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Kant and the "Distinctively Moral *Ought*": A Platonic-Augustinian Defense, against MacIntyre*

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> Love God above all, and your neighbor as yourself. (The supreme evangelical commandment, according to Kant.)
>
> Love yourself above all, but God and your neighbor for your own sake. (The supreme principle of eudaemonism, according to Kant.)[1]

I. INTRODUCTION

In her influential article "Modern Moral Philosophy," Elizabeth Anscombe rejects uses of a distinctively moral idea of obligation as amounting to "derivatives from survivals" of an older divine command theory of ethics. Since few modern ethicists are theists, she advocates a return to the far more ordinary use of "ought" to be found in Aristotle (and Plato)—the everyday one by which a man just shouldn't spoil his life in its essentials through, say, sloth or injustice.[2] Alasdair MacIntyre has earned his place in our current philosophical canon largely by arguing

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[1] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* (*CPR*), trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor, in *Practical Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 5:83 and 83n (pagination for Kant's works follows the standard Akademie Ausgabe); cf. Luke 10:27, Deut. 6:5, Lev. 19:18.

[2] See Elizabeth Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," in *Virtue Ethics*, ed. Roger Crisp and Michael Slote (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), esp. 26, 33, 43. Her historical thesis regarding Aristotle—that he lacks moral categories such as moral rightness, moral wrongness, and moral duty—has been partially challenged by Nicholas White in *Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics* (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002), 108–20, but then defended with unprecedented thoroughness by Richard Kraut in "Doing without Morality: Reflections on the Meaning of *Dein* in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 30 (2006): 159–200.

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Anscombe's thesis of the ungrounded character of modern ethics in his iconoclastic *After Virtue*. But it is especially later—and after his conversion to Christianity and Thomism—that he invokes Anscombe's phrase and launches a critique of the "distinctively moral." In *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* it is said to be John Duns Scotus whose divine command theory rejects the idea of the natural law as directed to our good. In the latter's place, Scotus posits a division of the self between self-regarding and other-regarding inclinations, and alongside his enfeebled ought of practical reasoning there appears "another 'ought,' one unknown to Aristotle and to the ancient world generally, the distinctive 'ought' of moral obligation."[3] As the account goes, it was this move that led to the voluntarism and irrationalism of Ockham, and from there to Kant and his successors, who disparage happiness, virtue, and natural sociability in favor of deontology—"unintelligible residues" of Ockhamist divine command theories.[4]

MacIntyre's alternative to this program is the plain, everyday, eudaemonistic ought of the Aristotelian. In this schema, rational human agency is structured as a practical syllogism: the major premise is that the agent should do what is good for or needed by her, the minor premise perceives some particular object as such a good, and the corresponding action results.[5] What may be most impressive, though, is the tremendous progress MacIntyre has made in developing and clarifying the manners in which this eudaemonistic foundation can support the profound human conviction that virtuous behavior and affectionate dedication to others should be performed for their own sake.[6] This is basically because it is the teleological structure of the person to pursue her own good, the attainment of which is only possible through noninstrumental dedication to the virtues and to a generous communal life;[7] the corresponding transformations of desire and in-

[3] Alasdair MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 155.

[4] Compare MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions*, 28, 163, 178, 193–94, Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 44–45, 111, 149, and *Dependent Rational Animals* (Chicago: Open Court, 1999), 122.

[5] For the fuller complexity, see MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 161–62, Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 138–41, 125–30, *Three Rival Versions*, 154, *Dependent Rational Animals*, 70, and, on the foundational question "What is my ultimate good?" Alasdair MacIntyre, "Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues, and Goods," in *The MacIntyre Reader*, ed. Kelvin Knight (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 136–52, 150–51.

[6] A just person performs an act because it is just (MacIntyre, *Whose Justice?* 113). Aristotelians standardly defend this view while distinguishing it from Kant's (e.g., Sarah Broadie, *Ethics with Aristotle* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1991], 111, 94).

[7] See MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 52, 150, *Three Rival Versions*, 138–39.

clination harmonize the search for one's own good with *the* good[8] and the common good.[9] She thus performs each virtuous action for its own sake and as a means to the further end of happiness,[10] often regardless of its consequences in a particular case.[11] Thus Aristotelian practical reason avoids a merely instrumental view of reason, an arbitrary concept of choice among ultimate ends, and the characteristically modern egoism-altruism dichotomy.[12]

My own basic identification with the Platonic and Augustinian ethical traditions makes me highly sympathetic to MacIntyre's project (unlike so many of his critics). I do not at all doubt that harmonizing self-interested desires with virtue and common goods is central to the morally and experientially good life. However, I do challenge the common neo-Aristotelian claim that this is the entire foundational story of ethics. I thus maintain that in one respect MacIntyre (like Anscombe

[8] For Aristotle, it is the good and the best alone that provides a fully rational *archē* for human action; for Aquinas, the true end of human nature is nothing less than perfect happiness (MacIntyre, *Whose Justice?* 89, 192). As contrasted with utilitarianism, Aristotle is said to defend "a single, albeit perhaps complex, supreme good" (133).

