BY ORDER OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

AIR FORCE TACTICS,
TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

3-4.6

ACTIVE SHOOTER

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PURPOSE: To provide tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to prepare personnel for an active shooter incident (ASI) and prevent the unnecessary loss of life.

SCOPE: This publication describes the active shooter environment and provides guidelines for Air Force personnel to better prepare themselves mentally and physically for an active shooter incident. It focuses on individual and unit preparation, emphasizing the need for a cultural mindset shift.

APPLICATION: This publication is applicable in all theaters of operation. The publication has applicability for planners and warfighters at all levels. This publication applies to the operating forces of the regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard. TTP publications are not directive. AFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management* states, "Complying with publications in this category is expected, but not mandatory." The tactics, techniques, and procedures in this document are still authoritative; deviations require sound judgment and careful consideration. The applicable AFI will take precedence in cases where this publication and AFIs conflict. In accordance with *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, the following joint publication definitions apply:

Tactics—The employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other.

Techniques—Non-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, functions, or tasks.

Procedures—Standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks.

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CHAPTER 1

DEVELOPING THE WARRIOR MINDSET

1.1 Overview. To address an active shooter threat, commanders and leaders are responsible for providing training to assist Airmen in the development of the warrior mindset. Realistic training conditions Airmen to fight through factors that may normally cause them to hesitate when faced with a threat. This training should be part of a commander's home station responsibility and basic deployment readiness. To meet this responsibility, it is imperative leaders understand how to appropriately conduct training and avoid conditioning and training pitfalls to increase chances for survival.

1.2 Active Shooter Definition. One or more subjects who participate in a shooting, random or systematic, with the intent to continuously harm others. The term active shooter will also include anyone who uses any other deadly weapon (e.g., knife, club, bow and arrow, explosive, vehicle) to systematically or randomly inflict death or great bodily harm on others.

1.3 Warrior Mindset. The first step in enhancing an Airman's chances of survival is to actively develop and foster a warrior mindset. The need for all Airmen to possess a proper mindset is essential in protecting themselves and fellow Airmen. The warrior mindset is more important than polished technique. When faced with an active shooter attack there are three possible actions to take: escape, barricade, and/or fight. Do not let anything get in the way of survival. The essential components of the warrior mindset are:

> **1.3.1 Toughness.** The uninhibited mental resolution to aggressively react to illegal violence with a fierce and violent defense.

> **1.3.2 Decisiveness.** Respond immediately with the force necessary to survive (escape, barricade, or fight). A warrior does not wait, as the advantage is the surprise of instant and direct offense.

1.4 Factors When Reacting to a Threat. Commanders and leaders should provide training to mitigate the factors that cause unnecessary hesitation when reacting to a threat. This section discusses how commanders and Airmen can identify such factors and develop an effective way of dealing with them to enable reasonable responses in active shooter incidents (ASI). There are many factors that may cause Airmen to hesitate when faced with an active shooter threat:

- Personal beliefs.
- Psychological inhibitions.
- Physiological, perceptual, and cognitive changes.
- Misunderstanding of the rules of engagement (ROE) and arming/use of force policy.
- Command policies.
- Prior training (or lack thereof).

> **1.4.1 Personal Beliefs.** Airmen must resolve personal issues within themselves such as commitment to mission, mortality, and willingness to sacrifice.

> > 1.4.1.1 Airmen should overcome the false belief of, "this could never happen to me." Recent ASIs in Texas, Germany, and Afghanistan have shown any Airman can become the victim of an active shooter.

1.4.1.2 Another belief, which may hinder an Airman's ability to react to violence, is the false assumption others will respond on their behalf. In most ASIs, the person in the best position to stop the threat is the individual closest to the threat, to include the targeted victim.

1.4.2 Psychological Inhibitions. Humans have a natural aversion to killing other human beings. There are situations when we may be faced with the decision to take another's life. Mentally rehearsing a self-defense scenario and mental commitment to the use of deadly force prior to the event can improve the ability of Airmen to respond to acts of violence and fulfill this duty without unnecessary hesitation.

1.4.3 Physiological Changes. When faced with a threat, an Airman may experience physiological changes. These changes are triggered by the autonomic nervous system. The autonomic nervous system controls the parasympathetic and sympathetic nervous system, which are both involved in response to stress.

1.4.3.1 The sympathetic nervous system initiates a defense mechanism referred to as the *fight or flight* response when you are stressed with the possibility of death or serious bodily harm. This response prepares the body for a survival reaction. A third response known as *freezing* could occur once the body's defense mechanism is activated. This response is important because it can affect an Airman's ability to react to the situation at hand.

1.4.3.2 Once the sympathetic nervous system is triggered, Airmen may experience negative effects in visual processing, motor skill performance, and cognitive processing. The following are physical responses to fear:

- Pounding heart.
- Muscle tension.
- Trembling.
- Rapid, shallow breathing.
- Dizziness.
- Nausea.
- Gut wrenching knot.
- Sweating.
- Dry mouth.
- Goose bumps.
- Tingling sensation in limbs and/or face.
- Insensitive to pain.
- Jumpy, easily startled.
- Urge to urinate.
- Urge to defecate.
- Loss of fine motor skills.
- Loss of complex motor skills.

- Loss of depth perception.
- Loss of near vision.
- Increase in gross motor skills.

1.4.4 Perceptual Changes from Fear. The following perceptual changes may occur when faced with a threat:

- **Tunnel Vision.** The loss of peripheral vision where vision may narrow to mere inches while losing depth perception and the ability to see what is behind the threat.
- **Heightened Visual Clarity.** While experiencing tunnel vision, a heightened sense of clarity of detail may occur.
- **Hearing Distortion.** The most common hearing distortion is diminished sound, which may include a total loss of hearing to muffled and distant (e.g., cannot hear shots being fired, people yelling, sirens).
- **Time Distortion.** Events may seem to slow down (slow motion) or speed up. Both types of time distortion can be experienced during the same incident.

1.4.5 Cognitive/Behavioral Changes.

- **Automatic Behavior.** Many individuals involved in a traumatic event give little or no thought to their behavior; they just instinctively do what their experience has programmed them to do.
- **Memory Gaps.** It is normal for an individual involved in a deadly force encounter to not remember parts of what happened and parts of what they did. Memories of high threat situations are often like a series of snapshots, some vivid, some blurry, and some even missing.
- **Intrusive Thoughts.** An individual may have intrusive thoughts that may not be immediately relevant to the current situation (e.g., thoughts of family, some future event, or a previous event serving as a reminder of the present one).

