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Manuscript Number: **JESP-D-24-00351**    
  
Space to Think: Testing the Effect of Distancing on Moral Dumbfounding - A Registered Report  
  
Dear Dr McHugh,  
  
Thank you for submitting your manuscript to Journal of Experimental Social Psychology.  
  
I have now read your manuscript, and the comments of the reviewers. Based on my evaluation, I would like to offer a reconsideration of your manuscript following major revision. I invite you to resubmit your manuscript after addressing the comments below. Please resubmit your revised manuscript by **Oct 29, 2025**.  
  
When revising your manuscript, please consider all issues mentioned in the editor's and reviewers' comments carefully. In your reply, please outline every change made in response to their comments and provide suitable rebuttals for any comments not addressed. Although it is not our general policy to send manuscripts for a second review, exceptions may be made if new studies are reported or if specialist issues are involved.   
  
To submit your revised manuscript, please log in as an author at <https://www.editorialmanager.com/jesp/>, and navigate to the "Submissions Needing Revision" folder.    
  
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology values your contribution and I look forward to receiving your revised manuscript.  
  
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Kind regards,    
Paul Conway, Ph.D.    
Associate Editor    
  
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology  
  
Editor and Reviewer comments:  
  
  
  
Thank you for submitting JESP-D-24-00351, Space to Think: Testing the Effect of Distancing on Moral Dumbfounding - A Registered Report, to JESP. Thanks especially for your patience in waiting for feedback; as you likely know, it is increasingly difficult to secure quality reviews in a timely fashion. Fortunately, I was able to secure reviews from three experts in the field whose opinions I value very much, and I read your paper myself with interest. I salute the reviewers for their time and effort.  
  
Overall, the reviewers and I certainly saw merit in this work. For example, reviewers wrote that this is a “promising approach,” “the general aim is worthwhile,” and “conceptually clean and sensible.” That said, the reviewers and I noted a number of issues with the paper that should be addressed before this project moves forward. Therefore, I have decided to award a decision of major revision. If you choose to submit a new version of this registered report plan, please address all reviewer comments. I will note those I deem most important to focus on below.  
  
Theory  
  
First, it strikes me that the literature review and theorising is undercooked in this paper, with a number of relevant findings not mentioned despite important implications for the current paradigm, especially CLT papers that show findings inconsistent with the proposed theory. How do the authors account for those findings? I have become increasingly skeptical of CLT as the years pass after many failures getting CLT predictions to consistently work, and like the reviewer I would frankly be surprised if you obtain clear replicable patterns from these manipulations. Naturally, this is not necessarily a reason to avoid the study—after all, I could be proven wrong, and things may well work as expected—but I worry about how clearly readers can interpret findings using these manipulations, especially in case of null effects—what would we learn then exactly? Perhaps you can say that about many studies, but this design seems fairly likely to result in null effects, and it is unclear to me the evidentiary value that would be obtained if they arose. What then—the paper should be clearer about what we stand to learn depending on the patterns of data.  
  
Relatedly, reviewers cited several papers that should give pause when using CLT as a theory for this work. Indeed, the current lit review is far too thin and too biased to give the reader an accurate impression of the state of construal theory with regard to morality. In fact, one can find multiple different CLT papers showing the exact opposite impacts on dilemma decision-making and moral decisions in general—most decent papers in this area identify at least one or two key moderators that completely flip effects, whereas the current paper seems to assume there will be a simple main effect across all cases, measures, and so on. Further care should be taken in discussing this literature, considering that CLT research has been plagued with accusations of publication bias, inconsistent meta-analytic results, and much of the strongest evidence (including evidence cited here) comes from papers that were, um, ‘pre-replication crisis’ and should be taken with a grain of salt, not to mention some authored by people later accused of doctoring data. Although some theorists have attempted to reconcile these inconsistencies, I suggest that current state of the art thinking here is that CLT by itself may be inappropriately generalizing across a series of many different types of thinking. Rather than ‘abstract construal’ generally, there is the fact that outcomes can seem abstract (unless they are concrete!), moral rules can seem abstract, harm can seem concrete, and so on. I suggest it may be important to drill down and really conceptually clarify ‘what exactly’ is being processes in an abstract or concrete way according to the thinking here?  
  
Maier, M., Bartoš, F., Oh, M., Wagenmakers, E. J., Shanks, D., & Harris, A. (2022). Adjusting for publication bias reveals that evidence for and size of construal level theory effects is substantially overestimated. PsyArXiv Preprints.  
  