[9] See MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, 88.

[10] For Aristotle, the good man values the fine, noble, or just act "for its own sake as well as for its part in constituting *eudaimonia*" (MacIntyre, *Whose Justice?* 108). Vindicating this end-and-means reconciliation is basic to contemporary defenders of Aristotle, as in T. H. Irwin's remark that virtuous people choose virtuous action "for its own sake because it is a part of their happiness" ("Theory and Common Sense in Greek Philosophy," in *How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues*, ed. Roger Crisp [Oxford: Clarendon, 1996], 51); cf. Jan Szaif, "Aristotle on the Benefits of Virtue (*Nicomachean Ethics* 10.7 and 9.8)," in *The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics*, ed. Burkhard Reis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 170–71; and, on Plato, see Christopher Bobonich, *Plato's Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), esp. 582 n. 163. Aristotle's controversial claim that practical deliberation is concerned only with means, not ends, is thus interpreted to mean that one can deliberate about particular ends but that these are means (as well as constitutive parts) of the final end; cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* (*NE*) 3.3, 1112b33–35; MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, 106, *Whose Justice?* 132, "Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy," 139. All Aristotle references follow *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

[11] See MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 49, 205, esp. 150, 185, 198, 273, and *Whose Justice?* 113: "To say that just actions are to be pursued for their own sake is to say, not that nothing can outweigh the requirements of justice, but that the whole notion of weighing the requirements of justice against something else is from the standpoint of the virtuous a mistake. . . . That being just is taken to be a condition of achieving any good at all and that being just requires caring about and valuing being just, even if it were to lead to no further good." Note also in this context MacIntyre's depiction (*After Virtue*, 184, *Dependent Rational Animals*, 66–67) of practices with goods internal to them; cf. Charles Taylor, "Justice after Virtue," 25; Janet Coleman, "MacIntyre and Aquinas," 80–81, both in *After MacIntyre*, ed. J. Horton and S. Mendus (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).

[12] On instrumental reason, see MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 53–54, *Whose Justice?* 88, 285, and *Three Rival Versions*, 97. The egoism-altruism dichotomy is discussed below (sec. II.*C*).

et al.) has overstated his case regarding duty and "the moral *ought*."[13] This essay begins by drawing broadly from Plato and Augustine and two thinkers insightfully developing some of their fundamental principles—Anselm (1033–1109) and Scotus (1265–1308)—in order to present a sympathetic genealogy of the moral ought as rooted in an ideal eager and able to accommodate this-worldly happiness, but increasingly aware of happiness's limitations in the justification of some fundamental virtuous behavior. The second section argues that, whatever significant (and in my view questionable) departures from premodern thought Kant may have embraced, a close reading of his ethical writings shows him to be developing these Platonic-Augustinian concerns in a sophisticated and balanced manner.[14] I then outline Kant's model of practical reasoning with special reference to its theory of virtue and its attempt to ground and justify costly moral dedication, along with Platonic-Augustinian parallels. Finally, after presenting MacIntyre's striking account of "self-sacrifice" as a vice, I argue that the picture of moral agency and duty fully developed in Anselm, Scotus, and Kant offers a more rationally and phenomenologically plausible account of paradigmatically virtuous behavior—that is, that which is done for its own sake under difficult circumstances—than the eudaemonistic foundations of MacIntyre and his predecessors. Attempting to offer suggestive (rather than conclusive) challenges and alternatives to a justly distinguished ethical paradigm, this essay attempts to keep its main text at a manageable length through extensive footnoting and cross-refer-

[13] Bernard Williams also alleges an unfortunateness in the "very special notion of obligation in modern 'morality'" (*Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985], 32, and see also 174–96). For Philippa Foot's challenge of categorical imperatives, see D. Z. Phillips, "In Search of the Moral 'Must': Mrs. Foot's Fugitive Thought," *Philosophical Quarterly* 27, no. 107 (1977): 140–57. A prominent dissenter from this view has been Julia Annas ("Prudence and Morality in Ancient and Modern Ethics," *Ethics* 105, no. 2 [1995]: 252 n. 20), who maintains that in Aristotle, for instance, the *kalon* "marks a distinct moral perspective that cannot be fully accounted for on the traditional view."

