set of *Ideas*, which I call *Ideas* of *Reflection*. These are the *Impressions* that are made on our *Senses* by outward Objects, that are extrinsical to the Mind; and *its own Operations*, proceeding from Powers intrinsical and proper to it self, which when reflected on by it self, become also Objects of its contemplation, are, as I have said, *the Original of all Knowledge*. Thus the first Capacity of Humane Intellect, is, That the mind is fitted to receive the Impressions made on it; either, through the *Senses*, by outward Objects; or by its own Operations, when it *reflects* on them. This is the first step a Man makes towards the Discovery of any thing, and the Groundwork, whereon to build all those Notions, which ever he shall have naturally in this World. All those sublime Thoughts, which towre above the Clouds, and reach as high as Heaven it self, take their Rise and Footing here: In all that great Extent wherein the mind wanders, in those remote Speculations, it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those *Ideas*, which *Sense* or *Reflection*, have offered for its Contemplation.

§ 25. In this Part, the *Understanding* is meerly *passive*; and whether or no, it will have these Beginnings, and as it were materials of Knowledge, is not in its own Power. For the Objects of our Senses, do, many of them, obtrude their particular *Ideas* upon our minds, whether we will or no: And the Operations of our minds, will not let us be without, at least some obscure Notions of them. No Man, can be wholly ignorant of what he does, when he thinks. These *simple Ideas*, when offered to the mind, *the Understanding can* no more refuse to have, nor alter, when they are imprinted, nor blot them out, and make new ones in it self, than a mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the Images or *Ideas*, which, the Objects set before it, do therein produce. As the Bodies that surround us, do diversly affect our Organs, the mind is forced to receive the Impressions; and cannot avoid the Perception of those *Ideas* that are annexed to them.

§ 25. *In the reception of simple* Ideas, *the Understanding is for the most part passive.*

(2) *v.* 117(34), n. (3) Mind;] **5** | Mind, **1–4** (3–6) proceeding . . . Thus] **5** | about the [these **1–3**] Impressions, *reflected* on by it [its **1–3**] self, as proper Objects to be contemplated by it, *are*, I conceive, *the Original of all Knowledge*; and **1–4** (13) it] **4–5** | its **1–3** (27) in] **1–4**; *om.* **5** (*l. below* 31) *for the most part*] **4–5** | *most of all* **2–3**

Second Locke selection
· Book II, chs. 2–5
ch. 13 (secs. 11–26
ch. 23 (secs. 1–7)

CHAPTER II

Of simple Ideas.

start

§ 1. THE better to understand the Nature, Manner, and Extent of our Knowledge, one thing is carefully to be observed, concerning the *Ideas* we have; and that is, That *some* of them are *simple*, and *some complex*.

Though the Qualities that affect our Senses, are, in the things themselves, so united and blended, that there is no separation, no distance between them; yet 'tis plain, the *Ideas* they produce in the Mind, enter by the Senses simple and unmixed. For though the Sight and Touch often take in from the same Object, at the same time, different *Ideas*; as a Man sees at once Motion and Colour; the Hand feels Softness and Warmth in the same piece of Wax: Yet the simple *Ideas* thus united in the same Subject, are as perfectly distinct, as those that come in by different Senses. The coldness and hardness, which a Man feels in a piece of *Ice*, being as distinct *Ideas* in the Mind, as the Smell and Whiteness of a Lily; or as the taste of Sugar, and smell of a Rose: And there is nothing can be plainer to a Man, than the clear and distinct Perception he has of those simple *Ideas*; which being each in it self uncompounded, contains in it nothing but *one uniform Appearance*, or Conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different *Ideas*.

§ 2. These simple *Ideas*, the Materials of all our Knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the Mind, only by those two ways above mentioned, *viz. Sensation* and *Reflection*. When the Understanding is once stored with these simple *Ideas*, it has the Power to repeat, compare, and unite them even to an almost infinite Variety, and so can make at Pleasure new complex *Ideas*. But it is not in the Power of the most exalted Wit, or enlarged Understanding, by any quickness or

§ 1. *Uncompounded Appearances.* §§ 2, 3. *The mind can neither make nor destroy them.*

(11) feels] **1–4** | feel **5** (23) **5** *adds, in a footnote, quotation from Locke's* First Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, *pp. 35, etc.*; *prefaced by* 'Against this, that the Materials of all our Knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the Mind only by Sensation and Reflection, the Bishop of *Worcester* makes Use of the Idea of *Substance* in these Words: *If the Idea of Substance be grounded upon plain and evident Reason, then we must allow an Idea of Substance, which comes not in by Sensation, or Reflection, so we may be certain of something which we have not by those* Ideas. To which our Author answers: . . .'

variety of Thought, to *invent or frame one new simple* Idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned: nor can any force of the Understanding, *destroy* those that are there. The Dominion of Man, in this little World of his own Understanding, being muchwhat the same, as it is in the great World of visible things; wherein his Power, however managed by Art and Skill, reaches no farther, than to compound and divide the Materials, that are made to his Hand; but can do nothing towards the making the least Particle of new Matter, or destroying one Atome of what is already in Being. The same inability, will every one find in himself, who shall go about to fashion in his Understanding any simple *Idea*, not received in by his Senses, from external Objects; or by reflection from the Operations of his own mind about them. I would have any one try to fancy any Taste, which had never affected his Palate; or frame the *Idea* of a Scent, he had never smelt: And when he can do this, I will also conclude, that a blind Man hath *Ideas* of Colours, and a deaf Man true distinct Notions of Sounds.

§ 3. This is the Reason why, though we cannot believe it impossible to God, to make a Creature with other Organs, and more ways to convey into the Understanding the notice of Corporeal things, than those five, as they are usually counted, which he has given to Man: Yet I think, it is *not possible*, for any one *to imagine* any other *Qualities* in Bodies, howsoever constituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, besides Sounds, Tastes, Smells, visible and tangible Qualities. And had Mankind been made with but four Senses, the Qualities then, which are the Object of the Fifth Sense, had been as far from our Notice, Imagination, and Conception, as now any *belonging to a Sixth, Seventh, or Eighth Sense*, can possibly be: which, whether yet some other Creatures, in some other Parts of this vast, and stupendious Universe, may not have, will be a great Presumption to deny. He that will not set himself proudly at the top of all things; but will consider the Immensity of this Fabrick, and the great variety, that is to be found in this little and inconsiderable part of it, which he has to do with, may be apt to think, that in other Mansions of it, there may be other, and different intelligent Beings, of whose Faculties, he has as little Knowledge or Apprehension, as a Worm shut up in one drawer of a Cabinet, hath of the Senses or Understanding of a Man; Such Variety and Excellency, being suitable to the Wisdom and Power of the Maker.

(12) ; or by reflection] **4–5** |, or **1–3**

I have here followed the common Opinion of Man's having but five Senses; though, perhaps, there may be justly counted more; but either Supposition serves equally to my present purpose.

CHAPTER III

Of Ideas *of one Sense.*

§ 1. THE better to conceive the *Ideas*, we receive from Sensation, it may not be amiss for us to consider them, in reference to the different ways, whereby they make their Approaches to our minds, and make themselves perceivable by us.

First then, There are some, which come into our minds *by one Sense* only.

Secondly, There are others, that convey themselves into the mind *by more Senses than one.*

Thirdly, Others that are had from *Reflection* only.

Fourthly, There are some that make themselves way, and are suggested to the mind *by all the ways of Sensation and Reflection.*

We shall consider them apart under these several Heads.

First, There are *some* Ideas, *which have admittance only through one Sense*, which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus Light and Colours, as white, red, yellow, blue; with their several Degrees or Shades, and Mixtures, as Green, Scarlet, Purple, Sea-green, and the rest, come in only by the Eyes: All kinds of Noises, Sounds, and Tones only by the Ears: The several Tastes and Smells, by the Nose and Palate. And if these Organs, or the Nerves which are the Conduits, to convey them from without to their Audience in the Brain, the mind's Presence-room (as I may so call it) are any of them so disordered, as not to perform their Functions, they have no Postern to be admitted by; no other way to bring themselves into view, and be perceived by the Understanding.

§ 1. *Division of simple* Ideas. § 1 (16). Ideas *of one Sense.*

(1) Opinion] **1, 3–5** | Opinions **2** (20) kinds] **1–4** | kind **5** (*l. below* 27) *Division of simple* Ideas.] **4–5** | *As Colours of Seeing, Sounds of Hearing.* **2–3** Ideas *of one Sense.*] **4**; *not in* **2–3, 5**

The most considerable of those, belonging to the Touch, are Heat and Cold, and Solidity; all the rest, consisting almost wholly in the sensible Configuration, as smooth and rough; or else more, or less firm adhesion of the Parts, as hard and soft, tough and brittle, are obvious enough.

