

Locke - first selection
An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding

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BOOK I

CHAPTER I

Introduction.

§ 1. SINCE it is the *Understanding* that sets Man above the rest of sensible Beings, and gives him all the Advantage and Dominion, which he has over them; it is certainly a Subject, even for its Nobleness, worth our Labour to enquire into. The Understanding, like the Eye, whilst it makes us see, and perceive all other Things, takes no notice of it self: And it requires Art and Pains to set it at a distance, and make it its own Object. But whatever be the Difficulties, that lie in the way of this Enquiry; whatever it be, that keeps us so much in the Dark to our selves; sure I am, that all the Light we can let in upon our own Minds; all the Acquaintance we can make with our own Understandings, will not only be very pleasant; but bring us great Advantage, in directing our Thoughts in the search of other Things.

§ 2. This, therefore, being my *Purpose* to enquire into the Original, Certainty, and Extent of humane Knowledge; together, with the Grounds and Degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Assent; I shall not at present meddle with the Physical Consideration of the Mind; or trouble my self to examine, wherein its Essence consists, or by what Motions of our Spirits, or Alterations of our Bodies, we come to have any Sensation by our Organs, or any *Ideas* in our Understandings; and whether those *Ideas* do in their Formation, any, or all of them, depend on Matter, or no. These are Speculations, which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my Way, in the Design I am now upon. It shall suffice to my present Purpose, to

§ 1. *An Enquiry into the Understanding pleasant and useful.*² § 2. *Design.*

¹ In 1-5, 'OF Humane Understanding' is printed above 'BOOK I. CHAP. I.', separated by a rule.

² Coste treats this Chapter as an introduction to the whole following work ('AVANT-PROPOS. Dessein de l'Auteur dans cet Ouvrage.') and makes Bk. I begin with the original Ch. ii, with a consequent renumbering of the original Chs. iii and iv as Chs. ii and iii.

³ This marginal summary, in common with all subsequent marginal summaries unless an editorial indication to the contrary is given, add. 2-5.

consider the discerning Faculties of a Man, as they are employ'd about the Objects, which they have to do with: and I shall imagine I have not wholly misemploy'd my self in the Thoughts I shall have on this Occasion, if, in this Historical, plain Method, I can give any
 5 Account of the Ways, whereby our Understandings come to attain those Notions of Things we have, and can set down any Measures of the Certainty of our Knowledge, or the Grounds of those Perswasions, which are to be found amongst Men, so various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet asserted some where or other
 10 with such Assurance, and Confidence, that he that shall take a view of the Opinions of Mankind, observe their Opposition, and at the same time, consider the Fondness, and Devotion wherewith they are embrac'd; the Resolution, and Eagerness, wherewith they are maintain'd, may perhaps have Reason to suspect, That either there
 15 is no such thing as Truth at all; or that Mankind hath no sufficient Means to attain a certain Knowledge of it.

§ 3. It is therefore worth while, to search out the *Bounds* between Opinion and Knowledge; and examine by what Measures, in things, whereof we have no certain Knowledge, we ought to regulate our
 20 Assent, and moderate our Perswasions. In Order whereunto, I shall pursue this following Method.

First, I shall enquire into the *Original* of those *Ideas*, Notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a Man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his Mind; and the ways whereby the
 25 Understanding comes to be furnished with them.

Secondly, I shall endeavour to shew, what *Knowledge* the Understanding hath by those *Ideas*; and the Certainty, Evidence, and Extent of it.

Thirdly, I shall make some Enquiry into the Nature and Grounds
 30 of *Faith*, or *Opinion*: whereby I mean that Assent, which we give to any Proposition as true, of whose Truth yet we have no certain Knowledge: And here we shall have Occasion to examine the Reasons and Degrees of *Assent*.

§ 4. If by this Enquiry into the Nature of the Understanding, I
 35 can discover the Powers thereof; *how far* they reach; to what things they are in any Degree proportionate; and where they fail us, I suppose it may be of use, to prevail with the busy Mind of Man, to

§ 3. *Method*. § 4. *Useful to know the extent of our Comprehension*.

(35) *how*] 1 T.er, 2-5 | at *how* 1 what] 1er-5 | which 1

be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its Comprehension; to stop, when it is at the utmost Extent of its Tether; and to sit down in a quiet Ignorance of those Things, which, upon Examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our Capacities. We should not then perhaps be so forward, out of an Affectation of
 5 an universal Knowledge, to raise Questions, and perplex our selves and others with Disputes about Things, to which our Understandings are not suited; and of which we cannot frame in our Minds any clear or distinct Perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happen'd) we have not any Notions at all. If we can find out, how
 10 far the Understanding can extend its view; how far it has Faculties to attain Certainty; and in what Cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content our selves with what is attainable by us in this State.

§ 5. For though the *Comprehension* of our Understandings, comes
 15 exceeding short of the vast Extent of Things; yet, we shall have Cause enough to magnify the bountiful Author of our Being, for that Portion and Degree of Knowledge, he has bestowed on us, so far above all the rest of the Inhabitants of this our Mansion. Men have Reason to be well satisfied with what God hath thought fit for
 20 them, since he has given them (as St. Peter says,) πάντα πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ εὐσέβειαν, Whatsoever is necessary for the Conveniences of Life, and Information of Vertue;* and has put within the reach of their Discovery the comfortable Provision for this Life and the Way
 25 that leads to a better. How short soever their Knowledge may come of an universal, or perfect Comprehension of whatsoever is, it yet secures their great Concernments, that they have Light enough to lead them to the Knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own Duties. Men may find Matter sufficient to busy their Heads,
 30 and employ their Hands with Variety, Delight, and Satisfaction; if they will not boldly quarrel with their own Constitution, and throw away the Blessings their Hands are fill'd with, because they are not big enough to grasp every thing. We shall not have much Reason to complain of the narrowness of our Minds, if we will but employ

§ 5. *Our Capacity suited to our State and Concerns*.

(21) St.] 1-3, 5 | S. 4 says,)] edit. | says, 1-5 (22) Conveniences] 1-4 | Conveniences 5 (24) the . . . Life] 2-5 | the Provisions, that may support, or sweeten this Life, 1 (28) sight] 2-5 | Discovery 1

* 2 Pet. 1: 3.

them about what may be of use to us; for of that they are very capable: And it will be an unpardonable, as well as Childish Peevishness, if we undervalue the Advantages of our Knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was given us, because there are some Things that are set out of the reach of it. It will be no Excuse to an idle and untoward Servant, who would not attend his Business by Candle-light, to plead that he had not broad Sun-shine. The Candle, that is set up in us, shines bright enough for all our Purposes. The Discoveries we can make with this, ought to satisfy us: And we shall then use our Understandings right, when we entertain all Objects in that Way and Proportion, that they are suited to our Faculties; and upon those Grounds, they are capable of being propos'd to us; and not peremptorily, or intemperately require Demonstration, and demand Certainty, where Probability only is to be had, and which is sufficient to govern all our Concernments. If we will disbelieve every thing, because we cannot certainly know all things; we shall do much-wisely as he, who would not use his Legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no Wings to fly.

§ 6. When we know our own *Strength*, we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of Success: And when we have well survey'd the *Powers* of our own Minds, and made some Estimate what we may expect from them, we shall not be inclined either to sit still, and not set our Thoughts on work at all, in Despair of knowing any thing; nor on the other side question every thing, and disclaim all Knowledge, because some Things are not to be understood. 'Tis of great use to the Sailor to know the length of his Line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the Ocean. 'Tis well he knows, that it is long enough to reach the bottom, at such Places, as are necessary to direct his Voyage, and caution him against running upon Shoals, that may ruin him. Our Business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our Conduct. If we can find out those Measures, whereby a rational Creature put in that State, which Man is in, in this World, may, and ought to govern his Opinions, and Actions depending thereon, we need not be troubled, that some other things escape our Knowledge.

§ 7. This was that which gave the first Rise to this Essay concerning the Understanding. § 6. *Knowledge of our Capacity a cure of Scepticism and Idleness.* § 7. *Occasion of this Essay*

(9) Coste adds a reference, in a marginal note, to Prov. 20: 27. escape 1-3

(36) escape] 4-5

cerning the Understanding. For I thought that the first Step towards satisfying several Enquiries, the Mind of Man was very apt to run into, was, to take a Survey of our own Understandings, examine our own Powers, and see to what Things they were adapted. Till that was done I suspected we began at the wrong end, and in vain sought for Satisfaction in a quiet and secure Possession of Truths, that most concern'd us, whilst we let loose our Thoughts into the vast Ocean of *Being*, as if all that boundless Extent, were the natural, and undoubted Possession of our Understandings, wherein there was nothing exempt from its Decisions, or that escaped its Comprehension. Thus Men, extending their Enquiries beyond their Capacities, and letting their Thoughts wander into those depths, where they can find no sure Footing; 'tis no Wonder, that they raise Questions, and multiply Disputes, which never coming to any clear Resolution, are proper only to continue and increase their Doubts, and to confirm them at last in perfect Scepticism. Whereas were the Capacities of our Understandings well considered, the Extent of our Knowledge once discovered, and the Horizon found, which sets the Bounds between the enlightned and dark Parts of Things; between what is, and what is not comprehensible by us, Men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avow'd Ignorance of the one, and employ their Thoughts and Discourse, with more Advantage and Satisfaction in the other.

§ 8. Thus much I thought necessary to say concerning the Occasion of this Enquiry into humane Understanding. But, before I proceed on to what I have thought on this Subject, I must here in the Entrance beg pardon of my Reader, for the frequent use of the Word *Idea*, which he will find in the following Treatise. It being that Term, which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by *Phantasm*, *Notion*, *Species*, or whatever it is, which the Mind can be employ'd about in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently using it.

§ 8. *What Idea stands for.*

(6) secure] 1-4 | sure 5. (Coste 'la possession tranquille et assurée') (33) 5 adds, in a footnote, quotations from the Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr Locke's First Letter, p. 93, Locke's Second Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, pp. 63, etc., and Locke's Third Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, pp. 353, etc.; prefaced by 'This modest Apology of our Author could not procure him the free use of the Word *Idea*. But great offence has been taken at it, and it has been censured as of dangerous Consequence: To which you may here see what he Answers'.