[14] Among other departures to be noted below (see, e.g., nn. 35, 40, and 48), I think of the subversive impetus of Kant's emphasis on autonomy; see the comments of the broadly Kantian Vittorio Hösle (*Morals and Politics*, trans. Steven Rendall [Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004], 50, 100–101). From a Platonic point of view, debunking customary moral assumptions without replacing them with substantive and justified ones—something relatively few individuals may be capable of doing—leaves human nature by default with a crude, self-flattering sensualism; see Augustine, *City of God*, trans. R. W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 14.2, 582 (for all Augustine *City of God* citations, page numbers refer to this edition); and Plato *Republic* 7.538d–e; cf. Plato *Laws* 3.695b, 7.793e, *Gorgias* 463b, 527b–c. Unless otherwise noted, Plato references follow *The Complete Works of Plato*, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997).

ences, aiding readers to pursue further whichever issues are of interest to them.

II. TRANSCENDING THE SELF-INTERESTED SYLLOGISM

To a remarkable extent, philosophers with substantial premodern or antimodern moral commitments have been led and preeminently represented by Aristotelians, including Thomists. Accordingly, Aristotelians have been highly influential in shaping a prevailing understanding of the history of ethics. But those who believe that Aristotle often discards, or assumes with minimal exploration, themes central to Plato—concerning psychology, justice, love, happiness, or the practical implications of metaphysics—might hope for an alternative history of ethics in which the essential contrasts of the premodern with the modern might be framed subtly differently. The Aristotelian historical account is quite compelling if we must either retain solely eudaemonistic foundations or be left with stifling duties, neglected virtues, or arbitrary wills. We shall begin by tracing the various characteristically Platonic alternatives to this dichotomy, in which phenomenological insights such as behaving rightly for its own sake are reasonably developed, while attempts to root them eudaemonistically are shown to be less promising and hence subordinated—but far from neglected or discarded.

A. The Road to Rectitude: Plato to Scotus

In the *Protagoras*, Plato's Socrates seems to be at the heights of anti-Kantianism, attempting to justify morality entirely through a pleasure-pain calculus. However, it is far from obvious that this should be taken at face value,[15] as Aristotle and many other commentators have assumed.[16] Attributing some form of eudaemonism to Plato seems necessary nonetheless, in that he thought a rational vindication of justice requires a full-scale investigation of the effects of noble and shameful acts on one's psychic health, arguing toward a moral and spiritual view of the self and the universe in which indulgence and social contempt

[15] See Daniel Russell (epilogue to *Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life* [Oxford: Clarendon, 2005]) for a persuasive case that the *Protagoras* presents no reasons to construe Socrates or Plato as a hedonist of any kind. Gregory Vlastos (*Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher* [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991], 205) also denies that Socrates was a hedonist; cf. John M. Rist, *The Mind of Aristotle* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 51.

[16] See Aristotle's treatment of *akrasia* (*NE* 7.1–10, esp. 1145b21–29).

are bound to fail even on the egoist's own grounds.[17] And though he recognized that the world's severe injustices may require appeal to an afterlife to show that the just do flourish,[18] it is also clear that he, without hesitation or qualification, championed the rigorous moral life as that which is ultimately the most rewarding and never seemed to abandon eudaemonism.[19] In all of this Plato seems genuinely non-Kantian.

Nonetheless, we have strong reasons to believe that the Platonic idea of morality is not entirely grounded in self-interested calculation and shows noteworthy parallels to Kant. Socrates advises us to give no "countervailing weight" in decision making to any considerations but justice and goodness,[20] and he persevered in this amid a near-limit case of worldly hardship not because an afterlife would surely bring more benefits but because believing in this possibility is a "noble risk."[21] Across his career Plato showed this dedication to a distinctive and rad-

[17] The peak of this argument is Plato *Republic* 8–9. For Plato's case against the tyrannical way of life, see John M. Rist, "Plotinus and Moral Obligation," in *Platonism and Its Christian Heritage* (London: Variorum, 1985), 227–28, "Democracy and Religious Values: Augustine on Locke, Lying and Individualism," *Augustinian Studies* 29 (1998): 22, *Real Ethics: Rethinking the Foundations of Morality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 74, 117, 212. For the broader moral and spiritual context, see Plato *Laws* 6.770c–e; Rist, *Real Ethics*, 214; Annas, "Prudence and Morality," 246. Plato's negative psychological case is accepted even by Epicureans (Lucretius *De rerum natura* 6.1–28; cf. Plato *Gorgias* 493a) and in general seems stronger than his positive project, namely, that enjoyment in this life is proportioned to one's justice.

