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SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE**

AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 91-121

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Safety

**NUCLEAR SURETY STAFF
ASSISTANCE VISIT PROGRAM**

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

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This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive 91-1, *Nuclear Weapons and Systems Surety*. This publication is consistent with Air Force Policy Directive 13-5, *Air Force Nuclear Mission*. The publication contains copyrighted information. It establishes key components of the nuclear surety program according to guidance in Department of the Air Force Instruction 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*. This instruction assigns responsibilities and establishes procedures for conducting Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits and provides guidance to all levels of command participating in the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit process. It applies to designated directorates, Numbered Air Force and Center staff agencies, parent wing main operating bases when augmenting the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team, and all units participating in the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit. This instruction applies to all civilian employees and uniformed members of the Regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard. This publication does not apply to the United States Space Force. Ensure all records generated as a result of processes prescribed in the publication adhere to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, and are disposed in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule, which is located in the Air Force Records Information Management System. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility using Department of the Air Force (DAF) Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route DAF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional chain of command. This publication may not be supplemented, further implemented, or extended. The authorities to waive wings, and unit or delta level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier (“**T-0**, **T-1**, **T-2**, **T-3**”) number following the compliance statement. See Department of the Air Force Manual 90-161, *Publishing*

Processes and Procedures, for a description of the authorities associated with the Tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval authority, or alternately, to the publication office of primary responsibility for non-tiered compliance items. Compliance with the attachments in this publication is mandatory.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. It incorporates multiple format changes for ease of use and currency. Changes the minimum percentage of personnel and medical personnel reliability assurance program record that will be reviewed for compliance with governing Department of Defense and United States Air Force (USAF) guidance. Ensures that the use or disclosure of protected health information as part of the medical personnel reliability assurance program Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit process are conducted properly. Changes to proposed report format revised to streamline report writing. Additionally, several publications were deleted as they no longer provided required guidance to the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Program.

Chapter 1

NUCLEAR SURETY STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT PROGRAM

1.1. Overview.

1.1.1. Scope of the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Program. The Secretary of the Air Force established the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit program to assist nuclear tasked units, on a non-attribution basis, to maintain effective nuclear surety programs. The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit is an opportunity to receive assistance from experienced headquarters personnel who write nuclear surety policy and guidance. It is not an inspection nor is it intended to prepare units to pass Nuclear Surety Inspections. Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits may not give a rating, score, grade, or assessment. However, the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team may recommend the Wing Commander conduct a root-cause analysis if significant observations are identified during the visit. The Wing Commander should provide the results of the analysis to the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit lead division or team chief. The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team chief will determine which Major Command (MAJCOM) identified observations require a formal root cause analysis. **(T-1)** Assessment statements will be limited to processes and procedures. **(T-1)** [Attachment 2](#) outlines typical areas observed during a Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit. Wing Commanders may use the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit results to strengthen the unit Nuclear Surety Program. The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit also provides an opportunity for resolution and clarification of issues between the unit and headquarters functional managers. The objective is threefold:

1.1.1.1. Determine if higher headquarters guidance is adequate and clear.

1.1.1.2. Provide feedback to the Wing Commander on whether the unit is properly applying sound procedures to implement Nuclear Surety guidance.

1.1.1.3. Provide situational awareness on command nuclear surety to senior leadership in the form of a Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit executive summary and crossfeed report (described in [paragraph 2.3](#)).

