

in any danger of becoming "A Modern Lear," as one of her most brilliant essays cast George Pullman.

And yes, Hull-House really did work in many, many ways: "Nearly every major piece of social legislation or civic initiative having to do with the well-being of children from 1890 until the New Deal bears the Hull-House stamp in one way or another; and this legislation, at its best, began life as sympathetic understanding, a determination to enter into lives that were not one's own, without falling into the arrogant pretense that one understood the lives of others better than they did" (p. 122). Ultimately, Elshtain endorses Herbert Leibowitz's view that for "Addams, it is in giving the self that one truly discovers oneself. The self requires social and cultural forms and channels through which to flow. Absent these, the self is buffeted, becoming so much flotsam and jetsam on the surging currents of social, political, and economic life. By establishing a framework within which enthusiasms are housed, one creates a cultural form that makes action in freedom possible" (p. 153). And clearly, she endorses the view itself.

One need not be enamored of the religious side of community to follow this line of thought and action. As Addams put it, with an engaging simplicity, the function of settlements was "to bring into the circle of knowledge and fuller life, men and women who might otherwise be left outside" (p. 92). Some such vision might still challenge the gated community, the carceral society, and the "Daily Me," though Addams, good pragmatist that she was, would have been the first to insist that her notions had to change and grow along with the rest of life. One can imagine her and Dewey patiently listening to a Michael Warner in much the same way they listened to anarchists and Oscar Wilde. Still, as crusades go, Elshtain's is much better than many of the alternatives. And after all, it is on behalf of a woman who represented pacifism as well as fellowship, something that does indeed seem as endangered as the wilderness it cries out from, a place that even Elshtain is reluctant to enter.

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Foot, Philippa. *Natural Goodness*.

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One can distinguish usefully between two tasks that Philippa Foot sets for herself in *Natural Goodness*. One task is that of showing that what she calls "natural normativity" sets a constraint on practical rationality and morality. The other task is that of showing that there are no other constraints on practical rationality and morality other than those of natural normativity: practical rationality and morality are not merely limited by the naturally normative but determined by nothing else besides it. The latter task is the topic of the introduction and the first chapter of the book: there she indicates briefly her reasons for rejecting Moorean and neo-Moorean conceptions of value and expressivist accounts of moral judgment. Having rejected accounts of the grounds of the truth or appropriate assertion of moral judgments that identify such grounds with either

impersonally valuable states of affairs or speaker's attitudes, Foot sets herself to the other of her main tasks, the carrying out of which structures the bulk of *Natural Goodness*: chapters 2 and 3 serve, respectively, to provide a sketch of an account of natural normativity and to apply that account to human beings; chapter 4 exhibits the constraint that this account of natural normativity imposes on any adequate view of practical rationality; and chapter 5 tries to dissolve any meaningful distinction between the domain of practical rationality generally and the domain of morality. (As I read them, chaps. 6 and 7, which deal with the connection between virtue and happiness on one hand and immoralism on the other, are—while interesting and provocative—not central to the book's argument.)

Foot's argument that natural normativity constrains practical rationality and morality is carried out in three stages. In the first stage—chapters 2 and 3—Foot means to bring to light a certain sort of goodness-judgment, that of natural normativity, which applies to living things and has among its truth or appropriate-assertion conditions no appeal to the judge's aims, interests, desires, choices, and so forth (pp. 25–27). Such judgments thus resist analysis along expressivist lines (pp. 25–26). These judgments, argues Foot, are caught up in patterns of inference to which her student, Michael Thompson, called our attention (“The Representation of Life,” in *Virtues and Reasons*, ed. Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence, and Warren Quinn [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995], pp. 247–96). Foot follows Thompson in holding that there is a special type of judgment of the form ‘the S is F’ (e.g., ‘the duck is a skillful swimmer’), where S is some species or life-form and F is some feature or activity exhibited by that species or life-form, which is not reducible to a claim about what is universally or statistically usually true of particular S's. What is particularly important about these ‘the S is F’ judgments for Foot's purposes is that they serve as major premises in deductions of judgments of natural normativity: if the S is F, and this S is not F, then this S is defective (p. 30).

Foot is insistent that ‘the S is F’ judgments, which carry with them commitment to judgments of natural normativity, are not inconsistent with evolutionary science (p. 29), and with this we need not quarrel (though we might ask whether such science can dispense with these judgments and show up talk of natural normativity as empty). The more important objections, I think, would be those that grant the propriety of ‘the S is F’ judgments while denying that they make intelligible natural normativity. Consider, for example, the judgment ‘The turtle walks slowly.’ This judgment is true: slow walking is part of the turtle's natural history if anything is. But a turtle that is able to pick up the pace is not ipso facto defective. So appeal to judgments of the form ‘the S is F’ is, at least, not sufficient on its own to license judgments about the ways in which being non-F counts as a defect for any S.

