



---

Modernity and the Spirit of Naturalism

Author(s): Thelma Z. Lavine and Clarence J. Robinson

Source: *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Nov., 1991), pp. 73-83

Published by: [American Philosophical Association](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3130154>

Accessed: 10/02/2014 18:33

---

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



American Philosophical Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

# THE FIFTH ANNUAL PATRICK ROMANELL LECTURE ON PHILOSOPHIC NATURALISM

*Delivered in Chicago, Illinois on April 26, 1991 at the American Philosophical Association, Central Division Meeting.*

## MODERNITY AND THE SPIRIT OF NATURALISM

**Thelma Z. Lavine**  
**Clarence J. Robinson Professor of Philosophy**  
**and American Culture**  
**George Mason University**

I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Patrick Romanell, through whose philosophic vision the Annual Romanell Lectures on Philosophical Naturalism were established. I present this Fifth Annual Romanell Lecture in memory of my friend, Yervant H. Krikorian, esteemed American philosophical naturalist and editor of the volume *Naturalism and the Human Spirit*. [1]

### **I. *Naturalism and the Human Spirit* Revisited**

It was John Herman Randall who wrote the epilogue, "The Nature of Naturalism," to *Naturalism and the Human Spirit*, that collection of essays written by fourteen American philosophers, including John Dewey, as a joint public statement of the naturalistic viewpoint. Randall's legendary perceptiveness as intellectual historian and philosopher identified the formation of American philosophical naturalism as the uniting of "two major strands"—idealism and the natural and social sciences. Randall develops the concept of the "two major strands" succinctly:

Viewed in this extended perspective, and in the light of the great intellectual movements of the nineteenth century, contemporary naturalism thus represents at once the culmination of the idealistic criticism, and of the natural sciences of man and human culture. It carries on the idealistic emphasis that man is united to his world by a logical and social experience. But it rephrases the idealistic scheme of man's activities and environment in biological and anthropological categories. While like the idealists it makes them all amenable to a single intellectual method, it reformulates that method in experimental terms. At the same time, contemporary naturalism is rooted in the natural sciences, extending their content and scope, and expanding and rendering more flexible their methods to include a treatment of even those human activities formerly set apart as 'spiritual.'

In the light of these two major strands that have united to form contemporary naturalism, its double opposition to supernaturalism and to reductionism should now be clearer. [2]

Randall notes that naturalism, as presented by the essays in this volume, is not so much a system or a body of doctrine as an attitude and temper: it is essentially a philosophic method and a program. It undertakes to bring scientific analysis and criticism to bear on all the human enterprises and values so zealously maintained by the traditional supernaturalists and by the more sophisticated idealists.

Naturalism has thus come to mean, he says, "not so much a continuity of genesis as a continuity of analysis." [3] And this contemporary naturalism, he continues, "may well claim to be a distinctively American philosophy."

And in a tone of unmistakable triumphalism, Randall issued these fateful words: "Today we are at last in possession of a science that insists on the importance and reality of all man's experience and enterprises . . . and [a philosophy] that can embrace in one natural world, amenable to a single intellectual method, all the realities to which human experience points." [4]

But at the time of writing his hopeful words of the promise of American naturalism, Randall did not see, and could not foretell, the impending philosophical avalanches which were about to descend upon American philosophical naturalism. His triumphal language is poignantly fateful in the light of the threatening advance of logical positivism, already underway as he wrote, followed by analytical philosophy which was soon to overpower American philosophical naturalism and to become the dominating philosophic viewpoint in American universities, in the organizational structure and functions of the American Philosophical Association, in funding agencies, and in publication.

Nor were Randall and his fellow naturalists able to foresee the influx into American philosophical and social scientific discourse after World War II of phenomenology, hermeneutics, Frankfurt School critical theory deconstruction or the challenge which these groups presented in turn to naturalism, logical positivism, and analytic philosophy. Nor could it then have been perceived that the new philosophic arrivals were not historical contingencies but were exemplars of the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment cognitive frameworks of Modernity which have provided the cognitive horizon of the West since the middle of the 19th century. Nevertheless, in Randall's suggestion that contemporary naturalism "may well claim to be a distinctively American philosophy," and in his identification of its "two major strands"—idealism and the sciences, natural and social—he had discerned the formation of American naturalism and the structures of Modernity. American naturalism had indeed drawn upon those "two major strands" as a philosophical response to the social, economic, and political crisis in American life at the end of the 19th century.