1.1.2. Assistance Areas. The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team assesses all areas included in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3263.05E, *Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection*, and AFI 90-201, *The Air Force Inspection System* as supplemented. Additional areas may be assessed by MAJCOM staffs as time permits or when requested by MAJCOM Commander or wing leadership. At Joint Bases where USAF is a supported component, installation support is a sister service responsibility and USAF may not control elements of the Nuclear Surety program at that installation. Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team will either include sister service members to evaluate supporting processes and procedures, or forward team observations to the Joint Base chain of command. **(T-0)**

1.2. Roles and Responsibilities.

1.2.1. MAJCOMs. MAJCOM Headquarters will designate a directorate, division, or special staff as the lead to perform Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits. **(T-1)**

1.2.2. Units. Units will provide a unit point of contact to MAJCOM Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Program Manager. **(T-1)**

1.3. Process Overview.

1.3.1. For Technical Operations, Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team members will select maintenance teams for each specific technical operation based on team/crew integrity. **(T-1)**

1.3.2. Team integrity for maintenance teams will be maintained in accordance with Department of the Air Force 21-101, *Aircraft and Equipment Maintenance Management*, and Air Force Manual 21-202, *Missile Maintenance Management* requirements. **(T-1)** To demonstrate their knowledge and proficiency, they may be tasked to perform at least one evaluation of a maintenance operation within their area of responsibility. Loading Standardization Crews and Squadron Lead Crews will be observed by the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team. **(T-1)**

1.3.3. For Weapon Security, Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit functional area experts will use performance-based methodology to determine whether a unit meets the Nuclear Weapons Security Standard. **(T-1)** They will observe the integrated execution of security actions and response (performance), and compliance with technical criteria, as applicable. **(T-1)** They will observe execution of applicable plans and tactics, techniques and procedures. **(T-1)** They will assess the effectiveness of active and/or passive defenses, deployed delay and/or denial systems, and other technology. **(T-1)** They will assess the use of available options to deny unauthorized access to nuclear weapons. **(T-1)** If denial is not achieved, the ability to prevent the loss, theft, damage or destruction of nuclear weapons will be assessed by the functional area experts. **(T-1)** Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit functional area members will develop or validate that wing planned exercises are realistic scenarios to determine the wing's ability to meet the Nuclear Weapon Security Standard. **(T-1)** The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team will assess the adequacy of and compliance with approved compensatory measures for MAJCOM approved security deviations. **(T-1)**

1.3.4. The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team will review nuclear surety training programs and administration to ensure commanders and supervisors at all levels demonstrate effective responsibility, emphasis and focus on nuclear weapons surety per Department of the Air Force 91-101. **(T-1)**

1.3.5. The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team will review the administrative qualifications, certification, continuing evaluation, removal from Personnel Reliability Assurance Program, Department of Defense Manual 5210.42_Air Force Manual 13-501, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program* duties, return to duty, and training and management processes to assess the overall effectiveness of the unit's implementation of Personnel Reliability Assurance Program. **(T-0)** The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team will focus on Personnel Reliability Assurance Program processes, including scenario-based exercises, formal and informal interviews, and observe day-to-day operations to validate/verify processes employed by the unit. **(T-0)** Ensure that the use or disclosures of protected health information as part of the medical Personnel Reliability Assurance Program Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit process are properly accounted for in accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. **(T-0)**

1.3.6. Command Post Controller and Communication Security Two Person Code Team Member closed book testing will be administered at bases with a strategic tasking as follows:

1.3.6.1. Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Teams will test and evaluate eighty percent of available Communication Security Two Person Code Team Members (i.e., not on temporary duty, leave, or just completing a 12-hour Command Post shift). **(T-1)**

1.3.6.2. Command Post will be evaluated with performance evaluations in the same manner as Air Force Manual 10-207 *Command Posts*, including respective MAJCOM supplements and AFI 90-201. **(T-1)** Performance evaluations will include a scenario portion and testing portion. **(T-1)** The Command Post Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team members will conduct as many evaluations as possible so the number of evaluated members of the Command Post can be maximized. **(T-1)**

1.3.7. For Regular and Reserve/Guard Associate/Total Force Integration units, the sponsoring unit will have responsibility for the Associate/Total Force Integration unit(s) outlined in this instruction. **(T-1)**

1.3.8. MAJCOMs will determine the composition and qualifications required for the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Team. **(T-1)** The composition and qualifications should be based on the scope of the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit as required by either the MAJCOM or Wing Commander.

