Disjunctivism and Being-in-the-world



Thesis presented as part of the requirements for the MA Consciousness and Embodiment degree in

University College Dublin.

UCD School of Philosophy

Student number:15570547

August 2020

Supervisor: Assoc Prof Timothy Mooney

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# **Abstract**

In this dissertation, I expound a moderate disjunctivist account of non-veridical perception which espouses the difference between veridical perceptions, illusions, and hallucinations. I advocate a stance that acknowledges that veridical and non-veridical perceptions can share common phenomenal features but refute that these distinct experiential events are of the same fundamental kind as hallucinations are parasitic upon perceptual processes. I expound a direct realist approach to perception, in doing so I argue against representationalist theories which invoke unnecessary ‘mental gymnastics’ for cases of veridical perception. The direct realism I propose is rooted in the phenomenological fact of one’s being-in-the-world, and it is this means of being-in-the-world that I take to be pivotal to any accurate account of perception. I outline various features of veridical perception which are key to an understanding of non-veridical perception; namely, constancy, presence, intentionality, horizons, perspectival variation, style, indeterminacy, and grip. And Illustrate how these processes, in concert with deviant causation and perceptual faith, facilitate non-veridical perception. We are embedded in a world that is filled with objects and entities with which we engage, we are perpetually involved with them in our projects, and it is this fundamentally constitutive aspect of our being-in-the-world that I keep at the fore of my argument. As such my account recognizes that perception, by and large, is engaged perception, and it is at the level of engagement - not content, that we should first establish the difference between perception proper and hallucination.

# **Section 1: Introduction**

Representationalism has been the cornerstone of most theories of perception and cognition and has become the orthodox paradigm for empirical research in these areas (Chemero, 2009, pp. 50-52; Warren, 2006, p. 358; Wilson & Golonka, 2013, p. 2). As a direct by-product of Cartesianism, representations were posited to bridge the epistemic gap between a reified mind and a mechanistic body (*cf.* Ryle, 2009, pp. 2-3; p. 10). This substance dualism has begun to face scrutiny from several fronts, e.g., 4E cognition, ecological psychology, and phenomenology to name but a few. In the sections to follow, I will illustrate why representationalism and dualism rest on shaky foundations and expound an opposing view which I believe restores the validity of the perceivers’ world and affirms the content of their veridical perceptions as direct. Perception will thus be elucidated as a grounded and well-founded process and not as the mere overlaying of meaning by the intellect onto a world devoid of quality and character. Though representations offer a useful explanatory crutch, theories of perception which explicitly begin from this substance-dualist position face a plethora of philosophical problems that arise when the perceiver’s experiences are torn from their environment.

Firstly, there is the problem of other minds – the Cartesian Theatre can only host one-man shows and the audience’s response may be a pre-recording! A representationalist theory of perception presupposes a solipsistic isolation from others (Gardiner, 1998, p. 130) where one can never be certain that people walking past the window aren’t merely coat-clad automata (*cf.* Descartes, 2008, p. 23). Then, the is the problem of meaning, as the cogito is torn from the world, all external objects are demoted to being mere props, their meaning must be assigned to them by the actor on stage – the intellect (*cf.* Ryle, 2009, p. 5). This is of course the extreme degree of indirect realism, but even lesser formulations of such a representationalist thesis struggle to resolve whether the perceptual proxy/mental image represents the real features of the object (Smith, 2002, p. 7). There is the issue of circularity in explanation, for any representational account of perception cannot make appeal to the very perceptual abilities they attempt to explain. If all perceptual content is representational, how can an individual know what the representations are representing without some other form of unmediated access to the environment (Warren, 2006, p. 361). An explanatory regress is thus likely. Finally, there is the problem of system detectable error; if representational systems cannot be grounded in some direct and unmediated form of perception as noted above, they then lack access to a frame of reference for identifying when they are making errors. As Golonka and Wilson put it: “a system cannot know that it is wrong if it is blindly trading in symbols with inaccessible content.” (2019, p. 238).

These are but a few of the issues that arise when one adopts an indirect theory of perception, mental images are employed as ontological duct tape to patch the holes in an otherwise unseaworthy idealist doctrine. Such a dualist approach also commits itself far too readily to the construction of dichotomous relationships: mental-physical; self-other; mind-body; subject-object; and so on. Whilst these distinctions can prove fruitful in certain contexts, I will endeavour to jettison these dichotomies from the remainder of this thesis. Instead I will ground my arguments for a disjunctivist account of perception in the notion of being-in-the-world, and I will take that form of being to be the most fundamental concept in one’s phenomenology when one is perceiving (*cf.* Heidegger, 2008, pp. 84-88; Merleau-Ponty, 2005, pp. 90-92). Perhaps then we might evade some of the problems described above and return the perceiver to her rightful place in the world she inhabits.

# **1.1: Sense-Data**

To provide a comprehensive introduction to the view I aim to reject, namely conjuctivism; it will now prove fruitful to outline briefly what a representationalist account of perception looks like. There is no better candidate for this than the sense-data theory. While there are many variations of the sense-data theory, they largely posit that the only thing one is directly aware of in perception are mind-dependent sense-data. One of the reasons this approach was conceived, is the supposed poverty of stimulus of perception. Take vision for example, the standard explanation of the process of seeing an object involves light bouncing off the object and “onto” your retina, where the scene arrives as an inverted 2D image. The image is then corrected and transformed somehow into a 3D image by the brain. This 3D mental image is then what we perceive in seeing, we are thus directly aware of then visual sense-data but not of the object itself. Explanations in this vein are terribly incomplete, they lean on the miracle of representation to sneakily dodge the heart of the matter of how one perceives and to detract all importance from why we perceive – for action.

# **1.2: Conjunctivism**

The example above would fall under a conjunctivist conception of perceptual experience. Conjunctivism is a doctrine of perception which holds that the only truly direct object of perception a perceiver can have is of an imaginary or hallucinatory kind. Whether the conjunctivist would call this direct, albeit hallucinated, percept veridical or non-veridical is another matter we need not concern ourselves with here. For the purposes of my arguments, suffice it to say that conjunctivism does not posit any fundamental differences in kind between a tree as seen and as imagined, instead the latter is merely seen as more direct as it does not require any mediation to be observed imaginarily. As such, conjunctivism readily lends itself to sense-data theories. A few other theories fit this mandate too providing they posit mental intermediaries for perceptual content and their causal objects. For the conjunctivist all perception of objects is indirect, and one can only acquire direct acquaintance with perceptual proxies of objects. Following this reasoning then only the perception of a mental image; say an imagined apple for example, is a true perception. If one is to perceive a real object, there is always some aspect of it which will not be ascertained by the senses, you only view one face of the apple and in a certain lighting, etc. The stimulus is always impoverished and never exhausted, only an imagined object can be known directly and in its totality. Johnston (2019) succinctly sums up the two core assumptions of conjunctivism by providing a conjunctive analysis of seeing:

(i) the direct object of her visual awareness is not some particular in the external environment, but something that she could be aware of even if she were hallucinating,

And – the crucial conjunction –

(ii) by contrast with the hallucinatory case, her visual awareness is appropriately caused by some external particular in the scene before the eyes. Thanks to this causal connection the material particular counts as an indirect object of experience. (p. 208)

I believe that this analysis is incorrect. I propose that there can be direct perception of objects and that such a process need not be exhaustive of the object. It is only if your conception of perception hinges on representations that conjunctivism becomes a necessary evil. I believe that veridical and non-veridical perceptions can share common phenomenal features, e.g., my imagined apple can exhibit the same shade of red as an apple before me on a table, after all I possess the same perceptual capacities for both experiences. I will, however, argue that veridical and non-veridical perceptions are distinctly different in virtue of their causes, intentionality, and their relation to one’s being-in-the-world. Furthermore, I will deny the conjunctivist ruling that only hallucinatory or imagined objects may be directly perceived.

# **Section 2: Direct Realism**

Now that opponent theories of perception have been sketched out, I will outline the philosophical position I aim to defend. Direct realism (also known as naïve realism) is the antithesis of sense-data and representationalist theories of perception. Direct realists hold that we are aware of physical phenomena when we perceive physical objects. There is no intermediary posited between object and perceiver and no need for anything to have to act as a stand-in for the object when that object is available to the senses (*cf.* Smith, 2002, pp. 2-7). Perceptual experiences consist of an inter-relationship between objects and their perceivers, and these experiences bear the qualitative characteristics that they do because the objects themselves possess and exhibit these qualities (Moran, 2019, p. 368). This view holds that in veridical perception one is not merely aware of a mind-dependent construct which bears some relation or other to the genuine object. Instead, we can directly experience the features of the mind-independent things-in-themselves as they are (at least insofar as they can be perceived by our affective capacities, i.e., within the limits of our sensory abilities, perception need not be exhaustive, nor even determinate). Kent (2018) highlights the emphasize that direct realists place on the means that perceptual information is instantiated in one’s conscious awareness, stating that this is a hallmark feature which differentiates this view from indirect realism. He outlines the two core commitments of this view as follows:

1. by some means information contained in my conscious awareness is determined at least in part by information about the remote object of my perception, and

2. this is accomplished without the cognitive mediation of intervening representations of the information. (p.37)

Direct realism is thus naturally opposed to the very notion of sense-data and conjunctivism as the first tenet ascribed above asserts that perceptual objects have mind-independence, at least to some degree. The second tenet of direct realism is an outright refusal to lean on ‘mental gymnastics’ in its explanation of how objects inform our conscious awareness of their intrinsic properties and qualities. Direct realism does not do away with the perceiver’s input into the process, however. The content of your experience is certainly attributable in part to the object as it is presented before you, but the subject-object relationship is reciprocal. A perceiver colours the experience with their own intentions, horizons, knowledge, and so on, but I will elaborate further on that point later in Section 2.2.

