

## Question

On January 16, 2024, the Respondent was ordered to vacate his home and business premises based on claims by the Petitioner, without a hearing, without evidence being admitted, and without the opportunity to cross-examine his accuser. No emergency or protective order was shown or entered, and the case was reset for a later date. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before deprivation of a significant property interest (*Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); *Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.*, 339 U.S. 306 (1950)). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a federal cause of action against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Ordering the Respondent to vacate his home and business without a hearing, evidence, or opportunity to contest the claims constitutes a deprivation of property without due process, actionable under § 1983. # ISSUE #1 – DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW

Amendment XIV Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. VIOLATION: On January 16, 2024, James Munford ordered the Respondent to vacate his home, which also served as his place of business, based on intentionally fabricated claims raised by the Petitioner, Morgan Michelle Myers. This order was rendered without a hearing taking place, without any evidence being admitted, and without the Respondent being able to cross examine his accuser. No protective order was entered, no emergency situation was shown, and the case was reset for January 22, 2024, to be heard by the associate judge, Jeffrey Kaitcer. Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. ISSUE #2 – SUBSEQUENT ORDERS ARE VOID FOR WANT OF JURISDICITON If an associate judge in Texas acts without a valid order of referral, they lack jurisdiction, and actions taken in such circumstances may be considered ultra vires and outside the protection of judicial immunity. This can support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injunctive or declaratory relief if the respondent's rights were deprived. The Texas Family Code and Government Code make it unequivocal that an associate judge's authority to act in a case is dependent on a valid order of referral from the referring court. The order of referral is not a mere formality; it is the legal instrument that vests the associate judge with jurisdiction over the matter (Tex. Fam. Code § 201.006; Tex. Gov't. Code § 54A.007; Tex. Gov't. Code § 54B.007). If an associate judge acts without such an order, or beyond the scope of the order, they are acting without jurisdiction. The statutes are clear that the powers of an associate judge are "contingent upon" and "limited by" the order of referral (Tex. Fam. Code § 201.007; Tex. Gov't. Code § 54A.008; Tex. Gov't. Code § 54A.209). Judicial immunity is a well-established doctrine that shields judges from liability for

judicial acts performed within their jurisdiction, even if those acts are erroneous, malicious, or in excess of authority (*Tobias v. SLP Brownwood LLC*, No. 11-19-00247-CV (Tex. App. Jun 24, 2021); *Walker v. Hartman*, 516 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. App. 2017)). However, this immunity is not absolute. The U.S. Supreme Court and Texas courts have repeatedly held that judicial immunity is overcome in two circumstances: (1) when the judge's actions are non-judicial in nature, or (2) when the judge acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction (*Partain v. Gabert*, 13-21-00037-CV (Tex. App. Aug 26, 2021); *West v. Robinson*, 486 S.W.3d 669 (Tex. App. 2016); *Twilligear v. Carrell*, 148 S.W.3d 502 (Tex. App. 2004)). The "clear absence of all jurisdiction" standard is met when a judge acts without any legal authority to do so. In the context of associate judges, acting without a valid order of referral is acting without jurisdiction, not merely in excess of authority (Tex. Fam. Code § 201.006; Tex. Gov't. Code § 54A.007). In the scenario described, the associate judge allegedly took further actions in the case without a signed order of referral and summarily denied motions warning of the petitioner's alleged scheme. Under Texas law, the absence of a valid referral order means the associate judge lacked jurisdiction to act in the case (Tex. Fam. Code § 201.006; Tex. Gov't. Code § 54A.007). Actions taken in the clear absence of jurisdiction are not protected by judicial immunity (*Partain v. Gabert*, 13-21-00037-CV (Tex. App. Aug 26, 2021); *West v. Robinson*, 486 S.W.3d 669 (Tex. App. 2016)). If these actions resulted in the deprivation of the respondent's rights, the associate judge's conduct would be considered ultra vires and outside the scope of judicial immunity, supporting a § 1983 claim for injunctive or declaratory relief (*Patino v. Tex. Dep't of Ins.-Div. of Workers' Comp.*, 631 S.W.3d 163 (Tex. App. 2020); *City of El Paso v. Heinrich*, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009)).

