

Question

If temporary orders in Texas are issued without the respondent's and their counsel's signatures, but explicitly state 'as evidenced by the signatures below all parties agreed' and 'AGREED AND CONSENTED TO' on the signature page, are they enforceable by law enforcement?

Answer (Texas)

Short response

Temporary orders in Texas that state parties have agreed but lack the respondent's and counsel's signatures may be legally questionable and difficult to enforce by law enforcement, particularly if the respondent challenges the order's validity. The enforceability depends on whether proper notice and hearing requirements were met and whether the order clearly and unambiguously states the terms for compliance, rather than solely on the presence of signatures.

Summary

The enforceability of temporary orders in Texas that indicate agreement but lack the respondent's and counsel's signatures involves complex considerations of statutory requirements and case law principles. While Texas Family Code provides that temporary orders are enforceable under Chapter 157 and violations are punishable by contempt, the absence of signatures on orders that explicitly claim agreement creates a contradiction that may undermine their enforceability, particularly if challenged. In [In re Russell, 321 S.W.3d 846 \(Tex. App. 2010\)](#), the court held that a signature under "Approved and Agreed," standing alone, does not establish consent—suggesting that the mere recitation of agreement without actual signatures is even more problematic.

The enforceability question is further complicated by procedural requirements for temporary orders, which generally require notice and hearing before issuance. While temporary orders are binding on parties who receive notice, the discrepancy between the stated agreement and missing signatures raises due process concerns. For law enforcement to enforce such orders, they must state in clear and unambiguous terms what the respondent must do to comply, as established in [Ex parte Brister, 801 S.W.2d 833 \(Tex. 1990\)](#). The inconsistency between the claimed agreement and missing signatures creates ambiguity that might render the order unenforceable through contempt proceedings or by law enforcement.

Background and Relevant Law

Statutory Framework

The Texas Family Code provides the statutory basis for temporary orders in family law cases. Under Section 105.001 of the Texas Family Code, a court may issue temporary orders in suits affecting the parent-child relationship for the safety and welfare of the child. The 2025 version of this statute states: "Temporary orders rendered under this section are not subject to interlocutory appeal. The violation of a temporary restraining order, temporary injunction, or other temporary order rendered under this section is punishable by contempt and the order is subject to and enforceable under Chapter 157." [Tex. Fam. Code § 105.001](#). This provision establishes that temporary orders are enforceable and violations can be punished through contempt proceedings, which is a significant aspect of law enforcement's ability to enforce such orders.

The enforceability of agreed orders is specifically addressed in Section 85.005(b) of the Texas Family Code, which provides that "An agreed protective order is enforceable civilly or criminally, regardless of whether the court makes the findings required by Section FAMILY CODE 85.001." [Tex. Fam. Code § 85.005](#)(b). This provision suggests that agreed orders can be enforced without meeting certain procedural requirements, but it does not specifically address the necessity of signatures to validate the agreement.

Additionally, Section 157.001 of the Texas Family Code addresses the enforcement of temporary orders: "(a) A motion for enforcement as provided in this chapter may be filed to enforce any provision of a temporary or final order rendered in a suit. (b) The court may enforce by contempt any provision of a temporary or final order." [Tex. Fam. Code § 157.001](#)(a)-(b). The statute further clarifies that "'temporary order' includes a temporary restraining order, standing order, injunction, and any other temporary order rendered by a court." [Tex. Fam. Code § 157.001](#)(e). This provision establishes the general enforceability of temporary orders in Texas, without specifically addressing signature requirements.

Case Law on Agreement and Signatures

The Texas Court of Appeals addressed a similar issue in [In re Russell, 321 S.W.3d 846 \(Tex. App. 2010\)](#), where the court examined whether signatures on a document established consent to a temporary order. The court noted: "The August 3, 2006 temporary orders recite that '[t]he parties have agreed to the terms of this order as evidenced by their signatures on the Associate Judge's recommendation on file in this cause.' But nowhere in the associate judge's report, which Chassidie and her counsel signed, is section 153.3161 or David's possible deployment mentioned. Nor does the report contain any explicit 'agreement' as to factual allegations that would support standing under the family code." [In re Russell, 321 S.W.3d 846 \(Tex. App. 2010\)](#).

