

Question

Charles was evicted from his home, deprived of marital funds, and removed from his business as a direct result of the defendants' coordinated actions. To have standing under RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)), a plaintiff must show injury to business or property proximately caused by the RICO violation. Charles's eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business constitute compensable injuries under RICO, giving him standing to bring a claim.

Answer (U.S. Federal)

Short response

Charles has standing under RICO based on the injuries described, as eviction from his home, deprivation of marital funds, and removal from his business constitute injuries to "business or property" within the meaning of [18 U.S.C. § 1964\(c\)](#). These injuries, if proximately caused by the defendants' coordinated actions that violated RICO, satisfy the standing requirements for bringing a civil RICO claim.

Summary

The [Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations](#) Act (RICO) provides a civil remedy under [18 U.S.C. § 1964\(c\)](#) for "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962." To establish standing under this provision, a plaintiff must demonstrate three elements: (1) a violation of RICO under § 1962, (2) an injury to the plaintiff's business or property, and (3) that the RICO violation proximately caused the injury. The injuries Charles has suffered—eviction from his home, deprivation of marital funds, and removal from his business—qualify as injuries to "business or property" within the meaning of the statute.

Courts have consistently interpreted "injury to business or property" to include concrete financial losses and deprivation of property use, which aligns with Charles's situation. His eviction represents a loss of property use, the deprivation of marital funds constitutes a direct financial injury, and his removal from his business implicates both loss of property rights and business interests. Provided that Charles can establish that these injuries were proximately caused by the defendants' pattern of racketeering activity in violation of § 1962, he has standing to bring a civil RICO claim and seek the remedies available under § 1964(c), including treble damages and attorney's fees.

Background and Relevant Law

Statutory Framework

The civil remedies provision of RICO, [18 U.S.C. § 1964\(c\)](#), provides the legal foundation for private individuals to bring claims under the statute. According to the most current version of this provision:

"Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee..." [18 U.S.C. § 1964\(c\)](#) (2025).

This provision creates a private right of action for individuals who have suffered injury to their business or property as a result of a RICO violation, allowing them to recover treble damages and attorney's fees.

Requirements for Civil RICO Standing

Elements of Standing Under § 1964(c)

Multiple judicial decisions and secondary sources consistently articulate three elements required for civil RICO standing:

1. A violation of § 1962
2. Injury to business or property
3. Proximate causation between the violation and the injury

As stated in [Hellenic Petroleum LLC v. Mansfield Oil Co. of Gainesville, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-01071-DAD-SKO \(E.D. Cal. Jan 28, 2020\)](#): "To have standing under § 1964(c), a plaintiff must allege: (i) 'that his alleged harm qualifies as injury to his business or property;' and (ii) 'that his harm was 'by reason of' the RICO violation, which requires the plaintiff to establish proximate causation.'"

Similarly, [Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 214 F.Supp.3d 808 \(N.D. Cal. 2016\)](#) specifies: "The elements of a RICO claim are: (i) the conduct of (ii) an enterprise that affects interstate commerce (iii) through a pattern (iv) of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt... In addition, the conduct must be the proximate cause of harm to the victim. Under § 1964(c), plaintiffs must also allege that they have been injured in their 'property or business' by reason of the alleged racketeering activities."

These requirements are further reinforced by [Pappas v. Passias, 887 F.Supp. 465 \(E.D. N.Y. 1995\)](#), which explains that "the injury complained of must be to business or property, and moreover, such business or property must belong to the plaintiff." The court also emphasized that "a plaintiff must demonstrate 'proximate causation' in order to recover under RICO; that is to

say, the plaintiff must establish that the relationship between the defendants' conduct and the injury claimed is not too remote."

Injury to "Business or Property" Requirement

Courts have interpreted the phrase "business or property" to require concrete financial losses or deprivations of property use. According to [Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897 \(9th Cir. 2005\)](#): "The only requirement for RICO standing is that one be a 'person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962.'" The court further clarifies that "for a complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must allege not only a section 1962 violation but also that he was 'injured in his business or property.'"