[18] And so in perhaps his three greatest ethical dialogues—*Phaedo*, *Gorgias*, *Republic*—Plato concludes with eschatological myths, where an afterlife reveals the natural consequences of virtue and vice unambiguously, and the injustices of this world are turned on their head (*Laws* 10 repeats and extends this approach). Plato's general awareness of the unhappiness that results from serious misfortune is apparent even during his vindication of justice's rewards (see *Republic* 10.613a). On this aspect of Platonic providence, see E. de Strycker and S. R. Slings, *Plato's Apology of Socrates* (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 232–35.

[19] See the strong affirmations of the importance of eudaemonism in moral education in Plato *Laws* 2.662b–63b (cf. 663d–e). Unfortunately, White does not seem to take this passage into account in his denial that Plato is a thoroughgoing eudaemonist (*Individual and Conflict*, chap. 2, esp. 182–85, but see, rightly, 166–73 on how Thrasymachus's attacks presuppose that eudaemonism is not universally assumed in Greek culture).

[20] Plato *Apology* 28b: "Man, you don't speak well, if you believe that a man worth anything at all would give countervailing weight to danger of life or death, or give consideration to anything but this when he acts: whether his action is just or unjust, the action of a good or of an evil man" (in Vlastos, *Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, 209). Compare Plato *Crito* 48c-d with Vlastos, *Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, 210–14.

[21] Plato *Phaedo* 114d: "No sensible man would insist that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their dwelling places." Compare *Phaedo* 91ab and *Meno* 86bc with *Philebus* 16cd, 28c–30d, and *Laws* 5.727d. The parallel to Kant's idea of the supreme good is evident—see *CPR* 5:143; Robert Adams, "Introduction" to Kant, *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, trans. A. Wood and G. di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), xxv–xxvi; and John Hare, *The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and God's Assistance* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), chap. 3.

ically prioritized moral good, which was perhaps seen as sufficient for happiness, and this was adopted in their own ways by the Stoics and Kant.[22] Plato forwarded the "inspired lover" as his model of goodness, demonstrating that when we are in love with someone there is a sense in which we desire him, but for any "high-grade" Platonic eros this manifests itself unselfishly;[23] only debased forms of eros are merely prudential.[24] A just soul takes in the abundance of beauty and reflects it back in a generosity that seeks to make the beloved better for his own sake.[25] And, just as one who says he is in love but is willing to

[22] See Plato *Apology* 30ab, *Republic* 505a, *Laws* 1.631bc, 2.661d; cf. *Euthydemus* 281d. For the Stoics, see *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, vol. 1, ed. A. A. Long and D. Sedley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), chaps. 58 and 60, esp. the entry for Diogenes Laertius 7.101–3 at 58a. Julia Annas maintains that these Stoicizing passages are fully reconciled with the idea that happiness is what we seek in all we do ("Virtue and Eudaimonism," *Social Philosophy and Policy* 15 [1998]: 42, 46), which may imply that virtuous action is seen as sufficient for happiness (cf. Vlastos, *Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, 217; contrast de Strycker and Slings, *Plato's Apology of Socrates*, 130 n. 9). Annas also claims this sharp distinction between virtue and all other kinds of goods "is never developed into an account of two sorts of reasoning, of the kind we find in the Stoics" and that its status in Plato is puzzling (Julia Annas, "Aristotle and Kant on Morality and Practical Reasoning," in *Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty*, ed. Stephen Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], 240). For Kant, see his treatment of the "good will," as well as *CPR* 5:60, and "Idea for a Universal History" (I) 8:26: "All good that is not grafted onto a morally-good character is nothing but illusion and glistering misery" (in *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, trans. Ted Humphrey [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983]).

[23] John Rist (*Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994], 153) centrally explores the "ethics of inspiration": "In Platonic and Platonically inspired ethics the Greek word *kalon* . . . means 'inspiring' and hence 'compelling.' . . . In Augustine's time no moralist would have supposed that his choices were limited to something like utilitarianism (or, more broadly, consequentialism), Kantian obligations or a form of contract-theory. Even the original ancient versions of what is now called virtue-ethics were far from an ethic of good training inducing good habits. Aristotelians [and even Stoics], as well as Platonists, dealt in the ethics of inspiration." On Diotima and *Republic* 7, see Rist, *Augustine*, 152, John Rist, "Plato Says That We Have Tripartite Souls," in *Man, Soul, and Body: Essays in Ancient Thought from Plato to Dionysius* (London: Variorum, 1996), 122–23, *Human Value: A Study in Ancient Philosophical Ethics* (Leiden: Brill, 1982), 50–51; see also Plato *Phaedrus* 256b, 256e–57a.