I presume it will be easily granted me, that there are such *Ideas* in Men's Minds; every one is conscious of them in himself, and Men's Words and Actions will satisfy him, that they are in others.

Our first Enquiry then shall be, how they come into the Mind.

CHAPTER II

No innate Principles in the Mind.

§ 1. IT is an established Opinion amongst some Men, That there are in the Understanding certain *innate Principles*; some primary Notions, *Κοινὰ ἐννοιαί*, Characters, as it were stamped upon the Mind of Man, which the Soul receives in its very first Being; and brings into the World with it. It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced Readers of the falseness of this Supposition, if I should only shew (as I hope I shall in the following Parts of this Discourse) how Men, barely by the Use of their natural Faculties, may attain to all the Knowledge they have, without the help of any innate Impressions; and may arrive at Certainty, without any such Original Notions or Principles. For I imagine any one will easily grant, That it would be impertinent to suppose, the *Ideas* of Colours innate in a Creature, to whom God hath given Sight, and a Power to receive them by the Eyes from external Objects: and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several Truths, to the Impressions of Nature, and innate Characters, when we may observe in our selves Faculties, fit to attain as easie and certain Knowledge of them, as if they were Originally imprinted on the Mind.

But because a Man is not permitted without Censure to follow his own Thoughts in the search of Truth, when they lead him ever so little out of the common Road: I shall set down the Reasons, that made me doubt of the Truth of that Opinion, as an Excuse for my Mistake, if I be in one, which I leave to be consider'd by those, who, with me, dispose themselves to embrace Truth, where-ever they find it.

§ 1. *The way shewn how we come by any Knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innate.*

(2) [2nd] Men's] 2-4 | Mens 1er, 5 | a Man's 1 (15) Original] 1-3, 5 | original 4

§ 2. There is nothing more commonly taken for granted, than that there are certain Principles both *Speculative* and *Practical* (for they speak of both) universally agreed upon by all Mankind: which therefore they argue, must needs be the constant Impressions, which the Souls of Men receive in their first Beings, and which they bring into the World with them, as necessarily and really as they do any of their inherent Faculties.

§ 3. This Argument, drawn from *Universal Consent*, has this Misfortune in it, That if it were true in matter of Fact, that there were certain Truths, wherein all Mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shewn, how Men may come to that Universal Agreement, in the things they do consent in; which I presume may be done.

§ 4. But, which is worse, this Argument of Universal Consent, which is made use of, to prove innate Principles, seems to me a Demonstration that there are none such: Because there are none to which all Mankind give an Universal Assent. I shall begin with the Speculative, and instance in those magnified Principles of Demonstration, *Whatsoever is, is*; and *'Tis impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*, which of all others I think have the most allow'd Title to innate. These have so settled a Reputation of Maxims universally received, that 'twill, no doubt, be thought strange, if any one should seem to question it. But yet I take liberty to say, That these Propositions are so far from having an universal Assent, that there are a great Part of Mankind, to whom they are not so much as known.

§ 5. For, first 'tis evident, that all *Children*, and *Ideots*, have not the least Apprehension or Thought of them: and the want of that is enough to destroy that universal Assent, which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate Truths: it seeming to me near a Contradiction, to say, that there are Truths imprinted on the Soul, which it perceives or understands not; imprinting, if it signify any thing, being nothing else, but the making certain Truths to be perceived. For to imprint any thing on the Mind without the

§ 2. *General Assent the great Argument.*

§ 3. *Universal Consent proves nothing innate.*

§ 4. *What is, is; and It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, not universally assented to.* § 5. *Not on the Mind naturally imprinted, because not known to Children, Ideots, etc.*

(4) the] 1-4; om. 5 (18-19) Demonstration,] edit. | Demonstration. 2-4 | Demonstration: 5 | Demonstration 1

Mind's perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore Children and *Ideots* have Souls, have Minds, with those Impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to these Truths, which since they do not, it is evident that there are no such Impressions. For if they are not Notions naturally imprinted, How can they be innate? And if they are Notions imprinted, How can they be unknown? To say a Notion is imprinted on the Mind, and yet at the same time to say, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this
 10 Impression nothing. No Proposition can be said to be in the Mind, which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of. For if any one may; then, by the same Reason, all Propositions that are true, and the Mind is capable ever of assenting to, may be said to be in the Mind, and to be imprinted: Since if any one can be said to be
 15 in the Mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only because it is capable of knowing it; and so the Mind is of all Truths it ever shall know. Nay, thus Truths may be imprinted on the Mind, which it never did, nor ever shall know: for a Man may live long, and die at last in Ignorance of many Truths, which his Mind was capable
 20 of knowing, and that with Certainty. So that if the Capacity of knowing be the natural Impression contended for, all the Truths a Man ever comes to know, will, by this Account, be, every one of them, innate; and this great Point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of speaking; which whilst it pretends to
 25 assert the contrary, says nothing different from those, who deny innate Principles. For no Body, I think, ever denied, that the Mind was capable of knowing several Truths. The Capacity, they say, is innate, the Knowledge acquired. But then to what end such contest for certain innate Maxims? If Truths can be imprinted on the Under-
 30 standing without being perceived, I can see no difference there can be, between any Truths the Mind is capable of knowing in respect of their Original: They must all be innate, or all adventitious: In vain shall a Man go about to distinguish them. He therefore that talks of innate Notions in the Understanding, cannot (if he intend
 35 thereby any distinct sort of Truths) mean such Truths to be in the Understanding, as it never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if these Words (*to be in the Understanding*) have any Propriety, they signify to be understood. So that, to be in the Understanding, and, not to be understood; to be in the Mind, and, never to be

(36) wholly] 3-5 | fully 1-2

perceived, is all one, as to say, any thing is, and is not, in the Mind or Understanding. If therefore these two Propositions, *Whatsoever is, is*; and, *It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*, are by Nature imprinted, Children cannot be ignorant of them: Infants, and all that have Souls must necessarily have them in their Understandings,
 5 know the Truth of them, and assent to it.

§ 6. To avoid this, 'tis usually answered, that all Men know and assent to them, *when they come to the use of Reason*, and this is enough to prove them innate. I answer,

§ 7. Doubtful Expressions, that have scarce any signification, go
 10 for clear Reasons to those, who being prepossessed, take not the pains to examine even what they themselves say. For to apply this Answer with any tolerable Sence to our present Purpose, it must signify one of these two things; either, That as soon as Men come to the use of Reason, these supposed native Inscriptions come to be
 15 known, and observed by them: Or else, that the Use and Exercise of Men's Reasons assists them in the Discovery of these Principles, and certainly makes them known to them.

§ 8. If they mean that by the *Use of Reason* Men may discover these Principles; and that this is sufficient to prove them innate;
 20 their way of arguing will stand thus, (*viz.*) That whatever Truths Reason can certainly discover to us, and make us firmly assent to, those are all naturally imprinted on the Mind; since that universal Assent, which is made the Mark of them, amounts to no more but this; That by the use of Reason, we are capable to come to a certain
 25 Knowledge of, and assent to them; and by this Means there will be no difference between the Maxims of the Mathematicians, and Theorems they deduce from them: All must be equally allow'd innate, they being all Discoveries made by the use of Reason, and Truths that a rational Creature may certainly come to know, if he
 30 apply his Thoughts rightly that Way.

§ 9. But how can these Men think the *Use of Reason* necessary to discover Principles that are supposed innate, when Reason (if we may believe them) is nothing else, but the Faculty of deducing unknown Truths from Principles or Propositions, that are already
 35

§§ 6, 7. *That Men know them when they come to the use of Reason, answered.* § 8. *If Reason discovered them, that would not prove them innate.* §§ 9-11. *'Tis false that Reason discovers them.*

(17) assists] 2-5 | assist 1 (18) makes] 2er-5 | make 1-2 to them.] Coste adds 'Or ceux à qui j'ai à faire, ne scauroient montrer par aucune de ces deux choses qu'il y ait des Principes innez.' (32) these] 4-5 | those 1-3

known? That certainly can never be thought innate, which we have need of Reason to discover, unless as I have said, we will have all the certain Truths, that Reason ever teaches us, to be innate. We may as well think the use of Reason necessary to make our Eyes discover
 5 visible Objects, as that there should be need of Reason, or the Exercise thereof, to make the Understanding see, what is Originally engraven in it, and cannot be in the Understanding, before it be perceived by it. So that to make Reason discover those Truths thus imprinted, is to say, that the use of Reason discovers to a Man,
 10 what he knew before; and if Men have these innate, impressed Truths Originally, and before the use of Reason, and yet are always ignorant of them, till they come to the use of Reason, 'tis in effect to say, that Men know, and know them not at the same time.

§ 10. 'Twill here perhaps be said, That Mathematical Demonstrations, and other Truths, that are not innate, are not assented to, as soon as propos'd, wherein they are distinguish'd from these Maxims, and other innate Truths. I shall have occasion to speak of Assent upon the first proposing, more particularly by and by. I shall here only, and that very readily, allow, That these Maxims,
 20 and Mathematical Demonstrations are in this different; That the one has need of Reason using of Proofs, to make them out, and to gain our Assent; but the other, as soon as understood, are, without any the least reasoning, embraced and assented to. But I withal beg leave to observe, That it lays open the Weakness of this Subterfuge,
 25 which requires the *Use of Reason* for the Discovery of these general Truths: Since it must be confess'd, that in their Discovery, there is no Use made of reasoning at all. And I think those who give this Answer, will not be forward to affirm, That the Knowledge of this Maxim, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*, is a
 30 deduction of our Reason. For this would be to destroy that Bounty of Nature, they seem so fond of, whilst they make the Knowledge of those Principles to depend on the labour of our Thoughts. For all Reasoning is search, and casting about, and requires Pains and Application. And how can it with any tolerable Sence be suppos'd,
 35 that what was imprinted by Nature, as the Foundation and Guide of our Reason, should need the Use of Reason to discover it?

§ 11. Those who will take the Pains to reflect with a little attention on the Operations of the Understanding, will find, that this ready Assent of the Mind to some Truths, depends not, either on

(10) these| 1-4 | those 5 (39)-53(1) not . . . or| 2-5 | not either on native Inscription, nor 1

native Inscription, or the *Use of Reason*; but on a Faculty of the Mind quite distinct from both of them as we shall see hereafter. Reason therefore, having nothing to do in procuring our Assent to these Maxims, if by saying, that *Men know and assent to them, when they come to the Use of Reason*, be meant, That the use of Reason assists us
 5 in the Knowledge of these Maxims, it is utterly false; and were it true, would prove them not to be innate.