The Supreme Court in [Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U.S. 258, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 \(1992\)](#) stated that "a RICO plaintiff 'only has standing if, and can only recover to the extent that, he has been injured in his business or property by [reason of] the conduct constituting the violation.'" It's important to note that Holmes was stated as vacated by *State v. Swafford*, 654 S.E.2d 297, 375 S.C. 637 (S.C. App. 2007). However, this subsequent treatment does not directly impact the specific holding regarding RICO standing requirements, as the vacatur relates to other aspects of the case and was issued by a state appellate court, which does not override U.S. Supreme Court precedent on federal law matters.

The secondary source "[Defending RICO Claims In The Business Context Part II: RICO Claims Must Allege Injury To Business Or Property](#)" (2022) provides additional clarity on what constitutes an injury to business or property: "Indeed, most courts have construed them narrowly to mean that there must be a pecuniary injury to a proprietary interest, and thus a plaintiff must show some sort of concrete financial loss. In addition, the injury must be ascertainable and definable, such as when a plaintiff is deprived of the ability to use or transfer property."

This source further elaborates that courts have found sufficient injuries in cases involving "lost profits, excessive interest charges, property damage and interference with business, such as decreased business profits or increased costs of doing business." These examples are particularly relevant to Charles's situation, as his removal from his business could result in lost profits and his eviction represents a deprivation of his ability to use property.

Proximate Causation Requirement

For a RICO claim to proceed, the plaintiff must demonstrate that their injuries were proximately caused by the RICO violation. The Supreme Court in [Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S.Ct. 1991, 164 L.Ed.2d 720, 547 U.S. 451 \(2006\)](#) confirmed that § 1964(c) "broadly authorize[s] suit by '[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962.'" However, courts have consistently interpreted the "by reason of" language to require proximate causation.

As [Livingston Downs Racing Ass'n v. Jefferson Downs, 192 F.Supp.2d 519 \(M.D. La. 2001\)](#) explains: "To establish standing under § 1964(c), a plaintiff must show (1) a violation of § 1962, (2) an injury to his business or property, and (3) that his injury was proximately caused by a RICO violation."

The secondary source "[Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations](#)" (2008) reinforces this point: "a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's violation of [section] 1962 was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury to have standing for a civil RICO action."

Analysis of Charles's Standing Under RICO

Qualification of Charles's Injuries as "Injury to Business or Property"

To determine whether Charles has standing under RICO, we must first assess whether his alleged injuries—eviction from his home, deprivation of marital funds, and removal from his business—qualify as injuries to "business or property" under § 1964(c).

Eviction from Home

Charles's eviction from his home constitutes an injury to property within the meaning of § 1964(c). The secondary source "[Defending RICO Claims In The Business Context Part II: RICO Claims Must Allege Injury To Business Or Property](#)" (2022) notes that an injury to property includes instances "when a plaintiff is deprived of the ability to use or transfer property." Eviction directly deprives Charles of the ability to use his home, which is a clear property interest.

This interpretation aligns with "Chapter 3. Standing", which states that "A civil RICO plaintiff must have suffered concrete financial loss. Speculative, amorphous, attenuated, or intangible loss will not do... The requirement that the injury be to the plaintiff's business or property means that the plaintiff must show a proprietary type of damage." Eviction represents a concrete, proprietary type of damage to Charles's interest in his home.

Deprivation of Marital Funds

The deprivation of marital funds constitutes a direct financial injury to Charles's property. Courts have consistently recognized that financial losses qualify as injuries to property under RICO. As noted in [Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271 \(7th Cir. 1989\)](#), where the plaintiffs' injury was "direct and substantial" when they were deprived of the value of fuel or its proceeds, the same principle applies to Charles's situation with respect to his marital funds.