Taking a direct realist stance has several advantages in my opinion. For one, sense-data and adverbialist philosophies have difficulty in explaining perceptual constancies and perspectival variations, which the direct realist does not face (*cf*. Siegel, 2006, p. 383). The direct realism to which my views align, namely, the Theory of Appearing and disjuntcivism about non-veridical perception, has been criticized by its opponents as being the product of a backward methodology. This means that some philosophers view direct realism’s arguments as beginning with an ideological hunch and then working backwards to resolve any issues with this view against classic arguments, such as the causal argument, argument from illusion, and argument from hallucination. However, I reject this criticism. Firstly, any theory of perception in my view is a backward methodology, for I view that perception stems from one’s being-in-the-world and hold that non-conceptual perception is a possibility. If we take the common-sensical view that the body and its relation with the world, the existence of which it takes to be a given, forms the foundation of all perceptual experience, then any philosophy of perception must be suspect to a backward methodology. I take representationalist accounts to rely more heavily on such methods, however, as they begin from a standpoint where the body is cut-off from the world, and our experience of objects is only ever through an imagined proxy. As such, I contend that the correct position to take as our launching point for our investigation into non-veridical perceptions is one which begins with our being-in-the-world and not the disconnected brain-in-a-vat alternative.

# **2.1: Perceptual Constancy and Presence**

Being-in-the-world is thus better poised for explaining several key problems in the philosophy of perception. Representationalist theories fall short in their explanation of perceptual constancies and perceptual presence. But as a direct realist approach, we must elaborate upon how being-in-the-world can accommodate constancies and presence. We are intuitively aware that an object’s qualities can persist despite variations in our perception of them (Rookes & Wilson, 2000, pp. 42-43), but if we are in direct contact with these objects, as I contend, it is necessary to explain how we can perceive such features as enduring through augmentations of are acquaintance with them, viz. lighting, angle, perspective, etc. How do we perceive colour as a constant in different lighting? How does a coin remain coin-shaped whilst balancing on its side and resist becoming elliptical in our perception? As Madary (2012) elaborates: “The way a wall looks changes with one’s position and because of shading, but we perceive the wall to be uniformly coloured. The shape and size of objects in one’s visual field changes, but the shape and size of the objects themselves do not change, nor are they perceived to change.” (p. 146).

This is obviously a challenge to our direct realist account, as at first glance it threatens to derail any account that posits an ability to be aware of features of mind-independent objects. A sense-data theory may seem to provide an explanation for this phenomenon more readily, however. I will argue that sense-data theories cannot adequately incorporate constancies into their accounts. Merleau-Ponty took great issue with such accounts. He immediately attacks the tenets of sense-data theories in *Phenomenology of Perception*: “An isolated datum of perception is inconceivable… quality is not an element of consciousness, but a property of the object.” (2005, pp. 4-5). Here he also rejects the supposed mind-dependence of what is perceived and ascribes qualitative properties to the objects themselves. This is in stark contrast to the constancy hypothesis which posits an isomorphism between external, mind-independent objects and the supposed internal, mind-dependent mental images of said objects (an attempt to ground the notion of representations). The constancy hypothesis is “…in principle a point-by-point correspondence and constant connection between the stimulus and the elementary perception.” (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. 8). By beginning from our being-in-the-world however, we can sidestep the constancy hypothesis, in favour of a view of constancies which is grounded in the phenomenology of such experiences.

Take size constancy for instance, as an object moves towards you, you perceive it as remaining the same despite it undergoing changes in the way it looks as it gets larger the closer it gets. The sense-data theorist will have to argue that the percept gets bigger the closer it gets, i.e., the sense-datum one is aware of grows as it comes closer. This is in stark contrast with how we actually experience this phenomenon. We do not see, nor believe that, the object is growing in size as it approaches. Rather we are aware that an object is coming closer to us (Smith, 2002, p. 178). Similarly, sense-data theorists cannot account for the phenomenology of perceptual presence as satisfactorily as an account rooted in being-in-the-world. Perceptual presence is the related notion of how we implicitly and indirectly perceive the hidden sides an object as present, in that we take them or ‘appresent’ them as also being there, even though they are not occurrent in our perspective of the object (*cf*. Matherne, 2017, p. 693). This problem begs a key question of theories of perception. For a sense-data theorist it asks; how can one have a perception of an aspect of an object which is not encapsulated in the correspondent sense-datum, if that’s the only thing available to the perceiver? And for the direct realist it asks; how can one have a perception of a hidden aspect of an object which is directly perceived if that aspect is not directly given in the experience of the object itself?

Though both of the above approaches face a similar problem; the sense-data theorist is now in quite a bind and must work backwards from their cartesian isolation to somehow rectify the highly abstracted, second-order process of dealing in perceptual proxies with beliefs about perceptual presence that cannot be duly justified from such a stance. Yet again, another return to being-in-the-world can satisfy the problem of perceptual presence for the direct realist, as being-in-the-world incorporates the body’s pre-conceptual know-how that continually encounters objects as occluded or backgrounded by other objects. “To see is to enter a universe of beings which display themselves, and they would not do this if they could not be hidden behind each other or behind me.” (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. 79). This phenomenological fact is the basis for all perception, i.e., there must be a figure-ground relationship for a perceiver to discern between objects in the environment (*cf.* Carman, 2009, p. 631). Moreover, perceptual presence is bound up in our motor-intentional gearing towards the world. Upon reflection, it is a strikingly commonplace feature of perception that in viewing an object we also experience the presence of its hidden sides – I do not see a mug as only its front face, I see it holistically as having volume and hidden sides and should I go to grasp it my hand will anticipate the roundness of the hidden side without my having to do so consciously. It is this experience that needs to be encompassed in the theory of perception we are outlining, for it is only by including the phenomenological nuances of perceiving that we can accurately describe what it is to be-in-the-world. Perceptual presence and constancies are deeply entangled with intentional horizons, embodied motor-intentionality, and a prima-facie justification that the objects before us are there and can be known directly. I will elaborate on these last technical points in the following sections. For now, it is best to outline what I mean by intentionality and horizon.

# **2.2: Intentionality and Horizons**

When we perceive objects, we are presented with things that are already constituted and meaningful. Not only are we aware of the objects’ properties, but we are also implicitly aware of the potential actions the objects afford. Intentionality is intricately linked to the inner and outer horizons of an object. The inner horizon of an object predelineates its hidden aspects and features, those that are currently being perceived and those that remain hidden for now. In developed perception it runs with the idea of the totality of the object. Obviously, beings such as us can never have such a view from everywhere (no being likely can for that matter), it is due to this fact that the inner horizon can include empty or unfulfilled intentions. E.g., when I look at a single face of a cube I am struck by my percept’s implicit reference to its other hidden faces. Those intentions are empty from this perspective, but I know if I were to move the object, it could be fulfilled, in place of the occurrent fulfilled intention: the face now seen (Husserl, 2001, p. 87; Smith, 2008, p. 324). We experience a progressive fulfilment of expectations, in which we do not merely recognize something as a possibility, rather, “one anticipates it with such confidence that no alternatives present themselves” (Ratcliffe, 2015, p. 98). Intentions and horizons are pivotal to rejecting representationalist accounts of perception, thus also to explaining the brand of disjunctivism that I espouse, as it is through proper investigation of the roles of horizons and intentionality that we uncover the interconnection and reciprocity of the perceiver and their objects of perception through their being-in-the-world.

Heft (2007) asserts that intentional acts cannot be but mere abstractions if they do not relate to some external features of the environment and its objects as “intention refers to possibilities that are only instantiated in a particular form in interaction with situational factors.” (p. 11). As such, perception is always pursuant to a goal, and so it is necessarily tied to one’s actions while simultaneously drawing from the inherent possibilities that an object possesses. If I am tired and want to sit down but there are no chairs to be seen the window ledge may invite me to sit upon it. Even though this is not typically an intention we would house in the window’s outer horizon, we are guided by our being-in-the-world to recognize the potential the window ledge has as a place for sitting. Being-in-the-world then shares many similarities with the ecological psychology notion of affordances (Gibson, 1983, p. 285). Motor-intentionality comes into play here, and crucially, can supervene one’s deliberate intentions. As the body is geared toward the world, it is at times susceptible to automatically and pre-conceptually orient one’s experience around salient possibilities that the outer horizon of an object affords. The most basic example of this being found in the case of Schneider, whose grasping comported itself to the object of its intended grip without this information being accessible to Schneider himself, thus indicative of the body’s covert know-how when dealing with the world’s objects (*cf.* Merleau-Ponty, 2005, pp. 118-128). Similarly, Merleau-Ponty’s account of phantom limb and anosognosic patients demonstrates precisely how objects can be presented in perception already calling to our bodily capacities and skills (*Ibid.* p. 94). That is not to say that intentionality cannot work top-down, beginning with one’s goal and then colouring the experience from there. In fact, it is this plasticity in the intentional process, that illustrates just how we are made of the same flesh as the world - both summoned and summoner (Carman, 2009, p. 631). These themes will recur continually throughout this thesis as seminal forces in my explanation of non-veridical perception; for now, let us see how they can help us combat the argument from perspectival variation.

# **2.3: Perspectival Variation**

Like perceptual constancy and presence, the argument from perspectival variation is often invoked in attempts to illustrate how we cannot be in direct contact with the mind-independent world. Hume presents the example of how a table seems to grow smaller the further away he moves from it, as the table itself obviously does not undergo any diminution. He thus concludes that it was only a mental image of the table that he could have been aware of, and not the table directly (*cf.* Hume, 1758, Section XII.1). This classic example makes a catastrophic error however, by committing himself to a representational view of perception, Hume has conflated the intellectual notion of a mental image decreasing in size with the phenomenological truth of the matter – that the table is actually only seen to be getting farther away, not diminishing. As Smith (2002) notes, it cannot be that sensations are the objects of our perceptual awareness, for when we perceive the table, we see it as getting farther away - not as getting smaller! If raw sensations were the objects of our awareness, we would not have the experience of constancies, rather, objects would undergo radical transformations all the time (p. 178) and that is without even considering the drastic effects that sensory inter-modality can incite in the experience of an object (*cf.* Hass, 2008, p. 29).

