

Question

I. Introduction Within the last 23 days, four mandamus petitions have been docketed involving the same parties but identify distinct legal errors made by the trial courts below. In sum, the respondents include two Associate Judges, a District Judge, and a Regional Presiding Judge currently presiding over recusal proceedings. Each of the Respondents, the Real Party, her counsel, and the Office of the Attorney General were duly notified of all intentions to initiate these actions, the relief sought, and to date no input has been provided. The legal errors identified are significant and multifaceted: (1) an issuance of a void order by rendering a consent judgment where consent was lacking and in excess statutory authority; (2) a refusal to hear a properly filed emergency Temporary Restraining Order (TRO); (3) a swift and improper consolidation of cases without a hearing; and (4) a failure to adhere to Rule 18a regarding recusal proceedings. These actions have not only violated procedural norms but have also exacerbated the legal and personal hardships faced by the petitioner, and consolidation would serve the interest of judicial efficiency in providing a more wholistic view of these issues. 2 Amended Statement of Facts Relator, CHARLES DUSTIN MYERS, is referred to herein as “Father.” Real Party in Interest, MORGAN MICHELLE MYERS, is referred to herein as “Mother”. Each record citation marked with (R. X-X) is referencing the concurrently filed Amended Consolidated Mandamus Record. A. The Precipitating Event and Background Facts The events giving rise to these proceedings began on December 12, 2023, when the father discovered a series of text message exchanges between the mother and two individuals outside the marriage—identified in the record as Damen Kazlauskas and Debbie Price (R. 253-711). This discovery occurred shortly after the mother’s abrupt announcement of her intent to divorce and raised concerns regarding the children’s well-being and emotional environment. In an effort to address the matter constructively, the father contacted the mother’s grandfather—who resides next door to the marital home—via text message to request a family meeting to discuss the situation (R. 717-720). The following day, however, when Father confronted Mother with the discovery—presenting his concerns in the form of data visualizations (R. 255- 257)—she began distancing herself, starting by redirecting the planned family conversation into a private meeting solely between herself and her grandparents (R. 1716). On December 14, 2023, Mother initiated text communication with her 3 stepfather, Dan Branthoover, who resides in Yukon, Oklahoma (R. 274-278). Mr. Branthoover then contacted Father via text message, stating that he wanted to help both parties and requested a phone conversation (R. 1703). That conversation resulted in an arrangement for Mother to travel to Mr. Branthoover’s residence over the weekend beginning December 15, 2023, where Mr. Branthoover later acknowledged that he would be assisting with the divorce paperwork (R. 1710). During this same period, Mother also sought an ex parte emergency protective order against Father from the 322nd District Court of Tarrant County, as referenced in her divorce petition (R. 78 at 9B). B. Travel, Influence and Conversion of Marital Assets While en route to, or upon arrival at, Mr. Branthoover’s residence, Mother withdrew the entirety of the funds from the joint marital bank account, totaling \$1,576

(R. 723; 1716-1717). The transaction was facilitated by Mr. Branthoover, who used his PayPal account—identified as “dmb575” (R. 1707)—as an intermediary to transfer the funds. This identifier corresponds to the relevant December 2023 bank statement (R. 1706). Both Mr. Branthoover and Mother later admitted that the transaction had occurred (R. 1709, 1716). As a result, on December 16, 2023, Father was notified that the joint account had been overdrawn, which caused the suspension of his business’s advertising services due to a failed payment (R. 726-727). Father subsequently contacted Mr. 4 Branthoover in writing to request the return of the funds, explaining that the money was needed to cover essential family expenses and to purchase Christmas presents for the children (R. 728-729). During this exchange, Mr. Branthoover explicitly informed Father that Mother’s visit was for the purpose of receiving assistance with the preparation of divorce paperwork (R. 730).

C. The Eviction The situation escalated further on December 17, 2023, when Father was served with an eviction notice by Mother’s grandmother, Margie Wilson. The notice cited a protective order and a divorce petition as the basis for eviction, despite those documents not having been formally filed at the time (R. 735). The case was later heard by the Honorable Judge Swearingin Jr. and was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (R. 736-737) on January 17, 2024.

D. The Divorce Petition On December 18, 2023, Mother formally filed for divorce (R. 71-81) and requested an “Uncontested Cases” form from the court (R. 101). In her divorce petition, she claimed that the parties had stopped living together as spouses on or around December 1, 2023 (R. 74 at 4). She also asserted financial indigence, stating that she had only \$21 in her bank account (R. 91) while being responsible for \$1,610 in monthly expenses (R. 92). Contradicting the timeline established by the eviction notice served the previous day, the petition further alleged that an active protective order was already in place against Father, and that a finding of family violence had been made during the marriage—thereby waiving the statutory 60-day waiting period (R. 78 at 10). Mother further claimed that the marital property would be divided by agreement yet designated both family vehicles as her separate property (R. 79). She requested joint managing conservatorship (R. 75 at 6D) and sought standard visitation rights for Father (R. 76 at 6F), while simultaneously alleging that she and the children could face abuse or serious harm if Father were provided with her contact information (R. 81 at 15).

E. The Protective Order Four days after filing for divorce, on December 22, 2023, Mother filed an application for a protective order (R. 103-109). In supporting documents, including an affidavit (R. 108) and an unsworn declaration, she alleged that family violence occurred on December 18, 2023—the same day she filed for divorce (R. 109). However, evidence indicates that on that same day, Mother was present at the family home with Father, exhibiting no signs of being in a state of emergency (R. 1692). Mother continued to cohabit with Father intermittently following these filings, as evidenced by her presence at the family home on December 29, 2023, participating in a typical evening with Father and the children (R. 1716). Father 6 was formally served with the protective order suit on December 27, 2023 (R. 117- 118). Within the protective order application, Mother requested that Father be prohibited from approaching within 200 feet of the children’s school, that he cease all communication with her, and that he complete a battering intervention and prevention program (R. 105). She acknowledged the joint ownership of the

matrimonial residence but nonetheless requested spousal support, child support, and Father's immediate removal from the home (R. 106). Adding another layer to the situation, the day after the divorce was filed—on December 19, 2023—Mr. Branthoover contacted Father via text message, claiming to represent Mother in the legal proceedings (R. 1712). Despite these filings and allegations, Father continued to cohabit with Mother leading up to the first scheduled legal proceeding: a show cause hearing set for January 16, 2024. During this interim period, Father prioritized the children and spent time with them during their holiday break (R. 826-829).

F. Father Prepares His Defense In response to the series of legal actions initiated by Mother, Father waited until after the children's Christmas holiday to formally begin preparing his defense. He first filed an original answer to the protective order application, denying all allegations of family violence (R. 129-133). In his answer, Father raised the 7 affirmative defenses of fraud, illegality, and duress, asserting that Mother was attempting to misuse the legal process (R. 131). To support his position, Father attached two exhibits: the first was a copy of his Texas Department of Public Safety (TxDPS) record, demonstrating no history of violence (R. 134-136); the second highlighted inconsistencies within Mother's divorce petition (R. 137-140). Subsequently, on January 3, 2024, Father filed a motion to consolidate the protective order proceedings with the divorce case (R. 142-145). He also submitted a background report intended to provide the court with context regarding the children's familial circumstances (R. 146-148). Father later filed a motion for continuance to obtain legal representation (R. 149-151), accompanied by additional documentation related to the family situation (R. 152-155), including text message evidence from Mr. Branthoover intended to refute Mother's claim of indigency (R. 161-164). Finally, on January 13, 2024, Father submitted an unsworn declaration detailing the sequence of events leading up to that point (R. 175-179).

G. Setting #1 - Show Cause The first court hearing was scheduled for January 16, 2024 (R. 117-118). The parties appeared but announced they were not ready to proceed (R. 180-181). Due to inclement weather conditions, the Honorable James Munford presided over the matter temporarily. Judge Munford granted a continuance but also ordered Father to vacate the family residence effective immediately—without conducting an evidentiary hearing, making specific findings, or considering Father's submitted pleadings. This resulted in a de facto temporary termination of Father's custodial rights, and the case was reset for January 22, 2024, to be heard by the Honorable Jeffrey Kaitcer (R. 182-185). Faced with the sudden loss of his residence and access to his children, Father sought legal representation immediately and retained attorney Daniel R. Bacalis on January 19, 2024—just three days before the rescheduled hearing (R. 818 at 9). Father promptly briefed Mr. Bacalis on the situation, providing insights into the family dynamics through a comprehensive statement of context (R. 168-174).

