BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

AIR FORCE MANUAL 11-2C-130JV2





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Flying Operations

C-130J AIRCREW EVALUATION CRITERIA

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This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 11-2, *Aircrew Operations*. It establishes evaluation criteria for the operation of C-130J aircraft to accomplish their worldwide mobility missions safely and successfully. This is a specialized publication intended for use by Airmen who have graduated from technical training related to this publication. It is used in conjunction with AFI 11-202 Volume 2, *Aircrew Standardization/Evaluation Program*, and the appropriate MAJCOM supplement. This AFMAN applies to all civilian employees and uniformed members of the Regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard who operate or maintain C-130J aircraft. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using the AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication; route AF Form 847s from the field through MAJCOM publications/forms managers.

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This interim change revises AFMAN 11-2C-130JV2 by (1) incorporating checkride standards for Block 8.1 aircraft, (2) adding in CAT II ILS checkride procedures and (3) updating pilot checkride requirements. A margin bar (|) indicates newly revised material.

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Chapter 1

GENERAL INFORMATION

1.1. General. This manual provides flight examiners, instructors, and aircrews with procedures and evaluation criteria/tolerances to be used during the administration of flight evaluations according to AFI 11-202, Volume 2, Aircrew Standardization/Evaluation Program. Specific areas for evaluation are prescribed to ensure an accurate assessment of the proficiency and capabilities of aircrews. Flight examiners will use this AFMAN when conducting aircrew evaluations. Instructors use this AFMAN when preparing aircrews for qualification.

1.2. Key Words and Definitions.

- 1.2.1. "Will" and "Shall" indicate a mandatory requirement.
- 1.2.2. "Should" is normally used to indicate a preferred, but not mandatory, method of accomplishment.
- 1.2.3. "May" indicates an acceptable or suggested means of accomplishment.
- 1.2.4. "**Note**" indicates operating procedures, techniques, etc., that are considered essential to emphasize.
- **1.3. Deviations and Waivers.** Report deviations or exceptions, without waivers, through normal command channels to the parent MAJCOM Stan/Eval. MAJCOM Stan/Eval will notify lead command for follow-on action, if necessary. (**T-2**). MAJCOM/DOs shall forward a copy of approved long-term waivers to this AFMAN to lead command for follow-on action, if required. (**T-2**).

1.4. Roles and Responsibilities.

- 1.4.1. MAJCOM/A3. AMC is designated lead command for the C-130J Mission Design Series (MDS) aircraft. AMC/A3 establishes and standardizes aircrew evaluations in coordination with all other MAJCOM/A3s.
- 1.4.2. Wing/Installation Commander (WG/CC) or equivalent. WG/CC will review, approve, disapprove, or delegate (no lower than SQ/CC) all **T-3** waivers to this AFMAN.
- 1.4.3. Group Commander (OG/CC) or equivalent. OG/CCs will establish and maintain the Standardization and Evaluation program and ensure evaluators comply with AFI 11-202 Volume 2 and this AFMAN. (**T-3**).
- 1.4.4. Squadron Commander (SQ/CC) or designated representative. SQ/CCs will establish and maintain the Squadron Standardization and Evaluation program and ensure evaluators comply with AFI 11-202, Volume 2, and this AFMAN. (**T-3**).
- 1.4.5. Flight Examiners. Flight examiners will administer evaluations in accordance with AFI 11-202, Volume 2, and this AFMAN. (**T-3**).
- **1.5. Evaluations.** This manual establishes standardized instrument, qualification, mission, and instructor evaluation criteria. It also establishes the areas and sub-areas necessary for the successful completion of evaluations, and which required areas/sub-areas are considered critical or non-critical. This criteria can be found in the tables located in chapters **2** and **3**.

- **1.6. Evaluation Requirements.** Whenever practical, evaluations should be accomplished concurrently. Aircrews complete the following evaluations on a 17-month frequency in accordance with AFI 11-202, Volume 2, and the appropriate MAJCOM supplement.
 - 1.6.1. Instrument (INSTM) Evaluation. All C-130J pilots will successfully complete a periodic instrument evaluation. (**T-2**). The flight phase will evaluate pilot performance and application of instrument procedures and maneuvers in a Weapon System Trainer (WST) or actual aircraft. (**T-2**). The ground phase includes a requisite open-book written instrument examination in accordance with AFMAN 11-210, *Instrument Refresher Program*.
 - 1.6.2. Qualification (QUAL) Evaluation. All C-130J crewmembers complete a periodic qualification evaluation. The flight phase evaluates performance and application of flight manual procedures and maneuvers. Evaluation may be accomplished in a WST for pilots, and in an Aircrew Training Device (ATD) for loadmasters. The ground phase includes the following requisites: open-book and closed-book examinations, Boldface examination, and an Emergency Procedures Evaluation (EPE).
 - 1.6.3. Mission (MSN) Evaluations. All mission qualified C-130J crewmembers successfully complete a periodic mission evaluation. MSN evaluations may be accomplished in conjunction with the QUAL evaluation (e.g., QUAL/MSN). Mission evaluation profiles are to be as realistic as possible with a minimum number of simulated events. The flight phase evaluates performance and application of operational procedures and include a sampling of maneuvers for which the individual is qualified. Evaluation may be in WST for pilots and in an ATD for loadmasters. The ground phase includes the following requisites: open-book examination, Boldface examination, and an EPE.
 - 1.6.3.1. Unit baseline qualifications. Unit supplements list baseline qualifications crewmembers hold to be considered Mission Ready in the unit's mission. Group Standardization and Evaluation office (OG/OGV) develops mission evaluation profiles to sample these qualifications. Any crewmember that maintains a qualification level below this baseline will have restrictions listed on the "MSN" portion of their AF Form 8, *Certificate of Aircrew Qualification*. (T-3).
 - 1.6.3.2. For units/aircrew with an airdrop requirement, MSN evaluations for all crew positions should include actual airdrop loads, if possible. For units/aircrew with a NVG requirement, MSN evaluations for all crew positions should be at night utilizing NVGs if scheduling permits.
 - 1.6.4. Instructor (INSTR) Evaluations. See AFI 11-202, Volume 2, for instructor evaluation requirements. Aircrew members designated as instructors are to be evaluated on their ability to instruct during all periodic evaluations. Crewmembers may use their initial INSTR evaluation to satisfy the requirements of a periodic evaluation provided all evaluation requirements for the periodic evaluation are met. Evaluation may be in WST for pilots and in an ATD for loadmasters.
 - 1.6.5. Emergency Procedures Evaluations (EPE). Use AFI 11-202, Volume 2 and the following: Evaluate an aircrew member's knowledge of emergency procedures (EPs) and aircraft systems knowledge for all QUAL and MSN evaluations. The EPE covers areas commensurate with the examinee's graduated training (e.g., initial, line, instructor, or evaluator). See specific crew position chapters of this AFMAN for EPE requirements.

- 1.6.5.1. OGVs develop and maintain a list of EPE program requirements (topics, special interest etc.). An EPE guide for each crew position should be developed detailing the evaluation areas and conduct of the EPE. Examiners may use one continuous scenario throughout the EPE, or may use different scenarios as required to ensure appropriate areas are evaluated.
- 1.6.5.2. EPEs should not be conducted immediately before or during a flight evaluation. When possible, EPEs should be conducted in an ATD. If an ATD is not available, the EPE may be verbally evaluated. Examinees may use publications normally available in flight. The examinee must recite, perform, or write all Boldface items. (**T-3**).
- 1.6.5.3. Examinees receiving an overall EPE grade of unqualified are placed in supervised status until recommended additional training and re-evaluation are completed. Examinees receiving an overall EPE grade of unqualified because of unsatisfactory Boldface procedures are not to be permitted to fly until a successful re-evaluation is accomplished. Accomplish additional training in accordance with AFI 11-202, Volume 2.

1.7. Grading Policies.

- 1.7.1. When in-flight evaluation of a required area is not possible, the area may be verbally evaluated. Flight examiners should make every effort to evaluate all required areas in-flight or in an ATD before resorting to this provision. If an alternate method is used to complete the evaluation, document in the Additional Comments portion of the AF Form 8. Use of this provision should be approved by the examinee's commander. The commander's signature on the AF Form 8 acknowledges this provision has been approved.
- 1.7.2. Do not verbally evaluate takeoffs, instrument approaches, landings or cargo loading that fulfill minimum evaluation requirements listed in Chapters 2 and 3.
- 1.7.3. Critical Areas. Critical areas require adequate accomplishment by the aircrew member in order to achieve the mission objectives successfully. If an aircrew member receives an unqualified grade in any critical area, the overall grade for the evaluation is unqualified. Critical areas are identified by "(Critical)" following the applicable area title, and the shading of the Q- block on the AF IMT 3862, *Flight Evaluation Worksheet*. See examples Attachment 2 and 3.
- 1.7.4. Crew Resource Management (CRM). If CRM is downgraded during the evaluation, ensure an AF IMT 4031, *CRM Skills Criteria Training/Evaluation* is completed. The completed IMT is then forwarded to OG/OGV, for inclusion in quarterly trends, and wing training so that the data can be passed to the MAJCOM CRM program manager.

1.8. Conduct of Evaluations.

- 1.8.1. Pre-brief the examinee on the purpose, conduct, requirements and general criteria of the evaluation. Evaluate the examinee in each area/sub-area.
- 1.8.2. Flight examiners should not evaluate personnel they have primarily trained or recommended for upgrade. Flight examiners should normally not evaluate personnel who serve as rating officers on their performance reports.
- 1.8.3. Aircrew Training System (ATS) contractors will not be in the seat during evaluations in an ATD. (**T-2**).

- 1.8.4. Unless otherwise specified, flight examiners may conduct the evaluation in any crew position or seat which best enables the flight examiner to observe the examinee's performance.
- 1.8.5. Evaluators **note** discrepancies and deviations from prescribed tolerances and performance criteria during the evaluation. Compare the examinee's performance with the tolerances provided in the grading criteria and assign an appropriate grade for each area.
 - 1.8.5.1. An evaluation will not be changed to a training mission to avoid documenting substandard performance, nor will a training mission be changed to an evaluation, with the exception of a No-Notice evaluation. (**T-2**).
 - 1.8.5.2. The judgment of the flight examiner, guidance provided in AFI 11-202, Volume 2, and this AFMAN, will be the determining factors in assigning an overall qualification level on the AF Form 8. (**T-2**). The flight examiner should thoroughly critique all aspects of the flight. During the critique, the flight examiner will review the examinee's overall rating, specific deviations, area/sub-area grades assigned, and any additional training required. (**T-2**).
- 1.8.6. In the event of unsatisfactory performance, the flight examiner determines recommended additional training requirements. Required additional training will not be accomplished on the same flight. (**T-3**). Exception: Additional training on the same flight is allowed when unique situations presenting valuable training opportunities exist (i.e., thunderstorm avoidance, crosswind landings). This option requires flight examiner discretion and judicious application. (**T-3**). When used, the examinee must be informed when the additional training begins and ends. (**T-3**).
 - 1.8.6.1. An ATD may be used to accomplish additional training and rechecks. Areas for additional training and rechecks should be limited to those areas/sub-areas that can be realistically accomplished in an ATD.
 - 1.8.6.2. The flight examiner who administered the original evaluation should not administer the recheck.
- **1.9.** Use of IMT Form 3862, Flight Evaluation Worksheet. Units (normally the OGV) complete the AF IMT 3862, using the examples in Attachments 2 and 3. Units may add special interest items and/or local evaluation requirements. The worksheet should be used in flight to ensure all required areas are evaluated. The completed worksheet serves as a temporary record of the evaluation and is filed in the aircrew member's Flight Evaluation Folder until the AF Form 8 is completed and filed.

1.10. Aircrew Testing.

1.10.1. Open-Book Exam. An open-book examination is a requisite for QUAL and MSN evaluations. The open-book QUAL exam consists of a minimum of 60 questions. The open-book MSN exam consists of a minimum of 40 questions, at least 25% of which come from tactical doctrine documents related to C-130J combat operations (Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-3.C-130J, *Combat Aircraft Fundamentals C-130J*). If a combined examination is created for combination evaluations (QUAL/MSN), include the appropriate number of questions for each portion. For periodic INSTR evaluations, a portion of the open-book exam will include instructor questions. (T-3). A separate (unique) INSTR open-book exam is not required.

- 1.10.2. Closed-Book Exam. A closed-book examination is a requisite for QUAL evaluations. The exam consists of a minimum of 20 questions from the Master Question File.
- 1.10.3. Boldface exam. A boldface exam is a requisite for any periodic evaluation.
- **1.11. Typical C-130J Evaluation Profile(s).** Unit OG/CC or OG/OGV determine the evaluation profiles suitable for aircrew evaluations. These profiles include all required items in Attachments **2** and **3** and include a sampling of other items.
- **1.12. Multiple C-130J Model Certifications.** Accomplish difference training in accordance with AFMAN 11-2C- 130J Volume 1, *Aircrew Training*. A periodic evaluation may be accomplished in any aircraft model in which the individual is certified.
- **1.13. Senior Officer Requirements.** Senior Officers meeting the criteria outlined in AFI 11-401 *Aviation Management*, AFI 11-202 Volume 1, *Aircrew Training* and AFMAN 11-2C-130J Volume 1 are authorized to complete a C-130J Senior Officer QUAL evaluation. Requisites include open and closed book examinations, instrument examination, Boldface, and EPE. If a Senior Officer does not complete the flight evaluation, the program is incomplete.