Gamliel, E., Kreiner, H., & McElroy, T. (2017). The effect of construal level on unethical behavior. The Journal of Social Psychology, 157(2), 211-222.  
  
Agerstrom, J., & Bjorklund, F. (2009). Moral concerns are greater for temporally distant events and are moderated by value strength. Social Cognition, 27, 261282.  
  
Amaral, N. B., & Jiao, J. (2023). Responses to ethical scenarios: The impact of trade-off salience on competing construal level effects. Journal of Business Ethics, 1-18.  
  
Xiao, W., Wu, Q., Yang, Q., Zhou, L., Jiang, Y., Zhang, J., ... & Peng, J. (2015). Moral hypocrisy on the basis of construal level: to be a utilitarian personal decision maker or to be a moral advisor?. PloS one, 10(2), e0117540.  
  
Hofer, M., Tamborini, R., & Ryffel, F. A. (2021). Between a rock and a hard place: The role of moral intuitions and social distance in determining moral judgments of an agent in a moral dilemma. Journal of Media Psychology: Theories, Methods, and Applications, 33(3), 103–112. <https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-1105/a000284>  
  
Gamliel, E., Kreiner, H., & McElroy, T. (2017). The effect of construal level on unethical behavior. The Journal of Social Psychology, 157(2), 211-222.  
  
Körner, A., & Volk, S. (2014). Concrete and abstract ways to deontology: Cognitive capacity moderates construal level effects on moral judgments. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 55, 139-145.  
  
Alper, S. (2020). Explaining the complex effect of construal level on moral and political attitudes. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 29(2), 115-120.  
  
Second, the paper says the current model, “assumes that making a moral judgment is an intuitive/habitual response,” without much support for this claim. This seems to oversimplify things quite a bit. Beyond the fact that most philosopher-types talk about moral reasoning, even papers like Cushman (2013) cited here do not seem to go so far as to make this claim—rather, there is generally discussion of qualitatively or quantitatively different kinds of moral judgments being made under intuitive or deliberative processing. Furthermore, this phrasing implies that any judgment derived from deliberation is therefore not moral? I do not think most theorists would agree. This section of the paper needs rephrasing for enhanced clarity and better grounding in the literature. Consider:  
  
Monin, B., Pizarro, D. A., & Beer, J. S. (2007). Deciding versus reacting: Conceptions of moral judgment and the reason-affect debate. Review of general psychology, 11(2), 99-111.  
  
Third, interpretation of results: As one reviewer noted, “I found the authors explanation of why "nothing wrong" should count as reflecting a moderate degree of deliberation quite uncompelling. In fact, I wonder whether these answers are less likely to track level of deliberation.” Indeed, I am unclear how to appropriately interpret this response with regard to reasoning or dumbfounding.  
  
I should add that the original dumbfounding studies used a rather different paradigm—it is not that participants voiced no reasons for their judgments—but rather that experimenters noted the (many) reasons they provided were not valid within the scenario. It is unclear to me how the current paradigm deals with such cases—can't participants indicate they ‘have reasons’ but they are thinking of invalid reasons, like ‘It’s wrong because the government should step in instead’? See Bennis et al., (2010) for a discussion of the ‘closed world assumptions’ involved in the kinds of scenarios used here and the challenge of getting participants to adhere to the exact standards stipulated in the scenarios. I would like to see some consideration of this possibility and perhaps a method of dending against it.  
  
Bennis, W. M., Medin, D. L., & Bartels, D. M. (2010). The costs and benefits of calculation and moral rules. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5(2), 187–202. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691610362354>  
  
Methods  
  
A reviewer argued, “I am not sure why a 2 x 3 design is needed to cross temporal and social distance.” I tend to agree—the need for this cross remains mysterious to me, and especially the possibility of an interaction, which seems not fully considered in the current design. This relates back to the CLT point earlier—what exactly do we learn from temporal versus social distance, are they expected to work the same (even Trope and Liberman 2010) admit they may operate differently at times, and what happens when we combine them? Overall, more precision in theorizing please or else maybe a different design.  
  
Re: “Social distance will be manipulated by asking participants to think about the moral dilemma for themselves (control) or from the perspective of another person (increased social distance).” This manipulation confounds many other factors beyond mere social distance. Moral decisions by myself, as opposed to someone else, may well have important consequences for me, may reflect upon my character, may involve more social desirability, etc. I am not convinced this is a clean manipulation of the construct in play. As one reviewer put it, “The social distance manipulation is fatally confounded with the identity of the target.” They offer a suggested alternative that may side-step much of the issue.  
  
