

Question

The Petitioner and her attorney allegedly secured temporary orders through fraudulent misrepresentations, presented altered agreements, and called undisclosed witnesses, while the associate judge lacked jurisdiction. The Respondent was ordered to sign a document he did not agree to, and the judge signed an order containing false statements about hearings and agreements. Fraud upon the court undermines the integrity of the judicial process and can be grounds for setting aside orders or judgments (Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944)). Due process is violated when a party is deprived of property based on fraudulent proceedings, especially where the court lacks jurisdiction or the party is denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Intentional attorney misconduct and fraud upon the court, combined with lack of jurisdiction and denial of due process, support a claim for federal relief under § 1983. # ISSUE #1 - DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW Amendment XIV Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. VIOLATION: On January 16, 2024, James Munford ordered the Respondent to vacate his home, which also served as his place of business, based on intentionally fabricated claims raised by the Petitioner, Morgan Michelle Myers. This order was rendered without a hearing taking place, without any evidence being admitted, and without the Respondent being able to cross examine his accuser. No protective order was entered, no emergency situation was shown, and the case was reset for January 22, 2024, to be heard by the associate judge, Jeffrey Kaitcer. Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. ISSUE #2 - SUBSEQUENT ORDERS ARE VOID FOR WANT OF JURISDICATION If an associate judge in Texas acts without a valid order of referral, they lack jurisdiction, and actions taken in such circumstances may be considered ultra vires and outside the protection of judicial immunity. This can support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injunctive or declaratory relief if the respondent's rights were deprived. The Texas Family Code and Government Code make it unequivocal that an associate judge's authority to act in a case is dependent on a valid order of referral from the referring court. The order of referral is not a mere formality; it is the legal instrument that vests the associate judge with jurisdiction over the matter (Tex. Fam. Code § 201.006; Tex. Gov't. Code § 54A.007; Tex. Gov't. Code § 54B.007). If an associate judge acts without such an order, or beyond the scope of the order, they are acting without jurisdiction. The statutes are clear that the powers of an associate judge are "contingent upon" and "limited by" the order of referral (Tex. Fam. Code § 201.007; Tex. Gov't. Code § 54A.008; Tex. Gov't. Code § 54A.209). Judicial immunity is a well-established doctrine that shields judges from liability for judicial acts performed within their jurisdiction, even if those acts are erroneous, malicious, or in excess of authority (Tobias v. SLP

Brownwood LLC, No. 11-19-00247-CV (Tex. App. Jun 24, 2021); Walker v. Hartman, 516 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. App. 2017)). However, this immunity is not absolute. The U.S. Supreme Court and Texas courts have repeatedly held that judicial immunity is overcome in two circumstances: (1) when the judge's actions are non-judicial in nature, or (2) when the judge acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction (Partain v. Gabert, 13-21-00037-CV (Tex. App. Aug 26, 2021); West v. Robinson, 486 S.W.3d 669 (Tex. App. 2016); Twilligear v. Carrell, 148 S.W.3d 502 (Tex. App. 2004)). The "clear absence of all jurisdiction" standard is met when a judge acts without any legal authority to do so. In the context of associate judges, acting without a valid order of referral is acting without jurisdiction, not merely in excess of authority (Tex. Fam. Code § 201.006; Tex. Gov't. Code § 54A.007). In the scenario described, the associate judge allegedly took further actions in the case without a signed order of referral and summarily denied motions warning of the petitioner's alleged scheme. Under Texas law, the absence of a valid referral order means the associate judge lacked jurisdiction to act in the case (Tex. Fam. Code § 201.006; Tex. Gov't. Code § 54A.007). Actions taken in the clear absence of jurisdiction are not protected by judicial immunity (Partain v. Gabert, 13-21-00037-CV (Tex. App. Aug 26, 2021); West v. Robinson, 486 S.W.3d 669 (Tex. App. 2016)). If these actions resulted in the deprivation of the respondent's rights, the associate judge's conduct would be considered ultra vires and outside the scope of judicial immunity, supporting a § 1983 claim for injunctive or declaratory relief (Patino v. Tex. Dep't of Ins.-Div. of Workers' Comp., 631 S.W.3d 163 (Tex. App. 2020); City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009)).