H. Reset #1 - Show Cause On the rescheduled date of January 22, 2024, the parties appeared at the courthouse for the second setting. Mother initially appeared without legal counsel but retained attorney Cooper L. Carter in the courthouse lobby just prior to the hearing. This prompted a further delay, as the Honorable Judge Kaitcer granted a continuance sua sponte, resetting the case once more to February 1, 2024 (R. 185-187). In the period between settings, both Mr. Bacalis, representing Father, and Mr. Carter, representing Mother, filed amended pleadings in the divorce

proceedings (R. 188-207, R. 208-219). 9 I. Reset #2 – Show Cause At the third scheduled setting on February 1, 2024, both parties arrived with their respective counsel and announced they were ready to proceed. 1 However, instead of the matter being heard by Honorable Jeffrey Kaitcer, father's counsel, Mr. Bacalis, drafted an "Agreed Associate Judge's Report" which was presented to father in the hallway outside the courtroom. (R. 228-234). This proposed agreement included terms to non-suit (dismiss) the protective order application, grant father residency in the family home only until March 1, 2024, and outline the division of financial responsibilities (R. 231-232). Father expressed significant reservations and initially refused to sign the agreed order, stating his desire to proceed to trial to address mother's allegations directly and hold her accountable, where he was told by his counsel, "I know the judge, this is the best we can get," and felt pressured into signing the agreement as the only presented option, which is corroborated by father's witness in an affidavit (R. 1367-1369). Feeling frustrated by this outcome, father paid particular attention to the procedural requirements highlighted in bold text within the agreement signed on February 1, 2024 (R. 233). The Father then realized that if he terminated his attorney, he wouldn't be able to prepare the written order and made the decision to terminate his counsel and represent himself moving forward. 1 No recorded appearance from either party can be found in the record on this date. 10 J. Father Proceeds Pro Se Shortly after the court setting, Father terminated the services of his attorney, Dan Bacalis, and notified the court (R. 220-222). An agreed motion for withdrawal of counsel was subsequently filed (R. 223-227). On February 8, 2024, the associate judge's report dated February 1, 2024, was filed into the record (R. 228-234). Around the same time, an agreed order of consolidation was entered—consolidating the protective order suit with the divorce matter—without Father's knowledge or signature (R. 235-238). In response, Father prepared an Emergency Motion to Vacate, which he filed the following day (R. 239-243). The motion included a supporting brief summarizing the procedural history and outlining what Father described as Mother's unlawful campaign against him (R. 244-252), and sought a de novo hearing on specific issues. The exhibits accompanying the motion included text message evidence and data visualizations involving Mother, Damen Kazlauskas, and Debbie Price, originally discovered on December 12, 2023 (R. 253-714); text messages between Father and Mother's grandfather indicating the divorce was unexpected (R. 715-720); evidence of marital asset conversion between Mother and Daniel Branthoover (R. 721-723); documentation of the overdrawn joint bank account and related communications from Branthoover (R. 724-731); a copy of the eviction notice served by Margie Wilson, which Mother later tore in half and marked "VOID" (R. 732-735); 11 and the judgment of dismissal in the eviction proceeding, entered on January 17, 2024—the day after Father was removed from the residence (R. 736-737). A few days later, the court issued the order granting Attorney Bacalis's withdrawal (R. 738-741). Father then prepared and filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, accompanied by a supporting brief (R. 757-767). He attached a Proposed Parenting Plan as Exhibit D to the motion (R. 768-772) and a proposed order (R. 773-774). No response was ever provided to these pleadings by the opposing party. K. Events Preceding the March 14 Hearing On February 22, 2024, the parties received notice that a hearing on Father's Emergency Motion was scheduled for March 14, 2024

signed by Hon. James Munford (R. 775-779). Father subsequently filed a notice stating his intention to remain in the marital residence due to work requirements and childcare responsibilities (R. 781-785). He then provided initial disclosures to the parties (R. 786-792) and received no response to his emergency motion. Two days later, while Father was taking the children to school, Mother locked him out of the marital residence and left a sign on the door declaring that "You should have been out by Saturday you are now locked out." (R. 1747-1748). To avoid unnecessary conflict, Father temporarily stayed in Flower Mound, Texas, with his own father while awaiting the hearing. 12 L. Setting #4 - Emergency Motion to Vacate and Reconsider Evidence Father appeared for the scheduled hearing on his Emergency Motion (R. 793).² Upon entering the courtroom, he was handed a document titled "Temporary Orders," which was a modified version of the February 1, 2024, agreement previously prepared by Father's former counsel (R. 887). These orders were prepared by Cooper L. Carter after the 20-day deadline stipulated in the original agreement. No agreement had been reached, as evidenced by the parties' presence in court to contest the matter, and no motion to sign had been set or filed—contrary to the judge's prior directive (R. 233) and agreement of the parties. The proposed orders also claimed that a hearing had been held on February 1, 2024, for "Mother's Motion for Temporary Orders,"³ and that all parties were in agreement with the terms "as evidenced by the signatures below" (R. 888). In reality, the February 1 setting resulted only in an associate judge's report, drafted informally in the hallway by Father's prior counsel. Despite this, the proposed order stated that the court "heard evidence and argument"—a statement Father asserts was inaccurate (R. 888). At that time, the only other scheduled hearing was on Mother's Application for Protective Order, which had been non-suited in the February 1 Associate Judge's Report after two delays. Once the hearing began, Father's Emergency Motion was denied without 2 No recorded appearance by the Real Party in Interest, Morgan Michelle Myers, can be found in the record on this date. 3 This document has never been served to the Relator. 13 explanation, and he was ordered to sign the very agreement he had appeared in court to contest (R. 794-795). Notably, the order itself contained two distinct sets of handwriting, was prepared by the opposing counsel, and Father refused to sign the document because he did not agree to its terms (R. 795). Notably, Father also refused to sign the Temporary Orders claiming his consent (R. 925). No order was ever issued regarding Father's Emergency Motion to Vacate. Following the setting, Father began exploring his appellate remedies and drafted a Preparatory Notice for Judicial Review, which he later amended twice (R. 797-846). The document provided a detailed account of the parties' family background (R. 807), employment history, and household dynamics (R. 808-815). It included a statement of facts segmented into background facts (R. 816-817), procedural facts (R. 817-821), and undisputed evidentiary facts (R. 822-825). The pleading also contained video evidence of Father with the children during the Mother's initial campaign to have him removed from the residence (R. 826-829). Appended to the filing were affidavits from Father's business clients attesting to his need to remain in the marital residence for professional reasons pending the divorce (R. 850-852, R. 853-855, R. 856-858, R. 859-861, R. 862-865, R. 866- 868, R. 869-872). The disputed Temporary Orders that claimed consent were filed into the record by the clerk on March 26, 2024. Father promptly responded by filing a formal