1.4.6 Inherent Right of Self-Defense. Airmen may exercise individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent when the Airman reasonably believes they are at imminent risk of serious bodily harm or death. Individuals with the capability to inflict death or serious bodily harm and who demonstrate intent to do so may be considered an imminent threat. Force is to be used as a last resort and the force should be the minimum necessary. The force used must be reasonable in intensity, duration and magnitude based on the totality of circumstances to counter the threat. Deadly force is to be used only when lesser means have failed or cannot reasonably be employed. An Airman's use of deadly force may be reasonable and appropriate to protect themselves and others. Airmen, regardless of Air Force specialty or rank, should feel confident their leadership, Air Force, and government will protect them from legal harm if they appropriately use force to protect themselves or their fellow Airmen. Unit commanders at all levels must teach and train their Airmen how and when to use both non-deadly and deadly force in self-defense. This can be achieved with practical training scenarios. Refer to AFI 31-117, *Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel.*

1.4.7 Defense of Others. The inherent right of self-defense applies to the defense of others. Airmen may exercise self-defense in the defense of others in the vicinity of an incident. This includes non-DOD personnel. Refer to AFI 31-117.

1.4.8 Command Policy. Commanders are encouraged to evaluate local risks to forces before employing policies that restrict an Airman's ability to protect themselves (e.g., changes in arming status, restricting types of weapons based on rank, preventing Airmen from carrying weapons). Additionally, commanders should consider factors that may place their subordinates at a tactical disadvantage (e.g., arming status other than what they are trained on, office layout and design).

1.4.9 Training. The Air Force currently provides commanders and leaders with a wide array of training opportunities to aid in the development of the warrior mindset. If commanders and leaders effectively execute existing training and avoid training pitfalls, these current opportunities expose Airmen to the desired conditioning needed. The training is intended to: (1) expose the member to realistic situations they may experience operationally, and (2) condition them to respond appropriately under stress to prepare for future unknown challenges. See **Chapter 6**, Training for training recommendations.

CHAPTER 2

ENHANCING RESILIENCE

2.1 Resilience. Resilience is the ability to respond, withstand, recover, and/or grow in the face of stressors and changing demands. Resilience does not mean an absence of stress or fear. Resilience during an ASI is about a process of performing under stress, resisting the effects it may have, and then recovering and restoring as needed. This chapter highlights opportunities for leaders to enhance these areas as well as address resilience specific to an ASI.

2.2 Comprehensive Airmen Fitness (CAF). The foundations of resilience are physical, mental, social, and spiritual fitness. According to research, these domains include a number of areas in which there is an increase in the chance for an adaptive or resilient-minded response during a stressful incident. Strengthening actions should focus on teams, units, families, and individual Airmen to be effective. Areas of focus for optimal effectiveness before, during, and after stressful events:

    2.2.1 Physical. Includes physical fitness and wellness; as well as the physical strength, endurance, and physical skills to accomplish tasks.

    2.2.2 Mental. Situational awareness paired with the warrior mindset includes mental toughness, self-confidence, and self-awareness.

    2.2.3 Spiritual. Resources outside oneself to build fortitude, sense of purpose, rightness of actions, and general spiritual fitness.

    2.2.4 Social. Trust in peers, family, organizations, leadership, desire to help others, and effective utilization of support resources.

2.3 Strategies to Strengthen Resilience.

    2.3.1 Stress Continuum. There will be a variety of reactions during and after an ASI. See Figure 2.1, Stress Continuum. Most individuals will respond in the green and yellow zone where some stress is expected due to the natural survival response system being engaged. The continuum is meant as a gauge. Someone may be somewhere in between responding and reacting or reacting and a stress injury. The descriptions in the green through yellow can vary by individual. Table 2.1, Stress Continuum demonstrates how the physiological stress response system (adrenaline and cortisol) and the mental controls work together to initiate a survival response.

Figure 2.1 Stress Continuum

Responding	Reacting	Injury	Illness
•TRT engaged optimally	•TRT overtaxed	•TRT overwhelmed	•TRT hyperactive
•Focused	•Increased mistakes	•Insubordination	•PTSD/anxiety disorder
•Alert	•Irritability	•Panic or rage	•Depressive disorder
•Confident	•Communication	•Alcohol misuse	•Significant work
•Sense of humor	problems	•Suicidal/homicidal	problems
•Active socially	•Mental static	thoughts	•Isolated
•Problem solving	•Cutting corners	•Disengaged	•Significantly reduced
•Sleeping/eating well	•Pessimistic	•Noticeable fatigue	self-care
•In the *Zone*	•Tired	•Multiple physical	•Alcohol abuse/
•Fine motor skills begin	•Stomach upset	problems	dependence
to deteriorate	•Complex motor	•Disruption of values	•Injury that has family
•Family interacting well	deteriorate	•Family negative	disrupted
		impact	

Unit, Leader Responsibility	Individual, Team, Family Responsibility	Caregiver Responsibility

PTSD - post-traumatic stress disorder   TRT - tactical response team

Table 2.1 Stress Continuum

Zone	Description
Responding (Green)	Stress can help increase performance. Tactical, mental, and physical skills are working in sync to optimize the tactical response team (TRT) response to a threat such as an active shooter. There may be some fine motor skill deterioration, which is why effective training and practice is necessary to overcome this. Performance is at its peak when responding and the experience has been described as *Flow* or *Being in the Zone*.
Reacting (Yellow)	Depending on length or intensity of the stressor and preparation, optimal response to a threat will begin to decline at some point. Heart rate may be increasing beyond optimal levels and complex motor skills begin to deteriorate. Communication may begin to break down and the likelihood of mistakes will increase. An individual may actually feel the physiological effects of stress and might notice some decline in performance. For the better trained and more fit, the decline in performance may be delayed, but this varies by individual and depends on the situation. Whether responding or reacting to stress, some recovery may be needed.
Injury (Orange)	Stress injuries are different from stress reactions because although they are less common, anyone, even the most fit individual, can be at risk. Stress injury means there has been some damage because of the stress. The individual may no longer feel like themselves. Stress injuries can heal but they can also leave scars because of the intensity of a stressor, but remember resilience does not mean an absence of scars. They can occur due to life threatening situations or where one has witnessed mass devastation, general fatigue from the wear and tear of mission grind, or because of the loss of someone or something, or shattered assumptions that affect ones values (e.g., having to shoot at children who are being used as combatants). It is possible to experience daily stress, be involved in a firefight, and witness the death of an innocent and have no ongoing problems or stress injury. It is normal to react to these events, and it is also possible for someone to experience a stress injury. A stress injury can be recovered from, but this can take days, weeks, or months.
Illness (Red)	Results from an unhealed stress injury can be treated to facilitate recovery, but will likely require assistance from a professional, such as a psychologist. It is likely to significantly affect one or more areas of performance, and it is important for individuals, team members, and leaders to recognize where team members may fall along the continuum and take appropriate action.