§ 2. I think, it will be needless to enumerate all the particular *simple Ideas*, belonging to each Sense. Nor indeed is it possible, if we would, there being a great many *more* of them belonging to most of the Senses, *than we have Names for*. The variety of Smells, which are as many almost, if not more than Species of Bodies in the World, do most of them want Names. *Sweet* and *Stinking* commonly serve our turn for these *Ideas*, which in effect, is little more than to call them pleasing or displeasing; though the smell of a Rose, and Violet, both sweet, are certainly very distinct *Ideas*. Nor are the different Tastes that by our Palates we receive *Idea*s of, much better provided with Names. Sweet, Bitter, Sowr, Harsh, and Salt, are almost all the Epithets we have to denominate that numberless variety of Relishes, which are to be found distinct, not only in almost every sort of Creatures, but in the different Parts of the same Plant, Fruit, or Animal. The same may be said of Colours and Sounds. I shall therefore in the account of simple *Ideas*, I am here giving, content my self to set down only such, as are most material to our present Purpose, or are in themselves less apt to be taken notice of, though they are very frequently the Ingredients of our complex *Ideas*, amongst which, I think, I may well account Solidity; which therefore I shall treat of in the next Chapter.

CHAPTER IV

Of Solidity.

§ 1. THE *Idea* of *Solidity* we receive by our Touch; and it arises from the resistance which we find in Body, to the entrance of any other

§ 2. *Few simple* Ideas *have Names.*
§ 1. *We receive this* Idea *from touch.*

(15) by . . . of] **4–5** | are in Nature **1–3** (16) Bitter, Sowr, Harsh,] **4–5** | Bitter and Sowre, Harsh **1–3** (16–17) the Epithets] *add.* **4–5** (17) that numberless] **4–5** | all the **1–3** (19) , Fruit,] *add.* **4–5** (20) Colours and Sounds] **4–5** | Colour and Sound **1–3** (28) which] *add.* **4–5** (*l. below* 28: §2.) **2–4**; *om.* **5**

Body into the Place it possesses, till it has left it. There is no *Idea*, which we receive more constantly from Sensation, than *Solidity*. Whether we move, or rest, in what Posture soever we are, we always feel something under us, that supports us, and hinders our farther sinking downwards; and the Bodies which we daily handle, make us perceive, that whilst they remain between them, they do by an insurmountable Force, hinder the approach of the parts of our Hands that press them. That which thus hinders the approach of two Bodies, when they are moving one towards another, I call *Solidity*. I will not dispute, whether this acceptation of the Word *solid* be nearer to its Original Signification, than that which Mathematicians use it in: It suffices, that I think, the common Notion of Solidity will allow, if not justifie, this use of it; but if any one think it better to call it *Impenetrability*, he has my Consent. Only I have thought the Term *Solidity*, the more proper to express this *Idea*, not only because of its vulgar use in that Sense; but also, because it carries something more of positive in it, than *Impenetrability*, which is negative, and is, perhaps, more a consequence of *Solidity*, than *Solidity* it self. This of all other, seems the *Idea* most intimately connected with, and essential to Body, so as no where else to be found or imagin'd, but only in matter: and though our Senses take no notice of it, but in masses of matter, of a bulk sufficient to cause a Sensation in us; Yet the Mind, having once got this *Idea* from such grosser sensible Bodies, traces it farther; and considers it, as well as Figure, in the minutest Particle of Matter, that can exist; and finds it inseparably inherent in Body, where-ever, or however modified.

§ 2. This is the *Idea* belongs to Body, whereby we conceive it *to fill space*. The *Idea* of which filling of space, is, That where we imagine any space taken up by a solid Substance, we conceive it so to possess it, that it excludes all other solid Substances; and, will for ever hinder any two other Bodies, that move towards one another in a strait Line, from coming to touch one another, unless it removes from between them in a Line, not parallel to that which they move in. This *Idea* of it the Bodies, which we ordinarily handle, sufficiently furnish us with.

§ 2. *Solidity fills Space.*

(5) which] *add.* **4–5** (18) negative,] **5** | negative; **1–4** (21) and] **4–5** | which **1–3** (22) it] *add.* **4–5** (32) removes] **4–5** | remove **1–3** (33) which] *add.* **4–5** (34) , which] *add.* **4–5** (',' *om.* **5**)

§ 3. This Resistance, whereby it keeps other Bodies out of the space which it possesses, is so great, That no force, how great soever, can surmount it. All the Bodies in the World, pressing a drop of Water on all sides, will never be able to overcome the Resistance, which it will make, as soft as it is, to their approaching one another, till it be removed out of their way: whereby our *Idea* of *Solidity* is *distinguished* both *from pure space*, which is capable neither of Resistance nor Motion; and from the ordinary *Idea* of *Hardness*. For a Man may conceive two Bodies at a distance, so as they may approach one another, without touching or displacing any solid thing, till their Superficies come to meet: whereby, I think, we have the clear *Idea* of Space without *Solidity*. For (not to go so far as annihilation of any particular Body) I ask, Whether a Man cannot have the *Idea* of the motion of one single Body alone, without any other succeeding immediately into its Place? I think, 'tis evident he can: the *Idea* of Motion in one Body, no more including the *Idea* of Motion in another, than the *Idea* of a square Figure in one Body includes the *Idea* of a square Figure in another. I do not ask, Whether Bodies do so exist, that the motion of one Body cannot really be without the motion of another. To determine this either way, is to beg the Question for, or against a *Vacuum*. But my Question is, Whether one cannot have the *Idea* of one Body moved, whilst others are at rest? And, I think, this no one will deny: If so, then the Place it deserted, gives us the *Idea* of pure Space without Solidity, whereinto another Body may enter, without either Resistance or Protrusion of any thing. When the Sucker in a Pump is drawn, the space it filled in the Tube is certainly the same, whether any other Body follows the motion of the Sucker or no: nor does it imply a contradiction, That upon the motion of one Body, another, that is only contiguous to it, should not follow it. The necessity of such a motion, is built only on the Supposition, That the World is full; but not on the distinct *Ideas* of Space and Solidity: which are as different, as Resistance and not Resistance, Protrusion and not Protrusion. And that Men have *Ideas* of Space without Body, their very Disputes about a *Vacuum* plainly demonstrate, as is shewed in another Place.

§ 3. *Distinct from Space.*

(2) which] *add.* **4–5** (4–5) , which] *add.* **4–5** (',' *om.* **5**) (8) from] *add.* **4–5** (15) Place?] **4–5** | Place; which, **2–3** | Place? which, **1** (36) Place.] **1–4** | Place. As **5**

§ 4. *Solidity* is hereby also *differenced from Hardness*, in that Solidity consists in repletion, and so an utter Exclusion of other Bodies out of the space it possesses; but Hardness, in a firm Cohesion of the parts of Matter, making up masses of a sensible bulk, so that the whole does not easily change its Figure. And indeed, Hard and Soft are Names that we give to things, only in relation to the Constitutions of our own Bodies; that being generally call'd hard by us, which will put us to Pain, sooner than change Figure by the pressure of any part of our Bodies; and that, on the contrary, soft, which changes the Situation of its parts upon an easie, and unpainful touch.

But this Difficulty of changing the Situation of the sensible parts amongst themselves, or of the Figure of the whole, gives no more Solidity to the hardest Body in the World, than to the softest; nor is an Adamant one jot more solid than Water. For though the two flat sides of two pieces of Marble, will more easily approach each other, between which there is nothing but Water or Air, than if there be a Diamond between them: yet it is not, that the parts of the Diamond are more solid than those of Water, or resist more; but because the parts of Water, being more easily separable from each other, they will by a side-motion be more easily removed, and give way to the approach of the two pieces of Marble: But if they could be kept from making Place, by that side-motion, they would eternally hinder the approach of these two pieces of Marble, as much as the Diamond; and 'twould be as impossible by any force, to surmount their Resistance, as to surmount the Resistance of the parts of a Diamond. The softest Body in the World will as invincibly resist the coming together of any two other Bodies, if it be not put out of the way, but remain between them, as the hardest, that can be found, or imagined. He that shall fill a yielding soft Body well with Air or Water, will quickly find its Resistance: And he that thinks, that nothing but Bodies, that are hard, can keep his Hands from approaching one another, may be pleased to make a trial, with the Air inclosed in a Football. The Experiment, I have been told was made at *Florence*, with a hollow Globe of Gold fill'd with

§ 4. *From Hardness.*

(6) Names . . . relation] **4–5** | , as apprehended by us, only relative Terms, **1–3** (7) own] *add.* **4–5** (18) a Diamond] **2–5** | an Adamant **1** (19) Diamond] **2–5** | Adamant **1** (33) a trial] **2–5** | an Experiment **1** (34)–126(8) The . . . it.] *add.* **2–5**

Water, and exactly closed, farther shews the solidity of so soft a body as Water. For the golden Globe thus filled, being put into a Press, which was driven by the extreme force of skrews, the water made it self way through the pores of that very close metal, and finding no room for a nearer approach of its Particles within, got to the outside, where it rose like a dew, and so fell in drops, before the sides of the Globe could be made to yield to the violent compression of the Engine, that squeezed it.

