

322-744263-23
IN THE 322ND DISTRICT COURT
OF TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

Morgan Michelle Myers,	§
	§
Petitioner,	§
v.	§
	§
Charles Dustin Myers,	§
	§
Respondent.	§
	§
And In the interest of M.E.M. and C.R.M., two children.	§

**OBJECTION
TO LOCAL RULE 1.06(b)(2)
AND FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
OF FEDERAL ACTION**

TO THE HONORABLE 322ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS:

COMES NOW, Charles Dustin Myers, Respondent in the above captioned cause, who respectfully submits this OBJECTION TO LOCAL RULE 1.06(b)(2) AND FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE to place on the record that he objects to any future handling of this matter by Court Coordinator Lindsey Baker and that Respondent has no choice but to pursue a federal claim.

Lindsey Baker, as court coordinator, exemplifies the problem of unequal treatment of pro se litigants when her actions—such as altering or withholding parts of a pro se party’s court filing—result in procedural disadvantages that are not faced by represented parties, thereby undermining the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under Texas law. Her conduct, as described, highlights how court staff can perpetuate or institutionalize preferential treatment, which is constitutionally suspect and contrary to the principles of fairness and access to justice.

I. SUMMARY

1. The Texas Constitution and established case law require that all litigants, whether represented by counsel or appearing pro se, receive equal treatment in the judicial process. When a court coordinator like Lindsey Baker engages in conduct that disadvantages pro se litigants—

such as modifying, splitting, or omitting parts of their filings—this not only creates procedural barriers but also risks violating the constitutional mandate of equal protection and due process.

2. Lindsey Baker’s actions, as alleged, serve as a textbook example of how court staff can, intentionally or not, create a two-tiered system that favors attorneys and their clients over unrepresented parties. Such conduct is particularly problematic because court coordinators wield significant administrative power and discretion, and their preferential treatment of represented parties can have a direct and detrimental impact on the substantive and procedural rights of pro se litigants, undermining both the appearance and reality of justice.

II. BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT LAW

A. Legislative Framework

3. The Texas Constitution, specifically Article 1, Section 3, enshrines the principle that all individuals are entitled to equal rights and protection under the law, and that no person or group is entitled to exclusive privileges except in consideration of public service, see Tex. Const. art. 1 § 3 Equal Rights. This constitutional guarantee is directly implicated when court officials, including coordinators, treat similarly situated litigants differently based solely on their representation status.

4. Texas Penal Code § 32.46 criminalizes the act of causing another person, with intent to defraud or harm, to sign or execute any document affecting property or pecuniary interest without effective consent. It also prohibits causing a public servant to file or record a document purporting to memorialize an act or order of a purported court or judicial officer not established by law. This provision is relevant where court staff manipulate or alter court documents in a way that affects a party’s property or legal interests.

5. The Texas Government Code authorizes judges to appoint court coordinators to improve justice and expedite case processing, and these coordinators serve at the pleasure of the appointing judge, see Tex. Gov't. Code § 74.101. This structure gives coordinators significant administrative discretion, but also places a duty on them to act impartially and in accordance with constitutional mandates.

6. Additionally, court staff are required to maintain the confidentiality of non-public judicial work product, and improper handling or disclosure of such materials can constitute a criminal offense, see Tex. Gov't. Code § 21.013.

B. Jurisprudence

7. Texas jurisprudence outlines that the state's equal protection clause provides the same guarantees as the federal Fourteenth Amendment, requiring that all individuals, including litigants, be treated equally by the courts, see *Ho v. University of Texas at Arlington*, 984 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App. 1998). The court in *Ho* emphasized that any practice or rule resulting in disparate treatment of pro se litigants as compared to those represented by counsel could raise serious constitutional concerns.

8. The importance of impartiality and the avoidance of personal interests interfering with judicial or quasi-judicial duties is further underscored in *State v. Terrazas*, 962 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), which, while addressing prosecutorial conduct, is instructive for the broader principle that court officials must avoid conduct that undermines procedural fairness and due process.

9. By applying these principles, the court can avoid any appearance of impropriety or a risk of being seen as impartial.

III. Analysis

C. Application of Equal Protection Principles to Lindsey Baker's Conduct

10. The core constitutional issue is whether Lindsey Baker's actions as court coordinator resulted in pro se litigants being treated less favorably than represented parties, thereby violating the equal protection guarantees of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. The Texas Constitution's equal rights provision is unequivocal: all individuals are entitled to equal treatment, and no one is entitled to special privileges absent a public service justification, see Tex. Const. art. 1 § 3 Equal Rights.

11. In the instant matter described, Lindsey Baker altered Respondent's joint motion to recuse by removing exhibits and affidavits, splitting the document, and removing hyperlinks after the motion was filed and served. These actions, which are facially supported by the record, directly impact the Respondent's ability to present their case fully and effectively, and may result in the presiding judge or reviewing authority not having access to the complete record. Such conduct creates a procedural disadvantage for the pro se litigant that is not faced by parties represented by counsel, who may have the resources or relationships to ensure their filings are handled correctly.

