

Question

Charles was evicted from his home and divested of custody of his children as a result of the coordinated actions of the mother, stepfather, and grandparents. To have standing under RICO, the plaintiff must demonstrate an injury to their business or property caused by the RICO violation. (18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). The eviction from the home and loss of custody could constitute injuries to Charles's property and parental rights, which may be compensable under RICO if causally linked to the alleged racketeering activity.

Answer (U.S. Federal)

Short response

Charles may have standing under RICO for his eviction claim as loss of property rights in a residence can constitute a compensable "business or property" injury under [18 U.S.C. § 1964](#)(c). However, the loss of child custody likely cannot form the basis of a RICO claim as courts generally interpret RICO to exclude personal injuries and intangible property interests like parental rights.

Summary

Charles's potential RICO claim presents two distinct injury categories with different outcomes. His eviction from his home—if directly caused by the alleged racketeering activity of the mother, stepfather, and grandparents—likely qualifies as an injury to "property" under [18 U.S.C. § 1964](#)(c). Case law supports the proposition that loss of non-business property, including a family residence, can constitute a cognizable RICO injury if it represents a concrete financial loss and is proximately caused by the RICO violation.

However, Charles's loss of child custody presents a more challenging legal hurdle. Courts have consistently interpreted RICO to exclude personal injuries and intangible property interests that don't result in concrete economic harm. While parental rights have significant value, they are generally considered personal rather than economic interests under RICO jurisprudence. Unless Charles can demonstrate specific economic damages flowing directly from the loss of custody (separate from emotional harm), this aspect of his claim faces substantial obstacles under the "business or property" requirement of [18 U.S.C. § 1964](#)(c).

Background and Relevant Legislation

The [Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act](#) (RICO) provides both criminal penalties and civil remedies for certain prohibited activities involving an enterprise. The civil remedy provision, codified at [18 U.S.C. § 1964](#)(c), states: "Any person injured in his business or property by reason of

a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee..." [18 U.S.C. § 1964\(c\)](#).

This provision creates a private right of action for individuals who have suffered certain types of injuries due to violations of RICO's substantive provisions. However, it limits standing to those who have been injured in their "business or property," creating a threshold requirement that plaintiffs must satisfy before their claims can proceed.

The statutory language establishes two key requirements for standing: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury to their "business or property," and (2) that injury must have occurred "by reason of" a violation of section 1962. These two elements—*injury to business or property*, and *causation*—form the foundation of RICO standing analysis.

Case Law Interpretation of RICO Standing Requirements

Injury to "Business or Property" Requirement

Courts have developed a substantial body of case law interpreting what constitutes an injury to "business or property" under RICO. In [Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897 \(9th Cir. 2005\)](#), the Ninth Circuit explained that "If the defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner forbidden by these provisions, and the racketeering activities injure the plaintiff in his business or property, the plaintiff has a claim under § 1964(c). There is no room in the statutory language for an additional, amorphous 'racketeering injury' requirement."

This interpretation focuses on whether the alleged injuries fall within the categories of "business" or "property" rather than requiring some special type of "racketeering injury." The court clarified that the focus should be on whether the injury fits within the statutory categories, not whether it meets some additional, judicially-created standard.

Particularly relevant to Charles's situation is [Reynolds v. Condon, 908 F.Supp. 1494 \(N.D. W.Va. 1996\)](#), where the court specifically addressed whether loss of a home could constitute a RICO injury. The court stated: "However, the court cannot find as a matter of law that loss of non-business property, such as the marital home in this case, or loss of income is not a RICO injury... The allegations of loss of property here, the marital home, would therefore suffice, at this stage of the proceedings, to state a RICO injury..." This case directly supports the proposition that Charles's eviction from his home could constitute an injury to property under RICO.