ISSUE #3 - INTENTIONAL ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT AND THE LACK OF AN OPPONENT In this case, Morgan Michelle Myers, after securing the March 14, 2024, temporary orders by fraudulent misrepresentations to the court, she hid behind her alleged attorney who did not prosecute the case for over 18 months. This attorney claimed to be representing the Petitioner in her individual capacity, yet used the marx altman and johnson letterhead in her pleadings. Since she was allegedly retained after January 16, 2024, everything she did in the case is arguably void given the associate judge had no jurisdiction. On March 14, 2024, this attorney was allowed to trial by ambush, when she called undisclosed witnesses and produced a proposed order asking the associate judge, who had no jurisdiction, to deny the father's emergency motion which clearly outlined the petitioner's fraudulent scheme. Despite not responding to this motion, the judge ruled in her favor, and signed an order which had altered terms, contained false statements about hearings that never happened, and gave morgan the home and claimed the father agreed to it. The father refused to sign it, and he was actually ordered by the associate judge to sign the fraudulent document. He refused, and then appealed.

ISSUE #3 - APPELLATE PROCESS INSUFFICIENT The father's first mandamus was denied without explanation, and he appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. The opposing side did not participate at all, and actually attempted to get the OAG involved mid-appeal, who wasn't able to enforce the clearly fraudulent orders. After the Texas Supreme Court denied rehearing, the opposing party moved to set a pre-trial conference in the face of all of these issues, which was countered by a motion to recuse both the district and associate judge.

ISSUE #4 - COMPROMISED RECUSAL PROCEEDINGS The recusal proceedings were just as tainted. On October 7, 2024, Father filed his first

motion to recuse against Kaitcer and Munford. A day later, an order of referral was forwarded by the court coordinator, someone who should not be involved at all in the recusal process. Upon inspection, the original motion to recuse had been modified where the hyperlinks were removed, the exhibits were removed, and the affidavit was removed. This was only corrected after the Respondent pointed out the discrepancy, which the coordinator then replied with an excuse that "due to the size of the motion, it was split into three separate files". This is clear tampering. The judge must send the original motion to the regional judge, not a modified one. An amended order of referral issued with these changes, however, the hyperlinks were still removed. COOPER L. CARTER'S FRAUD UPON THE COURT 1. On February 1st, 2024, the parties met for the third time at the 322nd District Court of Tarrant County. It's important to note here that no order of referral had been signed and filed, so the associate judge had no authority to even hear the matter. 2. Nevertheless, the parties appeared, both represented by counsel. Father insisted on proceeding to trial, however, his attorney said he didn't want to be in court all day, and presented him with a settlement agreement that he did not find would be in the best interests of his Children. The proposed agreement had the following provisions, and was prepared by Dan Bacalis, attorney for Father: i. It was titled "Agreed Associate Judge's Report" ii. RESET DATE: blank. iii. Under APPEARANCES, it has both parties appearing and both represented by counsel, however, only the Father's appearance was recorded on the case docket. iv. Under TEMPORARY CONSERVATORSHIP, it elected JOINT CONSERVATORSHIP with the mother as the primary conservator. v. It gave the mother the exclusive right to establish the residence. vi. The right to receive child support was given to the Mother. vii. Under the TEMPORARY POSSESSION SCHEDULE, the EXTENDED was elected (TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 153.311 THROUGH 153.316.) viii. Under TEMPORARY CHILD SUPPORT, it had Father responsible for making payments in the amount of \$973.19 per month to the Mother beginning on April 1, 2024. ix. Mother was to apply for Medicaid. x. Under ADDITIONAL ORDERS, the application for protective order that started all of this was non-suited. xi. Under TEMPORARY POSESSION OF PROPERTY, it stated Father had the right to the 2020 Mazda 3, his personal belongings, and the Mazda CX-5 lease. It also stated that Respondent was to vacate the home by March 1, 2024, thus giving him one full month back into the home. However, this meant that the mother actually removed the children from their own home for a month, as she lived with her new boyfriend during this time. xii. Mother was entitled to her 2007 Mazda and her personal property. xiii. Most importantly, right before the signature lines, the following provision was ordered: "A typed written Order conforming to this Report will follow within 20 days from the date this Report is signed. The Temporary Order shall be prepared by Dan Bacalis Each attorney should approve the Order. The parties do not need to approve the Order. The attorney reviewing the proposed Order shall have five (5) days to do so. There are no ten (10) day letters. If an agreement is not reached, a Motion to Sign shall be filed and set within thirty (30) days from the signing of this Report. xiv. All parties signed this document and agreed to form and substance, and it was signed by the Associate Judge (who had no authority to even hear this agreement). The parties did this settlement in the conference room in the hallway, not before the judge. 3. Because Father knew Mother was lying, and was leveraging Judge Munford's initial

