

derived from *Sensation*, or *Reflexion*, is too obvious to need any Explication.

CHAPTER XXXVII

Of Identity and Diversity.

Start

§ 1. ANOTHER occasion, the mind often takes of comparing, is the very Being of things, when considering any thing as existing at any determin'd time and place, we compare it with it self existing at another time, and thereon form the *Ideas of Identity and Diversity*. When we see any thing to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure, (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another, which at that same time exists in another place, how like 10 and undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects: And in this consists *Identity*, when the *Ideas* it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment, wherein we consider their former existence, and to which we compare the present. For we never finding, nor conceiving it possible, that two things of the same kind should exist in the same place at the same time, we rightly conclude, that whatever exists any where at any time, excludes all of the same kind, and is there it self alone. When therefore we demand, whether any thing be the same or no, it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place, which was certain, at that instant, was the same with it self and no other: From whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two beginnings of Existence, nor two things one beginning, it being impossible for two things of the same kind, to be or exist in the same instant, in the very same place; or one and the same thing in different places. That therefore that had one beginning, is the same thing, and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the same but divers. That which has made the Difficulty about this Relation, has been the little care and attention used in having precise Notions of the things to which it is attributed.

§ 1. *Wherein Identity consists.*

§ 2. We have the *Ideas* but of three sorts of Substances; I. God. 2. Finite Intelligences. 3. *Bodies*. First, God is without beginning, eternal, unalterable, and every where; and therefore concerning his Identity, there can be no doubt. Secondly, Finite Spirits having had each its determinate time and place of beginning to exist, the relation to that time and place will always determine to each of them its Identity as long as it exists.

Thirdly, The same will hold of every Particle of Matter, to which no Addition or Subtraction of Matter being made, it is the same. For though these three sorts of Substances, as we term them, do not exclude one another out of the same place; yet we cannot conceive but that they must necessarily each of them exclude any of the same kind out of the same place: Or else the Notions and Names of Identity and Diversity would be in vain, and there could be no such distinction of Substances, or any thing else one from another. For Example, could two Bodies be in the same place at the same time; then those two parcels of Matter must be one and the same, take them great or little; nay, all Bodies must be one and the same. For by the same reason that two particles of Matter may be in one place, all Bodies may be in one place: Which, when it can be supposed, takes away the distinction of Identity and Diversity, of one and more, and renders it ridiculous. But it being a contradiction, that two or more should be one, Identity and Diversity are relations and ways of comparing well founded, and of use to the Understanding. All other things being but Modes or Relations ultimately terminated in Substances, the Identity and Diversity of each particular Existence of them too will be by the same way determined: Only as to things whose Existence is in succession, such as are the Actions of finite Beings, *e.g. Motion and Thought*, both which consist in a continued train of Succession, concerning their Diversity, there can be no question: Because each perishing the moment it begins, they cannot exist in different times, or in different places, as permanent Beings can at different times exist in distant places; and therefore no motion or thought considered as at different times can be the same, each part thereof having a different beginning of Existence.

§ 2. *Identity of Substances.* § 2(20). *Identity of Modes.*

(*Below 36: § 2(20).*) In 2-4, *this facer in the margin* "Which, when it can be supposed . . . ; in 5 it facer II, 19-20; in Cosse, *in facies* 'All other things . . . ', (*J. 25*), which begin a new paragraph in § 2.

* The whole of this Chapter xxvii add. 2-5, with a consequent re-numbering in 2-5 of the following chapters of Book II.

§ 3. From what has been said, 'tis easy to discover, what is so much enquired after, the *principium Individuationis*, and that 'tis plain is Existence it self, which determines a Being of any sort to a particular time and place incommunicable to two Beings of the same kind. This though it seems easier to conceive in simple Substances or Modes; yet when reflected on, is not more difficult in compounded ones, if care be taken to what it is applied; v.g. Let us suppose an Atom, i.e. a continued body under one immutable Superficies, existing in a determined time and place: 'tis evident, that, considered in any instant of its Existence, it is, in that instant, the same with it self. For being, at that instant, what it is, and nothing else, it is the same, and so must continue, as long as its Existence is continued: for so long it will be the same, and no other.

In like manner, if two or more Atoms be joined together into the same Mass, every one of those Atoms will be the same, by the foregoing Rule: And whilst they exist united together, the Mass, consisting of the same Atoms, must be the same Mass, or the same Body, let the parts be never so differently jumbled: But if one of these Atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer the same Mass, or the same Body. In the state of living Creatures, their Identity depends not on a Mass of the same Particles; but on something else. For in them the variation of great parcels of Matter alters not the Identity: An Oak, growing from a Plant to a great Tree, and then lopp'd, is still the same Oak: And a Colt grown up to a Horse, sometimes fat, sometimes lean, is all the while the same Horse: though, in both these Cases, there may be a manifest change of the parts: So that truly they are not either of them the same Masses of Matter, though they be truly one of them, the same Oak, and the other the same Horse. The reason whereof is that in these two cases of a Mass of Matter, and a living Body Identity is not applied to the same thing.

§ 4. We must therefore consider wherein an Oak differs from a Mass of Matter, and that seems to me to be in this; that the one is only the Cohesion of Particles of Matter any how united, the other such a disposition of them as constitutes the parts of an Oak; and

§ 3. Principium Individuationis. § 4. Identity of Vegetables.

such an Organization of those parts, as is fit to receive, and distribute nourishment, so as to continue, and frame the Wood, Bark, and Leaves, etc. of an Oak, in which consists the vegetable Life. That being then one Plant, which has such an Organization of Parts in one coherent Body, partaking of one Common Life, it continues to be the same Plant, as long as it partakes of the same Life, though that Life be communicated to new Particles of Matter vitally united to the living Plant, in a like continued Organization, conformable to that sort of Plants. For this Organization being at any one instant in any one Collection of *Matter*, is in that particular concrete 10 distinguished from all other, and is that individual Life, which existing constantly from that moment both forwards and backwards in the same continuity of insensibly succeeding Parts united to the living Body of the Plant, it has that Identity, which makes the same Plant, and all the parts of it, parts of the same Plant, 15 during all the time that they exist united in that continued Organization, which is fit to convey that Common Life to all the Parts so united.