The secondary source "Chapter 3. Standing" confirms that "a civil RICO plaintiff must have suffered concrete financial loss," which Charles has experienced through the deprivation of marital funds. This financial loss is precisely the type of injury that § 1964(c) was designed to remedy.

Removal from Business

Charles's removal from his business constitutes an injury to both his business and property interests under § 1964(c). The Seventh Circuit in [Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271 \(7th Cir. 1989\)](#) recognized that conduct that exploits business procedures and diverts business assets causes "direct and substantial" injury that qualifies under § 1964(c).

Additionally, "[Defending RICO Claims In The Business Context Part II: RICO Claims Must Allege Injury To Business Or Property](#)" (2022) specifically mentions that "courts have determined that a plaintiff's alleged injuries were sufficient in cases involving... interference with business, such as decreased business profits or increased costs of doing business." Being removed from his business would likely result in decreased business profits for Charles, qualifying as an injury to his business under RICO.

Proximate Causation Analysis

For Charles to have standing, his injuries must have been proximately caused by the defendants' alleged RICO violations. According to "[Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations](#)" (2023), "Standing for a civil cause of action under RICO is established when a plaintiff shows: (i) any violation of § 1962; (ii) injury to the plaintiff's business or property; and (iii) the statutory violation caused the injury."

The facts state that Charles's injuries were "a direct result of the defendants' coordinated actions." If these coordinated actions constitute a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of § 1962, then the proximate causation requirement would be satisfied.

The standard for proximate causation in RICO cases was addressed by the Supreme Court in [Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U.S. 258, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 \(1992\)](#), which held that there must be a direct relationship between the injury and the alleged RICO violation. While this case was stated as vacated by State v. Swafford, 654 S.E.2d 297, 375 S.C. 637 (S.C. App. 2007), the vacatur by a state court does not override the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law. Moreover, the principle of proximate causation in RICO cases has been consistently upheld by other courts.

Application to Charles's Case

Based on the statutory language of § 1964(c) and its judicial interpretation, Charles appears to have standing to bring a RICO claim. His eviction, deprivation of marital funds, and removal from his business qualify as injuries to business or property. If these injuries were proximately caused by the defendants' coordinated actions in violation of § 1962, Charles would satisfy all three requirements for RICO standing:

1. A violation of § 1962 (assuming the defendants' actions constitute a pattern of racketeering activity)

2. Injury to business or property (eviction, loss of funds, removal from business)
3. Proximate causation between the violation and the injury (the injuries were "a direct result" of the defendants' actions)

As "[PAYORS, PLAYERS, AND PROXIMATE CAUSE](#)," (2022) notes, "as long as the plaintiff was injured--regardless of the type--by the defendant's racketeering activity, that plaintiff's claim does not fail for lack of a 'racketeering injury.'" This principle supports Charles's standing to bring a RICO claim based on his various injuries.

Potential Challenges and Counterarguments

Nature of the Injuries

While Charles's injuries appear to qualify as injuries to business or property, potential counterarguments could arise regarding their characterization:

1. **Eviction from Home:** Opponents might argue that eviction is a personal injury rather than a property injury. However, "[Defending RICO Claims In The Business Context Part II: RICO Claims Must Allege Injury To Business Or Property](#)" (2022) clarifies that deprivation of the ability to use property constitutes an injury to property. Eviction clearly deprives Charles of the ability to use his home.
2. **Marital Funds:** Questions might arise about Charles's legal interest in the marital funds. However, if Charles had a legal right to these funds under applicable family law, their deprivation would constitute an injury to his property interest.
3. **Removal from Business:** Depending on the nature of Charles's involvement in the business (owner, partner, employee), different legal standards might apply. However, [Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271 \(7th Cir. 1989\)](#) suggests that interference with business interests generally qualifies as an injury under RICO.

Proximate Causation Challenges

Defendants might challenge the proximate causation element by arguing that the link between their actions and Charles's injuries is too attenuated. However, the fact pattern states that the injuries were "a direct result" of the defendants' coordinated actions, which suggests a direct causal relationship that would satisfy the proximate causation requirement established in cases like [Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U.S. 258 \(1992\)](#).