The court in [Russell](#) went on to cite an important principle from earlier case law: "See, e.g., Oryx Energy Co. v. Union Nat'l Bank of Tex., 895 S.W.2d 409, 416-17 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied) (holding that signature underneath heading 'Approved and Agreed,' standing alone, does not establish consent judgment)." [In re Russell, 321 S.W.3d 846 \(Tex. App. 2010\)](#). This principle suggests that even when signatures are present under a heading indicating agreement, additional evidence of consent may be necessary to establish a true agreed order. By extension, if signatures themselves are insufficient to establish consent, the absence of signatures on an order claiming agreement would be even more problematic for enforceability.

Notice and Hearing Requirements

Several Texas cases emphasize that temporary orders in suits affecting the parent-child relationship require notice and a hearing before they can be rendered, with limited exceptions for emergency situations. In [In re Farmer](#), the court stated: "In a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, the trial court may make a temporary order for the safety and welfare of the child, including an order modifying a prior temporary order. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.001(a)... Other than an emergency order sought by a governmental entity, an order may not be rendered under section 105.001(a) (1), (2), or (5) except after notice and a hearing. Id. § 105.001(b), (h)..." [In re Farmer](#).

Similarly, in [In re Chester, 357 S.W.3d 103 \(Tex. App. 2011\)](#), the court emphasized: "In a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, the trial court may make a temporary order for the safety and welfare of the child, including an order modifying a prior temporary order. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 105.001(a) (West 2008). A temporary order for the conservatorship of the child may not be rendered without notice and a hearing. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 105.001(a), (b), (h); Herring, 221 S.W.3d at 730." [In re Chester, 357 S.W.3d 103 \(Tex. App. 2011\)](#). This emphasizes that due process, including proper notice and the opportunity for a hearing, is a critical component of enforceability for temporary orders.

The court in [In re K.M., NO. 12-18-00044-CV \(Tex. App. Apr 18, 2018\)](#) also reaffirmed these requirements, stating: "Other than an emergency order sought by a governmental entity, an order may not be rendered under section 105.001(a)(1), (2), or (5) except after notice and a hearing." [In re K.M., NO. 12-18-00044-CV \(Tex. App. Apr 18, 2018\)](#).

Requirements for Enforceability by Contempt

The Texas Supreme Court has established clear principles for when an order is enforceable through contempt proceedings, which is relevant to law enforcement's ability to enforce temporary orders. In [Ex parte Brister, 801 S.W.2d 833 \(Tex. 1990\)](#), the court held: "To be enforceable by contempt a judgment must set out the terms for compliance in clear and unambiguous terms. See, e.g., Ex parte Reese, 701 S.W.2d 840 (Tex.1986); Ex parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.1967). The judgment must also clearly order the party to

perform the required acts. See *Ex parte Gorena*, 595 S.W.2d 841, 845 (Tex. 1979)." [Ex parte Brister, 801 S.W.2d 833 \(Tex. 1990\).](#)

This principle was also applied in [In re Sherry Lemons, 47 S.W.3d 202 \(Tex. App. 2001\)](#), where the court stated: "The order does not state in clear and unambiguous terms what John Lemons must do to comply with the judgment and thus, is unenforceable by Sherry. See [Ex parte Brister, 801 S.W.2d 833, 834-35 \(Tex. 1990\).](#) [In re Sherry Lemons, 47 S.W.3d 202 \(Tex. App. 2001\).](#) These cases establish that for an order to be enforceable through contempt proceedings, it must clearly and unambiguously state what the party must do to comply.

Binding Effect of Temporary Orders

In [Ayala v. Minniti, 714 S.W.2d 452 \(Tex. App. 1986\)](#), the court addressed the binding effect of temporary injunctions: "This temporary injunction is effective immediately and shall continue in full force and effect until further order of this Court or until it expires by operation of law. This order shall be binding on respondent, on respondent's attorneys, agents, servants and employees, and on those persons in active concern [sic] or participation with them who receive notice of this order by personal service or otherwise." [Ayala v. Minniti, 714 S.W.2d 452 \(Tex. App. 1986\)](#). This case suggests that temporary orders can be effective and binding when the parties have agreed and stipulated to them, and they are binding on those who receive notice of the order.