Perspectival variation is instead to be construed correctly by emphasizing one’s bodily point of contact with the world. As a physical subject, we have sufficient grounds for acquiring an understanding of whole physical objects. A cube will never truly be viewed as having six equal sides *viz*. how it is given to me in perception, even if the cube is transparent. For in perceiving the cube, my perspective always privileges one face above the others. But by directing one’s awareness around an object it is possible to grasp the concept of the object, as a whole (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, pp. 235-236; *cf.* Priest, 1998, p. 89). Moreover, the body is necessarily implicated in the figure-ground relationship of any perception as “every figure stands out against the double horizon of external and bodily space.” (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. 115) and it is from this bodily perspective that “I know the relation of appearances… not in virtue of any law or in terms of any formula, but to the extent that I have a body, and that through that body I am at grips with the world.” (*Ibid.* p. 115). Thus, to account for variation by appeal to internalized mentation is to forego the role of the body in perception. This is a critical error as the body provides the primordial ground for any object of awareness and so it is from this foundation that constancy and variation ought to be considered.

For Husserl, every object’s inner horizon forms a unitary system, one which predelineates all possible perspectives and perceptions of the object itself. In recognizing a unified object, we continually consult this internal system of intentions and seek harmony between what limited perception we now have and the object itself (Smith, 2008, p. 324; *cf.* Husserl, 1962, pp. 117-119). It is by this token that misperceptions become a possibility, as we will see later. Merleau-Ponty adapts this systemic view of intentionality but improves upon it significantly by eradicating any need for a reflective synthesis which merges past and present perspectives to grasp the notion of the system as whole. Instead, he rightly claims that it is the object’s *style* which already houses the harmonious system of intentions and that it is our motor-intentionality that is responsible for perceptual constancies (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, pp. 327-328).

The natural world is the horizon of all horizons, the style of all possible styles, which guarantees for my experiences a given, not a willed, unity underlying all the disruptions of my personal and historical life. Its counterpart within me is the given, general, and pre-personal existence of my sensory functions in which we have discovered the deﬁnition of the body. (*Ibid.* p. 385).

The body’s apprehension of an object’s style then allows for different perspectives to be synthesized in relation to our motor-intentionality (Matherne, 2017, p. 718), thus accounting for perceptual presence. As such, an object is perceived as a constant because its style persists through alterations in perspective, thus unifying these appearances that we then synthesize in relation to our motor-intentions and their fulfilment. Variations in secondary qualities, like lighting and colour, do not perturb one’s implicit style recognition, as:

Our perception in its entirety is animated by a logic which assigns to each object its determinate features in virtue of those of the rest, and which ‘cancel out’ as unreal all stray data; it is entirely sustained by the certainty of the world… the constancy of colour is only an abstract component of the constancy of things, which in turn is grounded in the primordial constancy of the world as the horizon of all experiences. (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. 365)

Thus, the properties of an object are harmonized within its style, making any instance of perception of it, a realization of its entirety. We see what is given and what may go over and above this occurrent perspective as we recognize how what is now present would continue homogenously stylistically. Moreover, this notion of style stems from our immersion within the world, as it is presupposed by our ability to direct ourselves toward objects - to grasp what it is for them to be present or not (Ratcliffe, 2015, p. 100). And so, style is not the object of an intentional state or some content of perception, but the manner that all perception is carried out in the pursuit of attaining the best possible grip of an object (See Section 2.6).

So far, we have noted the ways in which objects as given can maintain normativity despite changing contextual factors. But also, how objects in experience can arrive already coloured by the perceiver’s goals, movements, knowledge, and expectations, as well as their perspective. Merleau-Ponty, along with Husserl, affirms that objects of experience are co-created by the object and the experiencer (as relata). Objects have veridical qualities that one can directly perceive, yet every experience of an object is co-intended by the perceiver and possesses outer horizons which are instilled in them by the perceiver, at least to some degree. This point will be crucial to my argument as I believe that it is this feature of perception which allows one to misperceive something, although it is still a given and direct object.

# **2.4: The Theory of Appearing**

As we have now sketched out, veridical perception hinges on the interplay between an object’s inner and outer horizon, and the intentional stance from which the object is approached. This functional reciprocity, however, poses problems for a direct realist account, as it is by this token that it becomes possible to misperceive something. How then might we resolve this fact with a direct and unmediated awareness of objects as they are given? To answer this question, it will be necessary to outline the slant of direct realism which I contend to be wholly compatible with the notion of being-in-the-world. The Theory of Appearing is a direct realist position which champions the common-sense phenomenology experienced in our everyday being-in-the-world. It achieves this through its emphasis on the relational quality of perceptual consciousness. For a proponent of this theory, an object looking a certain way to a perceiver is a fundamentally bottom-line concept, i.e., any account which places the perceptual onus on conceptualization, causality, propositional attitudes, or some such higher-order cognition, ultimately misses the point (*cf.* Alston, 1999, pp. 182-183). Thus, an object’s appearing a certain way, is taken to be indicative of that phenomenal feature’s instantiation in that object with respect to a perceiver. As such, a ball appearing round to me is characterised as a relational appearance of the phenomenal feature of roundness, in which the ball and myself are both implicated in the occurrent perception of the ball’s intrinsic roundness (Langsam, 1997, p. 36). The crucial point here is that this relational definition of perception in which an object is directly perceived and need not undergo some mental mediation to arrive in awareness, does not mean that the object cannot be misperceived. Perception of direct objects can still be fallible. The Theory of Appearing does not necessitate the same point-to-point correspondence that the constancy hypothesis does. In fact, how something appears to a perceiver, need not be isomorphic to how the material object is in itself for the “givenness” here refers to the fact that objects will be presented to our affective faculties whether or not we put ourselves in this state actively. As such, objects have veridical qualities that one can directly perceive, yet potential experiences of a perceived object are co-intended by the perceiver, and the overall horizon of an object includes an outer horizon of where and when it will typically appear.

This kind of givenness runs complementary to the fact that consciousness is always a consciousness of something; intentionality always has, *a priori,* an aboutness, whether or not what it is about transpires to be real or hallucinatory (Smith, 2008, p. 320). This is what led Heidegger to abandon subject-object dichotomies in his descriptions; replaced by the concept of being-in-the-world which presupposes the existence of objects to be aware of and interact with, thus encompassing them in the overall being of the perceiver to begin with (Heidegger, 2008, p. 84). Bearing all this in mind, how do given objects get to be given then in the way that they do?

It follows that the ‘sensible quality’, the spatial limits set to the percept, and even the presence or absence of a perception, are not de facto eﬀects of the situation outside the organism, but represent the way in which it meets stimulation and is related to it. An excitation is not perceived when it strikes a sensory organ which is not ‘attuned’ to it. (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. 86).

Appearances, i.e., percepts of objects, are summoned by the perceiver, yet they arrive in experience already laden with meaning as sensory faculties are guided by intentions. Thus, intentions and goals are a driving contributor to how an object is constituted in our experience, just like how we move around and interact with an object constitutes part of our relation to its phenomenal features, colouring the experience (*cf.* Romdenh-Romluc, 2007, p. 80). Moreover, as I have already elucidated, the object’s external horizon also affords certain perceptions over others. So, the manner in which appearances are given is a reciprocal relationship, where one is invited to see one phenomenal feature as opposed to another, while also beckoning certain features to appear within that objects’ structure to fulfil one’s intentions. Motor skills are also implicated in this process, and it is by virtue of our skills and talents that certain features will be taken as ideal conditions for an activity, and this is crucially not the product of a reflective judgement. A skilled sailor does not actively judge that the weather is good enough to go sailing, “Instead, the subject simply perceives her surroundings as offering an opportunity to exercise her skill.” (*Ibid.* p. 79).

# **2.5: Indeterminacy & Non-conceptualism**

A positive account of indeterminacy in perception is key to an account of non-veridical perception that acknowledges our being-in-the-world as a foundational imperative. It is a truism of everyday experience that much of what we sense is often ill-defined and indistinct. Whether it be a feint tune in the distance that I can’t quite place, or something as close to home as the objects at the boundary of my visual field, I frequently encounter objects that hang in the periphery of my awareness. The style of an object maintains an open-endedness *viz.* the horizon of all other possible perspectives; it is through this that we are aware how the style would persist in the sides unknown. This open horizon is thus fully indeterminate also, and dependent on our body’s connection to the object itself. When identifying the style, we distinguish the object, while simultaneously identifying the indeterminate horizon the style alludes to. So, in recognising the crystal cube by its style, we are immediately and implicitly aware of its hidden aspects, along with the infinite other variants that are possible within the style of the cube (Matherne, 2017, p. 714). This givenness of presence, I take to be indicative of the possibility of non-conceptual perceptual content. Briefly put, this means that I believe it is possible for perception to occur without any cognition of it. The case in point for this is of course motor-intentionality, but I also take the awareness of hidden sides of objects to be an exemplar of non-conceptualism. I make the point of noting indeterminacy and non-conceptualism as they are pivotal facets of our being-in-the-world, but they are also key players in non-veridical perception as a result.