deprivation of constitutional rights, he immediately fired his attorney, thus invaliding the agreement, as he would not be able to prepare the reduced version as ordered and as agreed by the parties. 4. On February 8, 2024, the agreement was filed with the clerk, and the next day on February 9, 2024, the Father filed an EMERGENCY MOTION TO RECONSIDER EVIDENCE AND VACATE TEMPORARY ORDERS, referring to the Feb 1 Agreement. 5. This motion highlighted in detail Mother's illegal actions, including falsifying her affidavit of indigency, falsifying her claims of family violence, and provided evidence in the form of text messages to show she was having an affair leading up to the divorce, and also attached bank statements to show that she transferred \$1,576 of community property to herself using a third party's paypal account to conceal her banking information. 6. This motion was served on all of the parties on February 9, 2024. No response was ever received to this motion. The only response was via email from Cooper Carter, attorney for petitioner, who stated she would be filing a counter motion. No such motion was ever filed. 7. On February 27, 2024, District Judge James Munford signed and filed a notice of hearing, setting the Father's emergency motion to be heard on March 14, 2024. 8. On March 3, 2024, Father filed a notice with the Court informing them that he would not be leaving the marital home because the agreement was invalidated. 9. Three days later on March 6, 2024, while Father was walking his children to school, the mother ran inside the home and locked him out, and when the cops arrived, produced the Feb 1 agreement showing he had to leave by March 1. To prevent conflict, Father left to stay with his Father until the time of the hearing. 10. On March 14, 2024, the parties arrived at the 322nd District Court for Father's emergency motion. Upon walking into the courtroom, Father observed Cooper Carter and the mother quickly passing papers back and forth across the table in the conference room. 11. After checking in with the bailiff, the Father turned around to see Cooper Carter handing him a document entitled "Temporary Orders" which were the reduced version of the February 1 agreement that the parties were in court that day to challenge. 12. Alongside these orders was a "Proposed Order" recommending that the judge deny his emergency motion to vacate. The judge denied the father's motion without any arguments against his position being raised, and Cooper Carter called the wife as a witness despite not disclosing any evidence or potential witnesses prior to the hearing. 13. Despite non-suited the protective order in the alleged agreement that they claimed was still binding, she had the mother testify about fearing for her safety if the Father was allowed near the home. 14. Upon inspection of the fraudulent temporary orders produced by Cooper Carter, the following provisions were unilaterally changed: i. The original agreement required the father to vacate by March 1, 2024, but the modified version had the father in the home until March 20, 2024, and the Mother after March 30, 2024, leaving a 10 day window where nobody would occupy the home. ii. On page 1 of the orders, it expressly stated that "as evidenced by the signatures below, the parties have agreed to the terms of this order" which was a blatant lie, as Cooper had unilaterally changed the terms of the agreement when she knew Dan Bacalis had to be the one to reduce it. iii. The orders also falsely claimed a hearing occurred on February 1, 2024, on an alleged "Motion for Temporary Orders" filed by the mother and was never served on Respondent. iv. The orders also claimed that the agreement was in the best interests of the children, and that the Court had reviewed the record. v. No

relief in father's emergency motion was argued against, yet the motion was summarily denied and the fraudulent orders were adopted by the Court. TIE THESE FACTS TO A CLAIM FOR FEDERAL RELIEF, CITING THE SPECIFIC FACTS

Answer (Texas)

Short response

The facts described, if proven, demonstrate a deprivation of property without due process and actions by an associate judge in the clear absence of jurisdiction, both of which can support a claim for federal relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Texas law and the provided authorities confirm that fraudulent court orders, lack of jurisdiction, and denial of a meaningful hearing undermine the validity of judicial actions and may render such orders void and subject to federal challenge.