§ 5. The Case is not so much different in *Brutes*, but that any one may hence see what makes an Animal, and continues it the same. Something we have like this in Machines, and may serve to illustrate it. For Example, what is a Watch? 'Tis plain 'tis nothing but a fit Organization, or Construction of Parts, to a certain end, which, when a sufficient force is added to it, it is capable to attain. If we would suppose this Machine one continued Body, all whose organized Parts were repair'd, increas'd or diminish'd, by a constant Addition or Separation of insensible Parts, with one Common Life, we should have something very much like the Body of an Animal, with this difference, That in an Animal the fitness of the Organization, and the Motion wherein Life consists, begin together, the Motion coming from within; but in Machines the force, coming sensibly from without, is often away, when the Organ is in order,

§ 6. This also shews wherein the Identity of the same *Man* consists; viz. in nothing but a participation of the same continued Life, 35

§ 5. Identity of Animals. § 6. Identity of Man.

(3) A Being of any sort] 4-5 | any sort of Being 2-3 (11) instant] 2-3
 instant 4-5 (17-18) or the same Body.] add. 4-5 (19) no longer 4-5
 not 2-3 (20), or the same Body.] add. 4-5 (26) may add. 4-5 (16) they
 in Coste) (28) Masses 2, 4-5 [Mass 3 (likewise Coste)

(4) [ut the] 4-5 | the same 2-3 (15) and . . . Plant,] add. 4-5
 ut] 4-5 (likewise Coste) | they exist, 4 | it exists, one Body, 2-3 (16) they
 in Animal] add. 4-5 | and 2-3 (29) in

by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter, in succession virally united to the same organized Body. He that shall place the *Identity* of Man in any thing else, but like that of other Animals in one fifty organized Body taken in any one instant, and from thence continued under one Organization of Life in several successively fleeting Particles of Matter, united to it, will find it hard, to make an *Embryo*, one of Years, mad, and sober, the same Man, by any Supposition, that will not make it possible for *Seth, Ismael, Socratus, Pilate, St. Austin, and Caesar Borgia* to be the same Man. For if the *Identity* of Soul alone makes the same Man, and there be nothing in the Nature of Matter, why the same individual Spirit may not be united to different Bodies, it will be possible, that those Men, living in distant Ages, and of different Tempers, may have been the same Man: Which way of speaking must be from a very strange use of the 15 Word *Man*, applied to an *Idea*, out of which Body and Shape is excluded: And that way of speaking would agree yet worse with the Notions of those Philosophers, who allow of Transmigration, and are of Opinion that the Souls of Men may, for their Miscarriages, be dectracted into the Bodies of Beasts, as fit Habitations with Organs suited to the satisfaction of their Brutal Inclinations. But yet I think no body, could he be sure that the Soul of *Heliogabalus* were in one of his Hogs, would yet say that Hog were a *Man* or *Heliogabalus*.

§ 7. "Tis not therefore Unity of Substance that comprehends all sorts of *Identity*, or will determine it in every Case: But to conceive, 20 and judge of it aright, we must consider what *Idea* the Word it is applied to stands for: It being one thing to be the same *Substance*, another the same *Man*, and a third the same *Person*; if *Person, Man*, and *Substance*, are three Names standing for three different *Ideas*; for such as is the *Idea* belonging to that Name, such must be the *Identity*: Which if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would possibly have prevented a great deal of that Confusion, which often occurs about this Matter, with no small seeming Difficulties especially concerning *Personal Identity*, which therefore we shall in the next place a little consider.

§ 8. An Animal is a living organized Body; and consequently, the same Animal, as we have observed, is the same continued Life

communicated to different Particles of Matter, as they happen successively to be united to that organiz'd living Body. And whatever is talked of other definitions, ingenuous observation puts it past doubt, that the *Idea* in our Minds, of which the Sound *Man* in our Mouths is the Sign, is nothing else but of an Animal of such a certain Form: Since I think I may be confident, that whoever should see a Creature of his own Shape and Make, though it had no more reason all its Life, than a *Cat* or a *Parrot*, would call him still a *Man*; or whoever should hear a *Cat* or a *Parrot* discourse, reason, and philosophize, would call or think it nothing but a *Cat* or a *Parrot*; 10 and say, the one was a dull irrational *Man*, and the other a very intelligent rational *Parrot*. A Relation we have in an Author of great note is sufficient to countenance the supposition of a rational *Parrot*. His Words(α) are,

"I had a mind to know from *Prince Maurice's* own Mouth, the 15 account of a common, but much credited Story, that I had heard, so often from many others, of an old *Parrot* he had in *Brazil*, during his Government there, that spoke, and asked, and answered common Questions like a reasonable Creature; so that those of his Train there, generally concluded it to be Witchery or Possession; and one 20 of his Chaplains, who lived long afterwards in *Holland*, would never from that time endure a *Parrot*, but said, they all had a Devil in them. I had heard many particulars of this Story, and assevered by People hard to be discredited, which made me ask *Prince Maurice* what there was of it. He said, with his usual plainness, and dryness in 25 talk, there was something true, but a great deal false, of what had been reported. I desired to know of him, what there was of the first; he told me short and coldly, that he had heard of such an old *Parrot* when he came to *Brazil*, and though he believed nothing of it, and 'twas a good way off, yet he had so much Curiosity as to 30 send for it, that 'twas a very great and a very old one; and when it came first into the Room where the Prince was, with a great many *Dutch-men* about him, it said presently, *What a company of white Men are there?* They asked it what he thought that Man was, pointing at the Prince? It answered, *Some General or other*; when they brought it 35