If we abandon the empiricist postulate of the priority of contents, we are free to recognize the strange mode of existence enjoyed by the object behind our back. The hysterical child who turns round ‘to see if the world behind him is still there’, suﬀers from no deﬁciency of images, but the perceived world has lost for him that original structure which ensures that for the normal person its hidden aspects are as indubitable as are its visible ones. (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. 29)

Moreover, being-in-the-world and the related theory of appearing can accommodate explanations that need not rely on what the content of perception is (Alston, 1999, p. 184). We will see in Section 3.9 that the emphasis often placed on content can lead one to overlook the crucial role of delusional mood in hallucinations (*cf.* Ratcliffe, 2015, p. 95). For if the world is a primordial given, and my being gears into it so smoothly that perception is seen as the relation of an object’s properties and myself, then what we have is a coupling within the world – not some relation where there is something implanted in my mind, like a photograph placed inside a box. And so causal terminology often falls short of explaining how emergent and dynamic the act of perception is, particularly when attempting to explain the more fundamental forms of perceptual activity that are rooted in one’s projects and motor-intentionality. By identifying these states by content alone, one mistakes the tree for the forest and loses grasp of the wider context within which the content emerged. As I type this, I need not look to the keys to see which letters I am typing, yet if someone were to ask me to close my eyes and point to the “#” key I would probably fail to do so. As I do not chart the keys conceptually, nor trace them as a path in external space, rather I ground my intention (that of typing this sentence) in my bodily know-how.

It is knowledge in the hands, which is forthcoming only when bodily eﬀort is made, and cannot be formulated in detachment from that eﬀort. The subject knows where the letters are on the typewriter as we know where one of our limbs is, through a knowledge bred of familiarity which does not give us a position in objective space. (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. 166)

This is our default *modus operandi,* as being-in-the-world is a form of being-involved, as such we scarcely operate at the level of mere perception. Habitually, we have garnered the bodily know-how to perceive for action, and it is imperative that we act in order to perceive developmentally so that we integrate sensations across modalities and preserve constancy and perspectival variation (*cf.* Held & Hein, 1963, pp. 183-187; Held et al., 2011, p. 553; O’Regan & Noë, 2001). We comport ourselves to entities which are *ready-to-hand* and so mere perception of sensible qualities is a deficient mode of such a comportment that is necessarily engaged (Gorner, 2007, p. 43). Now, developed perception implicates its own specific kind of sight: *circumspection*, through which we already perceive the object as a door, and so as openable or closable, as Heidegger notes:

Any mere pre-predicative seeing of the ready-to-hand is, in itself, something which already understands and interprets… In the mere encountering of something, it is understood in terms of a totality of involvements; and such seeing hides in itself the explicitness of the assignment-relations (of the ''in-order-to") which belong to that totality. (2008, p. 189).

Regarding illusory and hallucinatory perception, we will see that a non-conceptualist approach to perceptual content will be necessary for any explanation that is true to the phenomenology of the experience. Take the waterfall illusion for example, this refers to the persistence of the perception of movement observed when one looks at a waterfall for an extended period and then at another object that is stationary. The after-effect can also be induced experimentally using everyday objects, such as a record player. Motion is “somehow superimposed on what you see.”; despite the fact that “nothing is instantiating this quality.” (Johnston, 2019, pp. 233-4). This content cannot rightly be thought to be conceptual as the experience is itself a contradiction (*cf.* Crane, 1988, p. 144), one in which the horizons of two distinct objects are competing for fulfilment and creating an indeterminate and dissonant perception that cannot be resolved by introspection alone. I take such illusions to be cases of veridical perception, however, as will be elaborated later in Section 3.5.

# **2.6: Grip and Optimal Viewing**

That indeterminacy is a positive feature of perception seems odd at first as the whole point of perception is to make things determinate. On closer inspection however, we can see that indeterminacy plays just as big a role in perception - just as I focus my eyes and the letters on this page become more legible and better defined, the words at the edge of my field of vision become fuzzy and out of focus (Kelly, 2004, p. 82). Perception is always a process of give and take as it is built essentially from the figure-ground relationship of objects and the perceiver (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. 352). This is the final fact of our being-in-the-world that requires elucidation before we begin to venture into an account of non-veridical perceptual experience.

The idea of getting a maximum grip on an object, or an optimal perspective from which to view it, brings our body’s natural recognition of an object’s style to the fore (*Ibid*. p. 84; Romdenh-Romluc, 2007, p. 82). When viewing a painting at an art gallery, we find ourselves instinctively moving around the painting, naturally adjusting our perspective to maximise the hold the object has on our senses. While there will always remain some indeterminate features, we still strive to lessen these as much as possible and harmonize the horizon of the piece of art with that of our own body’s (*cf.* Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. 352). Similarly, we will seek the best conditions for ascertaining the colour of something, intuitively knowing that directing it toward the most natural light will reveal its authentic shade (Romdenh-Romluc, 2007, p. 82), this is intricately linked to our body’s style recognition. As we saw with constancy and presence, we tend to orient toward conditions that meddle the least with the horizonal structure of the object itself. This is originally a pre-conceptual endeavour, we must get a firm enough grip on an object before we can begin to conceptualize it, that is, recognize it as such and articulate its features in intelligible terms, without this we are prey to misperceptions. Such misperceptions can only be rectified later when we achieve a greater grasp of the object’s style. Now that the critical processes employed in veridical perception and encompassed in our being-in-the-world have been outlined (*viz.* grip, indeterminacy, style, intentionality, horizons, and motor-intentionality), we can begin to lay down a disjunctivist account of non-veridical perception. As it is by these processes that ground our being in the facticity of the world, that we too can be led astray to misperceive or hallucinate.

**Section 3: Disjunctivism**

Disjunctivism is the antithesis of the conjunctivist thesis outlined in Section 1.2. Conversely to conjuctivism, disjunctivism asserts that the direct objects of perception are in fact the concrete objects in the world – and not hallucinated objects. This is because disjunctivism is necessarily aligned with the direct realist view that we can come to know objects as they really are and that perception, at its core, is relational between veridical objects and a perceiving subject. As such, things generally are as they appear to be. And so, the notion of being-in-the-world provides a better foundation from which to build up our disjunctivist account. Now, the extreme version of disjunctivism would deny that there is anything in common between the content of experience of a real object and a hallucinatory one, even if the hallucination were indistinguishable from the real percept.

The kind of experience that one has when one perceives a real object is simply unavailable when some such real physical object is not being perceived. In other words, according to disjunctivism, a perception of some object in the world does not differ from a hallucination simply in virtue of certain (presumably causal) extra-mental relations that it, unlike the hallucination, bears to the environment. Rather, the two experiences as experiences differ essentially in kind. (Smith, 2008, p. 315)

This excerpt captures the core tenet of a disjunctivist account. Perception is taken, in the direct realist sense, to have perceived objects and properties as its content, which are causally linked to the object as such. An exact replica of that veridical object’s content perceived through hallucination, on the other hand, is taken as a mere appearance – arriving only in the guise of its indistinguishable veridical counterpart, yet fundamentally different in kind, either by appeal to causality or some other technicality, like the sharing of an epistemic property (*cf.* Conee, 2007, pp. 16-17). Disjunctivism is wholly compatible with the notion of being-in-the-world as it shares the same foundational commitment to the objects in a subject’s environment manifesting directly in her experience (McDowell, 2010, p. 244). If then, the object’s mind-independent properties are a crucial contributing factor for the content of one’s experience of said object, then we arrive at a form of content externalism (see Section 3.4), as the givenness of the world is paramount to our perceptual capacities (and thus to our hallucinatory capacities), but more on that in the following section.

While I contend that disjunctivism is indeed an intuitive position that avoids the shortcomings of many other theories of perception that are forced to commit to a Cartesian schism of the subject and her world, I do not commit fully to the hard-line formulation of it above. For one, I do not think that the mechanisms involved in perception and hallucination are so dissimilar that their contents should be classified as intrinsically different. If patients with hallucinatory disorders intuitively use perceptual language to explain their experiences, and these experiences supervene upon veridical ones (at least to the extent that if someone has a hallucination of a wall, they will not see the occurrent scene of the environment behind that wall), then it follows suit that there is some degree of an overlap (*cf.* Romdenh-Romluc, 2007, p. 77). I believe that the disjunction between veridical and non-veridical perceptions stems primarily from deviant causation as hallucination is derivative/parasitic upon perception (Johnston, 2019, p. 208), wherein the main experiential differences in non-veridical cases arise from an inability to exploit the horizonal structure of the object in the manner described in Section 2.2. The content of perception in the hallucinatory case is then distinct from the content of the veridical case insomuch as the veridical case will possess a horizonal structure that is inexhaustible, as it is an external object one can interact with and utilize in pursuit of some project and even move around to gain further perspectives on. The hallucinatory case, however, will surely be exhaustible, and its internal horizons will be inconsistent and disharmonious upon closer scrutiny - no matter how convincing the hallucination is. I thus class a perception of a table and a subsequent hallucination of said table as fundamentally different in kind. Yet, the latter is derivative and so dependent upon one’s capacity to instantiate the former. They are distinguishable in lieu of differences exhibited in their horizonal structure and causation (as will be shown in Sections 3.3, 3.9, and 3.11), yet both experiences are manifest within the same sphere; that of one’s being-in-the-world, and so it is possible to mistake one for the other in lived experience. Resultantly, I adhere to a V/I v. H disjunctivism, as opposed to a V v. I/H disjunctivism (*cf.* Byrne and Logue, 2019, p. xii), meaning I take illusions to be classed along with veridical perceptions, thus on the ‘left/good’ side of the disjunct, whilst I class hallucinations alone to lie to the ‘right/bad’ side of the disjunct.