At any rate, while the complexity of the way of life characteristic of the human species far surpasses that of other living things, this additional complexity does not give us reason to think that we have left natural normativity behind. The human being does not only live and reproduce: that the human being (e.g.) forms intimate relationships is itself a ‘the S is F’ judgment (pp. 42–43). And even the goods of living and reproducing are saturated with our rationality, so that living and reproducing are not unqualifiedly the same activity in humans

as in other animals (p. 42). So a human life that falls short in these respects is in some way defective. The virtues, as Foot understands them, are just those dispositions that are necessary in the life of our species for the achievement of the goods characteristic of beings like us (pp. 44–45). While on some occasions we may fare poorly for having the virtues—just as, to use Foot’s favorite example, a deer’s swiftness may cause it to fall into the hunter’s trap (p. 34)—these failures will be accidental. To have these virtues is to be a good human being, and to act well is to act as a good human being acts. This last point is highly contentious, even understood not as a claim about meaning but as a claim about necessary coextensiveness: it is not at all clear that the goodness of certain dispositions entails the goodness of the acts flowing from those dispositions, even in non-bizarre circumstances. And it seems that Foot herself is not entirely satisfied with her views on the matter. She considers a case in which the anthropologist Mikluko-Maklay had an opportunity to photograph a member of a tribe that had deep objections to being photographed and to whom he had made a promise not to take such a photograph (p. 47). Given that the disposition to trustworthiness is good for human beings, so that a person without that disposition is defective in some way, how can we show that the act of photographing the tribesman was itself defective, a bad act? Foot’s argument moves in a large, lazy circle here, concluding with the remark that we need more work on what Anscombe called “stopping modals” (p. 50)—a remark that seems to me only to restate the original difficulty.

Suppose that we allow that Foot has identified a form of goodness-judgment, that of natural goodness, and that human action can be assessed in terms of it: there are acts that are good by the standard of natural goodness, and those that are bad. In the second stage of her argument she tries to show that there is a conceptual connection between the natural normativity of good human action and the normativity—of whatever sort it is—that is involved in practical rationality. Here her central argumentative maneuver is indebted to Warren Quinn’s work, to his view that an adequate account of practical rationality must satisfy the desideratum that it preserve the sense that practical rationality is a master virtue (“Rationality and the Human Good,” in his *Morality and Action* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993], pp. 210–27, pp. 212–13). Seizing this idea, Foot appeals to her earlier arguments that there are certain ways of acting that are *ipso facto* defective, because they are acts that a good human being would not perform. And so on her view no account of what we have practical reason to do, all things considered, can be correct if it does not rule out acts that are, by the standard of natural normativity, defective. Note what this argument does not show. It does not show that our reasons for action are all determined by natural normativity. It is compatible with this Quinn-inspired argument that some of our reasons for action arise from other sources. Nor does it show that it is practically rational, all things considered, to act as the good human being acts. What it shows is, at most, that it is not practically rational, all things considered, to act as the good human being would not act.

In the third stage of Foot’s argument, she gives reasons to think that this constraint on the practically rational is also a constraint on the moral. Her method of accomplishing this task is to reject any systematically important distinction between the domain of the moral and the domain of the practically

rational generally. Moral evaluations differ from evaluations of practical rationality neither by their restriction to the voluntary (p. 69) nor by their correctness being resultant on a number of distinct features of what is voluntarily undertaken (pp. 72–74). One might try to distinguish the moral from the practically rational generally in terms of its status as overriding or trumping nonmoral considerations, but Foot argues that this appearance is illusory. That there is a limited class of moral absolutes provides no basis for thinking that moral considerations are always overriding (p. 78), and the status of some moral terms (e.g., ‘unjust’, ‘cruel’) as “conceptually verdictive” is matched by the status of some nonmoral terms (e.g., ‘foolish’, ‘imprudent’) as conceptually verdictive as well (p. 78). There is thus, on Foot’s view, no basis for thinking that there is some feature special to moral judgment such that the constraints set by the naturally normative on all-things-considered judgments of practical rationality would fail to apply to it. Foot is silent on the notion that the domain of the moral is governed by constraints of impartiality that fail to govern practical rationality generally; this is surprising, as surely the idea that morality is tied to the impartial point of view is one of the primary motivations for affirming the existence and practical relevance of a form of value that is basically impersonal.