§ 12. If by knowing and assenting to them, *when we come to the use of Reason* be meant, that this is the time, when they come to be taken notice of by the Mind; and that as soon as Children come to
 10 the use of Reason, they come also to know and assent to these Maxims; this also is false, and frivolous. *First*, It is false. Because it is evident, these Maxims are not in the Mind so early as the use of Reason: and therefore the coming to the use of Reason is falsely assigned, as the time of their Discovery. How many instances of the
 15 use of Reason may we observe in Children, a long time before they have any Knowledge of this Maxim, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*? and a great part of illiterate People, and Savages, pass many Years, even of their rational Age, without ever thinking on this, and the like general Propositions. I grant Men
 20 come not to the Knowledge of these general and more abstract Truths, which are thought innate, till they come to the use of Reason; and I add, nor then neither. Which is so, because till after they come to the use of Reason, those general abstract *Ideas* are not framed in the Mind, about which those general Maxims are, which
 25 are mistaken for innate Principles, but are indeed Discoveries made, and Verities introduced, and brought into the Mind by the same Way, and discovered by the same Steps, as several other Propositions, which no Body was ever so extravagant as to suppose innate. This I hope to make plain in the sequel of this Discourse.
 30 I allow therefore a Necessity, that Men should come to the use of Reason, before they get the Knowledge of those general Truths: but deny, that Men's coming to the use of Reason is the time of their Discovery.

§ 13. In the mean time, it is observable, that this saying, that
 35 Men know, and assent to these Maxims, *when they come to the use of*

§ 12. *The coming to the use of Reason, not the time we come to know these Maxims.* § 13. *By this, they are not distinguished from other knowable Truths.*

(1) p. 52(39), n. (16) a| 1-4; om. 5 (19) Age| 1 T.er, 2-5 | Ages 1 (22) innate, | 2-5 | innate | 1 (27), and | 2-5 | and 1 (32) get | 1-2, 4-5 | get to 3

But since no Proposition can be innate, unless the *Ideas*, about which it is, be innate, This will be, to suppose all our *Ideas* of Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Figures, *etc.* innate; than which there cannot be any thing more opposite to Reason and Experience. Universal and ready assent, upon hearing and understanding the Terms, is (I grant) a mark of self-evidence: but self-evidence, depending not on innate Impressions, but on something else (as we shall shew hereafter) belongs to several Propositions, which no Body was yet so extravagant, as to pretend to be innate.

§ 19. Nor let it be said, That those more particular self-evident Propositions, which are assented to at first hearing, as, *That One and Two are equal to Three; That Green is not Red*, *etc.* are received as the Consequences of those more universal Propositions, which are look'd on as innate Principles: since any one, who will but take the Pains to observe what passes in the Understanding, will certainly find, That these, and the like less general Propositions, are certainly known and firmly assented to, by those, who are utterly ignorant of those more general Maxims; and so, being earlier in the Mind than those (as they are called) first Principles, cannot owe to them the Assent, wherewith they are received at first hearing.

§ 20. If it be said, that these Propositions, *viz. Two and Two are equal to Four; Red is not Blue*, *etc.* are not general Maxims, nor of any great use. I answer, That makes nothing to the Argument of universal assent, upon hearing and understanding. For if that be the certain mark of innate, whatever Proposition can be found, that receives general assent, as soon as heard and understood, that must be admitted for an innate Proposition, as well as this Maxim, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*, they being upon the same Ground equal. And as to the difference of being more general, that makes this Maxim more remote from being innate; those general and abstract *Ideas*, being more strangers to our first Apprehensions, than those of more particular self-evident Propositions; and therefore, 'tis longer before they are admitted and assented to by the growing Understanding. And as to the usefulness of these magnificent Maxims, that perhaps will not be found so great as is generally conceived, when it comes in its due place to be more fully considered.

§ 19. Such less general Propositions known before these universal Maxims. § 20. One and Two, *etc.* not general nor useful, answered.

(1) Proposition] 1-3, 5 (likewise Coste) | Propositions 4 (3) Figures] Figure 5 (36) in] 1-4 | to 5 (1. below 36: § 19.) In Coste this summary applied to §§ 19 and 20.

§ 21. But we have not yet done with *assenting to Propositions at first hearing and understanding their Terms*; 'tis fit we first take notice, That this, instead of being a mark, that they are innate, is a proof of the contrary: Since it supposes, that several, who understand and know other things, are ignorant of these Principles, till they are propos'd to them; and that one may be unacquainted with these Truths, till he hears them from others. For if they were innate, What need they be propos'd, in order to gaining assent; when, by being in the Understanding, by a natural and original Impression (if there were any such) they could not but be known before? Or, doth the proposing them, print them clearer in the Mind, than Nature did? If so, then the Consequence will be, That a Man knows them better, after he has been thus taught them, than he did before. Whence it will follow, That these Principles may be made more evident to us by other's teaching, than Nature has made them by Impression: which will ill agree with the Opinion of innate Principles, and give but little Authority to them; but on the contrary, makes them unfit to be the foundations of all our other Knowledge, as they are pretended to be. This cannot be deny'd, that Men grow first acquainted with many of these self-evident Truths, upon their being proposed: But it is clear, that whosoever does so, finds in himself, That he then begins to know a Proposition, which he knew not before; and which from thenceforth he never questions: not because it was innate; but, because the consideration of the Nature of the things contained in those Words, would not suffer him to think otherwise, how, or whensoever he is brought to reflect on them. And if whatever is assented to at first hearing, and understanding the terms, must pass for an innate Principle, every well-grounded Observation drawn from particulars into a general Rule, must be innate. When yet it is certain, that not all, but only sagacious Heads light at first on these Observations, and reduce them into general Propositions, not innate, but collected from a preceding acquaintance, and reflection on particular instances. These, when observing Men have made them, unobserving Men, when they are propos'd to them, cannot refuse their assent to.

§ 22. If it be said, The Understanding hath an *implicit Knowledge*

These Maxims not being known sometimes till proposed, proves them not innate. § 22. implicitly known before proposing, signifies that the Mind is capable of understanding them, or signifies nothing.

And . . . to.] add, 2-5

Reason, amounts in reality of Fact to no more but this, That they are never known, nor taken notice of before the use of Reason, but may possibly be assented to sometime after, during a Man's Life; but when, is uncertain: And so may all other knowable Truths, as well as these, which therefore have no Advantage, nor distinction from others, by this Note of being known when we come to the use of Reason; nor are thereby proved to be innate, but quite the contrary.

§ 14. But *Secondly*, were it true, that the precise time of their being known, and assented to, were, when Men come to the Use of Reason; neither would that prove them innate. This way of arguing is as frivolous, as the Supposition of it self is false. For by what kind of Logick will it appear, that any Notion is Originally by Nature imprinted in the Mind in its first Constitution, because it comes first to be observed, and assented to, when a Faculty of the Mind, which has quite a distinct Province, begins to exert it self? And therefore, the coming to the use of Speech, if it were supposed the time, that these Maxims are first assented to (which it may be with as much Truth, as the time when Men come to the use of Reason) would be as good a Proof that they were innate, as to say, they are innate because Men assent to them, when they come to the use of Reason. I agree then with these Men of innate Principles, that there is no Knowledge of these general and self-evident Maxims in the Mind, till it comes to the Exercise of Reason: but I deny that the coming to the use of Reason, is the precise time when they are first taken notice of; and, if that were the precise time, I deny that it would prove them innate. All that can with any Truth be meant by this Proposition, That Men assent to them when they come to the use of Reason, is no more but this, That the making of general abstract Ideas, and the Understanding of general Names, being a Concomitant of the rational Faculty, and growing up with it, Children commonly get not those general Ideas, nor learn the Names that stand for them, till having for a good while exercised their Reason about familiar and more particular Ideas, they are by their ordinary Discourse and Actions with others, acknowledged to be capable of rational Conversation. If assenting to these Maxims, when Men come to the use of Reason, can be true in any other Sence, I desire it

§ 14. If coming to the use of Reason were the time of their discovery, it would not prove them innate.

(3) after,] 2-5 | after 1 (11) [1st] as] 1-4 | so 5 (25) and . . . [2nd] that] 4-5 | and that if it were, 3 | and that if it were, that 1-2

may be shewn; or at least, how in this, or any other Sence it proves them innate.

§ 15. The Senses at first let in particular Ideas, and furnish the yet empty Cabinet: And the Mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the Memory, and Names got to them. Afterwards the Mind proceeding farther, abstracts them, and by Degrees learns the use of general Names. In this manner the Mind comes to be furnish'd with Ideas and Language, the Materials about which to exercise its discursive Faculty: And the use of Reason becomes daily more visible, as these Materials, that give it Employment, increase. But though the having of general Ideas, and the use of general Words and Reason usually grow together: yet, I see not, how this any way proves them innate. The Knowledge of some Truths, I confess, is very early in the Mind; but in a way that shews them not to be innate. For, if we will observe, we shall find it still to be about Ideas, not innate, but acquired: It being about those first, which are imprinted by external Things, with which Infants have earliest to do, and which make the most frequent Impressions on their Senses. In Ideas thus got, the Mind discovers, That some agree, and others differ, probably as soon as it has any use of Memory; as soon as it is able, to retain and receive distinct Ideas. But whether it be then, or no, this is certain, it does so long before it has the use of Words; or comes to that, which we commonly call the use of Reason. For a Child knows as certainly, before it can speak, the difference between the Ideas of Sweet and Bitter (i.e. That Sweet is not Bitter) as it knows afterwards (when it comes to speak) That Worm-wood and Sugar-plumbs, are not the same thing.

§ 16. A Child knows not that Three and Four are equal to Seven, till he comes to be able to count to Seven, and has got the Name and Idea of Equality: and then upon the explaining those Words, he presently assents to, or rather perceives the Truth of that Proposition. But neither does he then readily assent, because it is an innate Truth, nor was his Assent wanting, till then, because he wanted the Use of Reason; but the Truth of it appears to him, as soon as he has settled in his Mind the clear and distinct Ideas, that these Names stand for: And then, he knows the Truth of that Proposition,

§§ 15, 16. The steps by which the Mind attains several Truths.

