




Applied Cryptography

CPEG 472/672

Lecture 6A

Instructor: Nektarios Tsoutsos


Hash functions



- ◉ Cryptographer's Swiss Army Knife
 - ◉ Any length input -> short digest
- ◉ Examples
 - ◉ MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-3, BLAKE2
 - ◉ Digital signatures, public key encryption
 - ◉ integrity verification, key agreement
 - ◉ message authentication, password protection
 - ◉ Intrusion detection systems
 - ◉ Git, Bitcoin

Secure hash functions

- ◉ Notion of security in hash functions
 - ◉ Goal: ensure data hasn't changed
 - ◉ Different pieces of data must have different hashes
 - ◉ The hash serves as an identifier
 - ◉ Different notion compared to ciphers
- ◉ Case study: Digital signatures



Hashes are unpredictable

- ◉ Flipping one bit in the input, generates a completely different hash digest
- ◉ E.g., SHA256 hashes of "a", "b", "c"
 - ◉ ca978112ca1bbdcafacc231b39a23dc4da786eff8147c4e72b9807785afee48bb
 - ◉ 3e23e8160039594a33894f6564e1b1348bbd7a0088d42c4acb73eeaed59c009d
 - ◉ 2e7d2c03a9507ae265ecf5b5356885a53393a2029d241394997265a1a25aefc6

Security guarantees of hashes

- ◉ Preimage resistance (one-wayness)
 - ◉ Given H so that $H = \text{Hash}(M)$, it is impossible to find the original M
 - ◉ There are **infinite** preimages that give the same hash H
 - ◉ Even if you have **unlimited** resources, it is not possible to find the exact message M
- ◉ Second-preimage resistance
 - ◉ Given M_1 , can't find M_2 so that $H(M_2) = H(M_1)$
 - ◉ If you could find preimages, you could also find **2nd preimages**

Security guarantees of hashes (2)

- ◉ Collision Resistance

- ◉ Collisions are inevitable due to the pigeonhole principle

- ◉ If you have m holes and n pigeons with $n > m$, at least one hole must have more than one pigeon

- ◉ We want to hash functions where finding collisions is not possible

- ◉ Collisions resistance is related to 2nd preimage resistance

- ◉ Finding 2nd preimages, allows finding collisions


- ◉ Collision resistant hash functions are also 2nd preimage resistant

Finding collisions

- ◉ Uses the Birthday Attack method
 - ◉ If hash can have up to N different digests as outputs, we will find a collision after hashing \sqrt{N} messages with about 40% probability
- ◉ Memory efficient collision search
 - ◉ Rho method
 - ◉ Pick a random hash value $H_1 = H'_1$
 - ◉ $H_{i+1} = \text{Hash}(H_i)$, $H'_{i+1} = \text{Hash}(\text{Hash}(H'_i))$
 - ◉ Iterate until $H_{i+1} == H'_{i+1}$

Rho method to find collisions

◉ $\text{Hash}(H_4) = H_5 = \text{Hash}(H_{10})$




Building hash functions


- ◉ Split message into blocks and process each block iteratively
 - ◉ Iterative hashing
- ◉ Two approaches
 - ◉ Using **compression** functions
 - ◉ Examples: MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2
 - ◉ Using **sponge** functions
 - ◉ Examples: SHA-3

Compression-based hashing

- Uses the Merkle Damgard (M-D) construction and a compression function



- Compress. Reduce 2 inputs in 1 output
 - Can use the **Davies-Meyer** construction
 - Secure **block cipher** E
 - M is the key input E
 - H is the ptxt input of E
 - M-D: Turn E into a **secure hash**




M-D security

- ◉ If Compress is preimage and collision resistant, then a hash constructed using M-D is also preimage & collision resistant
 - ◉ Any successful preimage attack on M-D is a successful attack on Compress
 - ◉ Breaking collision resistance of M-D means breaking collision resistance of Compress
- ◉ A collision in Compress does not necessarily give a collision on M-D hash

Sponge-based hashing

- Use a single **permutation P** instead of compression functions and block ciphers
- Simpler than M-D functions (mostly XORs)



- Security level (bits) = $\text{MIN}(c/2, n/2)$

Reading for next lecture

- ◉ Aumasson: Chapter 6
 - ◉ From “*The SHA Family of Hash Functions*” to the end of the chapter
 - ◉ We will have a short quiz