Chapter 2

PILOT EVALUATIONS

- **2.1. General.** This chapter standardizes initial (INIT), periodic, and re-qualification (RQ) evaluations, including requirements for instrument/qualification, mission, and instructor evaluations.
 - 2.1.1. Flight examiners will not intentionally fail any equipment during flight evaluations, but may deny the use of systems not affecting safety of flight. (**T-3**).
 - 2.1.2. Under no circumstances will a flight examiner allow the aircraft to slow below one engine-out Vmca or exceed aircraft limitations specified in the flight manual, regardless of tolerances listed for specific areas. (**T-2**).
 - 2.1.3. If the flight manual recommends a specific airspeed range for performance of a maneuver, the flight examiner will apply the grading criteria to the upper and lower limits of that range. (T-3).
 - 2.1.4. Evaluator pilots may conduct evaluations when scheduled as primary aircrew members.
 - 2.1.5. Pilots may be evaluated in either the left or right seat. The term "Pilot" also includes Mobility Pilot Development (MPD) pilots. Pilots who are not Aircraft Commanders have a crew position of "FP" on their AF Form 8. The "MP" crew position is used for eligible Aircraft Commanders and when the evaluation concludes training leading to certification as an Aircraft Commander (such as an Operational Mission Evaluation (OME) or defined in an AETC syllabus).
- **2.2.** Instrument/Qualification Evaluations (Initial, Periodic and Requalification). C-130J INSTM evaluations will be flown concurrently with QUAL evaluations. The profile will include the following:
 - 2.2.1. A minimum of one precision, one non-precision, and one Category II (if qualified) approach will be flown. (T-3). One of the approaches will be flown without use of the autopilot and autothrottle. (T-3). Initial CAT II qualification evaluations require an approach to a missed approach and an approach to a landing. CAT II procedures may be evaluated on a CAT I approach. (T-3). If possible, approaches should be flown to airfields other than home station or deployed locations. If in a Block 8.1 aircraft, aircrew will also fly one approach as a Random Navigation Area Navigation/Global Positioning System (RNAV/GPS) approach. (T-3).
 - 2.2.1.1. During evaluations where both pilots are completing their Periodic Instrument/ Qualification requirements the CAT II approach requirement may be simultaneously evaluated for both the PF and PM.
 - 2.2.1.2. Document the examinee role (e.g. PF or PM) and alternate roles for each subsequent periodic evaluation.
 - 2.2.2. Holding or a Procedure Turn will be accomplished. (T-3).
 - 2.2.3. Circling and a VFR pattern are required if weather and traffic permit. (T-3).

- 2.2.4. Simulated emergency procedures will include: 3-engine instrument approach, 3-engine go-around, and a 3-engine landing. (**T-3**).
- 2.2.5. A full (100%) and a partial flap (50% or 0%) landing is required as well as touch and go procedures.
- 2.2.6. Pilot Senior Officer Instrument/Qualification Evaluations (SOP 1 and SOP 2). From the left seat, evaluate appropriate areas in the GENERAL, INST, and QUAL grading criteria. This evaluation will consist of a variety of instrument approaches and VFR patterns. (**T-3**). A minimum of one precision and one non-precision approach, and one 50% and one 100% landing will be accomplished. (**T-3**). No-flap landing, simulated engine-out approach/go-around/landing, and CAT II approach and landings are not required. This evaluation should normally be completed in the aircraft. Annotate AF Form 8 as an INSTM/QUAL evaluation with expiration date, crew position is "FP" and include a restriction on the AF Form 8, "Fly under direct supervision of a qualified C-130J instructor pilot." A qualified C-130J instructor pilot or higher will be in the other seat. (**T-3**).
- **2.3. Mission Evaluations (Initial, Periodic, and Requalification).** C-130J MSN evaluations may be accomplished in conjunction with the INSTM/QUAL evaluation. Depending on the unit's mission, or crewmember's qualification, the MSN evaluation will consist of an airdrop profile, a maximum effort profile, and/or formation procedures. (T-2). NVG usage and actual airdrop loads are desired.
 - 2.3.1. The maximum effort profile will consist of a maximum effort takeoff, tactical approach, and maximum effort landing. (**T-3**). The tactical approach will consist of either a high or low altitude tactical arrival. (**T-3**). Landings will be performed on an actual landing zone, if available. (**T-3**) If not available, a larger runway with clearly identifiable Landing Zone markings (in accordance with AFI 13-217, *Drop Zone and Landing Zone Operations*) may be used. The touchdown zone will be no longer than 500 feet. (**T-3**) One go-around is permitted, assuming smooth air and stable aircraft conditions.
 - 2.3.1.1. Pilots should accomplish the maximum effort takeoff and landing from the left seat (Exception: Instructor Pilots/Instructor Pilot candidates see paragraph 2.4).
 - 2.3.1.2. Pilots that only maintain an airland maximum effort qualification (non-airdrop) will fly an IFR or VFR high altitude route (minimum of 20 minutes long and 5000' AGL) to a Time of Arrival (TOA) at an airfield. (T-3). The arrival will consist of either a high altitude tactical arrival or a penetration decent to a low altitude tactical arrival. The arrivals will be to a maximum effort landing. (T-3).
 - 2.3.2. The airdrop profile will consist of a route (20 minute minimum from departure to Time Over Target (TOT)), Station Keeping Equipment (SKE) or visual formation procedures (if applicable), airdrop, and recovery. (T-3). The type of formation procedures will alternate for each periodic MSN evaluation. (T-3). This does not preclude units from accomplishing both types of formation procedures on a MSN evaluation. The profile will be planned as a two-ship minimum. (T-3). This does not preclude the completion of the evaluation as a single ship due to unforeseen circumstances.
 - 2.3.2.1. Two-Ship Formation Lead Pilot. Should accomplish the evaluation in the lead position.

- 2.3.2.2. Multi Element Flight Lead Pilot. Should accomplish the evaluation in the formation lead or element lead position. Examinee should participate in mission commander duties.
- 2.3.3. For unit/aircrew with a MSN evaluation requirement, Area 41 (Defensive Systems/ Tactics) and Area 42 (Threat Avoidance) will be evaluated. (**T-3**). Refer to **Table 3.4**.
 - 2.3.3.1. Pilot Senior Officer Mission Evaluations (SOP 2). (**T-2**). Evaluate appropriate areas in the GENERAL and MSN grading criteria. This evaluation will consist of an airdrop profile (no personnel), maximum effort profile, and formation procedures (no Coordinated Airplane Positioning System ((CAPS)/SKE). NVG usage and actual airdrop loads are desired. Annotate AF Form 8 as a MSN evaluation with expiration date, crew position is "FP" and include a restriction on the AF Form 8, "Fly under direct supervision of a qualified C-130J instructor pilot." A qualified C-130J instructor pilot or higher will be in the other seat. (**T-2**).
- **2.4. Instructor Evaluations (Initial, Periodic, and Requalification).** Flight examiners will place particular emphasis on the examinee's ability to recognize student difficulties and provide timely and effective corrective action. (**T-3**) Instructor pilots should be able to brief, observe, assess, and debrief the student's overall performance. State that instructional ability was evaluated in the comments section of the AF Form 8. List a minimum of two areas instructed by the examinee. (**T-3**) INIT or RQ INSTR evaluations will be conducted with a qualified pilot occupying the other seat. (**T-3**) For initial evaluation, the examinee will occupy the right seat; for recurring or RQs they may occupy either seat. (**T-3**).
 - 2.4.1. During periodic QUAL evaluations, instructors will initiate a simulated aircraft malfunction requiring a simulated engine shutdown, simulated engine-out approach and go-around. (T-3) The instructor will be evaluated on his ability to ensure safe simulated engine-out operations. (T-3).
 - 2.4.2. If airdrop qualified, all INIT and RQ INSTR evaluations require the examinee to instruct a SKE or visual low-level route and airdrop. (**T-3**).
 - 2.4.3. All instructor areas/sub-areas must be evaluated. (T-3)
- **2.5. Operational Mission Evaluation.** Prior to Aircraft Commander certification, all pilots, except those previously certified as Aircraft Commanders in Mobility Air Forces (MAF) C-130 aircraft, will complete an OME. (**T-1**) Flight examiners will evaluate the examinee's ability to operate in command while performing the unit's mission. (**T-3**) The flight should be an off-station operational or training mission. OG/CC may substitute a local mission to preclude lengthy certification delays. The evaluation will be documented as a "SPOT" and the remarks section will include the following: "This evaluation was conducted in conjunction with Aircraft Commander certification." (**T-3**)

2.6. Emergency Procedures Evaluation (EPE).

2.6.1. The INSTM/QUAL EPE will cover a cross section of aircraft systems knowledge and emergencies. (**T-2**) All Boldface procedures will be evaluated. (**T-3**) Examinees should demonstrate an understanding of aircraft systems beyond the actual steps required for an EP. Category I navigation procedures and Takeoff and Landing Data (TOLD) knowledge will be evaluated. (**T-3**).

2.6.2. MSN EPEs will include knowledge of C-130J mission employment guidance, airdrop emergency procedures, tactics, threats, defensive system operation and the effect of degraded systems. (**T-3**).

2.7. Pilot Grading Criteria.

Table 2.1. GENERAL.

Area 1. Dire	ectives/Publications/Personal and Professional Equipment.
Q	Possessed a high level of knowledge of all applicable aircraft directives and publications and understood how to apply both to enhance mission accomplishment. Required publications (paper or electronic) were current and properly posted. Had all required personal/professional equipment. Displayed satisfactory knowledge of the care and use of personal/professional equipment. Required equipment inspections were current.
Q-	Unsure of some directives but could locate information in appropriate publications. Required publications (paper or electronic) were current but improperly posted.
U	Unaware of established directives and/or could not locate them in the appropriate publication in a timely manner. Required publications (paper or electronic) were not current. Did not have required personal/professional equipment. Required equipment inspections were overdue or equipment was unserviceable.
Area 2. Miss	sion Preparation/Planning/Performance.
Q	Checked all factors applicable to flight such as weather, notices to airmen (NOTAM), alternate air-fields, airfield suitability, fuel requirements, charts, etc. Correctly computed performance data using applicable Communications Navigation IFF/Management Unit (CNI-MU) pages, and crosschecked with Portable Flight Planning System (PFPS)/tab-data/performance charts as required.
Q-	Made minor errors or omissions in checking all factors that could have detracted from mission effectiveness. Limited knowledge of performance capabilities. Made minor errors in computing performance data.
U	Made major errors or omissions that would have prevented an effective mission. Inadequate knowledge of aircraft performance. Committed major errors in utilizing the CNI-MU TOLD pages. Major errors in crosschecking/manually computing performance data.
Area 3. Brie	efings.
Q	Contributed to the briefing content to ensure it included all applicable information. Briefings effectively organized and presented in a logical sequence. Covered all pertinent items. Effectively used available briefing aids.

Q-	Allowed omission of items pertinent but not critical to the mission. Briefings lacked continuity or contained unnecessary repetition. Some difficulty communicating clearly. Did not make effective use of available briefing aids. Dwelled on non-essential items.		
U	Failed to conduct/attend required briefings. Omitted essential items or did not correct erroneous information that could affect mission accomplishment. Demonstrated lack of knowledge of subject. Briefing poorly organized and not presented in a logical sequence, resulting in confusion. Presented erroneous information that would affect safe/effective mission accomplishment.		
Area 4. Use of C	Checklist.		
Q	Consistently used and called for the correct checklist and gave the correct response at the appropriate time throughout the mission.		
Q-	Checklist responses were untimely and/or crewmember required continual prompting for correct response.		
U	Used or called for incorrect checklist or consistently omitted checklist items. Unable to identify the correct checklist to use for a given situation. Did not complete checklist prior to the event.		
Area 5. Safety C	Consciousness (Critical).		
Q	Aware of and complied with all safety factors required for safe aircraft operation and mission accomplishment.		
U	Not aware of, or did not comply with, all safety factors required for safe aircraft operation or mission accomplishment. Operated the aircraft in a dangerous manner.		
Area 6. Flight D	Discipline (Critical).		
Q	Exhibited strict flight and crew discipline. Prepared and completed mission in compliance with existing instructions and directives.		
U	Failed to exhibit strict flight and crew discipline. Failed to comply with existing instructions and directives that did, or could have, jeopardized safety of mission success.		
Area 7. Airmanship/Situational Awareness (Critical).			
Q	Maintained situational awareness and exercised sound judgment throughout the mission. Conducted the flight with a sense of understanding and comprehension. Prioritized tasks properly.		
U	Lacked situational awareness. Faulty judgment resulted in decisions that had negative mission impact. Lacks the skills to prioritize tasks. Unaware of significant events that impacted the mission.		

Area 8. Crew Coordination/Crew Resource Management (CRM) / Threat and Error Management (TEM). See AFI 11-290, Cockpit/Crew Resource Management Training Program, and use AF IMT 4031 (or MAJCOM equivalent), CRM Skills Criteria Training/Evaluation Form, as a reference. Observe or discuss Verbalize, Verify, Monitor practices and procedures and pilot monitoring duties.				
Q	Effectively coordinated with other aircrew members throughout the assigned mission. Demonstrated operational knowledge of other crewmembers' duties and responsibilities. Effectively applied CRM/TEM skills throughout the mission. Followed procedures for the monitoring/crosschecking of other crewmembers, the automation status and making required callouts.			
Q-	Crew coordination skills detracted from mission accomplishment. Demonstrated limited knowledge of other crewmembers' duties and responsibilities. Slow to follow procedures for the monitoring/crosschecking of other crewmembers, the automation status or making required callouts.			
U	Poor crew coordination or unsatisfactory knowledge of other crewmembers' duties and responsibilities negatively affected mission accomplishment or safety of flight. Did not follow procedures for the monitoring/crosschecking of other crewmembers, the automation status or making required callouts.			
Area 8.1. Pilot	Monitoring Duties			
Q	Effectively monitors and supports/advises the PF, intervening, when appropriate, if the PF is not adequately controlling the aircraft flight path. Complies with applicable flight policies and procedures and makes required flight callouts. Remains vigilant to identify, communicate, and mitigate events/distractions that may adversely affect flight path management. Monitors energy and flight path performance and is alert for erroneous/conflicting aircraft control and navigational information. Effectively addresses aircraft system failures or unexpected aircraft flight guidance and aircraft system outcomes.			
Q-	Does not fully support/advise the PF regarding the aircraft flight path. Slow to intervene if the PF is not adequately controlling the aircraft flight path. Flight policies/procedures are not fully applied and required flight callouts are inconsistent. Flight path/energy management awareness, communication, and/or vigilance is sporadic but does not adversely affect flight safety. Intermittently addresses aircraft system failures or unexpected aircraft flight guidance and aircraft system outcomes.			
U	Fails to support/advise the PF regarding the aircraft flight path. Does not intervene if the PF is not adequately controlling the aircraft flight path. Application of flight policies/ procedures is insufficient and required callouts are not made. Flight path/energy management awareness, communication, and/or vigilance is insufficient or jeopardizes flight safety. Fails to address aircraft system failures or unexpected aircraft flight guidance and aircraft system outcomes.			