Analysis

Legal Status of Unsigned "Agreed" Temporary Orders

The central question is whether temporary orders that state they are agreed to but lack the signatures of the respondent and their counsel can be enforced by law enforcement. The Texas Family Code clearly establishes that temporary orders are enforceable under Chapter 157 and violations are punishable by contempt. However, the absence of signatures on orders that explicitly claim agreement creates a contradiction that may undermine their enforceability.

The case of [In re Russell, 321 S.W.3d 846 \(Tex. App. 2010\)](#) is particularly instructive. In [Russell](#), the court examined a situation where temporary orders recited that parties had agreed to the terms as evidenced by their signatures, but the court found that the signatures alone did not establish consent to all aspects of the order. The court cited the principle that "signature underneath heading 'Approved and Agreed,' standing alone, does not establish consent judgment." [In re Russell, 321 S.W.3d 846 \(Tex. App. 2010\)](#). If signatures alone are insufficient to establish consent, then the absence of signatures on an order claiming agreement would be even more problematic for enforceability.

The scenario described in the question presents an even greater inconsistency: the order explicitly states "as evidenced by the signatures

below all parties agreed" and "AGREED AND CONSENTED TO" on the signature page, yet the signatures of the respondent and counsel are missing. This internal contradiction could undermine the credibility and enforceability of the order, as it falsely claims evidence of agreement that does not exist.

Procedural Requirements for Temporary Orders

The enforceability of temporary orders also depends on whether proper procedural requirements were followed in their issuance. Multiple cases, including [In re Farmer](#), [In re Chester](#), [357 S.W.3d 103 \(Tex. App. 2011\)](#), and [In re K.M., NO. 12-18-00044-CV \(Tex. App. Apr 18, 2018\)](#), emphasize that temporary orders require notice and a hearing before they can be rendered, except in limited emergency situations.

If the temporary orders in question were issued without these procedural safeguards, their enforceability would be questionable regardless of the signature issue. The missing signatures might suggest that the respondent did not participate in or receive notice of the proceedings, raising due process concerns that could render the orders unenforceable.

Requirements for Contempt Enforcement

For law enforcement to enforce temporary orders through contempt proceedings, the orders must meet certain standards of clarity and specificity. The Texas Supreme Court established in [Ex parte Brister](#), [801 S.W.2d 833 \(Tex. 1990\)](#) that to be enforceable by contempt, a judgment must "set out the terms for compliance in clear and unambiguous terms" and "clearly order the party to perform the required acts." [Ex parte Brister](#), [801 S.W.2d 833 \(Tex. 1990\)](#).

The inconsistency between the claimed agreement and the missing signatures creates ambiguity that might render the order unenforceable through contempt proceedings. If the order falsely claims that parties agreed "as evidenced by the signatures below" when those signatures are absent, this could be seen as a lack of the clarity and unambiguity required for contempt enforcement.

Binding Effect on Parties with Notice

In [Ayala v. Minniti](#), [714 S.W.2d 452 \(Tex. App. 1986\)](#), the court noted that temporary orders are "binding on respondent, on respondent's attorneys, agents, servants and employees, and on those persons in active concern or participation with them who receive notice of this order by personal service or otherwise." [Ayala v. Minniti](#), [714 S.W.2d 452 \(Tex. App. 1986\)](#). This suggests that receipt of notice, rather than signatures, might be the key factor in determining whether the order is binding on the respondent.

However, if the respondent never received notice of the order or had the opportunity to participate in the proceedings, the absence of signatures could corroborate a claim that they were not properly notified, potentially undermining the order's enforceability.

Exceptions and Caveats

Emergency Orders

Section 105.001 of the Texas Family Code contains exceptions for emergency orders sought by governmental entities, which may be issued without notice and hearing. [Tex. Fam. Code § 105.001](#). If the temporary orders in question were issued as emergency orders by a governmental entity, different procedural requirements would apply. However, even in such cases, the false claim of agreement evidenced by signatures would still present issues for enforceability.

