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C-130H AIRCREW EVALUATION CRITERIA

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

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This manual implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 11-2, Aircrew Operations. It establishes guidance for the operation of the C-130H aircraft to safely and successfully accomplish worldwide mobility missions. This is a specialized publication intended for use by aircrew members who have graduated from technical training related to this publication. It is used in conjunction with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 11-202V2, Aircrew Standardization and Evaluation Program, and the appropriate Major Air Command (MAJCOM) supplement. This manual applies to all civilian employees and uniformed members of the Regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard who operate or maintain C-130H aircraft. This manual does not apply to the United States Space Force. Ensure all records generated as a result of processes prescribed in this publication adhere to Air Force Instruction 33-322, Records Management and Information Governance Program, and are disposed in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule, which is located in the Air Force Records Information Management System. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the OPR using DAF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication; route DAF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional chain of command. This manual may be supplemented at any level, but all supplements that directly implement this manual must be routed to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for coordination prior to certification and approval. The authorities to waive wing/unit level requirements in this manual are identified with a Tier ("T-0, T-1, T-2, T-3") number following the compliance statement. See Department of the Air Force Manual (DAFMAN) 90-160, Publications and Forms Management, for a description of the authorities associated with the Tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate

Tier waiver approval authority, or alternately, to the requestor's commander for non-tiered compliance items. The use of the name or mark of any specific manufacturer, commercial product, commodity, or service in this publication does not imply endorsement by the Air Force.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This publication has been revised and needs to be completely reviewed. Major changes include Mission/Tactics integration for all Mission (MSN) evaluations, clarification on all MSN profile expectations and updated all flight evaluation worksheets.

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Chapter 1

GENERAL INFORMATION

1.1. General. This manual provides flight examiners, instructors and aircrews with procedures and evaluation criteria/tolerances to be used during flight evaluations as specified in AFMAN 11-202V2 and applicable MAJCOM supplement. Specific areas for evaluation are prescribed to ensure an accurate assessment of the proficiency and capabilities of aircrews. Flight examiners use this manual when conducting aircrew evaluations. Instructors use this manual when preparing aircrews for qualification.

1.2. Key Words Explained.

- 1.2.1. "Will" and "must" indicate a mandatory requirement.
- 1.2.2. "Should" is normally used to indicate a preferred, but not mandatory, method of accomplishment.
- 1.2.3. "May" indicates an acceptable or suggested means of accomplishment.
- 1.2.4. "**Note**" indicates operating procedures, techniques, etc., that are considered essential to emphasize.
- **1.3. Deviations and Waivers.** Submit waiver requests and/or report deviations/exceptions, (without waivers), through normal command channels to National Guard Bureau Mobility Forces Branch (NGB/A3M) or Air Force Reserve Command Mobility Forces Branch (AFRC/A3M) as appropriate. The parent MAJCOM Stan/Eval will notify Air Mobility Command Aircrew Standardization/Evaluation (AMC/A3V) for follow-on action, if necessary. **(T-2)** MAJCOM C-130H functional area managers will forward a copy of approved long-term waivers to this AFMAN to AMC/A3V for follow-on action, if required. **(T-2)**

1.4. Roles and Responsibilities.

- 1.4.1. MAJCOM Directorate of Operations (A3). AMC is designated lead command for the C-130H mission design series aircraft. Air Mobility Command Directorate of Operations (AMC/A3) establishes and standardizes aircrew evaluations in coordination with all other MAJCOM/A3s.
- 1.4.2. Wing Commander (WG/CC) or equivalent. WG/CC will review, approve, disapprove, or delegate (no lower than Squadron Commander (SQ/CC) all T-3 waiver requests to this AFMAN.
- 1.4.3. Operations Group Commander (OG/CC) or equivalent. OG/CCs will establish and maintain the Standardization and Evaluation program and ensure evaluators comply with AFMAN 11-202V2, appropriate MAJCOM supplement, and this AFMAN.
- 1.4.4. SQ/CC or designated representative. SQ/CCs will establish and maintain the Squadron Standardization and Evaluation program and ensure evaluators comply with AFMAN 11-202V2, appropriate MAJCOM supplement, and this AFMAN. (**T-3**)
- 1.4.5. Flight Examiners. Flight examiners will administer evaluations in accordance with AFMAN 11-202V2, appropriate MAJCOM supplement, and this AFMAN. (**T-3**)

- **1.5. Evaluations.** This manual establishes standardized instrument, qualification, mission, and instructor evaluation criteria. It also establishes the areas and sub-areas necessary for the successful completion of evaluations and which required areas/sub areas will be considered critical or non-critical.
- **1.6. Evaluation Requirements.** Accomplish evaluations concurrently, whenever practical. Each C-130H crewmember will be evaluated at specified intervals. (**T-2**) Reference AFMAN 11-202V2 and the appropriate MAJCOM supplement for evaluation interval guidance. Examiners and examinees will be current and qualified in all areas/subareas that are required for that particular evaluation. (**T-3**) This does not apply to requalification evaluations. Unless otherwise noted on AF Form 3862, *Flight Evaluation Worksheet*, all items on the AF Form 3862 (**Attachment 2** through **Attachment 6**) must be accomplished in order to complete the evaluation. (**T-2**) Weapon System Trainers (WSTs) must have a Level C or greater certification if used to accomplish evaluations. (**T-2**) Simulated emergencies will not be evaluated during critical phases of flight (low-level flight and airdrop). (**T-2**) This does not preclude simulated emergencies being performed in the traffic pattern.
 - 1.6.1. Instrument (INSTM) Evaluation. All C-130H pilots will successfully complete a periodic instrument evaluation. (**T-2**) The flight phase will evaluate pilot performance and application of instrument procedures and maneuvers. (**T-2**) The ground phase includes a requisite open-book written instrument examination. Reference AFMAN 11-210, *Instrument Refresher Program* for instrument testing criteria and guidance.
 - 1.6.2. Qualification (QUAL) Evaluation. All C-130H crewmembers complete a periodic qualification evaluation. The flight phase evaluates performance and application of flight manual procedures and maneuvers. The ground phase includes the following requisites: openbook and closed-book examinations, boldface examination, and an Emergency Procedures Evaluation (EPE). Navigators will also complete an open book written instrument examination. Reference AFMAN 11-210 for instrument testing criteria and guidance.
 - 1.6.3. Mission Evaluations. All mission qualified C-130H crewmembers will complete a periodic mission evaluation. (T-2) The MSN evaluation may be accomplished in conjunction with INSTM and/or QUAL evaluations (e.g., INSTM/QUAL/MSN or QUAL/MSN). The flight phase evaluates performance and application of operational procedures to include a sampling of maneuvers for which the individual is qualified. The ground phase includes the following requisites: open-book examination, boldface examination, and an EPE. Mission evaluations should be as realistic as possible that relate to real-world applications, correlate to the crew members highest qualification, and limits the number of simulated events.
 - 1.6.3.1. Unit baseline qualifications. Units establish baseline qualifications that crewmembers must hold to be considered mission ready (unit supplement, operating instruction, or process guidance). Aircrew mission evaluations should sample from applicable qualifications. See Chapter 2, Chapter 3, Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6 of this manual for further guidance.
 - 1.6.3.1.1. Mission Airland (MSN (AL)). Units with a baseline airland only mission evaluation annotate the AF Form 8, *Certificate of Aircrew Qualification*, as MSN (AL).

- 1.6.3.1.2. {Pilots/Navigators Only} Mission Single Ship (MSN (SS)). Units with a baseline single ship airdrop only mission evaluation annotate the AF Form 8 as MSN (SS).
- 1.6.3.1.3. {Pilots/Navigators Only} Mission Formation. Units with a baseline formation airdrop mission evaluation annotate the AF Form 8 as MSN.
- 1.6.3.1.4. {Flight engineers/loadmasters only} Mission Units with an airdrop mission (single ship or formation) annotate the AF Form 8 as MSN.
- 1.6.3.1.5. Any crewmember that maintains a qualification level below these baselines will have restrictions listed on their "MSN" AF Form 8 (**T-1**) For example, "RESTRICTIONS: Will not perform airdrop/formation operations."
- 1.6.3.1.6. See Chapter 6 for LC-130H mission evaluations.
- 1.6.3.2. For units/aircrew with an airdrop requirement, mission evaluations for all crew positions should include an actual airdrop load, if possible. For units/aircrew with a night vision goggles (NVG) requirement, MSN evaluations for all crew positions should be at night using NVGs if scheduling permits.
- 1.6.4. Instructor (INSTR) Evaluations. To initially qualify as an instructor in the C-130H, crewmembers will complete an initial instructor qualification course and evaluation. (T-1) Subsequently, aircrew members designated as instructors are to be evaluated on their ability to instruct during all periodic evaluations. Crewmembers may use their initial instructor evaluation to satisfy the requirements of a periodic evaluation provided all evaluation requirements for the periodic evaluation are met. Refer to the specific aircrew chapter for requirements.
- 1.6.5. Emergency Procedures Evaluations (EPE). Use AFMAN 11-202V2 and the following: Evaluate an aircrew member's knowledge of emergency procedures and systems knowledge for all QUAL and MSN evaluations. See specific crew position chapters of this manual for EPE requirements.
 - 1.6.5.1. Operations group standardization and evaluation (OG/OGV) office will develop and periodically review a list of EPE program requirements (topics, special interest, etc.). (T-3) OG/OGV should develop an EPE guide for each crew position detailing the evaluation areas and conduct of the EPE. EPEs will emphasize emergency procedures and systems knowledge. The EPE will include areas commensurate with the examinee's graduated training (e.g., initial, line, instructor, evaluator). (T-2) AFMAN 11-202V2, MAJCOM and unit supplements may also contain specific EPE content requirements. Examiners may use one continuous scenario throughout the EPE or use different scenarios as required to ensure appropriate areas are evaluated.
 - 1.6.5.2. When possible, conduct an EPE in a WST. If not available, the EPE may be verbally evaluated. Examinees may use publications that are normally available in-flight. The examinee must be able to recite, perform or write all boldface items from memory. **(T-3)**
 - 1.6.5.3. Examinees receiving an overall EPE grade of unqualified are placed in supervised status until recommended additional training and re-evaluation are completed. Examinees receiving an overall EPE grade of unqualified because of unsatisfactory boldface

procedures will not be permitted to fly in their aircrew position until a successful re-evaluation is accomplished. (**T-2**) Reference AFMAN 11-202V2 for mandatory additional training requirements.

1.7. Grading System. Reference AFMAN 11-202V2 and the following:

- 1.7.1. When in-flight evaluation of a required area is not possible, the area may be verbally evaluated or evaluated in a WST. These areas are marked by "Verbally Evaluated If Not Observed" in the appropriate chapter and an asterisk (*) on the AF Form 3862. Flight examiners will make every effort to evaluate all required areas in-flight or in a WST before resorting to this provision. Record all verbally evaluated areas by name and area in the mission description (e.g., Area 56. NVG Usage/Limitations was verbally evaluated.)
- 1.7.2. Critical Areas. Critical areas require adequate accomplishment by the aircrew member to successfully achieve the mission objectives. If an aircrew member receives an unqualified grade in any critical area, the overall grade for the evaluation is unqualified. Critical areas are identified by "(Critical)" in the area title and shading of Q- block on the AF Form 3862.
- 1.7.3. Crew Resource Management (CRM)/Threat and Error Management (TEM). Conduct a thorough pre-mission briefing and post-mission debriefing to the examinee and applicable aircrew members on all aspects of the evaluation. At a minimum, on all evaluations where the aircrew member is downgraded in CRM/TEM, evaluators will use the AF Form 4031, *CRM/TEM Skills Criteria Training/Evaluation*, or other MAJCOM-approved assessment form(s) to document and evaluate CRM/TEM skills. (**T-2**) This form will be used in feedback during evaluation debriefs and submitted to Air Mobility Command Aircrew Ops & Training Division (AMC/A3T) for CRM trend analysis. (**T-2**) Reference AFMAN 11-290, *Cockpit/Crew Resource Management and Threat & Error Management Program* for additional information.

1.8. Conduct of Evaluations.

- 1.8.1. Flight examiners will pre-brief the examinee on the conduct, purpose, requirements of the evaluation and all applicable evaluation criteria. (**T-2**) Flight examiners will then evaluate the examinee in each graded area/sub area. (**T-1**) Flight examiners should not evaluate personnel they have primarily trained or recommended for upgrade, or who write their performance reports.
- 1.8.2. Unless otherwise specified, flight examiners may conduct the evaluation in any seat or position that best enables the flight examiner to observe the examinee's performance. Simulator/aircrew training system contractors will not be in the seat during evaluations in the WST. (T-2)
- 1.8.3. Evaluators will note discrepancies and deviations from prescribed tolerances and performance criteria during the evaluation. They will compare the examinee's performance with the tolerances provided in the grading criteria and assign an appropriate grade for each area. (T-2)
 - 1.8.3.1. An evaluation will not be changed to a training mission to avoid documenting substandard performance, nor will a training mission be changed to an evaluation. (**T-2**)
 - 1.8.3.2. The judgment of the flight examiner, guidance provided in AFMAN 11-202V2 and this manual will be the determining factors in assigning an overall qualification level

- on the AF Form 8. The flight examiner will thoroughly critique all aspects of the flight. (T-2) During the critique, the flight examiner will review the examinee's overall rating, specific deviations, area/sub area grades assigned, and any additional training required. (T-2)
- 1.8.3.3. In the event of unsatisfactory performance, the flight examiner determines recommended additional training requirements. Required additional training will not be accomplished on the same flight. (T-3) Exception: Required additional training on the same flight is allowed when unique situations presenting valuable training opportunities exist (thunderstorm avoidance, crosswind landings, etc.). This option requires flight examiner discretion and judicious application. When used, the examinee must be informed when the additional training begins and ends. (T-3)
- 1.8.4. The WST may be used to accomplish additional training and re-checks. Areas for additional training and rechecks should be limited to those areas/sub areas that can be realistically accomplished in a WST.
- 1.8.5. Rechecks should be administered by a flight examiner other than the one who administered the original evaluation.
- 1.8.6. Flight examiners will not intentionally fail any equipment during flight evaluations in the aircraft but may deny the use of systems not affecting safety of flight. (T-2)
- 1.8.7. Under no circumstance will a flight examiner allow the aircraft to slow below one engine-out air minimum control speed (Vmca) or exceed aircraft limitations specified in the flight manual, regardless of tolerances listed for specific areas. (**T-2**)
- **1.9.** Use of AF Form 3862, *Flight Evaluation Worksheet*. Units may develop their own overprint AF Form 3862 using the examples in Attachments 2-6. Copy each title, area number and text (in the order illustrated) and shading to the appropriate blocks. Units may add special interest items and/or local evaluation requirements. All items on the AF Form 3862 are expected to be evaluated unless they are not part of the unit's baseline or otherwise noted. Use the worksheet to ensure all required areas are evaluated. The AF Form 3862 or draft copy of the AF Form 8, signed by the flight examiner, will serve as the temporary evaluation certificate. (**T-1**) File the AF Form 3862 or draft copy of the AF Form 8 in the aircrew member's flight evaluation folder immediately after the flight evaluation as a temporary record of the evaluation results. Maintain the temporary record until the completed AF Form 8 is added to the flight evaluation folder.
- **1.10. Aircrew Testing.** See specific testing requirements in AFMAN 11-202V2 and the following:
 - 1.10.1. Open-Book Exam. An open-book exam is a requisite for the QUAL and MSN evaluations. The open book QUAL exam will consist of a minimum of 50 questions. The open book MSN exam will consist of a minimum of 50 questions, at least 25% of which will come from tactical doctrine documents related to C-130H combat operations Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. If a combined exam is created for combination evaluations (QUAL/MSN), it will have the appropriate number of questions for each portion (e.g., the QUAL/MSN open book will have at least 100 questions). For periodic INSTR evaluations, a portion of the open-book exam will include instructor questions. A separate (unique) INSTR open book exam is not required.

- 1.10.2. Closed-Book Exam. A closed-book exam is a requisite for all QUAL or combined QUAL/MSN evaluations. The exam will consist of a minimum of 20 questions from the master question file. (**T-2**) The closed book exam will contain mission/tactical questions for crew members that are MSN qualified. (**T-2**)
- 1.10.3. Boldface Exam. A boldface exam is a requisite for any periodic evaluation.
- **1.11. Typical C-130H Evaluation Profile(s).** The unit (OG/CC or OG/OGV) will determine the evaluation profiles suitable for aircrew evaluations based on units' mission baseline requirements and document profiles in local guidance (unit supplement, operating instruction, or process guide). (**T-2**) All items on the AF Form 3862 are expected to be evaluated unless they are not part of the unit's baseline or otherwise noted.
- **1.12. Multiple C-130H Model Certification.** Reference AFMAN 11-2C-130HV1, *C-130H Aircrew Training* for guidance on mandatory differences training. A periodic evaluation may be accomplished in any C-130H aircraft model in which the individual is certified. Attempt to accomplish requisite testing in the same aircraft model in which the flight evaluation is flown or expected to be flown.
- **1.13. Senior Officer Requirements.** Senior officers meeting the criteria outlined in AFMAN 11-202V1, *Aircrew Training*, may complete a C-130H senior officer qualification evaluation. Requisites include open and closed book examinations, instrument examination, boldface and EPE. See chapters 2 and 3 of this manual along with AFMAN 11-202V1 and AFMAN 11-2C-130HV1.

Chapter 2

PILOT EVALUATIONS

- **2.1. General.** This chapter standardizes initial, periodic and re-qualification evaluations, including requirements for instrument/qualification, mission, and instructor evaluations.
 - 2.1.1. Combined evaluations (e.g., INSTM/QUAL/MSN) are the desired method of evaluation. The combined evaluation allows greater flexibility, allows the evaluator to see the full spectrum of the pilot's capabilities, and it reduces the number of overall evaluations each unit must accomplish. Events that are accomplished during one portion of the evaluation are not required to be evaluated again (e.g., if a non-precision approach is flown during the Station Keeping Equipment (SKE) recovery, it does not have to be re-accomplished during the instrument phase of the evaluation).
 - 2.1.2. If the flight manual recommends a specific airspeed range for performance of a maneuver, the flight examiner will apply the grading criteria to the upper and lower limits of that range.
 - 2.1.3. Evaluator pilots may conduct evaluations when scheduled as primary aircrew members.
- **2.2. Instrument/Qualification Evaluations (Initial, Periodic and Requalification).** C-130H instrument evaluations will be accomplished concurrently with qualification evaluations. Include all areas (unless otherwise noted) under GENERAL, INSTRUMENT and QUALIFICATION. Conduct the evaluation in-flight or in a WST.
 - 2.2.1. Accomplish a minimum of one precision and one non-precision approach. (**T-2**) Instrument/Qualification evaluations should include approaches to airfields other than home station or deployed locations.
 - 2.2.2. Flight Pilot (FP). From the right seat, evaluate appropriate areas in this chapter as illustrated on the evaluation worksheet at **Attachment 3**. Designate crew position as FP on the AF Form 8. All simulated emergencies will be evaluated. (**T-2**)
 - 2.2.3. Aircraft Commander. From the left seat, evaluate appropriate areas in this chapter as illustrated on the evaluation worksheet at **Attachment 3**. Designate crew position as MP on the AF Form 8.
 - 2.2.4. Instructor Pilot (IP). From the left or right seat evaluate appropriate areas in this chapter as illustrated on the evaluation worksheet at **Attachment 3**. Designate crew position as IP on the AF Form 8. See **paragraph 2.5** for further guidance.
 - 2.2.5. Pilot Senior Officer. From the left seat evaluate appropriate areas in GENERAL, INSTRUMENT and QUALIFICATION. See AFMAN 11-202V1 Senior Officer Qualification and Performance Requirements and AFMAN 11-2C-130HV1 senior officer qualification training requirements for additional information. A qualified C-130 Instructor pilot or above will be in the other seat. (T-2)
 - 2.2.5.1. For Senior Officer Course A/B, this evaluation consists of a variety of instrument approaches and visual patterns. This evaluation will consist of a minimum of one precision and one non-precision approach and one 50% and one 100% flap landing. (**T-1**) No-flap and simulated engine-out approach, go-around and landings are not required. This

- evaluation is normally completed in the aircraft. Annotate AF Form 8 as an INSTM/QUAL evaluation with expiration date, crew position is "FP" and include a restriction on the AF Form 8, "Fly only under direct supervision of a qualified C-130H instructor pilot."
- 2.2.5.2. For Senior Officer Course C1, annotate AF Form 8 as unrestricted QUAL with expiration date, crew position is "FP".
- 2.2.5.3. For Senior Officer Course C2, annotate AF Form 8 as unrestricted QUAL/MSN (AL) with expiration date, crew position is "MP".
- **2.3. Mission Evaluations (Initial, Periodic and Re-qualification).** Mission evaluations will fall into one of three categories: Formation Airdrop, Single-ship Airdrop, Airland only. **(T-2)**
 - 2.3.1. All Profiles.
 - 2.3.1.1. The max-effort portion will consist of a tactical/max-effort takeoff and tactical/max-effort landing and should be accomplished at the end of the tactical approach. (T-2) Landings will be performed on an actual landing zone if available. (T-2) If not available, a larger runway with landing zone markings and a clearly identifiable touchdown zone may be used. Reference DAFMAN 13-217, *Drop Zone, Landing Zone, and Helicopter Landing Zone Operations*) for landing zone marking guidance. One go-around is permitted, provided the aircraft does not touch down short of the zone. Takeoffs should be performed from a main runway when available (e.g., safe, and practical to taxi from an assault landing zone). At a minimum, thoroughly verbally evaluate flight pilots on pilot monitoring duties during tactical/max-effort procedures.
 - 2.3.1.2. Units and/or aircrew with a combat mission evaluation requirement (regardless of the type of mission being flown) will be evaluated on **Area 43** (Tactics) and **Area 44** (Defensive Systems/Threat Avoidance). (**T-2**) At a minimum, all mission evaluations will include the following (**T-2**):
 - 2.3.1.2.1. Mission Scenario. A mission scenario identifies the overall battle picture and details the specific airdrop and/or airland requirement.
 - 2.3.1.2.2. Threat Scenario. The threat scenario identifies and incorporates a specific threat system(s) that integrates into the overall mission scenario.
 - 2.3.1.2.3. Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP's). Incorporate TTPs that allow for effective execution of the mission scenario and best mitigate the threat system(s) selected.
 - 2.3.2. Formation Airdrop. A visual or SKE route to an airdrop and recovery must be flown to complete the evaluation. (T-2) Alternate the type of route/airdrop/recovery flown on subsequent periodic MSN evaluations at a minimum. (T-2) Unit policy may be more restrictive requiring both types be flown. Regardless, failure to accomplish the proper events will result in loss of MSN qualification for affected individuals. (T-2) The evaluator and examinee will ensure the correct evaluation profile prior to flight. All general and mission Areas (except area 58) are required evaluation items unless otherwise specified in Attachment 3. (T-2) Conduct the evaluation in-flight or in a WST. If a visual route is accomplished, a visual tactical arrival will be flown and consist of a high or low altitude tactical arrival. (T-2) At a minimum, all profiles will be scheduled, mission planned and executed as a two-ship.

- (T-2) This does not preclude the completion of the evaluation as a single-ship due to unforeseen circumstances and must be authorized by OG/OGV. (T-2)
- 2.3.3. Single-Ship Airdrop. The airdrop profile will (at a minimum) consist of a visual or Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) route to an airdrop. (**T-2**) Units may require both types to be flown. Areas 1-13, and mission areas 41-49 and 53-57 are required evaluation items unless otherwise specified in **Attachment 3**. Conduct the evaluation in-flight or in a WST.
- 2.3.4. Airland Only. Airland Mission Pilots that maintain max-effort qualification will fly an IFR or Visual Flight Rule (VFR) route (minimum of 20 minutes long and greater than Minimum En route Altitude (MEA), Minimum Obstruction Clearance Altitude (MOCA), Off Route Obstruction Clearance Altitude (OROCA), or Off Route Terrain Clearance Altitude (ORTCA) Above Ground Level (AGL)) to a Time Of Arrival (TOA) at an airfield or landing zone (LZ). (T-2) The arrival will consist of a tactical arrival followed by a max-effort landing. (T-2) General areas 1-13 and mission areas 41-44, 49 and 53-58 are required evaluation items unless otherwise specified in **Attachment 3**. Conduct the evaluation in-flight or in a WST.