Summary

The scenario involves a series of alleged fraudulent acts and procedural violations in a Texas family law case, including the securing of temporary orders through misrepresentation, the presentation of altered agreements, and the calling of undisclosed witnesses, all while the associate judge lacked a valid order of referral and thus jurisdiction. Texas statutes require a valid order of referral for an associate judge to act, and actions taken without such jurisdiction are ultra vires and not protected by judicial immunity; when combined with due process violations—such as deprivation of property without a hearing—these facts can support a federal claim under § 1983.

The legislative framework in Texas is clear that associate judges must have a written order of referral to exercise jurisdiction, and any orders or actions taken without such authority are void. Furthermore, fraudulent securing of document execution is criminalized under Texas law, and both fraud and lack of jurisdiction are recognized bases for setting aside judgments. The facts, as alleged, tie directly to these legal principles and, if substantiated, provide a strong foundation for federal relief based on due process violations and ultra vires judicial conduct.

Background and Relevant Law

Legislative Framework: Associate Judge Jurisdiction and Due Process

Texas law strictly regulates the authority of associate judges in family law matters. Under the Texas Family Code, an associate judge may only act in a case if there is a valid order of referral from the referring court. This requirement is set out in [Tex. Fam. Code § 201.006](#), which mandates that a judge must render either an individual or general order of referral specifying the cases or types of cases to be heard by the associate judge. Without such an order, the associate judge lacks jurisdiction to act in the

matter, and any actions taken are ultra vires, meaning beyond legal authority ([Tex. Fam. Code § 201.006](#)).

Similarly, Tex. Gov't. Code § 54A.007 requires a written order of referral that specifies the associate judge's duties. The absence of such an order means the associate judge has no legal authority to preside over the case or issue orders (Tex. Gov't. Code § 54A.007). The powers of an associate judge, including conducting hearings and rendering temporary orders, are explicitly limited by the order of referral ([Tex. Fam. Code § 201.007](#)). If an associate judge acts without a valid order of referral, their actions are void for want of jurisdiction.

Due process under the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. In the context of state court proceedings, this means that a party must be given notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before being deprived of property rights.

Fraudulent Securing of Document Execution

Texas Penal Code § 32.46 criminalizes the act of causing another person, without effective consent and with intent to defraud or harm, to sign or execute any document affecting property or pecuniary interest. It also criminalizes causing a public servant to file or record a purported judgment or order without effective consent, especially if the document is not authorized by law ([Tex. Pen. Code § 32.46](#)). This statute is directly implicated where a party is ordered to sign a document under fraudulent circumstances or where a court order is procured through misrepresentation.

Fraud and Jurisdiction in Judgments

Texas courts recognize that judgments rendered without jurisdiction or procured by fraud are not entitled to full faith and credit and may be set aside. The Texas Court of Appeals has held that issues of fraud and jurisdiction are always open to investigation, even when judgments are otherwise entitled to deference ([Strick Lease, Inc. v. Cutler, 759 S.W.2d 776 \(Tex. App. 1988\)](#)).

Analysis

1. Deprivation of Property Without Due Process

The facts allege that the Respondent was ordered to vacate his home and business premises based on fabricated claims, without a hearing, without evidence being admitted, and without the opportunity to cross-examine his accuser. No protective order was entered, and no emergency was shown. These circumstances, if true, constitute a deprivation of property without due process, as the Respondent was not afforded notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard before being dispossessed of his property.

Due process requires that before a person is deprived of property, there must be notice and an opportunity to be heard. The absence of a hearing, the lack of evidence, and the inability to challenge the opposing party's claims all point to a violation of these fundamental requirements. Such a deprivation is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a federal remedy for the deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law.