12. Furthermore, when questioned about these modifications, Baker's explanations were illogical and contradictory to how filings are typically handled. Together, these actions create a scenario where her involvement in the case is prejudicial to the Respondent.

13. This type of disparate treatment is precisely what the equal protection clause is designed to prevent. As the Texas Court of Appeals made clear in *Ho v. University of Texas at Arlington*, 984 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App. 1998), the state's equal protection clause is coextensive

with the federal standard, and any practice that results in pro se litigants being systematically disadvantaged is constitutionally suspect.

14. Moreover, the administrative discretion granted to court coordinators under Tex. Gov't. Code § 74.101 does not override the constitutional requirement of equal treatment. While coordinators are tasked with expediting case processing and improving justice, these objectives must be pursued in a manner that is neutral and non-discriminatory. Preferential treatment of attorneys or their clients, whether through informal relationships or deliberate manipulation of filings, is inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of the law.

15. Here, Lindsey Baker's involvement has only created ambiguities, delays, and unexplained conduct that is criminal in nature.

D. Procedural Unfairness and Access to Justice

16. The problem is not merely theoretical. Procedural disadvantages—such as missing exhibits, altered documents, or incomplete filings—can have real and substantial effects on a litigant's ability to obtain relief, respond to adverse actions, or appeal unfavorable decisions. These barriers are particularly acute for pro se parties, who may lack the legal knowledge or resources to identify and correct such errors.

E. Potential Criminal and Civil Liability

17. Beyond constitutional concerns, Lindsey Baker's conduct may also implicate criminal statutes. Under Tex. Pen. Code § 32.46, it is a criminal offense to cause another person, with intent to defraud or harm, to sign or execute any document affecting property or pecuniary interest without effective consent. If a court coordinator alters or manipulates court documents in

a way that affects a party's legal or property interests, and does so with the requisite intent, this could constitute a violation of the statute.

18. Additionally, the requirement for court staff to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of judicial work product, as set out in Tex. Gov't. Code § 21.013, which underscores the seriousness of mishandling or altering court filings. Breaches of these duties can have both criminal and professional consequences, which Respondent seeks to pursue if this Court continues to disregard the law.

F. The Role of Discretion and Institutional Practices

19. The structure of the court coordinator system in Texas, as described in Tex. Gov't. Code § 74.101, gives coordinators significant administrative power, but also places them under the direct supervision of the appointing judge. This arrangement can create an environment where informal relationships or unwritten practices develop, potentially leading to preferential treatment of certain parties. When such practices result in pro se litigants being disadvantaged, they are constitutionally problematic.

20. The secondary materials highlight the need for clear guidelines and training for court staff to ensure that all litigants are treated fairly, regardless of representation status. Without such safeguards, the risk of institutionalizing unequal treatment is significant.

21. The appearance of fairness is as important as its reality. When court staff are perceived to favor attorneys or their clients over pro se parties, public confidence in the judiciary is undermined. The due process rights of litigants are not limited to the outcome of their cases, but extend to the procedures by which those outcomes are reached. Any deviation from impartial and equal treatment threatens the legitimacy of the judicial system as a whole.

IV. CONCLUSION

Lindsey Baker's conduct as court coordinator, as described, is a clear example of how court staff can perpetuate or institutionalize unequal treatment of pro se litigants, in violation of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under Texas law. By altering or withholding parts of a pro se party's court filing, Baker created procedural disadvantages that are not faced by represented parties, undermining both the appearance and reality of fairness in the judicial process. The Texas Constitution, relevant statutes, and case law all require that all litigants be treated equally, and any deviation from this standard—whether through formal rules or informal practices—risks both constitutional violation and loss of public confidence in the courts. The judiciary and court staff must be vigilant in ensuring that all parties, regardless of representation, have equal access to justice and are not subjected to systemic disadvantages.

Accordingly, and for all the reasons stated above, Respondent OBJECTS to any further involvement in this matter by court coordinator Lindsey Baker.

The Court is also put on official notice that Federal proceedings will commence in the coming days. The Court should consider issuing an immediate stay as soon as possible considering Baker, Carter, and others currently presiding over this case will be named as defendants.

This notice and objection are filed in good faith as Respondent is not obligated to provide such notice.

If the court chooses not to stay these proceedings, Respondent hereby invokes his right to a trial by jury, and objects to the final trial setting scheduled for December 10, 2025, being heard by District Judge James Munford, as he will also be named a defendant.

Due to the court's collective failures and unexplained abnormalities, Respondent has no other option, absent relief, but to initiate proceedings to protect his children, his interests, and his rights.

Respondent asks the Court to take judicial notice of these issues.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Charles Dustin Myers
CHARLES DUSTIN MYERS
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PRO-SE RESPONDENT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On September 16, 2025, a true and accurate copy of this OBJECTION TO LOCAL RULE 1.06(B)(2) AND FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FEDERAL ACTION was served upon all parties of record pursuant to Rule 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Charles Dustin Myers
CHARLES DUSTIN MYERS
PRO-SE RESPONDENT

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Status as of 9/17/2025 8:41 AM CST

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