Conclusion

Based on the statutory language of [18 U.S.C. § 1964\(c\)](#) and its judicial interpretation, Charles has standing to bring a civil RICO claim. His eviction from his home, deprivation of marital funds, and removal from his business

constitute injuries to business or property within the meaning of the statute. Assuming these injuries were proximately caused by the defendants' coordinated actions that violated § 1962, Charles satisfies all three requirements for RICO standing.

The phrase "Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962" in [18 U.S.C. § 1964\(c\)](#) (2025) has been consistently interpreted by courts to encompass concrete financial losses and deprivations of property use. Charles's injuries fall squarely within this interpretation, as they involve financial loss (marital funds), deprivation of property use (eviction), and interference with business interests (removal from business).

Furthermore, the direct causal relationship between the defendants' actions and Charles's injuries, as indicated by the phrase "direct result," likely satisfies the proximate causation requirement that courts have read into the "by reason of" language in § 1964(c).

In conclusion, Charles's eviction from his home, deprivation of marital funds, and removal from his business constitute compensable injuries under RICO, giving him standing to bring a claim under [18 U.S.C. § 1964\(c\)](#).

Legal Authorities

[Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271 \(7th Cir. 1989\)](#)

U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Extract

Section 1964(c) permits any person injured in his or her business or property by reason of a violation of Sec. 1962(c) to recover treble damages. Plaintiffs here seem plainly qualified to sue under Sec. 1964(c). They pleaded, and the jury found, that the Arnett brothers conducted the affairs of Arnett Oil through a pattern of racketeering activity. The fraudulent scheme alleged in Count II involved exploiting the plaintiffs' sales and billing procedures so that Arnett Oil could rapidly obtain unusually large quantities of the plaintiffs' property, and then diverting that fuel or its proceeds, making worthless Arnett Oils' obligations to pay the plaintiffs for the fuel taken. The plaintiffs' injury from such conduct of the enterprise was direct and substantial.

Summary

Requirements for standing under RICO, specifically under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), which allows individuals injured in their business or property by a RICO violation to recover damages. The court found that the plaintiffs in the case had standing because they suffered direct and substantial injuries due to the defendants' racketeering activities. This supports the proposition that Charles, having suffered similar injuries (eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business), would have standing under RICO.

[Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897 \(9th Cir. 2005\)](#)

U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Extract

The only requirement for RICO standing is that one be a 'person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962.' 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). ... For a complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must allege not only a section 1962 violation but also that he was 'injured in his business or property.' ... The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ('RICO'), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68, provides a civil remedy of treble damages to '[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter.' *Id.* at § 1964(c). See *Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.*, 473 U.S. 479, 496, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985) ('[T]he plaintiff only has standing if, and can only recover to the extent that, he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the violation.').

Summary

The statute requires a direct injury to business or property, not merely personal injuries with financial consequences. This supports the proposition that Charles's eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business, if directly caused by the defendants' actions, could constitute compensable injuries under RICO, thus giving him standing to bring a claim.

[Livingston Downs Racing Ass'n v. Jefferson Downs, 192 F.Supp.2d 519 \(M.D. La. 2001\)](#)

U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana

Extract

To establish standing under § 1964(c), a plaintiff must show (1) a violation of § 1962, (2) an injury to his business or property, and (3) that his injury was proximately caused by a RICO violation. See *Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.*, 503 U.S. 258, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992); *Cullom v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank*, 859 F.2d 1211, 1214 (5th Cir.1988). The Court concludes that LDRA has established an injury to its business or property sufficient to confer standing.

Summary

To have standing under RICO, a plaintiff must demonstrate a violation of § 1962, an injury to business or property, and that the injury was proximately caused by the RICO violation. The court in this case found that LDRA had established an injury to its business or property, which is a requirement for

RICO standing. This supports the proposition that Charles's eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business could constitute compensable injuries under RICO, giving him standing to bring a claim.