**ISSUE #3 – INTENTIONAL ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT AND THE LACK OF AN OPPONENT** In this case, Morgan Michelle Myers, after securing the March 14, 2024, temporary orders by fraudulent misrepresentations to the court, she hid behind her alleged attorney who did not prosecute the case for over 18 months. This attorney claimed to be representing the Petitioner in her individual capacity, yet used the marx altman and johnson letterhead in her pleadings. Since she was allegedly retained after January 16, 2024, everything she did in the case is arguably void given the associate judge had no jurisdiction. On March 14, 2024, this attorney was allowed to trial by ambush, when she called undisclosed witnesses and produced a proposed order asking the associate judge, who had no jurisdiction, to deny the father's emergency motion which clearly outlined the petitioner's fraudulent scheme. Despite not responding to this motion, the judge ruled in her favor, and signed an order which had altered terms, contained false statements about hearings that never happened, and gave morgan the home and claimed the father agreed to it. The father refused to sign it, and he was actually ordered by the associate judge to sign the fraudulent document. He refused, and then appealed.

**ISSUE #3 – APPELLATE PROCESS INSUFFICIENT** The father's first mandamus was denied without explanation, and he appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. The opposing side did not participate at all, and actually attempted to get the OAG involved mid-appeal, who wasn't able to enforce the clearly fraudulent orders. After the Texas Supreme Court denied rehearing, the opposing party moved to set a pre-trial conference in the face of all of these issues, which was countered by a motion to recuse both the district and associate judge.

**ISSUE #4 – COMPROMISED RECUSAL**

PROCEEDINGS The recusal proceedings were just as tainted. On October 7, 2024, Father filed his first motion to recuse against Kaitcer and Munford. A day later, an order of referral was forwarded by the court coordinator, someone who should not be involved at all in the recusal process. Upon inspection, the original motion to recuse had been modified where the hyperlinks were removed, the exhibits were removed, and the affidavit was removed. This was only corrected after the Respondent pointed out the discrepancy, which the coordinator then replied with an excuse that "due to the size of the motion, it was split into three separate files". This is clear tampering. The judge must send the original motion to the regional judge, not a modified one. An amended order of referral issued with these changes, however, the hyperlinks were still removed. COOPER L. CARTER'S FRAUD UPON THE COURT 1. On February 1st, 2024, the parties met for the third time at the 322nd District Court of Tarrant County. It's important to note here that no order of referral had been signed and filed, so the associate judge had no authority to even hear the matter. 2. Nevertheless, the parties appeared, both represented by counsel. Father insisted on proceeding to trial, however, his attorney said he didn't want to be in court all day, and presented him with a settlement agreement that he did not find would be in the best interests of his Children. The proposed agreement had the following provisions, and was prepared by Dan Bacalis, attorney for Father: i. It was titled "Agreed Associate Judge's Report" ii. RESET DATE: blank. iii. Under APPEARANCES, it has both parties appearing and both represented by counsel, however, only the Father's appearance was recorded on the case docket. iv. Under TEMPORARY CONSERVATORSHIP, it elected JOINT CONSERVATORSHIP with the mother as the primary conservator. v. It gave the mother the exclusive right to establish the residence. vi. The right to receive child support was given to the Mother. vii. Under the TEMPORARY POSSESSION SCHEDULE, the EXTENDED was elected (TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.§§ 153.311 THROUGH 153.316.) viii. Under TEMPORARY CHILD SUPPORT, it had Father responsible for making payments in the amount of \$973.19 per month to the Mother beginning on April 1, 2024. ix. Mother was to apply for Medicaid. x. Under ADDITIONAL ORDERS, the application for protective order that started all of this was non-suited. xi. Under TEMPORARY POSESSION OF PROPERTY, it stated Father had the right to the 2020 Mazda 3, his personal belongings, and the Mazda CX-5 lease. It also stated that Respondent was to vacate the home by March 1, 2024, thus giving him one full month back into the home. However, this meant that the mother actually removed the children from their own home for a month, as she lived with her new boyfriend during this time. xii. Mother was entitled to her 2007 Mazda and her personal property. xiii. Most importantly, right before the signature lines, the following provision was ordered: "A typed written Order conforming to this Report will follow within 20 days from the date this Report is signed. The Temporary Order shall be prepared by Dan Bacalis Each attorney should approve the Order. The parties do not need to approve the Order. The attorney reviewing the proposed Order shall have five (5) days to do so. There arc no ten (JO) day letters. If an agreement is not reached, a Motion to Sign shall be filed and set within thirty (30) days from the signing of this Report. xiv. All parties signed this document and agreed to form and substance, and it was signed by the Associate Judge (who had no authority to even hear this agreement). The parties did this settlement in the conference room in the hallway, not before the judge. 3.