Area 9. Commu	nication Procedures.
Q	Had a complete knowledge of and complied with the correct communications procedures. Transmissions were concise with proper terminology. Complied with and acknowledged all required instructions. Asked for/provided clarification when necessary.
Q-	Made minor deviations from procedures that required re-transmissions. Slowin initiating, or missed, required radio calls. Transmissions contained extraneous matter, were not in proper sequence, or used non-standard terminology. Slow to ask for/provide clarification when necessary.
U	Used incorrect procedures; poor performance caused confusion and jeopardized mission accomplishment. Omitted numerous radio calls. Failed to use precise, stated terminology. Did not ask for/provide clarification when necessary.
Area 10. Life Su	ipport Systems/Egress.
Q	Displayed thorough knowledge of location and use of life support systems and equipment. Demonstrated and emphasized the proper operating procedures used to operate aircraft egress devices such as doors, windows, hatches, life rafts, and escape ropes.
Q-	Showed limited knowledge of location and use of life support systems and equipment. Unsure of the proper operating procedures used to operate some of the aircraft egress devices.
U	Displayed unsatisfactory knowledge of location and use of life support systems and equipment. Unable to properly operate aircraft egress devices.
Area 11. Knowl	edge/Completion of Forms.
Q	Completed all required forms and/or flight plans accurately, on time and in accordance with applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs and FAA/ICAO directives. Related an accurate debrief of significant events to applicable agencies (Intel, Maintenance, etc.).
Q-	Made minor errors on forms and/or flight plans that did not affect the mission. Incorrectly or incompletely reported some information due tominor errors, omissions, and/or deviations.
U	Did not accomplish required forms and/or flight plans. Omitted or incorrectly reported significant information due to major errors, omissions, and/or deviations.

Table 2.2. QUALIFICATION.

Area 12. Aircraft Preflight Inspection.		
Q	Accomplished required inspections in a thorough and proficient manner as	
outlined in applicable checklists and/or directives without deviations or		
	omissions. Properly checked aircraft systems and components in accordance	

	with flight manual. Coordinated with ground support personnel. Correctly
	determined aircraft status.
Q-	Displayed Minor deviations or omissions in the accomplishment of required inspections as outlined inapplicable checklists and/or directives. Limited knowledge of proper procedures for checking aircraft systems/componential flight manual.
U	Failed to accomplish required inspections in a thorough and proficient
U	manner. Major deviations or omissions. Omitted or improperly checked aircraft systems/components in accordance with flight manual. Did not coordinate with ground support personnel. Unable to determine correct aircraft status. Required assistance to complete inspections or exceeded time allotted causing a mission delay.
Area 13. Gr	ound Operations/Taxi.
Q	Established and adhered to station, start engine, taxi, and take-off time to assure thorough preflight, check of personal equipment, crew/passenger briefings, etc. Accurately determined readiness of aircraft for flight. Completed all systems preflight/postflight inspections in accordance with flight manual. Conducted taxi operations according to flight manual, AFMAN 11-218, Aircraft Operations and Movement on the Ground, and local procedures.
Q-	Made minor procedural errors that did not detract from mission
	effectiveness with respect to start engine, taxi, and take-off time, preflight, check of personal equipment, crew/passenger briefings, etc. Completed all systems preflight/postflight inspections in accordance with flight manual with minor discrepancies.
U	Made errors that directly contributed to a late takeoff that degraded the mission. Failed to accurately determine readiness for flight. Failed to preflight/postflight a critical component or could not conduct a satisfactory preflight/postflight inspection.
Area 14. Ta	keoff.
Q	Maintained smooth, positive aircraft control throughout the takeoff. Performed the takeoff in accordance with flight manual and as published/directed.
Q-	Made minor deviations from published procedures without affecting safety of flight. Aircraft control was safe but not consistently smooth and positive. Hesitant in application of procedures/corrections.
U	Made a potentially dangerous takeoff. Exceeded aircraft/systems limitations. Failed to establish proper climb attitude. Excessive deviation from intended flight path. Violated flight manual procedures.
Area 15. Ba	sic Aircraft Control.

Q	Maintained positive aircraft control. Experienced minor deviations but corrected in timely manner. Airspeed: +10/-5 KIAS Altitude: +/-100 feet Heading/Course: +/-5 degrees Frequent deviations in airspeed altitude or heading, but does not
Q-	compromise flight safety. Slow to correct deviations. Exceeds Q criteria but does not exceed: Airspeed: +15/-5 KIAS Altitude: +/-200 feet Heading/Course: +/-10 degrees
U	Exceeds Q- criteria.
	nation Management.
Q	Established/followed guidelines for the operation of automated systems; aware of when systems should be disabled, and when programming actions are to be verbalized and acknowledged. Established/followed Pilot Flying (PF) and Pilot Monitoring (PM) responsibilities with regard to automated systems. Periodically reviewed and verified the status of aircraft automated systems. Verbalized and acknowledged entries and changes to automated systems parameters. Allowed sufficient time for programming the Mission Computer. Used automated systems at appropriate levels to reduce workload, but reduced or disengaged level of automation when programming demands could have reduced situational awareness or created work overloads.
Q-	Had limited knowledge of guidelines for the operation of automated systems; unclear as to when systems should be disabled, or when programming actions are to be verbalized and acknowledged. Slow to establish/follow Pilot Flying (PF) and Pilot Monitoring (PM) responsibilities with regard to automated systems. Slow to review and verify the status of aircraft automated systems. Inconsistently verbalized and acknowledged entries and changes to automated systems parameters. Did not always allow sufficient time for programming the Mission Computer. Inconsistently used automated systems at appropriate levels.
U	Did not establish/follow guidelines for the operation of automated systems; unaware of when systems should be disabled, or programming actions that are to be verbalized and acknowledged. Did not establish/follow Pilot Flying (PF) and Pilot Monitoring (PM) responsibilities with regard to automated systems. Did not periodically review and verify the status of aircraft automated systems. Did not verbalize and acknowledge entries and changes to automated systems parameters. Failed to allow sufficient time for programming the Mission Computer. Did not use automated systems at appropriate levels, to decrease workload. Did not reduce or disengage level of automation when programming demands reduced situational awareness or created work overloads.

Area 17. VFR Pa	uttern.
Q	Performed traffic pattern and turn to final/final approach in accordance with published procedures. Aircraft control was smooth and positive. Did not over/under-shoot final approach. Constantly cleared area of intended flight. Effectively divided lookout workload among the crew.
Q-	Performed traffic pattern and turn to final/final approach with minor deviations to published procedures. Controlled aircraft safely, but was not consistently smooth and positive. Over/under-shot final approach slightly but was able to intercept a normal glide path. Adequately cleared area of intended flight. Slow to divide lookout workload among the crew.
U	Did not perform traffic pattern and/or turn to final/final approach in accordance with published procedures. Displayed erratic aircraft control. Over/under-shot final approach by a wide margin requiring a go-around or potentially unsafe maneuvering on final. Did not clear area of intended flight. Failed to divide lookout workload among the crew effectively.
_	gs. Include sub-areas for Full Flap, Partial Flap (50% or 0%), Engine-out,
Touch/Stop-and-	full Flap Landing.
	artial Flap (50%/0%) Landing.
	ngine-out Landing.
	ic items to evaluate include threshold airspeed, runway alignment, flare, l and landing in a crab. Airspeed tolerances apply to computed touchdown
Q	Performed landings as published/directed in accordance with flight manual and met the following criteria: Airspeed: +/-5 KIAS Touchdown Zone: Within 1000 feet of intended touchdown point Centerline: +/-15 feet left or right
Q-	Performed landings with minor deviations to procedures as published/directed. Landed in a slight crab. Exceeded Q criteria but not the following: Airspeed: +10/-5 KIAS Touchdown Zone: Threshold-3000 feet Centerline: +/-25 feet left or right
U	Did not perform landing as published/directed. Exceeded Q- criteria.
Sub-area 18D. T	Ouch/Stop and Go Landing.
Q	Maintained positive aircraft control while the aircraft was on the runway from landing to takeoff. Properly applied flight manual procedures.
Q-	Controlled aircraft safely, but was not consistently smooth and positive. Slow to correctly apply flight manual procedures.

U	Allowed aircraft to deviate in an unsafe or potentially unsafe manner. Failed
	to properly apply flight manual procedures.
Area 19. Landi	ng Roll/Braking/Propeller Reversing.
Q	Performed landing roll procedures as published/directed in accordance with
	flight manual. Braking action and propeller reversing commensurate with
	landing conditions.
Q-	Performed landing roll procedures with minor deviation to procedures as
	published/directed. Braking action and propeller reversing not accomplished
	commensurate with landing conditions, but did not jeopardize safety.
TT	Braking or propeller reversing action not applied smoothly.
U	Did not perform landing roll procedures as published/directed. Braking or
	propeller reversing accomplished in an unsafe manner.
Area 20. All Er	ngine Go-Around.
Q	Initiated and performed go-around promptly and in accordance with flight
	manual and directives. Applied smooth control inputs. Acquired and
	maintained a positive climb.
Q-	Slow or hesitant to initiate go-around. Slightly over-controlled the aircraft.
	Made minor deviations which did not affect mission accomplishment or
	compromise safety.
U	Did not initiate go-around when appropriate or directed. Made major
	deviations or misapplication of procedures that could have led to an unsafe
	condition.
Area 21. Engin	e-out Operations
Q	Used appropriate control inputs for asymmetric condition. Gave proper
	consideration to maneuvering the aircraft with regard to the inoperative
	engine.
Q-	Made minor deviations in aircraft control, which occasionally allowed the
	aircraft to fly uncoordinated.
U	Consistently controlled the aircraft erratically resulting in uncoordinated
	flight. Did not maneuver the aircraft with regard to the inoperative engine
	with due regard to aircraft safety.
	e-out Go-Around
Q	Performed all required procedures in accordance with the flight manual and
	directives. Applied the correct control inputs is a smooth, positive, and
	coordinated manner.
Q-	Made procedural errors which did not affect safety. Aircraft control was not
	smooth and positive. Applied rudder and aileron inputs in the correct
	direction with some tendency to over/under control.
U	Made procedural errors which did affect safety. Aircraft control was not
	safely maintained. Made incorrect rudder and/or aileron inputs.
	ace Emergency Procedures (Critical).
Q	Correct, immediate responses in the proper sequence. Maintained aircraft
	control. Coordinated proper crew actions.

U	Incorrect sequence, unsatisfactory response, or unsatisfactory performance of corrective actions.
Area 24. Other E	Emergency Procedures.
Q	Operated within prescribed limits and correctly diagnosed problems.
	Performed/explained proper corrective action for each type of malfunction.
	Effectively used available resources.
Q-	Operated within prescribed limits but slow to analyze problems or apply
	proper corrective actions. Did not effectively use and/or experienced delays,
	omissions, or deviations in use of checklist and/or available resources.
U	Exceeded limitations. Unable or failed to analyze problem or take proper
	corrective action. Did not use checklist and/or available resources.
Area 25. System	s Operations/Knowledge/Limitations.
Q	Demonstrated/explained complete knowledge of aircraft systems, operating
	limitations and procedures.
Q-	Possessed a limited knowledge of aircraft systems operations and limitations
	in some areas. Used individual technique instead of established procedure
	and was unaware of differences.
U	Demonstrated unsatisfactory systems knowledge. Unable to demonstrate or
	explain procedures, or aircraft systems operations.

Table 2.3. INSTRUMENT.

Area 26. Instrument Departure/SID.		
Q	Complied with all restrictions or controlling agency instructions. Made all required reports. Applied course/heading corrections promptly. Demonstrated smooth, positive control.	
Q-	Made minor deviations in navigation during departure. Was slow to complywith controlling agency instructions or unsure of reporting requirements. Slow to apply course/heading corrections. Did not always control theaircraft smoothly and/or positively.	
U	Failed to comply with published/directed departure, or controlling agency instructions. Accepted an inaccurate clearance. Controlled the aircraft erratically.	
Area 27. En Ro	Area 27. En Route Navigation.	
Q	Navigated satisfactory using all available means. Used appropriate navigation procedures. Complied with clearance instructions. Aware of position at all times. Remained within the confines of assigned airspace.	

comp	e minor errors in procedures/use of navigation equipment. Slow to bly with clearance instructions. Had some difficulty in establishing exact ion and course. Slow to adjust for deviations in time and course.
estab	e major errors in procedures/use of navigation equipment. Could not lish position. Failed to recognize checkpoints or adjust for deviations e and course. Did not remain with the confines of assigned airspace.
Area 28. Holding/Proc	edure Turn.
	rmed entry and holding in accordance with applicable tives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs and FAA/ICAO directives.
Q- Perfo	rmed entry and holding procedures with minor deviations.
	not perform holding procedures in accordance with applicable tives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs and FAA/ICAO directives.
Area 29. Use of NAVA	AIDs.
Q Ensu	red NAVAIDs were properly tuned, identified, and monitored.
Q- Made	e some errors when tuning, identifying, and monitoring NAVAIDs.
U Did r	not ensure NAVAIDs were tuned, identified, and monitored.
Area 30. Descent/Arriv	val.
contr	ormed descent as directed. Complied with all flight manual, oller-issued, or STAR restrictions in a proficient manner. mplished all required checks. Briefed STAR procedures and crew load.
comp	ormed descent as directed with minor deviations that did not bromise mission safety. Slow to accomplish required checks. Ally briefed STAR procedures and crew workload.
check	ormed descent with major deviations. Did not accomplish required as. Erratic corrections. Exceeded flight manual limitations. Failed of STAR procedures and crew workload adequately.
	roaches (Precision Approach Radar (PAR), Instrument Landing System cision Radar Approach (IPRA)) and Block 8.1 RNAV Localizer al Guidance (LPV).
	wing criteria as general tolerances for airspeed, altitude, heading, glide beed tolerances are based on computed approach speed.
Q Airsp	need: +10/-5 KIAS
	ide: Initiated missed approach at decision height +50/-0feet ing: +/-5 degrees of controller's instructions(PAR)
Glide	e Slope: Within one dot (ILS/LPV)
1	

Q-	Exceeds Q criteria but does not exceed:
	Airspeed: +15/-5 KIAS
	Altitude: Initiated missed approach at decision height +100/-0feet Heading: +/-10 degrees of controller's instructions(PAR)
	Glide Slope: Within one dot low, two dots high (ILS/LPV) Course: Within two dots (ILS/LPV)
U	Exceeds Q- criteria.
Sub-area 31A. P	AR.
Q	Flew approach in accordance with applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs and FAA/ICAO directives. Responded to controller's instructions in a smooth and timely manner. Established initial glide path and maintained with only minor deviations. Complied with decision height. Was in a good position to execute a safe landing.
Q-	Flew the approach with minor deviations. Was slow to respond to controller's instructions and make corrections. Complied with decision height. Was in a good position to permit a safe landing. Elevation did not exceed well above or well below glide path.
U	Did not fly the approach in accordance with applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs and FAA/ICAO directives. Made erratic corrections and did not respond to controller's instructions resulting in erratic glide path control. Did not comply with decision height and/or position would not have permitted a safe landing. Exceeded Q- criteria.
Sub-area 31B. II	LS.
Q	Flew approach in accordance with applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs and FAA/ICAO directives. Made smooth and timely corrections to azimuth and glide slope. Established initial glide path and maintained with only minor deviations. Complied with decision height criteria and was in a good position to executea safe landing.
Q-	Flew the approach with minor deviations. Was slow to make corrections resulting in poor glide path control. Complied with decision height criteria and was in a satisfactory position to make a safe landing.
U	Did not fly approach in accordance with applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs and FAA/ICAO directives. Erratic corrections. Did not comply with decision height and/or position at decision height would not have permitted a safe landing. Exceeded Q- criteria.
Sub-area 31C. C	AT II ILS. Use the same criteria as sub-area 31B.
Sub-area 31D. II	PRA. Use the same criteria as sub-area 31B.
Sub-area 31E. LPV. Use the same criteria as sub-area 31B.	