Request for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law regarding the 14 March 14 decision (R. 882–886).⁴ He then filed a notice of his intent to seek mandamus relief by April 8, 2024 (R. 902–905). M. The Appellate Proceedings In April 2024, Father prepared a Motion for Emergency Relief directed to the Second Court of Appeals (R. 979–1007) and a Petition for Writ of Mandamus (R. 931–978). The Petition was accepted by the appellate court under cause number 02- 24-00149-CV on April 8, 2024, and the trial court was notified of the filing that same day (R. 1009–1010). Two days later, Father’s Motion for Emergency Relief and Petition for Writ of Mandamus were denied per curiam (R. 1011–1012). Father then submitted a Motion for Rehearing on April 18, 2024 (R. 1028–1044). Six days later, on April 24, 2024, Cooper L. Carter filed a Motion for Pre-Trial Conference (R. 1013–1016), to which Father promptly objected (R. 1017–1023). The following day, Father’s Motion for Rehearing was denied by the Second Court of Appeals (R. 1045). Father moved for en banc reconsideration on April 26, 2024 (R. 1052–1066). On April 30, 2024, although Father continued to disagree with the Temporary Orders and the hardship they imposed, he abided by the court’s directives and filed a Notice of Completion regarding the court-ordered parenting class, which both parties were required to complete by May 1, 2024 (R. 1046–1050).⁵ The en banc reconsideration⁴ No findings were ever issued. ⁵ No notice of completion was ever filed by the Mother. ¹⁵ motion was denied the following day (R. 1067). Father then prepared a second Petition for Writ of Mandamus before this Court, which was accepted under cause number 24-0395. The trial court was notified of the filing by postcard (R. 1068–1073). On May 9, 2024, Cooper L. Carter emailed Father requesting his signature on an Income Withholding Order and claimed that the orders were agreed (R. 1115). Father reviewed the proposed order, determined that it was defective (R. 1117–1122), and communicated his objections to Ms. Carter (R. 1116). N. Intervention From the Texas Attorney General’s Office Subsequently, an intervention pleading was filed by the Office of the Attorney General, seeking relief from the trial court regarding child support obligations (R. 1098–1104). Father objected to this intervention (R. 1105–1113). Notably, upon examining the pleading purportedly filed by “Holly Hayes,” Father observed that the signature line did not match the name of the listed attorney of record. Additionally, the font sizes in the document appeared inconsistent, suggesting that the signature may have been irregular (R. 1102). No further correspondence was filed by the Attorney General’s Office in this matter. By July 2024, during Father’s designated month for visitation under the disputed orders, he stayed in an Airbnb near the marital home to maintain stability for the children and worked with the host to attempt to establish a source of business revenue (R. 1736–1746). ¹⁶ On August 30, 2024, this Court declined to hear Father’s mandamus petition, and the trial court was notified (R. 1157–1162). Immediately following the denial, Father prepared a Motion for Rehearing, which he submitted and later amended in mid-September (R. 1135–1156). The court was notified of the rehearing filing (R. 1163–1168). O. Challenge to Opposing Counsel’s Authority Under Rule 12 After filing the Motion for Rehearing with this Court, Father served discovery requests on the opposing party, including Requests for Production of Documents (R. 1410–1411) and Requests for Admissions (R. 1411–1415). In addition, Father filed a motion under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 12, challenging Cooper L. Carter’s authority to represent Mother in the trial court (R. 1169–1177). This

challenge was based on ambiguity surrounding Ms. Carter's employment status and the fact that her pleadings were being filed by Roderick D. Marx—an individual who was not listed as counsel of record and not a party to the case (R. 219, R. 1016). P. Declining Resources and Exhaustion of Remedies Facing rapidly declining credit, reduced income (R. 1717-1718), and limited housing options, Father filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Orders on September 24, 2024, requesting relief by October 1, 2024 (R. 1183-1195). When no relief was granted and no response was received from the opposing party, Father 17 filed a motion seeking the joint recusal of Judge James Munford and Associate Judge Jeff Kaitcer. The motion asserted that the nature of Mother's initial allegations had created an appearance of bias that could undermine fairness in the proceedings (R. 1196-1220). Q. The First Recusal - Procedural Abnormalities Two days after the recusal motion was filed, Judge James Munford declined to recuse himself without explanation and referred the matter to the Honorable David L. Evans, the 8th Administrative Regional Judge of Fort Worth (R. 1221-1243). Upon reviewing this referral, Father observed that the version of the motion submitted to Judge Evans differed significantly from the one he originally filed. Father's original filing was a single, 20.21 MB hyperlinked PDF submitted via the re:SearchTX platform (R. 1253-1254). The version transmitted to Judge Evans was missing exhibits and the supporting affidavit. Father notified the court coordinator of the discrepancy and noted that the file was approximately 18 MB smaller (R. 1254-1255). Receiving no response, Father filed a formal notice with the court outlining these procedural irregularities (R. 1245-1252). The following day, Judge Munford issued an amended order of referral and again declined to recuse, without explanation (R. 1281-1283). This time, the recusal motion was divided into three separate files, with the court citing the "size of the motion" as justification (R. 1356-1357). Father objected to the handling of the recusal process (R. 1268-1280), noting that the Tarrant County District 18 Clerk's publicly available filing guidelines instruct litigants to compile all exhibits into a single document (R. 1272 at 9). He also noted that his original 20.21 MB file was well within the platform's approximately 30 MB capacity and that fragmenting the submission contradicted the court's standard electronic filing protocol (R. 1271 at 6-7). R. The First Recusal - the Appointment of Justice Lee Gabriel Activity paused until October 18, 2024, when the parties received postcard notification that Father's Supreme Court Motion for Rehearing had been denied (R. 1292-1297). Three days later, Judge David L. Evans issued an order setting a video conference regarding the recusal motion for October 30, 2024 (R. 1298-1301). On the day before the conference, Judge Evans appointed retired Justice Lee Gabriel to preside over the recusal matter (R. 1305-1308). During the scheduled video conference, internet connectivity issues arose, and the hearing was rescheduled to November 7, 2024, to be held in person at the 322nd District Court. In anticipation of possible objections from opposing counsel—who had not filed a response to the recusal motion—Father filed a PreTrial Motion in Limine to prevent unnecessary interruptions during his presentation and to reiterate key facts of the case (R. 1309-1315). Two days later, Father submitted a Request for Confirmation of Procedural Requirements, respectfully asking the district clerk to provide a certified copy of 19 Justice Gabriel's oath of office, in an effort to ensure procedural transparency (R. 1319-1324). S. The First Recusal - Dental Emergency On

the morning of the rescheduled in-person hearing, November 7, 2024, Father awoke experiencing significant dental distress, which he promptly communicated to his father (R. 1391-1392), opposing counsel and the court coordinator via email (R. 1394), and to Mother directly (R. 1395). Opposing counsel agreed in writing to reschedule the hearing due to the emergency (R. 1393). Nonetheless, four days later, on November 11, 2024, the court coordinator disseminated via email an order signed by Justice Gabriel denying Father's recusal motion. The order specifically referenced Father's absence from the November 7 hearing but made no mention of the dental emergency (R. 1397). In response, Father filed a Motion to Enter Judgment on November 13, 2024, in which he articulated objections to the procedural irregularities surrounding the recusal proceedings (R. 1325-1369). This motion was supported by an affidavit elaborating upon those irregularities (R. 1346-1349). Shortly thereafter, Father filed a Notice of Intent to Remove the case to federal court, citing exhaustion of state judicial remedies and setting forth jurisdictional grounds for removal to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas (R. 1371-1397).²⁰ On November 18, 2024, Father also submitted a Motion to Compel Discovery (R. 1398-1407) pertaining to discovery requests initially served on Mother on September 17, 2024, attached as Exhibit A (R. 1408-1418). He requested that the court deem the requested admissions conclusively established by operation of law due to Mother's failure to respond (R. 1405). The recusal proceedings concluded when the court formally documented and served the order denying Father's recusal motion on November 19, 2024 (R. 1422-1423). At that point, the parties awaited formal confirmation of the termination of Justice Lee Gabriel's assignment, as such termination would not effectuate "...until the undersigned Presiding Judge has terminated this assignment in writing." (R. 1306.)

T. Federal Removal, Remand, and Initiation of Proceedings Against Daniel Kenneth Branthoover

Following the denial of the recusal motion, Father spent the next two weeks compiling the necessary record in preparation for federal removal. On December 2, 2024, he filed a Notice of Removal with the state trial court (R. 1425-1444). Two days later, however, the United States District Court remanded the matter back to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.⁶ On December 14, 2024, Dan Branthoover sent Father a threatening text⁶ The Petitioner has not fulfilled her obligation under Tex. R. Civ. P. 237a by failing to serve a certified copy of the Order of Remand. ²¹ message (R. 1719-1720). At that point, Father's financial losses had exceeded \$75,000 (R. 1460-1462), prompting him to initiate separate federal litigation against Daniel Branthoover in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. That action sought damages arising from Mr. Branthoover's involvement in the events underlying this case, and was later amended (R. 1450-1464). Father provided notice of the related federal case to the state trial court on December 31, 2024 (R. 1445-1449). The federal complaint was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (R. 1428), and its statement of facts closely mirrored those presented in the current matter (R. 1452-1455).