1.4. Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Trip and Event Scheduling.

1.4.1. MAJCOMs will determine when Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits are scheduled. **(T-1)** Wing Commanders may request a Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit outside the MAJCOM recommended schedule. United States Air Forces in Europe may deviate from this schedule as required to accommodate host nation requirements and the Functional Expert Visit Program.

1.4.2. MAJCOMs will provide a notification message to the Numbered Air Force or Center, and unit 60 days prior to the planned visit confirming the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit. **(T-1)** The message will include date(s), lead point of contact, billeting, transportation and work center requirements (A Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team member should provide an info copy to the installation-owning MAJCOM if the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit is for a tenant unit). **(T-1)** Units will appoint a Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit point of contact and forward the name to the MAJCOM within one week of receiving the notification message. **(T-1)**

1.4.3. Units should locally coordinate and provide inputs on a proposed Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit sequence of events. Units will send a draft schedule of events to the MAJCOM not less than 40 days prior to the scheduled visit. **(T-1)** MAJCOMs will ensure the proposed schedule of events fulfills the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit requirements and coordinate the proposed schedule of events within the staff. **(T-1)** Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team members will coordinate functional area specific scheduling requirements with their unit points of contact. **(T-1)** A confirmed schedule of events will be completed by the unit and submitted to the MAJCOM not less than 14 days prior to the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team's arrival. **(T-1)** After the visit and schedule of events is confirmed, any scheduling conflicts must be immediately brought to the attention of the MAJCOM Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit point of contact for resolution. **(T-1)**

1.5. Unit Preparation.

1.5.1. Units will provide current self-assessment checklists as well as copies of the last self-assessment performed in reviewable areas 30 days prior to the arrival of the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Team. **(T-1)**

1.5.2. Units will provide a copy of their simulations/deviations to the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team not later than 30 days prior to the scheduled visit. **(T-1)** The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team chief(s) will approve or disapprove simulations at least seven days before the visit commences. **(T-1)**

Chapter 2

NUCLEAR SURETY STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT SUMMARY

2.1. Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Report.

2.1.1. Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit reports assist units in identifying strengths and areas for improvement in order to enhance overall nuclear surety effectiveness. Identified deficiencies will reference governing instructions and guidance (i.e., Air Force Instruction, MAJCOM Instructions, Technical Order, United States Strategic Command Publications, etc.) **(T-0)** Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit reports will be classified in accordance with CJCSI 3263.05E, Enclosure F, paragraph 2. **(T-0)** Unclassified information to include observations, corrective actions, or significant observation resolutions, when separated from its final report, must be handled according to its respective portion markings by the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team members. **(T-0)** Final release of any data separated from its final report is subject to guidance defined in section 3 of CJCSI 3263.05E. **(T-0)**

2.1.2. The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team project officer uses inputs provided by each functional team member to build the report in accordance with the contents listed at [Attachment 2](#). The Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team chief will provide a draft copy of the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit report to the Wing Commander prior to the team's departure and provide a copy to the lead division upon return to the staff location. **(T-1)** The authority for further distribution resides with the Wing Commander and/or MAJCOM Commander.

2.1.3. To preserve program integrity, the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team members will not be used as Inspector General augmentees at a wing or unit where they have performed a Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit in the past 12 months. **(T-1)**

2.1.4. Team members must include all safety, security, and weapon system reliability related observations in the detailed report, referenced by published guidance, with paragraph numbers to the maximum extent possible. **(T-1)** Overall and sub-area ratings are not assigned. Observations are categorized in the following categories:

2.1.4.1. **STRENGTH** — An observation that highlights strong processes, knowledge, or performance.

2.1.4.2. **REPEAT SIGNIFICANT OBSERVATIONS** — Any significant observation not corrected from a previous Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit or Nuclear Surety Inspection report.

2.1.4.3. **SIGNIFICANT OBSERVATION** — Any deficiency having or likely to have a major negative effect on the nuclear weapons mission of the activity.