§ 7. *Identity suited to the Idea.* § 8. *Same Man.*

(α) *Mémoires of what part in Christendom from 1672. to 1679.* p. 57.
1-6) Add. i. Form. 1 : and that our Notion of a *Man*, whatever is talked
of other definitions, is but of a particular sort of Animal, I doubt not. 2-4
(g-10) discourse . . . Philosophie 5 | Discourse, Reason and Philosophize 4 |
discourse Reason and Philosophie 2-3 (*Liberale Coste*) (12)-335(3) A . . .
Parrot] add. 4-5. (*Nat. in Coste*, but in Coste₂) (1. below 35) [Memorier . . . ,
by Sir William Temple]

Livre I.

close to him, he asked it, *D'où viens vous ?* it answered, *De Marimian.* The Prince, *A qui estes vous ?* The Parrot, *A un Portugais.* Prince, *Que fais tu là ?* Parrot, *Je garde les pouilles.* The Prince laughed and said, *Vous gardez les pouilles ?* The Parrot answered, *Oui, moy et je stay bien faire ;* and made the Chuck four or five times that People use to make to Chickens when they call them. † I set down the Words of this worthy Dialogue in *French*, just as Prince *Maurice* said them to me. I asked him in what Language the *Parrot* spoke, and he said, in *Brasilian*; I asked whether he understood *Brasilian*; he said No, but he had taken care to have two Interpreters by him, the one a *Dutchman*, that spoke *Brasilian*, and the other a *Brasilian*, that spoke *Dutch*; that he asked them separately and privately, and both of them agreed in telling him just the same thing that the *Parrot* said. I could not but tell this odd Story, because it is so much out of the way, and from the first hand, and what may pass for a good one; for I dare say this Prince, at least, believed himself in all he told me having ever passed for a very honest and pious Man; I leave it to Naturalists to reason, and to other Men to believe as they please upon it; however, it is not, perhaps, amiss to relieve or enliven a busie Scene sometimes with such digressions, whether to the

I have taken care that the Reader should have the Story at large
in the Authors own Words, because he seems to me not to have
thought it incredible; for it cannot be imagined that so able a Man
as he, who had sufficiency enough to warrant all the Testimonies he
gives of himself, should take so much pains, in a place where it had
nothing to do, to pin so close, not only on a Man whom he mentions
as his Friend, but on a Prince in whom he acknowledges very great
Honesty and Piety, a Story which if he himself thought incredible
he could not but also think ridiculous. The Prince, 'tis plain, who
vouches this Story, and our Author who relates it from him, both
call this Talker a *Parrot*; and I ask any one else who thinks
such a Story fit to be told, whether if this *Parrot*, and all of its kind
had always talked as we have a Princes word for it, this one did
not deserve to be told.

[†] Whence come ye? It answered, From Marinman. The Prince, To whom we look after the Chickens? The Parrot, To a Portugese Prince, What do you there? Parrot, I look after the Chickens? The Parrot answered, In The Parrot laughed and said, You look after the Chickens?

(1) it], 5 | it; 4 (22) In 4-5, the repeated facing the beginning of this paragraph.

whether, I say, they would not have passed for a race of *rational Animals*, but yet whether for all that, they would have been allowed to be Men and not *Parrots*? For I presume 'tis not the *Idea* of a thinking or rational Being alone, that makes the *Idea* of a *Man* in most Peoples Sense; but of a Body so and so shaped joined to it; and if that be the *Idea* of a *Man*, the same successive Body not shifted all at once, must as well as the same immaterial Spirit go to the making of the same *Man*.

§ 9. This being premised to find wherein *personal Identity* consists, we must consider what *Person* stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: It being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our Present Sensations and Perceptions: And by this every one is to himself, that which he calls *self*: If not being considered in this case, whether the same *self* be continued in the same, or divers Substances. For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and

is that, that makes every one to be, what he calls *self*; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists *personal Identity*, i.e. the sameness of a rational Being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that *Person*; it is the same *self*, now it was then; and 'tis by the same *self* with this present one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done.

§ 10. But it is farther enquir'd whether it be the same Identical Substance. This few would think they had reason to doubt of, if these Perceptions, with their consciousness, always remain'd present in the Mind, whereby the same thinking thing would be always consciously present, and, as would be thought, evidently the same to it self. But that which seems to make the difficulty is this, that this consciousness, being interrupted always by forgetfulness, there being no moment of our Lives wherein we have the

"What do you want?" asked the Parrot, *To a Parrot*. Prince, *What do you want?* The Parrot, *To the Chickens?* The Parrot answered, *You look after the Chickens!* The Prince laughed and said, *You*.

(1) it], 5 | it; 4 (22) In 4-5, the repeated facing the beginning of this paragraph.

whole train of all our past Actions before our Eyes in one view: But even the best Memories losing the sight of one part whilst they are viewing another; and we sometimes, and that the greatest part of our Lives, not reflecting on our past selves, being intent on our present Thoughts, and in sound sleep, having no Thoughts at all, or at least none with that consciousness, which remarks our waking Thoughts. I say, in all these cases, our consciousness being interrupted, and we losing the sight of our past *selves*, doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking thing; *i.e.* the same substance ⁵ personal Identity at all. The Question being what makes the same Person, and not whether it be the same Identical Substance, which always thinks in the same Person, which in this case matters not at all. Different Substances, by the same consciousness (where they do 10 partake in it) being united into one Person; as well as different Bodies, by the same Life are united into one Animal, whose Identity is preserved, in that change of Substances, by the unity of one continued Life. For it being the same consciousness that makes a Man be himself to himself, personal Identity depends on that only, whether it be annexed only to one individual Substance, or can be continued in a succession of several Substances. For as far as any intelligent Being can repeat the Idea of any past Action with the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present Action; so far it is the same *personal self*.
 15 For it is by the consciousness it has of its present Thoughts and Actions, that it is *self* to it *self* now, and so will be the same *self* as far as the same consciousness can extend to Actions past or to come, and would be by distance of Time, or change of Substance, no more than two Persons than a Man be two Men, by wearing other Cloaths to
 20 Day than he did Yesterday, with a long or short sleep between: The same consciousness uniting those distant Actions into the same Person, whatever Substances contributed to their Production.
 § 11. That this is so, we have some kind of Evidence in our very Bodies, all whose Particles, whilst vitally united to this same thinking conscious self, so that we feel when they are touch'd, and
 25 are affected by, and conscious of good or harm that happens to them, are a part of our *selves*: *i.e.* of our thinking conscious *self*. Thus
 30 § 11. Personal Identity in change of Substances.