With the development of American naturalistic pragmatism [5] American philosophy had taken the step of identifying the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment as the two great traditions of Modernity and also of attempting to integrate elements of both into a new type of philosophy for American culture and a new type of philosophic paradigm.

As Habermas has identified the uncompleted project of the Enlightenment, so it is also significant to identify the uncompleted project, after a long hiatus, of American naturalistic pragmatism. The reconstruction of the paradigm for philosophy which had remained implicit in American naturalistic pragmatism is its uncompleted project. It is the burden of this Romanell Lecture on philosophical naturalism to provide a preliminary sketch of the completed paradigm of naturalistic pragmatism and to suggest its significance for the philosophic discourse of Modernity.

## II. The Frameworks of Modernity

It is only in the last decades of the 20th century that the intellectual culture has gained sufficient reflective distance from its philosophic conflicts to begin to frame a conception of Modernity and of its contentious traditions and modes of interpretation. [6] It is only in the context of the conflicts of Modernity that the struggle of American philosophical naturalism and naturalistic pragmatism toward the formation of an integrative paradigm can be understood.

The conceptual structure of Modernity may be seen to be a framework which exists in the form of historically evolved counter-frameworks which are constitutive of it and which provide the horizon of our time. Modernity is the conflict and confluence of the Enlightenment and the Romantic Counter-Enlightenment cognitive views, each subverting and delegitimizing the other's conception of human nature, truth, morality, politics and the appropriate method for knowing them. The tradition of the Enlightenment arose in the 17th century as the first phase of the complex structure of Modernity.

Enlightenment Modernity as the first framework encompassed within Modernity may be briefly formulated as beginning with the scientific breakthrough of Newton, unifying the laws of terrestrial and celestial mechanics, and the political breakthrough of Locke, grounding politics upon the self-evident natural rights of human individuals and upon representative democracy. Both breakthroughs are founded on reason and share the claim to offer truths which are universal, absolute, realistic, and objective. Enlightenment Modernity claimed the primacy of reason in all significant domains, with substantive reason yielding true intuitions concerning human nature and society, and scientific instrumental reason yielding scientific laws of nature and technology. Together, they yield a natural law of rational progress.

But by the end of the 18th century only instrumental reason survived skeptical challenges to the intuitions of Enlightenment Modernity. A new phase of Modernity, Romantic Modernity, arose in cultural protest against the disenchanting, despiritualized, increasingly mechanized, technological world of Enlightenment scientific reason; and it arose in political protest against the Enlightenment, waging the Wars of Liberation from Napoleon, the symbol of Enlightenment domination. Romantic Modernity arose as a cognitive framework linked to Enlightenment Modernity as its antithesis. The intuitions of Romanticism crystallized into a counter-framework of opposing conceptualizations: in opposition to Enlightenment primacy of reason, Romanticism affirms the primacy of spirit; in opposition to the scientific focus on fact and externality, Romanticism takes the inward path of

subjectivity; in opposition to scientific reason in its pursuit of objective and valid knowledge, Romanticism holds to the truths of history, culture, the arts, the dialectic of personal and collective will; in opposition to the natural rights political autonomy of the Enlightenment individual, Romanticism asserts a politics of the group, of collectivism of the left or right; in opposition to Enlightenment-style rational liberation from the historical domination of church and state falsity, Romantic liberation is from the hegemony of the Enlightenment mentality in its abstract, ahistorical universalism, objectivism, and realism, and from the resulting bureaucratization of the social world. Here in Romantic Modernity we discover the counter-tradition to the Enlightenment.

Modernity is, then, cognitively pluralistic. The structure of Modernity may be seen to be a pluralistic framework, a framework which exists in the form of diametrically opposed counter-frameworks which are constitutive of it.

