



Applied Cryptography

CPEG 472/672

Lecture 1B

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Encryption security

- ◉ What is the definition of security?
 - ◉ “nothing can be learned” even given many ptxt-ctxt pairs
- ◉ Attack model
 - ◉ Assumptions about attacker powers
- ◉ Security goals
 - ◉ What is considered a successful attack

Black box models

- ◉ Ciphertext-only attack (COA)
 - ◉ Passively observe ctxts, no Enc/Dec queries
- ◉ Known-plaintext attack (KPA)
 - ◉ Known random ptxt/ctxt pairs, passive
- ◉ Chosen-plaintext attack (CPA)
 - ◉ Active enc queries for selected ptxts
- ◉ Chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA)
 - ◉ Active enc & dec of chosen ptxts/ctxts

Gray box models

- ◉ Attacker knows cipher implementation
 - ◉ More realistic for IoT, embedded systems
- ◉ Side channel attacks
 - ◉ Non-invasive
 - ◉ Measure implementation parameters
- ◉ Invasive attacks
 - ◉ Fault Injection attacks

Security goals

- ◉ Indistinguishability (**IND**)
 - ◉ Attackers cannot distinguish ctxt from random strings
- ◉ Non-malleability (**NM**)
 - ◉ Attackers cannot create ctxt2 from ctxt1 where ptxt2 has meaningful a relationship to ptxt1

Security notions (GOAL-MODEL)

- ◉ IND-CPA


- ◉ Also known as **semantic security**
- ◉ Can be achieved using **randomized enc**
 - ◉ $C_{\text{txt}} = \text{Enc}(K, \text{random_num}, p_{\text{txt}})$
 - ◉ Ctxts are longer than ptxts

- ◉ Notion relations

- ◉ $\text{IND-CCA} \Rightarrow \text{IND-CPA}$, $\text{NM-CCA} \Rightarrow \text{NM-CPA}$
- ◉ IND-CPA DOES NOT imply NM-CPA
- ◉ $\text{NM-CPA} \Rightarrow \text{IND-CPA}$
- ◉ $\text{IND-CCA} \Leftrightarrow \text{NM-CCA}$ (equivalent notions)

The IND-CPA challenge

- ◉ `ptxt_1` and `ptxt_0` have the same length



- ◉ We want the Probability of $b' = b$ (i.e., correctly predicting `b`) to be **0.5**

A semantically secure cipher

- ◉ Use a deterministic random bit generator
- ◉ Cipher inputs
 - ◉ Key k , random string R , plaintext $ptxt$
- ◉ Cipher outputs
 - ◉ Ciphertext $ctxt$, copy of R
- ◉ $(ctxt, R) = (DRBG(k || R) \text{ XOR } ptxt, R)$
 - ◉ This offers IND-CPA but not NM-CPA
 - ◉ $ctxt \text{ XOR } 1$ is the encryption of $ptxt \text{ XOR } 1$

Asymmetric encryption

- ◉ Encryption inputs
 - ◉ Public key PUB, plaintext ptxt
- ◉ Decryption inputs
 - ◉ Private/secret key PRI, ciphertext ctxt
- ◉ What are the attack models in this case?
- ◉ As before, but default is CPA
 - ◉ Attacker knows the public key
 - ◉ Attacker can encrypt any ptxt at will

Reading for next lecture

- ◉ Aumasson: Chapter 2