Because Father knew Mother was lying, and was leveraging Judge Munford's initial deprivation of constitutional rights, he immediately fired his attorney, thus invalidating the agreement, as he would not be able to prepare the reduced version as ordered and as agreed by the parties. 4. On February 8, 2024, the agreement was filed with the clerk, and the next day on February 9, 2024, the Father filed an EMERGENCY MOTION TO RECONSIDER EVIDENCE AND VACATE TEMPORARY ORDERS, referring to the Feb 1 Agreement. 5. This motion highlighted in detail Mother's illegal actions, including falsifying her affidavit of indigency, falsifying her claims of family violence, and provided evidence in the form of text messages to show she was having an affair leading up to the divorce, and also attached bank statements to show that she transferred \$1,576 of community property to herself using a third party's paypal account to conceal her banking information. 6. This motion was served on all of the parties on February 9, 2024. No response was ever received to this motion. The only response was via email from Cooper Carter, attorney for petitioner, who stated she would be filing a counter motion. No such motion was ever filed. 7. On February 27, 2024, District Judge James Munford signed and filed a notice of hearing, setting the Father's emergency motion to be heard on March 14, 2024. 8. On March 3, 2024, Father filed a notice with the Court informing them that he would not be leaving the marital home because the agreement was invalidated. 9. Three days later on March 6, 2024, while Father was walking his children to school, the mother ran inside the home and locked him out, and when the cops arrived, produced the Feb 1 agreement showing he had to leave by March 1. To prevent conflict, Father left to stay with his Father until the time of the hearing. 10. On March 14, 2024, the parties arrived at the 322nd District Court for Father's emergency motion. Upon walking into the courtroom, Father observed Cooper Carter and the mother quickly passing papers back and forth across the table in the conference room. 11. After checking in with the bailiff, the Father turned around to see Cooper Carter handing him a document entitled "Temporary Orders" which were the reduced version of the February 1 agreement that the parties were in court that day to challenge. 12. Alongside these orders was a "Proposed Order" recommending that the judge deny his emergency motion to vacate. The judge denied the father's motion without any arguments against his position being raised, and Cooper Carter called the wife as a witness despite not disclosing any evidence or potential witnesses prior to the hearing. 13. Despite non-suiting the protective order in the alleged agreement that they claimed was still binding, she had the mother testify about fearing for her safety if the Father was allowed near the home. 14. Upon inspection of the fraudulent temporary orders produced by Cooper Carter, the following provisions were unilaterally changed: i. The original agreement required the father to vacate by March 1, 2024, but the modified version had the father in the home until March 20, 2024, and the Mother after March 30, 2024, leaving a 10 day window where nobody would occupy the home. ii. On page 1 of the orders, it expressly stated that "as evidenced by the signatures below, the parties have agreed to the terms of this order" which was a blatant lie, as Cooper had unilaterally changed the terms of the agreement when she knew Dan Bacalis had to be the one to reduce it. iii. The orders also falsely claimed a hearing occurred on February 1, 2024, on an alleged "Motion for Temporary Orders" filed by the mother and was never served on Respondent. iv. The orders also claimed that the agreement was in the best

interests of the children, and that the Court had reviewed the record. v. No relief in father's emergency motion was argued against, yet the motion was summarily denied and the fraudulent orders were adopted by the Court. TIE THESE FACTS TO A CLAIM FOR FEDERAL RELIEF, CITING THE SPECIFIC FACTS DRAFT THE COMPLAINT