§ 5. By this *Idea* of Solidity, is the Extension of Body distinguished from the Extension of Space. The Extension of Body being nothing, but the cohesion or continuity of solid, separable, moveable Parts; and the Extension of Space, the continuity of unsolid, inseparable, and immoveable Parts. *Upon the Solidity of Bodies* also *depends their mutual Impulse, Resistance, and Protrusion.* Of pure Space then, and Solidity, there are several (amongst which, I confess my self one) who persuade themselves, they have clear and distinct *Ideas*; and that they can think on Space, without any thing in it, that resists, or is protruded by Body. This is the *Idea* of pure Space, which they think they have as clear, as any *Idea* they can have of the Extension of Body: the *Idea* of the distance, between the opposite Parts of a concave Superficies, being equally as clear, without, as with the *Idea* of any solid Parts between: and on the other side, they persuade themselves, That they have, distinct from that of pure Space, the *Idea* of something that fills Space, that can be protruded by the impulse of other Bodies, or resist their Motion. If there be others, that have not these two *Ideas* distinct but confound them, and make but one of them, I know not, how Men, who have the same *Idea*, under different Names, or different *Ideas*, under the same Name, can, in that case, talk with one another, any more than a Man, who not being blind, or deaf, has distinct *Ideas* of the Colour of Scarlet, and the sound of a Trumpet, could discourse concerning Scarlet-Colour with the blind Man, I mention in another Place, who fancied, that the *Idea* of Scarlet was like the sound of a Trumpet.

§ 6. If any one asks me, *What this Solidity is*, I send him to his Senses to inform him: Let him put a Flint, or a Foot-ball between

§ 5. *On Solidity depends Impulse, Resistance, and Protrusion.* § 6. *What it is.*

(3) by] **5** | with **2–4** (8) *v.* 125(34), n. (14) *Impulse*] *edit.* | *impulse* **1–5** (18–20) Body . . . Body:] **4–5** | Body; whereof they think they have as clear an *Idea*, as of the Extension of Body, **1–3** (22–3) they . . . Space,] **4–5** | That they have **1–3** (34) asks] **4–5** | ask **1–3** (*I. below* 35: § 5.) *Marginal summary not in* **Coste** *here, but only in his Table of Contents.*

his Hands; and then endeavour to join them, and he will know. If he thinks this not a sufficient Explication of Solidity, what it is, and wherein it consists; I promise to tell him, what it is, and wherein it consists, when he tells me what thinking is, or wherein it consists; or explain to me, what Extension or Motion is, which, perhaps, seems much easier. The simple *Ideas* we have are such, as experience teaches them us; but if beyond that, we endeavour, by Words, to make them clearer in the Mind, we shall succeed no better, than if we went about to clear up the Darkness of a blind Man's mind, by talking; and to discourse into him the *Ideas* of Light and Colours. The Reason of this, I shall shew, in another Place.

CHAPTER V

Of simple Ideas *of divers Senses.*

THE *Ideas* we get by more than one Sense, are of *Space*, or *Extension*, *Figure*, *Rest*, and *Motion*: For these make perceivable impressions, both on the Eyes and Touch; and we can receive and convey into our Minds the *Ideas* of the Extension, Figure, Motion, and Rest of Bodies, both by seeing and feeling. But having occasion to speak more at large of these in another place, I here only enumerate them.

stop here

CHAPTER VI

Of simple Ideas *of Reflection.*

§ 1. THE Mind receiving the *Ideas*, mentioned in the foregoing Chapters, from without, when it turns its view inward upon it self, and observes its own Actions about those *Ideas* it has, takes from thence other *Ideas*, which are as capable to be the Objects of its Contemplation, as any of those it received from foreign things.

§ 1. *Are the Operations of the Mind about its other* Ideas.

(6) we have are] **4–5** | are **3** | we have **1–2** (15) [*2nd*] the] **1–4** | our **5** (19) Chapters] **2er–5** | Chapter **1–2** [*2nd*] it] **4–5** | its **1–3** (22) as] **1er–5** | as of **1**

while: and the Ship is said to be in the *same Place*, supposing it kept the same distance with the Parts of the neighbouring Land; though, perhaps, the Earth hath turned round; and so both Chess-men, and Board, and Ship, have every one *changed Place* in respect of remoter Bodies, which have kept the same distance one with another. But yet the distance from certain Parts of the Board, being that which determines the Place of the Chess-men; and the distance from the fixed parts of the Cabin (with which we made the Comparison) being that which determined the Place of the Chess-board, and the fixed parts of the Earth, that by which we determined the Place of the Ship, these things may be said properly to be in the *same Place*, in those respects: Though their distance from some other things, which in this matter we did not consider, being varied, they have undoubtedly *changed Place* in that respect; and we our selves shall think so, when we have occasion to compare them with those other.

§ 9. But this Modification of Distance, we call *Place*, being made by Men, for their common use, that by it they might be able to design the particular Position of Things, where they had occasion for such Designation, Men consider and determine of this *Place*, by reference to those adjacent things, which best served to their present Purpose, without considering other things, which to another Purpose would better *determine the Place* of the same thing. Thus in the Chess-board, the use of the *Designation of* the *Place* of each Chess-man, being determined only within that chequer'd piece of Wood, 'twould cross that Purpose, to measure it by any thing else: But when these very Chess-men are put up in a Bag, if any one should ask, where the black King is, it would be proper to *determine the Place* by the parts of the Room it was in, and not by the Chess-board; there being another use of *designing the Place* it is now in, than when in Play it was on the Chess-board, and so must be determined by other Bodies. So if any one should ask, in what Place are the Verses, which report the Story of *Nisus* and *Eurialus*, 'twould be very improper to determine this Place, by saying, they were in such a part of the Earth, or in *Bodley*'s Library: But the right Designation of the place, would be by the parts of *Virgil*'s Works; and the proper Answer would be, That these Verses were about the middle of the Ninth Book of his *Æneids*; And that they have been always constantly in the same Place ever since *Virgil* was printed: Which is true, though the Book it self hath moved a Thousand

times, the use of the *Idea* of Place here, being to know only, in what part of the Book that Story is; that so upon occasion, we may know where to find it, and have recourse to it for our use.

§ 10. That our *Idea* of Place, is nothing else, but such a relative Position of any thing, as I have before mentioned, I think, is plain, and will be easily admitted, when we consider, that we can have no *Idea* of the Place of the Universe, though we can of all the parts of it; because beyond that, we have not the *Idea* of any fixed, distinct, particular Beings, in reference to which, we can imagine it to have any relation of distance; but all beyond it is one uniform Space or Expansion, wherein the Mind finds no variety, no marks. For to say that the World is somewhere, means no more, than that it does exist; this though a Phrase, borrowed from Place, signifying only its Existence, not Location; and when one can find out, and frame in his Mind clearly and distinctly the Place of the Universe, he will be able to tell us, whether it moves or stands still in the undistinguishable *Inane* of infinite Space; though it be true, that the Word Place, has sometimes a more confused Sense, and stands for that Space, which any Body takes up; and so the Universe is in a Place. The *Idea* therefore of *Place*, we have by the same means, that we get the *Idea* of Space, (whereof this is but a particular limited Consideration) *viz.* by our Sight and Touch; by either of which we receive into our Minds the *Ideas* of Extension or Distance.