U. Case Abandonment

The divorce case remained largely inactive until January 16, 2025, when Father submitted a comprehensive Case Memorandum and served copies upon Judges James Munford and Jeff Kaitcer of the 322nd Judicial District Court, Visiting Retired Justice Lee Gabriel, Regional Judge David L. Evans, and opposing counsel Cooper L. Carter (R. 1465-1519). On January 26, 2025, Father filed a Motion to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution,

citing the lack of activity in the case by the opposing party and the Court's time standards for divorce proceedings (R. 1526-1533). On January 29, 2025, facing the imminent repossession of his primary vehicle, Father returned to the matrimonial residence to retrieve his secondary vehicle. Inside, he discovered numerous personal items that Mother had placed in 22 the vehicle. He temporarily relocated these items to the porch (R. 1628-1629). Upon returning the next day to collect the children for his scheduled possession, Father observed that Mother had moved the items from the porch to the curb (R. 1630-1631). No further docket activity occurred until February 25, 2025, when Father filed a Notice of Loss of Employment, notifying the court of a significant reduction in income (R. 1520-1525). At the same time, he submitted a Motion to Sign, requesting a ruling on his long-pending Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which had remained unresolved since its original filing on February 22, 2024 (R. 1636-1656), and which the court acknowledged during the March 14, 2024, hearing (R. 1369). Father also filed an Objection and Request for Judicial Notice, recapping relevant procedural history and identifying pending matters requiring rulings (R. 1660-1677). On February 28, 2025, Father filed a Request for Ruling on his outstanding motions (R. 1678-1685). On March 5, 2025, he submitted a Notice of New Information, documenting Watauga Police Department involvement regarding his personal property being placed at the curb by Mother (R. 1686-1695). On March 12, 2025, Father filed a Notice of Continued Obstruction, itemizing pending, unopposed motions and emphasizing the ongoing lack of response from opposing counsel (R. 1929-1942). He reinforced these concerns on March 14, 2025, through 23 a Notice of Submission, restating the uncontested factual background and the judicial inaction on multiple unresolved filings (R. 1943-1955). By March 18, 2025, Father contacted the court coordinator via email, highlighting that neither Judge Munford nor Judge Kaitcer had been formally reinstated to preside over the case, despite Justice Gabriel's denial of recusal being entered nearly four months earlier (R. 1506-1507). In light of the continued judicial inactivity, and being confident in his understanding of dominant jurisdiction based on the extensive record, Father initiated a new Original Suit Affecting the Parent- Child Relationship (SAPCR) in the 233rd District Court of Tarrant County, submitting a cover letter explaining his need for immediate relief for himself and his minor children (R. 2259-2277). V. The SAPCR Suit and the Sudden Reappearance of Counsel On March 18, 2025, the 233rd District Court of Tarrant County accepted Father's original SAPCR petition (R. 2053-2064). Shortly thereafter, Mother reappeared in the litigation after several months of inactivity and filed a general denial in response to the SAPCR petition (R. 2278-2282). This pleading was submitted on behalf of Cooper L. Carter by Roderick D. Marx (R. 2282). Mr. Marx subsequently filed a motion to consolidate the SAPCR matter back into the original divorce case in the 322nd District Court (R. 2283-2286), again purporting to act on Ms. Carter's behalf (R. 2286). Father moved to strike both the general denial and the motion to consolidate 24 (R. 1956-1965), and attached an exhibit showing that opposing counsel was registered under a different law firm than what appeared on her pleadings. (R. 1962-1963). Father also filed a second Rule 12 Motion challenging Cooper L. Carter's authority to represent Mother in the 233rd District Court, citing Ms. Carter's continued failure to formally appear and the repeated filings by Mr. Marx in her name (R. 2287-2300). As of the date of

this filing, no response has been submitted to any of these pleadings by Ms. Carter. W. The Emergency TRO On March 24, 2025, Father filed an Objection to Consolidation in the second-filed case (R. 1880-1888) and an Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), seeking to prevent Mother from restricting his access to the family residence and to safeguard the children (R. 2301-2326). The TRO incorporated the same statement of facts that remains unopposed in multiple pleadings (R. 2304-2312). Father then coordinated with court staff to schedule the presentation of his emergency motion and documented all communications (R. 2333-2365) regarding these interactions. In those communications, Father first inquired about the status of his request and informed the court that the opposing party had been notified of the substance of the relief sought (R. 2338). The clerk advised that in-person presentation was required, and Father requested to appear between 9 a.m. and 2 p.m. on March 28, 2025, again confirming that the opposing party had been served (R. 2339). Father 25 delivered the intended materials to opposing counsel in advance of that presentation (R. 2351), and the clerk confirmed the scheduled time (R. 2339-2340). On March 28, 2025, Father appeared before the court coordinator, who assisted in securing opposing counsel's agreement to set the TRO hearing for April 10, 2025, from the available dates provided (R. 2358). The coordinator initialed the scheduling notice to reflect that agreement (R. 2360-2361). Father then proceeded to present the motion to the Honorable Kate Stone, who summarily declined to even hear it based solely on a prospective objection communicated by Mother's counsel—who was not even present in court (R. 2352). Even the coordinator acknowledged that the motion could have been heard on the spot, and noted that it could have been transferred after the emergency was addressed (R. 2356). Instead, the Associate Judge declined entirely to entertain the motion, ultimately triggering cause number 25-0367, now pending before this Honorable Court. On April 1, 2025, Father filed a Pre-Objection in the 322nd court addressing opposing counsel's anticipated motion to consolidate (R. 1889-1915). He also submitted a Respondent's Statement in the 322nd District Court (R. 1916-1919) and a separate Petitioner's Statement in the 233rd District Court (R. 1920-1928). Father then filed a Petitioner's Notice in the 233rd, presenting a side-by-side analysis of the children's best interests and relevant procedural considerations (R. 1995-2004). 26 On April 3, 2025, Roderick Marx filed the Motion to Consolidate on behalf of Mother's counsel that had been used to block the emergency hearing in the 322nd District Court, which failed to acknowledge Father's prior objection (R. 2366-2369). In response, Father filed a Pre-Objection to Transfer in the 233rd District Court (R. 2084-2087) realizing that the case would need to be transferred at some point along with a Notice of New Information advising the court that Mother was now engaged to Damen Kazlauskas—the individual with whom she exchanged extensive messages at the outset of this case (R. 2019-2024). Father also submitted a Comprehensive Legal Analysis in Support of Dismissal in the 322nd District Court, setting forth grounds to dismiss the original divorce matter so that the SAPCR could proceed independently (R. 1975-1994). X. The Dragon in Triplicate A few days later, Father filed a Notice of Intent to File Mandamus in the 233rd District Court (R. 2065-2083) and a Notice of Intent to File Prohibition in the 322nd District Court (R. 2005-2018). On April 10, 2025, Father filed an Emergency Motion for Declaratory Relief (R. 1775-1786) and a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in