2.3.5. Flight Pilot.

- 2.3.5.1. From the right seat evaluate all applicable mission areas in this chapter as illustrated on the evaluation worksheet at **Attachment 3**. The MSN evaluation will focus on pilot monitoring duties. Pilot flying duties may be evaluated on Areas 39-44 and **Area 50**. Designate as FP with restrictions as needed on the AF Form 8. For formation airdrop profiles, the evaluation may be flown in the lead (preferred) or wing position.
- 2.3.5.2. All pilots not previously certified as an aircraft commander in a C-130 will receive an Initial Mission evaluation (INIT MSN) prior to aircraft commander certification. (**T-1**) Conduct the INIT MSN evaluation in accordance with **paragraph 2.3.6** and designate crew position as MP on the AF Form 8. **Note:** An operational mission evaluation will also be administered as part of the Pilot Checkout Program. (**T-1**) Comply with the requirements specified in AFMAN 11-2C-130HV1 and **paragraph 2.6** of this AFMAN.

2.3.6. Aircraft Commander.

- 2.3.6.1. From the left seat, evaluate appropriate areas in this chapter as illustrated on the evaluation worksheet at **Attachment 3**. Designate crew position as MP on the AF Form 8.
- 2.3.6.2. Formation Profiles.
 - 2.3.6.2.1. Non-Lead. The route will be flown in the wing position or element lead position without followers. (**T-3**)
 - 2.3.6.2.2. Element Lead. Accomplish the route in the element lead (preferred) or flight lead position.
 - 2.3.6.2.3. Flight Lead. Accomplish the route in the flight lead (preferred) or element lead position. The flight lead pilot will participate in the mission commander duties. **(T-3)**
- 2.3.7. Instructor Pilot. From the left or right seat evaluate appropriate areas in this chapter as illustrated on the evaluation worksheet at **Attachment 3**. Designate crew position as IP on the AF Form 8. See paragraph 2.4 for further guidance.

- 2.3.8. Pilots that do not meet unit baseline mission requirement (such as, basic mission capable crewmembers) will note appropriate restrictions on the AF Form 8 (Airdrop, Formation, SKE/Radar Verified Airdrop (RVAD), etc.). See **Chapter 1** for further baseline guidance.
- **2.4. Instructor Evaluations** (**Initial, Periodic and Requalification**). Flight examiners will place particular emphasis on the examinee's ability to recognize student difficulties and provide timely, effective corrective action. Instructor pilots should be able to brief, observe, assess, and debrief the student's overall performance. The evaluator will state which instructional abilities were evaluated in the comments section of the AF Form 8. (**T-3**) List a minimum of two areas instructed by the examinee, these areas should be different from the previous evaluation. If the instructor taught throughout the entire mission and there were numerous areas in which instructional ability was demonstrated, one general comment will suffice. (**T-3**) Conduct initial or requalification instructor evaluations with a qualified pilot occupying the other seat. For the initial instructor evaluation, the examinee will occupy the right seat; for recurring or RQ evaluations, the instructor examinee may occupy either seat. (**T-3**)
 - 2.4.1. During periodic QUAL evaluations, instructors will initiate a simulated aircraft malfunction requiring a simulated engine shutdown, simulated engine-out approach, and go-around. (T-3) Instructors will be evaluated on their ability to ensure safe simulated engine-out operations. (T-3)
 - 2.4.2. If airdrop mission qualified, all INIT and RQ instructor evaluations require the examinee to instruct a SKE or visual low-level route and airdrop.
 - 2.4.3. All instructor areas/sub areas are required instructor evaluation items.

2.5. Emergency Procedures Evaluation (EPE).

- 2.5.1. The INSTM/QUAL EPE will cover a cross section of aircraft systems knowledge and emergencies. (T-2) Examinees should be able to demonstrate an understanding of aircraft systems beyond the actual steps required for an emergency procedure. A WST may be used to conduct the EPE. Include the following items on EPEs:
 - 2.5.1.1. All Boldface procedures. (T-2)
 - 2.5.1.2. Takeoff and Landing Data (TOLD) definitions, takeoff procedures and emergencies for Qual and Mission evaluations. Mission evaluations will also include maximum effort TOLD definitions, takeoff procedures and emergencies (as applicable). (T-2)
 - 2.5.1.3. Airdrop emergency procedures, defensive system operation (representative of unit's aircraft), lookout doctrine, threat calls and threat pre-emptive/reactive countertactics for all mission evaluations (as applicable). (T-2)

2.5.2. Grade EPEs as follows:

- 2.5.2.1. Q1 Correctly analyzed, stated, and understood aircraft/airdrop emergencies. Completed/can complete the proper action in the correct sequence (not a verbatim response). Properly utilized TO emergency procedure sections.
- 2.5.2.2. Q2 Correctly analyzed and understood aircraft/airdrop emergencies but had difficulty performing/stating required procedures to correct the emergency/malfunction. Had limited knowledge of TO emergency procedure sections. Requires additional training.

2.5.2.3. Q3 - Failed to analyze, state and did not understand aircraft/airdrop emergencies and/or could not perform required procedures to correct the emergency/malfunction. Could not utilize TO emergency procedure sections. Requires additional training.

2.6. Operational Mission Evaluation (OME). All pilots will complete a one-time OME demonstrating their ability to operate in command of an aircraft performing the unit's primary mission prior to aircraft commander certification. (T-1) The evaluation should be completed in conjunction with an off-station training mission. This evaluation is not required for pilots previously certified as aircraft commanders in mobility air forces (MAF) C-130 aircraft. Document the OME on the AF Form 8 as a "SPOT" evaluation and include the following comment in the "This OME was conducted in conjunction with Aircraft Commander remarks section: certification". If this evaluation is intended to satisfy the requirements of a Qualification/Instrument and/or Mission Evaluation, comply with the requirements specified in AFMAN 11-202V2 and paragraph 2.3 of this AFMAN. Include the remark: "This evaluation was conducted in conjunction with aircraft commander certification". Although the goal is to complete the evaluation on the most representative mission, the profile must be balanced between mission availability and the imperative to not delay aircraft commander certification. The OG/CC may substitute a local mission to preclude lengthy certification delays.

2.7. Pilot Grading Criteria.

Table 2.1. General.

Area 1. Directive	es/Publications/Personal and Professional Equipment.
Q	Possessed an adequate knowledge of all applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs and FAA/ICAO directives. Required publications (paper or electronic) were current and properly posted. Had all required personal/professional equipment. Displayed satisfactory knowledge of the care and use of such equipment. Required equipment inspections were current.
Q-	Possessed a limited knowledge of applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs and FAA/ICAO directives but could locate information in the appropriate publications. Publications were current but improperly posted.
U	Unaware of applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs and FAA/ICAO directives and/or could not locate them in the appropriate publication in a timely manner. Required publications (paper or electronic) were not current. Did not have required personal/professional equipment. Required equipment inspections were overdue or equipment was unserviceable.
Area 2. Mission	Preparation/Planning/Performance.
Q	Checked all factors applicable to flight such as weather, notices to airmen (NOTAM), alternate airfields, airfield suitability, fuel requirements, charts, etc. Adequate knowledge of performance capabilities and operating data. Attended required briefings.
Q-	Made minor errors or omissions that detracted from mission effectiveness. Limited knowledge of performance capabilities or approved operating procedures/rules. Late for required briefings.
U	Made major errors or omissions that would have prevented a safe or effective mission. Unsatisfactory knowledge of performance capabilities and/or operating data. Performance calculations exceeded Q- limits. Failed to attend required briefings.
Area 3. Briefing	S.
Q	Contributed to the briefing content to ensure it included all applicable information. Briefings effectively organized and presented in a logical sequence. Covered all pertinent items. Effectively used available briefing aids.
Q-	Allowed omission of items pertinent but not critical to the mission. Briefings lacked

	continuity or contained unnecessary repetition. Some difficulty communicating clearly. Did
	not make effective use of available briefing aids. Dwelled on non-essential items.
	Failed to conduct/attend required briefings. Failed to use briefing aids. Omitted essential
	items or did not correct erroneous information that could affect mission accomplishment.
	Demonstrated lack of knowledge of subject. Briefing poorly organized and not presented in a
	logical sequence, resulting in confusion. Presented erroneous information that would affect
	safe/effective mission accomplishment.
Area 4. Use of Che	
_	Consistently used and called for the correct checklist and gave the correct response at the
	appropriate time throughout the mission.
~	Checklist responses were untimely and/or crewmember required continual prompting for
	correct response.
	Used or called for incorrect checklist or consistently omitted checklist items. Unable to
	identify the correct checklist to use for a given situation. Did not complete checklist prior to
	event.
	sciousness. (Critical)
_	Aware of and complied with all safety factors required for safe aircraft operation and mission
	accomplishment.
	Not aware of or did not comply with all safety factors required for safe aircraft operation or
	mission accomplishment. Attempted to operate aircraft in a dangerous manner.
Area 6. Flight Disc	
	Exhibited strict flight and crew discipline. Prepared and completed mission in compliance
	with published instructions and directives.
	Failed to exhibit strict flight and crew discipline. Failed to comply with published
	instructions and directives which did or could have jeopardized safety or mission success.
	dination/Management/Crew Resource Management (CRM)/Threat and Error Management AN 11-290, applicable MAJCOM Supplement, and AF Form 4031.
Q	Proactively applied appropriate/established CRM skills and TEM concepts throughout the
	flight/mission. Ensured safe/effective mission accomplishment by anticipating, recognizing,
	and mitigating relevant threats. Identified and mitigated own and other crewmembers' errors
	via the proper use of monitoring/crosschecking procedures and through the employment of
	applicable, established Verbalize, Verify, Monitor (VVM) practices/procedures.
Q-	Reactively and inconsistently, or inadequately applied appropriate/established CRM skills
	and TEM concepts but did not allow those deficiencies to detract from mission
	accomplishment and/or flight safety. Unreliably and/or inadequately anticipated, identified,
	or mitigated relevant threats and/or own or other crewmembers' inconsequential errors.
	Did not apply appropriate/established CRM skills and TEM concepts to ensure safe/effective
	mission accomplishment. Failed to anticipate, identify, or mitigate relevant threats and/or
	own or other crewmembers' consequential errors.
Area 8. Communica	ation/Identification Friend or Foe (IFF)/Selective Identification Feature (SIF) Procedures.
	Adequate knowledge of and compliance with correct communication/IFF/SIF procedures.
	Transmissions concise with proper terminology. Thoroughly familiar with and operated
	correctly, HAVE QUICK, IFF and secure voice equipment.
Q-	Occasional deviations from procedures required re-transmissions or resetting codes. Slow in
	initiating or missed several required radio calls. Transmissions contained extraneous matter,
	were not in proper sequence or used non-standard terminology. Displayed limited knowledge
	of HAVE QUICK, IFF and secure voice equipment.
U	Incorrect procedures or poor performance caused confusion and jeopardized mission
	accomplishment. Omitted numerous radio/interphone calls. Displayed inadequate
Area 9. Life Suppor	accomplishment. Omitted numerous radio/interphone calls. Displayed inadequate knowledge of HAVE QUICK, IFF and secure voice equipment.
	knowledge of HAVE QUICK, IFF and secure voice equipment.
	knowledge of HAVE QUICK, IFF and secure voice equipment. rt Systems/Egress.
Q	knowledge of HAVE QUICK, IFF and secure voice equipment. rt Systems/Egress. Displayed thorough knowledge of location and use of life support systems/equipment and
Q	knowledge of HAVE QUICK, IFF and secure voice equipment. rt Systems/Egress.
Q	knowledge of HAVE QUICK, IFF and secure voice equipment. rt Systems/Egress. Displayed thorough knowledge of location and use of life support systems/equipment and aircraft egress devices (doors, windows, hatches, life rafts, escape ropes, etc.).

U	Displayed unsatisfactory knowledge of location and use of life support systems or equipment.
	Unable to properly operate aircraft egress devices or egress the aircraft.
	dge/Completion of Forms.
Q	All required forms and/or flight plans were complete, accurate, readable, accomplished on time and in accordance with applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs and FAA/ICAO directives. Relayed an accurate, timely debrief of significant events to applicable agencies (intelligence, maintenance, etc.).
Q-	Minor errors on forms and/or flight plans did not affect conduct of the mission. Improperly reported some information due to minor errors, omissions and/or deviations.
U	Did not accomplish required forms and/or flight plans in accordance with applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs and FAA/ICAO directives. Omitted or incorrectly reported significant information due to major errors, omissions and/or deviations.
Area 11. Airmans	ship/Situational Awareness. (Critical)
Q	Executed the assigned mission in a timely, efficient manner. Demonstrated strict professional flight and crew discipline throughout all phases of flight. Maintained situational awareness and exercised sound judgment throughout the mission. Conducted the flight with a sense of understanding and comprehension. Prioritized tasks properly.
U	Untimely or inappropriate decisions degraded or prevented accomplishment of a portion of the mission. Lacks the skills to prioritize tasks. Resources were not always effectively used to the point that specific mission objectives were not achieved. Lacked situational awareness. Unaware of significant events that impacted the mission.
Area 12. Automa	tion Management.
Q	Adhered to, and demonstrated appropriate knowledge of, published guidance regarding the operation of automated aircraft flight systems, Pilot Flying (PF)/Pilot Monitoring (PM) flight automation responsibilities, and Verbalize, Verify, and Monitor (VVM) procedures as they relate to flight automation. Proficiently programmed, reviewed/verified, and operated automated flight systems at suitable levels to enhance situational awareness and/or to reduce pilot workload. Either did not make flight automation errors or quickly identified and mitigated those errors.
Q-	Demonstrated limited knowledge of published guidance for the operation of automated flight systems, PF/PM flight automation responsibilities, and VVM procedures as they relate to flight automation. Inconsistently or inadequately programmed, reviewed/verified, or operated aircraft automated flight systems at suitable levels to enhance situational awareness and/or to reduce pilot workload. Made, but did not identify or mitigate, inconsequential flight automation errors.
U	Did not follow published guidance for the operation of automated flight systems, causing detriment to mission/flight accomplishment. Did not adequately employ PF, PM, and/or VVM guidance regarding the usage of flight automation systems or adequately program, review/verify, and/or operate automated aircraft systems at suitable levels. Made, but did not identify or mitigate, consequential flight automation errors.
Area 13. Pilot Mo	onitoring
Q	Effectively monitors and supports/advises the PF, intervening, when appropriate, if the PF is not adequately controlling the aircraft flight path. Complies with applicable flight policies and procedures and makes required flight callouts. Remains vigilant to identify, communicate, and mitigate events/distractions that may adversely affect flight path management. Monitors energy and flight path performance and is alert for erroneous/conflicting aircraft control and navigational information. Effectively addresses aircraft system failures or unexpected aircraft flight guidance and aircraft system outcomes.
Q-	Does not fully support/advise the PF regarding the aircraft flight path. Slow to intervene if the PF is not adequately controlling the aircraft flight path. Flight policies/procedures are not fully applied and required flight callouts are inconsistent. Flight path/energy management awareness, communication, and/or vigilance is sporadic but does not adversely affect flight safety. Intermittently addresses aircraft system failures or unexpected aircraft flight guidance and aircraft system outcomes.
U	Fails to support/advise the PF regarding the aircraft flight path. Does not intervene if the PF

is not adequately controlling the aircraft flight path. Application of flight policies/procedures
is insufficient and required callouts are not made. Flight path/energy management
awareness, communication, and/or vigilance is insufficient or jeopardizes flight safety. Fails
to address aircraft system failures or unexpected aircraft flight guidance and aircraft system
outcomes.

Table 2.2. Qualification.

Area 14. Ground	Operations/Taxi
Q	Established and adhered to station, start engine, taxi, and takeoff time to assure thorough preflight, check of personal equipment, crew/passenger briefings, etc. Accurately determined readiness of aircraft for flight. Completed all systems preflight/post-flight inspections in accordance with flight manual. Conducted taxi operations according to flight manual, AFMAN 11-218, Aircraft Operations and Movement on the Ground, and local procedures.
Q-	Same as above except for minor procedural deviations that did not detract from mission effectiveness.
U	Crew errors directly contributed to a late takeoff that degraded the mission. Failed to accurately determine readiness for flight. Failed to preflight/post-flight a critical component or could not conduct a satisfactory preflight/post-flight inspection.
Area 15. Pre-Tak	
Q	Established and adhered to station, start engine, taxi, and takeoff times to assure thorough pre- flight, check of personal equipment, crew/passenger briefings, etc. Accurately determined readiness of aircraft for flight. Performed all checks prior to takeoff. Taxi was as briefed (if applicable).
Q-	Same as above except minor deviations occurred did not detract from mission effectiveness.
Ů	Omitted checklist items. Failed to accurately determine readiness of aircraft for flight. Crew errors directly contributed to a late takeoff that degraded the mission or made it non-effective. Taxi not as briefed due to pilot error that contributed to late takeoff or confusion in the formation.
Area 16. Takeoff.	
Q	Maintained smooth, positive aircraft control throughout the takeoff. Performed the takeoff in accordance with flight manual and as published/directed.
Q-	Minor deviations from published procedures without affecting safety of flight. Control was rough or erratic. Hesitant in application of procedures/corrections.
U	Takeoff was potentially dangerous. Exceeded aircraft/systems limitations. Failed to establish proper climb attitude. Excessive deviation from intended flight path. Violated flight manual procedures.
and heading/cours	ircraft Control. Note 1: Use the following criteria as general tolerances for airspeed, altitude, e. Note 2: Airspeed tolerances apply when a specific airspeed has been assigned by Air
maneuvering spee operating" criteria	prescribed in the flight manual. Airspeed "minus" tolerances are based on minimum d for aircraft configuration. Note 3: Add 50 feet (when practical) and 5 degrees to "all engines a for "operations with an engine out" criteria. Note 4: This criteria does not apply to landings. In a great for landing tolerances.
Q	Maintained positive aircraft control. Experienced minor deviations but corrected in a timely manner. Met the following tolerances: Airspeed: +10/-5 Knots Indicated Airspeed (KIAS); Altitude: +/-100 feet; Heading/Course: +/-5 degrees.
Q-	Frequent deviations in airspeed altitude or heading but does not compromise flight safety. Slow to correct deviations. Exceeds Q criteria but does not exceed: Airspeed: +15/-5 KIAS; Altitude: +/-200 feet; Heading/Course: +/-10 degrees.
U	Exceeded Q- criteria.
Area 18. Radar O	ps/Weather Avoidance/Windshear.
Q	Effectively demonstrated procedures for operating weather radar (if equipped). Updated weather radar/analysis throughout the mission. Possessed adequate knowledge of windshear detection and avoidance equipment/procedures. Used all available sources to determine if

	and/or to what degree severe weather conditions exist. Complied with all weather separation
	and windshear avoidance directives.
Q-	Minor deviations observed when operating weather radar (if equipped). Did not update
	radar/weather analysis during worsening weather conditions. Limited knowledge of
	windshear detection and avoidance equipment.
U	Unable to demonstrate proper use of weather radar (if equipped). Failed to update
	radar/weather analysis when critical. Displayed unsatisfactory knowledge of windshear
	detection and avoidance equipment. Failed to comply with weather separation or windshear
A 10 E .1 ECC	avoidance directives that could have jeopardized safety or mission success.
Area 19. Fuel Eff	
Q	Possessed adequate knowledge of all applicable aircraft publications and other governing
	directives and understood how to apply both to enhance fuel conservation and fuel planning. Successfully applied fuel conservation procedures in all applicable areas of the mission.
0	Possessed some knowledge of applicable aircraft publications and directives and understood
Q-	how to apply both to enhance fuel conservation and fuel planning. Successfully applied some
	fuel conservation procedures but failed to apply fuel conservation procedures in all areas of
	the mission.
U	Unaware of fuel conservation procedures. Unable to fuel plan. Failed to apply any fuel
	conservation procedures during the mission.
Area 20 VFR Pat	tern (Weather & traffic permitting). Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed.
Q	Performed traffic pattern and turn to final/final approach in accordance with published
~	procedures. Aircraft control was smooth and positive. Constantly cleared area of intended
	flight.
Q-	Performed traffic pattern and turn to final/final approach with minor deviations to procedures.
	Aircraft control was safe but not consistently smooth and positive. Over/under shot final
	approach but was able to intercept normal glide path. Adequately cleared area of intended
	flight.
U	Did not perform traffic pattern and/or turn to final/final approach in accordance with
	published procedures. Displayed erratic aircraft control. Did not clear area of intended
	flight.
	s (Includes Full Flap, Partial Flap, No-Flap and Touch/Stop-and-Go landings). Note: Specific
	nclude threshold altitude/airspeed, runway alignment, flare, touchdown speed and landing in a
crab.	
	ıll Flap Landing. (100%)
	rtial Flap Landing. (50%)
Sub Area 21C. No	
	ngine Out Landing.
	ouch/Stop and Go Landing.
Q	Performed landings as published/directed in accordance with flight manual and met the
	following criteria: Airspeed: +/-5 KIAS; Touchdown Zone: 1000-2000 feet; Centerline: +/-
	15 feet left or right.
Q-	Performed landings with minor deviation to procedures as published/directed. Landed in a
	slight crab. Exceeded Q criteria but not the following: Airspeed: +10/-5 KIAS; Touchdown
TT	Zone: Threshold-3000 feet; Centerline: +/-25 feet left or right.
U	Landing not performed as published/directed. Exceeded Q- criteria.
	Roll/Braking/Propeller Reversing.
Q	Performed as published/directed in accordance with flight manual. Braking action and
0	propeller reversing actuation smooth and commensurate with landing conditions. Performed landing roll with minor deviation to procedures as published/directed. Braking
Q-	Performed landing roll with minor deviation to procedures as published/directed. Braking action and propeller reversing actuation unnecessarily delayed or not smooth. Braking action
	and propeller reversing actuation unnecessarily delayed of not smooth. Braking action and propeller reversing not accomplished commensurate with landing conditions but did not
	jeopardize safety.
U	Landing roll not performed as published/directed. Braking or propeller reversing
	accomplished in an unsafe manner.
Area 23 All Engi	ne Go-Around (GA). (Not Required if Area 25 is Accomplished)
I II Cu 25. I III Eligi	are to thousand (orly), (thot requires in three are in the comprision)