Moreover, from our initial framework of being-in-the-world, it is not so much what the object of hallucination fundamentally is in type/kind that is of interest, rather the question we must ask is how is it that hallucinations come to occur in the first place? This is a vitally important question as it is part and parcel of sceptical, representational, and indirect realist accounts of perception that illusory and hallucinatory experiences are offered as alleged exemplars of how the subject is not in fact in direct contact with her environs. Instead of being-in-the-world she is denigrated to merely believing-in-a-world, and only naïvely so. Veridical perception can often be discussed regarding mere perception, i.e., from her armchair the philosopher can forget that we do not simply look at objects as bundles of sensible qualities, devoid of any meaning bar its characteristic properties; roundness, blueness, hardness, etc. Instead, perception is generally involved and engaged, and mere perception is a deficient mode of this involvement. For objects to be *present-at-hand* requires them first to become *unready-to-*hand, abandoned for any project and instead recognized solely as an object; as such-and-such (*cf.* Heidegger, 2008, p. 200). Hallucination as derivative upon perceptual processes, is an especially involved form of engaged perception, as hallucinatory objects lack an inexhaustible, veridical worldliness, there must be some narrative, mood, or project which conceals the hallucinated object’s lack of such-and-suchness or constructs sufficient imaginary proxies for the deception to go unchallenged. As such, it is only through the lens of experience, that of being-in-the-world, that we can investigate what distinguishes a hallucination from a perception proper.

I will now begin to broach three arguments that are often held against direct realism and disjunctivism, namely the argument from illusion, the causal argument, and the argument from hallucination. They all roughly amount to beg the same question - “*how can direct realism hold true, if we can perceive the world to be other than it really is*?”

# **3.1: The Argument from Illusion**

I will endeavour to tackle the argument from illusion first as it will prove fruitful in my explanation of why I categorize illusions and veridical perceptions together on the left side of the disjunct. This argument attempts to refute direct realism by appealing to illusory experience, i.e., if I can misperceive something or be deceived by an illusion, how can it be that I am in direct unmediated contact with that object? As such, it hinges entirely on the fact that “reality and appearances can diverge…” (Smith, 2002, p. 22). Unlike those who would pose this question, however, I do not view illusory experiences to be cases of non-veridical perception, as such my rebuttal will have to explicate why it is that I do not think that illusions are exemplary cases of an object appearing other than it really is. The defence I offer for this claim hinges on the following key points regarding being-in-the-world, publicness, the internal horizonal structure of illusory experiences and the very notion of truth.

# **3.2: The Veridical and Non-Veridical Distinction**

Beginning with the latter, illusions are generally thought to be cases of perceptual experience in which one’s perception of an object does not correspond with how the object really is. For this argument though, we must extend this notion to include cases where one misperceives something, and evenconditions of an original impoverishment of experience such as colour blindness or even simply having bad vision. As, if there is the possibility for two people to have different perceptions of any object, then the validity of the claim that we are in direct contact with such objects is threatened. Illusory experiences are by no means restricted to visual perception, however, just as every sense can be fallible, every sense can be the victim of an illusion. I will limit my discussion to the visual for now simply because it is in vision that we find illusions to be most pervasive and immediately obvious. It is commonplace in the perceptual nomenclature to use the terms veridical and non-veridical to describe experiences, but what distinction is it that these terms attempt to pinpoint? A perception is thought to be veridical when one’s knowledge about the object is in agreement with the properties of the object, as such if the object of perception is viewed as being true to itself we are then justified in our perception of it. I take great issue with this conception, however, as it conflates perceptual knowledge with intellectual belief, instead, following Kant, I agree with the following claim that:

[T]ruth and illusion are not in the object, insofar as it is intuited, but in the judgment about it insofar as it is thought. Thus, it is correctly said that the senses do not err; yet not because they always judge correctly, but because they do not judge at al. Hence truth, as much as error, and thus also illusion as leading to the latter, are to be found only in judgments, i.e., only in the relation' of the object to our understanding. (CPR, B350)

For this reason, Heidegger redefines the ‘veridical’ *being-true* assertion as *being-uncovering*. Being-uncovering then, is a preferable notion for a being-in-the-world, as perception does not necessitate any form of judgement. Rather we come to see a perception as demonstrably true if its relationship of agreement becomes visible phenomenally (*cf.* Heidegger, 2008, pp. 216-219). Being-uncovering, then, provides a more apt definition as it emphasizes the fact that perception is always on-going, it only exists in the present continuous. Moreover, to ask whether a perception is real is a categorical error, for the objects in the world always possess perspectives that could be explored *ad infinitum.*

[T]he world is not a sum of things which might always be called into question, but the inexhaustible reservoir from which things are drawn. The percept taken in its entirety, with the world horizon which announces both its possible disjunction and its possible replacement by another perception, certainly does not mislead us. There could not possibly be error where there is not yet truth, but reality, and not yet necessity, but facticity. (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. 401)

We will return to the notion of *perceptual faith* in response to the argument from hallucination later on, for now suffice it to say that any account of perception which invokes the faculty of judgement to compensate for the supposed inability of the body to reconcile its given percepts with the objects as they truly are must be rejected. Such accounts demote the faculty of sensation immensely, such that to see, hear, feel or taste something means close to nothing unless one stands in some propositional attitude to the intuitions that one’s affective capacities pre-conceptually present (Merleau-Ponty, p. 39). Thus, they mistakenly posit second-order reflective thought as being antecedent to perception itself (Hass, 2008, p.4). Instead, moving forward we must be mindful that any sensible is already endowed with meaning, as common sense would have us presuppose. Objects arrive in awareness as already attractive or repulsive as we are led by our body to recognize instinctively what might be favourable or detrimental to our current endeavour (*cf.* Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. 28; p.380; Romdenh-Romluc, 2007, p. 79).

# **3.3: The Horizon of Illusions**

Since perceptual knowledge is not a propositional relationship rather is taken as a given, let us investigate the horizonal structure of illusions to see if we can shed some light on the structure of these anomalous experiences. As noted earlier, any misperception is included in the totality of an object’s inner horizon. In such cases it is possible to consult the harmonious system and find fault in one’s current perception of an object, as with Husserl’s famous wax sculpture example in which he mistook a sculpture for a real woman. But here, we see that he was summoned by the object itself, it possessed much of the critical external features for it to be thought to be a woman (being in made in a woman’s likeness, of course this would be the case), and so he caught himself jumping the gun so to speak. Perception is an all or nothing game, by this I do not mean we cannot have indeterminate perceptions, indeed we can as I have stated previously, but in such cases, we would then fall back on propositions. If I see a figure in the distance that is indistinct, I can maintain that ‘it may be a tree’; but ‘it also looks like it could be a man’, and hold this thought - that is neither one nor the other, but that is if I am focusing on the object and attempting to discern whether it is a tree or a man. Ordinarily, if I were to see the identical tree/man shaped percept in the corner of my eye, it would go unnoticed and unexamined, a positively indeterminate figure in the boundary of my perceptual experience. But in cases where one misperceives, as in the wax sculpture example, we can be summoned by some characteristic features of an object’s external horizon and run with them, only to find out that they were merely features that seemed to be consistent with another object. This holds true for both sides of the perceptual dyadic, perhaps the object bears a striking resemblance to another thus inviting me to misperceive, conversely, my misperception may be driven by my intentions; if I am waiting for a bus that is running late at the bus stop and a truck comes quickly around the corner, I may anticipate that it should be the bus and so too fall victim to a misperception. This is simply a fact of our-being-in-the-world that; (i) our senses are fallible and the world is inexhaustible, yet many objects share decisive defining features, and (ii) our intentions can be a driving force in our interaction with the environment.

Misperceptions as well as illusions, however, tend not to go uncovered. For it is part of the structure of perception that each occurrent hold on an object gets held up against all other possible perspectives and the total harmonious system of the internal horizon as we attempt to achieve a maximum grip on that object. The internal horizon of an object, as such, serves a normative function by encompassing possible illusory perspectives within its reach and so it is able to self-regulate these dissonant experiences against the harmonious whole (*cf.* Smith, 2008, p. 329). I take this harmonious system to relate intrinsically to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of style, as I contend that it is the body’s motor-intentionality that ultimately recognizes the incongruity of illusory perceptions and brings them to balance within this whole. Moreover, this function is possible only in virtue of the body’s implicit ability to acquire non-conceptualized, indeterminate presences as this facilitates our recognition of an object’s style as being pervasive throughout its own internally infinite horizon (*cf.* Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. 385; Matherne, 2017, pp. 714-718). I believe that the horizonal structure of a pure illusion is crucially more dissonant than that of a mere illusion, i.e., a misperception of an object, as its style is overall more disharmonious than harmonious when taken as a whole. This is evident as pure illusions are never taken to be true perceptions, rather they are quickly and intuitively perceived as being suspect. Now, if we return to the role of judgement in perception, we see that we also do not judge an illusion to be deceptive. Rather we are presented with a dissonance in our immediate perception. This dissonance, I posit, is the result of the object’s intrinsic incompatibility, as such we do not have a non-veridical perception of an object in which we were deceived, rather we have the correct perception of an object as being impossible, but these two classifications are often confused. This point will become clearer with the supplementation of some visual examples, but first I want to raise the following line of argument. The very distinction of veridical and non-veridical perception is devised in such a way that we are drawn away from the phenomenological experience of perception and into the realm of rational reflective thought, and this is easily demonstrated. Consider the following question; if we are not solely in direct contact with some sense-data or perceptual proxy of the world, and we know for certain that there is a blind spot in our retinal image, then why is there no obvious blind spot in our visual field? Given the terminological prerequisites, one might then be forced to state that all visual perception is non-veridical for there is no obvious deficit/blind region in the visual field. However, on closer scrutiny, the very fact that we do not notice any obvious region of our visual field to be amiss, means that we have the veridical experience of having a blind spot. It can only be true to the experience of what it is to have a blind spot, that nothing is there in that spot to be seen.