the Second Court of Appeals, naming the Honorable Kate Stone as Respondent under cause number 02-25-00164-CV (“the SAPCR Mandamus”) (R. 2025-2052). Directly after this mandamus was submitted to the Second Court of Appeals, District Judge Kenneth Newell from the 233rd District Court sua sponte granted Mother’s Motion to Consolidate in the 233rd District Court and then filed it 27 with the 322nd District Court. (R. 2392-2395). The following day, the first-filed petition (“the SAPCR mandamus”) was denied per curiam in the Second Court of Appeals. On April 15, 2025, Father filed a Dominant Jurisdiction Analysis in the 322nd District Court (R. 2088-2100), along with a second memorandum titled Procedural Irregularities with Temporary Orders realizing that he was dealing with three potential abuses of discretion from three separate judges (R. 2172- 2202). That same day, Father filed a second Petition for Writ of Mandamus in the Second Court of Appeals, this time naming the Honorable Jeff Kaitcer as Respondent under cause number 02-25-00166-CV (“the Void Order Mandamus”) (R. 2396-2447) and filed an Emergency Motion for Stay to halt the proceedings given the extraordinary circumstances of this matter. (R. 2106-2123). See No. 02- 25-00166-CV The following day, Father filed a third Petition for Writ of Mandamus, naming the Honorable Kenneth Newell as Respondent under cause number 02-25- 00171-CV (“the Consolidation Mandamus”) for his arbitrary grant of Mother’s contested motion without a hearing (R. 2223-2253). On the same day, Father’s second mandamus petition was denied per curiam. By April 17, 2025, all three mandamus petitions had been denied per curiam, and Father moved for reconsideration en banc in all three matters (R. 2448-2467; R. 2203-2217; R. 2155-2171), thus giving birth to the “Dragon in Triplicate” – three separate judges implicated in three distinct abuses of discretion within the same family law matter. Y. The Sudden Move to Final Trial On April 23, 2025, with all three mandamus petitions pending, Father received a Notice of Court Proceeding scheduling a conference for April 29, 2025, purposed for setting the matter for final trial (R. 1772-1772). That same day, Father filed a formal objection to the setting (R. 2218-2222). The following day, Father’s first filed en banc motion for reconsideration (the “Void Order” mandamus) was denied per curiam by the appellate court. To address the unresolved issues regarding subject-matter jurisdiction over these orders, Father filed a Plea to the Jurisdiction asking the Honorable James Munford to clarify the legal basis for the current orders (R. 2468-2479). In a further effort to protect his procedural rights, Father filed a Second Motion to Recuse Judge Munford on April 25, 2025 (R. 1787-1859). Later that same day, Mother notified Father that the emergency circumstance which had formed the original basis for Father’s urgent push for the Emergency TRO petition had now materialized (R. 1766-1771). With this new development, Father filed a Notice of Non-Appearance and Objection to Trial Setting (R. 2480-2486) and amended his pending Motion to Recuse (R. 2487-2608). Despite the allegations and the procedural defects raised, Judge Munford declined to recuse himself for a second time without any substantive explanation (R. 2609-2613). 29 Separately, the Honorable Jeff Kaitcer—though not named in the recusal motion—filed a voluntary recusal from the case (R. 2614-2618). In response, Father filed an Objection to Procedural Handling of the Recusal Proceedings, explaining that Judge Kaitcer’s referral order was improper and specifically objected to the court coordinator managing the recusal process (R. 2619-2625). On May 1, 2025, the appellate court denied

Father's two remaining en banc motions per curiam (R. 2626-2627; 2628-2629). That same day, Father filed his second Petition for Writ of Mandamus before this Court under cause number 25- 0361. 7 He filed a third petition the next day, May 2, 2025, under cause number 25- 0367, followed by a fourth on May 7, 2025, under cause number 25-0378. There are now three concurrent mandamuses before this Honorable Court, but the risk of compounding error continues down below. Z. Risk of Future Error An Order of Assignment was forwarded by the coordinator from the Honorable David L. Evans appointing Senior Chief Justice John Cayce to oversee the recusal matters on May 6, 2025 (R. 3148-3150). Because the Order of Assignment still incorrectly named the Honorable Jeffrey Kaitcer and the coordinator was still handling the matters, Father filed a second objection (R. 3151-3166). 7 The first filed mandamus before this court was filed on April 8, 2024 under case number 25-0395. 30 AA. The Need for Relief Continues On May 12, 2025, Father filed an Affidavit in cause number 25-0361 reiterating the need for an emergency stay of the trial court proceedings (R. 3488- 3500). Three days later, the Honorable David L. Evans overruled the Father's objections regarding the involvement of the court coordinator and the Hon. Kaitcer motion which was never filed (R. 3506-3508). The next day, Father filed an emergency notice with the Court reiterating that the date by which he requested relief was approaching, and he reiterated the need for an emergency stay and reminded the Court that no opposition to the relief being sought had been raised. (R. 3501-3505). AB. Mandamus #4 On May 19, 2025, the Father filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus before this Court as an Original Proceeding which was docketed as case number 25-0426 on the grounds that the Regional Presiding Judge's refusal to comply with Rule 18a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure was an abuse of discretion (R. 3509-3559). Father then prepared a Case Memorandum and filed it in that cause number (R. 3837-3876). The next day, Father filed an Emergency Motion to Stay reiterating the need for a stay of the proceedings below given errors continue to compound. (R. 3877-3896). AC. Mandamus #5 The very same day, Hon. John H. Cayce, Jr., assigned by Hon. David L. 31 Evans, summarily denied the recusal of Hon. James Munford, District Judge of the 322nd District Court of Tarrant County (R. 3897-3900). An order was also issued denying the recusal of Hon. Jeff Kaitcer, referring to a motion that was never filed. (R. 3901-3904). The next day, Father filed a Notice of Intent to File Mandamus, raising the issue "... that the record, on its face, demonstrates a clear deviation from procedural due process and established Texas jurisprudence regarding recusal proceedings, warranting immediate corrective action to uphold this court's impartiality and public confidence in the judiciary." (R. 3905-3914). AD. Striking the OAG Finally, on May 22, 2025, Father filed a Motion to Strike the Intervention of the Office of the Attorney General requesting that "[i]f a justiciable interest cannot be demonstrated or if a response is not filed by a future date deemed appropriate by the Court, order that the intervention pleading from the Office of the Attorney General naming Holly Hayes as counsel be stricken from the record (R. 3915-3956). sHOW how that the court cannot just sua sponte move the case to final trial despite all of these issues. charles myers has been abused by the judicial system, and must stop the final hearing from happening. There are multiple unresolved motions, including motions for recusal, pleas to the jurisdiction, motions to strike, and pending mandamus proceedings, all raising serious questions about the

validity of prior orders and the authority of the presiding judges. Texas courts are required to resolve jurisdictional challenges and recusal motions before proceeding to substantive matters, including final trial. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a (recusal procedure); *In re Union Pac. Res. Co.*, 969 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (“A trial court commits error if it proceeds to trial while a recusal motion is pending and unresolved.”); *In re Gray*, 158 S.W.3d 876, 879 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding) (“A trial court must resolve a plea to the jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits.”). Because unresolved recusal motions and jurisdictional challenges deprive the court of authority to act, any sua sponte setting of a final trial is void or voidable, and proceeding would constitute an abuse of discretion and a violation of due process.

Answer (Texas)

Short response

A Texas trial court cannot proceed to set or conduct a final trial while there are unresolved recusal motions, jurisdictional challenges, or other pending dispositive motions; doing so is a clear violation of Texas law and renders any resulting orders void. The court must first resolve all such motions before taking further substantive action, and failure to do so constitutes an abuse of discretion and a denial of due process.

Summary

Texas law is unequivocal that when a motion to recuse is filed, the presiding judge must either recuse themselves or refer the motion to the regional presiding judge, and may not take further action in the case until the motion is resolved. Similarly, jurisdictional challenges and other dispositive motions must be addressed before the court can proceed to trial or issue substantive orders; any attempt to move forward while such motions are pending is not only improper but voids subsequent judicial actions.

In the present matter, the record demonstrates a pattern of judicial inaction and procedural irregularities, including the failure to rule on recusal motions, pleas to the jurisdiction, and other critical motions, as well as the improper issuance of orders and consolidation of cases without hearings. Under controlling Texas authority, these failures deprive the court of authority to act, and any sua sponte setting of a final trial under these circumstances is void or voidable, amounting to an abuse of discretion and a violation of the affected party’s due process rights.

Background and Relevant Law

Legislative and Regulatory Framework

The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically Rule 18a, govern the recusal and disqualification of judges. Rule 18a provides that if a motion to recuse is

filed before evidence is offered at trial, the judge must refrain from taking any further action in the case until the motion is decided, except for good cause stated in writing or on the record. The rule is mandatory and applies to all Texas trial courts, with limited exceptions not relevant here ([Rule 18a. Recusal and Disqualification of Judges, Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a](#)).