(7) In] 2-5 | By 1 (18) and which] 1-4 | which 5 (19) In . . . discovers] Coste 'C'est en réfléchissant sur ces idées . . . que l'Esprit juge' (30) the] 1-4; om. 5

upon the same Grounds, and by the same means, that he knew before, That a Rod and Cherry are not the same thing; and upon the same Grounds also, that he may come to know afterwards, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*, as shall be more fully shewn hereafter. So that the later it is before any one comes to have those general *Ideas*, about which those Maxims are; or to know the Signification of those general Terms, that stand for them; or to put together in his Mind, the *Ideas* they stand for: the later also will it be, before he comes to assent to those Maxims, whose Terms, with the *Ideas* they stand for, being no more innate, than those of a Cat or a Weesel, he must stay till Time and Observation have acquainted him with them; and then he will be in a Capacity to know the Truth of these Maxims, upon the first Occasion, that shall make him put together those *Ideas* in his Mind, and observe, whether they agree or disagree, according as is expressed in those Propositions. And therefore it is, That a Man knows that Eighteen and Nineteen, are equal to Thirty Seven, by the same self-Evidence, that he knows One and Two to be equal to Three: Yet, a Child knows this, not so soon as the other; not for want of the use of Reason: but because the *Ideas* the Words Eighteen, Nineteen, and Thirty seven stand for, are not so soon got, as those, which are signify'd by One, Two, and Three.

§ 17. This Evasion therefore of general Assent, when Men come to the use of Reason, failing as it does, and leaving no difference between those supposed-innate, and other Truths, that are afterwards acquired and learnt, Men have endeavoured to secure an universal Assent to those they call Maxims, by saying, they are generally assented to, as soon as proposed, and the Terms they are propos'd in, understood: Seeing all Men, even Children, as soon as they hear and understand the Terms, assent to these Propositions, they think it is sufficient to prove them innate. For since Men never fail, after they have once understood the Words, to acknowledge them for undoubted Truths, they would infer, That certainly these Propositions were first lodged in the Understanding, which, without any teaching, the Mind at very first Proposal, immediately closes with, and assents to, and after that never doubts again.

§ 17. *Assenting as soon as proposed and understood, proves them not innate.*

(4-5) shall be more fully shewn] 4-5 | we shall more fully shew 1-3 (19) this] 2-5 | that 1 (25) other] *Coste* 'plusieurs autres'

§ 18. In Answer to this, I demand whether ready assent, given to a Proposition upon first hearing, and understanding the Terms, be a certain mark of an innate Principle? If it be not, such a general assent is in vain urged as a Proof of them: If it be said, that it is a mark of innate, they must then allow all such Propositions to be innate, which are generally assented to as soon as heard, whereby they will find themselves plentifully stored with innate Principles. For upon the same ground (*viz.*) of Assent at first hearing and understanding the Terms, That Men would have those Maxims pass for innate, they must also admit several Propositions about Numbers, to be innate: And thus, *That One and Two are equal to Three, That Two and Two are equal to Four*, and a multitude of other the like Propositions in Numbers, that every Body assents to, at first hearing, and understanding the Terms, must have a place amongst these innate Axioms. Nor is this the Prerogative of Numbers alone, and Propositions made about several of them: But even natural Philosophy, and all the other Sciences afford Propositions, which are sure to meet with Assent, as soon as they are understood. *That two Bodies cannot be in the same place*, is a Truth, that no Body any more sticks at, than at this Maxim, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be; That White is not Black, That a Square is not a Circle, That Yellowness is not Sweetness*: These, and a Million of other such Propositions, as many at least, as we have distinct *Ideas*, every Man in his Wits, at first hearing, and knowing what the Names stand for, must necessarily assent to. If then these Men will be true to their own Rule, and have Assent at first hearing and understanding the Terms, to be a mark of innate, they must allow, not only as many innate Propositions, as Men have distinct *Ideas*; but as many as Men can make Propositions, wherein different *Ideas* are denied one of another. Since every Proposition, wherein one different *Idea* is denied of another, will as certainly find Assent at first hearing and understanding the Terms, as this general one, *It is impossible for the same to be, and not to be*; or that which is the Foundation of it, and is the easier understood of the two, *The same is not different*: By which Account, they will have Legions of innate Propositions of this one sort, without mentioning any other.

§ 18. *If such an Assent be a mark of innate, then that One and Two are equal to Three; that Sweetness is not Bitterness; and a thousand the like must be innate.*

(11) innate: And thus,] 2-5 | innate, 1 (20) this] 2-5 | that 1 (26) then] 1-4; om. 5 (36) Propositions] 1-3, 5 (*likewise Coste*) | Proposition 4

But since no Proposition can be innate, unless the *Ideas*, about which it is, be innate, This will be, to suppose all our *Ideas* of Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Figures, *etc.* innate; than which there cannot be any thing more opposite to Reason and Experience. Universal and ready assent, upon hearing and understanding the Terms, is (I grant) a mark of self-evidence: but self-evidence, depending not on innate Impressions, but on something else (as we shall shew hereafter) belongs to several Propositions, which no Body was yet so extravagant, as to pretend to be innate.

§ 19. Nor let it be said, That those more particular self-evident Propositions, which are assented to at first hearing, as, *That One and Two are equal to Three; That Green is not Red*, *etc.* are received as the Consequences of those more universal Propositions, which are look'd on as innate Principles: since any one, who will but take the Pains to observe what passes in the Understanding, will certainly find, That these, and the like less general Propositions, are certainly known and firmly assented to, by those, who are utterly ignorant of those more general Maxims; and so, being earlier in the Mind than those (as they are called) first Principles, cannot owe to them the Assent, wherewith they are received at first hearing.

§ 20. If it be said, that these Propositions, *viz. Two and Two are equal to Four; Red is not Blue*, *etc.* are not general Maxims, nor of any great use. I answer, That makes nothing to the Argument of universal assent, upon hearing and understanding. For if that be the certain mark of innate, whatever Proposition can be found, that receives general assent, as soon as heard and understood, that must be admitted for an innate Proposition, as well as this Maxim, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*, they being upon this Ground equal. And as to the difference of being more general, that makes this Maxim more remote from being innate; those general and abstract *Ideas*, being more strangers to our first Apprehensions, than those of more particular self-evident Propositions; and therefore, 'tis longer before they are admitted and assented to by the growing Understanding. And as to the usefulness of these magnified Maxims, that perhaps will not be found so great as is generally conceived, when it comes in its due place to be more fully considered.

§ 19. *Such less general Propositions known before these universal Maxims.* § 20. *One and One, equal to Two, etc. not general nor useful, answered.*

(1) Proposition] 1-3, 5 (likewise Coste) | Propositions 4 (3) Figures] 1-4 | Figure 5 (36) in] 1-4 | to 5 (l. below 36: § 19.) In Coste this summary is applied to §§ 19 and 20.

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§ 21. *These Maxims not being known sometimes till proposed, proves them not innate.* § 22. *Implicitly known before proposing, signifies that the Mind is capable of understanding them, or else signifies nothing.*

(27-35) And . . . to.] add. 2-5

BOOK II

CHAPTER I

Of Ideas in general, and their Original.

§ 1. EVERY Man being conscious to himself, That he thinks, and that which his Mind is employ'd about whilst thinking, being the *Ideas*, that are there, 'tis past doubt, that Men have in their Minds several *Ideas*, such as are those expressed by the words, *Whiteness*,
 5 *Hardness, Sweetness, Thinking, Motion, Man, Elephant, Army, Drunkenness*, and others: It is in the first place then to be enquired, How he comes by them? I know it is a received Doctrine, That Men have native *Ideas*, and original Characters stamped upon their Minds, in their very first Being. This Opinion I have at large examined
 10 already; and, I suppose, what I have said in the fore-going Book, will be much more easily admitted, when I have shewn, whence the Understanding may get all the *Ideas* it has, and by what ways and degrees they may come into the Mind; for which I shall appeal to every one's own Observation and Experience.

§ 2. Let us then suppose the Mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any *Ideas*; How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge?
 20 To this I answer, in one word, From *Experience*: In that, all our Knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives it self. Our Observation employ'd either about *external, sensible Objects*; or about the *internal Operations of our Minds, perceived and reflected on by our selves*, is that, which supplies our Understandings with all the materials of
 25 *thinking*. These two are the Fountains of Knowledge, from whence all the *Ideas* we have, or can naturally have, do spring.

§ 1. *Idea is the Object of Thinking.* § 2. *All Ideas come from Sensation or Reflection.*

(1. above 1) *Coste* add, before full stop, 'et où l'on examine par occasion si l'Âme de l'Homme pense toujours'. (2) employ'd] 1-4 | apply'd 5 (11) shewn] 2-5 | shewed 1

§ 3. First, *Our Senses*, conversant about particular sensible Objects, do convey into the *Mind*, several distinct *Perceptions* of things, according to those various ways, wherein those Objects do affect them: And thus we come by those *Ideas*, we have of *Yellow, White, Heat, Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, Sweet*, and all those which we call
 5 sensible qualities, which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external Objects convey into the mind what produces there those *Perceptions*. This great Source, of most of the *Ideas* we have, depending wholly upon our Senses, and derived by them to the Understanding, I call *SENSATION*.
 10

§ 4. Secondly, The other Fountain, from which Experience furnisheth the Understanding with *Ideas*, is the *Perception of the Operations of our own Minds* within us, as it is employ'd about the *Ideas* it has got; which Operations, when the Soul comes to reflect on, and consider, do furnish the Understanding with another set of *Ideas*,
 15 which could not be had from things without: and such are, *Perception, Thinking, Doubting, Believing, Reasoning, Knowing, Willing*, and all the different actings of our own Minds; which we being conscious of, and observing in our selves, do from these receive into our Understandings, as distinct *Ideas*, as we do from Bodies affecting our
 20 Senses. This Source of *Ideas*, every Man has wholly in himself: And though it be not Sense, as having nothing to do with external Objects; yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be call'd internal Sense. But as I call the other *Sensation*, so I call this *REFLECTION*, the *Ideas* it affords being such only, as the Mind gets by
 25 reflecting on its own Operations within it self. By *REFLECTION* then, in the following part of this Discourse, I would be understood to mean, that notice which the Mind takes of its own Operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof, there come to be *Ideas* of these Operations in the Understanding. These two, I say, viz.
 30 External, Material things, as the Objects of *SENSATION*; and the Operations of our own Minds within, as the Objects of *REFLECTION*, are, to me, the only Originals, from whence all our *Ideas* take their beginnings. The term *Operations* here, I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the Actions of the Mind about
 35

§ 3. *The Objects of Sensation one Source of Ideas.* § 4. *The Operations of our Minds, the other Source of them.*

(6-8) , which . . . *Perceptions*] add. 2-5 (10) the] 4-5 | our 1-3 (20) Under-standings] 4-5 | Understanding 1-3

its *Ideas*, but some sort of Passions arising sometimes from them, such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.