Thus the heritage of Modernity is the mutual destruction of its component mentalities. In response to this diremption, the great intellectual figures of Modernity have attempted to design integrating paradigms. Such integrating constructions provide a key to the work of Hegel, Marx, Weber, Mannheim, Durkheim, Freud, Dewey and Habermas. I shall argue that the attempt to construct a paradigm integrative of Enlightenment and Romantic Modernity provides the key to the very rise of American philosophic naturalism and naturalistic pragmatism.

### III. American Naturalistic Pragmatism and the Conflicts of Modernity

One may well view America as having been born into Modernity with the sailing of the *Arabella* in the spring of 1630, arriving in America in late June under the dissenting religious banner of the Protestant Reformation, in quest of religious freedom.

By the third quarter of the 18th century, American intellectuals such as Jefferson, Madison and Hamilton inevitably shared the perspective on human nature and politics of the English Enlightenment. The same cluster of beliefs concerning human nature, knowledge, politics, and history which defined the intellectual style of 17th and 18th century England provided the form and content of the meaningful universe of the American Founders. But the British Enlightenment principles had been transferred by the Errand into the Wilderness to the New World of America, to the early experiment of the Puritan theocratic communities, to new experiences in American local self-government, and to physical and then political separation from British centers of commerce and culture, and to new exceptional economic conditions. Doubts with regard to the functionality of certain of the Enlightenment views to solve problems within the situation of the American reality led the Founders to reconstruct those doctrines, and so began the Americanization of the Enlightenment which came to a climax in the Constitutional Convention of 1787.

The re-interpreted and Americanized framework of Enlightenment Modernity into which the American Nation was born is an instance of the interpretivism which characterizes American naturalistic pragmatism: the principle, stemming from Kant, which holds that whatever is known is in some measure constituted by the conferring of meaning or by the imposition of conceptual or

linguistic structure. And under the necessity of problem-solving in situations in which Old World conceptions came into ineffectual conflict with new American conditions, there arose in practice what was to become, for Peirce and Dewey, the theory of inquiry as the analysis, interpretation, and resolution of a problematic situation. But following the Civil War, a problematic situation of crisis proportions was produced by Enlightenment Modernist forces of modernization: the rapid expansion of industrialization, corporate wealth and influence, urbanization, immigration, federal and state bureaucratization, and political collusion with corporate interests. One significant response took the form of the rise of classical American philosophy.

Classical American philosophy (naturalistic pragmatism) came into being as an intellectual and moral response to the post-Civil War national problematic situation brought on by the effects of Enlightenment modernization upon American life. The response of American philosophers was to assimilate the newly available philosophic views of European Romantic Modernity as an antithetical way of perceiving the problems of Modernity; and to integrate the two cultural styles, Enlightenment and Romantic Modernity, into a philosophy for an America whose national, legal, and cultural identity was in Enlightenment truth. Each of the classical American philosophers worked through the conflict and the integration in his own way. Insofar as it is possible to speak of American philosophy, it is to perceive the characteristic form of American philosophy in the attempt to integrate the Enlightenment and Romantic modes of thought. What is characteristic of American naturalistic pragmatism is its incorporativeness, its attempt to hold together Enlightenment classical liberalism science and technology and Romantic communitarianism and the expressiveness of personal and group life.

After the long monologic hegemony of logical positivism, analytic philosophy, phenomenology, hermeneutics, structuralism, and deconstruction, the American naturalistic project of explaining, understanding, and working through the outcomes of the richly complex conflicts of Modernity is emerging as a blocked path that must now be re-opened. Independently of the declining vitality of the monologic philosophies at the conflicting poles of Modernity, American naturalistic pragmatism is increasingly perceived as the only contemporary viewpoint [7] which has the philosophical resources to explain and interpret the great upheavals in the scientific and political culture of the present time: the advances in astronomy, physics, the biological sciences and their technologies; and the decline of the economic and political power of Marxist socialism in the communist bloc countries of eastern Europe, in the Baltics, and in the Soviet Union; and the movement toward democracy.