2.3.2 Performance Optimization. Optimal performance under challenging conditions requires a combination of technical, physical, and mental skill. Training plays an essential role in developing these skills and increases the likelihood they will be in sync when needed. Training scenarios should be:

2.3.2.1 Realistic. Make training as realistic as possible to minimize surprises during an ASI. Varied scenarios and repeated practice are one way to accomplish this principle. Training should entail an understanding of what happens physiologically and psychologically under such situations. This understanding is important to normalize any reactions but also make aware how the impact of this natural reaction can be managed.

NOTE: Utilize extreme caution when implementing unannounced ASI exercises and drills; personnel may respond violently to the threat or utilize extreme measures to escape (i.e., jump out of a window).

2.3.2.2 Rigorous. Training should be tough enough to push unit members to develop new skills but not so difficult they will fail to master the challenges or cause them to experience stress injuries during training. Before active shooter scenarios, mental toughness skills should also be taught as these are tools that can be used to manage threat response with the aim to build a warrior mindset.

2.3.3 Building Protection. Training can build protection against the stress of being involved in an ASI. Full spectrum scenarios allow teams to practice working together and supporting each other during and after an ASI.

2.3.3.1 Events after an ASI can be just as stressful as the incident itself; therefore, a scenario should include post event scenarios (e.g., realistic debriefing by individuals role-playing Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) or commanders; someone who is struggling because they may have had to take a life; someone not having difficulties except for the stress of the inquiry afterwards). Adding post incident considerations to training enables individuals and teams to practice how they would respond and support fellow Airmen.

2.3.3.2 Unit cohesion and social support are key factors in promoting resilience. It can be developed through communication, trust, respect, loyalty, and familiarity. The more opportunities to face challenges successfully through training and other shared activities, the more likely unit cohesion can be built.

2.3.4 Restoration (Recovering After an ASI). There may be a variety of responses after an ASI ranging from no reaction, to an excitement because of adrenaline or fatigue to confusion. Any one of these is normal, but because physical and mental energy is expended, recovery is needed even if no injury is sustained. This could be as simple as the ability to rest, to sleep, to eat a meal, and/or the opportunity to socialize. If a stress reaction continues or a stress injury has occurred/ developed, ensuring that individual gets the proper support needed is essential. Attending to a stress injury should be no different from having a physical injury managed and leadership should promote a culture where this care is acceptable and expected for continued mission success and individual performance.

2.4 Tactical Mental Toughness Skills. Mental toughness focuses on two primary components: composure and concentration. During an ASI, this translates into: (1) does an individual pay

attention to what matters, and (2) can they do what is necessary without allowing emotions to control their actions?

2.5 Survival Response. It is important to understand how the body reacts when it faces a real or perceived threat so one can anticipate the expected effects and recognize when natural physiological reactions are either increasing or hindering an optimal response. Early recognition allows for adjustment to enhance the possibility of an optimal response and outcome. When a threat is perceived, the brain (primarily the amygdala responsible for fear response) sends signals to structures in the brain that secrete stress response chemicals—adrenaline and cortisol. This physiological response is an essential part our system to respond to threats.

  2.5.1 Adrenaline and Cortisol. Adrenaline and cortisol increase blood sugar, blood pressure, and heart rate amongst other physiological responses in an effort to initiate our fight or flight response. Examples of how this can help include stories of people being able to suddenly lift heavy objects, running faster, and so forth. There can also be negative effects if this response system is always responding or responding incorrectly, which can hurt long-term sustained performance. It is possible for the response system to be overloaded or overrun quickly and without warning particularly under extreme conditions. This can be helped by proper training and preparation including mental preparation.

  2.5.2 Heart Rate. The stress response chemical, adrenaline, affects heart rate making it a good but not a perfect gauge of the stress response. When at rest, our heart rate is typically between 60 to 80 beats per minute (BPM). At around 115 BPM, we start to lose control of fine motor skills. At around 145 BPM, our complex motor skills deteriorate. This includes hand-eye coordination and multitasking. Above 175 BPM, our brain stops processing information and we start to feel the physical effects of tunnel vision. Above 175 BPM is where we see undesirable combat behaviors, including submission and/or flight when doing so is inappropriate.

  2.5.3 Fear and Rage Responses. There is another part of the brain (the limbic system) involved in memory, learning, and emotional ties, particularly to the fear response. Fear and rage to some degree are part of the survival response. However, the system within our brain for this is fairly primitive and these emotions can be quite raw, overpowering, and negatively impact performance if not regulated. This can lead to impaired decision making and reduces the ability to utilize fine motor skills. Fear and rage are natural emotions and part of our survival system. Efforts should not be to eliminate or suppress them, but rather to regulate them for an optimal response.

  2.5.4 Controlling Thoughts. The thinking part of the response system is primarily in the frontal lobes and can help optimize our response by leveraging the body's natural survival response system. This part of the team is responsible for higher order function like decision-making, impulse control, and the regulation of emotions. Instead of reacting, it allows the response system to ACT (ACT = adrenaline + cortisol + thought) purposefully and sets us apart from animals who also have an ingrained flight or fight response. It is important to note that our thoughts can also have a negative impact on our ability to respond optimally. For instance, if we feel unprepared or doubt our ability, we essentially create ***mental static*** distracting us from the task at hand and reducing our ability to perform optimally.

2.5.5 Response System Activation. If the body's response system is not activated when it is needed, the body may tend to feel fatigued, exhausted, and not perform very well. It is almost similar to being asleep at the wheel. As the response system engages to meet the challenge, performance will improve. However, if the response system is too high, performance will be degraded due to agitation, sleep problems, and distractibility. Over the long term, if a response system remains in overdrive for too long, it can have a negative impact on your health. In fact, the body can forget how to turn it off, and can start experiencing physical and mental health problems that interfere with daily performance.