§ 5. The Understanding seems to me, not to have the least glimmering of any *Ideas*, which it doth not receive from one of these two. *External Objects furnish the Mind with the Ideas of sensible qualities*, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us: And the *Mind furnishes the Understanding with Ideas of its own Operations*.

These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their several Modes, Combinations, and Relations, we shall find to contain all our whole stock of *Ideas*; and that we have nothing in our Minds, which did not come in, one of these two ways. Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and thoroughly search into his Understanding, and then let him tell me, Whether all the original *Ideas* he has there, are any other than of the Objects of his *Senses*; or of the Operations of his Mind, considered as Objects of his *Reflection*: and how great a mass of Knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see, that he has *not any Idea in his Mind, but what one of these two have imprinted*; though, perhaps, with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by the Understanding, as we shall see hereafter.

§ 6. He that attentively considers the state of a *Child*, at his first coming into the World, will have little reason to think him stored with plenty of *Ideas*, that are to be the matter of his future Knowledge. 'Tis by degrees he comes to be furnished with them: And though the *Ideas* of obvious and familiar qualities, imprint themselves, before the Memory begins to keep a Register of Time and Order, yet 'tis often so late, before some unusual qualities come in the way, that there are few Men that cannot recollect the beginning of their acquaintance with them: And if it were worth while, no doubt a Child might be so ordered, as to have but a very few, even of the ordinary *Ideas*, till he were grown up to a Man. But all that are born into the World being surrounded with Bodies, that perpetually and diversly affect them, variety of *Ideas*, whether care be taken about it or no, are imprinted on the Minds of Children. *Light*, and *Colours*, are busie at hand every where, when the Eye is but

§ 5. All our Ideas are of the one or the other of these. § 6. Observable in Children.

(6) produce] 2-5 | produced 1 (7) Paragraph break here in 5, not in 1-4.
(9) Modes, Combinations, and Relations] 4-5 | modes, and the Compositions made out of them 1-3 (14) Senses;] 4-5 | Senses, 1-3 (18) these] 2-5 | those 1 (31-2) all . . . World] add. 4-5 (33) them] 4-5 | us 1-3 (35) at] 5 | and at 1-4

open; *Sounds*, and some *tangible Qualities* fail not to sollicit their proper Senses, and force an entrance to the Mind; but yet, I think, it will be granted easily, That if a Child were kept in a place, where he never saw any other but Black and White, till he were a Man, he would have no more *Ideas* of Scarlet or Green, than he that from his Childhood never tasted an Oyster, or a Pine-Apple, has of those particular Relishes.

§ 7. Men then come to be furnished with fewer or more simple *Ideas* from without, according as the *Objects*, they converse with, afford greater or less variety; and from the Operation of their Minds within, according as they more or less *reflect* on them. For, though he that contemplates the Operations of his Mind, cannot but have plain and clear *Ideas* of them; yet unless he turn his Thoughts that way, and considers them *attentively*, he will no more have clear and distinct *Ideas* of all the *Operations of his Mind*, and all that may be observed therein, than he will have all the particular *Ideas* of any Landscape, or of the Parts and Motions of a Clock, who will not turn his Eyes to it, and with attention heed all the Parts of it. The Picture, or Clock may be so placed, that they may come in his way every day; but yet he will have but a confused *Idea* of all the Parts they are made up of, till he *applies himself with attention*, to consider them each in particular.

§ 8. And hence we see the Reason, why 'tis pretty late, before most Children get *Ideas* of the Operations of their own Minds; and some have not any very clear, or perfect *Ideas* of the greatest part of them all their Lives. Because, though they pass there continually; yet like floating Visions, they make not deep Impressions enough, to leave in the Mind clear distinct lasting *Ideas*, till the Understanding turns inwards upon it self, *reflects* on its own *Operations*, and makes them the Object of its own Contemplation. Children, when they come first into it, are surrounded with a world of new things, which, by a constant sollicitation of their senses, draw the mind constantly to them, forward to take notice of new, and apt to be

§ 7. Men are differently furnished with these, according to the different Objects they converse with. § 8. Ideas of Reflexion later, because they need Attention.

(10) less] 1er-5 | lesser 1 (28) clear distinct] 2-5 | clear and distinct, 1 ('om. 1T.er) (29) turns] 2-5 | turn 1 it] 4-5 | its 1-3 reflects] 2-5 | and reflect 1 (30) makes] 2-5 | make 1 (30)-108(4) Children . . . without] 2-5 | Whereas Children at their first coming into the World, seek particularly after nothing, but what may ease their Hunger, or other Pain: but take all other Objects as they come, are generally pleased with all new ones, that are not painful 1

delighted with the variety of changing Objects. Thus the first Years are usually imploy'd and diverted in looking abroad. Men's Business in them is to acquaint themselves with what is to be found without; and so growing up in a constant attention to outward Sensations, seldom make any considerable Reflection on what passes within them, till they come to be of riper Years; and some scarce ever at all.

§ 9. To ask, *at what time a Man has first any Ideas*, is to ask, when he begins to perceive; having *Ideas*, and Perception being the same thing. I know it is an Opinion, that the Soul always thinks, and that it has the actual Perception of *Ideas* in it self constantly, as long as it exists; and that actual thinking is as inseparable from the Soul, as actual Extension is from the Body; which if true, to enquire after the beginning of a Man's *Ideas*, is the same, as to enquire after the beginning of his Soul. For by this Account, Soul and its *Ideas*, as Body and its Extension, will begin to exist both at the same time.

§ 10. But whether the Soul be supposed to exist antecedent to, or coeval with, or some time after the first Rudiments of Organisation, or the beginnings of Life in the Body, I leave to be disputed by those, who have better thought of that matter. I confess my self, to have one of those dull Souls, that doth not perceive it self always to contemplate *Ideas*, nor can conceive it any more necessary for the Soul *always to think*, than for the Body always to move; the perception of *Ideas* being (as I conceive) to the Soul, what motion is to the Body, not its Essence, but one of its Operations: And therefore, though thinking be supposed never so much the proper Action of the Soul; yet it is not necessary, to suppose, that it should be always thinking, always in Action. That, perhaps, is the Privilege of the infinite Author and Preserver of things, *who never slumbers nor sleeps*; but is not competent to any finite Being, at least not to the Soul of Man. We know certainly by Experience, that we sometimes think

§ 9. The Soul begins to have Ideas, when it begins to perceive. always; for this wants Proof.

§ 10. The Soul thinks not

(2-3) . Men's . . . acquaint[4er-5 | , and acquainting 2-4 (4) p. 107(30),
(9) perceive; . . . Ideas,] 5 | perceive, . . . Ideas 1-4 (10) Coste 'Je sai bien
qu'il y a une Opinion qui pose'; Coste, 'Je sai bien que certains Philosophes assurent
and appends a note 'Les Cartesiens' on 'certains Philosophes'. (11) [and] it 3-5
its 1-2 (15, 16) its] add. 2-5 (18) of] 1-4 | or 5 (22) Ideas] 2-5
Ideas 1 (23); the] 5 | : the 1-4 (25) one of its Operations] 2-5 | Operation
(29) of] 4-5 | of all 1-3 (likewise Coste)

* Ps. 121: 4.

and thence draw this infallible Consequence, That there is something in us, that has a Power to think: But whether that Substance perpetually thinks, or no, we can be no farther assured, than Experience informs us. For to say, that actual thinking is essential to the Soul, and inseparable from it, is to beg, what is in Question, and not to prove it by Reason; which is necessary to be done, if it be not a self-evident Proposition. But whether this, *That the Soul always thinks*, be a self-evident Proposition, that every Body assents to at first hearing, I appeal to Mankind. 'Tis doubted whether I thought all last night, or no; the Question being about a matter of fact, 'tis begging it, to bring, as a proof for it, an Hypothesis, which is the very thing in dispute: by which way one may prove any thing, and 'tis but supposing that all watches, whilst the balance beats, think, and 'tis sufficiently proved, and past doubt, that my watch thought all last night. But he, that would not deceive himself, ought to build his Hypothesis on matter of fact, and make it out by sensible experience, and not presume on matter of fact, because of his Hypothesis, that is, because he supposes it to be so: which way of proving, amounts to this, That I must necessarily think all last night, because another supposes I always think, though I my self cannot perceive, that I always do so.

But Men in love with their Opinions, may not only suppose what is in question, but alledge wrong matter of fact. How else could any one make it an *inference* of mine, *that a thing is not, because we are not sensible of it in our sleep*. I do not say there is no Soul in a Man, because he is not sensible of it in his sleep; But I do say, he cannot think at any time waking or sleeping, without being sensible of it. Our being sensible of it is not necessary to any thing, but to our thoughts; and to them it is; and to them it will always be necessary, till we can think without being conscious of it.

§ 11. I grant that the Soul in a waking Man is never without thought, because it is the condition of being awake: But whether

§ 11. It is not always conscious of it.

