the appropriate operating manuals. Slow to advise crew of other aircraft/team/survivor/target during employment. Was slow and/or ineffective

while directing the aircraft into tactically advantageous positions using established TTPs. Safety was never compromised.

3.7.10.3. U. Unable to preflight, arm, or de-arm the weapon. Major errors in procedures. Target acquisition and/or engagement was ineffective. Unable to identify and/or clear weapons malfunctions. Failed to advise crew of other aircraft/team/survivor/target during employment. Did not maneuver the aircraft into an advantageous position, or directed/allowed the aircraft to maneuver into a tactically unsound position. Compromised safety.

3.8. Instructor Phase.

3.8.1. Area 47—Instructor Briefings/Debriefings/Critique:

3.8.1.1. Q. Briefings/debriefings were well organized, accurate, and thorough. Clearly defined the mission's objectives. Ability to reconstruct the flight, offers mission analysis, and provides corrective guidance where appropriate. Pre-briefed the student's next mission.

3.8.1.2. Q-. Minor errors or omissions in briefings and/or debrief that did not affect safety or mission effectiveness. Occasionally unclear in analysis of events or procedures.

3.8.1.3. U. Briefings were marginal or non-existent. Major errors or omissions in briefings/debriefings. Analysis of events or procedures was incomplete, inaccurate, or confusing. Failed to define the mission's objectives. Vague or nonexistent pre-briefing of the student's next mission.

3.8.2. Area 56—Demonstration of Performance:

3.8.2.1. Q. Effectively demonstrated procedures and techniques on the ground and in flight, within prescribed parameters. Provided concise, meaningful commentary.

3.8.2.2. Q-. Demonstrated procedures and techniques with minor deviations from prescribed parameters. Commentary was sometimes unclear.

3.8.2.3. U. Did not demonstrate correct procedures or techniques. Did not provide commentary or commentary was consistently unclear.

3.8.3. Area 55—Instructor Knowledge:

3.8.3.1. Q. Demonstrated a thorough knowledge of all applicable aircraft procedures, requirements, systems/performance characteristics, techniques, and missions to be performed. Demonstrated a thorough knowledge of all applicable publications and regulations.

3.8.3.2. Q-. Demonstrated minor errors in the above areas that did not affect safety or mission accomplishment.

3.8.3.3. U. Failed to demonstrate an adequate knowledge of aircraft procedures, requirements, systems/performance characteristics, techniques, and missions performed. Knowledge of publications and/or regulations was inadequate. Lack of knowledge in certain areas seriously detracted from instructor effectiveness.

3.8.4. Area 33—Instructional Ability

3.8.4.1. Q. Demonstrated the ability to communicate effectively. Provided the appropriate corrective guidance when necessary. Planned ahead and made timely decisions. Identified and corrected potentially unsafe maneuvers/situations.

3.8.4.2. Q-. Accomplished the above tasks with minor discrepancies that did not affect safety or mission accomplishment

3.8.4.3. U. Demonstrated an inability to effectively communicate and provide timely feedback. Did not provide corrective actions when necessary. Did not plan ahead or anticipate student problems. Did not identify unsafe maneuvers/situations in a timely manner.

3.8.5. Area 50—Training Documentation Procedures:

3.8.5.1. Q. Demonstrated an accurate review and completion of the appropriate training/evaluation records. Accurately assessed and documented student performance. Comments were clear and pertinent.

3.8.5.2. Q-. Demonstrated minor errors or omissions in the review and completion of training/evaluation records that did not adversely affect effectiveness of the mission. Comments were incomplete or slightly unclear.

3.8.5.3. U. Did not review and/or complete the required forms or records. Comments were invalid and/or unclear. Did not accurately assess or document the student's performance.

JOSEPH T. GUASTELLA Jr., Lt Gen, USAF
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

37 USC § 301a, *Incentive Pay: aviation career*

AFI 11-200, *Aircrew Training, Standardization/Evaluation, and General Operations Structure*, 21 September 2018

AFMAN 11-202V2, *Aircrew Standardization and Evaluation Program*, 30 August 2021

AFMAN 11-210, *Instrument Refresher Program (IRP)*, 4 October 2019

AFMAN 11-290, *Cockpit/Crew Resource Management and Threat & Error Management Program*, 25 October 2021

AFMAN 11-2HH-60WV1, *HH-60W Aircrew Training*, 30 December 2021

AFMAN 11-2HH-60WV3, *HH-60W Operations Procedures*, 30 December 2021

AFPD 11-2, *Aircrew Operations*, 31 January 2019

AFI 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, 23 March 2020

DAFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*, 1 December 2015

DoDI 7730.67, *Aviation Incentive Pays and Bonus Program*, 20 October 2016

EO 9397 *Numbering for Federal Accounts Relating to Individual Persons*, 22 November 1943