Q Q- U Area 24. Engine O Q Q- U Area 25. Engine O Q Q-	Initiated and performed GA promptly and in accordance with flight manual and directives. Applied smooth control inputs. Acquired and maintained a positive climb. Slow or hesitant to initiate GA. Slightly over-controlled the aircraft. Minor deviations did not affect mission accomplishment or compromise safety. Did not initiate GA when appropriate or directed. Major deviations or misapplication of procedures could have led to an unsafe condition. Out Operations. Use approach criteria for the type of approach being flown and the following: Proper control inputs were used to correct asymmetric condition. Proper consideration was given to maneuvering the aircraft with regard to the engine out condition. Maintained criteria in Area 17, (Note 3). Minor deviations in aircraft control allowed the aircraft to occasionally fly in uncoordinated flight. Momentarily deviated from criteria in Area 17, (Note 3). Aircraft control was erratic and consistently resulted in uncoordinated flight. Maneuvering the aircraft with regard to the engine out condition was potentially unsafe. Exceeded Q-criteria in Area 17, (Note 3). Performed all required procedures in accordance with the flight manual and directives. Applied smooth, positive, and coordinated control inputs. Rudder and aileron inputs were in correct direction. Errors were made which did not affect safety. Aircraft control was not consistently smooth and positive. Rudder and aileron inputs were in the correct direction with some over/under		
U Area 24. Engine O Q Q- U Area 25. Engine O Q	Slow or hesitant to initiate GA. Slightly over-controlled the aircraft. Minor deviations did not affect mission accomplishment or compromise safety. Did not initiate GA when appropriate or directed. Major deviations or misapplication of procedures could have led to an unsafe condition. Out Operations. Use approach criteria for the type of approach being flown and the following: Proper control inputs were used to correct asymmetric condition. Proper consideration was given to maneuvering the aircraft with regard to the engine out condition. Maintained criteria in Area 17, (Note 3). Minor deviations in aircraft control allowed the aircraft to occasionally fly in uncoordinated flight. Momentarily deviated from criteria in Area 17, (Note 3). Aircraft control was erratic and consistently resulted in uncoordinated flight. Maneuvering the aircraft with regard to the engine out condition was potentially unsafe. Exceeded Q-criteria in Area 17, (Note 3). Out Go-Around. Performed all required procedures in accordance with the flight manual and directives. Applied smooth, positive, and coordinated control inputs. Rudder and aileron inputs were in correct direction. Errors were made which did not affect safety. Aircraft control was not consistently smooth		
U Area 24. Engine O Q Q- U Area 25. Engine O Q	not affect mission accomplishment or compromise safety. Did not initiate GA when appropriate or directed. Major deviations or misapplication of procedures could have led to an unsafe condition. Dut Operations. Use approach criteria for the type of approach being flown and the following: Proper control inputs were used to correct asymmetric condition. Proper consideration was given to maneuvering the aircraft with regard to the engine out condition. Maintained criteria in Area 17, (Note 3). Minor deviations in aircraft control allowed the aircraft to occasionally fly in uncoordinated flight. Momentarily deviated from criteria in Area 17, (Note 3). Aircraft control was erratic and consistently resulted in uncoordinated flight. Maneuvering the aircraft with regard to the engine out condition was potentially unsafe. Exceeded Q-criteria in Area 17, (Note 3). Dut Go-Around. Performed all required procedures in accordance with the flight manual and directives. Applied smooth, positive, and coordinated control inputs. Rudder and aileron inputs were in correct direction. Errors were made which did not affect safety. Aircraft control was not consistently smooth		
Area 24. Engine O Q Q- U Area 25. Engine O Q	Did not initiate GA when appropriate or directed. Major deviations or misapplication of procedures could have led to an unsafe condition. Out Operations. Use approach criteria for the type of approach being flown and the following: Proper control inputs were used to correct asymmetric condition. Proper consideration was given to maneuvering the aircraft with regard to the engine out condition. Maintained criteria in Area 17, (Note 3). Minor deviations in aircraft control allowed the aircraft to occasionally fly in uncoordinated flight. Momentarily deviated from criteria in Area 17, (Note 3). Aircraft control was erratic and consistently resulted in uncoordinated flight. Maneuvering the aircraft with regard to the engine out condition was potentially unsafe. Exceeded Q-criteria in Area 17, (Note 3). Out Go-Around. Performed all required procedures in accordance with the flight manual and directives. Applied smooth, positive, and coordinated control inputs. Rudder and aileron inputs were in correct direction. Errors were made which did not affect safety. Aircraft control was not consistently smooth		
Area 24. Engine O Q Q- U Area 25. Engine O Q	procedures could have led to an unsafe condition. Out Operations. Use approach criteria for the type of approach being flown and the following: Proper control inputs were used to correct asymmetric condition. Proper consideration was given to maneuvering the aircraft with regard to the engine out condition. Maintained criteria in Area 17, (Note 3). Minor deviations in aircraft control allowed the aircraft to occasionally fly in uncoordinated flight. Momentarily deviated from criteria in Area 17, (Note 3). Aircraft control was erratic and consistently resulted in uncoordinated flight. Maneuvering the aircraft with regard to the engine out condition was potentially unsafe. Exceeded Q-criteria in Area 17, (Note 3). Out Go-Around. Performed all required procedures in accordance with the flight manual and directives. Applied smooth, positive, and coordinated control inputs. Rudder and aileron inputs were in correct direction. Errors were made which did not affect safety. Aircraft control was not consistently smooth		
Q- U Area 25. Engine O Q	Proper control inputs were used to correct asymmetric condition. Proper consideration was given to maneuvering the aircraft with regard to the engine out condition. Maintained criteria in Area 17, (Note 3). Minor deviations in aircraft control allowed the aircraft to occasionally fly in uncoordinated flight. Momentarily deviated from criteria in Area 17, (Note 3). Aircraft control was erratic and consistently resulted in uncoordinated flight. Maneuvering the aircraft with regard to the engine out condition was potentially unsafe. Exceeded Q-criteria in Area 17, (Note 3). Dut Go-Around. Performed all required procedures in accordance with the flight manual and directives. Applied smooth, positive, and coordinated control inputs. Rudder and aileron inputs were in correct direction. Errors were made which did not affect safety. Aircraft control was not consistently smooth		
Q- U Area 25. Engine O Q	given to maneuvering the aircraft with regard to the engine out condition. Maintained criteria in Area 17, (Note 3). Minor deviations in aircraft control allowed the aircraft to occasionally fly in uncoordinated flight. Momentarily deviated from criteria in Area 17, (Note 3). Aircraft control was erratic and consistently resulted in uncoordinated flight. Maneuvering the aircraft with regard to the engine out condition was potentially unsafe. Exceeded Q-criteria in Area 17, (Note 3). Out Go-Around. Performed all required procedures in accordance with the flight manual and directives. Applied smooth, positive, and coordinated control inputs. Rudder and aileron inputs were in correct direction. Errors were made which did not affect safety. Aircraft control was not consistently smooth		
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U Area 25. Engine O Q	flight. Momentarily deviated from criteria in Area 17 , (Note 3). Aircraft control was erratic and consistently resulted in uncoordinated flight. Maneuvering the aircraft with regard to the engine out condition was potentially unsafe. Exceeded Q-criteria in Area 17 , (Note 3). Out Go-Around. Performed all required procedures in accordance with the flight manual and directives. Applied smooth, positive, and coordinated control inputs. Rudder and aileron inputs were in correct direction. Errors were made which did not affect safety. Aircraft control was not consistently smooth		
Area 25. Engine O	the aircraft with regard to the engine out condition was potentially unsafe. Exceeded Q-criteria in Area 17, (Note 3). Out Go-Around. Performed all required procedures in accordance with the flight manual and directives. Applied smooth, positive, and coordinated control inputs. Rudder and aileron inputs were in correct direction. Errors were made which did not affect safety. Aircraft control was not consistently smooth		
Q	criteria in Area 17, (Note 3). Out Go-Around. Performed all required procedures in accordance with the flight manual and directives. Applied smooth, positive, and coordinated control inputs. Rudder and aileron inputs were in correct direction. Errors were made which did not affect safety. Aircraft control was not consistently smooth		
Q	Put Go-Around. Performed all required procedures in accordance with the flight manual and directives. Applied smooth, positive, and coordinated control inputs. Rudder and aileron inputs were in correct direction. Errors were made which did not affect safety. Aircraft control was not consistently smooth		
Q	Performed all required procedures in accordance with the flight manual and directives. Applied smooth, positive, and coordinated control inputs. Rudder and aileron inputs were in correct direction. Errors were made which did not affect safety. Aircraft control was not consistently smooth		
	Applied smooth, positive, and coordinated control inputs. Rudder and aileron inputs were in correct direction. Errors were made which did not affect safety. Aircraft control was not consistently smooth		
Q-	correct direction. Errors were made which did not affect safety. Aircraft control was not consistently smooth		
Q-	Errors were made which did not affect safety. Aircraft control was not consistently smooth		
Q-			
	and positive. Rudder and aileron inputs were in the correct direction with some over/under		
	control.		
U	Rudder and/or aileron inputs were incorrect. Failed to perform the maneuver in accordance		
	with the flight manual and directives.		
	Emergency Procedures. (Critical)		
Q	Correct, immediate responses in the proper sequence. Maintained aircraft control.		
	Coordinated proper crew actions.		
U	Incorrect sequence, unsatisfactory response, or unsatisfactory performance of corrective actions.		
Area 27. Other Em	Area 27. Other Emergency Procedures. (If observed)		
Q	Operated within prescribed limits and correctly diagnosed problems. Performed/explained		
	proper corrective action for each type of malfunction. Effectively used available aircrew aids		
	and checklists.		
Q-	Operated within prescribed limits but was slow to analyze problems or apply proper		
	corrective actions. Did not effectively use, and/or experienced delays, omissions, or		
	deviations, in use of checklist and/or available aids.		
U	Attempted to exceed limitations and/or exceeded limitations. Unable or failed to analyze		
	problem or take proper corrective action. Did not use checklist or available aids effectively.		
Area 28. Systems Operations/Knowledge/Limitations.			
Q	Demonstrated adequate knowledge of aircraft systems and operating limitations and proper		
	procedural use of systems both with and without reference to the flight manual and/or		
	available aids.		
Q-	Marginal knowledge of aircraft systems operations and limitations in some areas. Used		
U			

Table 2.3. Instrument.

Note: 1. Use the following criteria as general tolerances for airspeed, altitude, and heading/course. 2. Airspeed			
tolerances apply v	tolerances apply when a specific airspeed has been assigned by Air Traffic Control or prescribed in the flight		
manual. 3. This	manual. 3. This criteria does not apply to landings. See specific landing area for landing tolerances.		
Q	Met the following tolerances: Airspeed: +10/-5 KIAS; Altitude: +/-100 feet;		
	Heading/Course: +/-5 degrees.		
Q-	Exceeds Q criteria but does not exceed: Airspeed: +15/-5 KIAS; Altitude: +/-200 feet;		

	H 1' /0/10.1
T T	Heading/Course: +/-10 degrees.
U	Exceeded Q- criteria.
	ent Departure/Standard Instrument Departure (SID). (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	Complied with all restrictions or controlling agency instructions. Made all required reports.
	Applied course/heading corrections promptly. Demonstrated smooth, positive control.
Q-	Minor deviations in navigation occurred during departure. Slow to comply with controlling
	agency instructions or unsure of reporting requirements. Slow to apply course/heading
	corrections. Aircraft control was not consistently smooth and positive.
U	Failed to comply with published/directed departure or controlling agency instructions.
	Accepted an inaccurate clearance. Aircraft control was erratic.
Area 30. En Rout	te Navigation/Self Contained Navigation System (SCNS).
Q	Satisfactory capability to navigate using all available means. Used appropriate navigation
	procedures. Complied with clearance instructions. Aware of position at all times. Remained
	within the confines of assigned airspace.
Q-	Minor errors in procedures/use of navigation equipment. Slow to comply with clearance
1	instructions. Had some difficulty in establishing exact position and course. Slow to adjust
	for deviations in time and course.
U	Major errors in procedures/use of navigation equipment. Could not establish position. Failed
-	to recognize checkpoints or adjust for position deviations from course. Did not remain with
	the confines of assigned airspace.
Area 31 Holding	or Procedure Turn.
Q	Performed entry and holding/procedure turn in accordance with published procedures and
Q	directives. Timing: +/-15 seconds; Distance Measuring Equipment (DME): +/-2 DME.
Q-	Performed entry and holding procedures with minor deviations. Timing: +/-20 seconds;
Q-	DME: +/-3 DME.
U	Holding/procedure turn was not in accordance with flight manual, directives, or published
U	procedures.
Araa 32 Usa of N	Vavigation Aid (NAVAIDs).
Q	Ensured NAVAIDs were properly tuned, identified, and monitored.
Q-	Some deviations in tuning, identifying, and monitoring NAVAIDs.
U	Did not ensure NAVAIDs were tuned, identified, and monitored.
Area 33. Descent	
Q	Performed descent as directed. Complied with all flight manual, controller issued or
	Standard Terminal Arrival (STAR) restrictions in a proficient manner. Accomplished all
	required checks.
Q-	Performed descent as directed with minor deviations that did not compromise mission safety.
	Slow to accomplish required checks.
U	Performed descent with major deviations. Did not accomplish required checks. Erratic
	corrections. Exceeded flight manual limitations.
	n Approaches. (Includes Precision Approach Radar (PAR) and Instrument Landing System
(ILS)) (1 Required	d). Note: 1. Use the following criteria as general tolerances for airspeed, altitude, heading,
glide slope and az	imuth. 2. Airspeed tolerances are based on computed approach speed.
Q	Met the following tolerances: Airspeed: +10/-5 KIAS; Altitude: Initiated missed approach
	at decision height +50/-0 feet; Heading: +/-5 degrees of controller's instructions (PAR);
	Glide Slope: Within one dot (ILS); Azimuth: Within one dot (ILS).
Q-	Exceeds Q criteria but does not exceed: Airspeed: +15/-5 (+10/-5) below 1000' Height
-	Above Touchdown (HAT); Altitude: Initiated missed approach at decision height +100/-0
	feet; Heading: +/-10 degrees of controller's instructions (PAR); Glide Slope: Within one dot
	low, two dots high (ILS), after runway was in sight examinee momentarily deviated below
	glidepath but corrected for a safe landing ("duck-under"); Azimuth: Within two dots (ILS).
U	Exceeded Q- criteria.
Sub Area 34A. P.	
Q	Approach was in accordance with published procedures. Smooth and timely response to
1	controller's instructions. Established initial glide path and maintained glide slope with minor

	deviations. Complied with decision height. Position would have permitted a safe landing.
	Elevation did not exceed slightly above or slightly below glide path.
Q-	Performed approach with minor deviations. Slow to respond to controller's instructions and
	make corrections. Complied with decision height. Position would have permitted a safe
	landing. Elevation did not exceed well above or well below glide path.
U	Approach not in accordance with flight manual, directives, or published procedures. Erratic
	corrections and glide path control. Did not respond to controller's instructions. Did not
	comply with decision height and/or position would not have permitted a safe landing. Erratic
	glide path control.
Sub Area 34B.	
Q	Approach was in accordance with published procedures. Smooth and timely corrections to
	azimuth and glide slope. Complied with decision height. Position would have permitted a
	safe landing. Maintained glide path with only minor deviations.
Q-	Performed approach with minor deviations. Slow to make corrections. Slow to comply with
Q	decision height. Position would have permitted a safe landing. Improper glide path control.
U	Approach not in accordance with flight manual, directives, or published procedures. Erratic
U	
	corrections and glide path control. Did not comply with decision height and/or position at
0.1.4. 240	decision height would not have permitted a safe landing.
	Non-Precision Approaches. (Includes Non-Directional Radio Beacon (NDB)), Localizer (LOC),
	quency Omni-directional Radio Beacon (VOR), Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR), Tactical Air
	stem (TACAN), and Airborne Radar Approach (ARA). (1 Required). Note: 1. Use the following
	l criteria as general tolerances for airspeed, altitude at Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA),
	e, timing and distance with all engines operating. 2. Airspeed tolerances are based on computed
approach speed	
Sub Area 35A.	NDB.
Sub Area 35B.	LOC/VOR.
Sub Area 35C.	ASR.
Sub Area 35D.	TACAN.
Sub Area 35E.	
Q	Approach was in accordance with published procedures. Used appropriate descent rate to
	arrive at Visual Descent Point (VDP) at or before the VDP. Position would have permitted a
	safe landing. Smooth and timely response to controller's/navigator's instructions
	(ASR/ARA). Met the following tolerances: Airspeed: +10/-5 KIAS; MDA: +100/-0 feet;
	Course: +/-5 degrees at Missed Approach Point (MAP) (NDB, VOR, TAC), less than one
	dot deflection (LOC); Timing: Computed/adjusted timing to determine MAP within 20
	seconds (when required); Distance: Determined MAP within +/-0.5 Nautical Mile (NM).
0	Performed approach with minor deviations. Arrived at MDA at or before the MAP, but past
Q-	
	the visual descent point. Position would have permitted a safe landing. Slow to respond to
	controller's/navigator's instructions and make corrections (ASR/ARA). Exceeded Q criteria
	but does not exceed: Airspeed: +15/-5 KIAS (+10/-5) below 300' above Threshold
	Elevation; MDA: +150/-50 feet; Course: +/-10 degrees at MAP (NDB, VOR, TAC), within
	2 dots (LOC); Timing: Computed/adjusted timing to determine MAP within 30 seconds
	(when required); Distance: Determined MAP within +1/-0.5 NM.
U	Approach not in accordance with published procedures. Maintained steady-state flight below
	the MDA, even though the -50-foot limit was not exceeded. Position would not have
	permitted a safe landing. Failed to compute or adjust timing to determine MAP (when
	required). Exceeded Q- criteria.
Area 36. Circl	ing Approach. (Weather & traffic permitting) (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	Properly identified aircraft category for the approach and remained within the lateral limits
	for that category. Complied with controller's instructions. Attained runway alignment
	without excessive bank angles. Did not descend from the MDA until in a position to place
	the aircraft on a normal glide path or execute a normal landing. Met the following tolerances:
	Airspeed +10/-5 KIAS; Altitude +100/-0 feet.
0	Deviated from established procedures but was not unsafe. Slow to comply with controller's
Q-	
	instructions. Attained runway alignment but occasionally required excessive bank angles or

	maneuvering. Exceeded Q criteria but does not exceed: Airspeed +15/-5 KIAS; Altitude +150/-50 feet.
U	Did not properly identify aircraft category or exceeded the lateral limits of circling airspace. Did not comply with controller's instructions. Excessive maneuvering to attain runway alignment was potentially unsafe. Descended from the MDA before the aircraft was in a position for a normal glide path or landing. Exceeded Q- criteria.
Area 37. Missed	Approach. (Not Required if Area 23 or Area 25 is Accomplished)
Q	Executed missed approach in accordance with published procedures. Complied with controller's instructions. Applied smooth control inputs.
Q-	Executed missed approach with minor deviations to published procedures. Slow to comply with controller's instructions. Slightly over controlled the aircraft.
U	Did not execute missed approach in accordance with flight manual, directives, or published procedures. Did not comply with controller's instructions. Deviation or misapplications of procedures could have led to an unsafe condition.

Table 2.4. Mission.

Area 38. F	ormation Takeoff. Note: Use Area 16 criteria and the following for formation takeoffs:
Q	Maintained smooth control. Properly briefed crew on appropriate abort calls. Followed established procedures.
Q-	Minor deviations to established procedures. Inputs/corrections slow when encountering
-	vortices.
U	Safe execution of the takeoff jeopardized by improper procedures. Did not use appropriate
	side of runway (Not Applicable for feed-on method).
	ormation Departure/Assembly. Note: Use Area 30 criteria and the following:
Lead Criter	ia.
Q	Flown in accordance with flight manual directives, published procedures or as pre-briefed.
	Smooth on controls. Good wingman consideration.
Q-	Minor deviations in directives, procedures or as briefed. Aircraft control was safe but not
	consistently smooth and positive. Inconsistent wingman consideration made it difficult for
	wingmen to maintain position.
U	Departure not in accordance with flight manual directives, published procedures or as pre-
	briefed. Rough on the controls. No wingman consideration.
Wingman C	
Q	Smooth on controls. Maintained position with only momentary deviations. Maintained good
	separation and complied with leader's instructions. Smooth, timely rejoin.
Q-	Minor deviations to published procedures. Over controlled the aircraft to the extent that
	formation position was somewhat inconsistent. Slow to respond to leader's instructions.
	Slow to rejoin.
U	Procedures not in accordance with flight manual directives or published procedures. Rough
	on the controls. Abrupt position corrections. Did not maintain safe separation or formation
	position. Failed to comply with leader's instructions. Unsafe rejoin.
	ormation En Route Procedures.
	ent Lead Criteria.
Q	Positive control of formation/element. Established appropriate formations. Smooth on
	controls and considered wingmen. Planned ahead and made timely decisions. Ensured
	wingmen flew proper position. Did not rush flight command indicator (FCI) test. Identified
	and complied with SKE system fault code requirements.
Q-	Minor deviations to published procedures. Limited flight management. Aircraft control was
	safe but not consistently smooth and positive. Inconsistent maneuvering made it difficult for
	wingmen to maintain position. Did not always plan ahead and/or hesitant in making
	decisions. Rushed or occasionally missed FCIs causing potential wingman confusion. Slow
II	to identify or comply with SKE system fault code requirements.
U	Procedures not in accordance with flight manual, directives, or published procedures. Did
	not establish appropriate formations. Rough on the controls. Erratic maneuvering caused

	wingmen to breakout or over- run formation. Little consideration for wingmen. Indecisive.
	Failed to ensure wingmen maintained proper position. Placed formation/wingmen in unsafe
	position or circumstances. Consistently missed FCIs. Did not identify or failed to comply
	with SKE system fault code requirements.
Wingman C	riteria.
Q	Maintained position with only momentary deviations. Smooth and immediate position
	corrections. Maintained safe separation and complied with leader's instructions. Smooth
	timely rejoin. Identified and complied with FCIs and SKE system fault code requirements.
Q-	Minor deviations to published procedures. Slow to comply with leader's instructions. Varied
	position considerably. Over controlled. Slow to rejoin. Occasionally missed or slow to
	respond to FCIs or SKE system fault code requirements.
U	Procedures not in accordance with flight manual, directives, or published procedures. Did
	not comply with leader's instructions. Unable to maintain formation position. Abrupt
	position corrections. Did not maintain safe separation. Unsafe rejoin. Did not identify or
	comply with FCIs or SKE system fault code requirements.
Area 41. Er	n-route Navigation. Use Area 30 criteria.
	isual/SKE Procedures.
Q	Flown in accordance with flight manual directives, published procedures or as pre-briefed.
Q	Smooth on controls. For single-ship procedures, stayed abreast of time status, worked with
	crew to determine corrective action and able to verbalize corrective action for gaining or
	losing time.
0	Minor deviations in directives, procedures or as briefed. Aircraft control was safe but not
Q-	consistently smooth and positive. For single-ship procedures, limited ability to make Time
	Over Target (TOT) adjustments.
TI	
U	Not flown in accordance with flight manual directives, published procedures or as pre-
	briefed. Rough on the controls. For single-ship procedures, exceeded TOT criteria due to
A 42 F	poor procedures or technique; made no attempt to maintain or recover TOT.
Area 43. Ta	
Q	Demonstrated thorough knowledge of mission analysis and tactics selection. Integrated and
	applied appropriate tactics to the mission/threat scenario. Made timely and appropriate inputs
	to crew and other aircraft/supporting agencies (as applicable) during mission.
Q-	Minor errors in mission analysis and tactics selection. Minor errors in integrating or applying
	appropriate tactics application to the mission/threat scenario. Did not make timely and
	appropriate inputs to crew and other aircraft/supporting agencies (as applicable) during
	mission.
U	Unsatisfactory tactics knowledge. Major errors in mission analysis and tactics selection or
	application that would have resulted in mission failure. Major errors in timely and
	appropriate inputs to crew and other aircraft/supporting agencies (as applicable) that would
	have resulted in mission failure. Did not integrate a mission or threat scenario into evaluation.
Area 44. De	efensive Systems/Threat Avoidance.
Q	Demonstrated thorough knowledge of defensive systems, defensive tactics, and threat
	reactions. Demonstrated threat mitigation and avoidance tactics applicable to the mission.
	Able to plot threats in-flight and formulate a plan of action to avoid a given threat. Made
	timely and accurate inputs to crew while integrating defensive systems during threat
	avoidance. Executed the proper evasive maneuver when given an immediate threat.
Q-	Limited knowledge of defensive systems, defensive tactics, and threat reactions. Minor
	errors in threat mitigation and avoidance tactics applicable to the mission. Minor errors in
	plotting and avoiding a given threat. Minor errors in timely and accurate inputs to crew while
	integrating defensive systems during threat avoidance. Minor errors in executing the proper
	evasive maneuver when given an immediate threat.
U	Unsatisfactory knowledge of defensive systems, defensive tactics, and threat reactions.
	Major errors in threat mitigation or avoidance tactics. Unable to plot threats. Did not avoid a
	given threat. Major errors in timely and accurate inputs to crew while integrating defensive
	systems during threat avoidance that would have resulted in mission failure. Did not execute
	proper evasive maneuver when given an immediate threat.
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