Area 32. Non Precision Approaches (NDB, Localizer, ASR, VOR/TACAN) and Block 8.1 RNAV (LNAV, LNAV/VNAV).

Sub-area 32A. NDB.

Sub-area 32B. Localizer.

Sub-area 32C. ASR.

Sub-area 32D. VOR/TACAN.

Sub-area 32E. Block 8.1 RNAV.

NOTES: Use the following description and criteria as general tolerances for airspeed, altitude at MDA, heading, course, timing, and distance with all engines operating. Airspeed tolerances are based on computed approach speed.

Flew the approach in accordance with published procedures. Made smooth and timely responses to the controller's instructions (ASR). Used appropriate descent rate to arrive at MDA/ Derived Decision Altitude (DDA)/ Decision Altitude (DA) at or before VDP (if depicted)/MAP. Maintained LNAV course and/or VNAV path in accordance with procedures. Was in position at MDA/DDA/DA to execute a safe landing.

Airspeed: +10/-5 KIAS

MDA: +100/-0 feet

Course: +/-5 degrees at MAP (NDB, VOR, TACAN), within one dot (LOC, RNAV),

Timing: Compute/adjusted timing to determine MAP within 10 seconds (when required)

Distance: Determined MAP within +0.0/-0.5 Miles (nothing past the MAP)

Q- Performed approach with minor deviations. Was slow to respond to controller's instructions and make corrections (ASR). Arrived at MDA at or before the MAP, but past the VDP (if depicted); however, was in position to make a safe landing. Exceeded Q criteria but does not exceed:

Airspeed: +15/-5 KIAS

MDA: +150/-0 feet

Course: +/-10 degrees at MAP (NDB, VOR, TACAN), within two dots (LOC, RNAV)

Timing: Compute/adjusted timing to determine MAP within 20 seconds (when required)

Distance: Determined MAP within +0/-1.0 Miles (nothing past the MAP)

U	Did not fly approach in accordance with published procedures. Maintained steady-state flight below the MDA. Failed to compute or adjust timing to determine MAP (when required). Was not in position to make a safe landing. Exceeded Q- criteria.
Area 33. Circlin	ng Approach.
Q	Properly identified aircraft category for the approach and remained within the lateral limits for that category. Complied with controller's instructions. Attained runway alignment. Did not descend from the MDA until in a position to place the aircraft on a normal glide path or execute a normallanding.
	Airspeed: +10/-5 KIAS Altitude: +100/-0 feet
Q-	Properly identified aircraft category for the approach and remained within the lateral limits for that category. Was slow to comply with controller's instructions. Slow to attain runway alignment.
	Airspeed: +15/-5 KIAS Altitude: +150/-0 feet Altitude: +150/-0 feet
U	Did not properly identify aircraft category or exceeded the lateral limits of circling airspace. Did not comply with controller's instructions. Did not attain runway alignment, was potentially unsafe. Descended from the MDA before the aircraft was in a position for a normal glide path or landing. Exceeded Q- criteria.
Area 34. Misseo	d Approach.
Q	Executed missed approach in accordance with applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs and FAA/ICAO directives. Complied with controller's instructions. Applied smooth control inputs.
Q-	Executed missed approach with minor deviations to published procedures but was slow to comply with controller's instructions. Slightly over controlled the aircraft.
U	Did not execute missed approach in accordance with applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs and FAA/ICAO directives. Did not comply with controller's instructions. Deviated from procedures, that could have led to an unsafe condition.

Table 2.4. MISSION.

Area 35. Pre-Takeoff.	
Q	Established and adhered to station, start engine, taxi, and take-off times to
	assure thorough preflight, check of personal equipment, crew/passenger
	briefings, etc. Accurately determined readiness of aircraft for flight.
	Performed all preflight checks prior to takeoff.

Q-	Minor procedural errors, that did not detract from mission effectiveness, with station, start engine, taxi, and take-off times, check of personal equipment, crew/passenger briefings, etc. Minor discrepancies with preflight checks prior to takeoff.
U	Omitted checklist items. Failed to determine the readiness of aircraft for flight. Made errors that directly contributed to a late takeoff, degrading the mission or making it non-effective. Did not taxi as briefed (pilot error) and contributed to late takeoff or confusion in the formation. Major discrepancies with preflight checks prior to takeoff.
Area 36. Takeof	
	o-area 14 criteria and the following (for single ship takeoffs, use Area 14
criteria only).	8 (
Q	Maintained smooth control. Properly briefed crew on appropriate abort calls. Followed established procedures.
Q-	Made minor deviations from established procedures. Was slow to make inputs/corrections when encountering vortices.
U	Jeopardized safe execution of the takeoff by use of improper procedures. Did not use appropriate side of runway (N/A for feed-on method).
Area 37. Departi	ure/Assembly.
NOTE : Use sub	o-area 26 criteria and the following:
Lead Criteria.	
Q	Controlled aircraft smoothly in accordance with flight manuals, directives or published procedures. Considered wingmen's requirements.
Q-	Made minor deviations in procedures. Was occasionally rough on controls. Was inconsistent when considering wingmen, which made it difficult for them to maintain position.
U	Did not fly departure in accordance with flight manuals, directives or published procedures. Was rough on controls and gave no consideration to the wingmen.
Wingman Criter	ia.
Q	Made smooth control inputs. Maintained position with only momentary deviations. Maintained good separation and complied with leader's instructions. Performed a smooth, timely rejoin.
Q-	Made minor deviations to published procedures. Over controlled the aircraft to the extent that formation position was inconsistent. Slow to respond to leader's instructions. Was slow to rejoin.
U	Did not fly procedures in accordance with flight manuals, directives or published procedures. Was rough on the controls and made abrupt position corrections. Did not maintain safe separation or formation position. Failed to comply with leader's instructions. Flew an unsafe rejoin.
Area 38. Formation Communication Procedures. Use area 9 criteria.	
	te Formation Procedures.
Lead/Element L	ead Criteria. (Visual/SKE)
Q	Demonstrated positive control of formation/element in accordance with flight manual, directives or published procedures. Established appropriate formations. Was smooth on controls and considered wingmen. Planned

	1 1 1 1 1 1 1
	ahead and made timely decisions. Ensured wingmen flew proper position.
	Displayed complete understanding of formation procedures.
Q-	Made minor deviations to published procedures. Inconsistently managed the
	flight. Was occasionally rough on controls. Maneuvered excessively making
	it difficult for wingmen to maintain position. Did not always plan ahead
	and/or hesitant in making decisions. Lacked complete understanding of
	formation procedures.
U	Did not fly procedures in accordance with flight manual, directives or
	published procedures. Did not establish appropriate formations. Was rough
	on the controls and maneuvered erratically causing wingmen to break out or
	overrun formation. Gave little consideration to the wingmen. Failed to
	ensure wingmen maintained proper position. Placed
	formation/wingmen in unsafe position or circumstances. Did not understand
	formation procedures.
NOTE: SKE a	also use the following:
Q	Did not rush Flight Command Indicator (FCIs). Identified and complied
-	with FCI and SKE Advisories Caution and Warning System (ACAWS)
	Special Alerts and advisories. Displayed complete understanding of
	relationship between mission computer, SKE, and Automatic Flight Control
	System (AFCS) systems.
Q-	Rushed or occasionally missed FCIs causing potential wingman confusion.
	Was slow to identify or comply with SKE ACAWS Special Alerts and
	advisories. Did not have complete understanding of relationship between
	mission computer, SKE, and AFCS systems.
U	Consistently missed FCIs. Did not identify or failed to comply with SKE
	ACAWS Special Alerts and advisories. Unable to understanding the
	relationship between mission computer, SKE, and AFCS systems.
Wingman Crite	eria. (Visual/SKE)
Q	Maintained position with only momentary deviations. Made smooth and
~	immediate position corrections. Maintained safe separation and complied
	with leader's instructions. Flew a smooth, timely rejoin. Displayed complete
	understanding of formation (Wingman) procedures.
Q-	Made minor deviations to published procedures. Slow to comply with
\ ✓⁻	leader's instructions. Varied position considerably. Over controlled aircraft.
	Was slow to rejoin. Lacked complete understanding of formation
	(Wingman) procedures.
U	Did not fly procedures in accordance with flight manual, directives or
U	
	published procedures. Did not comply with leader's instructions. Unable to
	maintain formation position. Abrupt position corrections. Did not maintain
	safe separation. Flew an unsafe rejoin. Did not understand formation
NODE GE	(Wingman) procedures.
	also use the following:
Q	Identified and complied with FCI and SKE ACAWS Special Alerts and
	advisories. Displayed complete understanding of relationship between
	mission computer, SKE, and AFCS systems.

Q-	Occasionally missed or slow to respond to FCIs or SKE ACAWS Special Alerts and advisories. Did not have complete understanding of relationship between mission computer, SKE, and AFCS systems.
U	Consistently missed FCIs or failed to comply with SKE ACAWS Special Alerts and advisories. Unable to understanding the relationship between mission computer, SKE, and AFCS systems.
Area 40. En route	e Navigation.
Q	Remained within 3 NMs of course centerline and was certain of aircraft position (Exceptions to course centerline tolerance: Threat avoidance, weather deviation, air traffic control assigned heading, time control, etc.). Thorough knowledge of en route time status in relation to objective area. Complied with all altitude restrictions. Adhered to all airspace restrictions.
Q-	Uncertain of exact aircraft position due to marginal navigational procedures. Flew3 to 5 NMs from course without the above exceptions. Better awareness of required timing events or en route time status could have avoided unplanned maneuvering.
U	Exceeded 5 NMs during en route navigation without the above exceptions. Unable to maintain position awareness throughout most of the route. Unable to accurately assess required timing or unaware of mission time status, jeopardizing formation integrity or mission accomplishment. Violated airspace restrictions. Poor airspeed control resulted in numerous or extreme airspeed adjustment. Descended below minimum altitude restrictions.
Area 41. Defensi	ve Systems/Tactics.
Q	Demonstrated satisfactory knowledge of defensive systems/tactics. Able to properly set up the defensive system and use appropriate settings. Applied appropriate tactics to avoid the threat and minimize exposure. Executed the proper evasive maneuver when given an immediate threat. Completely briefed crew on threat calls/duties.
Q-	Unsure on proper setup of the defensive systems and settings. Minor errors in threat analysis or tactics selection. Was unfamiliar with appropriate tactic for a given scenario. Did not completely brief crew on threat calls/duties.
U	Displayed an unsatisfactory knowledge of defensive systems. Made major errors in threat analysis or tactics selection would have resulted in an unsuccessful mission. Did not execute an effective evasive maneuver when given an immediate threat. Failed to brief crew on threat calls/duties.
Area 42. Threat A	
Q	Able to plot threats in-flight and formulate a plan of action to avoid lethal range of given threat system. Aware of appropriate tactics to avoid threats and exposure.
Q-	Made minor errors in plotting and avoiding the lethal range of a given threat system. Made minor errors in threat analysis or tactics selection.
U	Unable to plot a given threat. Did not avoid lethal range of given threat system. Not aware of appropriate tactics for specific threats or terrain.
Area 43. Slowdor Q	wn. Thorough knowledge of slowdown procedures. Complied with all published/briefed procedures.

Q-	Limited knowledge of slowdown procedures. Minor deviations did not
TT	affect mission accomplishment or formation integrity.
U	Unsatisfactory knowledge of slowdown procedures. Major deviations
11 57 11	adversely affected mission accomplish mentor formation integrity.
Area 44. DZ Ali	
Q	Correctly identified the DZ and made appropriate corrections to fine-tune
	track. Flew the track in accordance with mission plan or as updated by crew.
Q-	Identified the DZ late despite clear marking and sufficient landmarks.
	Aligned satisfactorily, but tended to angle.
U	Unable to identify DZ due to poor technique or pilot error. Did not fly
	proper alignment, or unaware of alignment error. Did not accomplish the
	mission due to poor DZ acquisition, alignment or deviation from procedures,
1	resulting from pilot error or omission. Did not recognize a no-drop
	situation.
Area 45. Airdrop	
Q	Met the following tolerances:
	Airspeed: +/-5 KIAS
	Altitude: +50/-0 feet
Q-	Exceeded Q criteria but did not exceed:
	Airspeed: +10/-5 KIAS
	Altitude: +100/-50 feet
U	Did not recognize a no-drop situation. Exceeded Q- criteria.
Area 46. Time O	ver Target/Time Of Arrival.
Airdrop Criteria.	ů .
Q	+/-60seconds (Visual)
	+/-90seconds (SKE)
Q-	+/-90seconds (Visual)
	+/-2minutes (SKE)
U	Exceeded Q- criteria.
TOA Criteria.	
Q	+/-5minutes
Q-	+/-7minutes
U	Exceeded Q- criteria.
Area 47. Airdrop	
Q	Applied proper procedures and correctly entered information into the
V	computer for the type of drop being executed.
	computer for the type of drop being executed.
Q-	Slow to apply proper procedures or entered incorrect information into the
~	computer, but did not adversely affect the airdrop. A no drop due to pilot
	error, but was called by the crew.
U	Exceeded Q- Criteria.
Area 48. Escape.	
•	
Q	Escape and recovery executed in accordance with published or briefed
	procedures.