2.1.4.4. **REPEAT OBSERVATION** — Any observation not corrected from a previous Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit or Nuclear Surety report.

2.1.4.5. **OBSERVATION** — Any deficiency not meeting, having or likely to have a major negative effect on the nuclear weapons mission of the activity, but requires corrective action.

2.1.4.6. RECOMMENDED IMPROVEMENT AREA — These suggestions to improve a process (Does not require referencing governing instruction or guidance).

2.1.5. MAJCOMs will determine the guidance for recognizing outstanding performers. (T-1)

2.2. Tracking Requirements.

2.2.1. MAJCOMs will determine any tracking requirements. (T-1)

2.2.2. MAJCOMs will determine the need for follow-up reports on any observations identified during Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits. (T-1)

2.3. Crossfeed Reports.

2.3.1. The MAJCOM lead will publish semi-annual Nuclear Surety crossfeed reports. (T-1) These reports will identify deficiencies and their associated root cause(s) and corrective action(s) for significant observations if determined by the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Team Chief, but will not attribute the deficiency to a particular wing. (T-1) Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit crossfeed reports will be classified in accordance with CJCSI 3263.05E, Enclosure F, paragraph 2. (T-0)

2.3.1.1. Semi-Annual crossfeed reports will be distributed electronically by the lead to the MAJCOM Commander, MAJCOM Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Leads, Numbered Air Force and/or Center Commanders, Air Force Safety Center (Weapons Safety Division), Air Force Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection (AF/A4), and all subordinate units at which Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits occur prior to 1 April and 1 October each calendar year. (T-1) In addition, the lead will provide these semi-annual crossfeed reports prior to 1 April and 1 October each calendar year to other MAJCOMs having a nuclear surety mission, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration Office (AF/A10), and Studies, Analysis, and Assessments (AF/A9), for posting in a nuclear surety lessons learned database. (T-1)

2.3.1.2. MAJCOMs will determine an appropriate forum (e.g., Nuclear Surety Council Meetings, Nuclear Surety Working Groups) for discussing Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit-highlighted trends on an annual basis.

JEANNIE M. LEAVITT,
Major General, USAF
Chief of Safety

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

Department of Defense Manual 5210.42_ Air Force Manual 13-501, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program*, 19 December 2018

Department of the Air Force Instruction 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*, 26 March 2020

Department of the Air Force Instruction 21-101, *Aircraft and Equipment Maintenance Management*, 16 January 2020

Department of the Air Force Manual 90-161, *Publishing Processes and Procedures*, 15 April 2022

Air Force Manual 21-202, *Missile Maintenance Management*, 29 August 2019

Air Force Manual 10-207, *Command Posts*, 11 April 2018

Air Force Policy Directive 91-1, *Nuclear Weapons and Systems Surety*, 24 October 2019

Air Force Policy Directive 13-5, *Air Force Nuclear Mission*, 17 July 2018

Air Force Instruction 33-322, *Records Management and Information Governance Program*, 23 March 2020

Air Force Instruction 90-201, *The Air Force Inspection System*, 20 November 2018

Air Force Instruction 63-125, *Nuclear Certification Program*, 16 January 2020

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3263.05E, *Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection System*, 28 September 2020

Prescribed Forms

None

Adopted Forms

DAF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFI—Air Force Instruction

CJCSI—Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

DAF—Department of the Air Force

MAJCOM—MAJCOM

USAF—United States Air Force

Office Symbols

AF/A4—Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection

AF/A9—Air Force Director, Studies, Analyses and Assessments

AF/A10—Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration

Terms

None

Attachment 2

NUCLEAR SURETY STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT REPORT FORMAT

A2.1. Major Commands.