Case Law

Texas appellate courts have consistently enforced the strict requirements of Rule 18a. When a recusal motion is filed, the judge has only two options: recuse themselves or refer the motion to the presiding judge of the administrative judicial district. Any further action taken by the judge before the recusal motion is resolved is void ([In re Gold, 04-25-00085-CV \(Tex. App. May 07, 2025\)](#); [In re Norman, 191 S.W.3d 858 \(Tex. App. 2006\)](#); [Brosseau v. Ranzau, 911 S.W.2d 890 \(Tex. App. 1995\)](#); [Jamilah v. Bass, 862 S.W.2d 201 \(Tex. App. 1993\)](#); [Lamberti v. Tschoepe, 776 S.W.2d 651 \(Tex. App. 1989\)](#); [Greenberg, Fisk & Fielder v. Howell, 676 S.W.2d 431 \(Tex. App. 1984\)](#)).

Similarly, Texas courts have held that a trial court must resolve jurisdictional challenges, such as pleas to the jurisdiction, before proceeding to the merits of the case. Failure to rule on such motions within a reasonable time is an abuse of discretion and may be corrected by mandamus ([In re Hudspeth Cnty., 08-24-00137-CV \(Tex. App. Jun 26, 2024\)](#); [In re Robinson, 05-22-00579-CV \(Tex. App. Sep 23, 2022\)](#); [In re Univ. of Tex. MD Anderson Cancer Ctr., NO. 01-19-00201-CV \(Tex. App. Jul 30, 2019\)](#); [In re Gray, 158 S.W.3d 876, 879 \(Tex. App.—Houston \[14th Dist.\] 2005, orig. proceeding\)](#)).

Due process also requires that parties receive adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before a final trial setting. Rule 245 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure mandates at least forty-five days' notice for a first trial setting in contested cases, and failure to provide such notice is a violation of due process ([In re Interest of K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101 \(Tex. 2014\)](#)).

Analysis

1. The Court's Duty to Resolve Recusal Motions Before Proceeding

The Texas Supreme Court and courts of appeals have repeatedly held that once a motion to recuse is filed, the trial judge is stripped of authority to take any further action in the case, except to recuse themselves or refer the motion to the presiding judge. This is a mandatory, not discretionary, duty ([In re Gold, 04-25-00085-CV \(Tex. App. May 07, 2025\)](#); [In re Norman, 191 S.W.3d 858 \(Tex. App. 2006\)](#); [Brosseau v. Ranzau, 911 S.W.2d 890 \(Tex. App. 1995\)](#); [Jamilah v. Bass, 862 S.W.2d 201 \(Tex. App. 1993\)](#); [Lamberti v. Tschoepe, 776 S.W.2d 651 \(Tex. App. 1989\)](#); [Greenberg, Fisk & Fielder v. Howell, 676 S.W.2d 431 \(Tex. App. 1984\)](#)). The rule is so strict that even if the recusal motion is defective or untimely, the judge must still recuse or refer; the judge cannot simply ignore the motion or proceed with the case.

If the judge fails to comply with these requirements and takes further action—such as setting the case for final trial, issuing orders, or conducting hearings—those actions are void and of no effect ([In re Gold, 04-25-00085-CV \(Tex. App. May 07, 2025\)](#); [Brosseau v. Ranzau, 911 S.W.2d 890 \(Tex. App. 1995\)](#)). This is true regardless of whether the recusal motion ultimately has merit; the procedural safeguard is designed to protect the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

2. The Court's Duty to Resolve Jurisdictional Challenges and Other Dispositive Motions

Texas law is equally clear that a trial court must resolve jurisdictional challenges, such as pleas to the jurisdiction, before proceeding to the merits of the case ([In re Hudspeth Cnty., 08-24-00137-CV \(Tex. App. Jun 26, 2024\)](#); [In re Gray, 158 S.W.3d 876, 879 \(Tex. App.—Houston \[14th Dist.\] 2005, orig. proceeding\)](#)). The act of considering and ruling on a properly filed and pending motion is a ministerial duty, and the court's failure to do so within a reasonable time is an abuse of discretion that may be corrected by mandamus ([In re Robinson, 05-22-00579-CV \(Tex. App. Sep 23, 2022\)](#); [In re Univ. of Tex. MD Anderson Cancer Ctr., NO. 01-19-00201-CV \(Tex. App. Jul 30, 2019\)](#); [O'Donniley v. Golden, 860 S.W.2d 267 \(Tex. App. 1993\)](#)).

A court cannot simply ignore or delay ruling on such motions and proceed to trial or issue substantive orders. Doing so deprives the court of authority to act and violates the due process rights of the parties.

3. Due Process and Notice Requirements

Rule 245 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure requires that parties receive at least forty-five days' notice of a first trial setting in contested cases ([In re Interest of K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101 \(Tex. 2014\)](#)). This rule is grounded in due process, ensuring that parties have adequate time to prepare and respond. If a court sets a final trial without resolving pending dispositive motions or without proper notice, any resulting judgment is subject to being set aside for violation of due process.

4. Application to the Present Facts

The record in this matter reveals a series of unresolved motions, including multiple recusal motions, pleas to the jurisdiction, motions to strike, and pending mandamus proceedings. The trial court has failed to rule on these motions, and in some instances, has taken further action—such as setting the case for final trial—while these motions remain pending.

Under the authorities cited above, the court's actions are improper and void. The court is required to resolve all recusal motions before taking any further action in the case ([In re Gold, 04-25-00085-CV \(Tex. App. May 07, 2025\)](#); [In re Norman, 191 S.W.3d 858 \(Tex. App. 2006\)](#); [Brosseau v. Ranzau, 911 S.W.2d 890 \(Tex. App. 1995\)](#)). The same is true for jurisdictional challenges and other dispositive motions ([In re Hudspeth Cnty., 08-24-00137-CV \(Tex. App. Jun 26, 2024\)](#); [In re Gray, 158 S.W.3d 876, 879 \(Tex. App.—Houston \[14th](#)

Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding)). Any attempt to proceed to final trial while these motions are unresolved is a clear abuse of discretion and a violation of due process.

Moreover, the court's failure to provide adequate notice of trial settings, as required by Rule 245, further compounds the due process violations ([In re Interest of K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101 \(Tex. 2014\)](#)).

5. Mandamus as a Remedy

Texas courts have repeatedly recognized mandamus as the appropriate remedy to compel a trial court to rule on pending motions and to prevent the court from proceeding to trial while dispositive motions remain unresolved ([In re Robinson, 05-22-00579-CV \(Tex. App. Sep 23, 2022\)](#); [In re Hudspeth Cnty., 08-24-00137-CV \(Tex. App. Jun 26, 2024\)](#); [In re Johnnie Tasby, 40 S.W.3d 190 \(Tex. App. 2001\)](#)). The courts have emphasized that the duty to rule on such motions is ministerial, and a trial court's refusal to do so is subject to correction by mandamus.

Exceptions and Caveats

There is a narrow exception in Rule 18a that allows a judge to take further action in the case before a recusal motion is resolved, but only for good cause stated in writing or on the record ([Rule 18a. Recusal and Disqualification of Judges, Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a](#)). The authorities make clear, however, that this exception is strictly construed and rarely applies. The record here does not indicate that any such good cause was stated or that the exception would apply.

Additionally, while some cases discuss the possibility of defective or untimely recusal motions, the courts have held that the judge must still recuse or refer the motion, and cannot simply ignore it or proceed with the case ([Jamilah v. Bass, 862 S.W.2d 201 \(Tex. App. 1993\)](#)).

Conclusion

Texas law is clear and unequivocal: a trial court cannot proceed to set or conduct a final trial while there are unresolved recusal motions, jurisdictional challenges, or other dispositive motions. The court must first resolve all such motions before taking further substantive action. Any attempt to move forward while these motions are pending is void, constitutes an abuse of discretion, and violates the due process rights of the affected party. The record in this matter demonstrates a pattern of judicial inaction and procedural irregularities that deprive the court of authority to act, and any sua sponte setting of a final trial under these circumstances is improper and must be halted.