Q-	Minor errors in escape and/or recovery procedures that did not affect mission accomplishment.
U	Major deviations from procedures that negatively affected mission
	accomplishment, formation integrity, or flight safety.
Area 49. Formati	on Recovery.
	a 31, 32 and 39 criteria and the following:
Q	Visual: Rolled out on final in position to intercept glide path to touchdown.
	SKE: Positioned aircraft to fly a normal glide path to touchdown at the
	DH/MAP.
Q-	Visual: Rolled out on final above or below the glide path, over or undershot
	final, but able to make a normal landing.
	SKE: Arrived at FAF out of position to fly a normal glide path to touchdown
	or flew an unstable approach, but able to make a normal landing.
U	Visual: Rolled out on final in a position that required a go-around, due to
	poor procedures or techniques. Did not initiate unplanned go-around when
	required.
	SKE: Intercepted a final that required a missed approach or go-around, due
	to poor procedures or techniques. Did not initiate an unplanned go-around
	when required.
Area 50. Formati	on Landing.
NOTE : Use area only):	18 criteria and the following (for single-ship landings, use area 18 criteria
Q	Maintained appropriate formation position throughout landing. Followed briefed procedures for reversing and braking.
Q-	Landed with approach separation exceeding 9,000 feet for SKE or 30
	seconds for visual landings, but the landing interval did not cause following
	aircraft to execute go-around or missed approach.
U	Attempted to touchdown with approach separation less than 5,000 feet
	(SKE) or 15 seconds (visual) spacing from the previous aircraft. Long
	landing interval caused following aircraft to execute go-around/missed
	approach. Did not follow briefed reversing and braking procedures.
Area 51. Flight L	eadership (Lead Only).

Q	Demonstrated satisfactory knowledge of threat analysis and route construction. Applied appropriate tactics to avoid the threat and minimize exposure. Correctly planned the route of flight, with emphasis on obstruction clearance. Made timely and appropriate inputs to target/crew study. Thoroughly coordinated mission with other agencies, if applicable. Relayed all flight commands consistent with procedures, briefings, and threat. Passed information to formation aircraft in a timely manner. Provided positive guidance in leading the formation. Stayed abreast of time status and worked with crew to determine corrective action. Able to verbalize corrective action for gaining or losing time. Effectively divided workload among crew and monitored performance. Challenged deviations to standard or the briefed plan.
Q-	Made minor errors in route construction, threat analysis, or tactics selection. Unfamiliar with appropriate tactic for a given scenario. Made minor errors providing signals, or signals not given appropriately for type formation or threat. Flew an erratic profile, but did not jeopardize safety of follower aircraft. Provided minimal leadership in the conduct of the flight. Unable to clearly verbalize TOT adjustment techniques. Poorly divided workload among crew and monitoring of performance. Slow to challenge deviations to standard or the briefed plan.
U	Made major errors in threat analysis or route construction. Could not safely fly planned profile. Unable to locate classified threat parameters. Did not contact appropriate agencies. Poorly planned, performed or lead the mission resulting in an unsuccessful mission. Did not pass critical information to other aircraft in-flight. Failed to effectively divide workload among crew and monitor performance. Failed to challenge deviations to standard or the briefed plan.
Area 52. NVG U	Jsage/Limitations.
Q	Properly preflighted, handled and utilized night vision goggles (NVGs) in accomplishment of the mission. Recognized benefits/limitations of NVGs.
Q-	Made minor omissions or deviations during preflight or utilization of NVGs. Caused no serious damage to equipment/aircraft and did not negatively affect the mission.
U	Used incorrect procedures for NVGs, which caused damage to equipment/aircraft or mission failure.
Area 53. High/L	ow Altitude Tactical Arrival.
Q	Followed procedures as briefed. Controlled the aircraft smoothly and positively throughout the recovery. Ensured the aircraft was in position to
	intercept glide path to landing. Constantly cleared area of intended flight.
Q-	Performed recovery with minor deviations to published procedures. Did not always control the aircraft positively and/or smoothly. Over/under-shot final approach slightly, but was able to intercept glide path to landing.
U	Did not perform the recovery in accordance with flight manual, directives or published procedures. Displayed erratic aircraft control. Over/under-shot

	final approach requiring a go-around or potentially unsafe maneuvering to
	intercept final. Did not clear area of intended flight.
	Maximum Effort Procedures.
Q	Displayed satisfactory knowledge of maximum effort procedures. Described and applied terms such as acceleration check speed, Minimum Field Length for Maximum Effort Takeoff, three-engine Vmca, etc. Thoroughly analyzed departure/landing runway and surrounding terrain. Reviewed all applicable TOLD and thoroughly briefed crew on their duties.
Q-	Showed minor gaps in knowledge and/or awareness of published procedures. Made minor errors in describing or applying the appropriate terms (listed above) or concepts. Made minor errors or omissions in TOLD or crew briefing.
U	Did not perform procedures in accordance with flight manual, directives or published procedures. Unable to analyze landing zone constraints or verbalize concerns posed by terrain or other factors. Could not describe or apply the appropriate terms (listed above) or concepts. Made major errors in TOLD data review or crew briefing. Possessed an unsatisfactory knowledge of maximum effort procedures.
Area 55. N	Maximum Effort Takeoff.
Q	Maintained smooth positive control throughout departure roll and takeoff. Climbed in accordance with flight manual, published directives or procedures until clear of obstacle. Reviewed all applicable TOLD and thoroughly briefed crew on their duties.
Q-	Made abrupt control inputs. Made minor deviations from flight manual, published or briefed procedures, but did not jeopardize safety. Made minor errors or omissions in TOLD or crew briefing.
U	Did not takeoff in accordance with with flight manual, directives or published procedures. Did not use Vmca when conditions permitted. Raised flaps too quickly with relation to airspeed. Performance of maneuver jeopardized safety. Made major errors in TOLD data review or crew briefing.
Area 56. N	Maximum Effort Landing.
Q	Maintained smooth approach path and constant aim point; made positive corrections when necessary. Landed on centerline and touched down within the marked touchdown zone without excessive bouncing or crab. Maintained runway centerline during rollout.
	Airspeed+/- 5 Knots
Q-	Made minor deviations to published procedures. Aim point wandered or corrections were not smooth or timely. Landed within 10 feet from centerline and touched down within the marked touchdown zone but had excessive bouncing or crab. Airspeed+10/- 5 Knots
TT	
U	Landed short of, or beyond, the marked touchdown zone. Or did not execute a go-around when required. Exceeded Q- criteria.

Table 2.5. INSTRUCTOR GRADING CRITERIA.

Area 57. Instru	uctor Ability. (Critical)
Q	Demonstrated the ability to communicate effectively. Provided appropriate guidance when necessary. Planned ahead and made timely decisions. Identified and corrected potentially unsafe maneuvers/situations.
U	Unable to effectively communicate or provide timely feedback to the student. Did not provide corrective action when necessary. Did not plan ahead or anticipate student problems. Did not identify unsafe maneuvers/situations in a timely manner. Made no attempt to instruct.
Area 58. Instru	uctor Demonstration. (Critical)
Q	Effectively demonstrated correct procedures, systems operation or flight maneuvers. Thorough knowledge of applicable aircraft systems, procedures, publications, and directives.
U	Ineffective or incorrect demonstration of procedures, systems operation, or flight maneuvers. Insufficient depth of knowledge about applicable aircraft systems, procedures, and/or proper source material.
Area 59. Stude	ent Briefing/Critique. (Critical)
Q	Briefings were well organized, accurate, and thorough. Reviewed student's present level of training and defined mission events to be performed. Demonstrated the ability during the critique to reconstruct the flight, offer mission analysis, and provide guidance where appropriate. Training grade reflected the actual performance of the student relative to the standard. Assessed both technical and CRM performance. Allowed the student to self-assess own performance. Pre-briefed the student's next mission, if required.
U	Briefings were unsatisfactory or non-existent. Did not review student's past performance. Failed to adequately critique student or analyze the mission. Training grade did not reflect actual performance of student. Overlooked or omitted major discrepancies. Failed to assess both technical and CRM performance. Did not allow the student to self-assess own performance. Incomplete pre-briefing of student's next mission, if required.
	wledge of Training Forms.
Q	All required forms were accomplished on time and in accordance with applicable directives. Demonstrated satisfactory knowledge of forms/publications required for mission accomplishment. Training documentation was concise and readable.
Q-	Displayed limited knowledge of forms/publications. Required forms were completed with some delay and in accordance with applicable directives. Minor errors or omissions in training documentation.
U	Knowledge of mission required forms/publications was inadequate. Did not accomplish required forms. Omitted or incorrectly documented significant training information.

Table 2.6. OME GRADING CRITERIA (NOTE: Table 2.6 is for use on OME's only).