[City of New York v. Smokes-Spirits.Com, Inc., 541 F.3d 425 \(2nd Cir. 2008\)](#)

U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Extract

Thus, under § 1964(c), a civil RICO claimant must show: (1) a substantive RICO violation under § 1962; (2) injury to the plaintiff's 'business or property,' and (3) that such injury was 'by reason of' the substantive RICO violation. ... 'the plaintiff only has standing if, and can only recover to the extent that, he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the [RICO] violation.' ... 'the compensable injury necessarily is the harm caused by [alleged] predicate acts. . . , for the essence of the violation is the commission of those acts in connection with the conduct of an enterprise.'

Summary

Requirements for a civil RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), which include showing a substantive RICO violation, an injury to business or property, and causation of the injury by the RICO violation. The passage emphasizes that the injury must be directly caused by the predicate acts of the RICO violation. This supports the proposition that Charles's eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business, if directly caused by the defendants' RICO violation, would constitute compensable injuries under RICO, thus giving him standing to bring a claim.

[Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 214 F.Supp. 3d 808 \(N.D. Cal. 2016\)](#)

U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

Extract

The elements of a RICO claim are: (i) the conduct of (ii) an enterprise that affects interstate commerce (iii) through a pattern (iv) of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) ; Eclectic Props. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2014). In addition, the conduct must be the proximate cause of harm to the victim. Under § 1964(c), plaintiffs must also allege that they have been injured in their 'property or business' by reason of the alleged racketeering activities.

Summary

Elements required for a RICO claim, emphasizing the need for the conduct to be the proximate cause of harm and for the plaintiff to show injury to business or property. This directly supports the proposition that Charles's eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business, if proximately caused by the defendants' actions, would constitute compensable injuries under RICO, thus giving him standing to bring a claim.

[Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S.Ct. 1991, 164 L.Ed.2d 720, 547 U.S. 451 \(2006\)](#)

U.S. Supreme Court

Extract

The terms of § 1964(c) (2000 ed.), which broadly authorize suit by '[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962,' permit no different conclusion when an individual brings a civil action against such a RICO violator.

Summary

The passage from the Supreme Court decision clarifies that RICO's civil action provision allows any person injured in their business or property due to a RICO violation to bring a suit. This supports the proposition that Charles, having suffered eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business, has standing under RICO if these injuries were proximately caused by the defendants' coordinated actions.

[Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U.S. 258, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 \(1992\)](#)

U.S. Supreme Court

Extract

RICO authorizes '[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962' to sue for treble damages in federal court. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). ... Of course, a RICO plaintiff 'only has standing if, and can only recover to the extent that, he has been injured in his business or property by [reason of] the conduct constituting the violation.'

Summary

Standing under RICO requires a direct injury to business or property caused by the alleged racketeering activity. This supports the proposition that Charles's eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business, if directly

caused by the defendants' actions, would constitute compensable injuries under RICO, giving him standing to bring a claim.

[Pappas v. Passias, 887 F.Supp. 465 \(E.D. N.Y. 1995\)](#)

U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

Extract

With regard to the second element, the injury complained of must be to business or property, and moreover, such business or property must belong to the plaintiff. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (providing a cause of action to 'any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962') (emphasis added). ... The third element, which requires the plaintiff to allege that the violation of § 1962 caused his injury, overlaps to some extent with the second. ... Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate 'proximate causation' in order to recover under RICO; that is to say, the plaintiff must establish that the relationship between the defendants' conduct and the injury claimed is not too remote.

Summary

The injury must belong to the plaintiff and that proximate causation is necessary, meaning the injury must be a direct result of the defendants' conduct. This supports the proposition that Charles's eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business, if directly caused by the defendants' actions, would constitute compensable injuries under RICO.