(6) Reason] 2-5 | Reasons 1 (9-30) 'Tis . . . it.] add. 2-5 (23-5) but . . .
[ep.] Coste 'mais encore de faire dire à ceux qui ne sont pas de leur avis, toute autre
chose que ce qu'ils ont dit effectivement. C'est ce que j'ai éprouvé dans cette occasion;
car il s'est trouvé un Auteur qui ayant lu la première Edition de cet Ouvrage, et
n'étant pas satisfait de ce que je viens d'avancer contre l'opinion de ceux qui soutien-
nent que l'Ame pense toujours, me fait dire, qu'une chose cesse d'exister parce que nous ne
savons pas qu'elle existe pendant notre sommeil. Etrange conséquence qu'on ne peut
attribuer sans avoir l'Esprit rempli d'une aveugle préoccupation!'

sleeping without dreaming be not an Affection of the whole Man, Mind as well as Body, may be worth a waking Man's Consideration; it being hard to conceive, that any thing should think, and not be conscious of it. If the *Soul* doth think in a sleeping Man, without being
 5 conscious of it, I ask, whether, during such thinking, it has any Pleasure or Pain, or be capable of Happiness or Misery? I am sure the Man is not, no more than the Bed or Earth he lies on. For to be happy or miserable without being conscious of it, seems to me utterly inconsistent and impossible. Or if it be possible, that the
 10 Soul can, whilst the Body is sleeping, have its Thinking, Enjoyments, and Concerns, its Pleasure or Pain apart, which the Man is not conscious of, nor partakes in: It is certain, that *Socrates* asleep, and *Socrates* awake, is not the same Person; but his Soul when he sleeps, and *Socrates* the Man consisting of Body and Soul when he is
 15 waking, are two Persons: Since waking *Socrates*, has no Knowledge of, or Concernment for that Happiness, or Misery of his Soul, which it enjoys alone by it self whilst he sleeps, without perceiving any thing of it; no more than he has for the Happiness, or Misery of a Man in the *Indies*, whom he knows not. For if we take wholly
 20 away all Consciousness of our Actions and Sensations, especially of Pleasure and Pain, and the concernment that accompanies it, it will be hard to know wherein to place personal Identity.

§ 12. The Soul, during sound Sleep, thinks, say these Men. *Whilst it thinks* and perceives, it is capable certainly of those of Delight or
 25 Trouble, as well as any other Perceptions; and *it must necessarily be conscious of its own Perceptions*. But it has all this apart: The sleeping Man, 'tis plain, is conscious of nothing of all this. Let us suppose then the Soul of *Castor*, whilst he is sleeping, retired from his Body, which is no impossible Supposition for the Men I have here to do
 30 with, who so liberally allow Life, without a thinking Soul to all other Animals. These Men cannot then judge it impossible, or a contradiction, That the Body should live without the Soul; nor that the Soul should subsist and think, or have Perception, even Perception of Happiness or Misery, without the Body. Let us then,
 35 as I say, suppose the Soul of *Castor* separated, during his Sleep, from

§ 12. If a sleeping Man thinks without knowing it, the sleeping and waking Man are two Persons.

(8) me | 1-2, 4-5 | be 3 (12) in: | 5 | in. 3-4 | in, 1-2 (14) sleeps | 1-3, 5 |
 Sleeps 4 (31) it | 2-5 | it is 1 (33) should . . . have | 2-5 | subsists and
 thinks, or has 1

his Body, to think apart. Let us suppose too, that it chuses for its Scene of Thinking, the Body of another Man, *v.g.* *Pollux*, who is sleeping without a Soul: For if *Castor*'s Soul can think whilst *Castor* is asleep, what *Castor* is never conscious of, 'tis no matter what
 5 Place it chuses to think in. We have here then the Bodies of two Men with only one Soul between them, which we will suppose to sleep and wake by turns; and the Soul still thinking in the waking Man, whereof the sleeping Man is never conscious, has never the least Perception. I ask then, Whether *Castor* and *Pollux*, thus, with
 10 only one Soul between them, which thinks and perceives in one, what the other is never conscious of, nor is concerned for, are not two as distinct Persons, as *Castor* and *Hercules*; or, as *Socrates* and *Plato* were? And whether one of them might not be very happy, and the other very miserable? Just by the same Reason, they make the
 15 Soul and the Man two Persons, who make the Soul think apart, what the Man is not conscious of. For, I suppose, no body will make Identity of Persons, to consist in the Soul's being united to the very same numerical Particles of matter: For if that be necessary to Identity, 'twill be impossible, in that constant flux of the Particles
 20 of our Bodies, that any Man should be the same Person, two days, or two moments together.

§ 13. Thus, methinks, every drowsy Nod shakes their Doctrine, who teach, That the Soul is always thinking. Those, at least, who do at any time *sleep without dreaming*, can never be convinced, That their Thoughts are sometimes for four hours busy without their
 25 knowing of it; and if they are taken in the very act, waked in the middle of that sleeping contemplation, can give no manner of account of it.

§ 14. 'Twill perhaps be said, That the *Soul* thinks, even in the soundest Sleep, but the Memory retains it not. That the Soul in a sleep-
 30 ing Man should be this moment busy a thinking, and the next moment in a waking Man, not remember, nor be able to recollect one jot of all those Thoughts, is very hard to be conceived, and would need some better Proof than bare Assertion, to make it be
 35 believed. For who can without any more ado, but being barely told so, imagine, That the greatest part of Men, do, during all their Lives, for several hours every day, think of something, which if they were asked, even in the middle of these Thoughts, they could

§ 13. Impossible to convince those that sleep without dreaming, that they think. § 14. That Men dream without remembering it, in vain urged.

remember nothing at all of? Most Men, I think, pass a great part of their Sleep without dreaming. I once knew a Man, that was bred a Scholar, and had no bad Memory, who told me, he had never dream'd in his Life, till he had that Fever, he was then newly recovered of, which was about the Five or Six and Twentieth Year of his Age. I suppose the World affords more such Instances: At least every one's Acquaintance will furnish him with Examples enough of such, as pass most of their Nights without dreaming.

Stop

§ 15. *To think often, and never to retain it so much as one moment, is a very useless sort of thinking:* and the Soul in such a state of thinking, does very little, if at all, excel that of a Looking-glass, which constantly receives variety of Images, or *Ideas*, but retains none; they disappear and vanish, and there remain no footsteps of them; the Looking-glass is never the better for such *Ideas*, nor the Soul for such Thoughts. Perhaps it will be said, that in a waking Man, the materials of the Body are employ'd, and made use of, in thinking; and that the memory of Thoughts, is retained by the impressions that are made on the Brain, and the traces there left after such thinking; but that in the *thinking of the Soul*, which is not perceived in a sleeping Man, there the Soul thinks apart, and making no use of the Organs of the Body, leaves no impressions on it, and consequently no memory of such Thoughts. Not to mention again the absurdity of two distinct Persons, which follows from this Supposition, I answer farther, That whatever *Ideas* the Mind can receive, and contemplate without the help of the Body, it is reasonable to conclude, it can retain without the help of the Body too, or else the Soul, or any separate Spirit, will have but little advantage by thinking. If it has no memory of its own Thoughts; if it cannot lay them up for its use, and be able to recal them upon occasion; if it cannot reflect upon what is past, and make use of its former Experiences, Reasonings, and Contemplations, to what purpose does it think? They, who make the Soul a thinking Thing at this rate, will not make it a much more noble Being, than those do, whom they condemn, for allowing it to be nothing but the subtilest parts of Matter. Characters drawn on Dust, that the first breath of wind effaces; or Impressions made on a heap of Atoms, or animal Spirits, are altogether

§ 15. Upon this Hypothesis, the Thoughts of a sleeping Man ought to be most rational.

(28) lay them up] 4 | lay up them 5 | record them 1-3 (29) occasion] 5
any occasion 1-4. (Goste 'dans l'occasion') (32) at . . . rate,] 2-4 |, at . .
rate, 5 |, at . . . rate 1

as useful, and render the Subject as noble, as the Thoughts of a Soul that perish in thinking; that once out of sight, are gone for ever, and leave no memory of themselves behind them. Nature never makes excellent things, for mean or no uses: and it is hardly to be conceived, that our infinitely wise Creator, should make so admirable a Faculty, as the power of Thinking, that Faculty which comes nearest the Excellency of his own incomprehensible Being, to be so idly and uselessly employ'd, at least $\frac{1}{4}$ part of its time here, as to think constantly, without remembering any of those Thoughts, without doing any good to it self or others, or being any way useful to any other part of the Creation. If we will examine it, we shall not find, I suppose, the motion of dull and senseless matter, any where in the Universe, made so little use of, and so wholly thrown away.

§ 16. 'Tis true, we have sometimes instances of Perception, whilst we are asleep, and retain the memory of those Thoughts: but how extravagant and incoherent for the most part they are; how little conformable to the Perfection and Order of a rational Being, those who are acquainted with Dreams, need not be told. This I would willingly be satisfied in, Whether the Soul, when it thinks thus apart, and as it were separate from the Body, acts less rationally than when conjointly with it, or no: If its separate Thoughts be less rational, then these Men must say, That the Soul owes the perfection of rational thinking to the Body: If it does not, 'tis a wonder that our Dreams should be, for the most part, so frivolous and irrational; and that the Soul should retain none of its more rational Soliloquies and Meditations.

§ 17. Those who so confidently tell us, That the Soul always actually thinks, I would they would also tell us, what those *Ideas* are, that are in the Soul of a Child, before, or just at the union with the Body, before it hath received any by Sensation. The Dreams of sleeping Men, are, as I take it, all made up of the waking Man's *Ideas*, though, for the most part, oddly put together. 'Tis strange, if the Soul has *Ideas* of its own, that it derived not from Sensation or Reflection, (as it must have, if it thought before it received any impressions from the Body) that it should never, in its private

§ 16. On this Hypothesis the Soul must have Ideas not derived from Sensation or Reflexion, of which there is no appearance. § 17. If I think when I know it not, no body else can know it.

(10) it] 4-5 | its 1-3 (21) than] 1 T.er, 2-5 | then, 1 (22) then] 1-3,
5 (likewise Goste) | than 4

conceive to be in the memory of Man in general, compared with some superiour created intellectual Beings, which in this faculty may so far excel Man, that they may have constantly in view the whole Scene of all their former actions, wherein no one of the thoughts they have ever had, may slip out of their sight. The omniscience of God, who knows all things past, present, and to come, and to whom the thoughts of Men's hearts always lie open, may satisfy us of the possibility of this. For who can doubt, but God may communicate to those glorious Spirits, his immediate Attendants, any of his Perfections, in what proportion he pleases, as far as created finite Beings can be capable. 'Tis reported of that prodigy of Parts, Monsieur *Pascal*, that, till the decay of his health had impaired his memory, he forgot nothing of what he had done, read, or thought in any part of his rational Age. This is a privilege so little known to most Men, that it seems almost incredible to those, who, after the ordinary way, measure all others by themselves: But yet, when considered, may help us to enlarge our thoughts towards greater Perfections of it in superior ranks of Spirits. For this of Mr. *Pascal* was still with the narrowness, that humane Minds are confin'd to here, of having great variety of *Ideas* only by succession, not all at once: Whereas the several degrees of Angels may probably have larger views, and some of them be endowed with capacities able to retain together, and constantly set before them, as in one Picture, all their past knowledge at once. This, we may conceive, would be no small advantage to the knowledge of a thinking Man; if all his past thoughts, and reasonings could be always present to him. And therefore we may suppose it one of those ways, wherein the knowledge of separate Spirits may exceedingly surpass ours.