Legal Authorities

[Rio Grande Valley Gas Co., In re, 987 S.W.2d 167 \(Tex. App. 1999\)](#)

Texas Court of Appeals

Extract

Rule 18a(c) requires a judge to either recuse himself or request the presiding judge to assign a judge to hear a recusal motion 'prior to any further proceedings in the case.' TEX.R.CIV.P. 18a(c) (Emphasis supplied). The filing of a recusal motion provides no rational basis for another court within the county to unilaterally order the lawsuit transferred. Republic, 931 S.W.2d at 343.

Summary

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a(c) mandates that a judge must address a recusal motion by either recusing themselves or requesting the assignment of another judge to hear the motion before any further proceedings in the case. This requirement underscores the importance of resolving recusal motions to ensure impartiality and proper judicial process. The passage also highlights that the filing of a recusal motion should not be circumvented by transferring the case to another court, reinforcing the necessity of addressing such motions before proceeding with the case.

[In re Interest of K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101 \(Tex. 2014\)](#)

Texas Supreme Court

Extract

Rule 245 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a trial court 'may set contested cases on written request of any party, or on the court's own motion, with reasonable notice of not less than forty-five days to the parties of a first setting for trial, or by agreement of the parties.' Tex.R. Civ. P. 245. If a timely answer has been filed in a contested case or the defendant has otherwise made an appearance, due process rights are violated when a judgment is subsequently entered without the party having received notice of the setting of the case, *Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr.*, 485 U.S. 80, 86-87, 108 S.Ct. 896, 99 L.Ed.2d 75 (1988), even when that party previously waived notice of citation.

Summary

Rule 245 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure requires that parties receive reasonable notice of not less than forty-five days for a first trial setting. This rule is in place to protect due process rights, ensuring that parties have adequate notice and opportunity to prepare for trial. The passage also references a U.S. Supreme Court case, *Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr.*, which underscores the importance of notice in upholding due process rights. This supports the proposition that the court cannot proceed to a final trial

without resolving pending motions and ensuring proper notice, as doing so would violate due process.

[In re Gold, 04-25-00085-CV \(Tex. App. May 07, 2025\)](#)

Texas Court of Appeals

Extract

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a(f)(1) provides: 'Regardless of whether the motion [to recuse] complies with this rule, the respondent judge, within three business days after the motion is filed, must either: (A) sign and file with the clerk an order of recusal or disqualification; or (B) sign and file with the clerk an order referring the motion to the regional presiding judge.' ... Once Gold filed the motion to recuse, respondent could not take further action other than signing an order of recusal or an order referring the motion to the regional presiding judge. ... The failure to take one of these two actions renders subsequent orders void. ... Additionally, '[i]f a motion is filed before evidence has been offered at trial, the respondent judge must take no further action in the case until the motion has been decided, except for good cause stated in writing or on the record.' ... We conclude that because the respondent signed the temporary orders after relator filed a motion to recuse and the record does not support a good cause exception as contemplated by rule 18a, the temporary orders are void and of no effect.

Summary

When a motion to recuse is filed, the judge must either recuse themselves or refer the motion to the regional presiding judge. The judge cannot take further action in the case until the motion is resolved unless there is a good cause stated in writing or on the record. Failure to comply with these requirements renders subsequent orders void. This supports the proposition that unresolved recusal motions and jurisdictional challenges must be addressed before proceeding to a final trial.

[In re Robinson, 05-22-00579-CV \(Tex. App. Sep 23, 2022\)](#)

Texas Court of Appeals

Extract

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy requiring relators to show that (1) the trial court has clearly abused its discretion, and (2) there is no adequate appellate remedy. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). Because the trial court has been afforded a reasonable time to rule and relators have no adequate remedy by appeal to challenge the trial court's refusal to rule, relators have demonstrated their entitlement to a writ of mandamus compelling the trial court to rule. The act

of considering and ruling on a motion that is properly filed and pending before a trial court is a ministerial act, and mandamus may issue to compel the trial judge to act. In *re Greater McAllen Star Props., Inc.*, 444 S.W.3d 743, 748 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2014, orig. proceeding); *Barnes v. State*, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (per curiam). To obtain mandamus relief for a trial judge's refusal to rule on a motion, the relator must establish the motion was properly filed and has been pending for a reasonable time, the relator requested a ruling on the motion, and the trial judge refused to rule.

Summary

Mandamus is an appropriate remedy when a trial court has failed to rule on motions that have been properly filed and pending for a reasonable time. The passage emphasizes that ruling on such motions is a ministerial act, and a trial court's refusal to do so can be challenged through mandamus. This supports the proposition that unresolved motions, such as recusal motions and jurisdictional challenges, must be addressed before proceeding to a final trial.

[Lamberti v. Tschoepe, 776 S.W.2d 651 \(Tex. App. 1989\)](#)

Texas Court of Appeals

Extract

The Texas Government Code provides that a district or statutory county court judge shall request the presiding judge to assign another judge to hear a motion relating to the recusal of the judge from a case pending in his own court. TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. § 74.059 (Vernon 1988). The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure are explicit with regard to these motions. The trial judge has two choices, recusal or referral. TEX.R.CIV.PROC.R. 18a(c). The rules further provide: If the judge declines to recuse himself, he shall forward to the presiding judge of the administrative judicial district, in either original form or certified copy, an order of referral, the motion, and all opposing and concerning statements. Except for good cause stated in the order in which further action is taken, the judge shall make no further orders and shall take no further action in the case after filing of the motion and prior to a hearing on the motion.

Summary

When a recusal motion is filed, the judge has only two options: to recuse themselves or to refer the motion to the presiding judge of the administrative judicial district. The judge is prohibited from taking further action in the case until the recusal motion is resolved. This supports the proposition that unresolved recusal motions deprive the court of authority to proceed with substantive matters, including setting a final trial.

[Greenberg, Benson, Fisk and Fielder, P.C. v. Howell, 685 S.W.2d 694 \(Tex. App. 1984\)](#)

Texas Court of Appeals

Extract

In a published opinion in a recent mandamus action involving these same parties, we discussed the duty of a district judge to whom a recusal motion is addressed, citing TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 200a § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1984) and TEX.R.CIV.P. 18a (Vernon Supp.1984). Greenberg, Fisk and Fielder v. Charles Ben Howell, 676 S.W.2d 431 (Tex.App.-Dallas, 1984). In that opinion we held that, under both statute and rule, in the event a recusal motion is filed a district judge must promptly enter one of the two orders which are permitted to him, i.e. recusal or referral. We now go a step further and hold that a trial judge, when presented with a recusal motion, has only the option to act in one of these two specified ways; he does not have the option of doing nothing.

Summary

Texas law mandates a district judge to act promptly on a recusal motion by either recusing themselves or referring the motion. The judge does not have the discretion to ignore the motion. This supports the proposition that unresolved recusal motions must be addressed before proceeding to substantive matters, such as a final trial.

[In re Hudspeth Cnty., 08-24-00137-CV \(Tex. App. Jun 26, 2024\)](#)

Texas Court of Appeals

Extract

Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy requiring the relator to show that (1) the trial court clearly abused its discretion and (2) the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. A trial court clearly abuses its discretion when it refuses to rule on a pending motion within a reasonable amount of time. ... To establish that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to rule on a pending motion, the relator must show that the trial court: (1) had a duty to perform a nondiscretionary act; (2) was asked to perform that act; and (3) failed to do so. Mandamus is proper to correct this abuse of discretion and compel the trial court to act.

Summary

A trial court has a duty to rule on pending motions, such as pleas to the jurisdiction, within a reasonable time. If the court fails to do so, it may be considered an abuse of discretion, and mandamus relief can be sought to compel the court to act. This supports the proposition that unresolved

motions, including jurisdictional challenges, must be addressed before proceeding to a final trial.

[In re Univ. of Tex. MD Anderson Cancer Ctr., NO. 01-19-00201-CV \(Tex. App. Jul 30, 2019\)](#)

Texas Court of Appeals

Extract

A trial judge has a legal, nondiscretionary duty to consider and rule on properly filed motions within a reasonable time." ... "A delay of more than 12 months in ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction is an abuse of discretion.