the Limbs of his Body is to every one a part of *himself*: He sympathizes and is concerned for them. Cut off an hand, and thereby separate it from that consciousness, we had of its Heat, Cold, and other Affections; and it is then no longer a part of that which is *himself*, any more than the remotest part of Matter. Thus we see the ⁵ Substance, whereof *personal self* consisted at one time, may be varied at another, without the change of personal Identity: There being no Question about the same Person, though the Limbs, which but now were a part of it, be cut off.

§ 12. But the Question is, whether if the same Substance, which ¹⁰ thinks, be changed, it can be the same Person, or remaining the same, it can be different Persons. And to this I answer first, this can be no Question at all to those, who place Thought in a purely material, animal, Constitution, void of an immaterial Substance. For, whether their Supposition be true ¹⁵ or no, 'tis plain they conceive personal Identity preserved in something else than Identity of Substance; as animal Identity is preserved in Identity of Life, and not of Substance. And therefore those, who place thinking in an immaterial Substance only, before they can come to deal with these Men, must shew why personal Identity cannot be preserved in the change of immaterial Substances, or variety of particular immaterial Substances, as well as animal Identity is preserved in the change of material Substances, or variety of particular Bodies: Unless they will say, 'tis one immaterial Spirit, that makes the same Life in Brutes; as it is one immaterial Spirit ²⁰ that makes the same Person in Men, which the Cartesians at least will not admit, for fear of making Brutes thinking things too.
 § 13. But next, as to the first part of the Question, Whether if the same thinking Substance (supposing immaterial Substances only to think) be changed, it can be the same Person. I answer, that cannot ²⁵ be resolv'd, but by those, who know what kind of Substances they are, that do think; and whether the consciousness of past Actions can be transfer'd from one thinking Substance to another. I grant, were the same Consciousness the same individual Action, it could not. But it being but a present representation of a past Action, why ³⁰ it may not be possible, that that may be represented to the Mind to have been, which really never was, will remain to be shewn. And
 35 § 12-15. Whether in the change of thinking Substances.

(10) not] 2-3 (*Likewise Coste*) | no 4-5
 (32) Person,] 4-5 | Person 2-3
 (29) Cloaths] 4-5 | Cloths 2-3
 (4-5 | Spiritus 2-3
 (22) immaterial Substances,]

(1) immaterial Substance] 4-5 | Spirit 2-3
 (2) immaterial Substances,]

therefore how far the consciousness of past Actions is annexed to any individual Agent, so that another cannot possibly have it, will be hard for us to determine, till we know what kind of Action it is, that cannot be done without a reflex Act of Perception accompanying it, and how perform'd by thinking Substances, who cannot think without being conscious of it. But that which we call the *same consciousness*, not being the same individual Act, why one intellectual Substance may not have represented to it, as done by it self, what it never did, and was perhaps done by some other Agent, why I say such a representation may not possibly be without reality of Matter of Fact, as well as several representations in Dreams are, which yet, whilst dreaming, we take for true, will be difficult to conclude from the Nature of things. And that it never is so, will by us, till we have clearer views of the Nature of thinking Substances, be best resolv'd into the Goodness of God, who as far as the Happiness or Misery of any of his sensible Creatures is concerned in it, will not by a fatal Error of theirs transfer from one to another, that consciousness, which draws Reward or Punishment with it. How far this may be an Argument against those who would place Thinking in a System of fleeting animal Spirits, I leave to be considered. But yet to return to the Question before us, it must be allowed, That if the same consciousness (which, as has been shewn, can be transfer'd from one thinking Substance to another, in Body) can be transfer'd from one thinking Substance to another, it will be possible, that two thinking Substances may make but one Person. For the same consciousness being preserv'd, whether in the same or different Substances, the personal Identity is preserv'd.

§ 14. As to the second part of the Question, Whether the same immaterial Substance remaining, there may be two distinct Persons; which Question seems to me to be built on this, Whether the same immaterial Being, being conscious of the Actions of its past Duration, may be wholly stripp'd of all the consciousness of its past Existence, and lose it beyond the power of ever retrieving again: And so as it were beginning a new Account from a new Period, have a consciousness that cannot reach beyond this new State. All those who hold pre-existence, are evidently of this Mind, since they allow the Soul to have no remaining consciousness of what it did in that pre-existent State, either wholly separate from

(3) is] 2-4 | is; 5 (4) without 2er-5 | with 2
2-3. (Coste 'entraine après lui') (29) , there] 3-5 | there, 2

[§ 1-4 (2) the . . . Person.] Coste 'les mêmes particules de matière unies à quelque Corps sans une *conscience* commune, peuvent faire la même personne.'