Area 45. Slov	
Q	Thorough knowledge of slowdown procedures. Complied with all published/briefed
	procedures.
Q-	Limited knowledge of slowdown procedures. Minor deviations did not affect mission
	accomplishment or formation integrity.
U	Unsatisfactory knowledge of slowdown procedures. Major deviations adversely affected
	mission accomplishment or formation integrity.
Area 46. Dro	p Zone (DZ) Alignment.
Q	Correctly identified the DZ and made appropriate corrections to fine-tune track. Track was in
	accordance with mission plan or as updated by crew. Flew the aircraft to an optimum DZ/LZ
	alignment from slowdown through escape/landing (+/- 10° of drift killed axis). Met the
	following tolerances: Airspeed +/-5 knots; Altitude +50/-0 feet.
Q-	Identified the DZ late despite clear marking and sufficient landmarks. Alignment was
	satisfactory but tended to angle. Slow in establishing or maintaining effective DZ/LZ
	alignment (11° - 15° of drift killed axis) but did not adversely impact mission
	accomplishment or formation integrity. Exceeded Q criteria but does not exceed: Airspeed
	+10/-5 knots; Altitude +100/-50 feet.
U	Unable to identify DZ due to poor technique or pilot error. Failed to fly proper alignment or
	unaware of alignment error, which resulted in an unsuccessful airdrop/no-drop condition or
	adversely affected the formation. Mission not accomplished due to poor DZ acquisition,
	alignment, or deviation from procedures, caused by pilot error or omission. Did not
Amaa 17 Aim	recognize a no-drop situation. Exceeded Q- criteria.
	Irop Procedures. Met the following telegrapes: Airgneed 1/5 VIAS: Altitude 150/0 feet
Q	Met the following tolerances: Airspeed +/-5 KIAS; Altitude +50/-0 feet.
Q- U	Exceeds Q criteria but does not exceed: Airspeed +10/-5 KIAS; Altitude +100/-50 feet.
	Did not recognize a no-drop situation. Exceeded Q- criteria.
Area 48. Esc	
Q	Escape and recovery executed in accordance with published or briefed procedures.
Q-	Minor errors in escape and/or recovery procedures that did not affect mission accomplishment.
U	Major deviations from procedures that negatively affected mission accomplishment,
U	formation integrity or flight safety.
Area 40 Hig	h/Low Altitude Tactical Arrival.
Q	Followed procedures as briefed. Correctly calculated initial descent point based on the
Q	altitude at which the approach began. Smooth positive control throughout the recovery.
	Aircraft in position to intercept glidepath to intended touchdown point. Constantly cleared
	area of intended flight.
Q-	Performed recovery with minor deviations to published procedures. Aircraft control was not
~	consistently positive and smooth. Over/under-shot final approach slightly but was able to
	intercept glidepath to intended touchdown point.
U	Recovery not performed in accordance with flight manual directives or published procedures.
	Displayed erratic aircraft control. Over/under-shot final approach requiring a go-around or
	potentially unsafe maneuvering to intercept final. Did not clear area of intended flight.
Area 50. For	mation Recovery.
Q	(Visual) Rolled out on final in position to intercept glide path to touchdown. (SKE) Aircraft
-	in position to fly a normal glidepath to touchdown at the decision height (DH)/missed
	approach point (MAP).
Q-	(Visual) Rolled out on final high or drug-in but able to make a normal landing. Slow to
-	recognize need for an unplanned go-around. Slow to initiate unplanned go-around.
	Unplanned go-around due to poor pilot procedure or technique. (SKE) Slow to identify the
	need for an unplanned go-around. Slow to initiate an unplanned go-around.
U	(Visual) Rolled out on final in position requiring go-around due to poor pilot procedure or
	technique. Did not initiate unplanned go-around when required. (SKE) Missed
	Approach/Go-Around required due to poor pilot procedures or technique. Did not identify
	need for an unplanned go-around. Did not initiate an unplanned go-around when required.

	ormation Landing. (Weather & traffic permitting) (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed) Note: Use teria and the following:
Q	Held formation position throughout landing. Followed briefed procedures for reversing and
Q-	braking. Aircraft approach separation exceeded 9,000 feet for SKE or 30 seconds for visual landings.
U	Long landing interval did not cause following aircraft to execute go-around/missed approach. Attempted to touchdown with aircraft approach separation less than 5,000 feet (SKE) or 15
	seconds (visual) spacing from the previous aircraft. Long landing interval caused following aircraft to execute go-around/missed approach. Did not follow briefed reversing and braking
Area 52 Fl	procedures. ight Leadership. (Flight and Element Lead)
Q	Demonstrated satisfactory knowledge of threat analysis and route construction. Applied
*	appropriate tactics to avoid the threat and minimize exposure. Correctly planned the route of
	flight, with emphasis on obstruction clearance. Made timely and appropriate inputs to
	target/crew study. Thoroughly coordinated mission with other agencies, if applicable.
	Relayed all flight commands consistent with procedures, briefings, and threat. Passed
	information to formation aircraft in a timely manner. Provided positive guidance in leading
	the formation. Stayed abreast of time status and worked with crew to determine corrective
	action. Able to verbalize corrective action for gaining or losing time.
Q-	Minor errors in route construction, threat analysis or tactics selection. Unfamiliar with
	appropriate tactic for a given scenario. Minor errors in providing signals or signals not given
	appropriately for type formation or threat. Flight profile inconsistent but did not jeopardize
	safety of follower aircraft. Provided minimal leadership in the conduct of the flight. Limited
	ability to make TOT adjustments.
U	Made major errors in threat analysis or route construction. Could not safely fly planned
	profile. Unable to locate classified threat parameters. Did not contact appropriate agencies.
	Poor planning resulted in an unsuccessful mission. Did not pass critical information to other
	aircraft in-flight. Mission unsuccessful because of examinee's lack of performance and/or
	leadership. Exceeded TOT criteria due to poor procedures or technique; made no attempt to
	maintain or recover TOT.
	fax Effort Procedures.
Q	Displayed satisfactory knowledge of max-effort procedures. Could describe and apply terms
	such as acceleration check speed, minimum field length for maximum effort takeoff, three-
	engine Vmca, etc. Thoroughly analyzed departure/landing runway and surrounding terrain.
	Reviewed all applicable TOLD and thoroughly briefed crew.
Q-	Minor deviations in knowledge or published procedures. Minor errors in describing or
**	applying above terms. Minor errors or omissions in TOLD or crew briefing.
U	Procedures not in accordance with flight manual directives or published procedures. Unable
	to analyze assault zone constraints or verbalize concerns posed by terrain or other factors.
	Could not describe or apply above terms. Major errors in TOLD review or crew briefing.
A 5.4 M	Unsatisfactory knowledge of max-effort procedures.
	ax Effort Takeoff.
Q	Maintained smooth positive control throughout departure roll and takeoff. Climbed on speed
0	and decreased angle of attack as required once clear of obstacle.
Q-	Control inputs were safe but not consistently smooth and positive. Minor deviations from published/briefed procedures did not jeopardize safety.
U	Takeoff not in accordance with flight manual directives or published procedures. Did not use
U	Vmca when conditions permitted. Raised flaps too quickly in relation to airspeed.
	Performance of maneuver jeopardized safety.
Area 55 M	ax Effort Landing.
Q	Maintained smooth approach path. Maintained constant aim point or made positive
V	corrections. Touched down on centerline within the zone (defined as the first 500 feet of
	usable runway) without excessive bouncing or crab. Maintained runway centerline during
	roll out. Met the following tolerances: Airspeed +/- 5 knots.
Q-	Minor deviations to published procedures. Aim point wandered or corrections were not
ν	17111101 deviations to paorished procedures. Anni point wandered of corrections were not

	smooth or timely. Landed in zone but with some bounce or crab. Touchdown was no more
	than 10 feet from centerline. Exceeded Q criteria but does not exceed: Airspeed +10/-5
	knots.
U	Touchdown short of the landing zone. Touchdown beyond the landing zone and did not
	execute a go-around. Exceeded Q- criteria.
Area 56. NVG U	sage/Limitations. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	Correctly described the use/limitations of night vision goggles (NVGs). Proper preflight,
	handling and use of NVGs during the flight.
Q-	Made minor omissions or deviations in describing the use/limitations of NVGs. Did not properly preflight, handle or use NVGs during the flight, but caused no serious damage to equipment. Mission success not negatively affected.
U	Procedures for using NVGs were incorrect. Caused damage to equipment. Mission
C	unsuccessful because of improper NVG usage.
Area 57 NVG I	anding. Use same criteria as Area 21 (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
	Arrival (TOA) Control. (Airland/Max-Effort only crews)
Q	Met the following tolerances: +/- 5 minutes.
Q-	Met the following tolerances: +/- 7 minutes. Met the following tolerances: +/- 7 minutes.
U	Exceeded Q- criteria.
	A. (LC-130H only).
Q	Made smooth and timely corrections. Maintained positive aircraft control throughout the
Q	approach.
Q-	Performed procedures with minor deviations. Slow to make corrections. Aircraft control
Q-	was not consistently smooth and positive.
U	ARA not in accordance with flight manual, directives, or published procedures. Made erratic
O	corrections. Jeopardized safety.
Area 60 Ski Lan	ding. (LC-130H only).
Q	Performed the ski landing as directed. Maintained positive aircraft control throughout the
Q	landing. Touchdown was within the first one-third of the skiway.
Q-	Performed procedure with minor deviations. Slow to make corrections. Aircraft control was
	not consistently smooth and positive. Touchdown was within the first one-third of the
	skiway.
U	Landing not in accordance with flight manual, directives, or published procedures. Made erratic corrections throughout the maneuver. Touchdown was not within the first one-third of the skiway. Jeopardized safety.
Aron 61 Ski Tok	eoff. (LC-130H only)
Q	Performed the takeoff as directed. Maintained awareness of prevailing wind and surface
Q	conditions. Exercised good judgment in use of available ski surface.
Q-	Performed procedure with minor deviations. Made slightly erratic or inappropriate
	corrections throughout the takeoff. Limited awareness of wind and/or surface conditions
	resulted in a less than optimum takeoff.
U	Takeoff not in accordance with flight manual, directives, or published procedures. Made
	erratic or inappropriate corrections throughout the takeoff. Lack of awareness of wind and/or
	surface conditions jeopardized safety.
Area 62. Ski Mis	sion Procedures. (LC-130H only) (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	Fully knowledgeable of ski mission procedures. Performed all associated mission checklists
	and mission operations in accordance with directives. Demonstrated satisfactory knowledge
	of ski mission events.
Q-	Limited knowledge of ski mission procedures. Minor deviations, errors or omissions on
	mission checklists but did not adversely affect mission accomplishment.
U	Inadequate knowledge of ski mission procedures. Made significant errors, deviations and/or omissions in mission checklists that did or would have adversely affected the safe or timely
	accomplishment of the mission.

Table 2.5. Instructor.

Area 63. Instructor Ability. (Critical)	
Q	Demonstrated the ability to communicate effectively. Provided appropriate guidance when
	necessary. Planned ahead and made timely decisions. Identified and corrected potentially
	unsafe maneuvers/situations.
U	Unable to effectively communicate or provide timely feedback to the student. Did not
	provide corrective action when necessary. Did not plan ahead or anticipate student problems.
	Did not identify unsafe maneuvers/situations in a timely manner. Made no attempt to
	instruct.
Area 64. Instructo	
Q	Effectively demonstrated correct procedures, systems operation, or flight maneuvers.
	Thorough knowledge of applicable aircraft systems, procedures, publications, and directives.
Q-	Minor discrepancies in the above criteria did not affect safety or adversely affect student
T.T.	progress.
U	Ineffective or incorrect demonstration of procedures, systems operation, or flight maneuvers.
	Insufficient depth of knowledge about applicable aircraft systems, procedures and/or proper source material.
A	
	Briefing/Critique. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	Briefings were well organized, accurate and thorough. Reviewed student's present level of training and defined mission events to be performed. Demonstrated the ability during the
	critique to reconstruct the flight, offer mission analysis and provide guidance where
	appropriate. Training grade reflected the actual performance of the student relative to the
	standard. Pre-briefed the student's next mission, if required.
Q-	Briefings were adequate but lacked clarity. Student critique was accurate but lacked the
~	depth needed to maximize the learning opportunity. Briefing was complete with only minor
	discrepancies overlooked or omitted.
U	Briefings were unsatisfactory or non-existent. Did not review student's past performance.
	Failed to adequately critique student or analyze the mission. Training grade did not reflect
	actual performance of student. Overlooked or omitted major discrepancies. Incomplete pre-
	briefing of student's next mission, if required.
Area 66. Knowled	dge of Training Forms. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	All required forms were complete, accurate, readable, accomplished on time and in
	accordance with applicable directives. Demonstrated satisfactory knowledge of
	forms/publications required for mission accomplishment. Training documentation was
	concise and readable.
Q-	Minor errors on forms and/or flight plans did not affect conduct of the mission. Improperly
	reported some information due to minor errors, omissions and/or deviations. Minor errors or
	omissions in training documentation.
U	Did not accomplish required forms in accordance with applicable directives. Omitted or
	incorrectly reported significant information due to major errors, omissions and/or deviations.

Table 2.6. OME.

Area 67. Aircraft Commander Responsibilities.	
Q	Effectively determined equipment required for mission and coordinated for waiver to operate with degraded capability, if required. Consistently decided to start, continue, or delay mission based on input from appropriate sources. Kept command and control (C2) agencies
	apprised of mission status changes. Effectively coordinated support activities to ensure timely mission activity flow.
Q-	Occasionally misinterpreted maintenance status regarding mission requirements but did not significantly impact mission accomplishment. Unsure of procedures to obtain waiver to operate with degraded capability. Slow to make decisions regarding mission continuation. Did not consistently communicate status and intentions to C2 functions. Poor coordination with support agencies disrupted mission flow.

U	Unable to determine equipment or waiver required for mission performance. Failed to make proper decision to start, continue or delay mission and/or did not communicate mission-essential information to C2 agencies. Ineffective support function coordination precluded mission accomplishment.
Area 68. Aircrew	•
Q	Continually coordinated crew activities during flight (e.g., work/rest plans) to maximize mission effectiveness.
Q-	Slow to coordinate crew activities before and during flight or ineffective use of crew resources negatively impacting mission effectiveness. Slow to plan or coordinate arrival and departure activities, deviations occurred, but did not preclude successful arrival(s) or departure(s).
U	Failed to coordinate crew activities during flight such that mission accomplishment was not possible.
Area 69. Mission	Management.
Q	Monitored mission progress and aware of possible impacts at all times. Coordinated requirements and intentions to C2 agencies in accordance with directives. Effective planning and coordination provided for smooth arrival(s) and departure(s).
Q-	Had difficulty recognizing or planning for unexpected occurrences that may affect mission. Late communication with C2 agencies. Slow to plan or coordinate arrival and departure activities, deviations occurred, but did not preclude successful arrival(s) or departure(s).
U	Did not communicate with destination C2 agencies, significantly affecting mission performance. Failed to recognize impact of changing circumstances on mission performance or did not adequately adapt to complete the mission.
Q Q	ht/Remain Over Night (RON) Procedures. Accomplished all post-flight activities in a timely manner. Coordinated with C2 agencies for subsequent mission taskings. Managed crew activities during crew rest to provide necessary rest and crewmember availability.
Q- U	Slow to perform post-flight duties. Marginal coordination with C2 agencies.
	Could not accomplish post-flight duties without impacting subsequent mission. Failed to coordinate mission requirements and/or taskings with C2 agencies. Poor management of crew during crew rest phase, which impacted (delayed) the aircrew's availability.
	cation/Aircraft Security.
Q	Demonstrated thorough knowledge of authentication documents and procedures. Ensured aircraft security in accordance with published directives and/or mission tasking requirements.
Q-	Displayed satisfactory knowledge of authentication documents and procedures. Limited understanding of aircraft security requirements but complied with basic security directives.
U	Unable to demonstrate proper use of authentication materials. Unaware of requirements for aircraft security. Did not ensure basic security measures taken.

Chapter 3

NAVIGATOR EVALUATIONS

- **3.1. General.** This chapter standardizes initial, periodic and re-qualification evaluations, including requirements for qualification, mission, and instructor evaluations.
- **3.2.** Qualification Evaluations (Initial, Periodic and Re-qualification). On a Class I or II route of no less than 1.5 hours, the examinee must demonstrate proficiency in navigation procedures. (T-2) All General and Qualification areas/sub areas are required qualification evaluation items unless otherwise specified in **Attachment 4**. In addition, navigators will also take the open-book written instrument examination. This will be documented on the ground phase portion of the AF Form 8. (T-2)
 - 3.2.1. Simulator Evaluations. Navigators may accomplish initial or periodic qualification evaluations or the qualification portion of a combined QUAL/MSN evaluation in an Operational Flight Trainer, WST, or Satellite Navigation Station. Basic Qualified Navigators (FN) must accomplish, at a minimum, every other QUAL evaluation in the aircraft. (T-2)
 - 3.2.2. Airborne Radar Approach (ARA). The ARA is considered part of a navigator's basic qualification. It will, however, be evaluated on both the qualification and mission evaluation (only one required if doing a combination evaluation). (T-2) State that an ARA was evaluated in the comments section of the AF Form 8. A navigator graded U in the ARA area may not fly unsupervised on any flight until successful re-accomplishment. The ARA may not be verbally evaluated.
 - 3.2.3. Grid Navigation. After initial Grid certification, evaluate Grid procedures on all periodic qualification evaluations. State, "Grid procedures were evaluated," in the comments section of the AF Form 8. At the discretion of the flight examiner, a navigator graded U in the Grid area may continue to fly unsupervised on non-Grid missions.
 - 3.2.4. Navigator Senior Officer. Evaluate appropriate areas in GENERAL and QUALIFICATION. This evaluation can be completed in the Operational Flight Trainer, WST, Satellite Navigation Station, or the aircraft. See AFMAN 11-202V1 Senior Officer Qualification and Performance Requirements and AFMAN 11-2C-130HV1 Senior Officer Qualification Training Requirements for additional information.
 - 3.2.4.1. For Senior Officer Course B, annotate AF Form 8 as a QUAL evaluation with expiration date, crew position is "FN" and include a restriction in the comment section, "Fly only under direct supervision of a qualified C-130 instructor navigator."
 - 3.2.4.2. For Senior Officer Course C, annotate AF Form 8 as a restricted QUAL (NVG AL) with expiration date, crew position is "FN".
- **3.3. Mission Evaluations (Initial, Periodic and Re-qualification).** Mission evaluations fall into one of three categories: formation airdrop, single-ship airdrop or airland. Mission evaluations may be accomplished in the WST with prior permission from AMC/A3V.
 - 3.3.1. Units and/or aircrew with a combat mission evaluation requirement (regardless of the type of mission being flown) will be evaluated on **Area 31** (Tactics) and **Area 32** (Defensive Systems/Threat Avoidance). (**T-2**) At a minimum, all mission evaluations will include the following: (**T-2**)

- 3.3.1.1. Mission Scenario. A mission scenario identifies the overall battle picture and details the specific airdrop and/or airland requirement.
- 3.3.1.2. Threat Scenario. The threat scenario identifies and incorporates a specific threat system(s) that integrates into the overall mission scenario.
- 3.3.1.3. Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP's). Incorporate TTPs that allow for effective execution of the mission scenario and best mitigate the threat system(s) selected.
- 3.3.2. Formation Airdrop. The airdrop profile will (as a minimum) consist of a visual route or a SKE route flown to an airdrop and a TOT. (**T-2**) A TOT must be accomplished during flight and will not be verbally debriefed. (**T-2**) Type of route flown will be alternated on recurring mission evaluations. For example, if a visual route is flown this time, then a SKE route must be flown next time. (**T-2**) The navigator will be unqualified in the C-130H mission if he/she goes for greater than two evaluation cycles without accomplishing both of these events. (**T-2**) The evaluator and examinee will ensure the correct profile to be evaluated prior to flight. Units may require both types to be flown. (**T-3**) All General and Mission areas/sub areas are required evaluation items unless otherwise specified in **Attachment 4**. Formation Airdrop mission evaluations will not be accomplished in the WST due to airdrop scoring limitations. (**T-2**)

3.3.2.1. Non-Lead Navigator.

- 3.3.2.1.1. Visual route: Accomplish an unfamiliar visual tactical route in the lead position or single ship. The visual route should culminate in a mission computer airdrop (MCAD) airdrop verified visually. Formal school student evaluations may consider any visual route unfamiliar.
- 3.3.2.1.2. SKE Route: If RVAD certified, the SKE route will be accomplished in the wing position and should culminate in an MCAD airdrop verified via RVAD. (**T-2**) If not RVAD certified, the SKE route will be accomplished in the wing position and should culminate in an MCAD airdrop verified via SKE timing. (**T-2**)

3.3.2.2. Element Lead Navigator.

- 3.3.2.2.1. Visual route: Accomplish an unfamiliar visual tactical route in the lead position or single ship. (**T-2**) The visual route should culminate in an MCAD airdrop verified visually. Formal school student evaluations may consider any visual route unfamiliar.
- 3.3.2.2.2. SKE Route: If RVAD certified, the SKE route will be accomplished in the element lead position and should culminate in an MCAD airdrop verified via RVAD. (T-2) If not RVAD certified, the SKE route will be accomplished in the element lead position and should culminate in an MCAD airdrop verified via SKE timing. (T-2)
- 3.3.2.3. Formation Lead Navigator. The lead navigator should participate in the mission commander duties. The SKE portion must be planned and briefed as a 2-ship (minimum) but may be flown single ship (at the discretion of the evaluator). **(T-3)**
 - 3.3.2.3.1. Visual route: Accomplish an unfamiliar visual tactical route in the lead position or single ship. **(T-2)** The visual route should culminate in an MCAD airdrop verified visually.

- 3.3.2.3.2. SKE Route: If RVAD certified, the SKE route will be accomplished in the lead or element lead position and should culminate in an MCAD airdrop verified via RVAD. (T-2) If not RVAD certified, the SKE route will be accomplished in the element lead position and should culminate in an MCAD airdrop verified visually. (T-2)
- 3.3.2.4. An unfamiliar route is defined as a route not flown by the examinee in the previous six months. Run-in should be at least 15 degrees different from normal run-in heading. Visual routes should be NVG routes.
- 3.3.3. Single-Ship Airdrop. The airdrop profile will (as a minimum) consist of a visual route or a SKE route flown to an airdrop and a Time Over Target (TOT). (T-2) A TOT must be accomplished during flight and will not be verbally debriefed. (T-2) Units may require both types to be flown. Visual routes will be planned in accordance with **paragraph 3.3.2.3**. All General and Mission areas/sub areas except **Area 35** and **Area 45** are required evaluation items unless otherwise specified in **Attachment 4**. (T-2) Single-ship Airdrop mission evaluations will not be accomplished in the WST due to airdrop scoring limitations. (T-2)
- 3.3.4. Airland. The airland profile will consist of an IFR or VFR route (minimum of 20 minutes long and greater than MEA, MOCA, OROCA, or ORTCA) to a tactical approach and landing with controlled TOA landing time. (**T-2**) All General and Mission areas/sub areas except Areas 35, 36, 41, 42 and 45 are required evaluation items unless otherwise specified in **Attachment 4**. Airland mission evaluations may be accomplished in the WST.
- 3.3.5. Combined QUAL/MSN Evaluation. The QUAL/MSN evaluation is not mandatory for mission qualified navigators but may be used to reduce the number of evaluations given during a 17-month cycle, while focusing on the most essential areas of the navigation process. The QUAL/MSN evaluation will consist of an airland planning portion (to include applicable open/closed book tests/Instrument Refresher Course/EPE/Boldface requisites) and the mission planning followed by the flight evaluation as defined above. (T-2) An ARA will be flown. (T-2) The overwater planning scenario should be completed prior to the mission flight evaluation. The evaluator will present an overwater planning scenario based on a realistic operational mission scenario that will drive the airland mission planning. (T-2) Evaluators will examine airland mission planning to include all applicable navigation procedures (route selection, flight in formation, publication review, flight plan, chart preparation, weather consideration, preflight fuel planning, equal time point computation, coast in/out procedures, deviation checks, aircraft position fixes, log work, dead reckoning, fuel management, departure, and arrival). (T-2)
 - 3.3.5.1. The low-level mission planning will be completed prior to the mission evaluation. **(T-2)** The flying phase of the mission will remain as currently defined. **(T-2)**
 - 3.3.5.2. During the airland/mission planning phases and flight debrief, the evaluator may ask the examinee to demonstrate navigation procedures pertaining to airland and/or mission planning.
- **3.4.** Instructor Evaluations (Initial, Periodic and Re-qualification). Flight examiners will place particular emphasis on the examinee's ability to recognize student difficulties and provide timely, effective corrective action. (T-3) State in the comments section of the AF Form 8 that instructional abilities were evaluated. List a minimum of two areas instructed by the examinee,

these areas should be different from the previous evaluation. If the instructor taught throughout the entire mission and there were numerous areas in which instructional ability was demonstrated, one general comment will suffice. (T-3)

- 3.4.1. If mission qualified, all initial and re-qualification instructor evaluations require the examinee to instruct a mission sortie as defined above in **paragraph 3.3.2.**, **paragraph 3.3.3**, and **paragraph 3.3.4**.
- 3.4.2. All instructor areas/sub areas are required instructor evaluation items on all flight evaluations.
- 3.4.3. Initial and re-qualification instructor evaluations may be accomplished in the WST.