#### IV. The Naturalistic Paradigm

What is perhaps the key to discerning a paradigm for the unfulfilled project of naturalistic pragmatism is to be found in Dewey's early and persistent rejection of "apart thought" whether in the form of logic or modes of intuition which remain unconnected to "the causal category as a leading principle of existential inquiry." [8]



(1) **The Continuity of Analysis Paradigm.** It is the rejection of “apart thought” which produces the convergence which Randall discovered among the contributors to *Naturalism and the Human Spirit* upon “the universal and unrestricted application of scientific method.” “That continuity of analysis can thus mean only that all analysis must be scientific analysis . . . is the nerve of the naturalistic principle” and the spirit of naturalism which animates the Krikorian volume.

Continuity of analysis remains, however, an early and relatively undeveloped and narrow formulation of a paradigm for philosophical naturalism. Although it can claim the distinctiveness and recognizability of a paradigm, and thus a logic by which to contest opposing positions (as Dewey’s own essay, “Antinaturalism in Extremis,” contests current Roman Catholic theology), it is far from an exploration of the complexities and implications of its own paradigm. Equipped, however, with this narrow paradigm it is possible to practice what, borrowing from Thomas Kuhn, may be said to be “normal philosophy”: “mopping up” a paradigm by problem-solving within it; contesting and critiquing problem-solving efforts within the paradigm and within other paradigms, taking a paradigm-dependent position on issues as they become the focus of philosophical discourse. (One thinks of the 700 pages of normal philosophy in *Dewey and His Critics* which Sidney Morgenbesser gathered from the *Journal of Philosophy* alone.) But a more adequate model was at hand.

(2) **The Problematic Situation Paradigm.** Explicitly and precisely developed in Chapter VI of Dewey’s *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* was his theory, or paradigm, of naturalistic pragmatism. It was the “Pattern of Inquiry,” presented as the general formula of a single model of inquiry applicable to problem-solving in everyday life and in all areas of the natural and social sciences. Inquiry takes place within a concrete “pre-cognitive” situation, a unique “contextual whole”; inquiry is called into being by the indeterminate, disunified quality which the situation takes on, and the Hegelian function of inquiry is to effect a resolution, to convert, reconcile, transform. A successful resolution changes the elements of the original situation into a synthesized, unified whole. And this entire ideational and operational transformation is construed as the adaptive integration of an organism with its environment.

Dewey’s pattern of inquiry, centered upon the problematic situation, may be seen to be contextually interpretivist: the resolution of a problematic situation is a response to the empirical and ideational conditions within the problematic context. Generalized beyond its initial physicalistic presentation, in time Dewey’s interpretivist paradigm of the problematic situation and its resolution pervaded American naturalistic pragmatism. The structure of the paradigm includes: an identifiable community, surviving in transaction with its environment by means of reliable, grounded knowledge; the presence of an immediate or long-range “problem” which is generative of stress, conflict, or indecision; the explanatory analysis of the problem, causal, historical, ideational; the experimental, creative engendering of an interpretive structure which yields an understanding of the situation and attempts a resolution-reconstruction in action, the success of which is to be experientially tested.

The Problematic Situation paradigm of naturalistic pragmatism offers great advances over the earlier paradigm. It avoids the limitation to negativity of the Continuity of Analysis paradigm and the gratuitous issue of the genetic fallacy. [9]

Another advantage of the Problematic Situation paradigm is its comprehensive analysis of the structural components of the paradigm. And it has the further advantage of explicitly reflecting its integration of Enlightenment explanatory schemata and Romantic Counter-Enlightenment interpretive understanding. But the fateful weakness of the Hegelian problematic situation is that it is a model which permits no finalities, no fixities, no functional absolutes, but only the indiscriminate category of hypotheses which change as new situations present new disharmonies to be unified. It is a paradigm which relativizes all elements to the particular situation and thus permits no universals, no general principles, no scientific laws, no political or moral truths. Dewey's resolution of America's problematic situation was to utilize process as a solvent for the obstructive fixities of American social life: the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court, private property and the capitalist economic system. (Scientific method and democracy were themselves held to be processes which control process, but are not themselves dissolved by process.)

