Cultural Agency in the Americas

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Contents

cultural creativity as the appropriate space of that utopian minimum without which material progress loses its sense of imagination and turns into the worst kinds of alienation. In the face of the trivialized and trivializing aestheticization of everyday life—and also in the face of its other pole, that ecstasy of form that confuses art with provocative gestures and mere extravagance—there do not appear to be any clear signs of a "way out." We have, however, been learning that any such way would inevitably pass through an opening of the aesthetic to the cultural question: that which seizes the density of the heterogeneity to which different sensibilities and tastes expose us to, in alternative lifestyles and in social movements.

Note

1. Michel Serres, *Hominescence* (Paris: Le Pommier, 2001).

Between Technology and Culture: Communication and Modernity in Latin America

JESÚS MARTÍN BARBERO

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To abstract modernization from its original context is to see that its processes have lost their center and multiplied throughout the world, in capital accumulations, the internationalization of markets, the spread of technology and schooling, the globalization of mass media, and the dizzying circulation of fashion that comes with universalizing certain patterns of consumption.—J. Joaquin Brunner

Clues to the Debate

From the beginning, but especially since the mid-1960s, Latin American communication studies have been rent between two poles: technology—the "fact of technology" with its modernizing or developmental logic—and culture, meaning memory and identities as they struggle to survive and regroup through resistance and reappropriation. The theoretical and political vacillation of communication studies derives from this ambivalent, mestizo discourse that pulls in the opposite directions of (1) *knowledge* regulated by the laws of accumulation and compatibility and (2) *acknowledgment* of cultural differences and variable truths. At stake in the relationship between communication and modernity is the very story line of modernity and cultural discontinuities, the anachronisms and the utopias that mass media both deliver and resist.

The debate about modernity has a very particular interest for Latin America because it recasts the linear model of progress that had run past modernity's variations and temporal discontinuities, the long durée of deep collective memory "brought to the surface by sudden changes in the social fabric torn by modernity itself."[1] The debate is about our crises, and this debate engulfs Latin America in "resistance" through traditions, the contemporaneousness of its "backwardness," and the contradictions of development. Modernism came early and modernity came late, in heterogeneous

pieces. These concerns have joined social sciences with philosophic reflection. Everyday experience demands more than shifting paradigms for analysis; it needs new questions.

One key question, unavoidable for understanding the folds in the fabric of Latin American development, is the cultural question. It is crucial, since constructions of identity take on decisive dimensions when cultural communities retrench themselves against modernity and refresh ethnic and racial labels. If development means the capacity for societies to act for themselves and to modify the course of events, the undifferentiated form of global modernization today clashes with cultural identities and exacerbates fundamentalist tendencies. We need a new notion of identity, "not static or dogmatic, but one that assumes continuous transformation and historicity as part of a substantive modernity."[2] The improvement would get beyond purely instrumental reason and would renew the pursuit of universality as the counterpoint to particularism and cultural ghettos. All this requires a new concept of development capacious enough for culturally different modes and rhythms of insertion.

Globalization delegitimizes the traditions and customs that, until very recently, served our societies as "contexts of confidence";[3] it dismantles our bases for ethics and cultural habitat. This is at the root of so much inner seething and also of surface violence. People can easily assimilate technological advances and images of modernization. But recovering a system of values and civic norms is a long and painful process. The uncertainty of epochal change compounds the ideological shifts with an erosion of cognitive maps, leaving one without interpretive categories to capture the dizzying transformations. This is most patent in the changes suffered by traditional cultures (agricultural, indigenous, and Black) during the intensification of communication with other cultures in each country and with other countries in the world. From within traditional communities, communication is perceived simultaneously as yet another threat to cultural survival and as a chance to break through isolation. If interaction is risky, it also creates opportunities. The fact is that traditional communities show a dynamism today that outstrips the interpretive frameworks of anthropologists and folklorists: there is less nostalgia and more consciousness that symbolic life needs to be adjusted for the future.[4] Consider the diversification and development of

artisanal production in open interaction with modern design and even with some dynamics of cultural industries, the growing number of radio and television stations run by communities themselves, or the Zapatista movement making proclamations over the Internet about the utopia of indigenous Mexicans in Chiapas. On the other hand, these traditional cultures offer modern society an unsuspected strategic relevance by helping to offset a purely mechanical replacement of values. In their diversity, traditions represent a challenge to the allegedly universal and ahistorical homogenizing pressure of modernization.