CHAPTER 3

AWARENESS, DETECTION, AND COMMUNICATION

3.1 Overview. ASIs are incredibly dangerous and difficult because there is no criminal objective (e.g., robbery, hostage taking) involved other than violence. Often, the shooter has no regard for their life, and may be planning to die. These factors leave responding forces little recourse but to locate and stop the shooter as quickly as possible. As a result, installation commanders are encouraged to not only focus on their readiness to respond to these types of incidents, but to focus planning efforts on mitigating the threat through awareness training. This training should be geared toward detecting behaviors indicative of an individual's propensity for violence and ensure effective communication of this information. This chapter focuses on mitigating threats through awareness training for behavioral indicators of violence, preventive efforts to mitigate the active shooter threat, and dissemination/information sharing.

3.2 Situational and Cultural Awareness. Commanders should ensure that members are trained and situationally aware of the cultural differences and the current threat environment. To increase situational awareness for the assigned area of responsibility (AOR):

3.2.1 Host Nation. Leaders should continually request feedback on the organizational climate of host nation (HN) units, the local HN culture, and patterns of daily living. This awareness aids in identifying areas of concern prior to escalation of a violent act. After an act of violence, leaders should focus on the reaction of personnel within the environment to ensure that additional violence does not escalate beyond the initial incident.

3.2.2 Observation. Train personnel to be observant of behavioral indicators that may be indicative of forces potential for violence.

3.3 Detection. Prevention starts with the ability to detect potential threats. Numerous documented case studies indicate there were trends of behavior demonstrated by an active shooter prior to taking violent action. Specific awareness training should be developed locally and contain a brief historical review of past incidents, but primarily focus on what actions our forces should take if they observe unusual behavior by an individual that may indicate a propensity for violence.

3.3.1 Behavioral Threat Indicators. This list is a compilation of behavioral threat indicators derived from credible open source documents from various Department of Defense (DOD) agencies. This list is not all-inclusive, but provides the foundation for indicator detection and reporting. If an individual demonstrates one or multiple indicators, this information should be communicated up the chain of command. If the individual is demonstrating an immediate threat of violence, contact the appropriate law enforcement agencies.

- Discontent with how United States (US) forces perform their mission.
- Increased use of alcohol and/or drugs.
- Unexplained increase in absenteeism; vague physical complaints.
- Noticeable decrease in attention to appearance and hygiene.
- Depression/withdrawal.
- Resistance and overreaction to changes in policy and procedures.
- Repeated violations of policies.

- Increased severe mood swings.
- Noticeable unstable, emotional responses.
- Explosive outburst of anger or rage without provocation.
- Suicidal; comments about "putting things in order."
- Behavior which is suspect of paranoia ("everybody is against me").
- Increasingly talks of problems at home.
- Talk of severe financial problems.
- Talk of previous incidents of violence.
- Empathy with individuals committing violence.
- Increase in unsolicited comments about firearms, other dangerous weapons, and violent crimes.
- Indicating real/perceived cultural disrespect.
- (For US military personnel only) Any action that advises, counsels, urges, or in any manner causes or attempts to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty by any member of the armed forces of the US.

3.3.2 Recognize Potential Threat Indicators. The people most likely to recognize potential threat indicators are those working in close proximity with the individual. Leaders are charged with educating the force and enabling the reporting of individuals exhibiting behavioral indicators indicative of violence, terrorism, or criminal activity. Educating our personnel to refer these individuals for additional law enforcement intervention or assistance enhances the overall integrated defense posture of an installation.

3.3.3 Reporting and Response. All reporting and response actions should be based on specific observed behaviors and other indicators.

NOTE: Not all indicators are independently actionable, but when put together or demonstrated in conjunction with one another, they could indicate a threat. Indicators should be perceived through a cultural lens that is specific to location.

3.4 Communication. The need to develop and share information and intelligence has significantly changed in recent years. Experience, both good and bad, has reinforced the premise that preventing future attacks depends upon our ability to gather, analyze, and share information and intelligence regarding those who want to attack us (e.g., the tactics that they use, and the targets that they intend to attack). Whether the attacker is a trained operative from an international terrorist organization, self-radicalized, or a disgruntled employee committed to revenge, ASI prevention is contingent on an information-sharing environment that facilitates the continual and rapid exchange of information. Personnel best suited to anticipate an ASI are those closest to the threat. If an individual notices any of the indicators from this chapter, it is imperative that they communicate their concerns to the appropriate level or agency (e.g., supervisors, commanders, law enforcement).

3.4.1 Information Sharing Organizations. Several recognized forums within the Air Force exist to facilitate multifunctional collaboration and information sharing. These organizations serve at multiple levels and include the Community Action Information Board (CAIB), the

High Risk for Violence Response Team (HRVRT), the threat working group (TWG), and the intelligence fusion center (IFC). Successful collaboration is realized when these entities work together to share information in a timely manner. Sharing information in a deployed environment is just as critical as sharing information in the continental United States.

3.4.2 Guiding Principles for Information Sharing. Entities responsible for combating and responding to violent activity must have access to timely and accurate information regarding potential threat actors. That information guides combined efforts to:

- **Threats.** Rapidly identify both immediate and long-term threats.

- **Activities.** Identify persons involved in threat-related activities.

- **Implementation.** Implement information-driven and risk-based detection, prevention, deterrence, response, protection, and emergency management efforts.

3.4.3 Information Sources. Criminal and terrorism-related intelligence is best derived by collecting, blending, analyzing, and evaluating relevant information from a broad array of sources on a continual basis. There is often no single source for threat-related information.

3.5 Conclusion. Effective and timely information sharing combined with analysis and contextualization of shared data provides the highest level of situational awareness available. Key principals with force protection responsibilities must communicate, collaborate, and be thoroughly familiar with each other's abilities and requirements. Shared information must be combined into a usable format, balancing accuracy and timeliness, and provided to the appropriate recipients.

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CHAPTER 4

EMERGENCY ACTION PLANNING BEST PRACTICES

4.1 Overview. Proper preparation for an ASI can directly affect the severity and outcome of the incident. To best prepare for an ASI, develop and exercise an emergency action plan (EAP).

4.2 Planning. When developing an EAP, ensure input is sought from all stakeholders. An effective EAP should include guidance on:

- When to attempt escape and when to confront the attacker.
- Emergency escape routes/procedures.
- Offices/areas that can be effectively locked down from potential attackers.
- Planning for elderly and/or handicap (e.g., hearing/mobility/visually impaired) personnel who may need assistance to execute ASI measures.
- Contact information of emergency responders and measures for emergency notification within a facility (intercom and mass warning/notification procedures).
- Consideration should be given to mutual aid partners and recalled first responders emergency access to the installation.