Thus the Problematic Situation paradigm leaves us only with a genetic pattern of inquiry, rooted in and flowing into the shifting process of complex conditions, the pattern of all inquiry. But this instrument of inquiry is only procedural, a form for inquiry which dissolves substantive content.

(3) **The Critique of Modernity Paradigm.** The vacuity of the Problematic Situation paradigm as Dewey leaves it, as process without content, as the solvent of all "fixities," has its significant counterpart in the outcome of the recent conflicts between the cognitive traditions of Modernity. On the one side of the conflict are the Enlightenment pursuers of rationally grounded objective, absolute, universal and realistic truth and the analytic philosophers who are their 20th century descendants, deploying Enlightenment-style empirical, epistemological, logical, and linguistic arguments to attack the Enlightenment intuitions of objective, absolute, universal, and realistic truth and a rational foundation for knowledge.

On the other side of the divide are the counter-intuitions of the Romantic displacers of reason by ontology, subjectivity, group consciousness and its projections, and by personal and collective will, as these are constitutive of history and culture. Their 20th century descendants among the phenomenologists, hermeneuticists, textualists, and deconstructionists are monologic interpretivists, asserting that historical conceptual structures and social webs of meaning mediate all areas of everyday life, science, and philosophy—thus undermining Enlightenment views old and new, the old Enlightenment ahistorical, unmediated rational foundations for knowledge and the new ahistorical unmediated analytic empiricism of forms of life and their language games, ordinary language philosophy, and speech-acts.

In the conflict of frameworks mediators are currently attempting to discern developing lines of change and signs of convergence. Recent discernment of deficiencies on both the analytic and phenomenological sides have exposed their vulnerability—with the recognition of a two-fold deficiency on the analytic side in its ahistoricity and in its failure to acknowledge the mediation of conceptual structures; and on the phenomenological side, with the recognition of methodological deficiency and the failure of experiential testing. The more moderate mediators have been led by these vulnerabilities to agree on some or all of a set of convergences between the frameworks. The developing convergence [10] is toward opposition to



foundationalism, essentialism, positivism, naturalism, universalism, traditionalism; opposition to all forms of cognitive transparency which claim an unmediated apprehension of truth, metaphysical, scientific, moral and political; opposition to the sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions and between realism and idealism; and opposition to all forms of historical or structural totalizing, including the historical cognitive structures of Modernity presented in this paper. Thus convergence is centered upon negativity, upon rejection of legitimating grounds for previously or currently held intuitions and conceptualizations.

The cost of the convergence upon negations is that both sides of the conflict are emptied out of the intuitions and conceptual structures which historically, culturally, morally, and politically have defined them. Lost to the Enlightenment frame are its great achievements of substantive and instrumental reason: the self-evidence and inalienability of universal individual rights as the rational ground of political democracy; the comprehensive engagement of philosophy with the sciences, in methods, validation, and foundations; the sense of historical progress in democratization, in the sciences, and in the human betterment resulting from scientific technologies. All these have been philosophically delegitimated along with the possibility of their replacement. Lost on the Romantic side are the world-historical visions of Hegel, Marx, Weber, and Dewey, all with moral and religious subtextual significance. Lost are philosophic explorations on the dynamics of self and other, which mediate family, education, civil society, the arts, the nation, the world-order, the sacred; the interplay of personal and collective will, negative and positive liberty, bureaucracy and charisma; the development of self-consciousness on the part of slaves and masters and racial, economic, and gender-based social subgroups. All these philosophic achievements have been delegitimated, as is the possibility of any replacement for them.

Implicit in *Naturalism and the Human Spirit's* two-strand conception of philosophy, in the work of recent pragmatists [11] in Dewey's view of philosophy as culture criticism, and in the interpretivism, historicity, and experiential testing of the Problematic Situation paradigm is the conception of Modernity itself as the complex, conflictual, richly historical conceptualization which is the problematic situation of our world. The cognitive structures of Modernity itself provide the models of what we define as problems and how they are to be resolved. Modernity is the problematic situation in which we find ourselves philosophically and find out how to work out philosophical problems. Modernity is thus the complex frame, the historical source, and the test of our philosophical structures; it is the historical, social, scientific web of meaning within which we function philosophically.