Agreed Protective Orders

Section 85.005(b) of the Texas Family Code specifically addresses agreed protective orders, stating they are "enforceable civilly or criminally, regardless of whether the court makes the findings required by Section FAMILY CODE 85.001." [Tex. Fam. Code § 85.005](#)(b). This suggests that agreed orders may be enforced without meeting certain procedural requirements. However, this provision assumes that the orders are genuinely agreed to by the parties. The absence of signatures on an order claiming agreement raises doubts about whether there was actual agreement, potentially removing it from the scope of this provision.

Evidence of Agreement Outside the Document

It's worth noting that evidence of agreement might exist outside the four corners of the document. For instance, the parties might have orally agreed to the terms on the record in court, even if they did not sign the final document. In [Ayala v. Minniti, 714 S.W.2d 452 \(Tex. App. 1986\)](#), the court considered dialogue from the hearing where the parties indicated agreement, not just the signatures on the document. However, if no such external evidence exists, the contradiction between the claimed agreement and missing signatures becomes more problematic.

Conclusion

Based on the provided legal authorities, temporary orders in Texas that state they are agreed to but lack the signatures of the respondent and their counsel present significant enforceability challenges, particularly if the respondent contests the order's validity. While Texas Family Code Section 105.001 establishes that temporary orders are generally enforceable and violations are punishable by contempt, the absence of signatures on orders that explicitly claim agreement creates a contradiction that undermines their enforceability.

The case of [In re Russell, 321 S.W.3d 846 \(Tex. App. 2010\)](#) suggests that even when signatures are present, they may not be sufficient to establish consent to all aspects of an order. By extension, the absence of signatures on an order claiming agreement would be even more problematic for

enforceability, particularly given the internal contradiction created by statements like "as evidenced by the signatures below all parties agreed" when those signatures are absent.

For law enforcement to enforce temporary orders, they must meet the standards established in [Ex parte Brister, 801 S.W.2d 833 \(Tex. 1990\)](#) - they must "set out the terms for compliance in clear and unambiguous terms" and "clearly order the party to perform the required acts." The inconsistency between the claimed agreement and missing signatures creates ambiguity that might render the order unenforceable through contempt proceedings or by law enforcement.

Additionally, temporary orders generally require notice and hearing before issuance, as emphasized in cases like [In re Farmer, In re Chester, 357 S.W.3d 103 \(Tex. App. 2011\)](#), and [In re K.M., NO. 12-18-00044-CV \(Tex. App. Apr 18, 2018\)](#). If the temporary orders were issued without these procedural safeguards, their enforceability would be questionable regardless of the signature issue.

In conclusion, while temporary orders in Texas are generally enforceable under Chapter 157 of the Family Code, the specific scenario described—orders claiming agreement evidenced by signatures that are actually absent—presents a contradiction that would likely lead to challenges in enforcement by law enforcement, particularly if the respondent contests the validity of the order. The false claim of agreement evidenced by signatures that do not exist undermines the clarity and unambiguity required for contempt enforcement under [Ex parte Brister, 801 S.W.2d 833 \(Tex. 1990\)](#). Law enforcement agencies faced with such orders may be reluctant to enforce them, particularly if the respondent raises valid objections about the absence of signatures and the false claim of agreement.

Legal Authorities

[In re Russell, 321 S.W.3d 846 \(Tex. App. 2010\)](#)

Texas Court of Appeals

Extract

The August 3, 2006 temporary orders recite that '[t]he parties have agreed to the terms of this order as evidenced by their signatures on the Associate Judge's recommendation on file in this cause.' But nowhere in the associate judge's report, which Chassidie and her counsel signed, is section 153.3161 or David's possible deployment mentioned. Nor does the report contain any explicit 'agreement' as to factual allegations that would support standing under the family code. See, e.g., Oryx Energy Co. v. Union Nat'l Bank of Tex., 895 S.W.2d 409, 416-17 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied) (holding that signature underneath heading 'Approved and Agreed,' standing alone, does not establish consent judgment).

Summary

The passage discusses a situation where temporary orders recited that parties agreed to the terms, but the signatures alone did not establish an agreed order because there was no explicit agreement on factual allegations supporting standing. This suggests that merely stating that parties agreed, without their signatures or explicit agreement on the record, may not be sufficient to enforce the order.