Defectively determined equipment required for mission and coordinated for waiver to operate with degraded capability, if required. Consistently decided to start, continue or delay mission based on input from appropriate sources. Kept command and control (C2) agencies apprised of mission status changes. Effectively coordinated support activities to ensure timely mission activity flow. Q- Occasionally misinterpreted maintenance status regarding mission requirements, but did not significantly impact mission accomplishment. Unsure of procedures to obtain waiver to operate with degraded capability. Slow to make decisions regarding mission continuation. Did not consistently communicate status and intentions to C2 functions. Poor coordination with support agencies disrupted mission flow. U Unable to determine equipment or waiver required for mission performance. Failed to make proper decision to start, continue or delay mission and/or did not communicate mission-essential information to C2 agencies. Ineffective support function coordinated crew activities during flight (e.g., work/rest plans) to maximize mission effectiveness. Q- Slow to coordinate crew activities during flight (e.g., work/rest plans) to maximize mission effectiveness. Slow to coordinate crew activities before and during flight or ineffective use of crew resources negatively impacting mission effectiveness. Slow to plan or coordinate arrival and departure activities, deviations occurred, but did not preclude successful arrival(s) or departure(s). Failed to coordinate crew activities during flight such that mission accomplishment was not possible. Area 63, Mission Management. Q Monitored mission progress and aware of possible impacts at all times. Coordinated requirements and intentions to C2 agencies in accordance with current directives. Effective planning and coordination provided for smooth arrival(s) and departure(s). Had difficulty recognizing or planning for unexpected occurrences that may affect mission. Late communicate with destinatio	Area 61 Aircra	ft Commander Responsibilities.
Occasionally misinterpreted maintenance status regarding mission requirements, but did not significantly impact mission accomplishment. Unsure of procedures to obtain waiver to operate with degraded capability. Slow to make decisions regarding mission continuation. Did not consistently communicate status and intentions to C2 functions. Poor coordination with support agencies disrupted mission flow. U		Effectively determined equipment required for mission and coordinated for waiver to operate with degraded capability, if required. Consistently decided to start, continue or delay mission based on input from appropriate sources. Kept command and control (C2) agencies apprised of mission status changes. Effectively coordinated support activities to ensure timely
Failed to make proper decision to start, continue or delay mission and/or did not communicate mission-essential information to C2 agencies. Ineffective support function coordination precluded mission accomplishment. Area 62, Aircrew Management. Continually coordinated crew activities during flight (e.g., work/rest plans) to maximize mission effectiveness. Slow to coordinate crew activities before and during flight or ineffective use of crew resources negatively impacting mission effectiveness. Slow to plan or coordinate arrival and departure activities, deviations occurred, but did not preclude successful arrival(s) or departure(s). U Failed to coordinate crew activities during flight such that mission accomplishment was not possible. Area 63, Mission Management. Q Monitored mission progress and aware of possible impacts at all times. Coordinated requirements and intentions to C2 agencies in accordance with current directives. Effective planning and coordination provided for smooth arrival(s) and departure(s). Q- Had difficulty recognizing or planning for unexpected occurrences that may affect mission. Late communication with C2 agencies. Slow to plan or coordinate arrival and departure activities, deviations occurred, but did not preclude successful arrival(s) or departure(s). U Did not communicate with destination C2 agencies, significantly affecting mission performance. Failed to recognize impact of changing circumstances on mission performance or did not adequately adapt to complete the mission.	Q-	Occasionally misinterpreted maintenance status regarding mission requirements, but did not significantly impact mission accomplishment. Unsure of procedures to obtain waiver to operate with degraded capability. Slow to make decisions regarding mission continuation. Did not consistently communicate status and intentions to C2 functions. Poor
Q-Slow to coordinate crew activities during flight (e.g., work/rest plans) to maximize mission effectiveness. Q-Slow to coordinate crew activities before and during flight or ineffective use of crew resources negatively impacting mission effectiveness. Slow to plan or coordinate arrival and departure activities, deviations occurred, but did not preclude successful arrival(s) or departure(s). U-Failed to coordinate crew activities during flight such that mission accomplishment was not possible. Area 63, Mission Management. Q-Monitored mission progress and aware of possible impacts at all times. Coordinated requirements and intentions to C2 agencies in accordance with current directives. Effective planning and coordination provided for smooth arrival(s) and departure(s). Q-Had difficulty recognizing or planning for unexpected occurrences that may affect mission. Late communication with C2 agencies. Slow to plan or coordinate arrival and departure activities, deviations occurred, but did not preclude successful arrival(s) or departure(s). U-Did not communicate with destination C2 agencies, significantly affecting mission performance. Failed to recognize impact of changing circumstances on mission performance or did not adequately adapt to complete the mission.	U	Failed to make proper decision to start, continue or delay mission and/or did not communicate mission-essential information to C2 agencies. Ineffective
Q-Slow to coordinate crew activities during flight (e.g., work/rest plans) to maximize mission effectiveness. Q-Slow to coordinate crew activities before and during flight or ineffective use of crew resources negatively impacting mission effectiveness. Slow to plan or coordinate arrival and departure activities, deviations occurred, but did not preclude successful arrival(s) or departure(s). U-Failed to coordinate crew activities during flight such that mission accomplishment was not possible. Area 63, Mission Management. Q-Monitored mission progress and aware of possible impacts at all times. Coordinated requirements and intentions to C2 agencies in accordance with current directives. Effective planning and coordination provided for smooth arrival(s) and departure(s). Q-Had difficulty recognizing or planning for unexpected occurrences that may affect mission. Late communication with C2 agencies. Slow to plan or coordinate arrival and departure activities, deviations occurred, but did not preclude successful arrival(s) or departure(s). U-Did not communicate with destination C2 agencies, significantly affecting mission performance. Failed to recognize impact of changing circumstances on mission performance or did not adequately adapt to complete the mission.	Area 62, Aircre	w Management.
of crew resources negatively impacting mission effectiveness. Slow to plan or coordinate arrival and departure activities, deviations occurred, but did not preclude successful arrival(s) or departure(s). U Failed to coordinate crew activities during flight such that mission accomplishment was not possible. Area 63, Mission Management. Q Monitored mission progress and aware of possible impacts at all times. Coordinated requirements and intentions to C2 agencies in accordance with current directives. Effective planning and coordination provided for smooth arrival(s) and departure(s). Q- Had difficulty recognizing or planning for unexpected occurrences that may affect mission. Late communication with C2 agencies. Slow to plan or coordinate arrival and departure activities, deviations occurred, but did not preclude successful arrival(s) or departure(s). U Did not communicate with destination C2 agencies, significantly affecting mission performance. Failed to recognize impact of changing circumstances on mission performance or did not adequately adapt to complete the mission.		Continually coordinated crew activities during flight (e.g., work/rest plans)
U Failed to coordinate crew activities during flight such that mission accomplishment was not possible. Area 63, Mission Management. Q Monitored mission progress and aware of possible impacts at all times. Coordinated requirements and intentions to C2 agencies in accordance with current directives. Effective planning and coordination provided for smooth arrival(s) and departure(s). Q- Had difficulty recognizing or planning for unexpected occurrences that may affect mission. Late communication with C2 agencies. Slow to plan or coordinate arrival and departure activities, deviations occurred, but did not preclude successful arrival(s) or departure(s). U Did not communicate with destination C2 agencies, significantly affecting mission performance. Failed to recognize impact of changing circumstances on mission performance or did not adequately adapt to complete the mission.	Q-	of crew resources negatively impacting mission effectiveness. Slow to plan or coordinate arrival and departure activities, deviations occurred, but did
Area 63, Mission Management. Q Monitored mission progress and aware of possible impacts at all times. Coordinated requirements and intentions to C2 agencies in accordance with current directives. Effective planning and coordination provided for smooth arrival(s) and departure(s). Q- Had difficulty recognizing or planning for unexpected occurrences that may affect mission. Late communication with C2 agencies. Slow to plan or coordinate arrival and departure activities, deviations occurred, but did not preclude successful arrival(s) or departure(s). U Did not communicate with destination C2 agencies, significantly affecting mission performance. Failed to recognize impact of changing circumstances on mission performance or did not adequately adapt to complete the mission.	U	Failed to coordinate crew activities during flight such that mission
Monitored mission progress and aware of possible impacts at all times. Coordinated requirements and intentions to C2 agencies in accordance with current directives. Effective planning and coordination provided for smooth arrival(s) and departure(s). Q- Had difficulty recognizing or planning for unexpected occurrences that may affect mission. Late communication with C2 agencies. Slow to plan or coordinate arrival and departure activities, deviations occurred, but did not preclude successful arrival(s) or departure(s). U Did not communicate with destination C2 agencies, significantly affecting mission performance. Failed to recognize impact of changing circumstances on mission performance or did not adequately adapt to complete the mission.	Area 63, Missio	· ·
affect mission. Late communication with C2 agencies. Slow to plan or coordinate arrival and departure activities, deviations occurred, but did not preclude successful arrival(s) or departure(s). Did not communicate with destination C2 agencies, significantly affecting mission performance. Failed to recognize impact of changing circumstances on mission performance or did not adequately adapt to complete the mission.		Monitored mission progress and aware of possible impacts at all times. Coordinated requirements and intentions to C2 agencies in accordance with current directives. Effective planning and coordination provided for smooth
mission performance. Failed to recognize impact of changing circumstances on mission performance or did not adequately adapt to complete the mission.	Q-	affect mission. Late communication with C2 agencies. Slow to plan or coordinate arrival and departure activities, deviations occurred, but did not
Area 64, Post Flight/Remain Over Night (RON) Procedures.	U	mission performance. Failed to recognize impact of changing circumstances on mission performance or did not adequately adapt to complete the
	Area 64, Post F	light/Remain Over Night (RON) Procedures.

Q	Accomplished all post-flight activities in a timely manner. Coordinated with C2 agencies for subsequent mission tasking's. Managed crew activities during crew rest to provide necessary rest and crewmember availability.
Q-	Slow to perform post-flight duties. Marginal coordination with C2 agencies.
U	Could not accomplish post-flight duties without impacting subsequent
	mission. Failed to coordinate mission requirements and/or tasking's with
	C2 agencies. Poor management of crew during crew rest phase, which
	impacted (delayed) the aircrew's availability.
Area 65, Authentication/Aircraft Security.	
Q	Demonstrated thorough knowledge of authentication documents and
	procedures. Ensured aircraft security in accordance with current directives
	and/or mission tasking requirements.
Q-	Displayed satisfactory knowledge of authentication documents and
	procedures. Limited understanding of aircraft security requirements, but
	complied with basic security directives.
U	Unable to demonstrate proper use of authentication materials. Unaware of
	requirements for aircraft security. Did not ensure basic security measures
	taken.

Chapter 3

LOADMASTER EVALUATIONS

- **3.1. General.** This chapter standardizes initial, periodic, and requalification evaluations, including requirements for qualification, mission, and instructor evaluations.
- **3.2.** Qualification Evaluations (Initial, Periodic and Requalification). Qualification evaluations consist of aircraft preflight, loading of palletized cargo or rolling stock, in-flight procedures, cargo offload, and aircraft postflight. If a periodic QUAL evaluation is combined with a MSN evaluation, an airdrop platform/Container Delivery System (CDS) can be used for evaluating the qualification loading requirement. If a load is not available for a periodic evaluation, palletized, airdrop platform, or vehicular cargo will be static loaded upon completion of the flight portion. (T-3) All General and Qualification areas/sub-areas are required qualification evaluation items. (T-3) When in-flight evaluation of Area 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 30, 31 and 32 are not possible, these areas will be verbally evaluated. (T-3)

3.3. Mission Evaluations (Initial, Periodic and Requalification).

- 3.3.1. Initial and requalification (unqualified over two years) mission evaluations consist of a mass CDS (minimum four containers) or sequential heavy equipment (HE) load. If a mass CDS or sequential HE load cannot be dropped for the evaluation, a single HE platform may be dropped provided sequential HE and mass CDS airdrop rigging was completed during training.
- 3.3.2. Periodic and requalification (unqualified less than two years) mission evaluations will consist of a minimum of a single CDS or single HE platform. (**T-3**).
- 3.3.3. The evaluator will not conduct two separate mission evaluations on the same flight with only one airdrop load aboard. (**T-3**). An airdrop sortie and evaluation may be credited if an unplanned no-drop is called after completion of the Run-In checklist provided the no-drop was not due to loadmaster error. All General and Mission areas/sub-areas are required mission evaluation items.
- 3.3.4. Document initial personnel restrictions when an actual personnel airdrop is not completed during initial mission training. Use the following statement in the restrictions block of the AF Form 8:

"SUPERVISED STATUS for personnel airdrop u	antil an actual static line personnel airdrop is
accomplished. Final certification will be accompl	ished under the supervision of a loadmaster
instructor or flight examiner. (T-3)	
Actual personnel airdrop accomplished on	·,·

3.4. Instructor Evaluations (Initial, Periodic and Requalification). Flight examiners will place particular emphasis on the examinee's ability to: recognize student difficulties, provide timely and effective corrective action, and observe, assess, and debrief the student's application of CRM skills. (T-3). All instructor areas/sub-areas are required instructor evaluation items. **(T-3)** The comments section of the AF Form 8 should include a statement that instructional abilities were evaluated and the topic.

3.5. Emergency Procedures Evaluation (EPE).

- 3.5.1. EPEs cover the following areas during a QUAL evaluation: Emergency signals; ground emergencies; in-flight emergencies (fuselage fire/smoke and fume elimination, in-flight door warning, rapid decompression, cargo door and ramp failure, cargo jettison, bailout procedures), flap emergencies, landing emergencies (landing gear retracted, ditching) and systems knowledge.
- 3.5.2. The EPE shall cover the following areas during a MSN evaluation: Personnel, HE, CDS/Combat Rubber Raiding Craft, any other mission specific airdrop emergencies, and systems knowledge. (**T-3**).

3.6. Loadmaster Grading Criteria.

Table 3.1. GENERAL.

Area 1. Directives/Publications/Professional Equipment.			
Q	Possessed a high level of knowledge of all applicable aircraft directives and		
_	publications and understood how to apply both to enhance mission		
	accomplishment. Required publications (paper or electronic) were current and		
	properly posted. Had all required personal and professional equipment.		
	Displayed satisfactory knowledge of the care and use of personal/professional		
	equipment. Required equipment inspections were current.		
Q-	Unsure of some directives but could locate information in appropriate		
	publications. Required publications (paper or electronic) were current but		
	improperly posted.		
U	Unaware of established directives and/or could not locate them in the		
	appropriate publication in a timely manner. Required publications (paper or		
	electronic) were not current. Did not have required personal/professional		
	equipment. Required equipment inspections were overdue or equipment was		
	unserviceable.		
Area 2. Mission Pre	eparation/Planning/Performance.		
Q	Checked all factors applicable to flight such as itinerary, aircraft configuration,		
	fuel requirements, airdrop load sequence, etc.		
Q-	Made minor errors or omissions in checking all factors that could have detracted		
	from mission effectiveness. Did not fully comply with directives.		
U	Made major errors or omissions that would have prevented an effective mission.		
Area 3. Briefings.			
Q	Contributed to the briefing content to ensure it included all applicable		
	information. Briefings effectively organized and presented in a logical sequence.		
	Covered all pertinent items. Effectively used available briefing aids.		
Q-	Allowed omission of items pertinent but not critical to the mission. Briefings		
	lacked continuity or contained unnecessary repetition. Some difficulty		
	communicating clearly. Did not make effective use of available briefing aids.		
	Dwelled on non-essential items.		

	vledge of subject. Briefing poorly organized and not ence, resulting in confusion. Presented erroneous ect safe/effective mission accomplishment.	
Area 4. Use of Checklist.		
Q Consistently used the corre appropriate time throughout	ect checklist and gave the correct response at the at the mission.	
	intimely and/or crewmember required continual	
U Used incorrect checklist or	consistently omitted checklist items. Unable to st to use for a given situation. Did not complete	
Area 5. Safety Consciousness (Critical).		
	th all safety factors required for safe aircraft nission accomplishment.	
U Not aware of, or did not co	imply with, all safety factors required for safe aircraft ssion accomplishment. Operated the aircraft	
Area 6. Flight Discipline (Critical).		
Q Exhibited strict flight and compliance with existing in	crew discipline. Prepared and completed mission in instructions and directives.	
U Failed to exhibit strict flight	nt and crew discipline. Failed to comply with existing that did, or could have, jeopardized safety of mission	
Area 7. Airmanship/Situational Awareness (Cri	tical).	
Q Maintained situational awa	reness and exercised sound judgment throughout the ght with a sense of understanding and comprehension.	
U Lacked situational awarene	ess. Faulty judgment resulted in decisions that had acks the skills to prioritize tasks. Unaware of acted the mission.	
Area 8. Crew Coordination/Crew Resource Management (CRM). See AFI 11-290 and use AF IMT 4031 as a reference.		
mission. Demonstrated ope	th other aircrew members throughout the assigned erational knowledge of other crewmembers' duties ively applied CRM skills throughout the mission.	
Q- Crew coordination skills de	etracted from mission accomplishment. Demonstrated crewmembers' duties and responsibilities.	
U Poor crew coordination or	unsatisfactory knowledge of other crewmember duties vely affected mission accomplishment or safety of	

Q	Complete knowledge of, and compliance with, correct communications
	procedures. Makes concise radio and interphone transmissions with proper
	terminology.
Q-	Occasional deviations from procedures required re-transmissions or resetting
	codes. Slow in initiating or missed several required radio/interphone calls.
	Transmissions contained extraneous matter, were not in proper sequence, or
	used non-standard terminology.
U	Incorrect procedures or poor performance caused confusion and jeopardized
	mission accomplishment. Omitted numerous radio/interphone calls.
Area 10. Life Suppo	1
Q	Displayed thorough knowledge of location and use of life support systems and
	equipment. Demonstrated and emphasized the proper operating procedures used
	to operate aircraft egress devices such as doors, windows, hatches, life rafts, and
	escape ropes.
Q-	Showed limited knowledge of location and use of life support systems and
	equipment. Unsure of the proper operating procedures used to operate some of
	the aircraft egress devices.
U	Displayed unsatisfactory knowledge of location and use of life support systems
	and equipment. Unable to properly operate aircraft egress devices.
Area 11 Knowledg	re/Completion of Forms.
Q	All required forms were complete, accurate, readable, accomplished on time and
~	in accordance with directives. Provided an accurate debrief of significant events
	to applicable agencies (Intel, Maintenance, etc.).
Q-	Minor errors on forms did not affect conduct of the mission. Incorrectly or
Q-	incompletely reported some information due to minor errors, omissions, and/or
	deviations.
U	
U	Did not accomplish required forms. Omitted or incorrectly reported significant
	information due to major errors, omissions, and/or deviations.
1	

Table 3.2. QUALIFICATION.