4.3 Security Assessment. To develop a realistic and executable EAP, facility managers and work center supervisors should conduct a security assessment to determine the facility's vulnerability to an ASI. The assessment should identify evacuation routes, possible lockdown locations for personnel who cannot evacuate, and roles and responsibilities of key individuals. Shelter locations should have thick walls, solid doors, minimal interior windows, first-aid kits, communications devices, and duress alarms.

4.4 Individual Responsibilities. The EAP should designate a point of contact (POC) with knowledge of the facility's security procedures and floor plan to liaise with police and other emergency agencies in the event of an attack.

4.4.1 Facility Manager. If identified, the facility manager can be the POC for antiterrorism and emergency management personnel as well as a key player in scheduling/conducting active shooter exercises within a building. Facility managers should coordinate with work center supervisors and include first responders, as often as possible, when conducting these exercises.

4.4.2 Supervisors. Ensure personnel assigned are trained, qualified, and ready to execute their individual responsibilities during an ASI.

4.4.3 Individuals. Responsible for knowing what to do during an ASI to include escape routes, emergency procedures, and applicable code words for different emergencies. Additionally, individuals should know important contact information for first responders (e.g., fire department, security forces).

4.5 Workplace Layout. The positioning of furniture, cubicles, appliances and other items within the work center can reduce or enhance the ability of an active shooter to achieve target acquisition. Large open workspaces provide a target rich environment by exposing large groups to the direct line of sight of an active shooter. Office areas where workspaces are separated by dividers or screening can hinder an active shooter's ability to engage multiple targets by restricting their

ability to achieve target acquisition. Additionally, this type of office design reduces the tactical advantage of surprise by placing Airmen in a better position to fight or escape.

NOTE: When personnel are armed, weapons racks should be stored in a location that is not easily accessible by passersby (adjacent to doors and other access points). Placing weapons racks away from access points gives personnel within the room or building a chance to identify and monitor the person(s) entering the workspace, which may result in detecting hostile intent before it begins. It would be most advantageous for workers to store weapons at/or near their desks or in the case of side arms, on their person.

4.6 Cover and Concealment. It is important for personnel to understand cover and concealment when reacting to an ASI. Cover is an object that can protect against weapons fire, while concealment only provides protection against visual detection from the enemy. Depending on material and construction, cubicles and furniture might only serve as effective concealment and fail to provide cover or protection from weapons fire.

4.7 Implementation. Once the EAP has been completed, active shooter drills should be incorporated into the unit's emergency preparedness exercises. In accordance with AFI 10-2501, *Air Force Emergency Management Program,* installations are required to conduct a minimum of two active shooter exercises per year. Together, the EAP and training exercises will prepare members to effectively respond and help minimize the loss of life.

NOTE: Utilize extreme caution when implementing unannounced ASI exercises and drills; personnel may respond violently to the threat or utilize extreme measures to escape (i.e., jump out of a window).

CHAPTER 5

INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS: ESCAPE, BARRICADE, FIGHT

5.1 Active Shooter Considerations. ASIs are often over before first responders arrive on scene. This rapid evolution and unpredictability of events makes individual actions critical to survival. All Airmen should receive mental, physical, and psychological training and exercising to react to an active shooter threat. To do this, Airmen should be prepared to employ their weapons (if armed) or seek other means of self-defense (if unarmed). All Airmen must know and understand the inherent right of self-defense, and the defense of others, as described in **Chapter 1**, Developing the Warrior Mindset and in accordance with AFI 31-117. To enhance an Airman's capability to meet these challenges, leaders should conduct frequent exercises to reinforce skills and develop muscle memory to execute the individual responses outlined in this chapter and throughout this publication.

5.2 Escape, Barricade, or Fight. During an ASI, there are three response options: escape, barricade, and/or fight. These choices are not in any particular order and there are no requirements to progress through one option before selecting another. The decision whether to escape, barricade, or fight is based on two factors: (1) your proximity to the shooter, and (2) the accessibility of escape routes. The information below provides a general synopsis of factors to consider when selecting to escape, barricade, or fight.

NOTE: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) refers to the option of *escape, barricade, and fight* as *run, hide, fight*. The options are the same, but the active nature of escape, barricade, and fight pertain to the context of a military operation or installation.

NOTE: Children, elderly, and/or handicapped (e.g., hearing/mobility/visually impaired) individuals may need assistance to execute the following ASI measures.

> **5.2.1 Escape.** Escape is a viable option if not directly confronted with the shooter(s), the escape route is unobstructed, or the escape route is not under the observation of the shooter(s). If close enough to hear gunshots, escape may be the best option. Unaffected buildings/ personnel should execute lockdown procedures (only first responders are authorized to move during lockdown) in accordance with AFI 10-2501. AFI 10-2501 defines lockdown as, "An announced emergency protocol used as a security measure to dramatically and rapidly enhance the level of security in a facility. Confining and restricting movement during an active shooter incident." The following considerations can enhance chances of survival while employing escape:
>
> • Consider all points of egress as potential escape routes (e.g., windows, doors).
>
> • Escape regardless of whether or not others agree to follow.
>
> • Be aware of other possible threats.
>
> • Be prepared to *fight,* and if not armed, carry an improvised weapon (e.g., scissors, something to strike someone with, something to throw).
>
> • Do not waste time gathering belongings (e.g., jacket, backpack); the only exception to this is *your weapon*.
>
> • Notify others to escape (*do not* pull fire alarm).
>
> • If armed, *do not* pursue the threat.

• Use individual tactics to move tactically (e.g., stay low, move quickly out of harm's way) through doorways and windows, around corners, and through hallways, away from gunfire. If armed, cover the general location of the shooter(s) with your weapon.

• Armed personnel can cover the escape of others while attempting to evacuate.

• Continually identify locations to fall back and barricade if your escape route is compromised.

• If wounded are encountered during escape, *do not* treat the wounded in the danger area—assist in their escape (if possible) and only treat wounded once properly barricaded.

• Proceed to a safe location—move away from the vicinity of the shooter(s) to an area providing protection from hostile fire and observation (could be another facility, or if injured, could be by self-transport to the nearest medical treatment facility).

NOTE: Avoid fratricide. It is extremely important to identify the target as hostile before using deadly force. Remember you may come in contact with nonhostile armed individuals such as first responders and other armed escapees (in a deployed environment) who are executing the same escape tactics as you. Performance based, practical training, incorporating decision-making scenarios will help avoid fratricide and condition Airmen to engage hostile targets.