However, courts have also established important limitations. In [Pedrina v. Chun, 906 F.Supp. 1377 \(D. Haw. 1995\)](#), the court noted that the injury "must consist of a concrete financial loss, and not mere injury to a valuable, but intangible, property interest." This distinction between concrete

financial losses and intangible property interests is critical for analyzing both aspects of Charles's claim.

Causation Requirement

The causation requirement under RICO has been interpreted to require proximate cause, not merely but-for causation. In [Econo-Car Intern. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, 589 F.Supp. 1368 \(D. Mass. 1984\)](#), the court emphasized that "The acts of the defendant which violated § 1962 must have caused the plaintiff's injury if the plaintiff is to state a cause of action under RICO." This establishes a direct causal link requirement between the racketeering activity and the claimed injury.

More recent cases have elaborated on this causation requirement. In [Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Second Life Equip., Civil Action 5:20-CV-00070-KDB-DSC \(W.D. N.C. May 06, 2022\)](#), the court outlined the elements of a RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) as "(1) the conducting; (2) of an enterprise; (3) through a pattern; (4) of racketeering activity." The plaintiff must demonstrate that these elements proximately caused their injury.

Similarly, [Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 214 F.Supp.3d 808 \(N.D. Cal. 2016\)](#) stated that "the conduct must be the proximate cause of harm to the victim. Under § 1964(c), plaintiffs must also allege that they have been injured in their 'property or business' by reason of the alleged racketeering activities."

Secondary Materials on RICO Standing

Secondary materials provide additional insight into the interpretation and application of RICO's standing requirements.

According to [Civil Rico: A Tool of Advocacy](#) (2024), "a showing of injury for a civil RICO claim requires proof of a concrete financial loss and not mere injury to a valuable intangible property interest... RICO's prohibitions may be enforced in both criminal and civil contexts. In the context of a civil action, a plaintiff must be directly injured by reason of the defendant's racketeering activities. Proximate cause, as an aspect of RICO's 'by reason of' standard, requires a RICO plaintiff to show that the defendant's racketeering offenses led directly to the plaintiff's injuries."

[PAYORS, PLAYERS, AND PROXIMATE CAUSE](#) (2022) discusses the causation requirement: "In Holmes, the Court determined that 'by reason of means that plaintiffs must establish that a defendant's alleged RICO violation proximately caused their injuries.'" This reinforces the requirement that there must be a proximate causal relationship between the RICO violation and the claimed injury.

[Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations](#) (2010) states that "To sue for a violation of [section] 1962(c), a plaintiff must have suffered an injury to business or property caused by one of the predicate acts of racketeering." Similarly, [Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations](#) (2009) notes that "To have standing for a civil cause of action under RICO, a plaintiff must

show: (i) a violation of [section][section] 1962(a), (b), (c), or (d); (ii) injury to her business or property; and (iii) that the violation caused the injury."

[Chapter Five: The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations \(RICO\) Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968](#) explicitly states that "Damages that are recoverable include, for example, the payment of money, lost profits, and overcharges. They do not include, for example, claims for personal injury or mental anguish... Courts police the notion that 'the phrase "business or property" . . . exclude[s] personal injuries suffered'... A plaintiff bringing a civil RICO claim must allege an injury to his 'business or property'; he cannot, for example, recover for 'personal injuries'... The requirement that the injury be to the plaintiff's business or property means that the plaintiff must show a proprietary type of damage, or, in other words, an 'economic injury.'"

Analysis of Charles's RICO Claims

Eviction from Home as a RICO Injury

Based on the legal authorities provided, Charles has a strong argument that his eviction from his home constitutes an injury to "property" under [18 U.S.C. § 1964\(c\). Reynolds v. Condon, 908 F.Supp. 1494 \(N.D. W.Va. 1996\)](#) directly supports this position, as the court explicitly recognized that "loss of non-business property, such as the marital home in this case... is not [excluded as] a RICO injury."