Start here

§ 11. There are some that would persuade us, that *Body and Extension are the same thing*; who either change the Signification of Words, which I would not suspect them of, they having so severely condemned the Philosophy of others, because it hath been too much placed in the uncertain meaning, or deceitful obscurity of doubtful or insignificant Terms. If therefore they mean by *Body and Extension the same*, that other People do, *viz.* by *Body* something that is solid, and extended, whose parts are separable and movable different ways; and by Extension, only the Space that lies between the Extremities of those solid coherent Parts, and which is possessed by them, they confound very different *Ideas* one with another. For I appeal to every Man's own Thoughts, whether the *Idea* of Space be

§§ 11–14. *Extension and Body not the same.*

(12) than] 5 | but **1–4** (20–3) The . . . Distance.] **4–5**; *this forms* § 11 *in* **1–3**. (24)–172(34) There . . . *Space.*] **4–5**; *this forms* § 12 *in* **1–3**. (24) some] **Coste**$_2$ *adds in a footnote* 'Les Cartesiens'. (27) others] **Coste** 'la Philosophie qui étoit en vogue avant eux'; *and* **Coste**$_3$ *adds, in a note, a reference to* 'La Philosophie Scholastique'. (*l. below* 35) *In* **1–3**, *this marginal summary is applied to their* §§ 11–14.

not as distinct from that of Solidity, as it is from the *Idea* of Scarlet-Colour? 'Tis true, Solidity cannot exist without Extension, neither can Scarlet-Colour exist without Extension; but this hinders not, but that they are distinct *Ideas*. Many *Ideas* require others as necessary to their Existence or Conception, which yet are very distinct *Ideas*. Motion can neither be, nor be conceived without Space; and yet Motion is not Space, nor Space Motion: Space can exist without it, and they are very distinct *Ideas*; and so, I think, are those of Space and Solidity. Solidity is so inseparable an *Idea* from Body, that upon that depends its filling of Space, its Contact, Impulse, and Communication of Motion upon Impulse. And if it be a Reason to prove, that Spirit is different from Body, because Thinking includes not the *Idea* of Extension in it; the same Reason will be as valid, I suppose, to prove, that *Space is not Body*, because it includes not the *Idea* of Solidity in it; *Space and Solidity* being *as distinct Ideas*, as Thinking and Extension, and as wholly separable in the Mind one from another. *Body* then and *Extension*, 'tis evident, are two distinct *Ideas*. For,

§ 12. *First*, *Extension* includes no Solidity, nor resistance to the Motion of *Body*, as Body does.

§ 13. *Secondly*, The Parts of pure Space are inseparable one from the other; so that the Continuity cannot be separated, neither really, nor mentally. For I demand of any one, to remove any part of it from another, with which it is continued, even so much as in Thought. To divide and separate actually, is, as I think, by removing the parts one from another, to make two Superficies, where before there was a Continuity: And to divide mentally, is to make in the Mind two Superficies, where before there was a Continuity, and consider them as removed one from the other; which can only be done in things considered by the Mind, as capable of being separated; and by separation, of acquiring new distinct Superficies, which they then have not, but are capable of: But neither of these ways of Separation, whether real or mental, is, as I think, compatible to pure *Space*.

'Tis true, a Man may consider so much of such a *Space*, as is answerable or commensurate to a Foot, without considering the rest; which is indeed a partial Consideration, but not so much as mental Separation, or Division; since a Man can no more mentally divide, without considering two Superficies, separate one from the

(34) *v.* 171(24), n. (35)–173(7) 'Tis . . . separately.] **4–5**; *this forms* § *13 in* **1–3**.

other, than he can actually divide, without making two Superficies disjoin'd one from the other: But a partial consideration is not separating. A Man may consider Light in the Sun, without its Heat; or Mobility in Body without its Extension, without thinking of their separation. One is only a partial Consideration, terminating in one alone; and the other is a Consideration of both, as existing separately.

§ 14. *Thirdly*, The parts of pure *Space*, are immovable, which follows from their inseparability; *Motion* being nothing but change of distance between any two things: But this cannot be between Parts that are inseparable; which therefore must needs be at perpetual rest one amongst another.

Thus the determined *Idea* of simple *Space* distinguishes it plainly, and sufficiently from *Body*; since its Parts are inseparable, immovable, and without resistance to the Motion of Body.

§ 15. If any one ask me, *What* this *Space*, I speak of, *is*? I will tell him, when he tells me what his *Extension* is. For to say, as is usually done, That Extension is to have *partes extra partes*, is to say only, That *Extension* is *Extension*: For what am I the better informed in the nature of *Extension*, when I am told, That *Extension is to have parts that are extended, exterior to parts that are extended*, i.e. *Extension* consists of extended Parts? As if one asking, What a Fibre was; I should answer him, That it was a thing made up of several Fibres: Would he hereby be enabled to understand what a Fibre was, better than he did before? Or rather, would he not have reason to think, that my design was to make sport with him, rather than seriously to instruct him?

§ 16. Those who contend that *Space and Body* are *the same*, bring this *Dilemma*. Either this *Space* is something or nothing; if nothing be between two Bodies, they must necessarily touch; if it be allowed to be something, they ask, whether it be Body or Spirit? To which I answer by another Question, Who told them, that there was, or could be nothing, but solid Beings, which could not think; and thinking Beings that were not extended? Which is all they mean by the terms *Body* and *Spirit*.

§ 15. *The definition of Extension explains it not.* § 16. *Division of Beings into Bodies and Spirits proves not Space and Body the same.*

(7) *v.* 172(35), n. (13) determined] **4–5** | clear and distinct **1–3** (*l. below* 35: § 15.) *This marginal summary for* § *15 in* **4–5** *replaces* 'Substance which we know not, no proof against Space without Body'. *for* §§ *15–17 in* **2–3**. (*l. below* 35: § 16.) *This marginal summary for* § *16, in* **4–5** *but not in* **2–3**.

§ 17. If it be demanded (as usually it is) whether this *Space* void of *Body*, be *Substance* or *Accident*, I shall readily answer, I know not: nor shall be ashamed to own my Ignorance, till they that ask, shew me a clear distinct *Idea* of *Substance*.

§ 18. I endeavour, as much as I can, to deliver my self from those Fallacies, which we are apt to put upon our selves, by taking Words for Things. It helps not our Ignorance, to feign a Knowledge, where we have none, by making a noise with Sounds, without clear and distinct Significations. Names made at pleasure, neither alter the nature of things, nor make us understand them, but as they are signs of, and stand for determined *Ideas*. And I desire those who lay so much stress on the sound of these two Syllables, *Substance*, to consider, whether applying it, as they do, to the infinite incomprehensible GOD, to finite Spirit, and to Body, it be in the same sense; and whether it stands for the same *Idea*, when each of those three so different Beings are called *Substances*? If so, whether it will not thence follow, That God, Spirits, and Body, agreeing in the same common nature of *Substance*, differ not any otherwise than in a bare different modification of that *Substance*; as a Tree and a Pebble, being in the same sense Body, and agreeing in the common nature of Body, differ only in a bare modification of that common matter; which will be a very harsh Doctrine. If they say, That they apply it to God, finite Spirits, and Matter, in three different significations, and that it stands for one *Idea*, when GOD is said to be a *Substance*; for another, when the Soul is called *Substance*; and for a third, when a Body is called so. If the name *Substance*, stands for three several distinct *Ideas*, they would do well to make known those distinct *Ideas*, or at least to give three distinct names to them, to prevent in so important a Notion, the Confusion and Errors, that will naturally follow from the promiscuous use of so doubtful a term; which is so far from being suspected to have three distinct, that in ordinary use it has scarce one clear distinct signification: And if they can thus make three distinct *Ideas* of *Substance*, what hinders, why another may not make a fourth?

§§ 17, 18. *Substance which we know not, no proof against Space without Body.*

(11) determined] **4–5** | clear and distinct **1–3** (14) Spirit] **5** | Spirits **1–4** (15) stands] **4–5** | stand **1–3** (18) any] *add.* **2–5** (20) Body] **1er–5** | bodied **1** (31) in ordinary use] *add.* **4–5** (*l. below* 34) *In* **4–5**, *this marginal summary is for §§ 17–18; in* **2–3**, *it is for §§ 15–17, that for § 18 being* 'Substance and Accidents of little use in Philosophy.'

§ 19. They who first ran into the Notion of *Accidents*, as a sort of real Beings, that needed something to inhere in, were forced to find out the word *Substance*, to support them. Had the poor *Indian* Philosopher (who imagined that the Earth also wanted something to bear it up) but thought of this word *Substance*, he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an Elephant to support it, and a Tortoise to support his Elephant: The word *Substance* would have done it effectually. And he that enquired, might have taken it for as good an Answer from an *Indian* Philosopher, That *Substance*, without knowing what it is, is that which supports the Earth, as we take it for a sufficient Answer, and good Doctrine, from our *European* Philosophers, That *Substance* without knowing what it is, is that which supports *Accidents*. So that of *Substance*, we have no *Idea* of what it is, but only a confused obscure one of what it does.