Area 12. Aircraft Preflight Inspection.		
Sub-area 12A. Prior To Entering		
Sub-area 12B. Inter	Sub-area 12B. Interior Inspection	
Sub-area 12C. Exterior Inspection/Top Of Airplane		
Sub-area 12D. Power-Up		
Sub-area 12E. Initial Preflight		
Sub-area 12F. Airdrop Prep (MSN or QUAL/MSN only)		
Q	Accomplished required inspections in a thorough and proficient manner as	
	outlined in applicable checklists and/or directives without deviations or	

	omissions. Properly checked aircraft systems and components in accordance
	with flight manual. Coordinated with ground support personnel. Correctly
	determined aircraft status.
Q-	Displayed Minor deviations or omissions in the accomplishment of required
	inspections as outlined inapplicable checklists and/or directives. Limited
	knowledge of proper procedures for checking aircraft systems/components
	in accordance with flight manual.
U	Failed to accomplish required inspections in a thorough and proficient
	manner. Major deviations or omissions. Omitted or improperly checked
	aircraft systems/components in accordance with flight manual. Did not
	coordinate with ground support personnel. Unable to determine correct
	aircraft status. Required assistance to complete inspections or exceeded
	time allotted causing a mission delay.
Area 13. Emerger	ncy Equipment.
Q	Demonstrated sound knowledge of emergency equipment. Located,
	inspected, distributed and/or demonstrated the proper use of life support and
	emergency equipment.
Q-	Demonstrated limited knowledge of emergency equipment. Had difficulty
	locating, inspecting, and/or demonstrating the proper use of life support and
	emergency equipment.
U	Has an unsatisfactory knowledge of emergency equipment. Failed to
	inspect, distribute and/or demonstrate the proper use of life support and
	emergency equipment.
Area 14. Aircraft	Configuration.
Q	Ensured the aircraft was properly configured to accommodate oncoming
	load. Was familiar with various configurations as outlined in applicable
	instructions/directives and properly stowed configuration items that were
	not used.
Q-	Had difficulty configuring the aircraft, but did not impede aircraft loading.
	Has limited knowledge of various configurations as outlined in applicable
	instructions/directives.
U	Failed to ensure proper aircraft configuration or caused loading delays.
	Possesses unsatisfactory knowledge of seat and litter configurations. Failed
	to properly stow configuration items.
Area 15. Load Pla	
Q	Accurately planned cargo and/or passenger loads and met aircraft Center of
	Gravity (CG) limits. Inspected cargo for proper preparation and
	documentation.
Q-	Had some difficulty planning a load of cargo and/or passengers to meet CG
	limits. Did not accurately inspect cargo for proper preparation and
	documentation.
U	Unable to plan a load of cargo and/or passengers and meet CG limits. Failed
	to inspect cargo for proper preparation and documentation.
Area 16 Onload/	Offload Procedures.
Arca 10. Ombad/	Officau i foccuutes.

0	Correctly onloaded/offloaded cargo/passengers in a safe and timely manner.
Q	Cargo entered into Multifunction Control Display (MFCD)/CNI with less
	than 10 inches variance from actual load placement.
Q-	Had difficulty correctly onloading/offloading cargo/passengers in the
Q-	aircraft. Cargo loaded in MFCD/CNI-MU 10-20 inches from actual load
	placement.
U	Failed to correctly or safely onload/offload cargo/passengers in the aircraft.
	Loading procedures caused undue delay. Cargo loaded in MFCD/CNI-MU
	more than 20 inches from actual load placement. Heavy Equipment and
	Combat offload platforms not programmed in the MFCD exactly as they are
	in loaded in the aircraft.
Area 17. Superviso	
Q	Established and maintained control of all personnel during loading
	operations.
Q-	Established and maintained control of all personnel, but made minor
	supervisory errors; however, they but did not compromise safety.
U	Did not establish or maintain control of all personnel and/or safety was
	compromised.
Area 18. Tie Dowr	n/Restraint.
Q	Correctly calculated and applied the correct amount of restraint to a given
	item. Understood and could state the principles of restraint.
Q-	Had difficulty calculating and applying the correct amount of restraint. Did
	not fully understand the principles of restraint.
U	Failed to correctly calculate and apply the correct amount of restraint. Did
	not understand and could not state the principles of restraint.
Area 19. Winching	g Procedures.
Q	Correctly demonstrated and/or explained winching procedures.
Q-	Had difficulty demonstrating and/or did not completely explain correct
	winching procedures, but did not compromise safety.
U	Failed to demonstrate and/or did not explain correct winching procedures.
	Compromised safety.
Area 20. Hazardou	is Material.
Q	Understood hazardous cargo procedures. Complied with the provisions of
_	AFMAN 24- 204, Preparing Hazardous Materials for Military Air
	Shipments, and followed the procedures for air movement of hazardous
	cargo under tactical, contingency or emergency conditions.
Q-	Understood hazardous cargo procedures, but made minor deviations stating
	them. Partially complied with the provisions of AFMAN 24-204, and/or
	followed the procedures for air movement of hazardous cargo under
	tactical, contingency or emergency conditions.
U	Did not understand hazardous cargo procedures provided in AFMAN 24-
J	204. Compromised safety.
A 01 A1 C.T	1
Area 21. Aircraft I	
Sub-area 21A9 I	Loading Limits

G 1 215 5 1	
Sub-area 21B. Pal	
Sub-area 21C. Loa	
	ons may include, but are not limited to: cargo floor; roller; station;
	et weight, height and nets; and loading aids (ground loading ramps, truck
	dge plates, pry bars, ramp support and shoring).
Q	Correctly stated, understood, and could apply the correct limitations
	associated with the aircraft, on loading/offloading, and associated
	equipment.
Q-	Had difficulty stating various limitations. Located correct limitations in the
	loading manual. Safety was not compromised.
U	Failed to display required knowledge of aircraft limitations, and/or could
	not locate correct limitations in the loading manual. Safety was
	compromised.
	Sub-area 21A9 Loading Limits Sub-area 21B. Pallet/Cargo Limits Sub-
	area 21C. Loading Aids
Area 22. Passenge	er Handling.
Q	Correctly briefed and performed passenger handling procedures.
Q-	Had difficulty briefing and/or performing passenger-handling procedures.
U	Failed to brief and/or did not perform proper passenger handling
	procedures.
	acking/Aircraft Security.
Q	Explained proper anti-hijacking/aircraft security procedures.
Q-	Had difficulty explaining proper anti-hijacking/aircraft security procedures.
U	Could not explain proper anti-hijacking/aircraft security procedures.
Area 24. Border C	
Q	Completed/explained border clearance requirements in accordance with
	current directives. Correctly followed MAJCOM guidelines.
Q-	Had difficulty explaining border-clearance requirements. Minor mistakes
	degraded effectiveness.
U	Could not accurately complete forms. Was unaware of command guidance,
	or could not explain requirements.
Area 25. Weight a	
Q	Correctly entered weight and balance data into the CNI-MU. Errors in
	takeoff or landing gross weights did not exceed +/- 500 pounds. Percent of
	Mean Aerodynamic Chord (MAC) was within +/- 0.5 percent. Did not
	exceed aircraft gross weight takeoff limits. Did not exceed CG limitations
	for takeoff or landing.
Q-	Entered weight and balance data into the CNI-MU with minor errors. Errors in telepoff or landing gross weights by 1/501 to 1,000 pounds or percent of
	in takeoff or landing gross weights by +/-501 to 1,000 pounds or percent of
	MAC limitations by +/-0.6 to 1.0 percent. Did not exceed aircraft gross
II	weight takeoff limits. Did not exceed CG limitations for takeoff or landing.
U	Incorrectly entered weight and balance data into the CNI-MU. Errors in
	takeoff or landing gross weights by +/-1,000 pounds or percent of MAC
	limitations by +/-1.0 percent. Exceeded aircraft gross takeoff weight/CG limits.
	mmo.

Area 26. Scanner D	outies	
Q	Periodically performed scanner duties by monitoring aircraft interior and	
Q 	exterior for abnormal conditions.	
Q-	Did not scan in a timely manner to recognize abnormal conditions.	
Ü	Failed to perform scanner duties by monitoring or making periodic checks	
	of the aircraft interior and exterior for abnormal conditions.	
Area 27. Engine Ru	inning On load/Offload.	
Q	Followed/explained proper procedures for engine running on load/offload operations.	
Q-	Had difficulty following/explaining proper procedures for engine running	
Q	on load/offload operations.	
U	Did not follow/explain proper procedures for engine running on	
	load/offload operations.	
Area 28. Combat O	ffload (If Observed).	
Q	Followed/explained proper procedures for combat offload operations.	
Q-	Had difficulty following/explaining proper procedures for combat offload	
	operations.	
U	Did not follow/explain proper procedures for combat offload operations.	
Area 29. Systems Knowledge.		
Sub-area 29A. Oxy	gen	
	anced Cargo Handling System (ECHS)	
Sub-area 29C. Ram		
	iliary Power Unit (APU)	
Sub-area 29E. Fuel	System/Refueling	
Sub-area 29F. ACAWS		
Sub-area 29G. Land	ding Gear	
Sub-area 29H. Hyd	raulic Systems	
Sub-area 29I. Electr	rical	
_	nowledge may include, but are not limited to: oxygen, APU, Ramp and Door, ectrical, landing gear, ACAWS, and ECHS	
Q	Demonstrated sufficient knowledge of aircraft systems and operation	
	limitations both with and without reference to the flight manual and/or	
	available resources.	
Q-	Displayed limited knowledge of aircraft systems operations and limitations	
	in some areas. Used individual technique instead of established procedure	
	and was unaware of differences.	
U	Displayed unsatisfactory systems knowledge. Unable to demonstrate or	
	explain the procedures for aircraft systems operations with or without	
	reference to the flight manual and/or available resources.	
Area 30. Boldface Emergency Procedures. (Critical)		
Q	Correct, immediate responses in the proper sequence. Coordinated proper	
	actions.	
U	Incorrect sequence, unsatisfactory response, or unsatisfactory performance	
	of corrective actions.	
Area 31. Other Eme	ergency Procedures.	

Q	Correctly analyzed, stated, and understood aircraft emergencies and
	performed required procedures to correct the emergency/malfunction.
	Effectively used available resources.
Q-	Correctly analyzed and understood aircraft emergencies but had difficulty
	performing/stating required procedures to correct the
	emergency/malfunction. Did not effectively use and/or experienced delays,
	omissions, or deviations in use of checklists and/or available resources.
U	Failed to analyze, state, and did not understand aircraft emergencies and/or
	could not perform required procedures to correct the
	emergency/malfunction. Did not use checklist and/or available resources.
Area 32. NVG Usa	ge/Limitations.
Q	Properly preflighted, handled, and utilized night vision goggles (NVGs) in
	accomplishment of the mission. Recognized benefits/limitations of NVGs.
Q-	Made minor omissions or deviations during preflight or utilization of
	NVGs. Caused no serious damage to equipment/aircraft and did not
	negatively affect the mission.
U	Used incorrect procedures for NVGs, which caused damage to
	equipment/aircraft or mission failure.

Table 3.3. MISSION.

Area 33. Airdrop Rigging Procedures.		
Q	Correctly rigged and identified key airdrop components.	
Q-	Had difficulty rigging and/or identifying key airdrop components.	
U	Improperly rigged and/or identified key airdrop components.	
Area 34. Joint Aird	lrop Inspection.	
Q	Correctly completed the joint airdrop inspection using applicable inspection form.	
Q-	Had difficulty completing the joint airdrop inspection using applicable inspection forms.	
U	Failed to complete the joint airdrop inspection using applicable inspection form.	
Area 35. Airdrop Knowledge.		
Sub-area 35A. CDS		
Sub-area 35B. Heavy equipment		
Sub-area 35C. Personnel		
Q	Correctly demonstrated and understood airdrop procedures and airdrop load information.	
Q-	Had difficulty demonstrating and/or understanding airdrop procedures and airdrop load information.	
U	Could not demonstrate and/or understand airdrop procedures and airdrop load information.	
Area 36. Airdrop Emergency Procedures.		
Q	Correctly analyzed, stated, and understood aircraft/airdrop emergencies and performed required procedures to correct the emergency/malfunction. Effectively used available resources.	

Q-	Correctly analyzed and understood aircraft/airdrop emergencies but had difficulty performing/stating required procedures to correct the	
	emergency/malfunction. Did not effectively use and/or experienced	
	delays, omissions, or deviations in use of checklists and/or available	
	resources.	
U	Failed to analyze, state, and did not understand aircraft/airdrop	
	emergencies and/or could not perform required procedures to correct the	
	emergency/malfunction. Did not use checklist and/or available resources.	
Area 37. Defensive	Systems/Tactics.	
Q	Demonstrated satisfactory knowledge of defensive systems/tactics.	
	Provided appropriate threat calls and appropriate inputs to crew during	
	mission.	
Q-	Was unfamiliar with appropriate tactic for a given scenario. Did not make	
	timely inputs to crew during mission. Made minor errors providing threat	
	calls to crew during mission.	
U	Possessed an unsatisfactory knowledge of defensive systems. Made major	
	errors in threat analysis or tactics selection would have resulted in an	
	unsuccessful mission. Failed to properly perform threat calls/duties.	
Area 38. Systems I	Knowledge.	
Sub-area 38A. CD	S	
Sub-area 38B. Hea	vy Equipment	
Sub-area 38C. Pers		
Sub-area 38D. Aer	ial Delivery System	
Q	Displayed satisfactory knowledge of systems, ensuring satisfactory operation within prescribed limits. Explained proper corrective action for each type of malfunction.	
Q-	Had difficulty in displaying a satisfactory knowledge of systems. Was	
	slow to analyze problems or apply proper corrective actions.	
U	Failed to display a satisfactory knowledge of systems. Was unable to	
	analyze problems or apply proper corrective actions.	
Area 39. Coordinated Tasks Briefing.		
	Correctly briefed the coordinated tasks in accordance with current	
_	directives.	
Q-	Had difficulty briefing the coordinated tasks in accordance with current	
_	directives.	
U	Failed to accomplish the coordinated tasks briefing in accordance with	
	current directives.	

Table 3.4. INSTRUCTOR GRADING CRITERIA.