A2.1.1. MAJCOMs will determine which sections of the standardized format apply to their unique mission requirements. **(T-1)** This list is not all-inclusive, and MAJCOMs are encouraged to focus on additional areas identified as trends within the MAJCOM or specifically requested by the Wing Commander. MAJCOMs will adhere to the following format to the maximum extent practical to improve standardization across the USAF. **(T-1)**

A2.1.1.1. Executive Summary.

A2.1.1.2. Management.

A2.1.1.3. Operations.

A2.1.1.4. Personnel Reliability Assurance Program. **(Note 3)**

A2.1.1.5. Nuclear Surety Program.

A2.1.1.6. Civil Engineers. **(Note 3)**

A2.1.1.7. Munitions/Maintenance.

A2.1.1.8. Nuclear Security. **(Note 3)**

A2.1.1.9. Intrusion Detection System Maintenance. **(Note 3)**

A2.1.1.10. Nuclear Weapons Loading and Mating Exercise.

A2.1.1.11. Recapture/Recovery Exercise.

A2.1.1.12. Special Assignment Airlift Mission.

A2.1.1.13. Vehicle Management. **(Note 3)**

A2.1.1.14. Emergency Response

A2.1.1.15. Outstanding Performers.

A2.1.2. Operations.

A2.1.2.1. Nuclear Control Order Procedures.

A2.1.2.1.1. Command Post Nuclear Control Order Procedures.

A2.1.2.1.2. Aircrew/Missile Crew Nuclear Control Order Procedures.

A2.1.2.2. Aircrew/Missile Crew Nuclear Operations.

A2.1.2.2.1. Combat Mission Folders.

A2.1.2.2.2. Positive Control Documents.

A2.1.2.2.3. Coded Switch Procedures.

A2.1.2.2.4. Missile Crew Weapon System Procedures

A2.1.2.2.5. Missile Control Procedures

A2.1.2.3. Command Post Security. (**Note 3**)

A2.1.2.4. Top Secret Control Accounts.

A2.1.2.5. Single Channel Anti-Jam Man-Portable Operations.

A2.1.2.5.1. Fixed Site Single Channel Anti-jam Man-Portable Operations.

A2.1.2.5.2. Mobile Single Channel Anti-jam Man-Portable Operations.

A2.1.2.6. Safe Passage Procedures

A2.1.3. Personnel Reliability Assurance Program.

A2.1.3.1. Force Support Squadron, Personnel Reliability Assurance Program Satellite Offices, Security Forces Squadrons, and Unit Programs. (**Note 3**)

A2.1.3.2. Military Treatment Facility Support. (**Note 3**)

A2.1.4. Nuclear Surety Program.

A2.1.4.1. Program Management.

A2.1.4.2. Inspection Program.

A2.1.4.3. Nuclear Surety Training.

A2.1.4.4. Nuclear Weapon Access/Two-Person Concept.

A2.1.4.5. Nuclear Certified Equipment Program. (**Note 5**)

A2.1.4.6. Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance Program.

A2.1.4.7. Radiation Safety Program.

A2.1.4.8. Miscellaneous Programs.

A2.1.5. Civil Engineers. (**Note 3**)

A2.1.5.1. Operations.

A2.1.5.1.1. Lightning Protection, Static Bonding, and Grounding.

A2.1.5.1.2. Emergency Backup Power.

A2.1.5.1.3. Nuclear Hoists.

A2.1.5.1.4. Blast Door Inspection.

A2.1.5.1.5. Earth Covered Magazine.

A2.1.5.1.6. Nuclear Haul Routes.

A2.1.5.1.7. Facility Maintenance and Upkeep.

A2.1.5.2. Explosive Ordnance Disposal.

A2.1.5.2.1. Management.

A2.1.5.2.2. Render Safe/Continuation Procedures.

A2.1.5.2.3. Emergency Response.

A2.1.6. Munitions.