The paradigm of naturalistic pragmatism as critique of Modernity undertakes reflexively to explain and interpret the philosophic thought of Modernity by reference to its Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment component structures. A sketch of this new paradigm redirects naturalistic pragmatism thus from a micro-level analysis of the problematic situation to a macro-level in which Modernity itself is the problematic situation. In opposition to the ahistoricity and conceptual deficiency of monologic philosophies, this new paradigm entails the binding of all philosophic claims to the historical conceptual structures of Modernity. In opposition to the current philosophic convergence in negation, in which both sides of the conflicting

structures of Modernity are emptied out of the historical conceptual meanings which have defined them, the new paradigm provides for the critical examination and reappropriation of historical concepts. This critical reappropriation is made possible by the naturalistic requirement, entailed in the new paradigm, that all interpretive structures be subject to critique in terms of their contexts and consequences within the specific micro-level problematic situations of the macro-level problematic situation of Modernity.

Entailed also in the new paradigm is the critical power which it makes possible: a criticism of “apart thought” represented by the isolation of the linguistic analysts and the phenomenologists; the concept of normal philosophy and the problem-solving with which it is engaged in “mopping up” current paradigms; the detection of repetitions and revisions in philosophic problems and problem-solving, seen as functions of the limits of the framework imposed by Modernity; the identification of anomalies, philosophic stand-offs, in which contending arguments trail off without the possibility of resolution.

Empowered also by the new paradigm is the critical examination of characteristic philosophic responses to the major cognitive and cultural achievements within the time-span of Modernity. The rise of natural science is perhaps the single most transformational development in modern history. How many Humes have arisen to contest the validity of scientific laws and/or their realistic reference? How many Kants have discovered their transcendental conditions? How many contemporary scientific realists are being held at bay by empiricists, even under Hilary Putnam’s [12] challenge that without some kind of realism, science becomes a miracle? And on the other side there is the “lordly indifference” to the philosophic significance of natural science on the part of the analysts and phenomenologists. A second major transformational event in the modern period is the rise of classical liberalism, which has suffered continuous criticism by anti-foundationalists, empiricists, and analysts on the one side, and by collectivists and communitarians on the other. In a recent version of this perennial conflict of Modernity there is the retreat of Richard Rorty from Enlightenment liberal universalism into the particularism of “our own tradition”—but this retreat is ominously the path which Martin Heidegger followed into Nazism. [13]

And finally the new paradigm will incorporate the earlier paradigms of Continuity of Analysis and the Problematic Situation (on the micro-level). In encompassing these, the new model exhibits, within the restrictions of interpretivism, a qualified realism, causality, and fallibilism.

This, then, is a sketch of the long-delayed paradigm of naturalistic pragmatism. It is intended to re-open the blocked path of naturalistic pragmatism. It projects a paradigm of a fully self-conscious naturalistic pragmatism which proposes to explain, to interpret and appropriate the conflicting frameworks of Modernity.

This sketch of an integrating, critical, and redemptive paradigm for naturalistic pragmatism is an immodest proposal. It is *integrating* in that it is in a position to command the scope of Modernity, the framework of its philosophy, the principal problems perceived and methods pursued, especially since the mid-19th century when the conflict of the structures of Modernity sharpened. It is *critical* of

“apart” thought and its separation from historicity and contextuality; its disengagement from continuity with the natural and social sciences; its monologic blindness; and its practice of philosophy as symptom rather than as self-conscious interpreter and critic of Modernity; and its un-Deweyan silence on issues of public concern. It is *redemptive* of the cognitive and moral problems which, along with their resolutions, continually revise and reaffirm themselves; it sees these as the evolving truths available in the framework of Modernity, their causes and consequences made visible, their negative criticism evolving from oppositional structures which are themselves defined within the problematic situation of Modernity. Can it be that the spirit of naturalistic pragmatism as it appropriates the structures of Modernity is also the path to such wisdom as is possible for philosophy in our time?