Summary

A trial judge has a nondiscretionary duty to rule on properly filed motions within a reasonable time. This includes jurisdictional challenges, which must be resolved before proceeding to substantive matters like a final trial. The passage also highlights that a delay of more than 12 months in ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction is considered an abuse of discretion. This supports the proposition that unresolved motions, such as those for recusal and jurisdictional challenges, must be addressed before moving to a final trial.

[Jamilah v. Bass, 862 S.W.2d 201 \(Tex. App. 1993\)](#)

Texas Court of Appeals

Extract

Relator's motion for recusal sought the have Judge Bass either recuse himself or forward the case to the presiding judge of Brazoria County. Respondent argues that the recusal motion is not a proper motion in that it was untimely filed and failed to state a ground for recusal. This court has previously held that the procedural requirements of Rule 18a are mandatory and a party who fails to comply with them waives the right to complain of a judge's failure to recuse himself. ... On these facts, we hold the trial judge had but two options: to recuse himself or refer the case to the presiding judge. TEX.R.CIV.P. 18a(c); Lamberti v. Tschoepe, 776 S.W.2d 651 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1989, writ denied). This is so regardless of the timeliness of the motion or the sufficiency of the grounds for recusal.

Summary

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a mandates that a judge must either recuse themselves or refer the recusal motion to the presiding judge of the administrative judicial district. This requirement is mandatory, and the court cannot proceed with substantive matters, such as a final trial, while a

recusal motion is pending and unresolved. This supports the proposition that the court cannot move the case to final trial while there are unresolved recusal motions and other pending issues.

[In re Johnnie Tasby, 40 S.W.3d 190 \(Tex. App. 2001\)](#)

Texas Court of Appeals

Extract

A trial court may not arbitrarily halt proceedings in a pending case, and mandamus will lie to compel a trial court to hear and rule on motions pending before it. ... Further, if a court unnecessarily delays ruling, mandamus will also lie in appropriate situations. An appellate court has the authority to issue a writ of mandamus where the court fails to act within a reasonable time, so that the relator may either accept the ruling or attack it.

Summary

A trial court is obligated to rule on pending motions and cannot arbitrarily halt proceedings. If a court fails to act within a reasonable time, mandamus relief is appropriate. This supports the proposition that the court cannot proceed to a final trial without resolving pending motions, such as recusal motions and jurisdictional challenges, as doing so would be an abuse of discretion and a violation of due process.

[O'Donniley v. Golden, 860 S.W.2d 267 \(Tex. App. 1993\)](#)

Texas Court of Appeals

Extract

When a motion is properly filed and pending before a trial court, the act of giving consideration to and ruling upon that motion is a ministerial act." ... "Having found a violation of his duty to rule, we must now determine whether Relator had an adequate remedy at law. Mandamus has historically been authorized to compel a trial judge to go to trial.

Summary

The passage highlights the duty of a trial court to consider and rule upon motions that are properly filed and pending. This duty is described as a ministerial act, meaning it is obligatory and not discretionary. The passage further indicates that mandamus can be used to compel a trial judge to act when there is a failure to rule on a motion. This supports the proposition that unresolved motions, such as recusal motions and jurisdictional challenges, must be addressed before proceeding to substantive matters like a final trial.

[In re Norman, 191 S.W.3d 858 \(Tex. App. 2006\)](#)

Texas Court of Appeals

Extract

Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a, Judge Austin had a mandatory duty either to recuse himself or to refer the recusal motion to the presiding judge. TEX.R. CIV. P. 18a... Even though a motion to recuse may be defective, the challenged judge must either recuse or refer the motion, so that another judge can determine the procedural adequacy and merits of the motion to recuse... Once the motion to recuse Judge Austin was filed, Judge Austin was precluded from taking any further action other than issuing an order of recusal of himself or an order of referral to the presiding judge. See TEX.R. CIV. P. 18a. If a judge fails to comply with the rules governing motions for recusal, all subsequent actions by the judge in that case are void.

Summary

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a imposes a mandatory duty on judges to either recuse themselves or refer recusal motions to the presiding judge. This duty is not discretionary, and failure to comply renders any subsequent actions by the judge void. This supports the proposition that unresolved recusal motions must be addressed before proceeding to substantive matters, such as a final trial.

[Brosseau v. Ranzau, 911 S.W.2d 890 \(Tex. App. 1995\)](#)

Texas Court of Appeals

Extract

There is a simple interpretation of Rule 18a. The appellate courts have agreed that when presented with a motion to recuse a judge has two, and only two, options. These options are for the judge to either recuse himself or refer the motion to the presiding judge of the administrative judicial district... If a trial court fails to comply with the rules provided for in Rule 18a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, all actions taken by the judge subsequent to such violation are void.

Summary

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a mandates that a judge must either recuse themselves or refer a motion to recuse to the presiding judge of the administrative judicial district. Failure to do so renders any subsequent actions by the judge void. This supports the proposition that unresolved recusal motions must be addressed before proceeding to substantive

matters, such as a final trial, and that any actions taken without resolving these motions are void.

[Woodruff v. Wright, 51 S.W.3d 727 \(Tex. App. 2001\)](#)

Texas Court of Appeals

Extract

When a motion to recuse has been filed, a judge must either recuse himself or request the presiding administrative judge to assign another judge to hear the motion. Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a(a),(c),(d). ... The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a judge shall recuse himself in any proceeding in which 'his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.' Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)(a).

Summary

Procedural requirements under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure when a motion to recuse is filed. It specifies that a judge must either recuse themselves or have another judge assigned to hear the motion. This supports the proposition that recusal motions must be resolved before proceeding to substantive matters, as it highlights the necessity of addressing potential impartiality before continuing with the case.

[Greenberg, Fisk & Fielder v. Howell, 676 S.W.2d 431 \(Tex. App. 1984\)](#)

Texas Court of Appeals

Extract

The duty of a district judge to whom a recusal motion is addressed is clear. Our Legislature has provided in Sec. 6, Art. 200a, TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. (Vernon Supp.1982) that among other duties of a judge: A district judge shall request the Presiding Judge to assign a judge of the administrative district to hear any motions to recuse such district judge from a case pending in his court. Our Supreme Court, pursuant to its rule-making powers, has provided in Rule 18a, TEX.R.CIV.P. (1983) that: Rule 18a. Recusal or Disqualification of Trial Judge ... (c) Prior to any further proceedings in the case, the judge shall either recuse himself or request the presiding judge of the administrative judicial district to assign a judge to hear such motion. ... (d) If the judge declines to recuse himself, he shall forward to the presiding judge of the administrative judicial district, in either original form or certified copy, an order of referral, the motion, and all opposing and concurring statements. Except for good cause stated in the order in which further action is taken, the judge shall make no further orders and shall take no further action in the case after filing of the motion and prior to a hearing on the motion.

Summary

Procedural requirements for handling recusal motions in Texas. It emphasizes that once a recusal motion is filed, the judge must either recuse themselves or refer the motion to the presiding judge of the administrative judicial district. The judge is prohibited from taking further action in the case until the recusal motion is resolved. This supports the proposition that the court cannot proceed to a final trial while recusal motions are pending and unresolved.

[Rule 18a. Recusal and Disqualification of Judges](#)

Extract

Restrictions on Further Action. (A) Motion Filed Before Evidence Offered at Trial. If a motion is filed before evidence has been offered at trial, the respondent judge must take no further action in the case until the motion has been decided, except for good cause stated in writing or on the record.

Summary

If a motion for recusal is filed before evidence is offered at trial, the judge must refrain from taking further action in the case until the motion is resolved. This supports the proposition that unresolved recusal motions and jurisdictional challenges must be addressed before proceeding to substantive matters, such as a final trial. The rule ensures that any potential bias or conflict of interest is resolved to maintain the integrity of the judicial process.

This memo was compiled by Vincent AI based on vLex materials available as of September 27, 2025. [View full answer on vLex](#)