Area 40. Instructor Ability. (Critical)	
Q	Demonstrated the ability to communicate effectively. Provided
	appropriate guidance when necessary. Planned ahead and made timely
	decisions. Identified and corrected potentially improper actions/situations.
U	Unable to effectively communicate or provide timely feedback to the
	student. Did not provide corrective action when necessary. Did not plan

	ahead or anticipate student problems. Did not identify unsafe
	actions/situations in a timely manner. Made no attempt to instruct.
Area 41. Instructo	or Demonstration. (Critical)
Q	Effectively demonstrated correct procedures or systems operation.
	Thorough knowledge of applicable aircraft systems, procedures,
	publications, and directives.
U	Ineffective or incorrect demonstration of procedures or systems operation.
	Insufficient depth of knowledge about applicable aircraft systems,
	procedures, and/or proper source material.
Area 42. Student	Briefing/Critique. (Critical)
Q	Briefings were well organized, accurate, and thorough. Reviewed
	student's present level of training and defined mission events to be
	performed. Demonstrated the ability during the critique to reconstruct the
	flight, offer mission analysis, and provide guidance where appropriate.
	Training grade reflected the actual performance of the student relative to
	the standard. Assessed both technical and CRM performance. Allowed the
	student to self-assess own performance. Pre-briefed the student's next
	mission, if required.
U	Briefings were unsatisfactory or non-existent. Did not review student's
	past performance. Failed to adequately critique student or analyze the
	mission. Training grade did not reflect actual performance of student.
	Overlooked or omitted major discrepancies. Failed to assess both
	technical and CRM performance. Did not allow the student to self-assess
	own performance. Incomplete pre-briefing of student's next mission, if
A 40 I/ 1	required.
	dge of Training Forms.
Q	All required forms were accomplished on time and in accordance with
	applicable directives. Demonstrated satisfactory knowledge of
	forms/publications required for mission accomplishment. Training
0	documentation was concise and readable. Displayed limited knowledge of forms/publications. Paguired forms were
Q-	Displayed limited knowledge of forms/publications. Required forms were completed with some delay and in accordance with applicable directives.
	Minor errors or omissions in training documentation.
U	Knowledge of required mission forms/publications was inadequate. Did
	not accomplish required forms. Omitted or incorrectly documented
	significant training information.
	organizati training information.

JOSEPH T. GUASTELLA, Jr., Lt Gen, USAF Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References

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AFI 11-202, Volume 2, Aircrew Standardization/Evaluation Program, 6 December 2018

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AFPD 11-2, Aircraft Rules and Procedures, 31 January 2019

AFMAN 11-210, Instrument Refresher Program (IRP), 1 September 2017

AFMAN 11-218, Aircraft Operations and Movement on the Ground, 5 April 2019

AFMAN 11-2C-130J, Volume 1, C-130J Aircrew Training, 10 February 2020

AFMAN 13-217, Drop Zone and Landing Zone Operations, 22 April 2021

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DAFI 33-360, Publications and Forms Management, 4 October 2019

DAFMAN 11-401, Aviation Management, 27 October 2020

Adopted Forms

AF Form 8, Certificate of Aircrew Qualification

AF IMT 3862, Flight Evaluation Worksheet

AF IMT 4031, CRM Skills Criteria Training/Evaluation

AF IMT 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACAWS—Advisory Cautions and Warning System

AFCS—Automatic Flight Control System

AFI—Air Force Instruction

AFPD—Air Force Policy Directive

AGL—Above Ground Level

APU—Auxiliary Power Unit

ASR—Airport Surveillance Radar

ATD—Aircrew Training Device

ATS—Aircrew Training System

C2—Communications and Control

CDS—Container Delivery System

CG—Center of Gravity

CNI-MU—Communications Navigation IFF/Management Unit

CRM—Cockpit/Crew Resource Management

DA—Decision Altitude

DDA—Derived Decision Altitude

DZ—Drop Zone

ECHS—Enhanced Cargo Handling System

EPE—Emergency Procedures Evaluation

FAF—Final Approach Fix

FCI—Flight Command Indicator

GPS—Global Positioning System

HE—Heavy Equipment

IFR—Instrument Flight Rules

ILS—Instrument Landing System

IMT—Information Management Tool

INIT—Initial

INSTM—Instrument Evaluation

INSTR—Instructor Evaluation

IPRA—Integrated Precision Radar Approach

KIAS—Knots Indicated Air Speed

LOC—Localizer

LPV—Localizer Performance with Vertical Guidance

MAC—Mean Aerodynamic Chord

MAJCOM—Major Command

MAP—Missed Approach Point

MDA—Minimum Descent Altitude

MFCD—Multifunction Display

MPD—Mobility Pilot Development

MSN—Mission Evaluation

NAF—Numbered Air Force

NAVAIDs—Navigational Aids

NDB—Non-directional Radio Beacon

NOTAM—Notice to Airman

NVG—Night Vision Goggles

OME—Operational Mission Evaluation

PAR—Precision Approach Radar

PF—Pilot Flying

PFPS—Portable Flight Planning System

PM—Pilot Monitoring

QUAL—Qualification Evaluation

RNAV—Random Navigation Area Navigation

RON—Remain Overnight

RQ—Re-qualification

SID—Standard Instrument Departure

SKE—Station Keeping Equipment

SOP—Pilot Senior Officer

STAR—Standard Terminal Area Routing

TACAN—Tactical Air Navigation System

TOA—Time Of Arrival

TOLD—Takeoff and Landing Data

TOT—Time Over Target

VDP—Visual Descent Point

VFR—Visual Flight Rules

VOR—Very High Frequency Omni-directional Radio Beacon

WST—Weapons System Trainer

Attachment 2

*PILOT FLIGHT EVALUATION WORKSHEET EXAMPLE

Figure A2.1. C-130J Pilot Flight Evaluation Worksheet.

	C-13	0J PILOT I	LIGHT EV	AL WORKS	HEET	DATE COMPLETE	ED .
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	FINAL APPROVIN	G OFFICER					
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	AREA/SUB-AREAS	Q	Q.	U	REMARKS	П	AREA/SUB-AREAS	Q	Q	U	REMARKS	
	GENERAL				32	2E	RNAV (LNAV, LNAV/VNAV)					
1	Directives/Publications/Pro Equip	$\overline{}$			33	3	Circling Approach					
2	Mission Prep/Planning/Performance						Missed Approach			Т		_
3	Briefings	\top	П	$\overline{}$			MISSION					_
4	Use of Checklist	-	\Box		3.5	5	Pre-Takeoff		$\overline{}$	т		_
5	Safety Consciousness (Critical)	-		$\overline{}$	26	à	Takeoff		$\overline{}$	-		_
6	Flight Discipline (Critical)	-		$\overline{}$			Departure/Assembly		$\overline{}$	$^{-}$		_
7	Airmanship/SA (Critical)	-		$\overline{}$			Formation Communications		$\overline{}$	-		_
8	Crew Coordination/CRM	-	П	$\overline{}$			En Route Formation Procedures	\neg	$\overline{}$	-		_
8.1	PM Duties	-					Eq Route Navigation	\neg	$\overline{}$	т		_
0	Communication Procedures	-	$\overline{}$	-			Defensive Systems/Tactics	\neg	$\overline{}$	-		_
10	Life Support Systems/Egress	+	Н				Threat Avoidance	$\overline{}$	-	-		_
	Knowledge/Completion of Forms	+	-	┰			Slowdown	_	-	+		_
	QUALIFICATION	_	_		4	4	DZ Alignment		$\overline{}$	$^{-}$		
12	Aircraft Preflight Inspection	$\overline{}$		$\overline{}$			Airdrop Procedures		$\overline{}$	-		_
13	Ground Operations/Taxi						Time Over Target/Time Of Arrival			\vdash		_
14	Takeoff	\top					Airdrop Accuracy			\vdash		_
15	Basic Aircraft Control	+	\vdash				Escape			+	1	_
16	Automation Management	+					Formation Recovery			\vdash	1	_
17	VFR Pattern	+	-	-			Formation Landing		-	+	 	_
18	Landings	-		_			Flight Leadership (Lead Only)	_	-	⊢	 	_
	Full (100%) Flao Landino	_		_			NVG Usage/Limitations	-	\vdash	⊢		_
	Partial (50% or 0%) Flap Landing	+	-	-			High/Low Altitude Tactical Arrival	_	-	⊢	 	_
	Engine out Landing	+	-	-			Maximum Effort Procedures	-	\vdash	⊢		_
	Touch/Stop and Go Landing	+	-	-			Maximum Effort Takeoff	-	\vdash	⊢		_
		+	-	\vdash			Maximum Effort Landing	-	\vdash	⊢		_
	Landing Roll/Braking/Prop Rev All Engine Go Around	+	-	-		0 1	INSTRUCTOR	_	-	-		_
20		+	\vdash	\vdash		- 1		-	_	-		_
	Engine Out Operations	+	\vdash	\vdash			Instructor Ability (Critical) Instructor Demonstration (Critical)	_	_	١.		_
	Engine Out Go Around Boldface (Critical)	+	_	-			Student Briefing/Critque (Critical)	-	_	Н		_
23		+	_	-				-	_	۰		_
24	Other Emergency Procedures	+	\vdash	₩		의	Knowledge of Training Forms	_	_	_		
25	Systems Ops/Knowledge/Limits	_	_	ㅗ		-	OME	_		-		
	INSTRUMENT	_					Aircraft CC Responsibilities	-	\vdash	⊢		_
	Instrument Departure/SID	-	\vdash	\vdash			Aircrew Management	_	⊢	⊢		
27	Eq Route Navigation	-	\vdash	\vdash			Mission Management	_	\vdash	⊢		
28	Holding/Procedure Turn	+	\vdash	\vdash			Post Flight/RON Procedures	_	\vdash	-		_
29	Use of Navaids	+				15	Authentication/Aircraft Security		_	-		_
30	Descent/Arrival	-		_		_			_	-		
31	Precision Approaches				L	_			_	_		_
31A	PAR	-					CRM (use this to expand on Area 8					
31B	ILS	\perp	ш	\vdash			in lieu of 4031)					_
31C	Cat II ILS	\perp				_	III NEW 01 4031)	_	_			
31D							Mission Planning					
_	RNAV (LPV)					_	Situational Awareness					
32	Non-Precision Approach						Crew Coordination/Flight Integrity					
32A	NDB	_					Communication					
328	Localizer						Risk Management/Decision Making					
32C	ASR						Task Management					
32D	VOR/TACAN						Debriefing					
	7 1082				Page 2 of 4		T 0080				Page	31

Attachment 3

LOADMASTER FLIGHT EVALUATION WORKSHEET EXAMPLE

Figure A3.1. C-130J Loadmaster Flight Evaluation Worksheet.

FLIC	FLIGHT EVALUATION WORKSHEET						
NAME (Last, First	(Middle Initial)			DANK SSN			
ORGANIZATION	LOCATION		ARCRAFTICIEWA	OSITION ELICIBILITY	ERICO		
_			QUALIFICATION				
	GROUN	ID PHASE	ZUALIFICATION	FLIGHT PHASE			
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			CERTIFICATION				
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FINAL APPROVE	NG OFFICER						
I							

	AREA/SUB-AREAS	a	Q.	U	REMARKS	Т	AREA/SUB-AREAS	a	Q.	U	REMARKS
	GENERAL	П	П		30	В	Boldface Emer Procedures (Critical)*	Г		Г	
	Directives/Publications/Pro Equip	т	т		31	C	Other Emergency Procedures*	П		Г	1
	Mission Prep/Planning/Performance	т	т	П	32	N	NVG Usage/Limitations*	П	П	г	1
	Briefings	-	-	$\overline{}$		1	MISSION	1			1
	Use of Checklist	_	_	$\overline{}$	33	14	Airdrop Rigging Procedures	_	$\overline{}$	т	1
	Safety Consciousness (Critical)	-	1				loint Airdrop Inspection	-	$\overline{}$	т	1
	Flight Discipline (Critical)	-	10		35		Airdrop Knowledge				1
_	Airmanship/SA (Critical)	_			35A		CDS				1
	Crew Coordination/CRM	-		Н	35B			-	-	Η-	1
	Communication Procedures	-	-	Н	350	+	Personnel	-	-	-	1
0	Life Support Systems/Egress	-	-	Н	36	-	Airdrop Emergency Procedures	-	Н	⊢	1
1	Knowledge/Completion of Forms	-	-	Н	37		Defensive Systems/Tactics	_	-	Η-	1
	QUALIFICATION	_	_		38	-	Systems Knowledge				1
2	Aircraft Preflight Inspection	-			38A		CDS				1
2A					38B	-		-		-	1
		+	+	\vdash		-	Heavy Equipment	-	\vdash	\vdash	1
12B		⊢	⊢	Н	380	-	Personnel	⊢	\vdash	⊢	4
12C	Exterior Inspection/Top of Airplane	┺	┺	ш	38D	-	ADS System	┺	╙	╙	1
12D		ᆫ	ᆫ	ш	39	C	Coordinated Tasks Briefing	_		ட	J
12E						Ι	INSTRUCTOR				j
12F		-	-		40		nstructor Ability (Critical)	\Box]
	Emergency Equipment	_	_		41		nstructor Demonstration (Critical)	_]
4	Aircraft Configuration	┺	⊢	\vdash	42		Student Briefing/Critique (Critical)	┺		ᆫ	1
5	Load Planning Inspection	⊢	⊢	\vdash	43	Į,	Knowledge of Training Forms	⊢	\vdash	⊢	1
6	On/Off Loading Procedures	┺	┺	ш	l	4		┺	╙	┡	1
7	Supervisory Ability	⊢	⊢	-	·	+		⊢	⊢	⊢	4
8	Tie Down/Restraint Winching Procedures*	⊢	⊢	Н	· ⊢	+		⊢	\vdash	⊢	4
9	Hazardous Material*	⊢	⊢	-	· -	+		⊢	\vdash	⊢	4
	Aircraft Limitations	-	_		· ⊢	+		⊢	\vdash	⊢	1
11 A	-9 Loading Limits	-	-		· –	+		⊢	\vdash	⊢	1
21B		⊢	⊢	-	· –	+		⊢	\vdash	⊢	1
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