## **Answer (Texas)**

### **Short response**

The facts described support a strong claim for deprivation of property without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, as Texas law and binding precedent require notice and an opportunity to be heard before a person is ordered to vacate their home or business. Additionally, any orders issued by an associate judge without a valid order of referral are void for want of jurisdiction, and such ultra vires actions are not protected by judicial immunity, further supporting a claim for federal relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

### **Summary**

The Respondent was ordered to vacate his home and business without a hearing, without evidence, and without the opportunity to contest the claims against him, in violation of fundamental due process rights under both the U.S. and Texas Constitutions. Texas statutes require a valid order of referral for an associate judge to have jurisdiction, and actions taken without such an order are void and not protected by judicial immunity, making the deprivation of property actionable under federal law.

The legal framework in Texas is clear: due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before deprivation of property, and associate judges may only act pursuant to a valid order of referral. The facts as alleged—summary eviction without process, and subsequent orders issued without jurisdiction—demonstrate violations of these requirements, supporting a § 1983 claim for injunctive or declaratory relief. The Respondent's complaint should focus on the lack of due process and the associate judge's lack of jurisdiction, as established by the relevant statutes and case law.

## **Background and Relevant Law**

### **Legislative Framework**

Texas law strictly regulates the authority of associate judges. Under the Texas Family Code and Government Code, an associate judge may only act in a case if there is a valid, written order of referral from the referring court. Specifically, Texas Family Code § 201.006 requires that a judge render either an individual or general order of referral to confer jurisdiction on an associate judge. Similarly, Texas Government Code §§ 54A.007 and 54B.007 mandate that a written order of referral is a prerequisite for an associate

judge to exercise any judicial power in a case. These statutes are not mere formalities; they are jurisdictional requirements. Without a valid order of referral, any action taken by an associate judge is ultra vires and void.

Further, Texas Family Code § 201.007 outlines the powers of an associate judge, such as conducting hearings, hearing evidence, and ruling on admissibility, but these powers are expressly limited by the order of referral. Thus, the statutory scheme makes clear that the jurisdiction and authority of an associate judge are entirely contingent upon a valid referral order.

## **Due Process Requirements**

Both the U.S. Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment) and the Texas Constitution guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The essential elements of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard before the state deprives a person of a significant property interest. The Texas Court of Appeals has reaffirmed that these are the cornerstones of due process, and that the state must provide both notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before depriving a person of property, as in the context of eviction or exclusion from one's home or business, see [Simmons v. Outreach Health Cmty. Care Servs., L.P., 511 S.W.3d 163 \(Tex. App. 2014\)](#).

## **Analysis**

### **1. Deprivation of Property Without Due Process**

The facts indicate that the Respondent was ordered to vacate his home and business premises based solely on the Petitioner's claims, without a hearing, without the admission of evidence, and without the opportunity to cross-examine his accuser. No emergency or protective order was entered, and the case was simply reset for a later date. This sequence of events constitutes a deprivation of a significant property interest—namely, the right to occupy one's home and place of business—without the procedural safeguards required by due process.

The Texas Court of Appeals has made clear that due process under both the U.S. and Texas Constitutions requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before the state may deprive a person of property, [Simmons v. Outreach Health Cmty. Care Servs., L.P., 511 S.W.3d 163 \(Tex. App. 2014\)](#). The absence of a hearing, the lack of evidence, and the denial of the opportunity to contest the claims or cross-examine the accuser all point to a fundamental violation of these requirements. The Respondent's exclusion from his home and business, without any of these procedural protections, is a textbook example of a due process violation.