§ 10. This faculty of laying up, and retaining the *Ideas*, that are brought into the Mind, several *other Animals* seem to have, to a great degree, as well as Man. For to pass by other Instances, Birds learning of Tunes, and the endeavours one may observe in them, to hit the Notes right, put it past doubt with me, that they have Perception, and retain *Ideas* in their Memories, and use them for Patterns. For it seems to me impossible, that they should endeavour to conform their Voices to Notes (as 'tis plain they do) of which they

§ 10. *Brutes have Memory.*

(4) Scene 2, 4 | Sence 3 | sense 5. (Coste 'sentiment') (20) by] 5 | in 2-4 (29, 30) p. 153(34), n.

had no *Ideas*. For though I should grant Sound may mechanically cause a certain motion of the animal Spirits, in the Brains of those Birds, whilst the Tune is actually playing; and that motion may be continued on to the Muscles of the Wings, and so the Bird mechanically be driven away by certain noises, because this may tend to the Birds Preservation: yet that can never be supposed a Reason, why it should cause mechanically, either whilst the Tune was playing, much less after it has ceased, such a motion in the Organs of the Bird's Voice, as should conform it to the Notes of a foreign Sound, which imitation can be of no use to the Bird's Preservation. But which is more, it cannot with any appearance of Reason, be supposed (much less proved) that Birds, without Sense and Memory, can approach their Notes, nearer and nearer by degrees, to a Tune play'd yesterday; which if they have no *Idea* of in their Memory, is now no-where, nor can be a Pattern for them to imitate, or which any repeated Essays can bring them nearer to. Since there is no reason why the sound of a Pipe should leave traces in their Brains, which not at first, but by their after-endeavours, should produce the like Sounds; and why the Sounds they make themselves, should not make traces which they should follow, as well as those of the Pipe, is impossible to conceive.

CHAPTER XI

Of Discerning, and other Operations of the Mind. **start**

§ 1. ANOTHER Faculty, we may take notice of in our Minds, is that of *Discerning* and distinguishing between the several *Ideas* it has. It is not enough to have a confused Perception of something in general: Unless the Mind had a distinct Perception of different Objects, and their Qualities, it would be capable of very little Knowledge; though the Bodies that affect us, were as busie about us, as they are now, and the Mind were continually employ'd in thinking. On this faculty of Distinguishing one thing from another, depends the *evidence and certainty* of several, even very general Propositions, which have passed for innate Truths; because Men over-looking the true cause, why those Propositions find universal

§ 1. *No Knowledge without it.*

assent, impute it wholly to native uniform Impressions; whereas it in truth *depends upon this clear discerning Faculty* of the Mind, whereby it perceives two *Ideas* to be the same, or different. But of this more hereafter.

§ 2. How much the imperfection of accurately discriminating *Ideas* one from another lies, either in the dulness, or faults of the Organs of Sense; or want of acuteness, exercise, or attention in the Understanding; or hastiness and precipitancy, natural to some Tempers, I will not here examine: It suffices to take notice, that this is one of the Operations, that the Mind may reflect on, and observe in it self. It is of that consequence to its other Knowledge, that so far as this faculty is in it self dull, or not rightly made use of, for the distinguishing one thing from another; so far our Notions are confused, and our Reason and Judgment disturbed or misled. If in having our *Ideas* in the Memory ready at hand, consists quickness of parts; in this of having them unconfused, and being able nicely to distinguish one thing from another, where there is but the least difference, consists, in a great measure, the exactness of Judgment, and clearness of Reason, which is to be observed in one Man above another. And hence, perhaps, may be given some Reason of that common Observation, That Men who have a great deal of Wit, and prompt Memories, have not always the clearest Judgment, or deepest Reason. For *Wit* lying most in the assemblage of *Ideas*, and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant Pictures, and agreeable Visions in the Fancy: *Judgment*, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in separating carefully, one from another, *Ideas*, wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by Similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to Metaphor and Allusion, wherein, for the most part, lies that entertainment and pleasantry of Wit, which strikes so lively on the Fancy, and therefore so acceptable to all People; because its Beauty appears at first sight, and there is required no labour of thought, to examine what Truth or Reason there is in it. The Mind without looking any farther, rests satisfied

§ 2. *The difference of Wit and Judgment.*

(28) , one from another, *Ideas*,] 2-5 (one . . . another *Ideas*, 2-3) | *Ideas* one from another, 1 (33-4) Fancy, . . . People;] 4-5 | Fancy; . . . People, 1-3

with the agreeableness of the Picture, and the gayety of the Fancy: And it is a kind of an affront to go about to examine it, by the severe Rules of Truth, and good Reason; whereby it appears, that it consists in something, that is not perfectly conformable to them.

§ 3. To the well distinguishing our *Ideas*, it chiefly contributes, that they be *clear and determinate*: And when they are so, it *will not breed any confusion* or mistake about them, though the Senses should (as sometimes they do) convey them from the same Object differently, on different occasions, and so seem to err. For though a Man in a Fever should from Sugar have a bitter taste, which at another time would produce a sweet one; yet the *Idea* of Bitter in that Man's Mind, would be as clear and distinct from the *Idea* of Sweet, as if he had tasted only Gall. Nor does it make any more confusion between the two *Ideas* of Sweet and Bitter, that the same sort of Body produces at one time one, and at another time another *Idea*, by the taste, than it makes a confusion in the two *Ideas* of White and Sweet, or White and Round, that the same piece of Sugar produces them both in the Mind at the same time. And the *Ideas* of Orange-colour and Azure, that are produced in the Mind by the same parcel of the infusion of *Lignum Nephriticum*, are no less distinct *Ideas*, than those of the same Colours, taken from two very different Bodies.

§ 4. The *COMPARING* them one with another, in respect of Extent, Degrees, Time, Place, or any other Circumstances, is another operation of the Mind about its *Ideas*, and is that upon which depends all that large tribe of *Ideas*, comprehended under *Relation*; which of how vast an extent it is, I shall have occasion to consider hereafter.

§ 5. How far Brutes partake in this faculty, is not easie to determine; I imagine they have it not in any great degree: For though they probably have several *Ideas* distinct enough, yet it seems to me to be the Prerogative of Humane Understanding, when it has sufficiently distinguished any *Ideas*, so as to perceive them to be perfectly different, and so consequently two, to cast about and consider in what circumstances they are capable to be compared. And therefore, I think, *Beasts compare* not their *Ideas*, farther than

§ 3. *Clearness alone hinders Confusion.*

§ 4. *Comparing.*

§ 5. *Brutes compare, but imperfectly.*

(1) agreeableness] 4-5 | pleasantness 1-3 (6) that] 1-4; om. 5 (16) the] 1-4; om. 5 (33) two] 1-3, 4er-5 (*likewise Coste*) | too 4 (1. below 35: § 3.) *This marginal summary not in Coste, which applies that for § 2 also to § 3.*

some sensible Circumstances annexed to the Objects themselves. The other power of Comparing, which may be observed in Men, belonging to general *Ideas*, and useful only to abstract Reasonings, we may probably conjecture Beasts have not.

§ 6. The next Operation we may observe in the Mind about its *Ideas*, is *COMPOSITION*; whereby it puts together several of those simple ones it has received from Sensation and Reflection, and combines them into complex ones. Under this of Composition, may be reckon'd also that of *ENLARGING*; wherein though the Composition does not so much appear as in more complex ones, yet it is nevertheless a putting several *Ideas* together, though of the same kind. Thus by adding several Unites together, we make the *Idea* of a dozen; and putting together the repeated *Ideas* of several Perches, we frame that of Furlong.

§ 7. In this also, I suppose, *Brutes* come far short of Men. For though they take in, and retain together several Combinations of simple *Ideas*, as possibly the Shape, Smell, and Voice of his Master, make up the complex *Idea* a Dog has of him; or rather are so many distinct Marks whereby he knows him: yet, I do not think they do of themselves ever compound them, and make complex *Ideas*. And perhaps even where we think they have complex *Ideas*, 'tis only one simple one that directs them in the knowledge of several things, which possibly they distinguish less by their Sight, than we imagine. For I have been credibly informed, that a Bitch will nurse, play with, and be fond of young Foxes, as much as, and in place of her Puppies, if you can but get them once to suck her so long, that her Milk may go through them. And those animals, which have a numerous brood of young ones at once, appear not to have any knowledge of their number; for though they are mightily concerned for any of their Young, that are taken from them whilst they are in sight or hearing, yet if one or two of them be stolen from them in their absence, or without noise, they appear not to miss them; or to have any sense, that their number is lessen'd.

§ 8. When Children have, by repeated Sensations, got *Ideas* fixed in their Memories, they begin, by degrees, to learn the use of Signs.

§ 6. Compounding. § 7. Brutes compound but little. § 8. Naming.

(13) putting] 1-3 | puting 4-5 (14) Furlong] 4-5 | a Furlong 1-3
(15) Men] 5 (likewise Coste) | Man 1-4 (18) the] 5 | a 1-4 (20) Ideas.]
5 | Ideas. 4 | Ideas: 1-3 (27-33) And . . . lessen'd.] add. 2-5

And when they have got the skill to apply the Organs of Speech to the framing of articulate Sounds, they begin to make *Use of Words*, to signify their *Ideas* to others: These verbal Signs they sometimes borrow from others, and sometimes make themselves, as one may observe among the new and unusual Names Children often give to things in their first use of Language.