[Hellenic Petroleum LLC v. Mansfield Oil Co. of Gainesville, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-01071-DAD-SKO \(E.D. Cal. Jan 28, 2020\)](#)

U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

Extract

To have standing under § 1964(c), a plaintiff must allege: (i) 'that his alleged harm qualifies as injury to his business or property;' and (ii) 'that his harm was 'by reason of' the RICO violation, which requires the plaintiff to establish proximate causation.' ... In a RICO action, 'the plaintiff only has standing if, and can only recover to the extent that, he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the violation'.

Summary

Necessity of showing both the injury and the causation link to the RICO violation, which aligns with the proposition that Charles's eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business are compensable injuries under RICO.

[18 U.S.C. § 1964 18 U.S.C. § 1964 Civil Remedies](#)

Extract

Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee...

Summary

Under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), a person who has been injured in their business or property due to a RICO violation has the right to sue in a U.S. district court. The statute explicitly provides for the recovery of damages, which supports the proposition that Charles's eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business are compensable injuries under RICO, thus giving him standing to bring a claim.

[Chapter 3. Standing](#)

Civil RICO: A Definitive Guide. Fifth Edition - American Bar Association - Gregory P. Joseph

Extract

A civil RICO plaintiff must have suffered concrete financial loss. Speculative, amorphous, attenuated, or intangible loss will not do. ... The requirement that the injury be to the plaintiff's business or property means that the plaintiff must show a proprietary type of damage. ... any injury to business or property caused by a violation ... is sufficient.

Summary

Requirement for a civil RICO plaintiff to demonstrate a concrete financial loss that is not speculative or intangible. It emphasizes that the injury must be to the plaintiff's business or property, indicating a proprietary type of damage. This aligns with the proposition that Charles's eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business are compensable injuries under RICO, as they represent concrete financial losses and proprietary damage.

[Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations.](#)

American Criminal Law Review - Georgetown University Law Center - Sacks, Michele - 2005-03-22

Extract

To have standing for a civil cause of action, a plaintiff must show: (i) a violation of [section] 1962(a), (b), (c), or (d); (ii) injury to her business or property; and (iii) causation of the injury by the violation. ... To sue for a violation of [section] 1962(c), a plaintiff must have suffered an injury to business or property caused by one of the predicate acts of racketeering. ... Moreover, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's violation of [section] 1962 was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury to have standing for a civil RICO action.

Summary

Requirements for a plaintiff to have standing in a civil RICO action, which includes showing a violation of RICO provisions, an injury to business or property, and that the injury was proximately caused by the RICO violation. This directly supports the proposition that Charles's eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business, if caused by the defendants' RICO violations, would give him standing to bring a RICO claim.

[Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations.](#)

American Criminal Law Review - Georgetown University Law Center - Bagley, Ross - 2007-03-22

Extract

To have standing for a civil cause of action under RICO, a plaintiff must show: (i) a violation of [section] 1962(a), (b), (c), or (d); (ii) injury to her business or property; and (iii) causation of the injury by the violation. ... To sue for a violation of [section] 1962(c), a plaintiff must have suffered an injury to business or property caused by one of the predicate acts of racketeering. ... Moreover, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's violation of [section] 1962 was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury to have standing for a civil RICO action.

Summary

Requirements for a plaintiff to have standing under RICO, which include showing a violation of specific sections of RICO, an injury to business or property, and causation of the injury by the violation. The passage specifically mentions that for a violation of section 1962(c), the injury must be caused by one of the predicate acts of racketeering. This supports the proposition that Charles's eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business, if caused by predicate acts of racketeering, would constitute compensable injuries under RICO, giving him standing to bring a claim.

[Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations.](#)

**American Criminal Law Review - Georgetown University Law Center -
Mecone, James Morrison - 2006-03-22**

Extract

To have standing for a civil cause of action, a plaintiff must show: (i) a violation of [section] 1962(a), (b), (c), or (d); (ii) injury to her business or property; and (iii) causation of the injury by the violation. (300) ... To sue for a violation of [section] 1962(c), a plaintiff must have suffered an injury to business or property caused by one of the predicate acts of racketeering. (305)

Summary

For a plaintiff to have standing under RICO, they must demonstrate an injury to business or property that is directly caused by a violation of RICO's provisions. The passage specifically mentions that the injury must be caused by one of the predicate acts of racketeering, which aligns with the proposition that Charles's injuries (eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business) are compensable under RICO if they were caused by such acts.

[Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations.](#)

**American Criminal Law Review - Georgetown University Law Center -
Franklin, Amy - 2008-03-22**

Extract

To have standing for a civil cause of action under RICO, a plaintiff must show: (i) a violation of [section] 1962(a), (b), (c), or (d); (ii) injury to her business or property; and (iii) causation of the injury by the violation. (299)... a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's violation of [section] 1962 was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury to have standing for a civil RICO action. (310)... Second, the Court established that plaintiff has a claim under [section] 1964(c) if defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner forbidden by [section] 1962 and such activity injured plaintiff in his business or property. Id. at 495.

Summary

Requirements for standing in a civil RICO action, which include showing a violation of RICO provisions, an injury to business or property, and that the injury was proximately caused by the RICO violation. The passage also clarifies that a compensable injury under RICO is the harm caused by the predicate acts of racketeering. This directly supports the proposition that Charles's eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business, if caused by the defendants' racketeering activities, would constitute compensable injuries under RICO, giving him standing to bring a claim.

[Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations.](#)

American Criminal Law Review - Georgetown University Law Center - Argust, Corey P. - 2010-03-22

Extract

A private party who is injured in her business or property because of a RICO violation also can bring a civil action to recover damages. ... To sue for a violation of [section] 1962(c), a plaintiff must have suffered an injury to business or property caused by one of the predicate acts of racketeering.

Summary

A private party injured in business or property due to a RICO violation can bring a civil action. This supports the proposition that Charles's eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business, if caused by a RICO violation, would constitute compensable injuries under RICO, thus giving him standing.

[Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations](#)

American Criminal Law Review - Georgetown University Law Center - Brynne Peluso, Mariah Breit, Natalie Cappuzzo, Katelyn Gloe, Alexandra Peterson - 2023-07-01

Extract

Standing for a civil cause of action under RICO is established when a plaintiff shows: (i) any violation of § 1962; (ii) injury to the plaintiff's business or property; and (iii) the statutory violation caused the injury. ... A plaintiff's business or property must be directly injured to qualify for relief.

Summary

Requirements for standing in a civil RICO action, which include showing a violation of § 1962, an injury to business or property, and a causal link between the violation and the injury. The passage emphasizes that the injury must be to business or property, which aligns with Charles's claims of eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business as injuries to his business or property.

[Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations.](#)

American Criminal Law Review - Georgetown University Law Center - Douglass, Sean M. - 2011-03-22

Extract

To sue for a violation of [section] 1962(c), a plaintiff must have suffered an injury to business or property caused by one of the predicate acts of racketeering. (314)

Summary

For a plaintiff to have standing under section 1962(c) of RICO, they must demonstrate an injury to business or property caused by a predicate act of racketeering. This directly supports the proposition that Charles's eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business, if caused by such predicate acts, would constitute compensable injuries under RICO, thereby giving him standing to bring a claim.

[Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations.](#)

American Criminal Law Review - Georgetown University Law Center - Holt, Michael W. - 2009-03-22

Extract

To have standing for a civil cause of action under RICO, a plaintiff must show: (i) a violation of [section][section] 1962(a), (b), (c), or (d); (ii) injury to her business or property; and (iii) that the violation caused the injury. ... To sue for a violation of [section] 1962(c), a plaintiff must have suffered an injury to business or property caused by one of the predicate acts of racketeering.

Summary

Requirements for standing in a civil RICO claim, which include showing a violation of RICO provisions, an injury to business or property, and that the violation caused the injury. This directly supports the proposition that Charles's eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business, if caused by a RICO violation, would give him standing to bring a claim.