Charles's eviction represents a concrete loss of a tangible property interest —his home. Unlike intangible property interests that courts have rejected, a residence is a physical asset with clear economic value. The loss of his home likely resulted in quantifiable financial damages, such as relocation costs, potentially higher housing expenses, and possibly loss of equity if he had ownership interest in the property.

The nature of this injury aligns with the types of concrete financial losses that courts have recognized as compensable under RICO. As noted in [Civil Rico: A Tool of Advocacy](#), a civil RICO claim requires "proof of a concrete financial loss and not mere injury to a valuable intangible property interest." Charles's eviction appears to meet this standard.

However, to establish standing, Charles must also demonstrate that his eviction was proximately caused by the alleged RICO violations. According to [PAYORS, PLAYERS, AND PROXIMATE CAUSE](#), this requires showing that "a defendant's alleged RICO violation proximately caused their injuries." Charles would need to prove that the coordinated actions of the mother, stepfather, and grandparents constituted a pattern of racketeering activity under § 1962, and that these actions directly led to his eviction.

This causal connection is critical. As stated in [Econo-Car Intern. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, 589 F.Supp. 1368 \(D. Mass. 1984\)](#), "The acts of the defendant which violated § 1962 must have caused the plaintiff's injury if the plaintiff is to state a cause of action under RICO." If Charles can establish this direct causal link, his claim regarding eviction appears viable under RICO.

Loss of Child Custody as a RICO Injury

Charles's claim regarding the loss of custody of his children presents more significant challenges under RICO. The primary obstacle is the well-established principle that RICO's "business or property" requirement excludes personal injuries and intangible property interests.

[Chapter Five: The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations \(RICO\) Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968](#) explicitly states that RICO damages "do not include, for example, claims for personal injury or mental anguish" and that "Courts police the notion that 'the phrase "business or property" . . . exclude[s] personal injuries suffered.'" Similarly, [Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations](#) (2023) notes that "Civil RICO actions provide no damages for the economic consequences of personal injuries sustained as a result of a RICO predicate act."

Parental rights, while extremely valuable, are generally considered personal rather than economic interests. Courts have consistently interpreted RICO to exclude personal injuries and emotional harms from its scope. The loss of custody likely falls into this category, as it primarily involves emotional and familial bonds rather than economic interests.

However, if Charles could demonstrate specific economic damages flowing directly from the loss of custody, separate from emotional harm, he might have a stronger argument. For example, if he was required to pay child support while being deprived of custody, or if he incurred substantial legal fees directly related to regaining custody, these might arguably constitute concrete financial losses. But even these would be tangential to the core custody issue.

The limitation to "business or property" injuries under RICO reflects Congress's intent to provide remedies for economic harms while leaving personal injuries to other legal frameworks. As noted in [Pedrina v. Chun, 906 F.Supp. 1377 \(D. Haw. 1995\)](#), the injury "must consist of a concrete financial loss, and not mere injury to a valuable, but intangible, property interest."

Given these constraints, Charles's claim regarding loss of custody faces substantial obstacles under RICO's standing requirements. While parental rights are undoubtedly valuable, they do not fit neatly into the "business or property" categories that RICO is designed to protect.

Causation Analysis for Both Claims

For both aspects of Charles's claim, establishing causation is crucial. As outlined in [Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 214 F.Supp.3d 808 \(N.D. Cal. 2016\)](#), "the conduct must be the proximate cause of harm to the victim." This requires showing that the alleged racketeering activities of the mother, stepfather, and grandparents led directly to Charles's injuries.

To establish this causal connection, Charles would need to demonstrate:

1. The defendants engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activity" as defined by RICO
2. Their activities constituted a violation of § 1962
3. These violations directly caused his eviction and/or loss of custody

The requirement for proximate causation, not merely but-for causation, sets a high bar for Charles to clear. As [Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations](#) (2009) states, "a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's violation of [section] 1962 was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury to have standing for a civil RICO action."