If economic and technological globalization discounts the importance of place and peoples, a complementary pressure from local cultures raises the ante with daily demands for more self-determination. They claim rights to count in decisions about economics and politics, to construct their own images, and to recount their own stories. Identity is therefore no longer conceivable as separate or exclusive in ways that would resist homogenization; it is a narrated construction. The polysemia of the verb *re-count* cannot be more meaningful. It means the plurality of cultures that can be counted and the activity of dynamic cultures that tell their own unfolding stories.[5] Those stories respond both to the hegemonic language of mass media with its double movement of hybridization (between appropriation and mestizaje) and to translations from orality to audiovisual and informatic media as well as to writing. In its thickest and most conceptually daunting sense, *multiculturalism* points to this reciprocity: societies dynamized by the economy and cultural differences to support a heterogeneity of groups and their adjustment to global pressures, but also aware of the diverse range of codes and stories within a cultural group. What globalization puts into play, then, is not just the greater circulation of products, but also a deep reorganization of relationships among peoples, cultures, and countries. Cultural identity can be narrated and constructed through new media and genres, but only if communications industries get direction from creative cultural policies that take everyday culture into account. This would include an explicit transformation of the relationship between educational systems and the fields of experience that make up the new languages of the information age.

The debate has special connections with the field of communication for obvious reasons: modernization is ever more identified with technological

advances in information, which makes communication the strategic site for reformulating modernity's viability and its repercussions for postmodernity. In recent years communication has become crucial for imagining and identifying new social models. The term *information society* signifies not only that information is vital to social life and development but that it organizes society at large through communication. What does this mean? Basically that all functions and spaces would be connected in a self-regulated, transparent way. Self-regulation means "well tempered functionality, solidarity among all the elements of the system so that all components stay informed about all others and about the system as a whole."[6] It is balance, retroactivity, constant circulation. In other words, self-regulation would mean a knot of complex relationships that tied each one of us down in incessant communication. Transparency is a corollary and alludes to the transformation of discourses into forms that become absolutely available to each other.[7] The result is to disturb the very nature of knowledge, understood now to be only that which is translatable to digitalized information. Society would then be transparent. Being and knowing would correspond to each other, with nothing left over.

Communication has also become paradoxically crucial in a sense opposed to the positivism of the informational model. Jürgen Habermas has expressly linked "communicative praxis" to the pursuit and defense of noninstrumental rationality, one that still sustains the liberating dimensions of modernity and questions the reduction of the project to its purely technical and economic aspects. Communicative reason is at the center of his reflection on society, filling the gap left by an "epistemological orphanhood" after the paradigms of production and representation came to crises.[8] This reorientation provides an ability to resist coercion and to promote new social movements, including ethnic, ecological, and feminist movements. From this perspective Habermas is a pioneer, despite critiques of his idealization of reason and communicative action. He established the relevance of communication as undeniable for reframing analyses of social action, a research agenda, and the epistemology and politics of critical theory.

From the other side of the crisis of modernity, where postmodernity enters, communication matters too. Communication is hardly a mere instrument or modality of action, but a constitutive element of the new conditions of knowledge, according to J. F. Lyotard.[9] This is where the fundamental

change of epoch is being produced: in knowledge that no longer bows down to that modern reason that strives for unity, but on the contrary, reason that moves between gaps in a limitless horizon and in the limited forms of all knowledge, the impossibility of metanarratives and the irreducibly "local character" of all discourse. Similarly, but less austerely optimistic than Lyotard, G. Vattimo listens to a society of communication that emerges from a "weakening of reality"[10] as urban subjects are subjected to the constant crisscross of information, interpretation, and images. Mass society becomes an experience of declining values and diminishing power of modernity's central oppositions: tradition/innovation, progress/reaction, vanguard/kitsch. Instead of polarities we confront multiplicity through questions of the other: the political and cultural thickness of differences in ethnicity, sexuality, and locality.