2. Void Orders for Want of Jurisdiction

The legislative framework in Texas is unequivocal: an associate judge must have a valid order of referral to exercise jurisdiction in a case ([Tex. Fam. Code § 201.006](#); Tex. Gov't. Code § 54A.007). The powers of the associate judge are limited by the order of referral ([Tex. Fam. Code § 201.007](#)). If the associate judge acts without such an order, any actions taken are void for want of jurisdiction.

In the scenario described, the associate judge allegedly acted without a signed order of referral, presided over hearings, and issued orders. Under Texas law, these actions are ultra vires and not protected by judicial immunity. The lack of jurisdiction is not a mere technicality; it is a fundamental defect that renders all subsequent actions and orders void. This is supported by the principle that actions taken in the clear absence of jurisdiction are not protected by judicial immunity and may be challenged in federal court ([Strick Lease, Inc. v. Cutler, 759 S.W.2d 776 \(Tex. App. 1988\)](#)).

3. Fraudulent Securing of Orders and Attorney Misconduct

The facts further allege that the Petitioner and her attorney secured temporary orders through fraudulent misrepresentations, presented altered agreements, and called undisclosed witnesses. The Respondent was ordered to sign a document he did not agree to, and the judge signed an order containing false statements about hearings and agreements. These actions, if proven, fall squarely within the conduct criminalized by [Tex. Pen. Code § 32.46](#), which prohibits causing another to sign a document affecting property without effective consent and with intent to defraud or harm.

Moreover, the presentation of altered agreements and the making of false statements to the court constitute fraud upon the court, which undermines the integrity of the judicial process. Texas law recognizes that fraud and lack of jurisdiction are grounds for setting aside judgments and orders ([Strick Lease, Inc. v. Cutler, 759 S.W.2d 776 \(Tex. App. 1988\)](#)). The combination of fraudulent conduct and lack of jurisdiction creates a compelling case for federal relief.

4. Appellate and Recusal Proceedings

The facts also describe irregularities in the appellate and recusal process, including the modification of motions and the involvement of court staff inappropriately altering filings. While these facts primarily go to the integrity of the process, they further support the claim that the Respondent

was denied a fair and impartial hearing, compounding the due process violations.

5. Federal Relief Under § 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that they were deprived of a constitutional right by a person acting under color of state law. Here, the deprivation of property without due process, the issuance of orders by a judge lacking jurisdiction, and the fraudulent securing of court orders all constitute violations of constitutional rights. The involvement of state actors (judges and court staff) satisfies the requirement that the conduct was under color of state law.

Furthermore, judicial immunity does not protect judges who act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Since Texas law requires a valid order of referral for an associate judge to have jurisdiction, actions taken without such an order are not protected by judicial immunity and may be challenged under § 1983.

Exceptions and Caveats

While the legal framework is clear, the success of a federal claim will depend on the ability to prove the alleged facts, including the absence of a valid order of referral, the fraudulent securing of orders, and the denial of due process. Additionally, while fraud and lack of jurisdiction are recognized bases for setting aside judgments, courts may require clear and convincing evidence of fraud or jurisdictional defects.

It is also important to note that while judicial immunity is not absolute, it is a strong defense for judges acting within their jurisdiction. The distinction between actions taken in excess of authority (which are protected) and actions taken in the clear absence of jurisdiction (which are not) is critical. The facts must establish that the associate judge acted without any legal authority, not merely in error or in excess of authority.

Conclusion

In summary, the facts described, if substantiated, demonstrate a deprivation of property without due process and actions by an associate judge in the clear absence of jurisdiction, both of which are actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Texas law requires a valid order of referral for associate judges to act, and actions taken without such authority are void. Fraudulent securing of court orders and denial of a meaningful hearing further support the claim for federal relief. The combination of these factors provides a strong legal basis for challenging the validity of the orders and seeking federal remedies for the constitutional violations suffered.