[24] See John Rist, "Moral Motivation in Plato, Plotinus, Augustine, and Ourselves," in *Plato and Platonism*, ed. J. M. Van Ophuijsen (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1999), 264, *Real Ethics*, 92 n. 32, 108–9. Bobonich extensively discusses Plato's vindication of the genuine value and eudaemonistic grounding of "other-regarding concern" for its own sake through "the appeal to friendship between citizens as such in a good city, the theological appeal of the god's efforts at bringing order to the universe, and the direct appeal to the value of virtue" (*Plato's Utopia Recast*, 434; see also secs. 5.6 and 5.8). Charles Kahn objects that "other-regarding" is anachronistic but endorses Bobonich's analysis "within the limits of the city" ("From *Republic* to *Laws*: A Discussion of Christopher Bobonich, *Plato's Utopia Recast*," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 26 [2004]: 342).

[25] See Rist, "Moral Motivation," 268; *Real Ethics*, 34, *Augustine*, 174; A. H. Armstrong, "Platonic *Eros* and Christian *Agape*," *The Downside Review* 255 (1961): 118; Plato *Phaedrus* 244a–57b. See also the Platonic, analytic ethics of Robert Adams (*Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999], chap. 5 on Eros, esp. 140).

make no sacrifices on the beloved's behalf can well be said to be a liar, one who has been inspired by the Good itself would never refuse a just obligation to return to the "cave" of public life and moral service, even though they are not in themselves fine things.[26] And it is these norms that ground whatever true moral beliefs exist among common people, even if they do not have the knowledge-*cum*-experience of the higher realities that would eudaemonistically vindicate such duties.[27] The Platonic focus upon the love for various ends instantiated in different ways of life, as well as the various sources of moral norms, suggests different avenues for reflection than the Aristotelian focus on proper habits and virtues serving as means to the single end of happiness.[28] And despite Plato's apparently consistent view that philosophy must give eudaemonistic vindication for such norms due to the centrality of self-interested motivation, his multifaceted approach to ethics gave rise to secondary noneudaemonistic appeals, such as condemning self-excepting self-interest as the source of all evil,[29] and insisting that the self was made first for the sake of the universe, not vice versa.[30]

[26] See Plato *Republic* 519c-21a, Letter 7 334e–35b; Rist "Plato Says," 123, *Augustine*, 153; and the more controversial specification of this thesis by White (*Individual and Conflict*, 202–8), maintaining that, in this one very particular situation, the philosophically trained indeed sacrifice their self-interest in giving up their best potential life.

[27] On the moral "true belief" of common people, see Rist, *Real Ethics*, 36–37. For the identification of the One and the Good in the later Plato, see Rist, *Mind of Aristotle*, 196–202. For some key statements of divine standards besides the doctrine of the Forms, see Plato *Theaetetus* 176e-77a, *Timaeus* 29e, *Laws* 4.716cd, 10.906a–b; cf. *Laws* 10.890d, 10.892b, *Republic* 6.501b. The once-neglected theme of the ideal of godlikeness in Plato has now received serious scholarly attention (see David Sedley, "The Ideal of Godlikeness," in *Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul*, ed. Gail Fine [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999], 309–28). For a correction of Sedley showing that the ideal is moral and not merely intellectual, see Timothy Mahoney, "Moral Virtue and Assimilation to God in Plato's *Timaeus*," *Oxford Studies in Classical Philosophy* 28 (2005): 77–91; see also n. 31 below. More generally, see Vlastos (*Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, 176–77) on how Socrates' disinterestedly benevolent god "brings a release from that form of egocentricity which is endemic in Socratic eudaemonism, as in all eudaemonism." On Plotinus, see Rist, "Plotinus and Moral Obligation," 229, and John Rist, "Plotinus and Christian Philosophy," in *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus*, ed. Lloyd Gerson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 390.

[28] For the various kinds of reason and soul battling within each person, see Rist, *Real Ethics*, chaps. 3–4, and "Plato Says," esp. 111–12; on Augustine, see John Rist, "Faith and Reason," in *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, ed. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 26. Aristotle's failure to focus on moral ends is related to his neglect of Platonic eros: see Rist, *Real Ethics*, 86–87, and n. 119 below.

[29] See Plato *Laws* 5.731d–32b.