Body, or informing any other Body; and if they should not, 'tis plain Experience would be against them. So that personal Identity reaching no farther than consciousness reaches, a pre-existent Spirit not having continued so many Ages in a state of Silence, must needs make different Persons. Suppose a Christian *Platonist*⁵ or *Pythagorean*, should upon God's having ended all his Works of Creation the Seventh Day, think his Soul hath existed ever since; and should imagine it has revolved in several Humane Bodies, as I once met with one, who was Perswaded his had been the Soul of *Socrates* (how reasonably I will not dispute. This I know, that in the Post he fill'd, which was no inconsiderable one, he passed for a very rational Man, and the Press has shewn, that he wanted not Parts or *Socrates's Actions* or *Thoughts*, could be the same Person with *Socrates*? Let any one reflect upon himself, and conclude, that he has in himself an immaterial Spirit, which is that which thinks in him, and in the constant change of his Body keeps him the same; and is that which he calls himself: Let him also suppose it to be the same Soul, that was in *Nestor* or *Therites*, at the Siege of *Troy*, (For Souls being as far as we know any thing of them in their Nature, in different to any parcel of Matter, the Supposition has no apparent absurdity in it) which it may have been, as well as it is now, the Soul of any other Man: But he, now having no consciousness of any of the Actions either of *Nestor* or *Therites*, does, or can he, conceive himself the same Person with either of them? Can he be concerned in neither of their Actions? Attribute them to himself, or think them his own more than the Actions of any other Man, that ever existed? So that this consciousness not reaching to any of the Actions of either of those Men, he is no more one *self* with either of them, than [if the Soul or immaterial Spirit, that now informs him, had been created, and began to exist, when it began to inform his present Body], though it were never so true, that the same Spirit that informed *Nestor's* or *Therites's Body*, were numerically the same that now informs his. For this would no more make him the same Person with *Nestor*, than if some of the Particles of Matter, that were once a part of *Nestor*, were now a part of this Man, the same immaterial Substance without the same consciousness, no more making the same Person by being united to any Body, than the same Particle of

(§ 1-4 (2) the . . . Person.) Coste 'les mêmes particules de matière unies à quelque Corps sans une *conscience* commune, peuvent faire la même personne.'

Matter without consciousness united to any Body, makes the same Person. But let him once find himself conscious of any of the Actions of *Nestor*, he then finds himself the same Person with *Nestor*.

§ 15. And thus we may be able without any difficulty to conceive, the same Person at the Resurrection, though in a Body not exactly in make or parts the same which he had here, the same consciousness going along with the Soul that inhabits it. But yet the Soul alone in the change of Bodies, would scarce to any one, but to him that makes the Soul the *Man*, be enough to make the same *Man*. For should the Soul of a Prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the Prince's past Life, enter and inform the Body of a Cobler as soon as deserted by his own Soul, every one sees, he would be the same Person with the Prince, accountable only for the Prince's Actions: But who would say it was the same *Man*? The

Body too goes to the making the *Man*, and would, I guess, to every Body determine the *Man* in this case, wherein the Soul, with all its Princely Thoughts about it, would not make another *Man*: But he would be the same Cobler to every one besides himself. I know that in the ordinary way of speaking, the same Person, and the same *Man*, stand for one and the same thing. And indeed every one will always have a liberty to speak, as he pleases, and to apply what articulate Sounds to what *Ideas* he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleases. But yet when we will enquire, what makes the same *Spirit*, *Man*, or *Person*, we must fix the *Ideas* of *Spirit*, *Man*, or *Person*, in our Minds; and having resolved with our selves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine, in either of them, or the like, when it is the *same*, and when not.

§ 16. But though the same immaterial Substance, or Soul does not alone, where-ever it be, and in whatsoever State, make the same *Man*; yet 'tis plain consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended, should it be to Ages past, unites Existences, and Actions, very remote in time, into the same Person, as well as it does the Existence and Actions of the immediately preceding moment: So that whatever has the consciousness of present and past Actions, is the same Person to whom they both belong. Had I the same consciousness,

that I saw the Ark and *Noah's* Flood, as that I saw an overflowing of the *Thames* last Winter, or as that I write now, I could no more doubt that I, that write this now, that saw the *Thames* overflow'd last Winter, and that view'd the Flood at the general Deluge, was the same *self*, place that *self* in what Substance you please, than that I that write this am the same *my self* now whilst I write (whether I consist of all the same Substance, material or immaterial, or no) than I was Yesterday. For as to this point of being the same *self*, it matters not whether this present *self* be made up of the same or other Substances, I being as much concern'd, and as justly accountable for any Action was done a thousand Years since, appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am, for what I did the last moment.

§ 17. *Self* is that conscious thinking thing, (whatever Substance, made up of whether Spiritual, or Material, Simple, or Compounded, it matters not) which is sensible, or conscious of Pleasure and Pain, capable of Happiness or Misery, and so is concern'd for it *self*, as far as that consciousness extends. Thus every one finds, that whilst comprehended under that consciousness, the little Finger is as much a part of it *self*, as what is most so. Upon separation of this little Finger, should this consciousness go along with the little Finger, and leave the rest of the Body, 'tis evident the little Finger would be the *Person*, the *same Person*; and *self* then would have nothing to do with the rest of the Body. As in this case it is the consciousness that goes along with the Substance, when one part is separated from another, which makes the same *Person*, and constitutes this inseparable *self*: so it is in reference to Substances remote in time. That with which the *consciousness* of this present thinking thing can join it self, makes the same *Person*, and is one *self* with it, and with nothing else; and so attributes to it *self*, and owns all the Actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that consciousness reaches, and no farther; as every one who reflects will perceive.

§ 18. In this *personal Identity* is founded all the Right and Justice of Reward and Punishment; Happiness and Misery, being that, for § 17. *Self depends on Consciousness*. §§ 18-20. *Object of Reward and Punishment*.