§ 20. Whatever a learned Man may do here, an intelligent *American*, who enquired into the Nature of Things, would scarce take it for a satisfactory Account, if desiring to learn our Architecture, he should be told, That a Pillar was a thing supported by a *Basis*, and a *Basis* something that supported a Pillar. Would he not think himself mocked, instead of taught, with such an account as this? And a Stranger to them would be very liberally instructed in the nature of Books, and the things they contained, if he should be told, that all learned Books consisted of Paper and Letters, and that Letters were things inhering in Paper, and Paper a thing that held forth Letters; a notable way of having clear *Ideas* of Letters and Paper. But were the Latin words *Inhærentia* and *Substantia*, put into the plain English ones that answer them, and were called *Sticking on*, and *Under-propping*, they would better discover to us the very great clearness there is in the Doctrine of *Substance and Accidents*, and shew of what use they are in deciding of Questions in Philosophy.

§ 21. But to return to our *Idea* of *Space*. If *Body* be not supposed infinite, which, I think, no one will affirm, I would ask, Whether, if God placed a Man at the extremity of corporeal Beings, he could not stretch his Hand beyond his Body? If he could, then he would put

§§ 19, 20. *Substance and Accidents of little use in Philosophy.* § 21. *A* Vacuum *beyond the utmost bounds of Body.*

(23) Letters] **1–4** | Letter **5** (31) *Idea*] **2–5** | *Ideas* **1** (*l. below* 34: §§ 19, 20.) *This marginal summary is for §§ 19–20 in* **4–5**; *but in* **2–3** *it is for §§ 18–19, that for § 20 being* 'A *Vacuum* beyond the utmost bounds of Body.' (*l. below* 34: § 21.) *A . . . Body.*] **4–5** | *The Power of annihilation proves a* Vacuum. **2–3**

his Arm, where there was before *Space* without *Body*; and if there he spread his Fingers, there would still be *Space* between them without *Body*: If he could not stretch out his Hand, it must be because of some external hindrance; (for we suppose him alive, with such a power of moving the parts of his Body, that he hath now, which is not in it self impossible, if God so pleased to have it; or at least it is not impossible for God so to move him:) And then I ask, Whether that which hinders his Hand from moving outwards, be Substance or Accident, Something or Nothing? And when they have resolved that, they will be able to resolve themselves, what that is, which is or may be between two Bodies at a distance, that is not Body, has no Solidity. In the mean time, the Argument is at least as good, That where nothing hinders, (as beyond the utmost bounds of all Bodies) a *Body* put into motion may move on, as where there is nothing between, there two Bodies must necessarily touch. For pure *Space* between, is sufficient to take away the necessity of mutual Contact; but bare *Space* in the way, is not sufficient to stop Motion. The truth is, these Men must either own, that they think Body infinite, though they are loth to speak it out, or else affirm, that *Space* is not *Body*. For I would fain meet with that thinking Man, that can, in his Thoughts, set any bounds to Space, more than he can to Duration; or by thinking, hope to arrive at the end of either: And therefore if his *Idea* of Eternity be infinite, so is his *Idea* of Immensity; they are both finite or infinite alike.

§ 21 [*bis*]. Farther, those who assert the impossibility of *Space* existing without *Matter*, must not only make Body infinite, but must also deny a power in God to annihilate any part of Matter. No one, I suppose, will deny, that God can put an end to all motion that is in Matter, and fix all the Bodies of the Universe in a perfect quiet and rest, and continue them so as long as he pleases. Whoever then will allow, that God can, during such a general rest, annihilate either this Book, or the Body of him that reads it, must necessarily admit the possibility of a *Vacuum*. For it is evident, that the Space, that was filled by the parts of the annihilated Body, will still remain, and be a Space without Body. For the circumambient Bodies being in perfect rest, are a Wall of Adamant, and in that state make it a

§ 21 [*bis*]. *The Power of annihilation proves a* Vacuum.

(1) he] **1, 3–5** | be **2** (25)–177(20) In **1–5**, *this section is numbered 21, as is the preceding one; in* **Coste**, *this section is numbered 22, with a consequent re-numbering of the following sections.*

perfect impossibility for any other Body to get into that Space. And indeed the necessary motion of one Particle of Matter, into the place from whence another Particle of Matter is removed, is but a consequence from the supposition of Plenitude; which will therefore need some better proof, than a supposed matter of fact, which Experiment can never make out; our own clear and distinct *Ideas* plainly satisfying us, that there is no necessary connexion between *Space* and *Solidity*, since we can conceive the one without the other. And those who dispute for or against a *Vacuum*, do thereby confess, they have distinct *Ideas* of *Vacuum* and *Plenum*, i.e. that they have an *Idea* of Extension void of Solidity, though they deny its existence; or else they dispute about nothing at all. For they who so much alter the signification of Words, as to call *Extension Body*, and consequently make the whole Essence of Body, to be nothing but pure Extension without Solidity, must talk absurdly, whenever they speak of *Vacuum*, since it is impossible for Extension to be without Extension. For *Vacuum*, whether we affirm or deny its existence, signifies Space without Body, whose very existence no one can deny to be possible, who will not make Matter infinite, and take from God a power to annihilate any Particle of it.

§ 22. But not to go so far as beyond the utmost bounds of Body in the Universe, nor appeal to God's Omnipotency to find a *Vacuum*, the *motion* of Bodies, that are in our view and neighbourhood, seem to me plainly to evince it. For I desire any one so to divide a solid Body, of any dimension he pleases, as to make it possible for the solid Parts to move up and down freely every way within the bounds of that Superficies, if there be not left in it a void space, as big as the least part into which he has divided the said solid Body. And if where the least Particle of the Body divided, is as big as a Mustard-seed, a void Space equal to the bulk of a Mustard-seed, be requisite to make room for the free motion of the Parts of the divided Body within the bounds of its Superficies, where the Particles of Matter are 100,000,000 less than a Mustard-seed, there must also be a space void of solid Matter, as big as 100,000,000 part of a Mustard-seed; for if it holds in one, it will hold in the other, and so on *in infinitum*. And let this void Space be as little as it will, it

§ 22. *Motion proves a* Vacuum.

(20) *v.* 176(25), n. (24) plainly] **1T.er, 2–5** | plain **1** (35) holds] **4** (**Coste** 'si ce Vuide proportionnel est nécessaire dans le prémier cas') | hold **1–3, 5**

destroys the Hypothesis of *Plenitude*. For if there can be a Space void of Body, equal to the smallest separate Particle of Matter now existing in Nature, 'tis still Space without Body; and makes as great a difference between Space and Body, as if it were *Μέγα χάσμα*, a distance as wide as any in Nature. And therefore if we suppose not the void Space necessary to Motion, equal to the least parcel of the divided solid Matter, but to $\frac{1}{10}$ or $\frac{1}{1000}$ of it, the same consequence will always follow of Space without Matter.

§ 23. But the Question being here, whether the *Idea of Space* or *Extension*, be *the same with the Idea of Body*, it is not necessary to prove the real existence of a *Vacuum*, but the *Idea* of it; which 'tis plain Men have, when they enquire and dispute, whether there be a *Vacuum* or no? For if they had not the *Idea* of Space without Body, they could not make a question about its existence: And if their *Idea* of Body did not include in it something more than the bare *Idea* of Space, they could have no doubt about the plenitude of the World; and 'twould be as absurd to demand, whether there were Space without Body, as whether there were Space without Space, or Body without Body, since these were but different Names of the same *Idea*.

§ 24. 'Tis true, the *Idea* of *Extension* joins it self so inseparably with all visible, and most tangible Qualities, that it suffers us to see no one, or feel very few external Objects, without taking in impressions of Extension too. This readiness of Extension to make it self be taken notice of so constantly with other *Ideas*, has been the occasion, I guess, that some have made the whole essence of *Body*, to consist in Extension; which is not much to be wond'red at, since some have had their Minds, by their Eyes and Touch, (the busiest of all our Senses) so filled with the *Idea* of Extension, and as it were wholly possessed with it, that they allowed no existence to any thing, that had not Extension. I shall not now argue with those Men, who take the measure and possibility of all Being, only from their narrow and gross Imaginations: but having here to do only with those, who conclude the essence of Body to be *Extension*, because, they say, they cannot imagine any sensible Quality of any Body without Extension, I shall desire them to consider, That had they reflected on their *Ideas* of Tastes and Smells, as much as on those of Sight and Touch; nay, had they examined their *Ideas* of Hunger and Thirst,

§ 23. *The* Ideas *of Space and Body distinct.* §§ 24, 25. *Extension being inseparable from Body, proves it not the same.*

and several other Pains, they would have found, that they included in them no *Idea* of Extension at all, which is but an affection of Body, as well as the rest discoverable by our Senses, which are scarce acute enough to look into the pure Essences of Things.