Similarly, I argue that to perceive an illusion as illusory, is a veridical perception because that is how the object summons you to perceive it. The Müller-Lyer illusion in figure 1 below presents us with two lines that “are neither of equal nor unequal length… each is taken in its private context as if it did not belong to the same universe as the other.” (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, pp. 6-7). There are two observations that must be note here regarding illusory qualities being manifest. Firstly, the direction that the occluding triangular lines point, has a direct effect on how long we perceive each line to be. The top line is perceived as shorter than the line beneath it as the line on top being enclosed by closed angles. This is in turn makes us perceive the line above as being enclosed. This experience is rooted in our being-in-the-world, as we have become accustomed to looking at right angles for perceptual cues. This clearly originates from our being-in-the-world, as the effect is not exhibited in non-westernised societies where right angles are nowhere near as prolific in architecture, and not at all in nature. When we look to one of the lines individually the right angles appear to act as corners, thus presenting the illusion of the lines possessing the quality of three-dimensionality. It is this pseudo-spatiality that causes us to see the lines differently, as we are intrinsically bound in space and time by our being-in-the-world.

Figure 1


There is another illusion which boasts the same spatial salience that I will now draw your attention to. The Necker Cube illusion, below in Figure 2, exhibits a similar manifest pseudo-spatiality by exhibiting direct three-dimensional cues (*cf.* Deregowski, 1989, p. 52). This illusion hinges on binocular rivalry which instantiates a multi-stable perception as the front face of the cube is seen to alternate periodically (Crick and Koch, 1990, p. 273). As such, this object is perceived as if having two competing perspectives from the one actual perspective. It is thus part of the object internal horizon that there be a constant explosion and reconstitution of the noema. This however, I take not to be a non-veridical perception, as this is how we ought to perceive this object correctly from our basis of being-in-the-world. We do not encounter actual two-dimensional objects in space and as a result this illusion highlights the body’s implicit exploration of an object’s internal horizon as it is manifest in such a way that this process becomes explicit. Furthermore, it is from our motor-intentionality that we immediately recognize that this object is peculiar and illusory, as such we have not been deceived, rather we are in direct contact with this object. It is by this token, that Merleau-Ponty claims that there must be some opacity in perception that keeps its processing from being fully within consciousness’ view, otherwise hallucinations would not be possible, as one “…would be conscious of constituting an illusion, and would not stand by it, so there would no longer be any illusion at all.” (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. 401).

Figure 2

# **3.4: Content Externalism**

The view I espouse regarding illusions as veridical perceptions above directly follows a content externalist line of thought. Following the theory of appearing and the notion of being-in-the-world, this view also considers the external objects as being, at least partly, determinative of one’s mental content (*cf.* McDowell, 1986, p. 139). This is evident, especially in the case of the Müller-Lyer illusion as the effect is mainly exhibited in ‘carpentered’ Western societies (Deregowski, 1989, p. 68). It is important to make note of content externalism at this juncture, as it is abundantly evident in illusions, especially those that allude to three-dimensional space, but, moreover, I will argue for a view of hallucinatory processes that is also content externalist thus necessarily parasitic upon our being-in-the-world. This view is succinctly put by Kant:

It does not follow that every intuitive representation of outer things includes at the same time their existence, for that may well be the mere effect of the imagination (in dreams as well as in delusions); but this is possible merely through the reproduction of previous outer perceptions… (CPR, B278-9)

I would go further, however, in distinguishing the initial perception of a real object as direct and unmediated, thus Kant’s “*vorstellung*” would mean *presentation* in the veridical case, and only in the hallucinatory case would it be denigrated to a mere *representation.*

# **3.5: Publicness**

Another key factor in my classification of illusions as veridical perceptions, is the fact that illusions are publicly verifiable. It would be impossible for you to have an experience of the Necker Cube above in which you somehow managed to grasp both dissonant perspectives of it in one. Hallucinations on the other hand are entirely private, thus there is no object that I can hallucinate that you could also be in direct contact with because it is not an object in the world. Take a stick that is protruding out of a lake for example, that the stick may appear bent in the water, means that the bentness is a public property of the appearance of the stick (cf. Allais, 2007, p. 472-473). Furthermore, this experience should be classed as non-veridical either as we do not see the stick as actually being bent, we know from the knowledge we have learned from being-in-the-world that the bentness is merely a property of its appearance, as it is a property of a body of water that objects in it may appear as augmented or distorted. There are of course illusory experiences which hinge on the after-effects caused by certain perceptual experiences and are thus not readily public. However, I maintain that illusions such as this are veridical for several reasons. Firstly, they are agreeable publicly upon report, as in the case of the waterfall illusion described in section on indeterminacy and non-conceptualism, you would report the same experience as myself were we both to attempt to produce this nonconceptual content. Secondly, the experience is immediately recognized as illusory, as such it is not that we are being deceived by our perception, rather the effect that stimulation has on our affective capacities can at times have consequences. This is intricately part of our being-in-the-world as our bodies are impressionable yes, but they can also be sensitive to certain frequencies and resonances. If I stare at the sun and then look away, I do not have the sensation that there is some glowing amorphous orb of bright light hovering before me, I know immediately that this is merely a phosphene experience, that was caused by my looking at the sun for a prolonged time – there is thus no deception here (*cf.* Smith, 2002, p. 193). Lastly, and on a related note, these after image effects are causal, and so necessarily tied to our direct acquaintance with an object.

# **3.6: The Causal Argument**

The causal argument is another line of reasoning often invoked to challenge the assumptions of direct realism. It challenges the content externalist position that the external objects presented in perception are a fundamentally constitutive factor of the content of that perception by appeal to the same cause, same effect principle. The argument posits a hypothetical case of veridical perception and a corresponding, indistinguishable hallucinatory perception of an object, both of which share the same cause (Moran, 2019, p. 374). It then supposedly follows that the content of both the veridical and hallucinatory perceptions would be identical. This obviously has grave consequences for direct realism if it cannot be refuted, as it would then mean that the veridical and non-veridical cases are fundamentally of the same kind. Now, I do not wish to claim that causality has no role in perception, quite the contrary, there is no need to reject the causal dependence of appearances from physical objects, this is obviously tied into the theory of appearing I have outlined above. The issue here lies with the idea that an analysis of the cause will reveal what something appearing to a subject as perceived is, i.e., looking at a brain scan will not divulge any information regarding why I see an apple as the shade of red that I do, nor will it show whether that shade is an accurate perception of the apple’s true colour. The appearing relation must be taken as irreducible and not explainable by virtue of some logical or conceptual analysis that goes above the relation immanent in the act of perception (*cf.* Alston, 1999, pp. 195-196).

This argument, thus, hinges entirely on the idea of local supervenience. If a subject S is in a brain state Y and that state is causing her to have a hallucinatory experience, then another subject P in the same brain state Y will also have the same hallucinatory experience. I reject this notion as perception for me is determined by the relations maintaining between the object and perceiver, as such if there is no external object for two perceivers to have in common as at least partly constitutive of their experience, then they will not be able to have identical hallucinations merely in virtue of some immediate electro-chemical stimulation in their brain, as it is only when there is a normal public object that their perceptual content can overlap fully. It will be seen through a consideration of functional equivalence and the phosphene phenomenon that when it comes to perception, the same brain state can have different effects. There is no paucity of causal dependencies in perception, yet how is it that only some of these causes become known in awareness as objects? Many things in perception are influenced causally that are better understood adverbially, like feelings of anxiety and depression, so why is one kind of cause sufficient for granting something the status of object and others not (Alston, 1999, p. 194)? Moreover, the indistinguishability posited in cases of veridical hallucination is merely a tool invoked in hypothetical arguments and it is not something that is descriptive of the phenomenology of hallucination itself.

# **3.7: The Functional Equivalence Hypothesis**

The ‘functional equivalence’ hypothesis refers to the insight afforded by neuroimaging studies that imagery processes share many mechanisms and neural pathway connections with motor preparation and production, and with perception in the same modality (Finke, 1980). In layman’s terms, this means that if I imagine kicking a ball, the same pathways in my brain that are activated when kicking a real ball, will also be activated when I imagine kicking an imaginary ball. Similarly, if I visualize an object, the same parts of my visual cortex will be activated as if I had just seen that object. This highlights just how integrated into our being-in-the-world our motor-intentionality is, but it raises a key concern that must be addressed in our rejection of the causal argument.

Functional equivalence holds that veridical and non-veridical perceptions unfold in much the same way neuronally. This equivalence is not exhibited at all levels of processing within the visual system, but is particularly associated with perception of an object’s identification through its characteristic features: shape, size, orientation, etc. These effects also hold for spatiality, as the time it takes someone to scan the distance between several concrete objects observed is directly proportional to the time it takes for someone to scan the distance between the same objects imagined (Kosslyn, Ball & Reiser, 1978, pp. 59-60). Similarly, visual after-effects can still present themselves whether an object is perceived or imagined, as demonstrated by Finke (1980, pp. 119-122). These equivalences may seem arbitrary at first, but not only do they illustrate how abstract conceptions are rooted in processes that mirror and even compete with the perception of concrete objects, thus further grounding my claim that hallucination is parasitic upon and derivative of perception. It also challenges the notion of using causality to derail direct realism. For example, if you take the brain state to be the cause, you make a categorical error, because the same cause is then shown to have two separate distinct effects in real and imagined instances of kicking a ball. Local supervenience as such, is then not obligatory, as a subject S in brain state Y could be hallucinating that she is kicking a ball, while subject P in the same brain state Y could be actually kicking a ball. Now this process may seem preferably instantiated for a representationalist account of perception as one could argue that they are simply both in contact only with sense-data (*cf.* Moran, 2019, pp. 370-371). But if the cause of perception is the corresponding brain state, and the brain state is the same for imagined and real perceptions of kicking a ball, then you have the same explanatory regress first noted in Section 1, because you would never be able to break the subject’s experience out of their inner sphere (Alston, 1999, p. 201). Thus, you are committed to saying that acting in the world and imagining acting in the world are in fact one and the same thing, and so, solipsism becomes unavoidable.