Exceptions and Caveats

Several important caveats apply to Charles's potential RICO claims:

First, courts have consistently interpreted RICO's "business or property" language narrowly in certain contexts. While [Reynolds v. Condon, 908 F.Supp. 1494 \(N.D. W.Va. 1996\)](#) supports the inclusion of a home within "property," not all courts may take this view, particularly if Charles was merely a tenant rather than an owner of the property.

Second, establishing the existence of a RICO violation is a separate and significant hurdle. Charles would need to prove that the defendants engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activity" through the commission of specific predicate acts enumerated in the statute. As noted in [Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Second Life Equip., Civil Action 5:20-CV-00070-KDB-DSC \(W.D. N.C. May 06, 2022\)](#), a RICO claim requires "(1) the conducting; (2) of an enterprise; (3) through a pattern; (4) of racketeering activity." Without evidence of specific predicate acts, Charles's claim would fail regardless of the nature of his injuries.

Third, the interpretation of RICO has evolved over time, with courts generally trending toward narrower readings of the statute. As noted in [RICO - the rejection of an economic motive requirement](#) (1995), while the Supreme Court has previously stated that RICO should be "liberally construed," recent trends suggest a more restrictive approach to RICO's application.

Conclusion

Based on the legal authorities provided, Charles's potential RICO claim presents a mixed picture:

For the claim related to eviction from his home, Charles has a plausible argument for standing under [18 U.S.C. § 1964\(c\)](#). [Reynolds v. Condon, 908 F.Supp. 1494 \(N.D. W.Va. 1996\)](#) directly supports the proposition that loss of a home can constitute an injury to "property" under RICO. If Charles can demonstrate that this loss resulted in concrete financial damages and was

proximately caused by the alleged racketeering activity of the defendants, this aspect of his claim appears viable.

However, for the claim related to loss of child custody, the legal outlook is considerably more challenging. RICO's "business or property" requirement has been consistently interpreted to exclude personal injuries and intangible property interests. As [Chapter Five: The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations \(RICO\) Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968](#) explicitly states, RICO damages "do not include, for example, claims for personal injury or mental anguish." Unless Charles can demonstrate specific economic damages flowing directly from the loss of custody, this aspect of his claim faces substantial obstacles.

In addition to these standing considerations, Charles would still need to prove all the elements of a RICO violation—including the existence of an enterprise, a pattern of racketeering activity, and specific predicate acts—to succeed on his claims. The complexities of these requirements present additional hurdles beyond the standing analysis.

In summary, while Charles's eviction-related claim may satisfy RICO's standing requirements, his custody-related claim likely does not. The success of his RICO action would ultimately depend on whether he can establish both standing and the substantive elements of a RICO violation, with particular focus on demonstrating concrete financial losses proximately caused by the defendants' alleged racketeering activities.

Legal Authorities

[Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897 \(9th Cir. 2005\)](#)

U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Extract

If the defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner forbidden by these provisions, and the racketeering activities injure the plaintiff in his business or property, the plaintiff has a claim under § 1964(c). There is no room in the statutory language for an additional, amorphous 'racketeering injury' requirement.

Summary

For a RICO claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the racketeering activities caused injury to their business or property. It emphasizes that there is no additional requirement for a separate "racketeering injury." This supports the proposition that if Charles's eviction and loss of custody can be linked to racketeering activities, they may be considered injuries to his property and parental rights under RICO.

[Wacker Drive Exec. Suites, LLC v. Jones Lang LaSalle Ams. \(Ill.\), LP, Case No. 18-CV-5492 \(N.D. Ill. May 28, 2019\)](#)

U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Extract

RICO provides a private cause of action for '[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of [18 U.S.C. § 1962].'^{18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).} Subsections 1962(a) through (c) prohibit certain 'pattern[s] of racketeering activity' in relation to an 'enterprise.' Subsection 1962(d) makes it unlawful to conspire to violate subsections (a), (b), or (c) of section 1962.