5.2.1.1   If you have escaped to a safe location, you will likely be held in that area by first responders until the situation is under control and all witnesses have been identified and questioned. Be patient, cooperate fully, and do not leave until first responders instruct you to do so.

NOTE: Personnel should avoid established fire/bomb threat/suspicious package rally points. If a secondary shooter is involved, the shooter(s) may know where a designated rally point is. A rally point provides an opportunity for the shooter(s) to inflict casualties at a mass gathering/rally point. Rally points can be used once an "ALL CLEAR" is implemented and the threat is neutralized.

5.2.1.2 Once in a safe area, notify first responders via any means available to you (e.g., landline, radio, runner). When notifying first responders, provide the following information (if known):

• Location of the active shooter(s).

• Number of shooters, if more than one.

• Physical description of shooter(s).

• Number and type of weapons held by the shooter(s).

• Number of potential victims at the location.

5.2.2 Barricade. Barricading is not merely hiding. It is the active effort to hinder the shooter's ability to enter the room or facility. Barricade is a viable option if: (1) you are in proximity with the shooter(s), or (2) it is likely your escape route is obstructed and/or under the observation of the shooter(s). The following are considerations to enhance survival while employing barricade:

• Close and lock door(s).

• Be prepared to fight. If not armed, secure an improvised weapon.

• If armed, cover the point of entry into your area with your weapon while others build the barricade.

• With a round in the chamber, place weapon on fire and keep it pointed at point of entry. You should take up a position, which provides you cover and protects you from weapons fire.

• Do not treat the wounded in the danger area—only treat wounded once properly barricaded.

• Weigh providing assistance to any wounded with the probability of detection by the shooter(s). This should be further addressed in local policy or as the situation unfolds.

• Move heavy objects to barricade the door.

• If barricading the door with objects in the room is not possible, use objects in the room as obstacles to slow down, fix, turn, or obscure the vision of the shooter. Even though an obstacle will not prevent a shooter from entering your area, it will help you achieve a tactical advantage.

• Turn off the lights and any source of noise (e.g., radios, televisions).

• Remain quiet and observe noise discipline (e.g., limit movement, talking, whispering, yelling).

• Silence your electronic devices. If possible, contact emergency services when it is safe to do so.

• Once barricaded, hide in a place that reduces observation from the shooter, but allows you to react if you must defend your area. These positions should provide cover and/or concealment. If you are armed, choose a position that provides you cover so you can effectively engage the shooter(s) with your weapon while being protected from weapons fire.

• Develop a strategy to fight in case you cannot prevent the threat from entering the room.

5.2.3 Fight. Fight is *not* a last option. As with each tactic previously discussed, fight is employed when it offers the best chance for survival. Fight may be the first and only option. Move to fight if: (1) you are directly confronted with the shooter(s), or (2) the shooter(s) breaches the barricade and you need to defend yourself and others. In short, if directly engaged with a hostile force or engagement is imminent; the best chance for survival is to counter the threat with fight. As already stated, even if you select escape and barricade you must always be prepared to transition to fight if the tactical situation changes. It is important to note, pursuit of an active shooter(s) is discouraged. However, violent and fierce fight for survival is advocated when the tactical situation dictates. Your ability to fight will greatly be affected by your weapon status (i.e., armed or unarmed) and your ability to engage with surprise, speed, and violence of action. The following are considerations that enhance your chances of survival when employing fight:

5.2.3.1 (Unarmed) Secure an improvised weapon (e.g., something to strike with or throw).

5.2.3.2 (Unarmed) Throw objects aiming at the individual's head (surprise); followed by an immediate (speed) committed counter attack (violence of action).

5.2.3.3 (Unarmed) Attempt to disarm or direct the weapons away from you and others.

5.2.3.4 (Unarmed) Commit to the fight. There is no move that is ***off limits***. Use whatever is necessary to survive and incapacitate the shooter(s) (e.g., hit the shooter with an object or fist, eye gouge, bite, groin strike, pull hair, stomp on feet, head butt, punch individual in the throat [violence of action]). Whatever it takes, become more violent than the shooter and do not stop until the threat is subdued or terminated. Focus attacks on weak points in the shooter's defense (e.g., eyes, nose, groin, throat [violence of action]). Hit hard, hit fast, and hit often.

5.2.3.5 (Unarmed) Seize the initiative. If you are directly in the vicinity of the shooter(s) and your fellow Airman attacks, join the fight and overwhelm the shooter(s). Do not stop your attack until the shooter has been incapacitated—this was evident by the actions of a few passengers in the Paris train attack on 21 August 2015. An assailant armed with an automatic rifle, nine magazines of ammunition, an automatic pistol, and a box cutter, attempted to attack a packed high-speed passenger train. With that kind of firepower, a massacre might have occurred if three American friends traveling together, and a British passenger, had not tackled, beaten, and tied up the suspect.

5.2.3.6 (Armed) If you are engaged or being pursued by shooter(s), immediately return fire while moving to cover (protection from weapons fire).

5.2.3.7 (Armed) Do not pursue the threat.

5.2.3.8 (Armed) Avoid fratricide.

5.2.3.9 If the shooter(s) is subdued, secure the weapon. Be aware there may be more shooters and only responding forces can declare a scene clear. If the immediate threat has been terminated, reevaluate escape, barricade, and fight options based on the presence of another shooter. If there are no other known shooters:

• Maintain control of the shooter; physically (restrain) or cover with your weapon.

• Maintain visual of the threat.

• Evacuate other personnel surrounding the immediate area (all personnel should still be trying to escape, barricade, and/or fight, in case of another shooter).

• Wait for first responders to arrive and be prepared to follow ***all*** instructions (full cooperation is key to ensure the safety of all personnel).

5.3 What to Expect When First Responders Arrive. Although not universally true for all responding elements, most US first responders generally utilize the following common procedures and it is important to know what to expect. The following is a basic synopsis of actions to expect from first responders:

• May arrive in small teams.

• May proceed directly to the area where the last shots were heard.

• May wear a variety of uniforms (e.g., local law enforcement, host nation) and tactical equipment (e.g., bulletproof vests, helmets).

• May be armed with rifles, shotguns, and/or pistols.

• May use pepper spray, tear gas, or flash bangs to control the situation.

• May shout commands and push individuals to the ground for their safety.

• Most likely will not stop to help injured personnel.