§ 25. If those *Ideas*, which are constantly joined to all others, must therefore be concluded to be the Essence of those Things, which have constantly those *Ideas* joined to them, and are inseparable from them; then Unity is without doubt the essence of every thing. For there is not any Object of Sensation or Reflection, which does not carry with it the *Idea* of one: But the weakness of this kind of Argument, we have already shewn sufficiently.

§ 26. To conclude, whatever Men shall think concerning the existence of a *Vacuum*, this is plain to me, That we have as clear an *Idea of Space distinct from Solidity*, as we have of Solidity distinct from Motion, or Motion from Space. We have not any two more distinct *Ideas*, and we can as easily conceive space without Solidity, as we can conceive Body or Space without Motion, though it be never so certain, that neither Body nor Motion can exist without Space. But whether any one will take Space to be only a relation resulting from the Existence of other Beings at a distance; or whether they will think the Words of the most knowing King *Solomon*, *The Heaven, and the Heaven of Heavens, cannot contain Thee*;* or those more emphatical ones of the inspired Philosopher St. *Paul*, *In Him we live, move, and have our Being*,** are to be understood in a literal sence, I leave every one to consider; only our *Idea* of *Space* is, I think, such as I have mentioned, and distinct from that of *Body*. For whether we consider in Matter it self, the distance of its coherent solid parts, and call it, in respect of those solid parts, *Extension*; or whether considering it, as lying between the extremities of any Body in its several dimensions, we call it *Length*, *Breadth*, and *Thickness*; or else considering it as lying between any two Bodies, or positive Beings, without any consideration, whether there be any Matter or no between, we call it *Distance*. However named or considered, it is always the same uniform simple *Idea* of *Space*, taken from Objects, about which our Senses have been conversant, whereof having

§ 26. Ideas *of Space and Solidity distinct.*

(4) Essences] **2–5** | Essence **1** (17) or Space] *add.* **2–5**

* 1 Kgs. 8: 27; 2 Chr. 2: 6 and 6: 18.
** Acts 17: 28.

setled *Ideas* in our Minds, we can revive, repeat, and add them one to another as often as we will, and consider the Space or Distance so imagined, either as filled with solid parts, so that another Body cannot come there, without displacing and thrusting out the Body that was there before; or else as void of Solidity, so that a Body of equal dimensions to that empty or pure Space, may be placed in it without the removing or expulsion of any thing that was there. But to avoid Confusion in Discourses concerning this Matter, it were possibly to be wished that the Name *Extension* were applied only to Matter, or the distance of the Extremities of particular Bodies, and the Term *Expansion* to Space in general, with or without solid Matter possessing it, so as to say *Space* is *expanded*, and *Body extended*. But in this every one has his liberty; I propose it only for the more clear and distinct way of speaking.

§ 27. The knowing precisely what our Words stand for, would, I imagine, in this, as well as a great many other cases, quickly end the dispute. For I am apt to think, that Men, when they come to examine them, find their simple *Ideas* all generally to agree, though in discourse with one another, they perhaps confound one another with different Names. I imagine, that *Men* who abstract their Thoughts, and do well examine the *Ideas* of their own Minds, *cannot much differ in thinking*; however, they may perplex themselves with words, according to the way of speaking of the several Schools, or Sects, they have been bred up in: Though amongst unthinking Men, who examine not scrupulously and carefully their own *Ideas*, and strip them not from the marks Men use for them, but confound them with words, there must be endless dispute, wrangling, and jargon; especially if they be learned bookish Men, devoted to some Sect, and accustomed to the Language of it; and have learned to talk after others. But if it should happen, that any two thinking Men should really have different *Ideas*, I do not see how they could discourse or argue one with another. Here I must not be mistaken, to think that every floating Imagination in Men's Brains, is presently of that sort of *Ideas* I speak of. 'Tis not easie for the Mind to put off those confused Notions and Prejudices it has imbibed from Custom, Inadvertency, and common Conversation:

§ 27. *Men differ little in clear simple* Ideas.

(7-14) But . . . speaking.] *add.* **4–5** (24) , or Sects,] **2–4** | or Sects **5** | , or Sects **1** (31) *Ideas*,] **2–5** | *Ideas*, different Notions, **1** (32) discourse] **2–5** | discourse, **1**

it requires pains and assiduity to examine its *Ideas*, till it resolves them into those clear and distinct simple ones, out of which they are compounded; and to see which, amongst its simple ones, have or have not a necessary connexion and dependence one upon another: Till a Man doth this in the primary and original Notions of Things, he builds upon floating and uncertain Principles, and will often find himself at a loss.

CHAPTER XIV

Of Duration, and its simple Modes.

§ 1. THERE is another sort of Distance, or Length, the *Idea* whereof we get not from the permanent parts of Space, but from the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts of Succession. This we call *Duration*, the simple Modes whereof are any different lengths of it, whereof we have distinct *Ideas*, as *Hours*, *Days*, *Years*, etc. *Time*, and *Eternity*.

§ 2. The Answer of a great Man, to one who asked what Time was *Si non rogas intelligo*,* (which amounts to this; the more I set my self to think of it, the less I understand it;) might perhaps perswade one, That *Time*, which reveals all other things, is it self not to be discovered. *Duration*, *Time*, and *Eternity*, are, not without reason, thought to have something very abstruse in their nature. But however remote these may seem from our Comprehension, yet if we trace them right to their Originals, I doubt not but one of those Sources of all our Knowledge, *viz. Sensation* and *Reflection*, will be able to furnish us with these *Ideas*, as clear and distinct as many other, which are thought much less obscure; and we shall find, that the *Idea* of Eternity it self is derived from the same common Original with the rest of our *Ideas*.

§ 3. To understand *Time* and *Eternity* aright, we ought with attention to consider what *Idea* it is we have of *Duration*, and how

§ 1. *Duration is fleeting Extension.* §§ 2-4. *Its* Idea *from Reflection on the train of our* Ideas.

(15) *Si* . . ., (which] **3–5** | (*Si* . . ., which **1–2** (16) understand] **1er–5** | understood **1** (18) are, not] **1–4** | are not, **5** (20) these] **3–5** | this **1–2** (23) these] **3–5** | those **1–2** (24) other] **2–5** | others **1**

* St. Augustine, *Confessions*, XI, xiv.

§ 11. *Power* being the Source from whence all Action proceeds, the Substances wherein these Powers are, when they exert this Power into Act, are called *Causes*; and the Substances which thereupon are produced, or the simple *Ideas* which are introduced into any subject by the exerting of that Power, are called *Effects*. The *efficacy* whereby the new Substance or *Idea* is produced, is called, in the subject exerting that Power, *Action*; but in the subject, wherein any simple *Idea* is changed or produced, it is called *Passion*: Which efficacy however various, and the effects almost infinite; yet we can, I think, conceive it, in intellectual Agents, to be nothing else but Modes of Thinking, and Willing; in corporeal Agents, nothing else but Modifications of Motion. I say, I think we cannot conceive it to be any other but these two: For whatever sort of Action, besides these, produces any effects, I confess my self to have no Notion, nor *Idea* of; and so it is quite remote from my Thoughts, Apprehensions, and Knowledge; and as much in the dark to me as five other Senses, or as the *Ideas* of Colours to a blind Man: And therefore *many words, which seem to express some Action*, signify nothing of the Action, or *Modus Operandi* at all, *but* barely *the effect*, with some circumstances of the Subject wrought on, or Cause operating; *v.g.* Creation, Annihilation, contain in them no *Idea* of the Action or Manner, whereby they are produced, but barely of the Cause, and the thing done. And when a Country-man says, the Cold freezes Water, though the word Freezing seems to import some *Action*, yet truly it signifies nothing, but the effect, *viz.* that Water, that was before fluid, is become hard and consistent, without containing any *Idea* of the Action whereby it is done.

§ 12. I think I shall not need to remark here, that though Power and Action make the greatest part of mixed Modes, marked by Names, and familiar in the Minds and Mouths of Men; yet other simple *Ideas*, and their several Combinations, are *not* excluded; much less, I think, will it be *necessary* for me *to enumerate all the mixed Modes*, which have been settled, with Names to them. That would be to make a Dictionary of the greatest part of the Words made use of in Divinity, Ethicks, Law, and Politicks, and several other Sciences. All, that is requisite to my present design, is to shew, what sort of

§ 11. *Several Words seeming to signify Action, signify but the Effect.* § 12. *Mixed Modes, made also of other* Ideas.