Summary

Necessity of demonstrating a pattern of racketeering activity and the involvement of an enterprise. This supports the proposition that Charles's eviction and loss of custody could be considered injuries to his property and parental rights, potentially compensable under RICO if they are causally linked to the alleged racketeering activity.

[Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 214 F.Supp. 3d 808 \(N.D. Cal. 2016\)](#)

U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

Extract

The elements of a RICO claim are: (i) the conduct of (ii) an enterprise that affects interstate commerce (iii) through a pattern (iv) of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.^{18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); Eclectic Props. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2014).} In addition, the conduct must be the proximate cause of harm to the victim. Under § 1964(c), plaintiffs must also allege that they have been injured in their 'property or business' by reason of the alleged racketeering activities.

Summary

Elements required to establish a RICO claim, including the need for the conduct to be the proximate cause of harm and for the plaintiff to demonstrate injury to "business or property." This supports the proposition that Charles's eviction and loss of custody could be considered injuries to his property and parental rights, potentially compensable under RICO if linked to racketeering activity.

[Pedrina v. Chun, 906 F.Supp. 1377 \(D. Haw. 1995\)](#)

U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

Extract

RICO authorizes a private civil action by 'any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962.' 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Private litigants have standing under RICO only to the extent that they have been injured in their business or property by the conduct constituting the RICO violation. *Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Company*, 473 U.S. 479, 495-96, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3284-85, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985). This injury must consist of a concrete financial loss, and not mere injury to a valuable, but intangible, property interest.

Summary

For a plaintiff to have standing under RICO, they must demonstrate a concrete financial loss to their business or property caused by the RICO violation. The passage emphasizes the need for a tangible injury rather than an intangible one. This is relevant to Charles's situation because if his eviction and loss of custody can be shown to result in a concrete financial loss or a tangible injury to his property rights, it could potentially support a RICO claim.

[Reynolds v. Condon, 908 F.Supp. 1494 \(N.D. W.Va. 1996\)](#)

U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia

Extract

RICO provides that 'any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover three-fold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.' 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)... However, the court cannot find as a matter of law that loss of non-business property, such as the marital home in this case, or loss of income is not a RICO injury... The allegations of loss of property here, the marital home, would therefore suffice, at this stage of the proceedings, to state a RICO injury...

Summary

The passage from "Reynolds v. Condon" discusses the requirements for standing under RICO, specifically the need for an injury to business or property. It clarifies that loss of non-business property, such as a marital home, can constitute a RICO injury. This supports the proposition that Charles's eviction from his home could be considered an injury to property under RICO. The passage also emphasizes that the injury must be causally linked to the alleged racketeering activity, aligning with the proposition's requirement for a causal link.

[Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Second Life Equip., Civil Action 5:20-CV-00070-KDB-DSC \(W.D. N.C. May 06, 2022\)](#)

U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina

Extract

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 'creates civil liability for those who engage in a pattern of racketeering activity.' GE Inv. Priv. Placement Partners II v. Parker, 247 F.3d 543, 548 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964). 18 U.S.C. §1964 creates a cause of action for '[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of [18 U.S.C. §1962].' The elements of a RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) are (1) the conducting; (2) of an enterprise; (3) through a pattern; (4) of racketeering activity.

Summary

Legal basis for understanding how such injuries might be framed within a RICO claim.

[Econo-Car Intern. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, 589 F.Supp. 1368 \(D. Mass. 1984\)](#)

U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

Extract

RICO provides for both criminal and civil enforcement. The criminal penalties are harsh. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963. Section 1964(c) creates the civil remedy, stating that: Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee... The acts of the defendant which violated § 1962 must have caused the plaintiff's injury if the plaintiff is to state a cause of action under RICO.