### Endnotes

[1] Yervant H. Krikorian, ed., *Naturalism and the Human Spirit* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944).

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 373-374.

[3] “This insistence on the universal and unrestricted application of ‘scientific method’ . . . is well set forth by Miss Lavine: ‘The naturalistic principle may be stated as the resolution to pursue inquiry into any set of phenomena by means of methods which administer the checks of intelligent experiential verification in accordance with the contemporary criteria of objectivity. . . . That scientific analysis must not be restricted in any quarter, that its extension to any field, to any special set of phenomena, must not be curtailed—this is the nerve of the naturalistic principle. ‘Continuity’ of analysis can thus mean only that all analysis must be scientific analysis.’” (Pp. 358-59)

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 369.

[5] It is as a principal component of American naturalistic pragmatism that American philosophical naturalism is currently recognized, and it is so understood in this lecture. The complex of themes characteristic of philosophic naturalism is distinctive of American naturalistic pragmatism and is present in no other major contemporary philosophic viewpoint. The question of derivation between the pragmatist and naturalist elements in Dewey’s thought has often been raised. See H.S. Thayer, *Meaning and Action: A Critical History of Pragmatism* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), p. 3: “Dewey’s pragmatism was an evolving if central strand in a thoroughly elaborated philosophical naturalism.” For a contrasting derivation, see Ernest Nagel’s proposal of a contextualist naturalism which, although it “has historical roots in pragmatism, and although Dewey himself is an exponent of both, those professing the former do not in general feel committed to the technical pragmatic doctrines concerning the nature of truth or the function of knowledge [or] . . . the pragmatic or instrumentalist label. . . . Nevertheless, pragmatism is the matrix out of which, at least in America, contextualistic naturalism has emerged.” Ernest Nagel, *Sovereign Reason and Other Studies in the Philosophy of Science* (New York: The Free Press, 1954).

[6] See, e.g., Karl-Otto Apel, Daniel Bell, Isaiah Berlin, Richard Bernstein, Hans Blumenberg, Fred Dallmayr, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Francis

Fukiyama, Ernest Gellner, Jurgen Habermas, Irving Howe, David Kolb, Joseph Margolis, Alisdair MacIntyre, Richard Rorty, Charles Taylor, Stephen Toulmin.

[7] With the exception of Marxism, now compromised in theory and in practice.

[8] *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, in John Dewey, *The Later Works, 1925-1953*, volume 12 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1938), p. 457. For a discussion of "apart thought" see R.N. Sleeper, *The Necessity of Pragmatism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 19-20, 155, 225 note 6.

[9] For a discussion of the genetic fallacy see T.Z. Lavine, "Reflections on the Genetic Fallacy," *Social Research*, Autumn 1962, pp. 321-326.

[10] For a discussion of the current movement toward convergence see Joseph Margolis, *Pragmatism Without Foundations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), ch. 8, "A Sense of Rapprochement between Analytic and Continental European Philosophy."

[11] Versions of the two strands, in varying degrees of explicitness, may be found in recent writings of American pragmatists. John McDermott provides an explicit version. Interpreting Emerson ("[T]he whole of nature is a metaphor of the mind"), McDermott notes: "This text mirrors the binary strands found in subsequent American philosophy: the idealist-pragmatic epistemology of James, Royce, Dewey, and Peirce, each with an original emphasis of one strand over another." *Streams of Experience: Reflections on the History and Philosophy of American Culture* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), p. 34.

[12] Hilary Putnam, "What Is Realism?" in Jarrett Leplin, ed., *Scientific Realism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

[13] See Victor Farias, *Heidegger and Nazism*, eds. Joseph Margolis and Tom Rockmore (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989). See also T.Z. Lavine, "Thinking Like a Nazi," review essay of *Heidegger and Nazism*, *Washington Post Book World*, March 25, 1990; *International Journal of Group Tensions*, 1990, v. 20, no. 3.