(1) [and] that] add. 3-5 (12) self-consciousness] *Coste adds a marginal linguistic note.*

(2) self] add. 3-5 (14) Substance, / | 2-3, 5 | Substance] *4*

(26) separated 2-3 (*likewise*

(27) Substances] *2-4* | Substance *5* separate 4-5

4-5 | So ... time, that . . . farther, *2-3* (27-32) : so . . . time. That . . . further;

mem. 2-3 (31) Actions,] *4-5* (34) Punishment; *4-5* | Punish-

(i. below 34: SS 18-20.) *Punishment*. *2-3* | *Punishments* *4-5*

(2) *Consciousness makes the same Person.*

(3) , the . . . Resurrection] *4-5* | at the Resurrection the same *Person* *2-3*

(6) which] add. 4-5 (17-18) he . . . besides] *4-5* it would to every one be

(24) [*2nd*] *Spirit*] *2er-5* [*Spirits* *2* (29) -ever]

the same Cobler beside *2-3* (i. below 35) make] *2-3* | make *4-5*

(31) Actions,] *4-5* [*Actions* *2-3* (i. below 4-5)

p. Register

which every one is concerned for *himself*, not mattering what becomes of any Substance, not joined to, or affected with that consciousness. For as it is evident in the instance I gave but now, if the consciousness went along with the little Finger, when it was cut off, that would be the same *self* which was concerned for the whole Body Yesterday, as making a part of it *self*, whose Actions then it cannot but admit as its own now. Though if the same Body should still live, and immediately from the separation of the little Finger have its own peculiar consciousness, whereof the little Finger knew nothing, it would not at all be concerned for it, as a part of *self*, or could own any of its Actions, or have any of them imputed to him.

§ 19. This may shew us wherein *personal Identity* consists, not in the Identity of Substance, but, as I have said, in the Identity of *consciousness*, wherein, if *Socrates* and the present Mayor of *Quinborough* agree, they are the same Person: If the same *Socrates* walking and sleeping do not partake of the same *consciousness*, *Socrates* walking, sleeping is not the same Person. And to punish *Socrates* walking, for what sleeping *Socrates* thought, and waking *Socrates* was never conscious of, would be no more of Right, than to punish one Twin for what his Brother-Twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished; for such Twins have been seen.

§ 20. But yet possibly it will still be objected, suppose I wholly lose the memory of some parts of my Life, beyond a possibility of retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never be conscious of them again; yet am I not the same Person, that did those Actions, had those Thoughts, that I was once conscious of, though I have now forgot them? To which I answer, that we must here take notice what the Word *I* is applied to, which in this case is the Man only. And the same Man being presumed to be the same Person, *I* is easily here supposed to stand also for the same Person. But if it be possible for the same Man to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same Man would at different times make different Persons; which, we see, is the Sense of Mankind in the solemnest Declaration of their Opinions,

35 Human Laws not punishing the *Mad Man* for the *Sober Man's* Actions, nor the *Sober Man* for what the *Mad Man* did, thereby making them two Persons; which is somewhat explained by our

(14) Mayor of *Quinborough* Goste 'Roy de Magal'
(30), I, 3-5 | I, 2

(23) I add. 2er-5

way of speaking in *English*, when we say such an one is *not himself*, or is *besides himself*; in which Phrases it is insinuated, as if those who now, or, at least, first used them, thought, that *self* was changed, the *self* same Person was no longer in that Man.

§ 21. But yet 'tis hard to conceive, that *Socrates* the same individual Man should be two Persons. To help us a little in this, we must consider what is meant by *Socrates*, or the same individual *Man*. *First*, It must be either the same individual, immaterial, thinking Substance: In short, the same numerical Soul, and nothing else.

Secondly, Or the same Animal, without any regard to an immaterial Soul.

Thirdly, Or the same immaterial Spirit united to the same Animal.

Now take which of these Suppositions you please, it is impossible to make personal Identity to consist in any thing but consciousness; or reach any farther than that does.

For by the First of them, it must be allowed possible that a Man born of different Women, and in distant times, may be the same Man. A way of speaking, which whoever admires, must allow it possible, for the same Man to be two distinct Persons, as any two that have lived in different Ages without the knowledge of one another's Thoughts.

By the Second and Third, *Socrates* in this Life, and after it, cannot be the same Man any way, but by the same consciousness; and so making *Humane Identity* to consist in the same thing wherein we place *Personal Identity*, there will be no difficulty to allow the same Man to be the same Person. But then they who place *Humane Identity* in consciousness only, and not in something else, must consider how they will make the Infant *Socrates* the same Man with *Socrates* after the Resurrection. But whatsoever to some Men makes a *Man*, and consequently the same individual Man, wherein perhaps few are agreed, personal Identity can by us be placed in nothing but consciousness (which is that alone which makes what we call *self*) without involving us in great Absurdities.

§ 22. But is not a Man Drunk and Sober the same Person, why else is he punish'd for the Fact he commits when Drunk, though he be never afterwards conscious of it? Just as much the same Person, as a Man that walks, and does other things in his sleep, is the same Person, and is answerable for any mischief he shall do in it. Humane

¶ 21, 22. *Difference between Identity of Man and Person.*

(2) , § 4-5 | 2-3 (9) Substance: 2-3, 5 | Substance: 4

Laws punish both with a Justice suitable to their way of Knowledge: Because in these cases, they cannot distinguish certainly what is real, what counterfeit; and so the ignorance in Drunkenness or Sleep is not admitted as a plea. For though punishment be annexed to personality, and personality to consciousness, and the Drunkard perhaps be not conscious of what he did; yet Humane Judicatures justly punish him; because the Fact is proved against him, but want of consciousness cannot be proved for him. But in the great Day, wherein the Secrets of all Hearts shall be laid open, it may be reasonable to think, no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of; but shall receive his Doom, his Conscience accusing or excusing him.

§ 23. Nothing but consciousness can unite remote Existences into one Person, the Identity of Substance will not do it. For what ever Substance there is, however framed, without consciousness, there is no Person: And a Carcase may be a Person, as well as any sort of Substance be so without consciousness.