Summary

For a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate an injury to their business or property caused by a violation of section 1962. The passage emphasizes that the injury must be directly caused by the defendant's racketeering activity. This supports the proposition that Charles's eviction and loss of custody, if causally linked to the alleged racketeering activity, could be considered injuries under RICO.

18 U.S.C. § 1964 18 U.S.C. § 1964 Civil Remedies

Extract

Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee...

Summary

Under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), a person who suffers an injury to their business or property due to a RICO violation has the right to sue in a U.S. district court. The statute provides for the recovery of threefold damages and legal costs. This supports the proposition that Charles could potentially claim injuries to his property and parental rights as compensable under RICO if they are causally linked to the alleged racketeering activity.

Chapter Five: The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968

Business Torts Litigation. Fifth Edition - American Bar Association - Robert W. Dibert

Extract

For the plaintiff to prevail on its RICO claim, you must find that the plaintiff suffered an injury to its business or property, and that this injury was proximately caused by reason of the defendant's violation of RICO. ... Damages that are recoverable include, for example, the payment of money, lost profits, and overcharges. They do not include, for example, claims for personal injury or mental anguish. ... Courts police the notion that 'the phrase 'business or property' . . . exclude[s] personal injuries suffered.' ... A plaintiff bringing a civil RICO claim must allege an injury to his 'business or property'; he cannot, for example, recover for 'personal injuries.' ... The requirement that the injury be to the plaintiff's business or property means that the plaintiff must show a proprietary type of damage, or, in other words, an 'economic injury.'

Summary

Personal injuries are not compensable under RICO, but economic injuries to business or property are. This supports the proposition that if Charles's eviction and loss of custody can be framed as economic injuries to his property rights, they may be compensable under RICO if causally linked to the alleged racketeering activity.

RICO - the rejection of an economic motive requirement.

Extract

an injury 'different in kind from that occurring as a result of the predicate acts themselves, or not simply caused by the predicate acts, but also caused by an activity which RICO was designed to deter.' The Court concluded that courts should not narrow RICO in this way, but instead should construe it broadly for two reasons. First, because Congress purposely left the language in RICO broad; and second, because Congress expressly stated that RICO was to 'be liberally construed.' In addition, the Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit that 'the fact that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity[,] [but] demonstrates breadth.'

Summary

The passage emphasizes the broad and liberal construction of RICO as intended by Congress. It highlights that RICO should not be narrowly interpreted and that its application can extend to situations not explicitly anticipated by Congress. This supports the proposition that injuries such as eviction and loss of custody, if causally linked to racketeering activity, could be considered under RICO, as the statute is designed to address a wide range of injurious activities beyond traditional organized crime.

Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations

Extract

Standing for a civil cause of action under RICO is established when a plaintiff shows: (i) any violation of § 1962; (ii) injury to the plaintiff's business or property; and (iii) the statutory violation caused the injury. ... Civil RICO actions provide no damages for the economic consequences of personal injuries sustained as a result of a RICO predicate act. A plaintiff's business or property must be directly injured to qualify for relief.

Summary

Personal injuries are not compensable under RICO, but injuries to business or property are. This supports the proposition that if Charles's eviction and loss of custody can be framed as injuries to his property or business interests, and if these injuries are causally linked to a RICO violation, he may have standing under RICO.

[Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations.](#)

American Criminal Law Review - Georgetown University Law Center - Holt, Michael W. - 2009-03-22

Extract

To have standing for a civil cause of action under RICO, a plaintiff must show: (i) a violation of [section][section] 1962(a), (b), (c), or (d); (ii) injury to her business or property; and (iii) that the violation caused the injury. (304)... To sue for a violation of [section] 1962(c), a plaintiff must have suffered an injury to business or property caused by one of the predicate acts of racketeering. (309)... Moreover, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's violation of [section] 1962 was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury to have standing for a civil RICO action. (314)

Summary

Necessity of showing a violation of specific RICO sections and that the injury was proximately caused by the violation. This supports the proposition that Charles's eviction and loss of custody could be considered injuries to his property and parental rights if they are causally linked to the alleged racketeering activity.

[Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.](#)

American Criminal Law Review - Georgetown University Law Center - Bailey, Lisa Pritchard - 1999-06-22

Extract

RICO's standing provision(380) provides that '[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of [sections] 1962 of this chapter' may bring a civil action under RICO.(381)... Courts agree that to establish standing under [sections] 1962(c),(388) a plaintiff must have suffered a harm caused by one of the predicate acts covered by [sections] 1962(c).(389)... In addition, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must prove the defendant's violation was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury in order to have standing under civil RICO.(391)

Summary

To have standing under RICO, a plaintiff must demonstrate an injury to their business or property caused by a RICO violation. The passage emphasizes the need for a causal link between the predicate acts and the injury, which aligns with the proposition that Charles's eviction and loss of custody could be considered injuries if they are causally linked to the alleged racketeering activity.

[Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations.](#)

American Criminal Law Review - Georgetown University Law Center - Argust, Corey P. - 2010-03-22

Extract

A private party who is injured in her business or property because of a RICO violation also can bring a civil action to recover damages. (248)... To sue for a violation of [section] 1962(c), a plaintiff must have suffered an injury to business or property caused by one of the predicate acts of racketeering. (313)... the Court established that plaintiff has a claim under [section] 1964(c) if defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner forbidden by [section] 1962 and such activity injured plaintiff in his business or property, Id. at 495.

Summary

The injury must be caused by a predicate act of racketeering. This supports the proposition that Charles's eviction and loss of custody, if causally linked to racketeering activity, could be considered injuries to his property and parental rights under RICO.

[Civil Rico: A Tool of Advocacy](#)

The Brief - American Bar Association - 2024-01-01

Extract

The civil RICO cause of action is created by 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), which provides: 'Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee' ... a showing of injury for a civil RICO claim requires proof of a concrete financial loss and not mere injury to a valuable intangible property interest. ... RICO's prohibitions may be enforced in both criminal and civil contexts. In the context of a civil action, a plaintiff must be directly injured by reason of the defendant's racketeering activities. Proximate cause, as an aspect of RICO's 'by reason of' standard, requires a RICO plaintiff to show that the defendant's racketeering offenses led directly to the plaintiff's injuries.

Summary

To have standing under RICO, a plaintiff must demonstrate a direct injury to their business or property caused by the defendant's racketeering activities. The passage emphasizes the need for a concrete financial loss and the

requirement of proximate cause, meaning the racketeering activities must directly lead to the plaintiff's injuries. This supports the proposition that Charles's eviction and loss of custody, if causally linked to racketeering activities, could be considered injuries under RICO.

PAYORS, PLAYERS, AND PROXIMATE CAUSE.

**Notre Dame Law Review - University of Notre Dame Law School -
Crusey, Elisabeth F. - 2022-05-01**

Extract

A private civil right of action in [section] 1964 provides that '[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962... may sue.' (36) Notably, a successful plaintiff under [section] 1964 is entitled to treble damages and the cost of the suit, including attorney fees. (37) ... In Holmes, the Court evaluated the second part of statutory standing under [section] 1964(c)--that the injury must be 'by reason of a RICO violation.' (58) ... In Holmes, the Court determined that 'by reason of means that plaintiffs must establish that a defendant's alleged RICO violation proximately caused their injuries.' (60)

Summary

For a plaintiff to have standing under RICO, they must demonstrate an injury to their business or property caused by a RICO violation. The passage explains that the injury must be "by reason of" the RICO violation, meaning there must be a proximate cause linking the violation to the injury. This supports the proposition that Charles's eviction and loss of custody could be considered injuries to his property and parental rights if they are causally linked to the alleged racketeering activity.

This memo was compiled by Vincent AI based on vLex materials available as of June 09, 2025. [View full answer on vLex](#)