§ 9. The use of Words then being to stand as outward Marks of our internal *Ideas*, and those *Ideas* being taken from particular things, if every particular *Idea* that we take in, should have a distinct Name, Names must be endless. To prevent this, the Mind makes the particular *Ideas*, received from particular Objects, to become general; which is done by considering them as they are in the Mind such Appearances, separate from all other Existences, and the circumstances of real Existence, as Time, Place, or any other concomitant *Ideas*. This is called *ABSTRACTION*, whereby *Ideas* taken from particular Beings, become general Representatives of all of the same kind; and their Names general Names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract *Ideas*. Such precise, naked Appearances in the Mind, without considering, how, whence, or with what others they came there, the Understanding lays up (with Names commonly annexed to them) as the Standards to rank real Existences into sorts, as they agree with these Patterns, and to *denominate* them accordingly. Thus the same Colour being observed to day in Chalk or Snow, which the Mind yesterday received from Milk, it considers that Appearance alone, makes it a representative of all of that kind; and having given it the name *Whiteness*, it by that sound signifies the same quality wheresoever to be imagin'd or met with; and thus Universals, whether *Ideas* or Terms, are made.

§ 10. If it may be doubted, Whether *Beasts* compound and enlarge their *Ideas* that way, to any degree: This, I think, I may be positive in, That the power of *Abstracting* is not at all in them; and that the having of general *Ideas*, is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt Man and Brutes; and is an Excellency which the Faculties of Brutes do by no means attain to. For it is evident, we observe no

§ 9. Abstraction. §§ 10, 11. Brutes abstract not.

(3) others: These verbal Signs] 4-5 | others; which words 1-3 (9) that] add. 4-5 (13, 22) Existences] 4-5 | Existencies 1-3 (27) quality] 2-5 | quali-/ 1

Names, applied to particular Things, whereof I alone having the *Ideas* in my mind, the Names of them could not be significant, or intelligible to another, who was not acquainted with all those very particular Things, which had fallen under my Notice.

§ 4. *Thirdly*, But yet granting this also feasible; (which I think is not,) yet a distinct Name for every particular Thing, would not be of any great use for the improvement of Knowledge: which though founded in particular Things, enlarges it self by general Views; to which, Things reduced into sorts under general Names, are properly
 10 subservient. These, with the Names belonging to them, come within some compass, and do not multiply every Moment, beyond what, either the Mind can contain, or Use requires. And therefore in these Men have for the most part stopp'd: but yet not so, as to hinder themselves from distinguishing particular Things, by
 15 appropriated Names, where Convenience demands it. And therefore in their own Species, which they have most to do with, and wherein they have often occasion to mention particular Persons; they make use of proper Names, and there distinct Individuals have distinct Denominations.

§ 5. Besides Persons, Countries also, Cities, Rivers, Mountains, and other the like Distinctions of Place, have usually found peculiar Names, and that for the same Reason; they being such as Men have often an Occasion to mark particularly, and, as it were, set before others in their Discourses with them. And I doubt not, but if we
 25 had Reason to mention particular Horses, as often as we have to mention particular Men, we should have proper Names for the one, as familiar as for the other; and *Bucephalus* would be a Word as much in use, as *Alexander*. And therefore we see that amongst Jockeys, Horses have their proper Names to be known and distinguished by
 30 as commonly as their Servants: Because amongst them, there is often Occasion to mention this or that particular Horse, when he is out of Sight.

start
here

§ 6. The next thing to be considered is, how general Words come to be made. For since all things that exist are only particulars, how
 35 come we by general Terms, or where find we those general Natures they are supposed to stand for? Words become general, by being

§ 5. What things have proper names. §§ 6-8. How general Words are made.

(6) Thing] 1-4 | Things 5 (13) Men] 4 | Men, 5 |, Men 1-3 (18) they
 ... there] 4-5 | there they make use of proper Names, and 1-3. (Coste om. 'there')

made the signs of general *Ideas*: and *Ideas* become general, by separating from them the circumstances of Time, and Place, and any other *Ideas*, that may determine them to this or that particular Existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of
 5 representing more Individuals than one; each of which, having in it a conformity to that abstract *Idea*, is (as we call it) of that sort.

§ 7. But to deduce this a little more distinctly, it will not perhaps be amiss, to trace our Notions, and Names, from their beginning, and observe by what degrees we proceed, and by what steps we
 10 enlarge our *Ideas* from our first Infancy. There is nothing more evident, than that the *Ideas* of the Persons Children converse with, (to instance in them alone,) are like the Persons themselves, only particular. The *Ideas* of the Nurse, and the Mother, are well framed in their Minds; and, like Pictures of them there, represent only
 15 those Individuals. The Names they first give to them, are confined to these Individuals; and the Names of *Nurse* and *Mamma*, the Child uses, determine themselves to those Persons. Afterwards, when time and a larger Acquaintance has made them observe, that there are a great many other Things in the World, that in some common
 20 agreements of Shape, and several other Qualities, resemble their Father and Mother, and those Persons they have been used to, they frame an *Idea*, which they find those many Particulars do partake in; and to that they give, with others, the name *Man*, for Example. And thus they come to have a general Name, and a general *Idea*. Wherein
 25 they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex *Idea* they had of *Peter* and *James*, *Mary* and *Jane*, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all.

§ 8. By the same way, that they come by the general Name and *Idea* of *Man*, they easily advance to more general Names and Notions. For observing, that several Things that differ from their *Idea* of
 30 *Man*, and cannot therefore be comprehended under that Name, have yet certain Qualities, wherein they agree with *Man*, by retaining only those Qualities, and uniting them into one *Idea*, they have again another and a more general *Idea*; to which having given a Name, they make a term of a more comprehensive extension:
 35 Which new *Idea* is made, not by any new addition, but only, as before, by leaving out the shape, and some other Properties

(2) [each] and] 4-5 | or 1-3 (12) alone,] 1-3 | alone 4-5 (15) give] 1-4 |
 gave 5 (21) Mother,] 4-5 | Mother: 1-3 (27) common] 1-2, 4-5 |
 commonly 3

signified by the name *Man*, and retaining only a Body, with Life, Sense, and spontaneous Motion, comprehended under the Name *Animal*.

§ 9. That this is the way, whereby Men first formed general Ideas, and general Names to them, I think, is so evident, that there needs no other proof of it, but the considering of a Man's self, or others, and the ordinary proceedings of their Minds in Knowledge: And he that thinks general Natures or Notions, are any thing else but such abstract and partial *Ideas* of more complex ones, taken at first from particular Existences, will, I fear, be at a loss where to find them. For let any one reflect, and then tell me, wherein does his *Idea* of *Man* differ from that of *Peter*, and *Paul*; or his *Idea* of *Horse*, from that of *Bucephalus*, but in the leaving out something, that is peculiar to each Individual; and retaining so much of those particular complex *Ideas*, of several particular Existences, as they are found to agree in? Of the complex *Ideas*, signified by the names *Man*, and *Horse*, leaving out but those particulars wherein they differ, and retaining only those wherein they agree, and of those, making a new distinct complex *Idea*, and giving the name *Animal* to it, one has a more general term, that comprehends, with *Man*, several other Creatures. Leave out of the *Idea* of *Animal*, Sense and spontaneous Motion, and the remaining complex *Idea*, made up of the remaining simple ones of Body, Life, and Nourishment, becomes a more general one, under the more comprehensive term, *Vivens*. And not to dwell longer upon this particular, so evident in it self, by the same way the Mind proceeds to *Body*, *Substance*, and at last to *Being*, *Thing*, and such universal terms, which stand for any of our *Ideas* whatsoever. To conclude, this whole mystery of *Genera* and *Species*, which make such a noise in the Schools, and are, with Justice, so little regarded out of them, is nothing else but abstract *Ideas*, more or less comprehensive, with names annexed to them. In all which, this is constant and unvariable, That every more general term, stands for such an *Idea*, as is but a part of any of those contained under it.

stop here

§ 10. This may shew us the reason, why, in the defining of Words, which is nothing but declaring their signification, we make use of the *Genus*, or next general Word that comprehends it. Which is not out

§ 9. General Natures are nothing but abstract Ideas. § 10. Why the Genus is ordinarily made use of in Definitions.

(11) and then tell me,] add. 4-5 (12) Man] 4-5 | a Man, 1-3 Horse] 4-5
an Horse 1-3 (21) [11] of] add. 4-5 Sense] 4-5 | Sense, 1-3

of necessity, but only to save the labour of enumerating the several simple *Ideas*, which the next general Word, or *Genus*, stands for; or, perhaps, sometimes the shame of not being able to do it. But though defining by *Genus* and *Differentia*, (I crave leave to use these terms of Art, though originally Latin, since they most properly suit those Notions they are applied to;) I say, though defining by the *Genus* be the shortest way; yet, I think, it may be doubted, whether it be the best. This I am sure, it is not the only, and so not absolutely necessary. For Definition being nothing but making another understand by Words, what *Idea*, the term defined stands for, a definition is best made by enumerating those simple *Ideas* that are combined in the signification of the term Defined: and if instead of such an enumeration, Men have accustomed themselves to use the next general term, it has not been out of necessity, or for greater clearness; but for quickness and dispatch sake. For, I think, that to one who desired to know what *Idea* the word *Man* stood for; if it should be said, that *Man* was a solid extended Substance, having Life, Sense, spontaneous Motion, and the Faculty of Reasoning, I doubt not but the meaning of the term *Man*, would be as well understood, and the *Idea* it stands for be at least as clearly made known, as when it is defined to be a rational *Animal*; which by the several definitions of *Animal*, *Vivens*, and *Corpus*, resolves it self into those enumerated *Ideas*. I have in explaining the term *Man*, followed here the ordinary Definition of the Schools: which though, perhaps, not the most exact, yet serves well enough to my present purpose. And one may in this instance, see what gave occasion to the Rule, that a Definition must consist of *Genus*, and *Differentia*: and it suffices to shew us the little necessity there is of such a Rule, or advantage in the strict observing of it. For Definitions, as has been said, being only the explaining of one Word, by several others, so that the meaning, or *Idea* it stands for, may be certainly known, if languages are not always so made, according to the Rules of Logick, that every term can have its signification, exactly and clearly expressed by two others. Experience sufficiently satisfies us to the contrary; or else those who have made this Rule, have done ill, that they have given us so few Definitions conformable to it. But of Definitions, more in the next Chapter.

(17) Man] 4-5 | a Man 1-3 (21) is] 1-3, 5 | it 4 (22) it] 1-3, 5 | its 4
(25) serves] 1-2, 4-5 | it serves 3 (26) the] 4-5 | that 1-3 (likewise Coste)
(27) Genus] 4-5 | its Genus 1-3