Could we suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses acting the same Body, the one constantly by Day, the other by Night; and on the other side the same consciousness acting by Intervals two distinct Bodies: I ask in the first case, Whether the *Day* and the *Night-man* would not be two as distinct Persons, as *Socrates* and *Plato*; and whether in the second case, there would not be one Person in two distinct Bodies, as much as one Man is the same in two distinct clothings. Nor is it at all material to say, that this same, and this distinct consciousness in the cases above-mentioned, is owing to the same and distinct immaterial Substances, bringing it with them to those Bodies, which whether true or no, alters not the case: Since 'tis evident the *personal Identity* would equally be determined by the consciousness, whether that consciousness were annexed to some individual immaterial Substance or no. For granting that the thinking Substance in Man must be necessarily suppos'd immaterial, 'tis evident, that immaterial thinking thing may sometimes part with its past consciousness, and be restored to it again, as appears in the forgetfulness Men often have of their past Actions, and the Mind many times recovers the memory of a

§§ 23-5. Consciousness alone makes self.

Past consciousness, which it had lost for twenty Years together. Make these intervals of Memory and Forgetfulness to take their turns regularly by Day and Night, and you have two Persons with the same immaterial Spirit, as much as in the former instance two Persons with the same Body. So that self is not determined by Identity or Diversity of Substance, which it cannot be sure of, but only by Identity of consciousness.

§ 24. Indeed it may conceive the Substance whereof it is now made up, to have existed formerly, united in the same conscious Being: But consciousness removed, that Substance is no more it self, or makes no more a part of it, than any other Substance, as is evident in the instance, we have already given, of a Limb cut off, of whose Heat, or Cold, or other Affections, having no longer any consciousness, it is no more of a Man's self than any other Matter of the Universe. In like manner it will be in reference to any immaterial Substance, which is void of that consciousness whereby I am my self to my self: If there be any part of its Existence, which I cannot upon recollection join with that present consciousness, whereby I am now my self, it is in that part of its Existence no more my self, than any other immaterial Being. For whatsoever any Substance his thought or done, which I cannot recollect, and by my consciousness make my own Thought and Action, it will no more belong to me, whether a part of me thought or did it, than if it had been thought or done by any other immaterial Being anywhere existing.

§ 25. I agree the more probable Opinion is, that this consciousness is annexed to, and the Affection of one individual immaterial Substance.

But let Men according to their divers Hypotheses resolve of that as they please. This every intelligent Being, sensible of Happiness or Misery, must grant, that there is something that is *himself*, that he is concerned for, and would have happy; that this self has existed in a continued Duration more than one instant, and therefore 'tis possible may exist, as it has done, Months and Years to come, without any certain bounds to be set to its duration; and may be the same self, by the same consciousness, continued on for the future. And thus, by this consciousness, he finds himself to be the same self which did such or such an Action some Years since, by

(1) two 4-5 | the two 2-3 (17) : If . . . which] 4-5 | so that 2-3
 (2) join] 4-5 | join any part of its Existence 2-3 (15) conscious.
 (3) Hypotheses] 3-5 | Hypothesis 2 (22) it add. 4-5
 (31-2) consciousness 2-3 (29) every 2er-5 | very 2

which he comes to be happy or miserable now. In all which account of *self*, the same numerical Substance is not considered, as making the same *self*: But the same continued consciousness, in which several Substances may have been united, and again separated from it, ⁵ which, whilst they continued in a vital union with that, wherein this consciousness then resided, made a part of that same *self*. Thus any part of our Bodies vitally united to that, which is conscious in us, makes a part of our *selfes*: But upon separation from the vital union, by which that consciousness is communicated, that, which a moment since was part of our *selfes*, is now no more so, than a part of another Man's *self* is a part of me; and 'tis not impossible, but in a little time may become a real part of another Person. And so we have the same numerical Substance become a part of two different Persons; and the same Person preserved under the change of various Substances. Could we suppose any Spirit wholly stripp'd of all its memory or consciousness of past Actions, as we find our Minds always are of a great part of ours, and sometimes of them all; the union or separation of such a Spiritual Substance would make no variation of personal Identity, any more than that of any Particle of Matter does. Any Substance vitally united to the present thinking Being, is a part of that very same *self* which now is: Any thing united to it by a consciousness of former Actions makes also a part of the same *self*, which is the same both then and now.

§ 26. *Person*, as I take it, is the name for this *self*. Where-ever a Man finds, what he calls *himself*, there I think another may say is the same *Person*. It is a Forensick Term appropriating Actions and their Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of a Law and Happiness and Misery. This personality extends its *self* beyond present Existence to what is past, only by consciousness, whereby it becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to it ³⁰ past Actions, just upon the same ground, and for the same reason, that it does the present. All which is founded in a concern for Happiness the unavoidable concomitant of consciousness, that which is conscious of Pleasure and Pain, desiring, that that *self*, that is conscious, should be happy. And therefore whatever past Actions it cannot reconcile or appropriate to that present *self* by consciousness, it can be no more concerned in, than if they had never been done: And to receive Pleasure or Pain; i.e. Reward or Punishment,

§§ 26, 27. *Person a Forensick Term.*

(19) Particle] 4-5 | Particles 2-3 (28) [2nd] and] 4-5 | or 2-3 (*like the Coste*)

on the account of any such Action, is all one, as to be made happy or miserable in its first being, without any demerit at all. For supposing a Man punish'd now, for what he had done in another Life, whereof he could be made to have no consciousness at all, what difference is there between that Punishment, and being created miserable? And therefore conformable to this, the Apostle tells us, *diligent, the secrets of all Hearts shall be laid open.** The Sentence shall be justified by the consciousness all Persons shall have, that they ¹⁰ *themselves* in what Bodies soever they appear, or what Substances those Actions, and deserve that Punishment for them.