Reviewers also argued for shifting temporal elements. One argued that “the assignment, not only the deadline should be further away in time to avoid the possibility of imagining finishing early” and another, “imagining that the assignment is due in several hours seems not very time-pressured to me. I wonder if the effect would be cleaner by shrinking that time window.” I won’t give any particular direction here as I trust you see the general issues raised and can shift things accordingly.  
  
A reviewer noted that when answering the dumbfounding questions in social distance, it is not clear whether I am answering from the perspective of "Alex"--this may elicit a whole set of responses you were not envisioning. I recommend clarifying this to participants and to readers.  
  
As reviewers noted, the paper would really benefit from manipulation checks.  
  
Reviewers also noted that “(Alex) is not really described at all, but subjects will be told to think about the scenario from Alex's perspective. By contrast, in the pliot studies we got a description of a student who was described as a good student who usually understands the material. The description prompts taking a cognitive approach to the scenario to be described. I didn't see anything in the materials explaining why the switch in approach was made.” I agree—consider revising this element of the procedure or better defend and support this decision.  
  
Further, reviews mentioned “it would have been nice to see more of a defence of the convenience sampling plan” and “Is there a plan to equalize samples per condition by site? To examine site effects and interactions with the factors of interest?” Indeed, there is not much theoretical hay made out of the fact that you apparently plan to recruit hundreds of people in different languages from different places. I gather this is done in the name of power? But there does not seem to be consideration for how that might affect things, especially in light of aspects like the foreign language effect, which not only influences moral judgment, but also may impact things like cognitive effort and construal. This paper needs more thought and care put into sampling and decisions surrounding it to persuade the reader that results will be interpretable in light of these plans.  
  
Reviewers also raised questions about the line mentioning, “Participants will then be given an opportunity to provide reasons for their judgment” following the initial DVs—this would seem to come before the ‘key slide’ DV that analyses focus on? This would seem to pre-emt the point of the dumbfounding DV—most/all participants will have already been prompted to think of reasons, which may reduce or eliminate dumbfounding, the point of the study.  
  
Furthermore, how will you analyse the DVs that are not the focal DV? The paper mentioned multiple DVs that do not seem to appear in the analysis plan. Moreover, the analysis is sparse in detail—it should be clear exactly what patterns you expect to find for each key DV and how the reader should interpret these patterns. For example, what pattern is expected for ratings of how moral actions are?  
  
Minor Points  
  
A reviewer mentioned, “The only example in the paper given of what would count as a qualifying reason for reason-giving was a clearly utilitarian”--indeed, it would be useful to clarify what kinds of reasons you anticipate, including a variety of types of reasons, and also examples of something that may not qualify as a moral reason per se.  
  
Your opening referring to politicians describing the right thing to do sensible cites Skitka 2010, but reminded me very much of a paper I was missing from your references:  
  
Kreps, T. A., & Monin, B. (2014). Core values versus common sense: Consequentialist views appear less rooted in morality. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40(11), 1529-1542.  
  
You may want to incorporate this into your opening argument, but I leave this up to you.  
  
In sum, the reviewers and I see potential in this project, but are requesting richer theory and method modifications to ensure that you have a clear plan to test exactly what you aim to test and the results will be clear to readers.  
  
I hope you find this feedback fair and useful in revising this registered report plan for the next phase. Please let me know if you need clarification on any points.  
  
Warm regards,  
Paul Conway  
  
  
Reviewer #1: Attached

Thank you for the opportunity to review the registration report for Stage 1, 'Space to Think: Testing the Effect of Distancing on Moral Dumbfounding.' I believe that the core idea of examining the moral dumbfounding phenomenon through the lens of Construal Level Theory is a promising approach.

However, I have some methodological concerns that temper my enthusiasm for the paper. Below, I include comments and questions.

(1) The authors should check the methodology of these two replication studies falsifying CLT:

Gong, H., & Medin, D. L. (2012). Construal levels and moral judgment: Some complications. Judgment and Decision making, 7(5), 628-638.

Žeželj, I. L., & Jokić, B. R. (2014). Replication of experiments evaluating impact of psychological distance on moral judgment. Social Psychology.

(2) For instance, Zezelj and Jokic (2014) asked participants to evaluate the moral wrongness of the classic three scenarios (eating one’s dead pet, sexual intercourse with sibling, dusting with national flag). The researchers manipulated temporal distance by asking participants to imagine that the event will happen “the next day” or “the next year”. Temporal distance had no effect on moral wrongness judgments; in Study 3, they tested again and could not verify the effect of temporal distance. However, social distance manipulations were found to be effective.

