many cases of believers who find themselves insufficiently motivated by the threat of damnation?

While I confess I am not persuaded by Waldron's argumentation here, I see promise in trying to connect these issues in the interpretation of Locke to the contemporary issue of liberal neutrality and religious commitment. Waldron is surely right to press liberal theorists for a more explicit justification of basic moral equality. One can only hope that the audience of this engaging volume extends beyond that of Locke scholars, who will surely find it essential reading.

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Philippa Foot, *Natural Goodness* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2001), pp. 125.

In her 1972 paper 'Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives', Philippa Foot boldly challenged the common assumption that viciousness is a form of irrationality and embraced a picture of practical rationality according to which an agent's reasons for action are grounded in nothing other than the agent's desires and self-interest. In her recent work, Foot (even more) boldly rejects her earlier position and sets herself the task of vindicating the view that viciousness is a form of irrationality. Foot's new position – which is highly influenced by the work of Elizabeth Anscombe, Peter Geach, Warren Quinn, and Michael Thompson – is developed in her thought-provoking and enjoyable book *Natural Goodness*.

According to the picture that Foot develops, (1) moral evaluation, like prudential evaluation, concerns the agent's reasons for action, and (2) evaluation concerning an agent's reasons for action is a form of species-based evaluation. It follows that moral evaluations are of the same logical type as evaluations of, for example, sight. Just as nearsightedness is a 'natural defect' in human beings – a defect of the eyes – injustice is a natural defect in human beings – a defect of the will. And just as nearsightedness counts as a defect in human beings because of the function of sight in human survival and reproduction, injustice counts as a defect in human beings because of the function of co-operation in human survival and reproduction. According to Foot, 'we are social animals, we depend on each other as do wolves that hunt in packs' (p. 16). So for human beings, at least in their current state of evolution, justice is 'necessary' – 'we can't get on without it' (pp. 16–17).

Foot considers several potential worries concerning her position. The two she spends the most space addressing are the following:

(1) If one's purposes are well-served by one's having a defective will, why think that having a defective will is something that a rational human being must avoid? Perhaps human beings cannot get on without justice, but an individual human being can get on without being just, and it might serve her purposes quite well to do so.

(2) Is it not a will to power, rather than a will to co-operate, that is essential for human flourishing? Doesn't morality just drag down our species by allowing the weak to hinder the development of the strong?

I will not attempt to summarize or evaluate Foot's answers to these questions. I want instead to raise two complications that threaten Foot's position and that Foot does not address.

Suppose there is a species of insect, call it the species of bleekers, that is subdivided into two types: the far-seeing and the near-seeing. Though they differ in their visual abilities, both far-seeing bleekers and near-seeing bleekers are naturally sound (as opposed to naturally defective). Whether a bleeker is far-seeing or near-seeing depends on what developmental path is triggered by early environmental cues. These cues prompt each bleeker to develop in a way that is appropriate given its circumstances. This developmental flexibility is essential to bleeker survival and reproduction. Relatedly, neither of the following statements is true:

(1) All naturally sound bleekers are far-seeing.
(2) All naturally sound bleekers are near-seeing.

Next suppose there is a species of mammal, call it the species of shumans, that is subdivided into two types: the just and the unjust. Though they differ in their psychologies, both just shumans and unjust shumans are naturally sound. Whether a shuman is just or unjust depends on what developmental path is triggered by early cues. These cues prompt each shuman to develop in a way that is appropriate given its circumstances. This developmental flexibility is essential to shuman survival and reproduction. Relatedly, neither of the following statements is true:

(1) All naturally sound shumans are just.
(2) All naturally sound shumans are unjust.

Might not injustice in humans be like injustice in shumans, which is as sound as near-vision in bleekers? That justice plays a crucial role in human survival and reproduction does not warrant the conclusion that injustice is a defect in humans. For injustice may also play a crucial role in human survival and reproduction, in which case humans may be like shumans, for whom both justice and injustice are naturally sound. It seems hasty to assume that the injustice we find in the human world has no function in human survival and reproduction. It may be that both justice and injustice figure as 'ways of making out that are in [the human] repertoire' (p. 15). Perhaps both ways of making out were selected for in humans, both continue to play important roles in human life, and the current functions served by justice and injustice match the functions they were selected to serve.

The complication I have attempted to bring out can be summarized as follows: there may be multiple naturally sound psychological types. Here is a second, related complication: mixed psychological types might be naturally sound. Suppose, for example, there is a species of mammal, call it the species of chumans, for which it is true that all naturally sound chumans are protective

of healthy-seeming newborns but indifferent or hostile to weak-seeming newborns. (These attitudes result not from conscious calculation, but from the unconscious processing of cues that chumans have evolved to be emotionally responsive to.) Chumans can thus move between being maternal and being unmaternal (in the stereotypic and oversimplified sense of the term *maternal*). Furthermore, this behavioural flexibility is important to their survival and reproduction.

Given that mixed types are possible, what reason is there to assume that a naturally sound human cannot be both just and unjust? Perhaps both just responses and unjust responses fulfil important functions in human life, just as (stereotypically) maternal responses and (stereotypically) unmaternal responses fulfil important functions in chuman life. It might be suggested that justice and injustice are not the sorts of things one can move back and forth between. But, given recent research in the area of human psychology, this empirical claim seems doubtful. A variety of experiments (many of which are described in John M. Doris's book *Lack of Character*) suggest that humans can be very flexible indeed.

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William Stafford, *John Stuart Mill* (Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), pp. viii + 155.

This is by far the most interesting, accessible and balanced introduction to John Stuart Mill's life and work that is in print today. It is – perhaps consciously – modelled after Alan Ryan's classic *J. S. Mill*. The first two chapters discuss Mill's life and reputation. This is followed by two chapters loosely organized around Mill's major works: the *Logic* coupled with the *Principles of Political Economy* in one and the *Utilitarianism* together with *On Liberty* in the other. The volume ends with a discussion of Mill's politics: imperialism, Ireland, Jamaica, democracy, socialism and feminism. This slim volume of less than 150 pages of text addresses all the main contentious themes over which the Mill scholarship has disagreed for over a century. Stafford manages this difficult task superbly and has produced a book that is delightful to read and outlines with great clarity the many often involved and disputed issues.

Stafford's book begins with an overview of Mill's life, his education and activities in the debating societies, his mental crisis and the influence of Romanticism and Saint-Simonianism. It continues by introducing Mill's changing reputation, ranging from diehard individualist to precursor of collectivism and Fabian socialism and from advocate of ethical pluralism and tolerance to an adherent of 'moral totalitarianism' who wanted to impose his conception of the good life on his fellows.

Mill's reputation as a philosopher underwent equally drastic mutations. His writings were often considered as a species of shallow syncretism, unable to create a synthesis from the various strands of thought which had