§ 27. I am apt enough to think I have in treating of this Subject made some Suppositions that will look strange to some Readers, and possibly they are so in themselves. But yet I think, they are ¹⁵ such, as are pardonable in this ignorance we are in of the Nature of that thinking thing, that is in us, and which we look on as our *lever*: Did we know what it was, or how it was tied to a certain System of fleeting Animal Spirits; or whether it could, or could not perform its Operations of Thinking and Memory out of a Body ²⁰ organized as ours is; and whether it has pleased God, that no one such Spirit shall ever be united to any but one such Body, upon the right Constitution of whose Organs its Memory should depend, we might see the Absurdity of some of those Suppositions I have made. But taking, as we ordinarily now do, (in the dark concerning these ²⁵ Matters) the Soul of a Man, for an immaterial Substance, independent from Matter, and indifferent alike to it all, there can from the Nature of things, be no Absurdity at all, to suppose, that the same Soul may, at different times be united to different Bodies, and with them make up, for that time, one Man; As well as we suppose a part of a Sheep's ³⁰ Body yesterday should be a part of a Man's Body tomorrow, and in that union make a vital part of *Melibæus* himself as well as it did of his Ram.

§ 28. To conclude, whatever Substance begins to exist, it must, during its Existence, necessarily be the same: Whatever Compositions of Substances begin to exist, during the union of those ³⁵ *self*.

§ 28. *The difficulty from ill use of Names.*

(6-7), that] add. 4-5 (25) these] 2er-5 | those 2 (1. below 35) *In Coste*,
§§ 26, 29 come under the same marginal summary as that for §§ 26, 27.

* *cf. 1 Cor. 14: 25 and 2 Cor. 5: 10.*

Substances, the concrete must be the same: Whatsoever Mode begins to exist, during its Existence, it is the same: And so if the Composition be of distinct Substances, and different Modes, the same Rule holds. Whereby it will appear, that the difficulty or obscurity, that has been about this Matter, rather rises from the Names ill used, than from any obscurity in things themselves. For whatever makes the specifick *Idea*, to which the name is applied, if that *Idea* be steadily kept to, the distinction of any thing into the same, and divers will easily be conceived, and there can arise no doubt about it.

§ 29. For supposing a rational Spirit be the *Idea* of a *Man*, 'tis easier to know, what is the *same Man*, viz. the *same Spirit*, whether separate or in a Body will be the *same Man*. Supposing a rational Spirit virtually united to a Body of a certain conformation to make a *Man*, whilst that rational Spirit, with that vital conformation of Parts, though continued in a fleeting successive Body, remains, it will be the *same Man*. But if to any one the *Idea* of a *Man* be, but the vital union of Parts in a certain shape; as long as that vital union and shape remains, in a concrete no otherwise the same, but by a continued succession of fleeting Particles, it will be the same *Man*. For whatever be the composition whereof the complex *Idea* is made, whenever Existence makes it one particular thing under any denomination, the same Existence continued, preserves it the same individual under the same denomination.

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CHAPTER XXXVIII

Of other Relations.

§ 1. Besides the before-mentioned occasions of Time, Place, and Causality of comparing, or referring Things one to another, there are, as I have said, infinite others, some whereof I shall mention.

§ 29. Continued Existence makes Identity.

(19-20) remains, . . . Particles, [4-5] remains . . . Particles 2-3 (24) [5 adh
in a faintate, quatinus from Locke? Third Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, pp. 153.
etc.; prefaced by The Doctrine of Identity and Diversity, contained in this Chapter
the Bishop of Worcester pretends to be inconsistent with the Doctrine of the Christian
Faith, concerning the Resurrection of the Dead. His Way of arguing from it is this:
He says, *The Reason of believing the Resurrection of the same Body upon Mr. Locke's Ground*
is from the Idea of Identity. To which our Author answers:
(*I. below 24*) *XXVIII*
2-5 | XVII 1 (*i. above 25*) *Relations* Coste adds ' et sur tout, des Relations
Morales'

First, The first I shall name, is some one simple *Idea*; which being capable of Parts or Degrees, affords an occasion of comparing the Subjects wherein it is to one another, in respect of that simple *Idea*, *e.g.* *Whiter*, *Sweeter*, *Bigger*, *Equal*, *More*, etc. These Relations depending on the Equality and Excess of the same simple *Idea*, in several Subjects, may be called, if one will, *Proportional*; and that these are only conversant about those simple *Ideas* received from Sensation or Reflection, is so evident, that nothing need be said to evince it.

§ 2. *Secondly*, Another occasion of comparing Things together, or 10 considering one thing, so as to include in that Consideration some other thing, is the Circumstances of their origin or beginning; which being not afterwards to be altered, make the Relations, depending thereon, as lasting as the Subjects to which they belong; *e.g.* *Father and Son, Brothers, Cousin-Germans*, etc. which have their 15 Relations by one Community of Blood, wherein they partake in several degrees; *Country-men*, *i.e.* those who were born in the same Country, or Tract of Ground; and these I call *natural Relations*: Wherein we may observe, that Mankind have fitted their Notions and Words to the use of common Life, and not to the truth and extent of Things. For 'tis certain, that in reality, the Relation is the same, betwixt the Begetter, and the Begotten, in the several Races of other Animals, as well as Men: But yet 'tis seldom said, This Bull is the Grandfather of such a Calf; or that two Pidgeons are Cousin-Germains. It is very convenient, that by distinct 25 Names, these Relations should be observed, and marked out in Mankind, there being occasion, both in Laws, and other Communications one with another, to mention and take notice of Men, under these Relations: From whence also arise the Obligations of several Duties amongst Men: Whereas in Brutes, Men having very 30 little or no cause to mind these Relations, they have not thought fit to give them distinct and peculiar Names. This, by the way, may give us some light into the different state and growth of Languages, which being suited only to the convenience of Communication, are proportioned to the Notions Men have, and the commerce of Thoughts familiar amongst them; and not to the reality or extent of Things, nor to the various Respects might be found among them;

§ 3. Natural.

(31) these] 2-5 | those 1