Another link between analyses of the crisis and issues of communication is the challenge to the modernist rejection of mass culture: "The firm line that had separated 'classical' modernism from mass culture does not hold for the critical and artistic sensibility of postmodernity."[11] F. Jameson adds that the erosion is perhaps the most disturbing aspect of postmodernity from an academic viewpoint.[12] With that line of difference undone, we face a "field of tensions" between tradition and innovation, between high art and popular or mass culture. The field doesn't fit into the categories of modernity because the question of the other exposes a basic imperialism inside and out. Today, opposition is not limited to negation or rejection but includes "affirmative forms of resistance and resistant forms of affirmation."[13]

The Modernity of Communication

Latin America experiences, in particular ways, the generally ambiguous but strategic centrality of communication in modernity. During the "lost decade" of the 1980s the only industry that enjoyed major investments and notable development was communications. Suffice it to mention a few facts: the number of television channels grew from four hundred to fifteen hundred from the mid-1970s to the 1980s; Brazil and Mexico acquired their own satellites; radio and television linked onto global networks by satellite in most

countries; data networks, parabolic antennae, TV cable networks were established; and several countries launched regional TV channels.[14] By the same token, since the eighties, telecommunications and information technologies have become beachheads for neoliberalism, as is evident from the priority given to the privatization of telecommunications (from Argentina and Colombia to Peru) and from the privatization of television in the few countries like Mexico and Colombia that still had some public channels. What accounts for this priority, except the fact that communication has become strategic not only at the level of technological advance but also in macroeconomic decisions? In other words, the technological and political enclave of communication has become decisive in social design and reorganization as well as in economics. This implies that public institutions are incapable of managing the technological change in communications. Initiatives are left to market forces, and state intervention is seen as interference that borders on censorship! The purposeful confusion has unraveled what for years was called public service.[15] We will have to revive it if we hope to save some notion of democracy.

To think through the relationship between modernity and communication in Latin America is to let go of the theoretical and ideological baggage that refuses to accommodate the messy matrixes of disorganization and reorganization in urban life, including migrations, fragmentation, and dislocation. The dynamism scrambles the opposition between expansive democratizing massification and an elite fascination with modern technology. This experience of communicative thickness obliges us to rethink the relationship between culture and politics.[16]

What role has communication played in the process of interpellating social subjects? It has been a leading role, one which represents a fundamental change at the heart of modernization as we live it. The idea of modernity that promoted the construction of modern nations in the 1930s had an economic component—integration into international markets—and a political component to constitute a national culture, identity, and feeling for the nation. That project was conceivable only through communication between urban masses and the state. Media, especially the radio, became the state's spokesmen, interpellating masses into the people and the people into a nation. Populist *caudillos* used the radio to develop a new political discourse that abandoned

the sermon and also parliamentary processes. Oscar Landi describes the modernity of Juan Perón's speeches, which, along with those of the Mexican Revolution, were the first to turn workers and farmers into citizens.[17]

Today, communication goes in the opposite direction to devalue the nation.[18] What the media broadcast, explicitly if you ask young people, is the emergence of cultures without territorial memory, or where place takes second place. New musical and visual cultures are unlike language-based cultures that are linked to a land. But just because transnational culture responds to transnational market strategies of television, records, and video, it should not be underestimated as an agent of particular identity formation. Today, identities live in short temporalities; they are precarious but also flexible enough to amalgamate elements from very different and discontinuous cultural worlds, including modernist residues and radical ruptures. It's easy to dismiss these new deterritorialized sensibilities as social agents, but that would make it harder to communicate the value that "the nation" may still have for them.