[In re Farmer](#)

Texas Court of Appeals

Extract

In a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, the trial court may make a temporary order for the safety and welfare of the child, including an order modifying a prior temporary order. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.001(a). Specifically, section 105.001(a) of the Texas Family Code provides that, in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, a trial court may make a temporary order for the child's safety and welfare, including an order (1) for the temporary conservatorship of the child, (2) for the temporary support of the child, (3) to restrain a party from disturbing the peace of the child or another party, (4) to prohibit a person from removing the child beyond a geographical area identified by the court, or (5) for payment of reasonable attorney's fees and expenses. Id. Other than an emergency order sought by a governmental entity, an order may not be rendered under section 105.001(a)(1), (2), or (5) except after notice and a hearing. Id. § 105.001(b), (h); see *In re L.A.-K.*, 596 S.W.3d 387, 396 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2020, no pet.) (concluding that Chapter 105, rather than Chapter 156, of the Texas Family Code applies to a challenge to temporary orders denying a Father access to and possession of the child without giving him notice and an opportunity to be heard); *In re Chester*, 357 S.W.3d 103, 107 (Tex. App.- San Antonio 2011, orig. proceeding) (noting that a parent is entitled to notice and an adversary hearing before entry of a temporary order modifying custody); *In re K.L.R.*, 162 S.W.3d 291, 301 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2005, no pet.).

Summary

Temporary orders in suits affecting the parent-child relationship in Texas require notice and a hearing before they can be rendered, except in emergency situations. This implies that the enforceability of such orders is contingent upon proper procedural adherence, including notice and hearing, rather than merely the presence of signatures or statements of agreement.

[In re Sherry Lemons, 47 S.W.3d 202 \(Tex. App. 2001\)](#)

Texas Court of Appeals

Extract

The order does not state in clear and unambiguous terms what John Lemons must do to comply with the judgment and thus, is unenforceable by Sherry. See *Ex parte Brister*, 801 S.W.2d 833, 834-35 (Tex. 1990).

Summary

For a court order to be enforceable, it must state in clear and unambiguous terms what the parties must do to comply with the judgment. If an order lacks clarity and specificity, it may be deemed unenforceable. This principle is applicable to the question of whether temporary orders without signatures but with language indicating agreement are enforceable.

[In re Perricone](#)

Texas Court of Appeals

Extract

Relator relies on Rules 680, 683, and 684 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to support his argument that the temporary orders signed by Judge Moore are void. However, pursuant to Section 105.001 of the Family Code, the trial court may issue temporary orders 'for the safety and welfare of the child[ren], including an order... restraining a party from disturbing the peace of the child[ren] or another party,' without including the specific requirements about which Relator complains here.

Summary

Under Section 105.001 of the Texas Family Code, a trial court has the authority to issue temporary orders for the safety and welfare of children without adhering to certain procedural requirements that might otherwise render an order void under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. This suggests that the absence of signatures from the respondent and their counsel does not necessarily invalidate the temporary orders if they are issued under the authority of Section 105.001 for the welfare of children.

[In re K.M., NO. 12-18-00044-CV \(Tex. App. Apr 18, 2018\)](#)

Texas Court of Appeals

Extract

In a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, a trial court may make a temporary order for the child's safety and welfare, including an order (1) for the temporary conservatorship of the child, (2) for the temporary support of the child, (3) to restrain a party from disturbing the peace of the child or

another party, (4) to prohibit a person from removing the child beyond a geographical area identified by the court, or (5) for payment of reasonable attorney's fees and expenses. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.001(a). The trial court is further authorized to render temporary orders in a suit for modification. Id. § 156.006(a) (West Supp. 2017). Other than an emergency order sought by a governmental entity, an order may not be rendered under section 105.001(a)(1), (2), or (5) except after notice and a hearing.

Summary

Temporary orders in suits affecting the parent-child relationship require notice and a hearing before they can be rendered, except in emergency situations. This suggests that the enforceability of such orders may depend on whether proper procedures, including notice and hearing, were followed, rather than solely on the presence of signatures.