[PAYORS, PLAYERS, AND PROXIMATE CAUSE.](#)

Notre Dame Law Review - University of Notre Dame Law School - Crusey, Elisabeth F. - 2022-05-01

Extract

A private civil right of action in [section] 1964 provides that '[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962... may sue.' (36) Notably, a successful plaintiff under [section] 1964 is entitled to treble damages and the cost of the suit, including attorney fees. (37) ...

Section 1964(c)'s language does not call for a plaintiff to allege a particular 'racketeering injury' as an element to state a claim. (54) Unlike the requirements for alleging an 'antitrust' injury under the Clayton Act, for RICO, as long as the plaintiff was injured--regardless of the type--by the defendant's racketeering activity, that plaintiff's claim does not fail for lack of a 'racketeering injury.' (55)

Summary

There is no requirement for a specific type of "racketeering injury," meaning any injury to business or property caused by racketeering activity is sufficient. This supports the proposition that Charles's eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business are compensable injuries under RICO, giving him standing to bring a claim.

[Civil Rico: A Tool of Advocacy](#)

The Brief - American Bar Association - 2024-01-01

Extract

§ 1962 violations must proximately cause the plaintiff's injury to business or property... A plaintiff only has standing to sue if they have been injured in their business or property by conduct constituting the violation. To establish a § 1962(c) RICO claim, the following elements must be proven: ... Injury: An injury to business or property due to the racketeering activity.

Summary

Requirements for a civil RICO claim, emphasizing that a plaintiff must demonstrate an injury to business or property caused by the racketeering activity. This directly supports the proposition that Charles's eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business are compensable injuries under RICO, as they represent injuries to his business or property.

[RICO: A Primer](#)

Extract

RICO provides for a civil action against persons engaged in a 'pattern of racketeering activity' or 'collection of an unlawful debt.' A successful plaintiff may recover treble damages, costs, and attorneys' fees. ... A 'pattern' may exist where any combination of two or more offenses occurred within a period of time. ... A plaintiff may demonstrate a pattern by establishment that the predicate acts pose a threat of continued criminal activity, which is generally demonstrated by showing either: * Closed-ended continuity. Proving 'a series of related predicate acts extending over a substantial period of time.' * Open-ended continuity. A threat of 'continuing

criminal activity extending indefinitely into the future,' in light of the nature of the enterprise and predicate acts alleged.

Summary

RICO allows for civil actions against individuals engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. The passage explains the concept of a "pattern" of racketeering activity, which is crucial for establishing a RICO claim. It also highlights the potential for recovering damages, costs, and attorneys' fees, which supports the idea that Charles's injuries (eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business) could be compensable under RICO if they resulted from such a pattern.

[Defending RICO Claims In The Business Context Part II: RICO Claims Must Allege Injury To Business Or Property](#)

Extract

If a plaintiff brings a civil suit alleging a RICO violation, the plaintiff must plausibly allege that his injury animating the RICO claim is associated with his business or property by reason of the defendant's violation of the RICO laws. ... Indeed, most courts have construed them narrowly to mean that there must be a pecuniary injury to a proprietary interest, and thus a plaintiff must show some sort of concrete financial loss. In addition, the injury must be ascertainable and definable, such as when a plaintiff is deprived of the ability to use or transfer property. ... In contrast, in addition to more obvious injuries to business or property, courts have determined that a plaintiff's alleged injuries were sufficient in cases involving lost profits, excessive interest charges, property damage and interference with business, such as decreased business profits or increased costs of doing business.

Summary

Injuries must involve a pecuniary loss or deprivation of property use, which aligns with Charles's claims of eviction, loss of funds, and removal from his business. These are concrete financial losses and deprivation of property use, which are compensable under RICO.

This memo was compiled by Vincent AI based on vLex materials available as of June 09, 2025. [View full answer on vLex](#)