The authors aimed to manipulate temporal distance on pg. 8 “ In the control condition, participants will not be provided with any instructions about a time frame; in the increased temporal distance condition, participants will be asked to imagine responding in the distant future (five weeks from now); in the reduced distance condition, participants will be asked to imagine responding in the near future (two to three hours from now).”

Even though DVs are different, Zezelj and Jokic examined moral wrongness judgments; however, the authors want to examine reason-giving, and I still doubt the effectiveness of this manipulation.

(3) A manipulation check is necessary to ensure that temporal distance manipulation increases reason-giving. Then, testing this idea in cases that trigger moral dumbfounding would be better. Another option would be testing the manipulations of social distance, how-why technique, and temporal distance on reason-giving. Then, the most effective ones might be used in the main study.

(4) On pg. 11-12 “Participants will be asked to rate on a 7-point Likert scale how right or wrong the behavior described is (where 1 = morally wrong; 4 = neutral; 7 = morally right), as well as their confidence in this judgment (where 1 = not at all confident; 7 = extremely confident). Participants will then be given an opportunity to provide reasons for their judgment” I do not understand here. Following the evaluation of the scenario, will participants be allowed to provide reasons for their judgment? Why?

a. If yes, this might interfere with the manipulation effect as people are equipped with reason-based thinking. So, the question is whether the high-reason-giving results are obtained from CLT manipulation or by asking participants’ reasons before they provide reasons.

b. Will participants provide their answers in response to this question -julie&mark scenario-, e.g. “And do you accept that they are both consenting adults, and that they both consented and enjoyed it?” Is this question asked to test whether participants understood/read the scenario?

(5) I also do not understand why participants will be asked whether they change their minds. Changing minds is a measure that can be tested with a within-subjects-design. However, if I do not miss anything here, participants will be randomly assigned to manipulation conditions. If the authors aim to compare participants’ responses under “counter-arguments” and “critical slide,” this also seems problematic to me. As I do not grasp what is measured with these responses. Let’s say I am one of the participants, and I respond, “No, I do not accept what they did, but yes, they consented and enjoyed the act as it is written in the scenario.” to your question, “do you accept that they are both consenting adults, and that they both consented and enjoyed it?” Does it assess whether I understand the acts in the scenario or my point of view?

(6) Theory-driven question: On pg. 6, it is written that “Applied to the available responses in the dumbfounding paradigm, providing a reason for a moral judgment (reason giving) involves the most deliberation; providing a dumbfounded response (dumbfounding) involves the least amount of deliberation; and selecting “There is nothing wrong” (nothing wrong) involves less deliberation than reason-giving, but more deliberation than dumbfounding (deliberation may lead participants to accept the counter-arguments, and revise their judgment rather than deliberate further to identify alternative reasons).”

For instance, will participants who are dumbfounded say “there is nothing wrong” with the incest scenario? Haidt explained that if the intuitions are highly strong, people are dumbfounded and find the act unacceptable. If there are possible alternatives to making the act acceptable, then people will not be dumbfounded as they can think reason-based. Dumbfounded people can also find reasons to support their intuitions, so the problem is not finding a reason but a counter-reason. So, the main question is, which reasons will the authors look at? Is High-reason-giving automatically considered that people think reason-based and less dumbfounded?

One possible solution would be to look at “reasons supporting the intuition (with intuition, I mean disapproving or approving the act in a given scenario)” and “reasons falsifying the intuition” across manipulation conditions.

Overall, I hope my questions and comments do not overwhelm the authors. While I am impressed with the core idea, I am confused by certain methodological and theoretical aspects.  
  
  
Reviewer #2: I should say up front that I am a philosopher, not a psychologist, even if one who has done a lot of interdisciplinary work. That said, I thought that setup of the study is very conceptually clean and sensible. I have a few questions to flag but nothing that makes me question the value of doing the study.  
  