(10–11) it, . . . Willing;] **1er–5** | it . . . Willing, **1** (15) it is] **2er, 4–5** | it is they are **3** | they are **1–2** (16) [*2nd*] and] **2er–5** | and are **1–2** (17) as] *add.* **4–5** (20) Cause] **1–3, 5** | cause **4** (24) seems] **4–5** | seem **1–3**

Ideas those are which I call *Mixed Modes*; how the Mind comes by them; and that they are Compositions, made up of simple *Ideas* got from Sensation and Reflection, which, I suppose, I have done.

CHAPTER XXIII

Of our Complex Ideas *of Substances.*

Start

§ 1. THE Mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the simple *Ideas*, conveyed in by the *Senses*, as they are found in exteriour things, or by *Reflection* on its own Operations, takes notice also, that a certain number of these simple *Ideas* go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and Words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch, are called so united in one subject, by one name; which by inadvertency we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simple *Idea*, which indeed is a complication of many *Ideas* together; Because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple *Ideas* can subsist by themselves, we accustom our selves, to suppose some *Substratum*, wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result, which therefore we call *Substance*.

§ 2. So that if any one will examine himself concerning his *Notion of pure Substance in general*, he will find he has no other *Idea* of it at all, but only a Supposition of he knows not what support of such Qualities, which are capable of producing simple *Ideas* in us; which Qualities are commonly called Accidents. If any one should be asked, what is the subject wherein Colour or Weight inheres, he would have nothing to say, but the solid extended parts: And if he were demanded, what is it, that that Solidity and Extension

§ 1. Ideas *of Substances how made.* § 2. *Our* Idea *of Substance in general.*

(1) are which] **4–5** | are, **1–3** (12) simple] **1T.er, 2–5** | single **1** (13) together;] **4** | together: **1–3, 5** (16) **5** *adds, in a footnote, quotations from the Bishop of Worcester's* Discourse in Vindication of the Trinity, *p. 236, and Locke's* Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, *pp. 27, etc.; prefaced by* 'This Section, which was intended only to shew how the Individuals of distinct Species of Substances came to be look'd upon as simple *Ideas*, and so to have simple Names, *viz.* from the supposed simple *Substratum* or *Substance*, which was look'd upon as the thing it self in which inhere, and from which resulted that Complication of *Ideas* by which it was represented to us, hath been mistaken for an Account of the *Idea* of Substance in general; and as such hath been reprehended in these Words: . . . To which Objection of the Bishop of *Worcester*, our Author answers thus:' (21) . If] **4–5** | : And if **1–3**

inhere in, he would not be in a much better case, than the *Indian* before mentioned; who, saying that the World was supported by a great Elephant, was asked, what the Elephant rested on; to which his answer was, a great Tortoise: But being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-back'd Tortoise, replied, something, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cases, where we use Words without having clear and distinct *Ideas*, we talk like Children; who, being questioned, what such a thing is, which they know not, readily give this satisfactory answer, That it is *something*; which in truth signifies no more, when so used, either by Children or Men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know, and talk of, is what they have no distinct *Idea* of at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The *Idea* then we have, to which we give the general name Substance, being nothing, but the supposed, but unknown support of those Qualities, we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, *sine re substante*, without something to support them, we call that Support *Substantia*; which, according to the true import of the Word, is in plain *English*, *standing under*, or *upholding*.

§ 3. An obscure and relative *Idea* of Substance in general being thus made, we come to have the *Ideas of particular sorts of Substances*, by collecting such Combinations of simple *Ideas*, as are by Experience and Observation of Men's Senses taken notice of to exist together, and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal Constitution, or unknown Essence of that Substance. Thus we come to have the *Ideas* of a Man, Horse, Gold, Water, *etc.* of which Substances, whether any one has any other clear *Idea*, farther than of certain simple *Ideas* coexisting together, I appeal to every one's own Experience. 'Tis the ordinary Qualities, observable in Iron, or a Diamond, put together, that make the true complex *Idea* of those Substances, which a Smith, or a Jeweller, commonly knows better

§ 3. *Of the sorts of Substances.*

(2) mentioned] **Coste** *adds marginal reference to II. xiii. 19.* (4) was, a] **5** | was a **4** | was, A **1–3** (9) it is *something*] **4–5** | it is something **1er, 2–3** | is something **1** (11) know] **2–5** | knew **1** (19) **5** *adds, in a footnote, quotations from Locke's* Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, *pp. 6, etc., and his* Third Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, *p. 381; prefaced by* 'From this Paragraph, there hath been raised an Objection by the Bishop of *Worcester*, as if our Author's Doctrine here concerning *Ideas, had almost discarded Substance out of the World.* His Words in this second Paragraph being brought to prove, that he is one of the *Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning, that have almost discarded Substance out of the reasonable part of the World.* To which our Author replies:'

than a Philosopher; who, whatever substantial forms he may talk of, has no other *Idea* of those Substances, than what is framed by a collection of those simple *Ideas* which are to be found in them; only we must take notice, that our complex *Ideas* of Substances, besides all these simple *Ideas* they are made up of, have always the confused *Idea* of *something* to which they belong, and in which they subsist: and therefore when we speak of any sort of Substance, we say it is a *thing* having such or such Qualities, as Body is a *thing* that is extended, figured, and capable of Motion; a Spirit a *thing* capable of thinking; and so Hardness, Friability, and Power to draw Iron, we say, are Qualities to be found in a Loadstone. These, and the like fashions of speaking intimate, that the Substance is supposed always *something* besides the Extension, Figure, Solidity, Motion, Thinking, or other observable *Ideas*, though we know not what it is.

§ 4. Hence when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal Substances, as *Horse*, *Stone*, *etc.* though the *Idea*, we have of either of them, be but the Complication, or Collection of those several simple *Ideas* of sensible Qualities, which we use to find united in the thing called *Horse* or *Stone*, yet because we cannot conceive, how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by some common subject; *which Support we denote by the name Substance*, though it be certain, we have no clear, or distinct *Idea* of that *thing* we suppose a Support.

§ 5. The same happens concerning the Operations of the Mind, *viz.* Thinking, Reasoning, Fearing, *etc.* which we concluding not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to Body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the Actions of some other *Substance*, which we call *Spirit*; whereby yet it is evident, that having no other *Idea* or Notion, of Matter, but *something* wherein those many sensible Qualities, which affect our Senses, do subsist; by supposing a Substance, wherein *Thinking*, *Knowing*, *Doubting*, and a power of Moving, *etc.* do subsist, *We have as clear a Notion of the Substance of Spirit, as we have of Body*; the one being supposed to be (without knowing what it is) the *Substratum* to those simple *Ideas* we have from without; and the other supposed (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the *Substratum* to those

§ 4. *No clear* Idea *of Substance in general.* § 5. *As clear an* Idea *of Spirit, as Body.*

(3) which] *add.* **4–5** (21) existing] **2–5** | to exist **1** (33) *Substance*] **4–5** | *Nature, or Substance* **1–3**

Operations, which we experiment in our selves within. 'Tis plain then, that the *Idea* of corporeal *Substance* in Matter is as remote from our Conceptions, and Apprehensions, as that of Spiritual *Substance*, or *Spirit*; and therefore from our not having any notion of the *Substance* of Spirit, we can no more conclude its non-Existence, than we can, for the same reason, deny the Existence of Body: It being as rational to affirm, there is no Body, because we have no clear and distinct *Idea* of the *Substance* of Matter; as to say, there is no Spirit, because we have no clear and distinct *Idea* of the *Substance* of a Spirit.