- A2.1.6.1. Management.
- A2.1.6.2. Stockpile and Housekeeping.
- A2.1.6.3. Key and Lock Management.
- A2.1.6.4. Tools, Test, Tiedown and Handling Equipment.
- A2.1.6.5. Technical Operations.
- A2.1.6.6. Munitions Control.
- A2.1.6.7. Nuclear Weapons Loading and Mating.
- A2.1.6.8. Supply Support. (**Note 3**)
- A2.1.7. Nuclear Security.
 - A2.1.7.1. Operations.
 - A2.1.7.2. Administration.
 - A2.1.7.3. Training and Resources.
 - A2.1.7.4. Standardization/Evaluation.
 - A2.1.7.5. Response Force Exercise.
- A2.1.8. Intrusion Detection System Maintenance. (**Note 3**)
- A2.1.9. Nuclear Weapon Loading and Mating Exercise.
- A2.1.10. Recapture/Recovery Exercise.
- A2.1.11. Prime Nuclear Airlift Force.
- A2.1.12. Logistics Readiness. (**Note 3**)
 - A2.1.12.1. Materiel Management.
 - A2.1.12.2. Deployment and Distribution.
 - A2.1.12.3. Vehicle Management.
- A2.1.13. Air Force Major Graded Area Emergency Exercises. (**Note 4**)
- A2.1.14. Outstanding Performers.

Note 1: Order categories in each section as follows:

Strength

Repeat Significant Observation

Significant Observation

Repeat Observation

Observation

Recommended Improvement Areas

Note 2: Observation (with references) will include:

Impact.

Recommendation.

Note 3: At a Joint Base where Air Force is a supported service, these functions are performed either partially or wholly by the sister service for the Air Force mission. In reference to Joint Bases, the Explosive Ordnance Disposal function is considered mission support. Where Air Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal is assigned at non-lead joint bases and the nuclear mission is primarily Air Force, the Air Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal flight will respond as the initial response force.

Note 4: Emergency Exercises along with sub areas in accordance with AFI 90-201, paragraph 4.11.3. Emergency Exercises (e.g., Command Disablement, Emergency Response, Disaster Response Force, Security Force, Munitions/Maintenance....)

Note 5: Verification or current training and accountability of Nuclear Certified Equipment is integral to Nuclear Surety. All units whether nuclear tasked or non-nuclear tasked will have nuclear certified equipment monitors responsible for annual inventory of assets in accordance with AFI 63-125.

Attachment 3**PREPARING FOR NUCLEAR SURETY STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT****A3.1. Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Preparation Guide.**

A3.1.1. Preparation for Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visits should use this guide.

A3.1.2. MAJCOMs may deviate from this guide as required to meet their requirements.

A3.2. Schedule of Events.

A3.2.1. INITIAL NOTIFICATION: SCHEDULE OF EVENTS PREP: start T-60 days, finish T-45 days

A3.2.2. Send formal visit message to the unit and info copy the Numbered Air Force and/or Center, and host MAJCOM (as required).

Note: Verify the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit days with a point of contact from the unit prior to formal visit message.

A3.2.3. Determine unit point of contact.

A3.2.4. Ensure unit point of contact begins coordination on the draft schedule of events. (It is common to use a prior year's schedule as a starting point).

A3.2.5. Designate team chief. Notify team chief of the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit dates.

A3.2.6. Update and verify appropriate MAJCOM Functional Organization list.

A3.2.7. Notify MAJCOM Functional Organization list.

A3.2.8. Update appropriate MAJCOM long range schedules.

A3.2.9. Schedule conference room for pre-departure briefing.

A3.3. Team Support: start T-45 days, finish T-25.

A3.3.1. Obtain team member names from the staff. Required information: Full Name as it appears for personnel shortages, have appropriate functional area arrange for augmentees. Request Numbered Air Force/Center augmentees if necessary. Request email address for augmentees in addition to standard team member personal information.

A3.3.2. Send team roster, vehicle needs and special requests to the unit point of contact so that they can begin making billeting/vehicle/work center arrangements. Update any subsequent changes with point of contact as they occur. Find out if team will be staying on or off base. Request wing key personnel roster and base map.