[30] Compare Plato *Laws* 10.903c, with Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (*A*), trans. V. L. Dowdell, rev. H. H. Rudnick (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), 7:130: "Egoism can only be contrasted with pluralism, which is a frame of mind in which the self, instead of being enwrapped in itself as if it were the whole world, understands and behaves as a mere citizen of the world." Similar pluralism is attained in Stoicism through belief in providential order combined with the realization that nature's general pattern shows no special concern for my individual survival (Michael Frede, "On the Stoic Conception of

It is in this Platonic spirit that classicist and moral philosopher John M. Rist offers his own ethical theory, which might be dubbed "metaphysical background eudaemonism": That doing what we ought to corresponds with our advantage, even though we are not to do it merely or foundationally because it is to our advantage; that we are obligated to pursue virtue for its own preeminent sake even while we recognize its ultimate utility; and that knowledge of the Good, itself the highest enjoyment, reveals irreducible obligations.[31] From this perspective, Plato had no allergy to a "distinctively moral *ought*"—much less was it "unknown" to his ancient world. Rather, he acknowledged and embraced it as practically embodied in both everyday and highly developed moral life but saw it as needing vindication in the face of "the determined subverter of morality."[32] And precisely because of his abiding concern with such interlocutors, he developed ideals of self, justice, love, and cosmos central to thinkers who would question eudaemonistic harmony in different and more fundamental ways than he himself did.

Thus, while Augustine consistently affirmed with his pagan philosophical predecessors that all humans obviously seek happiness, at the same time he considerably problematized self-love and the search for happiness, potentially leaving other-directed love as a more compelling legacy than his eudaemonistic heritage.[33] Taking Augustine's negative contribution first, we find a thoroughgoing critique of all previous philosophical attempts at finding one's highest good of happiness in this

the Good," in *Topics in Stoic Philosophy*, ed. Katerina Ierodiakonou [Oxford: Clarendon, 1999], esp. 80).

[31] See Rist, *Real Ethics*, 44, 92–93, 97, 170–74, 211–15, 262, 275. He writes that in Greek eudaemonism "it 'pays' to be moral, not in any crudely materialist sense but in that one will become a better, more complete, more unified person, . . . 'happier,' by living a 'moral' life. Though Plato would see no reason *against* wanting to become better and indeed many reasons why one should so want, in taking that view he, in particular . . . is not urging us to be good *because* it pays to be good, whether in this world or in another—though as a matter of fact it does—but because we are made to conform ourselves to the goodness of the gods" (123). For the ideal of godlikeness in various Greek eudaemonists, see n. 27 above; Rist, "Plato Says," 121, *Mind of Aristotle*, 52, John Rist, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 267 n. 2, and "Plotinus and Moral Obligation," 224. Kant may consider Rist's Platonism perfectionist rather than eudaemonist (see *Metaphysics of Morals* [*MM*] 6: 387–88, in Gregor, *Practical Philosophy*), but it also pursues a broadly eudaemonist justificational supplement.

[32] See Rist, *Real Ethics*, 37; White, *Individual and Conflict*, 166–73. Rist does oppose Kant's version of the moral "ought" if seen as separated from a hidden Christian metaphysics (*Real Ethics*, 163–77), but he clearly maintains that Platonic obligation is moral in a manner not reducible to enlightened self-interest (e.g., 35, 143, 259).

[33] See, e.g., Augustine, *De beata vita*, *Confessions*, trans. Henry Chadwick (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 10.21.31, *City of God* 4.23, 169, 171, 4.25, 174, 10.1, 930, 19.1, 912–13, *De Trinitate*, trans. Edmund Hill (New York: New City, 1991), 13.6, 347, 13.11, 352. Compare Oliver O'Donovan, *The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980), 148.

world—a criticism mounted most famously in *De civitate Dei* 19.1–20 but perhaps even more powerfully in *De Trinitate* 13.[34] The crux of the argument is that, given the hardships and vicissitudes of this life, such an idea of the foundations of ethics inevitably leads to a hardened retreat from emotional connection and/or to an undue limitation of the scope of moral concern.[35] The second element of his negative contribution—repeated and extended by Kant—is a strong sense of "moral suffering":[36] that there are sufferings peculiar to the righteous, not the least of which being the strife of moral self-division that will never be fully overcome (as it seems to be, for instance, in Aristotle's man of temperance)[37] as well as the duties rightly but painfully placed upon us by membership in a broken social world.[38]

[34] In *De Trinitate* 13.8, 349, Augustine concludes: "Thus no one is happy but the man who has everything he wants, and wants nothing wrongly" (cf. *Confessions* 10.28.39, and *De moribus ecclesiae Catholicae* 1.3.4). Kant affirms something like the second condition in I 8:26 (see n. 22 above); as for the first, he makes one condition of happiness "That *everything* should *always* go the way you would like it to" (*MM* 6:480; cf. *CPR* 5:124, 137; Plato *Laws* 3.687c). Kant explicitly departs from the Stoics because they fail to make happiness in this sense an independent object of aspiration, reducing happiness to consciousness of rectitude—although "in this they could have been sufficiently refuted by the voice of their own nature" (*CPR* 5: 127); cf. Augustine: "True virtues are not such liars" as to claim that they can protect their bearers "against suffering any miseries" (*City of God* 19.4, 924). With this move both Augustine and Kant reject what Rist dubs the "ascetic ploy" (see Rist, *Augustine*, 49–52, *Plotinus*, 145–46; cf. Augustine *De Trinitate* 13.11, 351).