3.5. Emergency Procedures Evaluation (EPE).

- 3.5.1. The EPE on qualification evaluations should cover the following areas: emergency signals, SCNS; ground emergencies; in-flight emergencies (fuselage fire/smoke and fumes elimination, in-flight door warning, rapid decompression, bailout procedures); landing emergencies (landing gear retracted, ditching).
- 3.5.2. On mission evaluations, the EPE should cover airdrop emergency procedures, defensive system operation, threat interpretation and evasive action.

3.5.3. Grade EPEs as follows:

- 3.5.3.1. Q1 Correctly analyzed, stated, and understood aircraft/airdrop emergencies. Completed/can complete the proper action in the correct sequence (not a verbatim response). Properly utilized TO emergency procedure sections.
- 3.5.3.2. Q2 Correctly analyzed and understood aircraft/airdrop emergencies but had difficulty performing/stating required procedures to correct the emergency/malfunction. Had limited knowledge of TO emergency procedure sections. Requires additional training.
- 3.5.3.3. Q3 Failed to analyze, state and did not understand aircraft/airdrop emergencies and/or could not perform required procedures to correct the emergency/malfunction. Could not utilize TO emergency procedure sections. Requires additional training.

3.6. Navigator Grading Criteria.

Table 3.1. General.

Area 1. Directives	Area 1. Directives/Publications/Personal and Professional Equipment.	
Q	Possessed an adequate knowledge of all applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs and FAA/ICAO directives. Required publications (paper or electronic) were current and properly posted. Had all required personal/professional equipment. Displayed satisfactory knowledge of the care and use of such equipment. Required equipment inspections were current.	
Q-	Possessed a limited knowledge of applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs and FAA/ICAO directives but could locate the information in appropriate publications. Publications were current but improperly posted.	
U	Unaware of applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs and FAA/ICAO directives and/or could not locate them in the appropriate publication in a timely manner. Required publications (paper or electronic) were not current. Did not have required personal/professional equipment. Required equipment inspections were overdue or equipment was unserviceable.	
Area 2. Mission Preparation/Planning/Performance.		

0	Charled all factors applicable to flight such as weather NOTAMs alternate sirfields
Q	Checked all factors applicable to flight such as: weather, NOTAMs, alternate airfields,
	airfield suitability, fuel requirements, charts, etc. Adequate knowledge of performance
0	capabilities and operating data. Attended required briefings.
Q-	Made minor errors or omissions in checking all factors that could have detracted from
	mission effectiveness. Limited knowledge of performance capabilities or approved operating
**	procedures/rules. Late for required briefings.
U	Made major errors or omissions that would have prevented a safe or effective mission.
	Unsatisfactory knowledge of performance capabilities and/or operating data. Performance
	calculations exceeded Q- limits. Failed to attend required briefings.
Area 3. Briefing	
Q	Contributed to the briefing content to ensure it included all applicable information. Briefings
	effectively organized and presented in a logical sequence. Covered all pertinent items.
	Effectively used available briefing aids.
Q-	Allowed omission of items pertinent but not critical to the mission. Briefings lacked
	continuity or contained unnecessary repetition. Some difficulty communicating clearly. Did
	not make effective use of available briefing aids. Dwelled on non-essential items.
U	Failed to conduct/attend required briefings. Failed to use briefing aids. Omitted essential
	items or did not correct erroneous information that could affect mission accomplishment.
	Demonstrated lack of knowledge of subject. Briefing poorly organized and not presented in a
	logical sequence, resulting in confusion. Presented erroneous information that would affect
	safe/effective mission accomplishment.
Area 4. Use of C	
Q	Consistently used and called for the correct checklist and gave the correct response at the
	appropriate time throughout the mission.
Q-	Checklist responses were untimely and/or crewmember required continual prompting for
· ·	correct response.
U	Used or called for incorrect checklist or consistently omitted checklist items. Unable to
	identify the correct checklist to use for a given situation. Did not complete checklist prior to
	event.
Area 5 Safety (Consciousness. (Critical)
Q	Aware of and complied with all safety factors required for safe aircraft operation and mission
· ·	accomplishment.
U	Not aware of or did not comply with all safety factors required for safe aircraft operation or
	mission accomplishment. Operated aircraft in a dangerous manner.
Area 6 Flight D	Discipline. (Critical)
Q	Exhibited strict flight and crew discipline. Prepared and completed mission in compliance
Q	with published instructions and directives.
U	Failed to exhibit strict flight and crew discipline. Failed to comply with published
U	
A 7 C C	instructions and directives which did or could have jeopardized safety or mission success.
	pordination/Management/Crew Resource Management (CRM)/Threat and Error Management
	MAN 11-290, applicable MAJCOM Supplement, and AF Form 4031.
Q	Proactively applied appropriate/established CRM skills and TEM concepts throughout the
	flight/mission. Ensured safe/effective mission accomplishment by anticipating, recognizing,
	and mitigating relevant threats. Identified and mitigated own and other crewmembers' errors
	via the proper use of monitoring/crosschecking procedures and through the employment of
	applicable, established VVM practices/procedures.
Q-	Reactively and inconsistently, or inadequately applied appropriate/established CRM skills
	and TEM concepts but did not allow those deficiencies to detract from mission
	accomplishment and/or flight safety. Unreliably and/or inadequately anticipated, identified,
	or mitigated relevant threats and/or own or other crewmembers' inconsequential errors.
U	Did not apply appropriate/established CRM skills and TEM concepts to ensure safe/effective
	mission accomplishment. Failed to anticipate, identify, or mitigate relevant threats and/or
	own or other crewmembers' consequential errors.
Area 8. Commu	nication Procedures.
Q	Adequate knowledge of and compliance with correct communications procedures. Makes

	radio and interphone transmissions concise with proper terminology.	
Q-	Occasional deviations from procedures required re-transmissions or resetting codes. Slow in	
	initiating or missed several required radio/interphone calls. Transmissions contained	
	extraneous matter, were not in proper sequence or used non-standard terminology.	
U	Incorrect procedures or poor performance caused confusion and jeopardized mission	
	accomplishment. Omitted numerous radio/interphone calls.	
Area 9. Life Support Systems/Egress.		
Q	Displayed thorough knowledge of location and use of life support systems and equipment.	
	Demonstrated and emphasized the proper operating procedures used to operate aircraft egress	
	devices such as doors, windows, hatches, life rafts and escape ropes.	
Q-	Limited knowledge of location and use of life support systems and equipment. Unsure of the	
	proper operating procedures used to operate some of the aircraft egress devices.	
U	Displayed unsatisfactory knowledge of location and use of life support systems and	
	equipment. Unsatisfactory knowledge of aircraft egress procedures.	
Area 10. Knowled	ge/Completion of Forms.	
Q	All required forms and/or flight plans were complete, accurate, readable, accomplished on	
	time and in accordance with applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs and	
	FAA/ICAO directives. Relayed an accurate, timely debrief of significant events to applicable	
	agencies (intelligence, maintenance, etc.).	
Q-	Minor errors on forms and/or flight plans did not affect conduct of the mission. Improperly	
	reported some information due to minor errors, omissions and/or deviations.	
U	Did not accomplish required forms and/or flight plans in accordance with applicable	
	directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs and FAA/ICAO directives. Omitted or incorrectly	
	reported significant information due to major errors, omissions and/or deviations.	
Area 11. Airmans	hip/Situational Awareness. (Critical)	
Q	Maintained situational awareness and exercised sound judgment throughout the mission.	
	Conducted the flight with a sense of understanding and comprehension. Prioritized tasks	
	properly.	
U	Lacked situational awareness. Faulty judgment resulted in decisions that had negative	
	mission impact. Lacks the skills to prioritize tasks. Unaware of significant events that	
	impacted the mission.	

Table 3.2. Qualification.

Area 12. Boldface Emergency Procedures. (Critical)		
Q	Correct, timely responses in the proper sequence. Maintained aircraft control.	
	Coordinated proper crew actions.	
U	Incorrect sequence, unsatisfactory response, or unsatisfactory performance of corrective	
	actions.	
Area 13. Other Emergency Procedures. (If observed)		
Q	Operated within prescribed limits and correctly diagnosed problems.	
	Performed/explained proper corrective action for each type of malfunction. Effectively	
	used available aids.	
Q-	Operated within prescribed limits but was slow to analyze problems or apply proper	
	corrective actions. Did not effectively use, omitted, or deviated in use of checklist	
	and/or available aids.	
U	Exceeded limitations. Unable or failed to analyze problem or take proper corrective	
	action. Did not use checklist and/or available aids.	
Area 14. Flight Plan/Charts.		
Q	Constructed a flight plan (either manually or using certified computer flight planning	
	programs) in its entirety with time errors not exceeding 5 minutes of total time to	
	destination. Demonstrated manual flight planning procedures if a computer flight plan	
	was used. Selected current navigation charts of a proper scale and type of the mission	
	profile. Charts constructed in accordance with published directives. Plotting errors did	
	not exceed 5 NMs.	

Q-	Made minor errors or omissions that would not have adversely affected mission
	accomplishment. Time errors did not exceed 10 minutes. Plotting errors did not exceed 10 NMs.
U	Flight plan was not completed. Could not demonstrate manual flight planning
	procedures or computer flight plan was not reviewed. Navigator flight plan contained
Area 15. Fuel Planni	major errors/omissions. Selected an improper or obsolete chart. Exceeded Q- criteria.
Q	Knowledgeable with fuel planning procedures. "En route fuel" computation errors did
Q	not exceed 3%. Correctly computed other time and fuel analysis items. Correctly
	computed an Equal Time Point (ETP), when required. Correctly constructed a range
	control chart (optional).
Q-	Displayed limited knowledge of fuel planning procedures. "En route fuel" computation
	errors did not exceed 5%. Other fuel computations and/or ETP computed with minor
	mathematical errors or omissions that did not adversely affect mission accomplishment.
**	If constructed, the range control chart had minor errors or omissions.
U	Displayed inadequate knowledge of fuel planning procedures. Fuel computations and/or
	ETP were not completed or contained major errors or omissions. If constructed, range control chart had major errors and omissions. Exceeded Q- criteria.
Area 16. Departure.	control chart had major errors and offissions. Exceeded Q- chieffa.
Q	Monitored headings, airspeeds, altitudes, and aircraft position throughout departure.
V.	Used a SID and/or appropriate scale departure area chart. Provided headings, estimated
	times of arrival (ETAs) and other required information in a timely manner. Monitored
	appropriate radios and clearances to ensure crew compliance. Provided updated
	information when the clearance caused a change in the planned departure.
Q-	Monitored aircraft position, but slow to provide headings, ETAs, or other required
	information. Performance did not degrade mission accomplishment or compromise
**	flight safety.
U	Failed to monitor aircraft position and/or departure clearance. Performance resulted in
Area 17. Radio Navi	unsafe deviations from departure procedures and/or clearance instructions.
Q	Accurately tuned, identified, read, and interpreted readings of TACAN, VOR or NDBs.
*	Consistently selected stations that afforded the best Line of Position. Position accuracy
	within 4 NMs.
Q-	Better use of radio aids could have enhanced navigation. Displayed weakness in fixing
	or plotting procedures. Position accuracy did not exceed 8 NMs.
U	Unable to accurately tune and identify radio aids. Did not understand
	VOR/TACAN/NDB bearing procedures or was unable to obtain position by means of
A 10 D. L. N.	radio aids. Position error exceeded Q- criteria.
	igation/Weather Avoidance.
Q	Demonstrated thorough knowledge and understanding of radar equipment. Used correct procedures for radar operation and weather avoidance procedures. Radar position error
	did not exceed 5 NMs. Maintained proper distance from adverse weather.
Q-	Demonstrated adequate knowledge of equipment, but occasionally used improper
	operating procedures. Had difficulty identifying radar returns. Did not update
	radar/weather analysis during worsening weather conditions. Radar position error did
	not exceed 10 NMs. Weather avoidance was safe with minor deviations from prescribed
	procedures. Did not update radar/weather analysis during worsening weather
**	conditions.
U	Displayed unsatisfactory knowledge of radar equipment. Used improper operating
	procedures that were potentially harmful to system components. Failed to correctly
	interpret scope returns. Displayed unsatisfactory knowledge of weather avoidance procedures. Radar position error exceeded Q- criteria.
Area 19 Navigation	Systems. Note: All references to navigation systems refer to actual systems onboard unit
	Global Positioning System or Inertial Navigation System).
Q	Thorough knowledge of onboard navigation system operating procedures. Effectively

	used navigation systems to direct the aircraft and update system as required.
Q-	Had only a basic knowledge of onboard navigation systems. Made minor errors in
Q-	operation/interpretation of navigation system data. More selective updating could have
	increased system effectiveness.
U	Displayed inadequate knowledge of onboard navigation system procedures. Improper
	operation procedures could have resulted in damage to equipment or affected mission
	accomplishment. Failed to update or correctly interpret navigation system data.
Area 20. Deviation Che	eck. (If applicable) Note: Dual Inertial Navigation Unit aircraft must record and
	sources of heading information. (T-2)
Q	Correctly computed compass deviation within 2 degrees of actual.
Q-	Minor errors in readings or computations. Computation is within 3 degrees of actual.
U	Did not accomplish deviation check or exceeded Q- criteria.
Area 21. Dead Reckoni	ng (DR)/Rating of Navigational Computers.
Q	Effective use of DR/Rating of Navigational Computers during aircraft positioning.
	Computed and plotted positions within 10 NMs, selecting the most reliable information.
Q-	Occasionally did not identify the navigational computer providing the most reliable
	information or used improper DR procedures resulting in erroneous ETAs or headings.
	Computed or plotted position error did not exceed 15 NMs.
U	Unable to use DR/Rate Navigational Computers effectively. Computed or plotted
	position error exceeded Q- criteria.
	Navigation. (If applicable)
Q	Thorough knowledge of grid/celestial concepts and procedures. Complied with all
	published procedures unique to grid/celestial navigation.
Q-	Limited knowledge of grid/celestial concepts and procedures. Minor deviations from
	published procedures.
U	Unsatisfactory knowledge of grid/celestial concepts or procedures. Major deviations
	from published grid/celestial procedures.
Area 23. Course and E	
Q	Remained within 10 NMs of course centerline. ETAs/revised estimated time of arrival
	(RETAs) within 2 minutes of actual time of arrival. Accurately determined course
0	deviation for weather. Remained within 15 NMs of course centerline. ETAs/RETAs within 3 minutes of actual
Q-	time of arrival.
U	Exceeded Q- criteria and/or the flight examiner had to alter aircraft heading to remain
U	within course tolerance, clear special use airspace or correctly deviate around weather.
Area 24. Fuel Managen	
Q	Maintained fuel management/range control in accordance with directives. Kept pilot
Q	advised of fuel status.
Q-	Adequate fuel management/range control with minor computation errors noted. Did not
Q-	adequately update the pilot on fuel status.
U	Failed to demonstrate an understanding of fuel management/range control procedures.
	Fuel computations not accomplished or contained significant errors. Failed to inform
	pilot of fuel status.
Area 25. Descent, Appr	
Q	Monitored aircraft position, approach instructions and primary approach navigation aids.
	Furnished headings, ETAs and other information to the pilot as required. Thoroughly
	understood approach and missed approach procedures. Ensured terrain clearance during
	approach by use of all available aids and area chart.
Q-	Monitored aircraft position but did not fully understand approach
-	instructions/procedures. Slow to provide headings, ETAs, or other appropriate
	information.
U	Failed to monitor aircraft position. Did not ensure terrain clearance during the approach.
	Area chart not available or used.
	quipment. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)

Q	Displayed thorough knowledge of location and use of emergency equipment.
Q-	Limited knowledge of location and use of emergency equipment.
U	Displayed unsatisfactory knowledge of emergency equipment.
Area 27. Airborne Rad	ar Approach (ARA).
Q	Complied with all published procedures. Used the radar to successfully direct the
	aircraft to ARA minimums. Used proper terminology; instructions were clear and
	concise during the entire approach.
Q-	Briefing was incomplete or deviated from established procedures. Required excessive
	course corrections on final approach, but used the radar to direct the aircraft to a point
	where a safe landing could be made.
U	Unsatisfactory knowledge of ARA procedures. Unable to direct the aircraft to a point
	from which a safe landing could be made.

Table 3.3. Mission.

Area 28. Flight	Plan/Airdrop Data/Charts.
Q	Completed flight plans in entirety with total time error not exceeding 2 minutes. Computed air release point (CARP) data completed in entirety with negligible errors. Charts completed in accordance with published directives. Plotting errors did not exceed 1 NM.
Q-	Minor errors or omissions that would not have adversely affected mission accomplishment. Total time error did not exceed 4 minutes. Plotting errors did not exceed 2 NMs.
U	Flight plan and CARP data were not completed or contained major errors/omissions. Selected an improper or obsolete chart. Plotting errors exceeded Q- criteria.
Area 29. Briefin	ngs/Advisories.
Q	Contributed to the briefing content to ensure it included all applicable information. Briefings effectively organized and presented in a logical sequence. Covered all pertinent items. Effectively used available briefing aids. In-flight briefings/advisories provided clear and concise information in a timely manner.
Q-	Allowed omission of items pertinent but not critical to the mission. Briefings lacked continuity or contained unnecessary repetition. Some difficulty communicating clearly. Did not make effective use of available briefing aids. Dwelled on non-essential items. In-flight briefings/advisories contained minor errors or omitted non-critical information.
U	Failed to conduct required briefings. Failed to use briefing aids. Omitted essential items or did not correct erroneous information that could affect mission accomplishment. Demonstrated lack of knowledge of subject. Briefing poorly organized and not presented in a logical sequence, resulting in confusion. Presented erroneous information that would affect safe/effective mission accomplishment. Did not provide required in-flight briefings/advisories.
Area 30. Naviga	ation Procedures.
Q	Remained within 3 NMs of course centerline and was certain of aircraft position (Exceptions to course centerline tolerance: Threat avoidance, weather deviation, air traffic control assigned headings, time control, etc.). Thorough knowledge of en route time status in relation to objective area. Complied with all altitude restrictions. Airspeed control contributed to reliable DR. Adhered to all airspace restrictions.
Q-	Uncertain of exact aircraft position due to marginal navigational procedures. Flew 3 to 5 NMs from course without the above exceptions. Better awareness of required timing events or en route time status could have avoided unplanned maneuvering or prevented degraded DR.
U	Exceeded 5 NMs during en route navigation without the above exceptions. Unable to maintain position awareness throughout most of the route. Unable to accurately assess required timing or unaware of mission time status, jeopardizing formation integrity or mission accomplishment. Violated airspace restrictions. Poor airspeed control resulted in numerous or extreme airspeed adjustment. Descended below minimum altitude

	restrictions.
Area 31 Tactic	s. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	Demonstrated thorough knowledge of mission analysis and tactics selection. Integrated
Q	and applied appropriate tactics to the mission/threat scenario. Made timely and
	appropriate inputs to crew and other aircraft/supporting agencies (as applicable) during
	mission.
Q-	Minor errors in mission analysis and tactics selection. Minor errors in integrating or
~	applying appropriate tactics application to the mission/threat scenario. Did not make
	timely and appropriate inputs to crew and other aircraft/supporting agencies (as
	applicable) during mission.
U	Unsatisfactory tactics knowledge. Major errors in mission analysis and tactics selection
	or application that would have resulted in mission failure. Major errors in timely and
	appropriate inputs to crew and other aircraft/supporting agencies (as applicable) that
	would have resulted in mission failure. Did not integrate a mission or threat scenario
	into evaluation.
Area 32. Defens	sive Systems/Threat Avoidance.
Q	Demonstrated thorough knowledge of defensive systems, defensive tactics, and threat
-	reactions. Demonstrated proper defensive system set up and use for the mission
	scenario. Demonstrated threat mitigation and avoidance tactics applicable to the
	mission. Able to plot threats in-flight and formulate a plan of action to avoid a given
	threat. Made timely and accurate inputs to crew while integrating defensive systems
	during threat avoidance.
Q-	Limited knowledge of defensive systems, defensive tactics, and threat reactions. Minor
	errors in proper defensive system set up and use for the mission scenario. Minor errors
	in threat mitigation and avoidance tactics applicable to the mission. Minor errors in
	plotting and avoiding a given threat. Minor errors in timely and accurate inputs to crew
	while integrating defensive systems during threat avoidance.
U	Unsatisfactory knowledge of defensive systems, defensive tactics, and threat reactions.
	Major errors in proper defensive system set up and use for the mission scenario. Major
	errors in threat mitigation or avoidance tactics. Unable to plot threats. Did not avoid a
	given threat. Major errors in timely and accurate inputs to crew while integrating
	defensive systems during threat avoidance that would have resulted in mission failure.
Area 33. Timin	g.
Q	Timing for departure and post-drop was within five seconds of planned and timing for
	en route turns and drop timing was within two seconds.
Q-	Timing for departure or post-drop was within 10 seconds of planned and timing for en
	route turns and drop timing was within five seconds. Minor errors did not affect
	formation performance or integrity.
U	Unsatisfactory timing negatively affected formation performance or integrity and timing
	for en route turns and drop timing was greater than five seconds. Exceeded Q- criteria.
	RVAD Procedures.
Q	Thorough knowledge of SKE/RVAD components and procedures. Able to properly
	place cursor on selected Offset Aim Point. Correctly passed SKE information in a
	timely manner. SKE delay turn/drop timing within 2 seconds.
Q-	Limited knowledge of SKE/RVAD components and procedures; however, mission not
	adversely affected. Passed/interpreted SKE information incorrectly or late but did not
	adversely affect formation integrity. SKE delay turn/drop timing error greater than 2 but
	no more than 5 seconds. Errors did not impact formation integrity or jeopardize airdrop
	load safety.
U	Failed to pass or interpret SKE information correctly. Exceeded Q- criteria.
	ht Airdrop Computation.
Q	CARP properly reevaluated in-flight, correct CARP data set up in SCNS and integrated
	in crosschecks.
Q-	CARP not properly reevaluated but drop successful.
U	CARP not reevaluated in-flight or SCNS data not crosschecked, leading to a no-drop,

	unsuccessful drop or negatively affected the airdrop. No CARP data put in SCNS.
Area 36. Slowdov	
Q	Thorough knowledge of slowdown procedures. Complied with all published/briefed procedures.
Q-	Limited knowledge of slowdown procedures. Minor deviations did not affect mission accomplishment or formation integrity.
U	Unsatisfactory knowledge of slowdown procedures. Major deviations adversely affected mission accomplishment or formation integrity.
Area 37. DZ/LZ	
Q	Timely identification of the DZ/LZ allowed for a smooth approach to the objective area.
Q-	Late identification of the DZ/LZ caused an abrupt change in procedures or course into the objective area but did not affect mission accomplishment.
U	Did not identify the DZ/LZ or late identification negatively affected mission accomplishment.
Area 38. DZ/LZ	
Q	Directed the aircraft to an optimum DZ/LZ alignment (+/- 10° of drift killed axis) from slowdown through escape/landing. Clearly communicated desired aircraft position to the crew.
Q-	Slow in establishing or maintaining effective DZ/LZ alignment (11° - 15° of drift killed axis) but did not adversely impact mission accomplishment or formation integrity.
U	Failed to establish effective DZ/LZ alignment which resulted in an unsuccessful airdrop/no-drop condition/landing or adversely affected the formation. Exceeded Q-criteria.
Area 39. Time Ov	ver Target. (Critical)
Airdrop Criteria.	
Q	Met the following tolerances: +/-60 seconds (Visual); +/- 90 seconds (SKE/IFR).
U	Exceeded Q criteria.
Airland/On Orbit	
Q	Met the following tolerance: +/- 90 seconds.
U	Exceeded Q criteria.
Area 40. Airdrop	Accuracy. (Critical)
Q	Within the following Circular Error (CE). SKE wingmen airdrops must meet these criteria after adjustment off of lead's drop score (there is no CE adjustment for RVAD wingmen): (T-2) Heavy Equipment, non-High Velocity Container Delivery System (HVCDS),
	Personnel, Simulated Airdrop Training Bundle, door/ramp bundles or wedge: 300 meters (328 yards). For airdrops above 800' AGL, add 15 meters (16 yards) for each
	100' above 800' to a maximum total CE of 600 meters (437 yards). HVCDS: 200 meters (219 yards). For airdrops above 600' AGL, add 20 meters (22 yards) for each 100' above 600' to a maximum total CE of 400 meters (437 yards). For night visual airdrops, add 50 meters (55 yards) to allowable CE not to exceed the
	above maximums.
U	Exceeded Q criteria.
Area 41. Escape.	Proceed & curoum
Q	Escape and recovery executed in accordance with published or briefed procedures.
Q-	Minor errors in escape and/or recovery procedures that did not affect mission accomplishment.
U	Major deviations from procedures that negatively affected mission accomplishment, formation integrity or flight safety.
Area 42. NVG Us	sage/Limitations. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	Correctly described the use/limitations of night vision goggles (NVGs). Properly preflighted, handled and used NVGs during the flight.
Q-	Made minor omissions or deviations in describing the use/limitations of NVGs. Did not properly preflight, handle or use NVGs during the flight, but caused no serious damage