I have indicated some doubts about Foot’s argument for the view that the naturally normative constrains the practically rational. But, given this conclusion, what basis does Foot offer for moving to an even stronger conclusion—that the naturally normative solely determines the practically rational? For, after all, one might agree that the field of possible all-things-considered rational requirements is limited to the field of the naturally good, without thinking that what we can say about the naturally good exhausts what we can say about the practically rational. Foot allows that the grounds of a moral judgment in natural normativity might well fail to entail the truth of the moral judgment (p. 23), so if Foot wishes to claim that, so far as morality is determinate, it is natural normativity that does the determining, she will have to eliminate alternative determinants. She rejects the view that there are any true judgments of goodness that are irreducibly predicative in form (e.g., ‘pain is bad’), relying on Geach’s “Good and Evil” argument (*Analysis* 17 [1956]: 35–42) that all true goodness-judgments are attributive rather than predicative (pp. 2–3). And she diagnoses expressivist views as based on the false presupposition that the action-guiding character of moral judgments can be accounted for only by connecting the sincere making of such judgments with the presence of proattitudes in the speaker (pp. 8–10). One would also like to see how she would respond to those who, like the post-Thomistic voluntarists of the medieval period, thought it necessary to tell further stories about the “special obligation” of the natural law, an obligation that it would not impose were it not for God’s command (Francisco Suarez, *De legibus ac deo legislatore*, bk. 2, chap. 6, par. 11). Foot’s skirmishes with her contemporary neo-Moorean and expressivist rivals are unsatisfyingly brief and inconclusive: the mode of engagement here is more along the lines of exclusion by alternative—Foot’s presentation of a coherent alternative (explaining the action-guidingness of morality in terms of reasons rather than attitudes, exhibiting the presence of value in the world by appeal to natural goodness rather than impersonal value) is somehow supposed to exclude the view that Foot wishes to reject. But this should cut no ice with her neo-Moorean, expressivist, or theo-

logical voluntarist opponents, especially the modest ones who wish to claim only that impersonal value, an expressed proattitude, or a divine command (respectively) is a necessary feature of correct moral judgment, not a sufficient one.

In assessing *Natural Goodness* one has the benefit of being reminded by Foot that to judge a thing good is to judge it as good of its kind. But to take this point to heart is to make it difficult to assess *Natural Goodness*. For it is not just a contribution to analytic ethics. It is of course a pointed intervention into present debates; but it is also a compendium of Foot's moral views and even on occasion a philosophical memoir. This makes it hard to place in a genre in order to assess it as an instance of that genre. But one can say that it is interesting, exciting, rich in ideas, and written with Foot's characteristic elegance and wit. It is embarrassingly obvious to note that it is an important book.

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Goldman, Alan H. *Practical Rules: When We Need Them and When We Don't*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. 210. \$55.00 (cloth).

In this valuable contribution to the literature on rules and reason, Alan Goldman advocates a "non-rule-based, but non-particularist, coherentist" method of reasoning (p. 183). Goldman presents his position in two stages, first arguing that rules have only a limited role in moral, prudential, and legal reasoning, then defending the possibility of moral reasoning without the aid of rules. Ordinary moral reasoning, in Goldman's view, seeks to establish coherence among judgments by means of analogy: similar cases should be treated alike in the absence of a "morally relevant difference . . . that can be shown to make a difference in other cases as well" (p. 161).

Goldman begins with the function of rules in moral deliberation. By rules, Goldman means "genuine rules" that determine a course of action in advance and limit or block reference to underlying aims and values. Rules of thumb, which indicate a course of action but permit consideration of underlying reasons, have no force in the process of reasoning. Genuine rules, which do constrain reasoning, can be "strong" rules, dictating action, or "weak" rules, giving added weight to certain reasons for action.

Rules, in Goldman's view, are at odds with moral reasoning. Goldman works from the premise that the objective of moral reasoning is coherence among judgments rather than discovery of moral truth. From this perspective, rules fail to capture the complex interaction of moral values in context and undermine coherence by mandating like treatment of relevantly different cases.

Goldman concedes that rules are justified as second-best strategies in two situations. Rules can prevent moral error when bias or lack of information makes errors of judgment more likely than the errors that result from the bluntness of rules. More importantly, rules can prevent cumulative bad effects that may result from otherwise correct decisions, as when credit is undermined because too many judges prevent banks from foreclosing on hard-up debtors. Yet, Goldman believes that cases calling for rules are exceptional. Errors of judgment by

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