### **2. Jurisdictional Defect: Void Orders by Associate Judge**

The subsequent involvement of an associate judge, who allegedly acted without a valid order of referral, raises a separate and equally fatal jurisdictional defect. Under Texas Family Code § 201.006 and Texas

Government Code §§ 54A.007 and 54B.007, an associate judge's authority to act in any case is strictly dependent on a valid, written order of referral from the referring court. If no such order exists, or if the associate judge acts beyond the scope of the referral, any orders issued are void for want of jurisdiction.

The statutes are unequivocal: the order of referral is the legal instrument that vests the associate judge with jurisdiction. Without it, the associate judge's actions are *ultra vires*—beyond the scope of any lawful authority. This is not a mere technicality; it is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Any orders issued in the absence of a valid referral are nullities and have no legal effect.

### **3. Judicial Immunity Does Not Apply**

Ordinarily, judges are protected by judicial immunity for acts performed within their jurisdiction, even if those acts are erroneous or in excess of authority. However, this immunity does not extend to acts performed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. The Texas statutes and the case law make clear that an associate judge who acts without a valid order of referral is acting without jurisdiction, not merely in excess of authority. Therefore, such actions are not protected by judicial immunity.

This distinction is critical for federal relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. If a judge acts in the clear absence of jurisdiction, as when an associate judge acts without a referral order, judicial immunity does not bar claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. The Respondent, having been deprived of property by an order issued without jurisdiction, has a viable claim for federal relief.

### **4. Application to the Facts**

Applying these principles to the facts, the Respondent was first deprived of his home and business without due process—no hearing, no evidence, no opportunity to contest the claims. This alone is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Texas Constitution, as recognized in [Simmons v. Outreach Health Cmty. Care Servs., L.P., 511 S.W.3d 163 \(Tex. App. 2014\)](#).

Subsequently, the associate judge took further actions in the case, including issuing orders, without a valid order of referral. Under Texas Family Code § 201.006 and Texas Government Code §§ 54A.007 and 54B.007, these actions were taken in the clear absence of jurisdiction and are therefore void. Because judicial immunity does not apply to acts taken without jurisdiction, the Respondent's claim for federal relief under § 1983 is not barred.

The facts also suggest a pattern of procedural irregularities and possible attorney misconduct, but the core legal claim rests on the deprivation of property without due process and the issuance of void orders by an associate judge lacking jurisdiction.

## **5. Drafting the Federal Complaint**

A federal complaint based on these facts should allege:

- The Respondent was deprived of his home and business without notice, hearing, or opportunity to be heard, in violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Texas Constitution.
- The associate judge issued subsequent orders without a valid order of referral, rendering those orders void for want of jurisdiction under Texas Family Code § 201.006 and Texas Government Code §§ 54A.007 and 54B.007.
- The deprivation of property was carried out under color of state law, and the actions of the associate judge are not protected by judicial immunity because they were taken in the clear absence of jurisdiction.
- The Respondent seeks injunctive and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to remedy the ongoing deprivation of his constitutional rights.

## **Exceptions and Caveats**

While the law is clear that due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard, and that associate judges may only act pursuant to a valid order of referral, there may be factual disputes regarding whether an emergency or protective order was warranted, or whether a valid referral order existed. The Respondent must be prepared to demonstrate that no such order was in place and that no emergency justified the summary deprivation of property.

Additionally, while judicial immunity does not protect acts taken in the clear absence of jurisdiction, it does protect acts that are merely in excess of authority. The distinction between acting without jurisdiction and acting in excess of authority can be fact-intensive and may be contested by the defense.