	to equipment. Mission success not negatively effected
U	to equipment. Mission success not negatively affected. Procedures for using NVGs were incorrect. Caused damage to equipment. Mission
U	
Area 12 Airbarna Dad	unsuccessful as a result of improper NVG usage.
	lar Approach (ARA). Use Area 28 Criteria.
	ship. (Flight and Element Lead)
Q	Demonstrated satisfactory knowledge of threat analysis and route construction. Applied appropriate tactics to avoid the threat and minimize exposure. Correctly planned the
	route of flight, with emphasis on obstruction clearance. Made timely and appropriate
	inputs to target/crew study. Thoroughly coordinated mission with other agencies, if
	applicable. Relayed all flight commands consistent with procedures, briefings, and
	threat. Passed information to formation aircraft in a timely manner. Provided positive
	guidance in leading the formation. Stayed abreast of time status and worked with crew
	to determine corrective action. Able to verbalize corrective action for gaining or losing
	time.
Q-	Minor errors in route construction, threat analysis or tactics selection. Unfamiliar with
	appropriate tactic for a given scenario. Minor errors in providing signals or signals not
	given appropriately for type formation or threat. Flight profile inconsistent but did not
	jeopardize safety of follower aircraft. Provided minimal leadership in the conduct of the
	flight. Limited ability to make TOT adjustments.
U	Made major errors in threat analysis or route construction. Could not safely fly planned
	profile. Unable to locate classified threat parameters. Did not contact appropriate
	agencies. Poor planning resulted in an unsuccessful mission. Did not pass critical
	information to other aircraft in-flight. Mission unsuccessful as a result of examinee's
	lack of performance and/or leadership. Exceeded TOT criteria due to poor procedures or technique; made no attempt to maintain or recover TOT.
Area 45 Ski ARA Rac	lar Procedures. (If Applicable)
Q	Demonstrated thorough knowledge and understanding of equipment and Ski radar
	procedures. Maintained good target (skiway) presentation throughout the approach.
Q-	Demonstrated adequate knowledge of equipment but deviated slightly from standard
	operating procedures. Some difficulty identifying skiway environmental returns.
U	Displayed unsatisfactory knowledge of equipment of used potentially unsafe Ski radar
	procedures. Failed to properly identify and interpret skiway environmental returns.
	gnment. (If Applicable)
Q	Aligned aircraft on a heading that paralleled or converged on centerline that allowed the
	copilot to identify lead-in flags and direct the aircraft to a safe landing.
Q-	Slightly erratic course corrections were required on final approach, but aircraft
	alignment permitted the copilot to identify lead-in flags and direct the aircraft to a safe
11	landing.
U	Examinee was unable to align the aircraft to a point where a safe landing could be made.
	Procedures. (If Applicable) Fully knowledgeable of ski mission procedures. Performed all associated mission
Q	Fully knowledgeable of ski mission procedures. Performed all associated mission checklists and mission operations in accordance with directives. Demonstrated
	satisfactory knowledge of ski mission events.
Q-	Limited knowledge of ski mission procedures. Minor deviations, errors, or omissions on
\ \ \	mission checklists, but did not adversely affect mission accomplishment.
U	Inadequate knowledge of ski mission procedures. Made significant errors, deviations
	and/or omissions in mission checklists that did or would have adversely affected the safe
	or timely accomplishment of the mission.
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Table 3.4. Instructor.

Area	Area 48. Instructor Ability. (Critical)	
Q	Demonstrated the ability to communicate effectively. Provided appropriate guidance	
	when necessary. Planned ahead and made timely decisions. Identified and corrected	
	potentially unsafe maneuvers/situations.	

U	Unable to effectively communicate or provide timely feedback to the student. Did not
	provide corrective action when necessary. Did not plan ahead or anticipate student
	problems. Did not identify unsafe maneuvers/situations in a timely manner. Made no
	attempt to instruct.
Area 49. Instructor De	monstration.
Q	Effectively demonstrated correct procedures, systems operation, or flight maneuvers.
	Thorough knowledge of applicable aircraft systems, procedures, publications, and
	directives.
Q-	Minor discrepancies in the above criteria did not affect safety or adversely affect student
	progress.
U	Ineffective or incorrect demonstration of procedures, systems operation, or flight
	maneuvers. Insufficient depth of knowledge about applicable aircraft systems,
	procedures and/or proper source material.
Area 50. Student Brief	ing/Critique. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	Briefings were well organized, accurate and thorough. Reviewed student's present level
	of training and defined mission events to be performed. Demonstrated the ability during
	the critique to reconstruct the flight, offer mission analysis and provide guidance where
	appropriate. Training grade reflected the actual performance of the student relative to
	the standard. Pre-briefed the student's next mission, if required.
Q-	Briefings were adequate but lacked clarity. Student critique was accurate but lacked the
	depth needed to maximize the learning opportunity. Briefing was complete with only
	minor discrepancies overlooked or omitted.
U	Briefings were unsatisfactory or non-existent. Did not review students' past
	performance. Failed to adequately critique student or analyze the mission. Training
	grade did not reflect actual performance of student. Overlooked or omitted major
	discrepancies. Incomplete pre-briefing of student's next mission, if required.
Area 51. Knowledge o	f Training Forms. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	All required forms were complete, accurate, readable, accomplished on time and in
	accordance with applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs. Demonstrated
	satisfactory knowledge of forms/publications required for mission accomplishment.
	Training documentation was concise and readable.
Q-	Minor errors on forms and/or flight plans did not affect conduct of the mission.
	Improperly reported some information due to minor errors, omissions and/or deviations.
	Minor errors or omissions in training documentation.
U	Did not accomplish required forms in accordance with applicable directives/procedures
	in Aircrew e-Pubs. Omitted or incorrectly reported significant information due to major
	errors, omissions and/or deviations.

Chapter 4

FLIGHT ENGINEER EVALUATIONS

- **4.1. General.** This chapter standardizes initial, recurring and re-qualification evaluations, including requirements for qualification, mission, and instructor evaluations.
- **4.2. Qualification Evaluations** (**Initial, Periodic and Re-qualification**). Accomplish qualification evaluations on any flight profile except Functional Check Flights and Acceptance Check Flights. (**T-2**) The QUAL portion of an evaluation may be conducted in the WST but a preflight must be accomplished at an actual aircraft. (**T-3**) All General, Qualification, Flight Phase and Systems Operations/Knowledge/Limitations areas/subareas are required qualification evaluation items unless otherwise specified in **Attachment 5**. Areas 35-60 may be covered during the Emergency Procedures Evaluation.
- **4.3. Mission Evaluations (Initial, Periodic and Re-qualification).** Conduct initial, periodic and re-qualification mission evaluations on a flight that requires mission checklists to be accomplished. Profile should be planned to include all mission qualifications held. Example: An engineer with NVG qualifications should fly a profile using NVG procedures if available.
 - 4.3.1. The MSN portion of an evaluation may be conducted in the WST but a preflight must be accomplished at an actual aircraft. **(T-2)**
 - 4.3.2. MSN Airland evaluation. All General and Mission areas/sub areas except airdrop specific emergencies/procedures are required evaluation items unless otherwise specified in **Attachment 5**. Minimum requirement for an airland mission evaluation will include a max effort TOLD Card using applicable performance charts or electronic takeoff and landing data (eTOLD) application (if available), a max effort takeoff, max effort landing and mission checklists other than airdrop (e.g., Combat Entry or Combat Offload Method A or B). (**T-2**)
 - 4.3.3. MSN Airdrop evaluation. All General and Mission areas/sub areas are required evaluation items unless otherwise specified in **Attachment 5**. Minimum requirement for an airdrop mission evaluation will include a SKE or Visual route, airdrop, max effort TOLD card using applicable performance charts or eTOLD application (if available) and verbally debriefing max effort procedures. (**T-2**) If mission requirements allow, then a max effort takeoff and max effort landing should be accomplished.
- **4.4. Instructor Evaluations (Initial, Periodic and Re-qualification).** Flight examiners will place particular emphasis on the examinee's ability to recognize student difficulties and provide timely, effective corrective action. (**T-2**) All Instructor areas/sub areas are required instructor evaluation items. State in the comments section of the AF Form 8 that instructional ability was evaluated. (**T-2**) List a minimum of two areas instructed by the examinee. (**T-2**) If the instructor taught throughout the entire mission and there were numerous areas in which instructional ability was demonstrated, one general comment will suffice. (**T-2**)
- **4.5. Emergency Procedures Evaluation (EPE).** The EPE should cover a cross section of aircraft systems emergencies such as bleed air, fuel, oil, electrical, engines, hydraulics, and propellers. Examinees should be able to demonstrate an understanding of aircraft systems, beyond the actual steps required for an emergency procedure. EPE for mission evaluations will include airdrop emergency procedures, defensive systems operation (representative of unit's aircraft),

lookout doctrine, threat calls, threat pre-emptive/reactive counter tactics. (**T-2**) Include applicable Boldface procedures. (**T-2**)

4.5.1. Takeoff and Landing Data (TOLD) definitions, takeoff procedures and emergencies for Qual and Mission evaluations. Mission evaluations will also include maximum effort TOLD definitions, takeoff procedures and emergencies. (T-2)

4.5.2. Grade EPEs as follows:

- 4.5.2.1. Q1 Correctly analyzed, stated, and understood aircraft/airdrop emergencies. Completed/can complete the proper action in the correct sequence (not a verbatim response). Properly utilized technical order (TO) emergency procedure sections.
- 4.5.2.2. Q2 Correctly analyzed and understood aircraft/airdrop emergencies but, had difficulty performing/stating required procedures to correct the emergency/malfunction. Had limited knowledge of TO emergency procedure sections. Requires additional training.
- 4.5.2.3. Q3 Failed to analyze, state and did not understand aircraft/airdrop emergencies and/or could not perform required procedures to correct the emergency/malfunction. Could not utilize TO emergency procedure sections. Requires additional training.

4.6. Flight Engineer Grading Criteria.

Table 4.1. General.

Area 1. Directives/Publications/Personal and Professional Equipment.		
Q	Possessed an adequate knowledge of all applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs. Required publications (paper or electronic) were current and properly posted. Had all required personal/professional equipment. Displayed satisfactory knowledge of the care and use of such equipment. Required equipment inspections were current.	
Q-	Possessed a limited knowledge of applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs but could locate the information in appropriate publications. Publications were current but improperly posted.	
U	Unaware of applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs and/or could not locate them in the appropriate publication in a timely manner. Required publications (paper or electronic) were not current. Did not have required personal/professional equipment. Required equipment inspections were overdue or equipment was unserviceable.	
Area 2. Mission Prepar	ation/Planning.	
Q	Thorough knowledge of Tactical/Contingency/Evasion Plans and other mission preparation/planning items. Attended required briefings. Complied with all directives prior to flight.	
Q-	Limited knowledge of Tactical/Contingency/Evasion Plans, etc., as applicable. Did not fully comply with directives but did not detract from mission effectiveness. Late for required briefings.	
U	Unsatisfactory knowledge of Tactical/Contingency/Evasion Plans, etc., as applicable. Did not comply with directives which detracted from mission effectiveness. Failed to attend required briefings.	
Area 3. Briefings. (If o		
Q	Contributed to the briefing to ensure it included all pertinent items and applicable information. Briefings were effectively organized and presented in a logical sequence.	
Q-	Allowed omission of items pertinent but not critical to the mission. Briefings lacked continuity or contained unnecessary repetition. Some difficulty communicating clearly.	
U	Failed to conduct required briefings. Omitted essential items or did not correct erroneous information that could affect mission accomplishment. Demonstrated lack of knowledge of subject. Briefing poorly organized and not presented in a logical	

	sequence, resulting in confusion. Presented erroneous information that would affect
	safe/effective mission accomplishment.
Area 4. Use of C	Checklist.
Q	Consistently used the correct checklist and gave the correct response at the appropriate
	time throughout the mission.
Q-	Checklist responses were untimely and/or crewmember required continual prompting for correct response.
U	Used incorrect checklist or consistently omitted checklist items. Unable to identify the correct checklist to use for a given situation. Did not complete checklist prior to event.
Area 5 Safety C	Consciousness. (Critical)
Q	Aware of and complied with all safety factors required for safe aircraft operation and
	mission accomplishment.
U	Not aware of or did not comply with all safety factors required for safe aircraft operation
	or mission accomplishment. Operated aircraft in a dangerous manner.
Area 6. Flight D	iscipline. (Critical)
Q	Exhibited strict flight and crew discipline. Prepared and completed mission in
	compliance with published instructions and directives.
U	Failed to exhibit strict flight and crew discipline. Failed to comply with published
	instructions and directives which did or could have jeopardized mission success.
	pordination/Management/Crew Resource Management (CRM)/Threat and Error Management
	MAN 11-290, applicable MAJCOM Supplement, and AF Form 4031.
Q	Proactively applied appropriate/established CRM skills and TEM concepts throughout
	the flight/mission. Ensured safe/effective mission accomplishment by anticipating,
	recognizing, and mitigating relevant threats. Identified and mitigated own and other
	crewmembers' errors via the proper use of monitoring/crosschecking procedures and
0	through the employment of applicable, established VVM practices/procedures.
Q-	Reactively and inconsistently, or inadequately applied appropriate/established CRM skills and TEM concepts but did not allow those deficiencies to detract from mission
	accomplishment and/or flight safety. Unreliably and/or inadequately anticipated,
	identified, or mitigated relevant threats and/or own or other crewmembers'
	inconsequential errors.
U	Did not apply appropriate/established CRM skills and TEM concepts to ensure
	safe/effective mission accomplishment. Failed to anticipate, identify, or mitigate
	relevant threats and/or own or other crewmembers' consequential errors.
Area 8. Commu	nication Procedures.
Q	Adequate knowledge of and compliance with correct communications procedures.
	Makes radio/interphone transmissions concise with proper terminology.
Q-	Occasional deviations from procedures that required re-transmissions. Slow in initiating
	or missed several required radio/interphone calls. Transmissions contained extraneous
	matter, were not in proper sequence or used non-standard terminology.
U	Incorrect procedures or poor performance caused confusion and jeopardized mission
	accomplishment. Omitted numerous radio/interphone calls.
	port Systems/Egress.
Q	Displayed thorough knowledge of location and use of life support systems and
	equipment. Demonstrated and emphasized the proper operating procedures used to
	operate aircraft egress devices such as doors, windows, hatches, life rafts and escape
0	ropes.
Q-	Limited knowledge of location and use of life support systems and equipment. Unsure
II	of the proper operating procedures used to operate some of the aircraft egress devices.
U	Displayed unsatisfactory knowledge of location and use of life support systems and
Area 10 Vnovil	edge/Completion of Forms.
Q Area 10. Knowle	All required forms were complete, accurate, readable, accomplished on time and in
V	accordance with applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs. Relayed an
	accurate, timely debrief of significant events to applicable agencies (intelligence,

	maintenance, etc.).
Q-	Minor errors on forms but did not affect conduct of the mission. Incorrectly or
	incompletely reported some information due to minor errors, omissions and/or
	deviations.
U	Did not accomplish required forms and/or flight plans in accordance with applicable
	directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs. Omitted or incorrectly reported significant
	information due to major errors, omissions and/or deviations.
Area 11. Airmanship/S	ituational Awareness. (Critical)
Q	Maintained situational awareness and exercised sound judgment throughout the mission.
	Conducted the flight with a sense of understanding and comprehension. Prioritized
	tasks properly.
U	Lacked situational awareness. Faulty judgment resulted in decisions that had negative
	mission impact. Lacks the skills to prioritize tasks. Unaware of significant events that
	impacted the mission.

Table 4.2. Qualification.

Area 12. Boldface Eme	ergency Procedures. (Critical)		
Q	Correct and timely responses in the proper sequence.		
U	Incorrect sequence, unsatisfactory response, or unsatisfactory performance of corrective		
L	actions.		
Area 13. Other Emerge	ency Procedures. (If observed)		
Q	Operated within prescribed limits and correctly diagnosed problems.		
1	Performed/explained proper corrective action for each type of malfunction. Effectively		
	used available aids.		
Q-	Operated within prescribed limits but was slow to analyze problems or apply proper		
1	corrective actions. Did not effectively use, omitted, or deviated in use of checklist		
	and/or available aids.		
U	Exceeded limitations. Unable or failed to analyze problem or take proper corrective		
	action. Did not use checklist and/or available aids.		
	ight Inspection. Note: Use the following criteria for Areas 14A through 14F.		
Q	Accomplished required inspections in a thorough and proficient manner as outlined in		
1	applicable checklists and/or directives without deviations or omissions. Properly		
	checked aircraft systems and components in accordance with flight manual.		
	Coordinated with ground support personnel. Correctly determined aircraft status.		
Q-	Minor deviations or omissions in the accomplishment of required inspections as outlined		
	in applicable checklists and/or directives. Limited knowledge of proper procedures for		
1	checking aircraft systems/components in accordance with flight manual. Limited		
TT	coordination with ground support personnel. Difficulty in determining aircraft status.		
U	Failed to accomplish required inspections in a thorough and proficient manner. Major		
	deviations or omissions. Omitted or improperly checked aircraft systems/components in		
	accordance with flight manual. Did not coordinate with ground support personnel.		
	Unable to determine correct aircraft status. Required assistance to complete inspections		
Sub Area 14A. Before	or exceeded time allotted causing a mission delay.		
	Sub Area 14B. Power Off Inspection. Sub Area 14C. Power On Inspection.		
	Sub Area 14D. Exterior Inspection. Sub Area 14E. Interior Inspection.		
	Airplane Inspection. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)		
Area 15. Performance/			
Q	Complete knowledge of aircraft performance. Correctly computed performance data		
	and applied the appropriate corrections for existing conditions using applicable charts		
1	and eTOLD application (if available). Correctly computed the C-130 TOLD card using		
	applicable charts and eTOLD application (if available). Required airspeeds were within		

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	2 knots. Required distances were within 200 feet. Predicted takeoff torque within 200 in/Pounds (lbs.). Transcribed the correct data to the Mini TOLD Card.
Q-	Limited knowledge of aircraft performance. Minor errors in the use of applicable
-	performance charts or eTOLD application (if available), computing the performance
	data or correcting for existing conditions resulted in data exceeding Q criteria. Required
	airspeeds were within 4 knots and distances within 400 feet. Predicted takeoff torque
	within 400 in/lbs. Incorrectly transcribed data to Mini TOLD card. Errors did not
	compromise safety of flight.
U	Failed to compute TOLD card. Omitted necessary corrections for existing conditions or
	errors in computing performance data or eTOLD application (if available) resulted in
	airspeeds and/or distances exceeding Q- criteria. Inadequate knowledge of aircraft
	performance. Compromised or could have compromised safety of flight.
Area 16. Arrival/Depar	
Q	Demonstrated satisfactory knowledge of arrival/departure procedures to include
	approach plates, SIDs, climb-out procedures, arrival procedures and Special Departure
	Procedures (SDPs).
Q-	Had difficulty in interpretation of arrival/departure procedures to include approach
	plates, SIDs, climb-out procedures, arrival procedures and SDPs.
U	Unsatisfactory knowledge of arrival/departure procedures to include approach plates,
	SIDs, climb-out procedures, arrival procedures and SDPs.
Areas 17-32.	
Q	Accomplished required checklists without errors, omissions, or deviations. Backed up
	pilots on flight parameters (e.g., altitudes, airspeeds, and clearances). Satisfactorily
	monitored engine/system indicators. All system usage and configuration were in
	accordance with flight manual and applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs.
	Recognized and corrected minor omissions or deviations. Recognized, reported, and
	properly documented out of limit conditions or malfunctions.
Q-	Accomplished required checklists with minor errors, omissions, or deviations. Backed
	up pilots on flight parameters (e.g., altitudes, airspeeds, and clearances) with some
	deviations. Monitored engine/system indicators with some deviations. Limited
	knowledge of systems operation and configuration caused deviations from flight manual
	and applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs. Slow to recognize, report
TT	and/or document out of limit conditions or malfunctions.
U	Failed to accomplish required checklists or made numerous errors, omissions, and
	deviations. Failed to back up pilots on flight parameters (e.g., altitudes, airspeeds, and clearances). Failed to monitor engine/system indicators. Inadequate knowledge of
	systems operation and configuration. Allowed limitations to be exceeded which,
	without correction, would cause damage to equipment.
Area 17. Cockpit.	without correction, would cause damage to equipment.
Area 18. Before Startin	10
Area 19. Starting Engi	
Area 20. Before Taxi.	
Area 21. Taxi.	
Area 22. Before Takeo	ff
Area 23. Line-up.	
Area 24. Takeoff.	
Area 25. After Takeoff	<u> </u>
Area 26. En-route.	u
Area 27. Descent.	
Area 28. Before Landi	ησ
Area 29. Landing.	ц5.
Area 30. After Landing	7
Area 31. Engine Shutd	
Area 32. Before Leavin	
Area 32. Defote Leavil	ng America.

Table 4.3. Mission.

Note: Mission Procedur	res are written to allow each unit to evaluate their mission specific events. Some units do	
not have any flight specific mission events for flight engineers. Those flight engineers who do not have flight		
specific mission events will be verbally evaluated on the unit's mission. (T-3) Applicable mission requirements		
will be published in loca		
Area 33. Mission Proce		
Q	Fully knowledgeable of unit mission procedures. Performed all associated mission	
-	checklists and mission operations in accordance with directives. Demonstrated	
	satisfactory knowledge of mission events.	
Q-	Limited knowledge of unit mission procedures. Minor deviations, errors, or omissions	
	on mission checklists, but did not adversely affect mission accomplishment.	
U	Inadequate knowledge of unit mission procedures. Made significant errors, deviations	
	and/or omissions in mission checklists that did or would have adversely affected the safe	
	or timely accomplishment of the mission.	
Area 34. NVG Usage/I	Limitations. (Verbally Evaluated If Not Observed)	
Q	Correctly described the use/limitations of night vision goggles (NVGs). Properly	
	preflighted, handled and used NVGs during the flight.	
Q-	Made minor omissions or deviations in the use/limitations of NVGs. Did not properly	
	preflight, handle or use NVGs during the flight, but caused no serious damage to	
	equipment. Mission success not negatively affected.	
U	Procedures for using NVGs were incorrect. Caused damage to equipment. Mission	
	unsuccessful as a result of improper NVG usage.	
	Operations/Knowledge/Limitations. Note: Use Area 13 criteria and the following:	
Q	Demonstrated a complete knowledge of aircraft systems and operating limitations both	
	with and without reference to the flight manual and/or available aids.	
Q-	Limited knowledge of aircraft systems operations and limitations in some areas. Used	
	individual technique instead of established procedure and was unaware of differences.	
U	Unsatisfactory systems knowledge. Unable to demonstrate or explain the procedures for	
	aircraft systems operations with or without reference to the flight manual and/or	
	available aids.	
Area 35. Engine.		
Area 36. Propeller.		
Area 37. Auxiliary Pov		
Area 38. Fire Detection	n/Extinguishing.	
Area 39. Oxygen.		
Area 40. Pneumatics/B		
Area 41. Pressurization		
Area 42. Air Condition		
Area 43. Anti-icing/De		
Area 44. Flight Control	ls.	
Area 45. Flaps.		
Area 46. Autopilot.	1 8 8	
Area 47. Windows/Hatches/Doors/Ramp.		
Area 48. Landing Gear.		
Area 49. Brakes.		
Area 50. Nose Wheel Steering.		
Area 51. Hydraulics.		
	Area 52. Fuel.	
Area 53. Refuel/Defuel	l.	
	Area 54. Electrical.	
Area 55. Radios/IFF/SI	IF.	
Area 56. Radar.	<u> </u>	
Area 57. Navigation Ed	quipment.	