I have argued that the same cause, same effect principle is not true to our everyday experience as the same cause can have different effects, as in kicking and imagining kicking a ball. But if one holds that veridical and hallucinatory perceptions are the same fundamental kind, they then must be the same kind of effect, and so we will need to elaborate further on this point to reject the causal argument’s claims (Langsam, 1997, p. 42). The view I have outlined avoids the causal argument, but we can only affirm this resolution if it can be shown that our commitment to disjunctivism is justified.

# **3.8: The Argument from Hallucination**

If a subject S in brain state Y is hallucinating that she is kicking a ball, while subject P in the same brain state Y is actually kicking a ball as I illustrated was possible above, we now face a premise from the argument of hallucination. Namely, if the above holds true in such a manner that the hallucinated ball and the real ball are perceived as being indistinguishable, thus necessitating that they exhibit the same phenomenal features then there is cause to categorize them as being of the same kind (Langsam, 1997, pp. 37-38). This is clearly detrimental to the disjunctivism I espouse, but we can get around this argument with some ease. Firstly, we can consider the phenomenal features that are experienced in the hallucinatory case as being phenomenal features of a hallucinatory experience, as opposed to it possessing the same phenomenal features as the veridical case. This is a pre-requisite for my view as the theory of appearing makes it imperative that veridical cases of perception only occur when there is an object appropriately presented in relation to the perceiver, as such phenomenal features instantiated between material objects and a subject only stand in this relation when it is a normal object there for perception and this cannot hold for hallucinatory experiences. This defence must then be capable of defending this position against the notion of indistinguishability posed by cases of veridical hallucination. This, however, is not difficult to do as armed with our distinction between veridical and non-veridical phenomenal features we can now differentiate between the two cases phenomenologically thus revealing how distinct the contents of both experiences are.

# **3.9: Indistinguishability**

It is often added in the argument from hallucination, that the hallucinatory experience and the veridical experience are indiscernible to the perceiver. It is easy to see why this claim is made as in cases of hallucination the hallucinator is necessarily deceived into thinking that the experience is real. This, however, does not lend itself to the indistinguishability that is being proposed here. While some disjunctivists maintain that perceptual and hallucinatory experiences possess a common epistemic property to explain why hallucinations can be taken as veridical in experience to begin with (Conee, 2007, p. 17), the contents of each type of experience are still taken to be distinct. Indistinguishability in the manner intended by the argument from hallucination is simply a convenient constraint for a thought experiment, that is not demonstrably true. I will contend that we often mistake hallucinations to be veridical because these experiences take advantage of our perceptual faith (see Section 3.10). For now, let us concentrate on how we can correctly distinguish between the two experiences, both phenomenologically, and causally.

A veridical hallucination is offered as the prototypical exemplar of an indistinguishable hallucinatory experience. On my line of thinking, a veridical hallucination is an impossibility, but this argument must be rejected for direct realism to hold its ground. A veridical hallucination then is a hallucination that is caused by the object that would ordinarily be the cause of a veridical perception of itself. E.g., if I look at a tree but instead of seeing the tree as it is given, fall victim to a hallucinatory experience of the tree, but all of its properties are identical to the way the tree truly is then I am having a case of veridical hallucination. The hallucinatory experience is thought to overlap entirely with the veridical experience as such. There are several things immediately wrong with this line of reasoning. I will argue that deviant causation is a necessary element in hallucination, as such the real tree could only cause a non-veridical perception of itself iff some additional contributing factors are in play, namely a delusional mood. Furthermore, beliefs about hallucinations have been found empirically not to rest on the intensity or phenomenology of the hallucination itself, indicating some further process is also involved (Connors et al., 2016, p. 98)*.* Secondly, it has been shown experimentally that a person’s hallucination remains discernible from a matching veridical case when both are being experienced at the same time (Romdenh-Romluc, 2007, p. 77). Additionally, it is not possible to classify any hallucination as veridical from the philosophical framework I have been defending. No matter how accurately a hallucination represents a real object, the hallucination will differ intentionally, it will not be an inexhaustible percept as its related object is immaterial (Smith, 2002, p. 195; Romdenh-Romluc, 2007, p. 89), and as such, it will not be a justified perception. Instead it will be derivative and parasitic upon certain key functions of perception like summoning, style, and perceptual faith, but critically it must be considered as a tangential yet distinct kind of experience.

Content externalism (see Section 3.4) is partly to blame for the capacity for hallucinations to closely resemble veridical perceptions. It is obvious that there are certain constraints placed on pure hallucination that must be met for a hallucinatory experience to be possible. But these constraints are derivative of our being-in-the-world. Consider the prerequisites for dreaming; when we have a dream, we must conjure up certain conditions otherwise the whole spectacle will collapse in on itself. You must always occupy some perspective, there is always some goal being pursued that is implicating your motor-intentionality, but since you are having a hallucinatory experience you must also occupy a hallucinatory body - though in some cases the hallucinated body competes with the actual body as the locus of control, as in heautoscopic experiences (*cf.* Furlanetto, Bertone & Becchio, 2013, pp. 1-4). These are the criteria necessary for normal waking perception, and so they must be replicated for us to have any simulation of being-in-the-world. This allegory offers greater insight to the nature of normal perception, as when one becomes lucid in a dream you begin to realize that the perceptual grip one has of an object (as in Section 2.6) is extremely unreliable and ordinary features of perception like constancy and variation fall to the waist side under a watchful gaze, as they are lacking their corresponding objects which ordinarily provide the standard for us to fact-check our current perceptions against. Moreover, there is a narrative implicating your motor-intentionality and once that narrative is brought into question, halting the power of summoning, the entire dream implodes.

Now, obviously, dreaming is a world away from how things are in waking consciousness, but dreams are the prototypical pure hallucination and rationally should be seen to share more in common with waking hallucinatory experiences, than hallucinatory experiences share with veridical experiences as such. The difference is that the waking hallucinatory experience need not simulate an environment entirely, instead deviant causation can instigate the hallucinatory process and so an object can be taken to be given as something other than it is, but this is the point of departure, as the subject is now aware of a non-normal object. We need not look only to dreams to find examples of pure hallucinations however, there is a common feature of everyday phenomenology that is often entirely hallucinatory but overlain upon our experience.

# **3.10: Phosphenes**

Phosphenes are hypothesized to be the building blocks of mental imagery and dreams (Bókkon, 2008; Bókkon, Dai and Antal, 2010) but they are also pervasive in all perception as they are internally generated light signal by-products of bioluminescent processes. I take phosphenes to be non-veridical in this regard, at least in most cases, as they can be perceived without any causal dependence on external objects. This is readily demonstrable as when you close your eyes the faint lights that are seen amid the darkness of the visual field are phosphenes. Now we must tread carefully in our definition here, for unlike Smith (2002) I do not encompass all phosphene phenomena within the ‘inner light show’ along with after-images, etc. (*Ibid.* p. 129; *cf.* Siegel, 2006, p. 397). This is because I class cases of after-images and other such effects of illusions as veridical because they are still relational to some veridical perception of an object and so are not products of deviant causation *per se* (see Sections 2.5 and 3.5). Phosphene experiences in the after-image case are thus a mere nomological necessity caused by a veridical object, a mere fact of our being-in-the-world. Phosphenes, can and do arise without a connection to any object, however, and it is in this isolated case where I take them to be akin to sense-data. We must make note of some key characteristics of phosphenes before going any further. If phosphenes can be caused by some internally isolated event then we are once again threatened by local supervenience, but I contend that in the usual sense of spontaneous phosphenes, it is not possible to have a perception that is anywhere close to that of a real object, thus I claim that there are sense-data involved in hallucinatory experiences but; (i) they are the phenomenal features of the hallucinatory experience as the phosphene as a mental image cannot be a veridical object of awareness in the normal sense; (ii) consequently, they require some additional constraints to become full-blown complex hallucinations, the kind that might be mistakenly categorized as indistinguishable from a veridical experience; (iii) the complex hallucinations that they can constitute mimic the features of real objects (*viz.* content externalism); and (iv) the perception of these non-veridical sense-data utilizes processes of veridical perception, like summoning, grip, style and perceptual faith that stem from our primordial being-in-the-world; and thus (v) in virtue of their parasitic nature, hallucinations can be mistaken for veridical perceptions. I believe that this thesis is preferable to the account offered by Dudley et al., (2019) which hinges primarily on propositional attitudes like judgements and prior beliefs (p. 90) which are in my formulation antecedent to deviant causation as will be elaborated in the following section.

Phosphenes then seem poised to be the best candidate for the non-normal objects of awareness in hallucinatory experiences. It is a phenomenological fact that phosphenes are displayed as if they are the figure to the background of all perception - superimposed over the perception of the world, much like seeing a protein floating in one’s eye. A good analogy is looking at raindrops on a window, you can either focus on them, or look past them to see the world behind the glass. Representationalist theories mistakenly posit this process as being antecedent to the perception of objects itself, I do not deny that phosphenes do seem at first a more direct perception because of the foreground they inhabit. But this is a critical error, and the argument unfolds like a Chicken-Egg debate. One can either take being-in-the-world as the most fundamental foundational concept, or work from the assumption that necessarily tears the perceiver from the environment that is responsible for their very perceptive faculties to begin with, by positing that all perception is sense-data as in the hallucinatory case just elucidated. I do not see how the latter approach is a possibility when we realize that the world is the “…framework for all illusion and all disillusion.” (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. 402) as being-in-the-world and content externalism show.