• Expect rescue teams (e.g., rescue task force [RTF]) comprised of additional first responders and (in some locations) emergency medical personnel (identified as a best practice) to follow the initial responders. These rescue teams are specifically focused on delivering critical medical care and expedient extraction of victims to stabilize and reduce fatalities from readily treatable injuries.

• May instruct able-bodied individuals to assist in providing self-aid buddy care and removing the wounded.

5.4 Reaction to First Responders. Individual actions do not end immediately after the threat is neutralized. Every individual must strictly adhere to local procedures regarding individual actions once first responders are on scene. These procedures are established for your safety and the safety of the first responders. In the absence of local procedures, the following individual actions apply:

• First responders are only subject to the orders of their operational and tactical command during a response. Individuals not formally assigned or attached in operational or tactical control of first responders should not give orders to first responders regardless of rank, position, or affiliation. Violating this procedure hinders the tactical effectiveness of first responders, may result in an increased risk to personnel still in harm's way, and may constitute a violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

• Upon contact with first responders, remain calm, empty your hands, spread your fingers, and raise your hands keeping them visible. Follow the instructions of any first responders.

• Avoid making quick movements toward first responders such as reaching for something or holding onto first responders for safety.

• Do not stop to ask first responders for help or directions when evacuating.

• Follow the directions of first responders.

• Provide first responders with the following information, upon request:

    1. Location of the active shooter(s).

    2. Number of shooters, if more than one.

    3. Physical description of shooter(s).

    4. Number and type of weapons held by the shooter(s).

    5. Number of potential victims at the location.

• If you have escaped to a safe location or an assembly point, you will likely be held in that area by first responders until the situation is under control and all witnesses have been identified and questioned. Be patient, cooperate fully, and do not leave until first responders instruct you to do so.

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CHAPTER 6

TRAINING

6.1 Conditioning/Training Pitfalls. The three primary ways leaders improperly condition their Airmen are: (1) unintentionally conditioning Airmen to react in an undesired manner, (2) relying on a single training event to yield desired operational capabilities, and (3) by excessive use of simulation of individual action during exercise scenarios.

NOTE: Utilize extreme caution when implementing unannounced ASI exercises and drills; personnel may respond violently to the threat or utilize extreme measures to escape (i.e., jump out of a window).

6.1.1 Unintentional Conditioning. Base X conducted operational readiness training by placing Airmen in simulated combat scenarios during their field training exercises (FTX). All Airmen *deployed* to the FTX were issued weapons; however, only security forces were issued blank ammunition. When the opposing forces (OPFOR) attacked the base, only security forces had the means to engage the enemy. This approach was the installation's standard training structure for years. A follow-on scenario was conducted at a training event where security forces were removed from the FTX and blank ammunition was issued to the remaining Airmen. When the base was under attack during the second scenario, few Airmen engaged the OPFOR and some never even loaded their weapons. When the installation's wing inspection team (WIT) questioned the Airmen as to why they had not engaged the active shooter, some responded they *forgot* they had a weapon. So what was the failure? The standard training conditioned the non-security forces Airmen to not fight back, even when attacked. In addition, Airmen were conditioned to view their weapon as a burden rather than the key to their survival. These lessons were even more important because this was not the intention of leadership.

6.1.2 Single Training Event. The execution of a singular training task in most cases will not yield an operational capability. Capabilities are normally developed through a continual developmental process of interrelated activities, concepts, and principles. For example, a commander wishes to develop in their Airmen the ability to engage a hostile threat, with their weapon, and uses Air Force weapons certification firing to meet this objective. Weapons certification provides the Airmen with the intellectual ability of how to use a weapon, but this singular approach to training does not yield the desired capability because: (1) it alone does not condition them to immediately react to a threat (through muscle memory or stimulus response), and (2) it does not cultivate the psychological mindset needed to react effectively to violence.

6.1.3 Excessive Simulation. Realistic exercise scenarios may yield great benefits in conditioning the appropriate response. However, when individuals/units actions are allowed to be simulated (e.g., due to weather conditions, perceived operational priorities), the outcome is degradation in appropriate conditioning. Excessive simulation of individual actions conditions Airmen to ignore the initial warnings, hesitate in their actions (wait to hear the direction to simulate), or not act at all. An installation may have a robust training and exercise program; however, if individuals and certain units are allowed to simulate their action then the exercise does little more than meet an annual exercise requirement rather than providing the desired level of conditioning.

6.1.4 Forcing Airmen to "Lose" During Training Scenarios. One of the greatest benefits of proper training is developing confidence in one's skills and abilities. Conversely, developing realistic training scenarios (particularly those associated with survival skills) where Airmen are guaranteed to fail creates doubt in their skills and abilities. When training Airmen, the training must emphasize the ***warrior ethos*** and condition Airmen to fight through adversity. A common mistake in training is forcing Airmen to ***die*** or quit once they are engaged. This simulation tactic conditions the Airmen to ***stop*** when hit or engaged versus fighting through the scenario. There is no benefit to teaching Airmen how to ***die*** or remove themselves from the fight. Leaders who train Airmen and then place them in ***unwinnable*** or ***cannot lose*** scenarios may undermine the value of that training. This may cause a creation of doubt and lead to unnecessary hesitation when an Airman is required to take lifesaving actions. Realistic training means that sometimes Airmen will fail despite the use of approved and practiced tactics.

6.2 Appropriate Application of Training Elements. In order for training to be effective, it must focus less on task certification and more on conditioning the response of the Airmen. To develop a warrior mindset, training should condition the Airmen's physical, intellectual, and psychological abilities to react to violence.

6.2.1 Physical Elements of Training. The physical elements of training achieve two objectives: (1) conditioning the Airmen to be physically capable to execute the task, and (2) developing the ability to react to the threat without hesitation during periods of high stress (muscle memory). Courses that are physical in nature, but merely introduce or familiarize a task (i.e., annual weapons qualification, annual chemical warfare training) meet the first objective, while courses that are repetitive, realistic, and reactive (e.g., battle drills, fire drills) meet the second objective. Examples of activities, which develop physical element, are:

- Task proficiency drills (stimulus response).
- Realistic scenario based exercise.
- Physical fitness.
- Weapons proficiency (not merely qualification).
- Combatives type training (must be routinely trained).

6.2.2 Intellectual Elements of Training. The intellectual elements of training are to inform, familiarize, clarify, or introduce subject matter required for a task. Examples of activities that develop intellectual element are:

- Understanding policies and procedures.
- Understanding individual responsibilities.
- Understanding of threat indicators.
- Annual weapons qualification.
- Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, defense training.
- Training which overcomes learned behaviors or inappropriate personal beliefs (e.g., ***this could never happen to me*** mentality).