§ 6. Whatever therefore be the secret and abstract Nature of *Substance* in general, all *the* Ideas *we have of particular distinct sorts of Substances*, are nothing but several Combinations of simple *Ideas*, co-existing in such, though unknown, Cause of their Union, as makes the whole subsist of itself. 'Tis by such Combinations of simple *Ideas* and nothing else, that we represent particular sorts of *Substances* to our selves; such are the *Ideas* we have of their several species in our Minds; and such only do we, by their specifick Names, signify to others, *v.g. Man*, *Horse*, *Sun*, *Water*, *Iron*, upon hearing which Words, every one who understands the Language, frames in his Mind a Combination of those several simple *Ideas*, which he has usually observed, or fancied to exist together under that denomination; all which he supposes to rest in, and be, as it were, adherent to that unknown common Subject, which inheres not in any thing else. Though in the mean time it be manifest, and every one upon Enquiry into his own thoughts, will find that he has no other *Idea* of any *Substance*, *v.g.* let it be *Gold*, *Horse*, *Iron*, *Man*, *Vitriol*, *Bread*, but what he has barely of those sensible Qualities, which he supposes to inhere, with a supposition of such a *Substratum*, as gives as it were a support to those Qualities, or simple *Ideas*, which he has observed to exist united together. Thus the *Idea* of the *Sun*, What is it, but an aggregate of those several simple *Ideas*, Bright, Hot, Roundish, having a constant regular motion, at a

§ 6. *Of the sorts of Substances.*

(7–8) have . . . distinct] **4–5** ('clear and distinct' *not in* **Coste**) | cannot know its Essence, as 'tis called, or have no **1–3** (9–10) have . . . Spirit] **4–5** ('clear and distinct' *not in* **Coste**) | know not its Essence, or have no *Idea* of a Spiritual Substance **1–3** (11) secret and] *not in* **Coste** (12) *sorts of*] *add.* **4–5** (16–17) sorts of *Substances*] **4–5** | Substances **1–3** (18) species] **4–5** | sorts **1–3** (29) inhere,] **2–5** | inhere **1** (32) the *Sun*] **4–5** | the Sun **1T.er**, **2–3** | Sun **1** those] **4–5** | these **1–3**

certain distance from us, and, perhaps, some other: as he who thinks and discourses of the *Sun*, has been more or less accurate, in observing those sensible Qualities, *Ideas*, or Properties, which are in that thing, which he calls the *Sun*.

§ 7. For he has the perfectest *Idea* of any of the particular sorts of *Substance*, who has gathered, and put together, most of those simple *Ideas*, which do exist in it, among which are to be reckoned its active Powers, and passive Capacities; which though not simple *Ideas*, yet, in this respect, for brevity's sake, may conveniently enough be reckoned amongst them. Thus the power of drawing Iron, is one of the *Ideas* of the Complex one of that substance we call a *Load-stone*, and a Power to be so drawn is a part of the Complex one we call *Iron*; which Powers pass for inherent Qualities in those Subjects. Because every *Substance* being as apt, by the Powers we observe in it, to change some sensible Qualities in other Subjects, as it is to produce in us those simple *Ideas*, which we receive immediately from it, does, by those new sensible Qualities introduced into other Subjects, discover to us those Powers, which do thereby mediately affect our Senses, as regularly, as its sensible Qualities do it immediately, *v.g.* we immediately by our Senses perceive in *Fire* its Heat and Colour; which are, if rightly considered, nothing but Powers in it, to produce those *Ideas* in us: We also by our Senses perceive the colour and brittleness of *Charcoal*, whereby we come by the Knowledge of another Power in Fire, which it has to change the colour and consistency of Wood. By the former Fire immediately, by the latter it mediately discovers to us these several Powers, which therefore we look upon to be a part of the Qualities of Fire, and so make them a part of the complex *Ideas* of it. For all those Powers, that we take Cognizance of, terminating only in the alteration of some sensible Qualities, in those Subjects, on which they operate, and so making them exhibit to us new sensible *Ideas*, therefore it is, that I have reckoned these Powers amongst the simple *Ideas*, which make the complex ones of the sorts of *Substances*; though these Powers, considered in themselves, are truly complex *Ideas*. And in this looser sence, I crave leave to be understood, when I

§ 7. *Powers a great part of our complex* Ideas *of Substances.*

(4) *Sun.*] **4–5** | Sun. **1–3** | Sun? **1T.er** (5–6) [*2nd*] of . . . *Substance*] **4–5** | particular Substance **1–3** (8) not] **4–5** | not strictly **1–3** (16) which] *add.* **4–5** (26) latter] **2–5** | later **1** (*1. below* 35) *Powers*] **2–4** | *Power* **5**

name any of these *Potentialities amongst the simple Ideas*, which we recollect in our Minds, when we think *of particular Substances*. For the Powers that are severally in them, are necessary to be considered, if we will have true distinct Notions of the several sorts of Substances.

§ 8. Nor are we to wonder, that *Powers make a great part of our complex* Ideas *of Substances*; since their secondary Qualities are those, which in most of them serve principally to distinguish Substances one from another, and commonly make a considerable part of the complex *Idea* of the several sorts of them. For our Senses failing us, in the discovery of the Bulk, Texture, and Figure of the minute parts of Bodies, on which their real Constitutions and Differences depend, we are fain to make use of their secondary Qualities, as the characteristical Notes and Marks, whereby to frame *Ideas* of them in our Minds, and distinguish them one from another. All which secondary Qualities, as has been shewn, are nothing but bare Powers. For the Colour and Taste of *Opium*, are, as well as its soporifick or anodyne Virtues, meer Powers depending on its primary Qualities, whereby it is fitted to produce different Operations, on different parts of our Bodies.

§ 9. *The* Ideas *that make our complex ones of corporeal Substances*, are of these three sorts. *First*, The *Ideas* of the primary Qualities of things, which are discovered by our Senses, and are in them even when we perceive them not, such are the Bulk, Figure, Number, Situation, and Motion of the parts of Bodies, which are really in them, whether we take notice of them or no. *Secondly*, The sensible secondary Qualities, which depending on these, are nothing but the Powers, those Substances have to produce several *Ideas* in us by our Senses; which *Ideas* are not in the things themselves, otherwise than as any thing is in its Cause. *Thirdly*, The aptness we consider in any Substance, to give or receive such alterations of primary Qualities, as that the Substance so altered, should produce in us different *Ideas* from what it did before, these are called active and passive Powers: All which Powers, as far as we have any Notice or Notion of them, terminate only in sensible simple *Ideas*. For whatever

§ 8. *And why.* § 9. *Three sorts of* Ideas *make our complex ones of Substances.*

(4) the several sorts of] *add.* **4–5**. (*Not in* **Coste**) (7) Qualities] **Coste** *adds marginal reference to II. viii.* (12) parts] **1–2, 4–5** | part **3** (16) shewn] **Coste** *adds marginal reference to II. viii. 13.* (21) '§ 9.' *add.* **2–5** (26) take notice of] **4–5** | perceive **1–3** (*likewise* **Coste**)

alteration a *Load-stone* has the Power to make in the minute Particles of Iron, we should have no Notion of any Power it had at all to operate on Iron, did not its sensible Motion discover it; and I doubt not, but there are a thousand Changes, that Bodies we daily handle, have a Power to cause in one another, which we never suspect, because they never appear in sensible effects.

§ 10. *Powers* therefore, justly *make a great part of our complex* Ideas *of Substances*. He, that will examine his complex *Idea* of Gold, will find several of its *Ideas*, that make it up, to be only Powers, as the Power of being melted, but of not spending it self in the Fire; of being dissolved in *Aqua Regia*, are *Ideas*, as necessary to make up our complex *Idea* of Gold, as its Colour and Weight: which if duly considered, are also nothing but different Powers. For to speak truly, Yellowness is not actually in Gold; but is a Power in Gold, to produce that *Idea* in us by our Eyes, when placed in a due Light: and the Heat, which we cannot leave out of our *Idea* of the Sun, is no more really in the Sun, than the white Colour it introduces into Wax. These are both equally Powers in the Sun, operating, by the Motion and Figure of its insensible Parts, so on a Man, as to make him have the *Idea* of Heat; and so on Wax, as to make it capable to produce in a Man the *Idea* of White.

§ 11. Had we Senses acute enough to discern the minute particles of Bodies, and the real Constitution on which their sensible Qualities depend, I doubt not but they would produce quite different *Ideas* in us; and that which is now the yellow Colour of Gold, would then disappear, and instead of it we should see an admirable Texture of parts of a certain Size and Figure. This Microscopes plainly discover to us: for what to our naked Eyes produces a certain Colour, is by thus augmenting the acuteness of our Senses, discovered to be quite a different thing; and the thus altering, as it were, the proportion of the Bulk of the minute parts of a coloured Object to our usual Sight, produces different *Ideas*, from what it did before. Thus Sand, or pounded Glass, which is opaque,

§ 10. *Powers make a great part of our complex* Ideas *of Substances.* § 11. *The now secondary Qualities of Bodies would disappear, if we could discover the primary ones of their minute Parts.*

(3) it;] **1–3, 5** | it, **4** (10) not spending it self] **4–5** | keeping its weight **1–3** (17) into] **2–5** | in **1** (19) Parts,] **2–3, 5** | Parts **4** | Parts; **1** (*l. below* 33: § 10.) **4–5**. *In* **2–3**, *the marginal summary for* § 10 *is the same as that for* § 11 *in* **4–5**, *whereas in* **Coste** § 10 *comes under the same marginal summary as that for* § 9.