[35] This is the Stoic error: see *City of God* 9.4–5, 14.5–9, 19.4. Emotional connection is painful, so the Stoic seeks to combine faithful dedication with a self-protective emotional disengagement (see Rist, "Faith and Reason," 35). The Augustinian would say that, in his championing of "moral apathy" (*MM* 6:408–9, *A* 7:252–54), Kant at least comes dangerously close to this Stoic error and that this is predictable, since, although he avoided the philosophical vanity of attaining happiness here and now, he does insist on the need to fulfill moral duties by human efforts alone, without essential connection to the divine abundance as a source of moral generosity (cf. Augustine *City of God* 19.4, 919, and n. 40 below for Kant's religious views, with Hare, *Moral Gap*, 86). But what is perhaps more striking is the extent to which at least the early Augustine was overinfluenced by these Stoic ideals even after his conversion—see *Confessions* 4.4–11 and 9.12, with the profound reply of C. S. Lewis, *The Four Loves* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1988), 120–21.

[36] See esp. Augustine *City of God* 22.22–23; see also 19.4, 920, 19.14–16, and, for uncharacteristically dour remarks, 21.14–15. Contrast the more optimistic *Confessions* 13.12.30, 9.1.1, 10.36.59–37.61.

[37] According to Bonnie Kent, "in Aristotle's ethics, internal division is a condition human beings can and should overcome" (*Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century* [Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1995], 204). Aristotle sees continence and incontinence as rare halfway houses en route to temperance or intemperance. In the end all become good men or bad man, and the bad man is irrevocably bad, unable to choose the good except incidentally, just as the good man cannot intentionally choose a bad act. Kent (*Virtues of the Will*, 225–26, and Bonnie Kent, "Rethinking Moral Dispositions: Scotus on the Virtues," in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, ed. Thomas Williams [Cambridge University Press, 2003], 352) cites convincingly Aristotle *NE* 1105a23-b3, 1114a11–21, 1128b28–29, 1150a21–22, 1152a29–33, *Categories* 9a2-4; cf. Jonathan Lear, *Aristotle: The Desire to Understand* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 168.

[38] See esp. Augustine *City of God* 19.5–6; and R. A. Markus, *Saeculum: History and Society in*

Thus requiring an alternative to the standard eudaemonist project, much in Augustine indicates a simple attempt to shift the source and occasion of attaining happiness from this world to the spiritual world.[39] It is in the centrality of love for the divine in human aspiration and motivation that Augustine and Kant most clearly differ;[40] particularly grotesque to Kant would be the early Augustine's view that all of creation—notoriously including other people—ought to be "used" as a means for the one intrinsic end, the "enjoyment" of God.[41]

This pure spiritual self-optimizer framework came to be considerably qualified, however, due to reflections on the need for ultimate and nonutilitarian love for God,[42] as well as the Christian neighbor-love

the Theology of St. Augustine (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 100: "there is no felicity to be realized among the 'necessities' of this social existence."

[39] See, e.g., Augustine *Confessions* 4.12.18, 10.20.29, *City of God* 5.18, 223, 5.24–25, 232–33, 6.9, 260. Compare O'Donovan (*Self-Love in St. Augustine*, 120): Augustine "insisted that self-love must always accompany neighbor-love because almsgiving is worthless unless done for the sake of one's own blessedness."