So, here are a few mild questions or concerns:  
-I notice that in the study the team wants to run the hypothetical character in the experimental conditions (Alex) is not really described at all, but subjects will be told to think about the scenario from Alex's perspective. By contrast, in the pliot studies we got a description of a student who was described as a good student who usually understands the material. The description prompts taking a cognitive approach to the scenario to be described. I didn't see anything in the materials explaining why the switch in approach was made between the pilot studies and the study to be proposed. I could imagine a few possible reasons, but it would be good to see that defended. As it stands, I do wonder whether one of two things will happen when subjects are asked to reflect as if they are Alex. Possibility #1 is that because we are not told anything about Alex that subjects will give the same answers as they gave in the control condition. The other possibility I'm wondering about is whether the lack of information will lead to uncontrolled mental modeling of Alex (what would an average male college student think?) as opposed to just spurring reflection. Regardless, the pivot to underdescribed Alex from the model philosophy student seemed in need of explanation if not defense.  
-Similarly, it would have been nice to see more of a defense of the convenience sampling plan. One would imagine that convenience sampling is going to get one mostly college students albeit perhaps an international set of the same. If there is any realistic hope of getting a less homogenous sample through convenience sampling, this was not explained. One would imagine that the ease and facility of pivoting from an intuitive to a deliberative mode of cognition would interact relevantly with age.  
-The only example in the paper given of what would count as a qualifying reason for reason-giving was a clearly utilitarian one related to the trolley problem. That's a fine example to use, but it would be a bit more reassuring as a philosopher to see explicitly in the paper examples of, for instance, deontological reasons as well or an explicit statement that reasons from different ethical perspectives would count as instances of deliberative moral reasoning.  
-I imagine that the analyses will be run and reported in a way that makes this point moot, but I found the authors explanation of why "nothing wrong" should count as reflecting a moderate degree of deliberation quite uncompelling. In fact, I wonder whether these answers are less likely to track level of deliberation and more likely to track some other factor. Someone who reverses course after reporting that something is wrong under the pressure of counter-argument might, for instance, simply be high on agreeableness or high on conflict aversion.   
-I wondered whether the near term temporal condition was near enough. Especially if one just has to have an opinion about a scenario and perhaps provide a reason for one's opinion, imagining that the assignment is due in several hours seems not very time-pressured to me. I wonder if the effect would be cleaner by shrinking that time window.   
  
  
Reviewer #3: On the face, this Registered Report proposal seems to be a perfectly reasonable A + B type of research, where manipulation A (construal level) is applied to outcome B (moral dumbfounding) to generate a research question. While I think the general aim is worthwhile, adding knowledge about the cognitive conditions that are conducive to the dumbfounding phenomenon, there are some details that do require comment and possibly course correction before the research is approved.  
  
1. This is actually a positive point the authors missed. If I had reviewed the previous paper where cognitive load was applied to dumbfounding, I would worry that the role of the load would be ambiguous. Does it influence the ability to express reasons, or actually the ability/motivation to process reasons? For example, some examples of dumbfounding might be due to overthinking (processing) which load might reduce, even as it also increases dumbfounding due to judgment that there isn't enough time to work on really good emotions. These manipulations are more contextual/cognitive in nature so do not have this fault.  
  
2. I am not sure why a 2 x 3 design is needed to cross temporal and social distance. If there are no well-founded predictions for the interactions, one could just have a 2 + 3 design (i.e. 2 different studies side by side) and save 1/6 of the participants. There don't seem to be good predictions for the interaction, and the influence of one factor could just end up making the main effect less interpretable as compared to the simple effect in the other factor's control group.  
  
3. The revelation that participants are to be sourced from 3 different sites in as many languages took me by surprise. Is there a plan to equalize samples per condition by site? To examine site effects and interactions with the factors of interest? More detail is needed, and if these three samples are to be mashed together, a defense of this approach.  
  
4. The social distance manipulation is fatally confounded with the identity of the target. Presumably any effects could be attributed to role-taking of an ethicist - either as someone who should have an answer, or someone who would overthink the solution and so become flummoxed. If you imagined social distance to a caveman you might get a different effect. A cleaner manipulation would be to imagine someone like you but in another (culturally similar) country or a different part of the same country. Even so, the temptation might be to double-guess what kind of mentality that person would have and give a different answer from your own, which is not exactly the same as a manipulation of distance per se. I can't see a way around the interpretive problems social distance and for this reason I would simply drop this condition or choose something else like spatial distance.  
  
5. A related problem, more concrete: when answering the dumbfounding questions in social distance, it is not clear whether I am answering from the perspective of "Alex" (in which case the response should be worded respecting Alex) or my own (in which case keep the "I" wording).  
  
6. In the temporal manipulation, the assignment, not only the deadline should be further away in time. It is easy and socially desirable to imagine myself virtuously completing the assignment sooner than it is due.  
  
  
  
  
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