The media augur a world that doesn't fit into polar oppositions between national and antinational. They promote contradictory movements of globalization and cultural fragmentation through the revitalization of local cultures. The press as well as radio and, increasingly, television are invested in differentiating culture by region and age group, all the while creating links among them through global rhythms and images. The idea of nation is not only devalued as a result of deterritorialized economics and world culture; it also erodes from an internal liberation of differences. From one point of view, the nation seems provincial and tied down by the state; from another it is a homogenizing force of centralization. From both perspectives, culture resignifies the meaning of borders. What can borders possibly mean now that satellites can "photograph" underground resources and information needed for economic decisions circulates through informal networks? Of course frontiers still exist, but they are likely to describe old differences of class and race and the new frontiers of technology and generation rather than national borders. Nation can still have some purchase, if it doesn't get derailed into intolerant particularism as a reaction to dissolving frontiers; it can work as historical mediator to make intergenerational and interethnic communication possible.

Communication from the Viewpoint of Culture

> We know that struggle through cultural mediation doesn't make for immediately spectacular results. But it is the only guarantee that we won't go from a simulacrum of hegemony to a simulacrum of democracy where defeated oppressors come back through the complicit habits of thought and feeling.—N. García Canclini

Thinking about communication from the perspective of culture unsettles the instrumental thinking that has dominated the field of communication and that still legitimates itself today through a technological optimism based on an expansive concept of information.[19] At stake, beyond the academic legitimacy of communication studies, is *intellectual legitimacy*, the potential for communication to be a strategic site for social thought.[20] The paradigm of mediation and cultural analysis opens toward this social weight of research on the relationship between communication and society. Otherwise the expansion of our field and its deepening theoretical sophistication could turn into an embarrassing alibi for moral and practical bankruptcy.

Communication becomes more strategic every day in the development, or in the blockage, of our societies. Consider the links between information and violence, between the media and new authoritarian regimes, and new technologies for reorganizing productivity, public administration, and education. As a result, intellectuals face the task of struggling against a cult of immediacy. We need to recover historical context and critical distance in order to make sense of the transformations that affect the future of civil society and of democracy.

No wonder communication studies have become so important. In Latin America the field developed from the overlap between (1) a North American paradigm of information and instrumentalism, and (2) a Latin American social scientific critique, meaning ideological denunciation. Between these was a wedge of French semiotic structuralism. By the end of the 1970s developmentalists promoted a model of society that turned mass media communications into a beachhead for "spreading innovation" and for transforming society.[21] From Latin America, dependency theory along with a critique of cultural imperialism would lead to another kind of reductionism, one that identified communications with ideological reproduction and denied its specificity of domain and practices.[22] The mutual rejection of technological know-how and social critique during the seventies made for a dangerous excision. Communication studies started by theorizing the complicity between the media and domination, treating technical issues as so many instruments of power and leaving no room for contributions by the Frankfurt School or by semiotics. Theodor Adorno was reduced to denouncing the complicity between technological development and economic rationality and to identifying mass media with the death of art.[23]

Semiotics fared no better. It simply reinforced ideological refusals of the media on the grounds that they managed social control.[24] The combined result was to mire communication studies in what Mabel Piccini calls "a chain of totalities" that blocked any consideration of the culturally and socially constitutive dimensions.[25]

By the mid-eighties the field showed profound changes brought about mostly by a general movement in the social sciences. The question of instrumental reason was raised, including its hegemony as the political horizon of ideological marxism. At the same time, globalization and transnationalism overwhelmed theorists of imperialism and obliged analysts to rethink the roles of territory, actors, and contradictions. The stimuli for reconceptualizing communication came as much from the experience of social movements as from a reflection on cultural studies. Together they lifted the barriers that had demarcated the field of communication. Information, associated with technological innovation, gained scientific and operational legitimacy while communication migrated to the neighboring fields of philosophy and hermeneutics. But the breach between technological optimism and political skepticism remained.