Area 58. Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)/Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR).		
Area 59. Defensive Systems/Tactics.		
Area 60. Ground Support Equipment.		

Table 4.4. Instructor.

Area 61. Instructor Al	pility. (Critical)
Q	Demonstrated the ability to communicate effectively. Provided appropriate guidance when necessary. Planned ahead and made timely decisions. Identified and corrected potentially unsafe maneuvers/situations.
U	Unable to effectively communicate or provide timely feedback to the student. Did not provide corrective action when necessary. Did not plan ahead or anticipate student problems. Did not identify unsafe maneuvers/situations in a timely manner. Made no attempt to instruct.
Area 62. Instructor De	emonstration.
Q	Effectively demonstrated correct procedures or systems operation. Thorough knowledge of applicable aircraft systems, procedures, publications, and directives.
Q-	Minor discrepancies in the above criteria did not affect safety or adversely affect student progress.
U	Ineffective or incorrect demonstration of procedures or systems operation. Insufficient depth of knowledge about applicable aircraft systems, procedures and/or proper source material.
Area 63. Student Brie	fing/Critique. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	Briefings were well organized, accurate and thorough. Reviewed student's present level of training and defined mission events to be performed. Demonstrated the ability during the critique to reconstruct the flight, offer mission analysis and provide guidance where appropriate. Training grade reflected the actual performance of the student relative to the standard. Pre-briefed the student's next mission, if required.
Q-	Briefings were adequate but lacked clarity. Student critique was accurate but lacked the depth needed to maximize the learning opportunity. Briefing was complete with only minor discrepancies overlooked or omitted.
U	Briefings were unsatisfactory or non-existent. Did not review students' past performance. Failed to adequately critique student or analyze the mission. Training grade did not reflect actual performance of student. Overlooked or omitted major discrepancies. Incomplete pre-briefing of student's next mission, if required.
Area 64. Knowledge	of Training Forms. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	All required forms were complete, accurate, readable, accomplished on time and in accordance with applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs. Demonstrated satisfactory knowledge of forms/publications required for mission accomplishment. Training documentation was concise and readable.
Q-	Minor errors on forms and/or flight plans did not affect conduct of the mission. Improperly reported some information due to minor errors, omissions and/or deviations. Minor errors or omissions in training documentation.
U	Did not accomplish required forms in accordance with applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs. Omitted or incorrectly reported significant information due to major errors, omissions and/or deviations.

Chapter 5

LOADMASTER EVALUATIONS

- **5.1. General.** This chapter standardizes initial, periodic and re-qualification evaluations, including requirements for qualification, mission, and instructor evaluations. Evaluator Loadmasters will not conduct QUAL and/or MSN evaluations while serving as a primary aircrew member. **(T-2)**
- **5.2. Qualification Evaluations (Initial, Periodic and Re-qualification).** The aircraft must be preflighted and loaded with a palletized or vehicular load, a mission flown and then offloaded to complete the evaluation. (**T-2**) If a qualification evaluation is combined with a mission evaluation, an airdrop platform/Container Delivery System (CDS) can be used for the qualification evaluation onload/offload requirement. If a load is not available for an evaluation, palletized, airdrop platform or vehicular cargo will be static loaded and offloaded upon completion of the flight portion. (**T-2**) All General and Qualification areas/sub areas are required qualification evaluation items unless otherwise specified in baseline requirements.

5.3. Mission Evaluations (Initial, Periodic and Re-qualification).

5.3.1. Mission Airdrop Evaluation. At a minimum, an airdrop mission evaluation must consist of a single CDS container or single heavy equipment platform. (T-2) Do not conduct two separate mission evaluations on the same flight with only one airdrop load aboard. (T-2) An airdrop sortie and evaluation may be credited if an unplanned no-drop is called after completion of the Slowdown Checklist provided the no-drop was not due to loadmaster error. All General and Mission areas/sub areas are required mission evaluation items unless otherwise specified in baseline requirements. Document initial personnel restriction when actual personnel is not completed during initial mission training on AF Form 8. (T-2) Use the following statement when actual personnel cannot be performed during initial mission training:

"RESTRICTIONS:

SUPERVISED STATUS for personnel airdrop until an actual static line personnel airdrop is accomplished. Final certification will be accomplished under the supervision of a loadmaster instructor or flight examiner. Actual personnel airdrop accomplished on ______."

- 5.3.2. Mission Airland Evaluation. At a minimum, all General and Mission areas/sub areas are required mission evaluation items other than **Area 32**, **Area 33**, and **Area 34**, unless otherwise specified in **Attachment 6**. Minimum requirement for an airland mission evaluation will include onload/offload procedures and mission checklists other than airdrop. (**T-2**)
- **5.4. Instructor Evaluations (Initial, Periodic and Re-qualification).** Flight examiners will place particular emphasis on the examinee's ability to recognize student difficulties and provide timely, effective corrective action. **(T-2)** All instructor areas/sub areas are required instructor evaluation items. State that instructional abilities were evaluated in the comments section of the AF Form 8. **(T-2)** List a minimum of two areas instructed by the examinee. **(T-2)** If the instructor taught throughout the entire mission and there were numerous areas in which instructional ability was demonstrated, one general comment will suffice. **(T-2)**

5.5. Emergency Procedures Evaluation (EPE).

- 5.5.1. The EPE should cover the following areas during a qualification evaluation: Emergency signals, ground emergencies, in-flight emergencies (fuselage fire/smoke and fume elimination, in-flight door warning, rapid decompression, cargo door and ramp failure, loose cargo, cargo jettison, bailout procedures); landing emergencies (landing gear retracted, brake failure, ditching).
- 5.5.2. The EPE should cover the following areas during a mission evaluation: Personnel; heavy equipment; CDS/Combat Rubber Raiding Craft/Low-Cost Low Altitude and any other mission specific airdrop emergencies.

5.5.3. Grade EPEs as follows:

- 5.5.3.1. Q1 Correctly analyzed, stated, and understood aircraft/airdrop emergencies. Completed/can complete the proper action in the correct sequence (not a verbatim response). Properly utilized TO emergency procedure sections.
- 5.5.3.2. Q2 Correctly analyzed and understood aircraft/airdrop emergencies but had difficulty performing/stating required procedures to correct the emergency/malfunction. Had limited knowledge of TO emergency procedure sections. Requires additional training.
- 5.5.3.3. Q3 Failed to analyze, state and did not understand aircraft/airdrop emergencies and/or could not perform required procedures to correct the emergency/malfunction. Could not utilize TO emergency procedure sections. Requires additional training.

5.6. Loadmaster Grading Criteria.

Table 5.1. General.

Area 1. Directives/Pub	lications/Personal and Professional Equipment.
Q	Possessed an adequate knowledge of all applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-
	Pubs. Required publications (paper or electronic) were current and properly posted.
	Had all required personal/professional equipment. Displayed satisfactory knowledge of
	the care and use of such equipment. Required equipment inspections were current.
Q-	Possessed a limited knowledge of applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs
	but could locate the information in appropriate publications. Publications were current
**	but improperly posted.
U	Unaware of applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs and/or could not locate
	them in the appropriate publication in a timely manner. Required publications (paper or
	electronic) were not current. Did not have required personal/professional equipment.
	Required equipment inspections were overdue or equipment was unserviceable.
Area 2. Mission Prepar	<u> </u>
Q	Checked all factors applicable to flight such as: itinerary, aircraft configuration and fuel
	requirements, airdrop equipment drop sequence, etc. Attended required briefings.
Q-	Made minor errors or omissions in checking all factors that could have detracted from
	mission effectiveness. Did not fully comply with directives. Late for required briefings.
U	Made major errors or omissions, which would have prevented an effective mission.
	Failed to attend required briefings.
Area 3. Briefings. (If o	bserved)
Q	Contributed to the briefing content to ensure it included all applicable information.
	Briefings effectively organized and presented in a logical sequence. Covered all
	pertinent items.
Q-	Allowed omission of items pertinent but not critical to the mission. Briefings lacked
	continuity or contained unnecessary repetition. Some difficulty communicating clearly.

U	Failed to conduct required briefings. Omitted essential items or did not correct
	erroneous information that could affect mission accomplishment. Demonstrated lack of
	knowledge of subject. Briefing poorly organized and not presented in a logical
	sequence, resulting in confusion. Presented erroneous information that would affect safe/effective mission accomplishment.
Area 4. Use of Che	
Q	Consistently used the correct checklist and gave the correct response at the appropriate
Q	time throughout the mission.
Q-	Checklist responses were untimely and/or crewmember required continual prompting for
Y	correct response.
U	Used incorrect checklist or consistently omitted checklist items. Unable to identify the
C	correct checklist to use for a given situation. Did not complete checklist prior to event.
Area 5 Safety Cor	asciousness. (Critical)
Q	Aware of and complied with all safety factors required for safe aircraft operation and
Q	mission accomplishment.
U	Not aware of or did not comply with all safety factors required for safe aircraft operation
O	or mission accomplishment. Operated aircraft systems or performed duties in a
	dangerous manner.
Area 6. Flight Disc	
Q	Exhibited strict flight and crew discipline. Prepared and completed mission in
Q	compliance with published instructions and directives.
U	Failed to exhibit strict flight and crew discipline. Failed to comply with published
O	instructions and directives which did or could have jeopardized safety or mission
	success.
Area 7 Crew Coor	rdination/Management/Crew Resource Management (CRM)/Threat and Error Management
	AN 11-290, applicable MAJCOM Supplement, and AF Form 4031.
Q	Proactively applied appropriate/established CRM skills and TEM concepts throughout
Q	the flight/mission. Ensured safe/effective mission accomplishment by anticipating,
	recognizing, and mitigating relevant threats. Identified and mitigated own and other
	crewmembers' errors via the proper use of monitoring/crosschecking procedures and
	through the employment of applicable, established VVM practices/procedures.
Q-	Reactively and inconsistently, or inadequately applied appropriate/established CRM
Q-	skills and TEM concepts but did not allow those deficiencies to detract from mission
	accomplishment and/or flight safety. Unreliably and/or inadequately anticipated,
	identified, or mitigated relevant threats and/or own or other crewmembers'
	inconsequential errors.
U	Did not apply appropriate/established CRM skills and TEM concepts to ensure
C	safe/effective mission accomplishment. Failed to anticipate, identify, or mitigate
	relevant threats and/or own or other crewmembers' consequential errors.
Area 8. Communic	<u> </u>
Q	Adequate knowledge of and compliance with correct communications procedures.
Y	Makes radio and interphone transmissions concise with proper terminology.
Q-	Occasional deviations from procedures required re-transmissions or resetting codes.
Y	Slow in initiating or missed several required radio/interphone calls. Transmissions
	contained extraneous matter, were not in proper sequence or used non-standard
	terminology.
U	Incorrect procedures or poor performance caused confusion and jeopardized mission
C	accomplishment. Omitted numerous radio/interphone calls.
Area 9 Life Suppo	Displayed thorough knowledge of location and use of life support systems and
Area 9. Life Suppo	
Area 9. Life Suppo Q	equipment. Demonstrated and emphasized the proper operating procedures used to
	equipment. Demonstrated and emphasized the proper operating procedures used to
	operate aircraft egress devices such as doors, windows, hatches, life rafts and escape

U	Displayed unsatisfactory knowledge of location and use of life support systems and
	equipment. Unsatisfactory knowledge of aircraft egress procedures.
Area 10. Knowledge/C	ompletion of Forms.
Q	All required forms were complete, accurate, readable, accomplished on time and in
	accordance with directives. Provided an accurate, timely debrief of significant events to
	applicable agencies (Intel, Tactics, Maintenance, etc.).
Q-	Minor errors on forms did not affect conduct of the mission. Incorrectly or incompletely
	reported some information due to minor errors, omissions and/or deviations.
U	Did not accomplish required forms. Omitted or incorrectly reported significant
	information due to major errors, omissions and/or deviations.
Area 11. Airmanship/S	ituational Awareness. (Critical)
Q	Maintained situational awareness and exercised sound judgment throughout the mission.
	Conducted the flight with a sense of understanding and comprehension. Prioritized
	tasks properly.
U	Lacked situational awareness. Faulty judgment resulted in decisions that had negative
	mission impact. Lacks the skills to prioritize tasks. Unaware of significant events that
	impacted the mission.

Table 5.2. Qualification.

Area 12. Preflight.	
Q	Completed required systems preflight/inspections in accordance with technical orders, checklists, AFMANs and AFIs.
Q-	Minor deviations from established systems preflight/inspection. Used individual technique instead of established procedure and was unaware of differences.
U	Failed to preflight critical component or could not conduct a satisfactory preflight/inspection.
Area 13. Emergency	Equipment. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	Located, inspected, distributed and/or demonstrated the proper use of emergency equipment. Complete knowledge of emergency equipment.
Q-	Difficulty locating, inspecting and/or demonstrating the proper use of emergency equipment. Knowledge of equipment is adequate but needs improvement.
U	Failed to inspect, distribute and/or demonstrate the proper use of emergency equipment. Unsatisfactory knowledge of emergency equipment.
Area 14. Aircraft Co	onfiguration.
Q	Ensured the aircraft was properly configured to accommodate the load. Familiar with various configurations as outlined in applicable instructions/directives and properly stowed configuration items that were not used.
Q-	Difficulty configuring the aircraft but did not impede loading of aircraft. Limited knowledge of various configurations as outlined in applicable instructions/directives.
U	Failed to ensure proper aircraft configuration or caused loading delays. Unsatisfactory knowledge of seat and litter configurations. Failed to properly stow configuration items.
Area 15. Load Plann	ning/Inspection.
Q	Accurately planned a load of cargo and/or passengers and met aircraft center of gravity (CG) limits. Inspected cargo for proper preparation and documentation.
Q-	Difficulty planning cargo load and/or passengers to meet CG limits. Difficulty inspecting cargo for proper preparation and documentation.
U	Unable to plan a cargo load and/or passengers to meet CG limits. Failed to inspect cargo for proper preparation and documentation.
Area 16. On/Off Loa	
Q	Correctly on/off loaded cargo safely and in a timely manner.
Q-	Difficulty on/off loading cargo in the aircraft. Minor deviations occurred but safety was not compromised.
U	Failed to correctly or safely on/off load cargo. Loading procedures caused undue delay.
Area 17. Supervisor	y Ability.

_	T
Q	Established and maintained control of all personnel during loading operations. Safety
	was not compromised.
Q-	Established and maintained control of all personnel but made minor supervisory errors.
**	Safety was not compromised.
U 10 Ti D T	Did not establish or maintain control of all personnel. Safety was compromised.
Area 18. Tie Down/Re	
Q	Correctly calculated and applied correct amount of restraint to a given item. Understood
0	and could state the principles of restraint.
Q-	Difficulty calculating and applying the correct amount of restraint. Did not fully understand the principles of restraint.
U	Failed to correctly calculate and apply the correct amount of restraint. Did not
O	understand and could not state the principles of restraint.
Area 19 Winching Pro	ocedures. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	Correctly demonstrated and/or explained winching procedures.
Q-	Difficulty demonstrating and/or explaining correct winching procedures. Safety was not
Q	compromised.
U	Failed to demonstrate and/or explain correct winching procedures. Safety was
	compromised.
Area 20. Hazardous M	Interial. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	Understood hazardous cargo procedures. Could comply with the provisions of AFMAN
	24-604, Preparing Hazardous Materials for Military Air Shipments, and/or follow the
	procedures for air movement of hazardous cargo under tactical, contingency, or
	emergency conditions.
Q-	Understood hazardous cargo procedures but made minor deviations. Safety was not
-	compromised.
U	Did not understand or did not comply with hazardous cargo procedures provided in
	AFMAN 24-604. Compromised safety.
	itations. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed) Note: Limitations may include, but are not
	, roller, station, compartment, pallet weight, height, and nets, loading aids (ground loading
	amps, bridge plates, pry bars, ramp support and shoring).
Q	Correctly understood and could apply the correct limitations associated with the aircraft,
	on/off loading, and associated equipment.
Q-	Difficulty applying various limitations. Located correct limitations in the loading
**	manual, if needed.
U	Could not apply various limitations and/or could not locate correct limitations in the
A 22 D II	loading manual.
	andling. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	Correctly briefed and performed passenger handling procedures.
Q-	Difficulty briefing and/or performing passenger handling procedures.
U	Failed to brief and/or did not perform proper passenger handling procedures.
	ng/Aircraft Security. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	Explained proper anti-hijacking/aircraft security procedures. Difficulty accomplishing/axplaining proper anti-hijacking/aircraft security procedures.
Q- U	Difficulty accomplishing/explaining proper anti-hijacking/aircraft security procedures.
	Could not explain proper anti-hijacking/aircraft security procedures.
Q	Correctly followed MAJCOM guidelines. Completed/explained border clearance
V	requirements in accordance with published directives.
Q-	Difficulty accomplishing/explaining border clearance requirements. Minor mistakes
~	degraded effectiveness.
U	Could not accurately complete forms. Unaware of command guidance or could not
	explain requirements.
Area 25. Weight and I	Balance. Note: The method used to complete the weight and balance (electronically or
manually) is determined by the flight examiner.	
Q	Accurately completed DD Form 365-4, Weight and Balance Clearance Form F-

	-
	Trasnport/Tactical. Errors in takeoff or landing gross weights did not exceed +/- 500 lbs. Percent of Mean Aerodynamic Chord (MAC) was within +/- 0.5 percent. Did not exceed aircraft gross takeoff limits. Did not exceed center of gravity limitations for takeoff or landing.
Q-	Errors on DD Form 365-4 exceeded takeoff or landing gross weights by +/- 501 to 1,000 lbs. or percent of MAC limitations by +/- 0.6 to 1.0 percent. Did not exceed aircraft gross takeoff limits. Did not exceed center of gravity limitations for takeoff or landing.
U	Failed to complete DD Form 365-4 accurately. Takeoff or landing gross weight was in excess of +/- 1,000 lbs. or percent of MAC limitations exceeded +/- 1.0 percent. Exceeded aircraft gross takeoff weight/center of gravity limits.
Area 26. Scanner Dutie	
Q	Periodically performed scanner duties by monitoring aircraft interior and exterior for abnormal conditions.
Q-	Did not scan in a timely manner to recognize abnormal conditions.
Ù	Failed to perform scanner duties. Did not monitor or make periodic checks of the aircraft interior and exterior for abnormal conditions.
Area 27. Engine Runni	ng Onload/Offload. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	Followed/explained proper procedures for engine running on/off loading operations.
Q-	Difficulty following/explaining proper procedures for engine running on/off loading operations.
U	Did not follow/explain proper procedures for engine running on/off loading operations.
Area 28. Combat Offlo	ad. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	Followed/explained proper procedures for combat offload operations.
Q-	Difficulty following/explaining proper procedures for combat offload operations.
U	Did not follow/explain proper procedures for combat offload operations.
	wledge. (QUAL) (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed) Note: At a minimum, evaluate tygen, Ramp and Door, Dual Rails.
Q	Displayed satisfactory knowledge of systems, ensuring satisfactory operation within prescribed limits. Explained proper corrective action for each type of malfunction.
Q-	Difficulty in displaying a satisfactory knowledge of systems. Slow to analyze problems or apply proper corrective actions.
U	Failed to display a satisfactory knowledge of systems. Unable to analyze problems or apply proper corrective actions.
Area 30. Other Emerge	ency Procedures. (If observed)
Q	Correctly analyzed, stated, and understood aircraft/airdrop emergencies and performed required procedures to correct the emergency/malfunction.
Q-	Correctly analyzed and understood aircraft/airdrop emergencies but had difficulty performing/stating required procedures to correct the emergency/malfunction.
U	Failed to analyze, state and did not understand aircraft/airdrop emergencies and/or could not perform required procedures to correct the emergency/malfunction.
Area 31. Boldface Eme	ergency Procedures. (Critical)
Q	Correct and timely responses in the proper sequence.
Ü	Incorrect sequence, unsatisfactory response, or unsatisfactory performance of corrective actions.
	actions.

Table 5.3. Mission.

Area 32. Airdrop Rigging Procedures.		
Q	Correctly rigged and identified key airdrop components.	
Q-	Difficulty rigging and/or identifying key airdrop components.	
U	Failed to rig and/or identify key airdrop components.	
Area 33. Joint Airdrop Inspection.		
Q	Correctly completed the joint airdrop inspection using applicable inspection form.	
Q-	Difficulty completing the joint airdrop inspection using applicable inspection forms.	

U	Failed to complete the joint airdrop inspection using applicable inspection form.
	op Knowledge. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed) Note : Evaluate the following areas:
	y Equipment, CDS/Combat Rubber Raiding Craft, and any other mission specific airdrop event.
Q	Correctly demonstrated and understood airdrop procedures and airdrop load
	information.
Q-	Difficulty demonstrating and/or understanding airdrop procedures and airdrop load
	information.
U	Could not demonstrate and/or understand airdrop procedures and airdrop load
	information.
Area 35. NVG	Usage/Limitations. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	Correctly described the use/limitations of night vision goggles (NVGs). Properly
	preflighted, handled and used NVGs during the flight.
Q-	Made minor omissions or deviations in the use/limitations of NVGs. Did not properly
	preflight, handle or use NVGs during the flight, but caused no serious damage to
	equipment. Mission success not negatively affected.
U	Procedures for using NVGs were incorrect. Caused damage to equipment. Mission
	unsuccessful as a result of improper NVG usage.
Area 36 System	ms Knowledge. (MSN) (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed) Note : As a minimum, evaluate the
	Static line retrievers, Aerial Delivery System, aft anchor cable supports, bomb rack.
	Displayed satisfactory knowledge of systems, ensuring satisfactory operation within
Q	prescribed limits. Explained proper corrective action for each type of malfunction.
0	
Q-	Difficulty in displaying a satisfactory knowledge of systems. Slow to analyze problems
**	or apply proper corrective actions.
U	Failed to display a satisfactory knowledge of systems. Unable to analyze problems or
	apply proper corrective actions.
	linated Tasks Briefing.
Q	Correctly briefed the coordinated tasks in accordance with published directives.
Q-	Difficulty briefing the coordinated tasks in accordance with published directives.
U	Failed to accomplish the coordinated tasks briefing in accordance with published
	directives.
Area 38. Defens	sive Systems/Tactics. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	Demonstrated satisfactory knowledge of defensive systems/tactics. Applied appropriate
	actions while responding to threat(s). Made timely and appropriate inputs to crew
	during mission.
Q-	Minor errors in defensive systems use/threat reaction. Limited knowledge of
· ·	appropriate actions for a given scenario. Did not make timely inputs to crew during
	mission.
U	Unsatisfactory defensive systems knowledge. Major errors in appropriate actions would
U	
A 20 Cl.: O.	not have defeated given threat(s).
	n/Off Loading Procedures (LC-130H only).
Q	Correctly on/off loaded cargo safely and in a timely manner utilizing ski procedures.
Q-	Difficulty on/off loading cargo in the aircraft utilizing ski procedures. Minor deviations
	occurred but safety was not compromised.
U	Failed to correctly on/off load cargo utilizing ski procedures. Loading procedures
	caused undue delay. Safety was compromised.
Area 40. System	ns Knowledge (LC-130H only). (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	Displayed satisfactory knowledge of equipment, ensuring satisfactory operation within
	prescribed limits. Analyzed problems and applied proper corrective actions.
Q-	Difficulty in displaying satisfactory knowledge of equipment, ensuring satisfactory
	operation within prescribed limits. Slow to analyze problems or apply proper corrective
	actions.
U	Unsatisfactory knowledge of equipment. Unable to analyze problems or apply proper
J	corrective actions.
Aron 41 Cl.: Cl.	
Area 41. Ski Co	ombat Offload (LC-130H only). (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)

Q	Followed/explained proper procedures for Ski combat offload operations.
Q-	Difficulty following/explaining proper procedures for Ski combat offload operations.
U	Did not follow/explain proper procedures for combat Ski offload operations.
Area 42. Ski Winching	Procedures (LC-130H only). (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	Correctly demonstrated/explained Ski winching procedures.
Q-	Difficulty demonstrating/explaining correct Ski winching procedures. Safety was not compromised.
U	Failed to demonstrate/explain correct Ski winching procedures. Safety was
	compromised.
Area 43. Remote Refue	eling (LC-130H only). (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	Displayed satisfactory knowledge of procedures/equipment. Executed procedures
	properly. Analyzed problems and applied proper corrective actions.
Q-	Difficulty in displaying a satisfactory knowledge of procedures/equipment. Slow to
	analyze problems or apply proper corrective actions.
U	Unsatisfactory knowledge of procedures/equipment. Unable to analyze problems or
	apply proper corrective actions.
Area 44. Assisted Take	Off (ATO) (LC-130H only). (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	Displayed satisfactory knowledge of procedures/equipment.
Q-	Difficulty in displaying a satisfactory knowledge of procedures/equipment.
U	Unsatisfactory knowledge of procedures/equipment.