PL 92-204, *Appropriations Act for 1973*; § 715

PL 93-570, *Appropriations Act for 1974*

PL 93-294, *Aviation Career Incentive Act of 1974*

T.O. 1H-60(H)W-1CL-1, *Flight Crew Checklist*, 1 November 2021

T.O. 1H-60(H)W-1CL-2, *Gunner/Hoist Operator Checklist*, 1 November 2021

Prescribed Forms

AF Form 4038W, *HH-60W Evaluation Worksheet*

Adopted Forms

AF Form 4031, *CRM Skills Criteria Training/Evaluation*

AF Form 8, *Certificate of Aircrew Qualification*

AF Form 8a, *Certificate of Universal Aircrew Qualification*

AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

DD Form 365-4, *Weight and Balance Form F – Transport*

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACC—Air Combat Command

AFI—Air Force Instruction
AFMAN—Air Force Manual
AFTTP—Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
AIE—Alternate Insertion or Extraction
ATO—Air Tasking Order
CONOPS—Contingency Operations
DA—Decision Altitude
DME—Distance Measuring Equipment
DRU—Direct Reporting Unit
EDECU—Enhanced Digital Electronic Control Unit
EF—Evaluator Flight Engineer
EM—Energy Maneuverability
EP—Emergency Procedure
EPE—Emergency Procedures Evaluation
FD—Flight Director
FE—Flight Examiner
FF—Basic Qualified Flight Engineer
FOA—Forward Operating Agency
FP—First Pilot
FTU—Formal Training Unit
HAAR—Helicopter Air-to-Air Refueling
HHQ—Higher Headquarters
IF—Instructor Flight Engineer
ILS—Instrument Landing System
IMC—Instrument Meteorological Conditions
INSTM—Instrument
INSTR—Instructor
IP—Instructor Pilot
KIAS—Knots Indicated Airspeed
LZ—Landing Zone
MAP—Missed Approach Point
MAJCOM—Major Command

MC—Mission Copilot
MDA—Minimum Descent Altitude
MDS—Mission Design Series
MF—Mission Qualified Flight Engineer
MP—Mission Pilot
MSN—Mission
NAVAIDS—Navigation Aids
NM—Nautical Mile
NOTAM—Notice to Airman
NVG—Night Vision Goggles
OPR—Office of Primary Responsibility
PAR—Precision Approach Radar
Q—Qualified—QUAL—Qualification
RPM—Revolutions Per Minute
SA—Situational Awareness
SPINS—Special Instructions
SQ/CC—Squadron Commander
TACAN—Tactical Air Navigation
TFM—Tactical Flight Maneuvering
T.O.—Technical Order
TOLD—Takeoff and Landing Data
TOT—Time On Target

Terms

Additional Training—Any training recommended by the FE to remedy a discrepancy identified during an evaluation that cannot be remedied during the evaluation debrief.

Basic Qualified—A documented designation allowing an aircrew member to perform the basic duties of a particular crew position in the specified weapons system.

Certification—Procedure used to document competency in a particular task (e.g., NVG Water Operations, Cargo Sling, Flight Lead). Not interchangeable with qualification, which requires AF Form 8 or AF Form 8a, *Certificate of Universal Aircrew Qualification*, documentation.

Formal Training Unit (FTU)—A unit with a primary mission to train aircrew personnel according to approved syllabi.

Eligibility Period—The 6-month period prior to the expiration date of an evaluation.

Emergency Procedures Evaluation (EPE)—An evaluation of an aircrew member's knowledge and skill with respect to Mission Design Series (MDS)-specific EPs and systems. An EPE can be completed during a flight, in an aircrew training device, a simulator or verbally.

Examination—A method of measuring an aircrew member's knowledge of normal/EPs, threats, and other information essential for the safe and effective operation of their assigned weapon system through the administration of written or computer- based examinations.

Evaluation Profile—Defines the required items of an evaluation to include a scenario

Flight Examiner (FE)—An aircrew member designated to perform evaluation duties as specified by this publication.

Grade—A characterization of examinee performance in a graded area or graded sub-area. Grades are Q, Q- and U.

Graded Area/Sub-area—A specific evaluated ability or skill set within an aircrew evaluation.

Half Dot/1-Dot—A visual depiction of aircraft lateral course displacement on either side of the miniature aircraft/course deviation bar within the horizontal situation indicator when the aircraft's course is correctly selected, and centered under the upper lubber line.

Initial (INIT) Aircrew Evaluation—The first evaluation of any type for a crew position in an MDS (i.e., INIT QUAL/INSTM, INIT MSN, INIT INSTR).

Instructor (INSTR) Evaluation—A means of assessing an aircrew member's instructional ability in their weapon system/crew position and to obtain/maintain instructor qualification. This evaluation initially establishes or reestablishes instructor qualification of the examinee in an MDS (i.e., INIT INSTR and RQ INSTR) as directed in AFI/AFMAN 11-2MDS V1.

Instructor Qualification—A documented designation allowing an aircrew member to instruct and provide airborne supervision of unqualified and/or uncertified aircrew members.

Instrument (INSTM) Evaluation—The means of assessing an aircrew member's ability to operate under instrument flight rules (IFR)

Instrument Qualification—A documented designation allowing an aircrew member to operate under instrument flight rules (IFR).

Mission Qualification—A documented designation allowing an aircrew to employ the assigned weapon system in accomplishing the unit's operational or DOC statement mission.

Mission (MSN) Evaluation—A means of assessing an aircrew member's ability to employ the assigned weapon system in accomplishing the unit's operational or DOC statement mission. Requires AF Form 8/8a documentation.

Non-Plug Qualified—Crewmember who has not successfully completed the full HAAR syllabus.

Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR)—Any headquarters, agency, or activity having the primary functional interest in, and responsibility for, a specific action, project, plan, program or problem.

Plug Qualified—Crewmember who has successfully completed the full HAAR syllabus and can perform these duties without dedicated instructor supervision.

QUAL Evaluation—A means of assessing an aircrew member's ability to perform the basic duties of a particular crew position in the specified aircraft. Requires AF Form 8/8a documentation.

Qualification Level—The overall characterization of examinee performance based on the compilation of requisite results and the aircrew evaluation graded areas/sub-areas. The EPE will also be assigned a qualification level based on the compilation of EPE graded areas/sub-areas. The qualification level will be Q1, Q2 or Q3.

Requalification (RQ)—An aircrew evaluation administered to remedy a loss of qualification due to expiration of a required periodic evaluation, loss of currency (as specified in applicable AFI/AFMAN 11-2MDS V1), an aircrew qualification following a failed aircrew evaluation or a commander directed downgrade.