In Latin America, the lifted barriers allowed for new relationships with a range of social sciences, often shaped by contributions from the very disciplines that reached out to study communication. Despite some misgivings, communication studies developed through methodological borrowings (from history, anthropology, aesthetics), while sociology, anthropology, and political science took on the media and cultural industries as central issues. From neighborhood histories of Buenos Aires to the transformation of Black Brazilian music into an urban and national sound, from accounts of symbolic artisanal crafts in market economies to the rhythms of continuity and rup-

ture in urban carnival and religious practices, anthropology had to rethink the disorienting and hybridizing effects of globalization, and sociology had to consider the place of media in cultural transformation and cultural politics.[26]

Along with the theme of media in the social sciences came the growing consciousness that communication needed a transdisciplinary approach.[27] Otherwise the endlessly heterogeneous experience of big cities would stay out of focus. Through new practices of getting together and staying apart, the media acquire a density that doesn't fit into one discipline; they constitute the public by mediating the production of imaginaries and somehow integrating the fractured experience of urban life.

Integration and Construction of Cultural Space in Latin America

The cultural scene of the 1990s was characterized by two general contradictions: (1) the acceleration of technological change along with deregulation of markets, and (2) the discounting of culture's political value or social function while mass media offered new vehicles for social movements and civic expression.

The integration of Latin American culture takes place through cultural industries. This was true of the past, in the collective imaginaries of film, its mythologies and stars, the bolero, tango, and ranchera, and it is even more true today, as the industries offer telenovelas and salsa, along with Latin rock, including a Latin MTV channel with its own myths and stars. Nevertheless, up till now audiovisual industries have been only marginal to regional integration through the Andean Pact, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and Mercosur. Marginality derives not from the media's lack of economic importance but because of the complex relationship between media and culture, regional heterogeneity and the jealous interests that promote a single allegedly national identity. The debate between the European Union and the United States during a recent meeting of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) over "cultural exceptions" shows that media accords fail in the absence of some political common ground. In Latin America this minimal ground has so far proved elusive. For one thing, the pressures of neoliberalism accelerate the privatization of telecommunications and the unraveling of regulations. At present multimedia

conglomerates are consolidating their power and doing what they will, at times in self-serving defense of national culture and at others in favor of transnational flows.

The main obstacle to a minimal political accord about the culture industries is the survival of an outdated notion of national identity linked to the state and to elite practices.[28] On the other hand, cultural industries use mass media to reorganize personal and family life through free-time entertainment at home and strategic management of information. Against the effects both of media industries and of independent groups, a growing third sector, public policy, stays anchored in an old idea of nation that deepens the inequities of consumption and impoverishes local production. This happens at the same time that heterogeneity and multiculturalism are becoming the bases for renovating democracy and that liberalism (through deregulation even in the cultural industries) is requiring national and international administrations to rebuild the public sphere.

Economic integration itself won't be possible without the creation of a shared cultural space that depends on public policy to enable circulation and cooperation among media industries. In contrast to the surprising passivity of states, other forces are mobilizing the audiovisual integration of Latin America, most notably new agents and forms of communication: regional and even municipal and community-based radio and television stations and start-up video production groups that seem destined to attract global attention.[29] These participate in informal networks that connect local demand with global supply and should not be overlooked in deliberations about regional integration.

Meanwhile, some gaps in the multimedia conglomerates suggest political opportunities. I am referring to the appearance of subsidiaries of CNN and CBS—plagued though they are by schematic designs but also letting polyphony develop—in countries that have had very poor international communication, especially with the rest of Latin America. Out of place and frivolous as much of the programming may be, the opportunities for contact and exposure to alternative information are patent. Similarly, the rock and roll industry is experiencing a movement of cultural integration. Latino rock is more than a listening activity for youth; it generates unsuspected hybrid creativity that affects cultural, political, and aesthetic developments. From groups like Botellita de Jerez to Maldita Vecindad, Caifanes, and Café Ta-

cuba in Mexico, Charly García, Fito Páez, or the Enanitos verdes and Fabulosos Cádillac in Argentina, to Estados Alterados and Aterciopelados in Colombia, rock has become a site for constructing symbolic unity for Latin America just as salsa was through Rubén Blades and the Nueva Trova in Cuba. This is no merely local phenomenon, as one can see from Latino MTV, where music and visual creativity develop through youth culture's favorite medium, the video clip.[30]

But in the absence of some minimal public policy on communication, a Latin American cultural space is unthinkable. And without that space, intergenerational and interethnic communication is also unthinkable. Policy would not be merely about media but about cultural communicative systems, since each medium has its particularities. Nor would appropriate policy be merely national, since internal and international diversity promote democratizing creativity. At stake are cultural politics, not simply technological policies. How can the relationship between state and culture change without an integral cultural policy? Can the state deregulate without reformulating the social, communicative contract? We need policies that address public and private interests. If deregulation is necessary, at least the state should provide a context for the democratic multiplication of voices through alternative radio and television channels that big business won't support.