Table 5.4. Instructor.

Area 45. Instructor Ab	ility. (Critical)
Q	Demonstrated the ability to communicate effectively. Provided appropriate guidance
	when necessary. Planned ahead and made timely decisions. Identified and corrected potentially unsafe actions/situations.
U	Unable to effectively communicate or provide timely feedback to the student. Did not provide corrective action when necessary. Did not plan ahead or anticipate student
	problems. Did not identify unsafe actions/situations in a timely manner. Made no attempt to instruct.
Area 46. Instructor Der	
Q	Effectively demonstrated correct procedures or systems operation. Thorough knowledge of applicable aircraft systems, procedures, publications, and directives.
Q-	Minor discrepancies in the above criteria did not affect safety or adversely affect student progress.
U	Ineffective or incorrect demonstration of procedures or systems operation. Insufficient
	depth of knowledge about applicable aircraft systems, procedures and/or proper source
	material.
Area 47. Student Brief	ing/Critique. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	Briefings were well organized, accurate and thorough. Reviewed student's present level of training and defined mission events to be performed. Demonstrated the ability during
	the critique to reconstruct the flight, offer mission analysis and provide guidance where
	appropriate. Training grade reflected the actual performance of the student relative to
	the standard. Pre-briefed the student's next mission, if required.
Q-	Briefings were adequate but lacked clarity. Student critique was accurate but lacked the
	depth needed to maximize the learning opportunity. Briefing was complete with only
	minor discrepancies overlooked or omitted.
U	Briefings were unsatisfactory or non-existent. Did not review students' past
	performance. Failed to adequately critique student or analyze the mission. Training
	grade did not reflect actual performance of student. Overlooked or omitted major
Arao 10 Vravula 1	discrepancies. Incomplete pre-briefing of students next mission, if required.
	f Training Forms. (Verbally Evaluate If Not Observed)
Q	All required forms were complete, accurate, readable, accomplished on time and in accordance with applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs. Demonstrated
	accordance with applicable directives/procedures in Africiew e-rubs. Demonstrated

	satisfactory knowledge of forms/publications required for mission accomplishment. Training documentation was concise and readable.
Q-	Minor errors on forms did not affect conduct of the mission. Improperly reported some information due to minor errors, omissions and/or deviations. Minor errors or omissions in training documentation.
U	Did not accomplish required forms in accordance with applicable directives/procedures in Aircrew e-Pubs. Omitted or incorrectly reported significant information due to major errors, omissions and/or deviations.

Chapter 6

LC-130H EVALUATIONS

- **6.1. General.** This chapter standardizes initial, periodic and re-qualification LC-130H evaluations, including requirements for instrument/qualification, mission, and instructor evaluations with the following **exception**: Ski mission qualified navigators will only be evaluated on Ski ARA's during a MSN (SKI) evaluation. (**T-3**)
- **6.2.** Instrument/Qualification Evaluations (Initial, Periodic and Requalification). LC-130H Instrument/Qualification evaluations will be accomplished in accordance with Chapters **2-5**. (**T-2**)
- **6.3. Mission Evaluations (Initial, Periodic and Re-qualification).** LC-130H mission evaluations for all crew members will be either Ski or Polar Airdrop; additionally, pilots and flight engineers will complete a max effort profile. **(T-3)** All crewmembers will be Ski mission qualified. **(T-3)**
 - 6.3.1. Dual qualified Ski and airdrop crewmembers' alternate mission checkrides between Ski and airdrop profiles. (**T-2**) If unable to alternate mission checkrides, the 109 OG/CC can waive this requirement on a case-by-case basis.
 - 6.3.2. Max Effort Profile. Pilots and flight engineers should accomplish the max effort procedures portion of their MSN profile during their QUAL checkride. Annotated as MSN (AL) along with the other applicable QUAL and/or MSN profiles on the AF Form 8 (e.g., QUAL/MSN (AL) or MSN (AL)/MSN (SKI)).
 - 6.3.2.1. Pilot Profile. The profile will (as a minimum) consist of maximum effort takeoff and a max effort landing. (**T-3**) Mission Areas evaluated will be 53-57. (**T-2**)
 - 6.3.2.2. Conduct the evaluation in-flight or in a WST. (T-2)
 - 6.3.3. Ski Profile. Annotated as MSN (SKI) on the AF Form 8.
 - 6.3.3.1. Pilot Profile. The profile will (as a minimum) consist of a Ski ARA, Ski takeoff and Ski landing. (**T-3**) General Areas 1-13, Missions Areas 59-62 are required evaluation items. Conduct the evaluation in-flight or in a WST. (**T-2**)
 - 6.3.3.2. Navigator Profile. The profile will (as a minimum) consist of a Ski ARA. (**T-3**) General Areas 1-11, Mission **Area 42**, and Areas 45-47 are required evaluation items. Conduct the evaluation in-flight or in a WST. (**T-2**)
 - 6.3.3.3. Flight Engineer Profile. The profile will (as a minimum) consist of a Ski takeoff and Ski landing. **(T-3)** General Areas 1-11 and Mission Areas 33-34 are required evaluation items. Conduct the evaluation in-flight or in a WST. **(T-2)**
 - 6.3.3.4. Loadmaster Profile. The profile will (as a minimum) consist of Ski onloading/offloading procedures utilizing palletized cargo or rolling stock. (**T-3**) General Areas 1-11, Qualification **Area 25**, Mission **Area 35**, and Areas 39-44 are required evaluation items. Conduct the evaluation in-flight. (**T-2**)
 - 6.3.4. Polar Airdrop Profile (PAD). Annotated as MSN PAD on the AF Form 8.

- 6.3.4.1. Pilot Profile. The profile will (as a minimum) consist of a visual or an IFR route flown to an airdrop. (**T-3**) General Areas 1-13, Missions **Area 41**, and Areas 45-48 are required evaluation items. Conduct the evaluation in-flight or in a WST. (**T-2**)
- 6.3.4.2. Navigator Profile. The profile will consist of a visual or an IFR route flown to an airdrop. (**T-3**) A TOT is not required. General Areas 1-11, Missions Areas 28-30, 35-38, and 40-42 are required evaluation items. Conduct the evaluation in-flight. (**T-2**)
- 6.3.4.3. Flight Engineer Profile. The profile will (as a minimum) consist of an airdrop. **(T-3)** If mission requirements allow, a max effort takeoff and a max effort landing should be accomplished. General Areas 1-11 and Mission Areas 33-34 are required evaluation items. Conduct the evaluation in-flight or in a WST. **(T-2)**
- 6.3.4.4. Loadmaster Profile. The profile will (as a minimum) consist of a CDS airdrop. (**T-3**) An airdrop sortie and evaluation may be credited if an unplanned no-drop is called after completion of the Slowdown Checklist provided the no-drop was not due to loadmaster error. General Areas 1-11, Mission Areas 32-37 are required evaluation items. Conduct the evaluation in-flight. (**T-2**)
- **6.4. Instructor Evaluations (Initial, Periodic and Requalification).** LC-130H Instructor evaluations will be accomplished in accordance with Chapters **2-5** with the following exceptions: **(T-3)**
 - 6.4.1. If Polar Airdrop mission qualified, pilot and navigator INIT instructor evaluations should include an airdrop.
 - 6.4.2. Pilot and navigator RQ instructor evaluations will be either a MSN (SKI) or MSN (PAD). (T-2)
- **6.5. Emergency Procedures Evaluation (EPE).** LC-130H EPEs will be accomplished in accordance with Chapters **2-5** with an emphasis on mission areas for the type of mission evaluation given. **(T-3)**
- **6.6. Grading Criteria.** Grading Criteria is in accordance with applicable Chapter 2-5.

JAMES C. SLIFE, Lt Gen, USAF Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References

AFI 33-322, Records Management and Information Governance Program, 23 March 2020

AFMAN 11-2C-130HV1, C-130H Aircrew Training, 22 October 2020

AFMAN 11-2C-130HV3, C-130H Operations Procedures, 27 September 2021

AFMAN 11-202V1, Aircrew Training, 27 September 2019

AFMAN 11-202V2, Aircrew Standardization and Evaluation Program, 30 August 2021

AFMAN 11-210, Instrument Refresher Program (IRP), 21 December 2021

AFMAN 11-218, Aircraft Operations and Movement on the Ground, 5 April 2019

AFMAN 11-290, Cockpit/Crew Resource Management and Threat & Error Management Program, 25 October 2021

AFMAN 24-604, Interservice Publication, *Preparing Hazardous Materials For Military Air Shipments*, 9 October 2020

AFPD 11-2, Aircrew Operations, 31 January 2019

DAFI 90-160, Publications and Forms Management, 14 April 2022

DAFMAN 13-217, *Drop Zone, Landing Zone, and Helicopter Landing Zone Operations*, 22 April 2021

DAFMAN 90-161, Publishing Processes and Procedures, 15 April 2022

Adopted Forms

AF Form 8, Certificate of Aircrew Qualification

AF Form 942, Record of Evaluation

AF Form 3862, Flight Evaluation Worksheet

AF Form 4031, CRM/TEM Skills Criteria Training/Evaluation

DAF Form 673, Department of the Air Force Publication/Form Action Request

DAF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication

DD Form 365-4, Weight and Balance Clearance Form F-Transport/Tactical

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AF—Air Force

AFI—Air Force Instruction

AFMAN—Air Force Manual

AGL—Above Ground Level

AMC—Air Mobility Command

ARA—Airborne Radar Approach

ASR—Airport Surveillance Radar

CARP—Computed Air Release Point

CC—Commander

CDS—Container Delivery System

CE—Circular Error

CG—Center of Gravity

CRM—Crew Resource Management

CVR—Cockpit Voice Recorder

DAFI—Department of the Air Force Instruction

DAFMAN—Department of the Air Force Manual

DFDR—Digital Flight Data Recorder

DR—Dead Reckoning

DZ—Drop Zone

EPE—Emergency Procedures Evaluation

ETA—Estimated Time of Arrival

eTOLD—Electronic Takeoff and Landing Data

ETP—Equal Time Point

FCI—Flight Command Indicator

FN—Basic Qualified Navigator

FP—Flight Pilot

GA—Go Around

HVCDS—High Velocity Container Delivery System

IFF—Identification Friend or Foe

IFR—Instrument Flight Rules

ILS—Instrument Landing System

INIT—Initial

INSTM—Instrument

INSTR—Instructor

KIAS—Knots Indicated Airspeed

LBS—Pounds

LOC—Localizer

LZ—Landing Zone

MAC—Mean Aerodynamic Chord

MAJCOM—Major Command

MAP—Missed Approach Point

MCAD—Mission Computer Airdrop

MDA—Minimum Descent Altitude

MEA—Minimum En route Altitude

MOCA—Minimum Obstruction Clearance Altitude

MP—Mission Pilot

MSN—Mission

MSN (AL)—Mission Airland

MSN (SS)—Mission Single Ship

NAVAID—Navigation Aid

NDB—Non-directional Radio Beacon

NM—Nautical Mile

NOTAM—Notice to Airmen

NVG—Night Vision Goggles

OG—Operations Group

OME—Operational Mission Evaluation

OPR—Office of Primary Responsibility

OROCA—Off Route Obstruction Clearance Altitude

ORTCA—Off Route Terrain Clearance Altitude

PAD—Polar Airdrop

PAR—Precision Approach Radar

PM—Pilot Monitoring

Q—Qualified—Q- —Qualified Minus

Q1—Qualification Level 1

Q2—Qualification Level 2

Q3—Qualification Level 3

QUAL—Qualification

RETA—Revised Estimated Time of Arrival

RQ—Re-qualification

RVAD—Radar Verified Airdrop

SCNS—Self Contained Navigation System

SDP—Special Departure Procedure

SID—Standard Instrument Departure

SIF—Selective Identification Feature

SKE—Station Keeping Equipment

SQ—Squadron

TACAN—Tactical Air Navigation System

TEM—Threat and Error Management

TO—Technical Order

TOA—Time of Arrival

TOLD—Takeoff and Landing Data

TOT—Time Over Target

U—Unqualified—USAF—United States Air Force

VDP—Visual Descent Point

VFR—Visual Flight Rules

Vmca—Minimum Control Airspeed

VOR—Very High Frequency Omni-directional Radio Beacon

VVM—Verbalize, Verify and Monitor

WG—Wing

WST—Weapon System Trainer

Office Symbols

A3—Directorate of Operations

AMC/A3—Air Mobility Command Directorate of Operations

AFRC/A3M—Air Force Reserve Command Mobility Forces Branch

AMC/A3T—Air Mobility Command Aircrew OPS & Training Division

AMC/A3V—Air Mobility Command Aircrew Standardization/Evaluation

OG/CC—Operations Group Commander

OGV—Operations Group, Standardization and Evaluation

SQ/CC—Squadron Commander

Terms

Aircrew Member—An individual, designated on the Flight Authorization who is an aircrew member as explained in AFPD 11-4, *Aviation Service*, AFMAN 11-402, *Aviation and Parachutist Service*, is assigned to a position listed in AFI 65-503, *US Air Force Cost and Planning Factors*, and is designated on orders to fulfill specific aeronautical tasks.

Areas/Subareas—Specific grading items which can be evaluated on an evaluation.

Tolerances—Range of acceptable deviation from the standard.

C-130H FLIGHT EVALUATION WORKSHEET

Figure A2.1. C-130H Flight Evaluation Worksheet (Front Page).

Comments:	C-130 Evaluati	on Work	sheet	DATE C	OMPLETE	D:	
	NAME (Last, Fi	rst, MI)		•	GRADE	DoD ID:	
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	QUALITED	ONQO	ALITILD	DOLDA	IIL(S)	COMPLETED	
	EXPIRATION	DATE		ING OFFIC	CIAL	SIGNATURE	DATE
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C-130H PILOT FLIGHT EVALUATION WORKSHEET

Figure A3.1. C-130H Pilot Flight Evaluation Worksheet (Back Page).

AREA / SUB AREA	Q	Q-	U	REMARKS
GENERAL				
Directives / Publications / Pers. And Pro Equip				
2. Mission Prep / Planning / Performance				
3. Briefings				
Use of Checklist				
Safety Consciousness (Critical)				
Flight Discipline (Critical)				
7. Crew Coord / Management / CRM / TEM				
8. Comm. Procedures / IFF / SIF Procedures				
9. Life Support Systems / Egress				
10. Knowledge / Completion of Forms				
11. Airmanship / Situational Aware. (Critical)				
12. Automation Management				
13. Pilot Monitoring				
QUALIFICATION				
14. Ground Operations / Taxi				
15. Pre-Takeoff				
16. Takeoff				
17. Basic Aircraft Control				
18. Radar Ops / WX Avoidance / Windshear				
19. Fuel Efficiency				
20. VFR Pattern (WX/Traffic Permitting) *				
21. Landings				
21A. Full Flap Landing (100%)				
21B. Partial Flap Landing (50%)				
21C. No Flap Landing				
21D. Engine Out Landing				
21E. Touch/Stop and Go Landing				
22. Landing Roll / Braking / Propeller Rev				
23. All Engine Go-Around (N/R if 25/37)				
24. Engine Out Operations				
25. Engine Out Go-Around				
26. Boldface Emergency Procedures (Critical)	-			
27. Other Emergency Procedures (If observed)	-			
28. Systems Operations / Knowledge / Limits				
INSTRUMENT 29. Instrument Departure / SID *				
30. En Route Navigation / SCNS			1	
31. Holding or Procedure Turn	 			
32. Use of NAVAIDS				
33. Descent / Arrival				
34. Precision Approaches (1 Required)				
34A. PAR				
34B. ILS 35. Non-Precision Approaches (1 Required)			<u> </u>	
35. Non-Precision Approaches (1 Required) 35A. NDB				

AREA / SUB AREA	Q	Q-	U	REMARKS
5B. LOC/VOR				
5C. ASR				
5D. TACAN				
5E. ARA				
6. Circling Approach (WX/Traffic Permitting) *				
7. Missed Approach (N/R if 23/25)				
MISSION				
8. Formation Takeoff				
9. Formation Departure / Assembly				
0. Formation En Route Procedures				
1. En Route Navigation				
2. Visual / SKE Procedures				
3. Tactics				
4. Defensive Systems / Threat Avoidance				
5. Slowdown				
6. DZ Alignment				
7. Airdrop Procedures				
8. Escape				
9. High/Low Altitude Tactical Arrival				
0. Formation Recovery				
1. Formation Landing *				
2. Flight Leadership (Flight & Element Lead)				
3. Max Effort Procedures				
4. Max Effort Takeoff				
5. Max Effort Landing				
6. NVG Usage / Limitations *				
7. NVG Landing *				
8. Time of Arrival (TOA) Control (Airland /Max-				
Effort only crews) Ski Procedures (LC-130H Only)				
9. Ski ARA				
i0. Ski Landing				
il. Ski Takeoff				
i2. Ski Mission Procedures *				
NSTRUCTOR				
i3. Instructor Ability (Critical)				
4. Instructor Demonstration				
i5. Student Briefing / Critique *				
66. Knowledge of Training Forms *				
OME				
7. Aircraft Commander Responsibilities				
8. Aircrew Management				
9. Mission Management			<u> </u>	
O. Post Flight / RON Procedures 1. Authentication / Aircraft Security			1	
Verbally Evaluated If Not Observed				

C-130H NAVIGATOR FLIGHT EVALUATION WORKSHEET

Figure A4.1. C-130H Navigator Flight Evaluation Worksheet (Back Page).

AREA / SUB AREA	Q	Q-	U	REMARKS	AREA / SUB AREA	Q	Q-	U	REMARKS
GENERAL					MISSION				
1. Directives / Publications / Pers. And Pro Equip					28. Flight Plan/Airdrop Data/Charts				
2. Mission Prep / Planning / Performance					29. Briefings/Advisories				
3. Briefings					30. Navigation Procedures				
4. Use of Checklist					31. Tactics *				
5. Safety Consciousness (Critical)					32. Defensive Systems/Threat Avoidance				
6. Flight Discipline (Critical)					33. Timing				
7. Crew Coord / Management / CRM / TEM					34. SKE/RVAD Procedures				
8. Comm. Procedures					35. In-flight Airdrop Computation				
9. Life Support Systems / Egress					36. Slowdown				
10. Knowledge / Completion of Forms					37. DZ/LZ Acquisition				
11. Airmanship / Situational Aware. (Critical)					38. DZ/LZ Alignment				
QUALIFICATION					39. Time Over Target (Critical)				
12. Boldface Emergency Procedures (Critical)					40. Airdrop Accuracy (Critical)				
13. Other Emergency Procedures (If observed)					41. Escape				
14. Flight Plan/Charts					42. NVG Usage/Limitations *				
15. Fuel Planning					43. Airborne Radar Approach (ARA)				
16. Departure					44. Flight Leadership (Flight and Element Lead)				
17. Radio Navigation					Ski Procedures (LC-130H Only)				
18. Radar Navigation/Weather Avoidance					45. Ski ARA Radar Procedures (If Applicable)				
19. Navigation Systems					46. Ski ARA Alignment (If Applicable)				
20. Deviation Check (If Applicable)					47. Ski Mission Procedures (If Applicable)				
21. Dead Reckoning/Rating of Navigational Computers					INSTRUCTOR				
22. Grid/Celestial Navigation (If Applicable)					48. Instructor Ability (Critical)				
23. Course and ETA Tolerance					49. Instructor Demonstration				
24. Fuel Management/Range Control					50. Student Briefing / Critique *				
25. Descent, Approach and Lancing					51. Knowledge of Training Forms *				
26. Emergency Equipment *									
27. Airborne Radar Approach (ARA)									
					* Verbally Evaluated If Not Observed				
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C-130H ENGINEER FLIGHT EVALUATION WORKSHEET

Figure A5.1. C-130H Engineer Flight Evaluation Worksheet (Back Page).

AREA / SUB AREA	Q	Q-	U	REMARKS		AREA / SUB AREA	Q	Q-	U	REMARKS
GENERAL						SYS OPS / KNOWLEDGE / LIMITS				
1. Directives / Publications / Pers. And Pro Equip						35. Engine				
2. Mission Prep / Planning / Performance						36. Propeller				
3. Briefings						37. APU				
4. Use of Checklist						38. Fire Detection / Extinguishing				
5. Safety Consciousness (Critical)						39. Oxygen				
6. Flight Discipline (Critical)						40. Pneumatics / Bleed Air				
7. Crew Coord / Management / CRM / TEM						41. Pressurization / Depressurization				
8. Comm. Procedures						42. Air Conditioning / Floor Heating				
9. Life Support Systems / Egress						43. Anti-icing / De-icing				
10. Knowledge / Completion of Forms						44. Flight Controls				
11. Airmanship / Situational Aware. (Critical)						45. Flaps				
QUALIFICATION						46. Autopilot				
12. Boldface Emergency Procedures (Critical)						47. Windows / Hatches / Doors / Ramp				
13. Other Emergency Procedures (If observed)						48. Landing Gear				
14. Aircraft Preflight Inspection						49. Brakes				
14a. Before Exterior Inspection						50. Nose Wheel Steering				
14b. Power Off Inspection						51. Hydraulics				
14c. Power On Inspection						52. Fuel				
14d. Exterior Inspection						53. Refuel / De-fuel				
14e. Interior Inspection						54. Electrical				
14f. Top of Airplane Inspection *						55. Radios / IFF / SIF				
15. Performance / TOLD						56. Radar				
16. Arrival / Departure Procedures						57. Navigation Equipment				
17. Cockpit						58. CVR / DFDR				
18. Before Starting						59. Defensive Systems / Tactics				
19. Starting Engines						60. Ground Support Equipment				
20. Before Taxi						INSTRUCTOR				
21. Taxi						61. Instructor Ability (Critical)				
22. Before Take-off						62. Instructor Demonstration				
23. Line-up						63. Student Briefing / Critique *				
24. Take-off						64. Knowledge of Training Forms *				
25. After Take-off										
26. En-route										
27. Descent										
28. Before Landing										
29. Landing										
30. After Landing										
31. Engine Shutdown	_									
32. Before Leaving Aircraft	_						-			
MISSION 33. Mission Procedures							-			
33. Mission Procedures 34. NVG Usage / Limitations *						* Verbally Evaluated If Not Observed				
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C-130H LOADMASTER FLIGHT EVALUATION WORKSHEEET

Figure A6.1. C-130H Loadmaster Flight Evaluation Worksheet (Back Page).

AREA / SUB AREA	Q	Q-	U	REMARKS
RAL				
rectives / Publications / Pers. And Pro Equip				
lission Prep / Planning				
. Briefings (If observed)				
Use of Checklist				
Safety Consciousness (Critical)				
Flight Discipline (Critical)				
7. Crew Coord / Management / CRM / TEM				
8. Comm. Procedures				
9. Life Support Systems / Egress				
10. Knowledge / Completion of Forms				
11. Airmanship / Situational Aware. (Critical)				
QUALIFICATION				
12. Preflight				
13. Emergency Equipment *				
14. Aircraft Configuration				
15. Load Planning / Inspection				
16. On / Off Loading Procedures				
17. Supervisory Ability				
18. Tie Down / Restraint				
19. Winching Procedures *				
20. Hazardous Materials *				
21. Aircraft Limitations *				
22. Passenger Handling *				
23. Anti-Hijacking / Aircraft Security *				
24. Border Clearance *				
25. Weight and Balance				
26. Scanner Duties				
27. Engine Running Onload / Offload *				
28. Combat Offload *				
29. Systems Knowledge (QUAL) *				
30. Other Emergency Procedures (If observed)				
31. Boldface Emergency Procedures (Critical)				
MISSION				
32. Airdrop Rigging Procedures				
33. Joint Airdrop Inspection				
34. Airdrop Knowledge *				
35. NVG Usage / Limitations *				
36. Systems Knowledge (MSN) *				
37. Coordinated Tasks Briefing				
8. Defensive Systems / Tactics *				