Legal Authorities

[Strick Lease, Inc. v. Cutler, 759 S.W.2d 776 \(Tex. App. 1988\)](#)

Texas Court of Appeals

Extract

It is the contention of the Appellee that full faith and credit need not be given to a judgment rendered by a foreign court that had no jurisdiction over the party. While full faith and credit must be given a judgment of another state so as to preclude inquiry into the merits of the subject matter, the questions as to fraud *Shaps v. Union Commerce Bank*, 476 S.W.2d 466 (Tex.Civ.App.--Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) and jurisdiction *Bernard Gloeckler Co. v. Baker Co.*, 52 S.W.2d 912 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1932, no writ) are subject to investigation.

Summary

The passage highlights that judgments rendered by courts without jurisdiction over a party are not entitled to full faith and credit. Additionally, it emphasizes that issues of fraud and jurisdiction are open to investigation, even when full faith and credit is generally required. This supports the proposition that fraudulent actions and lack of jurisdiction can undermine the validity of court orders and judgments, aligning with the argument that such circumstances can justify setting aside orders or judgments.

[Tex. Fam. Code § 201.006 Tex. Fam. Code § 201.006 Order of Referral](#)

Extract

In referring a case to an associate judge, the judge of the referring court shall render: an individual order of referral; or a general order of referral specifying the class and type of cases to be heard by the associate judge.

Summary

For an associate judge to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be a valid order of referral from the referring court. This order can be either an individual order for a specific case or a general order specifying the types of cases the associate judge can hear. Without such an order, the associate judge lacks jurisdiction, and any actions taken may be considered ultra vires.

[Tex. Gov't. Code § 54A.007 Tex. Gov't. Code § 54A.007 Order of Referral](#)

Extract

To refer one or more cases to an associate judge, a judge must issue a written order of referral that specifies the associate judge's duties.

Summary

An associate judge in Texas must have a written order of referral to have jurisdiction over a case. Without such an order, any actions taken by the associate judge could be considered ultra vires, or beyond their legal authority. This supports the proposition that the associate judge lacked jurisdiction if no valid order of referral was issued, which is a critical element in the claim of fraudulent proceedings and deprivation of due process.

[Tex. Fam. Code § 201.007 Tex. Fam. Code § 201.007 Powers of Associate Judge](#)

Extract

Except as limited by an order of referral, an associate judge may: conduct a hearing; hear evidence; compel production of relevant evidence; rule on the admissibility of evidence; ... without prejudice to the right to a de novo hearing before the referring court under Section FAMILY CODE 201.015 and subject to Subsection (c), render and sign: (A) a final order agreed to in writing as to both form and substance by all parties; (B) a final default order; (C) a temporary order; or (D) a final order in a case in which a party files an unrevoked waiver made in accordance with Rule 119, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, that waives notice to the party of the final hearing or waives the party's appearance at the final hearing.

Summary

Powers of an associate judge, including conducting hearings and rendering temporary orders, but these powers are limited by the order of referral. If an associate judge acts without a valid order of referral, they lack jurisdiction, which supports the proposition that actions taken by the associate judge in this case may have been without jurisdiction.

[Tex. Pen. Code § 32.46 Tex. Pen. Code § 32.46 Fraudulent Securing of Document Execution](#)

Extract

A person commits an offense if the person, with the intent to defraud or harm any person: causes another person, without that person's effective consent, to sign or execute any document affecting property or service or the pecuniary interest of any person; or causes a public servant, without the public servant's effective consent, to file or record any purported judgment or other document purporting to memorialize or evidence an act, an order, a directive, or process of: (A) a purported court that is not expressly created or established under the constitution or the laws of this state or of the United States; (B) a purported judicial entity that is not expressly created or

established under the constitution or laws of this state or of the United States; or (C) a purported judicial officer of a purported court or purported judicial entity described by Paragraph (A) or (B).

Summary

The statute criminalizes the act of causing someone to sign or execute a document affecting property or pecuniary interest without effective consent, with the intent to defraud or harm. This directly relates to the proposition where the Respondent was allegedly ordered to sign a document he did not agree to, and fraudulent misrepresentations were made to secure temporary orders. The statute also addresses the filing or recording of documents by a public servant without consent, which aligns with the claim of fraudulent court orders being signed and filed.

This memo was compiled by Vincent AI based on vLex materials available as of October 27, 2025. [View full answer on vLex](#)