Notes

1. G. Marramao, "Metapolítica: Más allá de los esquemas binarios," in *Razón, ética y política* (Barcelona: Anthropos, 1988), 60.

2. F. Calderon et al., *Esa esquiva modernidad: Desarrollo, ciudadanía y cultura en América Latina y el Caribe* (Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, 1996), 34. Key contributions along this line come from A. Touraine, *Critique de la modernité* (Paris: Fayard, 1992).

3. J. J. Brunner, *Bienvenidos a la modernidad* (Santiago: Planeta, 1994), 37.

4. N. Garcia Canclini, *Culturas híbridas* (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 1990), 280 ff.; G. Gimenez and R. Pozas, eds., *Modernización e identidades sociales* (Mexico City: UNAM, 1994); W. Rowe and V. Scheling, *Memory and Modernity: Popular Culture in Latin America* (London: Verso, 1991).

5. See Homi K. Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge, 1977); José M. Marinas "La identidad contada," in *Destinos del relato al fin del milenio* (Valencia: Archivos de la Filmoteca, 1996), 75–88.

6. J. Baudrillard, "El éxtasis de la comunicación," in H. Foster, J. Habermas, J. Baudrillard, et al., eds., *La postmodernidad* (Barcelona: Kairos, 1985); Ph. Breton, *L'utopie de la communication* (Paris: La Découverte, 1992).

7. G. Vattimo, *La sociedad transparente* (Barcelona: Paidos, 1989), 16–18.

8. J. Habermas, *Teoria de la acción comunicativa* (Madrid: Taurus,1986), and *El discurso filosófico de la modernidad* (Madrid: Taurus, 1989).

9. J. F. Lyotard, *La condición postmoderna: Informe sobre el saber* (Madrid: Cátedra, 1984), and *La diferencia* (Barcelona: Gedisa, 1988).

10. G. Vattimo, *El fin de la modernidad* (Barcelona: Gedisa, 1986), and *La sociedad transparente*.

11. A. Huyssen, *Guía del postmodernismo*, offprint from *Punto de vista*, no. 29 (Buenos Aires, 1987), 37.

12. F. Jameson, "Postmodernismo y sociedad de consumo," in *La postmodernidad*, 116.

13. Huyssen, *Guía del postmodernismo*, 40.

14. A. Alfonso, *Televisión de servicio público, televisión lucrativa en América Latina* (Caracas: Ministerio de Cultura, 1990).

15. T. Drago, ed., *Integración y comunicación* (Madrid: Turner, 1989).

16. O. Landi, *Reconstrucciones: Las nuevas formas de la cultura política* (Buenos Aires: Puntosur, 1988).

17. O. Landi, *Crisis y lenguajes políticos* (Buenos Aires: Cedes, 1982).

18. R. Schwarz, "Nacional por sustracción," *Punto de vista*, no. 28 (Buenos Aires, 1987), 22.

19. J. Martín Barbero, "Euforia tecnológica y malestar en la teoría," in *Dia-logos de la Comunicación*, no. 20 (Lima, 1988).

20. See Ph. Schlesinger et al., *Los intelectuales en la sociedad de la información* (Barcelona: Anthropos, 1987); S. Ramírez, *Culturas, profesiones y sensibilidades contemporáneas en Colombia* (Cali: Univalle, 1987).

21. E. Sanchez Ruiz, "La crisis del modelo comunicativo de la modernización," in *Requiem por la modernización* (Guadalajara: University of Guadalajara, 1986).