A3.3.3. Make travel arrangements for MAJCOM team members (travel/aircraft validation).

A3.3.4. Email team roster/Organizational Defense Travel Administrator fund authorization letter to the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team members for order preparation.

A3.3.5. Email travel information, itinerary, per diem costs, pre-departure briefing time/location and any miscellaneous information to local team members. Have them arrange temporary duty orders.

A3.3.6. Send team travel info, fund cite/Organizational Defense Travel Administrator fund authorization letter and approximate travel/per diem costs to augmentees. Have them make their arrival times as close to the team arrival times as possible, so the base can pick everyone up together. Have them create their own orders.

A3.4. Schedule of Events Coordination: start T-40 days, finish T-30 days.

A3.4.1. Receive draft schedule of events from wing point of contact.

A3.4.2. E-mail draft schedule of events to team members for review/input.

A3.4.3. Coordinate schedule of events with other MAJCOMs if conducting a multi-MAJCOM Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit.

A3.4.4. Compile schedule of events inputs/recommendations/changes.

A3.5. Trip Preparation Actions: start T-20 days, finish T-10 days.

A3.5.1. Re-confirm travel, billeting, and transportation arrangements.

A3.5.2. Arrange bus transportation to/from airport as required.

A3.5.3. Receive travel verification/itineraries from augmentees.

A3.5.4. Finalize the schedule of events with the unit and send to all team members.

A3.5.5. Generate entry authorization list for review at pre-departure briefing. Ensure entry authorization list is marked Controlled Unclassified Information and contains the Privacy Act Statement. Have team chief sign first sheet.

A3.5.6. Prepare laptop computer and/or disk for the visit.

A3.5.7. Update the pre-departure briefing with pertinent info.

A3.5.8. Verify conference room date and time at least 7 days prior to briefing.

A3.6. Team Chief Book: start T-14 days, finish T-3 days.

A3.6.1. Build team chief book no later than the day before the brief. Include: team roster, Entry Authorization List, schedule of events, wing key personnel list, base map, unit observation forms, travel itinerary, inbrief, draft out brief, draft report, AFI 90-201 and MAJCOM supplements, AFI 91-121, and a copy of the unit's previous Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit report.

A3.6.2. Present team chief book no later than the day before the brief.

A3.7. Team Documents: start T-14 days, finish T-3 days. Assemble team member documents. Include: finalized schedule of events, unit/team member observation forms, outstanding performer forms, team roster, wing key personnel list, pre-departure briefing, draft out brief, draft report, AFI 90-201 and MAJCOM supplements, AFI 91-121, and anything else that might be useful.

A3.8. Pre-Departure Brief: start and finish T-3 days.

A3.8.1. Email out team documents.

A3.8.2. Present briefing and address any outstanding issues.

A3.8.3. Have team members review Entry Authorization List for correctness.

A3.9. Conduct Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit: start T-0 days, finish T+5 days.

A3.10. Post Temporary Duty Actions: start T+6 days, finish T+25 days.

A3.10.1. Send out Augmentee "Thank You" letters from lead division.

A3.10.2. Send significant observation message to wing, listing a MAJCOM point of contact for each significant observation (usually the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit team member that authored the observation in the Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit Report).

A3.11. Significant Observation Resolution: start T+6 days, finish T+60 days. Receive Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance Visit significant observation resolution message from wing.

A3.12. Significant Observation Resolution Coordination: start T+60 days, finish T+90 days. Forward resolution message to appropriate MAJCOM points of contact.

A3.13. Tracking/Follow-up: When MAJCOMs determine tracking and follow up reports are required, the following actions will be taken: Forward resolution message to appropriate MAJCOM points of contact. **(T-1)** Once all MAJCOM points of contact are satisfied that the wing's corrective action addresses the root cause of the discrepancy, the lead division will forward a message to the wing to confirm that all significant observations have been closed. **(T-1)**