6.2.3 Psychological Element of Training. The psychological elements of training condition Airmen in three main areas to: (1) overcome physiological inhibitions, (2) foster the

development of a desired mindset, and (3) overcome the physical, cognitive, and behavioral responses of fear and stress. Some training designed to condition Airmen physically can also yield psychological benefits. For example, using a virtual weapons training simulator achieves the physical element of weapons proficiency while the interface with humanlike targets helps overcome the physiological inhibitions of engaging another human. Physical training, such as combatives, helps develop the mindset and will to fight while allowing Airmen to overcome fear of personal injury. Psychological training can help inoculate Airmen to the stress and fear of combat so they can function during high stress situations by introducing them to the visual, audio, and situational stimuli prior to an actual event. Preparing Airmen psychologically yields benefits beyond effectively reacting to enemy contact. This element of training can strengthen Airmen resiliency and enhances survival after the fight. Examples of activities, which develop psychological elements, are:

- Combatives training.
- Reality based training (dynamic and interactive).
- Virtual simulation.
- Live exercise (with realistic sounds, smells, sights, and scenarios).
- Stress Inoculation. Under high-stress conditions, over-learned behaviors (i.e., those previously experienced and repeatedly trained where limited decision-making is required) will be those easiest to use when it really matters, especially under challenging or adrenaline-inducing circumstances.

6.3 Additional Training. Leaders can contact local/base first responders for additional training resources available. Some additional training topics to consider are:

- Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) (first responder training).
- Air Force Be Ready program, see http//www.beready.af.mil.
- Mental Preparation.
- Combat Stress Recovery.
- Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC).
- Air Force Combatives Program.
- National Incident Management System (NIMS).
- Air Force Incident Management System (AFIMS).
- SALUTE Report.

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CHAPTER 7

ARMING CONSIDERATIONS

7.1 Overview. Firearms are an instrument of deadly force. Installation commanders should carefully examine the nature of the threat and the likelihood of an ASI. Some tools that should be carefully considered include (but are not limited to) the Unit Marshall Program (UMP) and Security Forces Staff Arming (SFSA) program. These programs are designed to supplement security forces and first responders in the event of an ASI. These programs allow commanders the ability to arm trained Airmen that can intercede before/until first responders arrive on scene. Upon the arrival of first responders, additionally armed Airmen would stand down and follow the directions of first responders.

> **7.1.1 Unit Marshall Program.** Squadron commanders have the option to arm and integrate personnel to mitigate perceived increased risk of workplace violence. With this program, a commander determines, based on a variety of factors, the need for armed security (i.e., a commander may determine that areas with easy accessibility to a large outside customer base, or a perceived threat to its personnel and customers, may require an armed presence to deter threats). UMP trained personnel, in accordance with AFI 31-117, are not first responders and are not expected to *move to the threat*; instead they are there to deter threats and protect their specific, dedicated area. UMP personnel can aid unit/individual survivability by an armed presence and the facilitation of escape, barricade, and/or fight.

> **7.1.2 Security Forces Staff Arming.** The SFSA program enables more security forces members, working in staff billets at the squadron, group, wing, or major command to open-carry a government issued weapon, while on duty, with the approval of the installation commander. With SFSA, these individuals can be armed and provide a more immediate response during an ASI. Individuals armed under this program still follow the same rules and have the same restrictions as on-duty SF personnel. These additionally armed SF Airmen can enhance the security of the installation and are available immediately to respond to a threat.

> **7.1.3 Privately Owned Firearms.** DODD 5210.56, *Arming and the Use of Force* provides guidance for permitting the carrying of privately owned firearms on DOD property by personnel for personal protection purposes that are not associated with the performance of official duties. Permissions granted under Section 4 of DODD 5210.56 do not apply to carrying a firearm within federal buildings. Unless the arming authority specifically determines, after consultation with servicing legal counsel and in accordance with applicable DOD policy, that an appropriate exception under Title 18, United States Code (USC), Section 930(d), *Possession of Firearms and Dangerous Weapons in Federal Facilities* applies. AFMAN 31-125, *Security Forces Implementation of the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA)* provides policy on the carry of privately owned firearms. LEOSA allows all categories of LEOSA credentialed-personnel—current, separated, and retired law enforcement officers to carry their concealed, privately owned firearm on base (if authorized by the installation commander). However, even if authorized, an installation commander and LEOSA carrying members, must still adhere to other jurisdictions that may have a presence on base (i.e., US Postal Service falls under another federal jurisdiction).

NOTE: Participation in any of the above programs does not preclude the member from strict adherence to local, State, or host nation laws/policies.

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ATTACHMENT 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

A1.1 References.

AFI 10-2501, *Air Force Emergency Management Program,* 19 April 2016 (AFGM2017-02, 2 August 2017)

AFI 31-117, *Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel*, 2 February 2016 (AFGM 2016-01, 29 June 2017)

AFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*, 1 December 2015 (AFGM2018-02.01, 15 February 2018)

AFMAN 31-125, *Security Forces Implementation of the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA)*, 22 April 2014

AFMAN 31-201, Volume 4, *High-Risk Response*, 17 November 2011 (certified current, 14 July 2017)

AFMAN 33-363, *Management of Records*, 1 March 2008, (AFGM2017-01, 2 June 2017; change 2, 9 June 2016; certified current 21 July 2016)

DODD 5210.56, *Arming and the Use of Force*, 18 November 2016

Title 18, United States Code (USC), §930(d), *Possession of Firearms and Dangerous Weapons in Federal Facilities*, Current Edition

A1.2 Adopted Forms.

AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

A1.3 Abbreviations and Acronyms.

ACT ....adrenaline + cortisol + thought
AOR ....area of responsibility
ASI..................................active shooter incident
CAF..................................comprehensive airmen fitness
CAIB ....Community Action Information Board
DOD................................Department of Defense
EAP..................................emergency action plan
FTX..................................field training exercise
HN...................................host nation
HRVRT ....High Risk for Violence Response Team
IFC ....intelligence fusion center
LEOSA............................Law Enforcement Officer Safety Act
OPFOR............................opposing force
POC.................................point of contact
ROE ....rules of engagement
SFSA...............................Security Forces Staff Arming
TWG ....threat working group
UCMJ..............................Uniform Code of Military Justice
UMP................................Unit Marshall Program

US ....United States
WIT ....wing inspection team

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AFTTP 3-4.6, ACTIVE SHOOTER