22. J. Nun, "El otro reduccionismo," in *América Latina: Ideología y cultura* (San José, Costa Rica: FLACSO, 1982). "En América Latina la literatura sobre los medios masivos de comunicación está dedicada a demostrar su calidad, innegable, de instrumentos oligárquico-imperialistas de penetración ideológica, pero casi no se ocupa de examinar cómo son recibidos sus mensajes y con cuáles efectos concretos. Es como si fuera condición de ingreso al tópico que el investigador olvidase *las consecuencias no queridas de la acción social* para instalarse en un hiperfuncionalismo de izquierdas."

23. T. Adorno, *Teoria estética* (Madrid: Taurus, 1980), 416.

24. J. Martin Barbero, *De los medios a las mediaciones: Comunicación, cultura y hegemonía* (Barcelona: G. Gili, 1987), 122; translated as *Communication, Culture and Hegemony* (London: Sage, 1990).

25. M. Piccini, *La imagen del tejedor: Lenguajes y políticas de comunicación* (Mexico City: G. Gili, 1987), 16; and "Industrias culturales, transversalidades y regímenes discursivos," in *Dia-logos de la Comunicación*, no. 17 (Lima, 1987).

26. L. Gutierez and L.A. Romero, *Sectores populares y cultura política* (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1985); E. Squef and J. M.Wisnik, *O nacional e o popular na cultura brasileira: Música* (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1983); R. Da Matta, *Carnavais, malandros, herois* (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1981); Muñiz Sodré, *A verdade seducida: Por un conceito de cultura no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Codecrí, 1983); J. J. Brunner, C. Catalán, and A. Barrios, *Chile: Transformaciones culturales y conflictos de la modernidad* (Santiago: FLACSO, 1989); R. Roncagliolo, "La integración audiovisual en América Latina: Estados, empresas y productores independientes," in N. Garcia Canclini, ed., *Culturas en globalización* (Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, 1996), 53; N. Garcia Canclini, *Culturas híbridas*, and *Las culturas populares en el capitalismo* (Mexico City: Nueva Imagen, 1982); N. Garcia Canclini, ed., *El consumo cultural en México* (Mexico City: Conaculta, 1994), and *Políticas culturales en América Latina* (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 1987); and N. Garcia Canclini and C. Moneta, eds., *Las industrias culturales en la integración latinoamericana* (Mexico City: Grijalbo/SELA/UNESCO, 1999).

27. For a review of two research approaches and theoretical developments up to the end of the 1980s, see J. Martín Barbero, "Retos a la investigación de comunicación en América Latina," *Comunicación y cultura*, no. 10 (Mexico City, 1980), and "Panorama bibliográfico de la investigación latinoamericana en Comunicación," *Telos*, no. 19 (Madrid, 1992).

28. Raúl Fuentes, "La investigación de la comunicación: Hacia la post-disciplinariedad en las ciencias sociales," in *Medios y mediaciones* (Mexico City: Iteso, 1994), 221–43.

29. Among works representative of the new tendencies are M. Wolf, "Tendencias actuales del estudio de medios," en *Comunicación social 1990, Tendencias* (Madrid: Informe Fundesco, 1990); Ph. Schlesinger, "Identidad europea y cambios en la comunicación: De la política a la cultura y los medios," *Telos*, no. 23 (Madrid, 1990); L. Grossberg, C. Nelson, and P. Treichler, eds., *Cultural Studies* (New York: Routledge, 1992); D. Morley, *Family Television, Cultural Power, and Domestic Leisure* (London: Comedia, 1986); G. Marcus and M. Fischer, *Anthropology as Cultural Critique* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); Bhabha, *Nation and Narration.*

30. H. Schmucler and M. C. Mata, eds., *Política y comunicación: Hay un lugar para la política en la cultura mediática?* (Córdoba: Catálogos, 1992); O. Landi, *Devórame otra vez: ¿Qué hizo la televisión con la gente, qué hace la gente con la televisión?* (Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1992); A. Rueda, "Representaciones de lo latinoamericano: Memoria, territorio y transnacionalidad en el videoclip del rock latino" (Thesis, Univalle, Cali, 1998).