## **Conclusion**

The facts as alleged support a strong claim for deprivation of property without due process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Texas Constitution, as well as a claim that subsequent orders issued by an associate judge without a valid order of referral are void for want of jurisdiction. Texas law is clear that associate judges may only act pursuant to a valid referral order, and actions taken without such an order are not protected by judicial immunity. The Respondent's federal complaint should focus on these core legal violations, supported by the relevant statutes and case law, to seek injunctive or declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

## **Legal Authorities**

[Simmons v. Outreach Health Cmty. Care Servs., L.P., 511 S.W.3d 163 \(Tex. App. 2014\)](#)

**Texas Court of Appeals**



## **Extract**

The Due Process Clauses of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution also serve as restraints on legislative power in establishing procedural prerequisites to vindicating a claim. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that '[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law....' U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1. Likewise, the Texas Constitution's Due Process Clause provides that '[n]o citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges, or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.' TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19. Notice and the opportunity to be heard are the cornerstones of due process. Before the State may deprive a person of property, the person must be afforded notice and the opportunity to be heard.

## **Summary**

The passage highlights the essential due process requirements under both the U.S. and Texas Constitutions, emphasizing that no person should be deprived of property without notice and an opportunity to be heard. This directly supports the proposition that the Respondent's due process rights were violated when he was ordered to vacate his home and business without a hearing or opportunity to contest the claims.

[Tex. Gov't. Code § 54B.007](#) [Tex. Gov't. Code § 54B.007](#) [Order of Referral](#)

## **Extract**

To refer cases to an associate judge, the referring court must issue an order of referral. The order of referral may limit the power or duties of an associate judge.

## **Summary**

The passage clearly states that an order of referral is necessary for an associate judge to have jurisdiction over a case. Without such an order, the associate judge would be acting without jurisdiction, which supports the proposition that actions taken without a valid order of referral are ultra vires and not protected by judicial immunity.

[Tex. Gov't. Code § 54A.007](#) [Tex. Gov't. Code § 54A.007](#) [Order of Referral](#)

## **Extract**

To refer one or more cases to an associate judge, a judge must issue a written order of referral that specifies the associate judge's duties.

## **Summary**

A written order of referral is a necessary legal instrument for an associate judge to have jurisdiction over a case. Without such an order, any actions taken by the associate judge could be considered outside their legal authority, or ultra vires. This supports the proposition that actions taken without a valid order of referral are not protected by judicial immunity and may be challenged.

[Tex. Fam. Code § 201.006 Tex. Fam. Code § 201.006 Order of Referral](#)

## **Extract**

In referring a case to an associate judge, the judge of the referring court shall render: an individual order of referral; or a general order of referral specifying the class and type of cases to be heard by the associate judge.

## **Summary**

The Texas Family Code mandates that a judge of the referring court must render an order of referral, either individual or general, to confer jurisdiction to an associate judge. This requirement is crucial because it establishes the legal authority for the associate judge to act in a case. Without such an order, any actions taken by the associate judge would be without jurisdiction, rendering them ultra vires and potentially void.

[Tex. Fam. Code § 201.007 Tex. Fam. Code § 201.007 Powers of Associate Judge](#)

## **Extract**

Except as limited by an order of referral, an associate judge may: conduct a hearing; hear evidence; compel production of relevant evidence; rule on the admissibility of evidence; ... regulate all proceedings in a hearing before the associate judge; ... without prejudice to the right to a de novo hearing before the referring court under Section FAMILY CODE 201.015 and subject to Subsection (c), render and sign: (A) a final order agreed to in writing as to both form and substance by all parties; (B) a final default order; (C) a temporary order; or (D) a final order in a case in which a party files an unrevoked waiver made in accordance with Rule 119, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, that waives notice to the party of the final hearing or waives the party's appearance at the final hearing; ...

## **Summary**

An associate judge in Texas has specific powers to conduct hearings, hear evidence, and regulate proceedings. However, these powers are contingent

upon an order of referral, and any actions taken without such an order may be outside the judge's jurisdiction. This supports the proposition that the associate judge's actions in ordering the Respondent to vacate without a hearing or evidence may have been beyond their jurisdiction, thus violating due process rights.

This memo was compiled by Vincent AI based on vLex materials available as of October 27, 2025. [View full answer on vLex](#)