[Ayala v. Minniti, 714 S.W.2d 452 \(Tex. App. 1986\)](#)

Texas Court of Appeals

Extract

We do not, however, reach the merits of appellant's contentions because the record reflects that appellant agreed and stipulated to the temporary injunction issued by the court. At the motion for temporary orders, the following discourse occurred: ... This temporary injunction is effective immediately and shall continue in full force and effect until further order of this Court or until it expires by operation of law. This order shall be binding on respondent, on respondent's attorneys, agents, servants and employees, and on those persons in active concern [sic] or participation with them who receive notice of this order by personal service or otherwise.

Summary

Temporary orders can be effective and binding if the parties have agreed and stipulated to them, even if there are procedural issues such as the absence of a bond. The enforceability of such orders is supported by the fact that they are binding on the respondent and others who receive notice of the order. This suggests that the agreement and stipulation to the order, as evidenced by the language in the order, can make it enforceable.

[In re Chester, 357 S.W.3d 103 \(Tex. App. 2011\)](#)

Texas Court of Appeals

Extract

In a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, the trial court may make a temporary order for the safety and welfare of the child, including an order modifying a prior temporary order. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 105.001(a) (West 2008). A temporary order for the conservatorship of the child may not be rendered without notice and a hearing. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 105.001(a), (b), (h); Herring, 221 S.W.3d at 730.

Summary

Temporary orders in suits affecting the parent-child relationship require notice and a hearing before they can be rendered. This suggests that due process, including proper notice and the opportunity for a hearing, is a critical component of enforceability. The absence of signatures from the respondent and their counsel, coupled with the requirement for notice and a hearing, raises questions about whether due process was followed. If due process was not adhered to, the enforceability of the orders could be challenged.

[Ex parte Brister, 801 S.W.2d 833 \(Tex. 1990\)](#)

Texas Supreme Court

Extract

To be enforceable by contempt a judgment must set out the terms for compliance in clear and unambiguous terms. See, e.g., Ex parte Reese, 701 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. 1986); Ex parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1967). The judgment must also clearly order the party to perform the required acts. See Ex parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d 841, 845 (Tex. 1979).

Summary

For a judgment or order to be enforceable by contempt, it must clearly and unambiguously set out the terms for compliance and clearly order the party to perform the required acts. This requirement is crucial for enforceability by law enforcement, as it ensures that the parties involved have a clear understanding of their obligations under the order.

[Tex. Fam. Code § 105.001 Tex. Fam. Code § 105.001 Temporary Orders Before Final Order](#)

Extract

Temporary orders rendered under this section are not subject to interlocutory appeal. The violation of a temporary restraining order,

temporary injunction, or other temporary order rendered under this section is punishable by contempt and the order is subject to and enforceable under Chapter 157.

Summary

Temporary orders under this section are enforceable and violations are punishable by contempt. The passage does not specifically address the requirement of signatures for enforceability, but it emphasizes that temporary orders are enforceable under Chapter 157, which deals with enforcement of court orders. The enforceability of the order does not seem to be contingent on the presence of signatures, but rather on the order being rendered by the court.

[Tex. Fam. Code § 85.005 Tex. Fam. Code § 85.005 Agreed Order](#)

Extract

(b) An agreed protective order is enforceable civilly or criminally, regardless of whether the court makes the findings required by Section FAMILY CODE 85.001.

Summary

An agreed protective order is enforceable both civilly and criminally, even if the court does not make specific findings typically required. This suggests that the enforceability of such orders does not necessarily depend on the presence of signatures from all parties, as long as the order is agreed upon and approved by the court.

[Tex. Fam. Code § 157.001 Tex. Fam. Code § 157.001 Motion For Enforcement](#)

Extract

(a) A motion for enforcement as provided in this chapter may be filed to enforce any provision of a temporary or final order rendered in a suit. (b) The court may enforce by contempt any provision of a temporary or final order. (e) For purposes of this section, 'temporary order' includes a temporary restraining order, standing order, injunction, and any other temporary order rendered by a court.

Summary

The Texas Family Code allows for the enforcement of temporary orders through a motion for enforcement. The court has the authority to enforce these orders by contempt, regardless of whether the respondent's and their

counsel's signatures are present, as long as the order is rendered by a court. The passage does not specifically address the issue of missing signatures but emphasizes the enforceability of court-rendered orders.

This memo was compiled by Vincent AI based on vLex materials available as of June 15, 2025. [View full answer on vLex](#)