Now, phosphenes allow for a kind of content that normal perception does not, because they are so fundamentally basic. They do not possess depth, they have no intrinsic colour rather can alter dramatically, as such they seem to be more referential than essential. They can suggest shape and perceptual cues for depth synonymous with basic Gestalt principles, but when taken at their most irreducible level they are two-dimensional. There is no grip that one can have on them as they exist in a state of flux, and they exhibit no style. It is not surprising then that hallucinations are typically classed under two categories: simple form and complex form (*cf.* Siegel and West, 1975, pp. 119-128). Local supervenience can now be overthrown finally, if, as the argument from hallucination claims, being in the correct brain state is all that is required to instantiate the same perceptual content as in the veridical perception of an object, then we would expect that stimulating the area of the brain that is active in the veridical case would give a subject the same experience as her veridical counterpart. This, however, does not hold true. Inducing a visual perception in a subject via invasive electrical stimulation and/or non-invasive transcranial magnetic stimulation does not create perceptions in the veridical case, it can however induce the perception of phosphenes in the participant (Elkin-Frankston et al., 2010). This finding comports itself succinctly within my categorization of phosphenes as a deviant phenomenon.

# **3.11: Deviant Causation**

I have spoken of deviant causation, but up to this point I have not elaborated on the idea fully. Consider a veridical hallucination once more, the argument follows that being in the presence of an object is not sufficient for perceiving that object, as it could be that one is merely hallucinating it. Now the theory of appearing implicates this notion of causality as perception is relational in the veridical case, and so the appearing is dependent upon the perceiver’s relation to that object. The causality in the veridical case is thus placed, at least to a significant degree, on the existence of the object to begin with. Local supervenience, however, hinges on the assumption that the most proximal cause is the brain state, thus the causal efficacy of objects is seen as distal. But on our content externalist view, we must work from the opposite perspective as the brain state in the veridical case would not be possible without the presence of the object, as illustrated by the mere production of phosphenes through electromagnetic stimulation outlined above. Moreover, what ‘standard’ causation is in the veridical case, following this view, is common-sensical and true to our phenomenological being-in-the-world.

As for when we have the right kind of causation, the answer is ‘when there’s causation of the standard kind’… we seem easily able to judge whether a case involves standard or deviant causation. Indeed, our understanding of these notions is arguably a crucial part of our intuitive grasp of the distinction between perceptual and hallucinatory experience itself. (Moran, 2019, p. 373)

Standard causation does not require a definition that need be more comprehensive than that outlined above. We can however say much more about deviant causation, in the case of phosphenes, and dreams thereafter the causation is wholly deviant as the images are summoned in some entirely mental process, there is no need for a corresponding object in reality. In typical cases of hallucination though, we must account for how the hallucination can be experienced as though it is part of reality.

Here again, we must refer to intentionality as a driving force in the summoning of appearances. We saw in Section 2.3 that one’s intentions are a vital constitutive factor in how the relation between object and perceiver comes into being. Hallucinations require more than standard intentionality to be instantiated. As in veridical cases, when intentionality leads us astray, we misperceive, but upon consulting the object we realize the err of our ways and regain a grip on the style of the object in question. Hallucination necessitates a delusional mood as a prerequisite, this implies an affective state in which our embeddedness in the world adapts an anomalous significance, this may result in paranoia and a sense of danger - as in Capgras syndrome where the patient feels imposters have taken the place of the people round them, or Cotard’s syndrome where the patient is convinced they have died and are now zombie-like (*cf.* Samico, Perestrelo & Venâncio, 2017.), or a newfound sense of meaning, awe and significance (Romdenh-Romluc, 2007, p. 81). As a radical alteration of our being-in-the-world, where perception was once grounded in the world, it is now being driven by intentionality which summons up a pseudo-environment (*cf.* Merleau-Ponty, 2005, pp. 395-396). The hallucinator thus, “makes use of his sensory ﬁelds and his natural insertion into a world in order to build up, out of the fragments of this world, an artiﬁcial world answering to the total intention of his being.” (*Ibid.* p. 398), as the environment as it really is cannot satiate one’s unfulfilled intentions. We can then differentiate between veridical and non-veridical perceptions as the horizonal structure of hallucinations will lack the capacity for self-regulation that the perception of veridical objects boasts (*cf.* Ratcliffe, 2015, p. 106). This is why hallucination is an all-or-nothing game, unlike misperceptions or illusions, the hallucinated object cannot play the same critical role of being its own yardstick, and so we can never achieve a maximum grip of the style of the hallucinated object consequently.

# **3.12: Perceptual Faith**

All that remains for my disjunctivist account of hallucination is an explanation of how it is that we can be fooled into treating hallucinations as valid. This fact relates entirely to our being-in-the-world as perception is not based on judgements or beliefs, rather it is built up from the givenness of the world. In our everyday life we treat objects as there for us, as obstacles in our path, as things which we can make more determinate through exploration. And it is by this implicit intuition that it is possible for us to be deceived by hallucinations (*cf.* Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. 94). As McDowell notes, if we have a notion of the world (which equates to the phenomenological facticity of being-in-the-world), that an aspect of reality is there for us to be aware of, then we have an “indefeasible warrant for believing that things are as the experience is revealing them to be” (McDowell, 2010, p. 245). Opponents to direct realism will attempt to mount an attack against the possibility of one being justified in their perceptual belief (*cf.* Alston, 1999, pp. 197-198). But this is a conflated argument, that again misses the point by being borne from a top-down conception of perception with which one must appeal to propositions to explain why we treat the world as there for us.

Perceptual faith then, is not a belief or judgement, instead it is rooted in our motor-intentional gearing toward the world. When a baby starts grasping at objects, you would be hard pressed to try to explicate this process based on the baby’s belief that the object is there, or that they have made a judgement that the object is there to grasp. As we saw in Section 2, the body exercises its own pre-conceptual processes which are coupled to the world as its scaffold. This is how we have perceptual presence, constancy, perspectival variation and style recognition; and all this before we have even begun any kind of conceptualisation or introspection. The body is of course fallible, and the world is at times opaque, but perceptual faith vouchsafes the summoned appearances with a sense of validity so that from that standpoint we can then investigate whether a perception is in a state of maximum grip, optimal viewing conditions, or whether it be illusory or veridical (*cf.* Romdenh-Romluc, 2007, p. 89). It is thus through this feature of perception that hallucinatory experiences can sneak into our perception of the world when aided by deviant causation.

**Section 4: Conclusion**

In this dissertation, I have expounded a moderate disjunctivist account of non-veridical experience motivated by the notion of our being-in-the-world. We saw in Section 1 that representationalist theories fall short of providing an adequate grounding for experience – if the subject is indeed torn from their world; and comported in such a manner as to deal exclusively with perceptual proxies of objects then it begs the question how she could have ever had access to the objects within her environment in the first place. She would not have evolved the capacity for motor-intentionality which is dependent upon being embedded and involved in a world. As such, representationalist theories predispose themselves more readily to an explanation of mere perception but err in this endeavour as they do not come to the realisation that this mode of mere perception is in fact a deficient form of engaged perception.

In Section 2, I provided an account of perceptual presence, constancy and perspectival variation that was rooted in the horizonal structure of intentionality and our being-in-the-world, and so dependent upon our engagement and involvement with the world. The style of an object was shown to be crucial to these processes, as it is by consulting the style of the object that we can assess the accuracy of our percept. We saw that these key normative features of perception are the product of our direct and unmediated contact with the world and that the qualities we perceive in objects are the actual properties of these objects. From this direct realist view, we then acknowledged that indeterminacy is a positive feature of perception, this intuitive notion is often used to mount attacks against the direct realist position but our direct realist account easily accommodates misperceptions as our analysis of the intentionality of perception and objects’ style showed. Moreover, I argued that the concepts of grip and optimal viewing provide further evidence that we can have direct access to the world, but that this access can at times be obstructed by the relational nature of the perceiver and the object of perception and their context.

In Section 3, I expounded a moderate form of disjunctivism that claimed that veridical and hallucinatory perceptions are fundamentally different in kind, though both can share phenomenal features. I argued for a view of hallucinatory processes as parasitic and derivative upon perceptual processes, and so a veridical perception like seeing a tree outside is a more direct object of perception than hallucinating/imagining a tree. I contended that illusions should be classed as veridical perceptions as when we see an illusion, we are aware that it is an illusion, it is part of its internal horizon that it be a dissonant percept. In virtue of this we see the illusion as illusory, it is publicly verifiable and so indeterminacy and contradiction are manifest properties of the illusion itself. My formulation of disjunctivism as driven by one’s being-in-the-world avoided the causal argument as veridical and non-veridical perceptions were shown to be fundamentally different in kind and so the same-cause, same-effect principle does not hold true. I argued that the notion of indistinguishability does not merit much credence, hallucinations are parasitic upon perceptual processes and so are often described in the same manner as perceptions, however, this is in part due to a lack of sufficient descriptive language with which to describe them. Moreover, hallucinators can often tell the difference between their hallucination and veridical replications of them, as hallucinations (though taken as real) possess some additional property that makes them distinguishable, not least because they are often extremely meaning-laden and so hallucinated objects are commonly felt to be miraculous or terrifying. This is because of deviant causation *viz.* delusional mood, through which one’s being-in-the-world is radically altered, and hallucinatory objects and pseudo-environments can be summoned to satiate unfulfilled intentions. Lastly, I noted the importance of perceptual faith in facilitating the acceptance of non-veridical experiences as fact. I have thus shown why I believe being-in-the-world to be a fundamentally foundational experience, from which we can build up a common-sense and phenomenologically true account of perception which guarantees the perceiver access to the world as it is, while also accounting for misperceptions and hallucinations that are derivative of these veridical experiences.

**Word Count: 16, 322**

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