[40] Negatively, Kant sounds a great deal like Augustine at times in speaking of the love of glory and dominance being highly motivating but insufficient for virtue (I 8:26, *A* 7:327–28, *MM* 6:284, 306–8, *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (*R*) 6:27, 58n, in *Religion and Rational Theology*, trans. and ed. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). But positively, Kant has no parallel to Augustine's idea that God is so completely our good that we are necessarily restive without him and will insatiably seize every manner of private goods to make up the difference (see Augustine *Confessions* 1.1, 2.6.4, *City of God* 2.17, 5.12, 7.27, 12.1, 15.4–5, as contrasted with the positive ideal, e.g., 5.16, 15.3–5). For Kant "religion" is "(subjectively considered) the recognition of all our duties as divine commands" (*R* 6:153–54), and he clearly excludes forms of religious piety such as prayer (see *R* 6:194). His key reason for this seems peculiarly blind to the distinctly religious needs highlighted by Augustine: "There are no particular duties toward God in a universal religion; for God cannot receive anything from us; we cannot act on him or for him" (*R* 6: 154n; cf. Adams, "Introduction," x, xxx). For Kant it is the focus on pure moral dispositions and duties, not external religious service, that improves the soul (*R* 6:124, 159; cf. his ideal of a church as a purely voluntary community formed for mutual ethical support in *R* 6:94–97). Accordingly, the uniquely effective moral pedagogy represents duty stripped of every incentive: see "On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, But It Is of No Use in Practice" (TP), in *Practical Philosophy*, 8:286–88, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (*G*), in *Practical Philosophy*, 4:410–11 with 411n, 426n, *CPR* 5:79–85, 152–56, *MM* 6:482–85, and *A* 7:295; cf. G. Felicitas Munzel ("Kant on Moral Education," *Review of Metaphysics* 57 [2003]: 59–60, 69) on the disciplinary preparation initially required. Though Kant is quite right in saying that even an eight- or nine-year-old can recognize the admirable character of choosing duty in difficult cases, the Augustinian would find him naive in thinking that entire lifetimes and entire societies could be won over to steady moral aspiration through pep rallies of purity. For a possible link of Kant's religious psychology and his idea of "moral apathy," see n. 35 above.

[41] See, e.g., Augustine, *Of True Religion*, trans. J. H. S. Burleigh, in *Earlier Writings* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1953), 47.91, 272, *On Christian Teaching*, trans. R. P. H. Green (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 1.22.20. See also O'Donovan, *Self-Love in St. Augustine*, 26–29; cf. n. 46 below.

[42] Using God for the sake of this-worldly enjoyment or taking this-worldly enjoyment as final without any belief in God frequently become the very definition of evil; see esp. *City of God* 15.7, 644, and also 15.17, 670, 21.26, 1095; contrast the acceptable use at 10.15, 413. The

command.[43] Augustine thus came to reflect upon the need to love God more than self[44] and the need for an overarching theological virtue of charity[45] enabling love for others "in God" and as they intrinsically merit,[46] rather than as they might fulfill or advance the self.[47] Virtues came to be seen as essentially other regarding, such that any act wherein the self-regarding overshadows the other regarding is immoral.[48] Developing the Platonic emphasis on love rather than happiness as a chief motivation gave rise to a noneudaemonistic strand in his thought, as Rist describes in his magisterial *Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized*: "He rejects all forms of hedonism, including spiritual hedonism. In and of itself delight would not entice the will to God, nor is the aim of the good man to secure the right sort of delight. Delight is not the final cause of the action of the good man, and to

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contrast is between love for "some extrinsic material reward" and that for "the benefits intrinsic to the relationship" (O'Donovan, *Self-Love in St. Augustine*, 127).

[43] See O'Donovan, *Self-Love in St. Augustine*, 115–17.

[44] Augustine's earthly city was formed "by love of self extending even to contempt of God" (*City of God* 14.28, 632, cf. 14.13, 609, 15.1, 634). For the two cities throughout Augustine's writings, see R. W. Dyson, *The Pilgrim City: Social and Political Ideas in the Writings of St. Augustine of Hippo* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2001), 32–38. This is, of course, in one sense a merely rhetorical point, since true self-love is understood as love of God; but the point of emphasis is nonetheless different and less at home with eudaemonism than the idea of self-love in, say, Aristotle *NE* 9.8. *Amor sui* is consistently used negatively in Augustine's mature thought (Rist, *Augustine*, 190).

[45] See Herbert Deane, *The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 83 and 279 n. 23; and Augustine, Letter 155.12–13, in *Political Writings*, ed. E. M. Atkins and R. J. Dodaro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 96.

[46] Augustine moved away from his earlier "use" formulation, through the view that one should love one's neighbors "because of God" (cf. *De Trinitate* 8.12, 254), and finally to an intrinsic but conditioned love: "enjoyment in God." For the mature position see *City of God* 19.13, 940, *De Trinitate* 9.13, 278; metaphysical inferiors are still supposed to be "used" (see also *City of God* 19.17, 945). For his comprehensive development, see Rist, *Augustine*, 162–66.

[47] See Augustine *Of True Religion* 46.87, *Confessions* 6.16.26, *De Trinitate* 9.13, 278, *City of God* 11.16, 470; Bonnie Kent, "Augustine's Ethics," in Stump and Kretzman, *Cambridge Companion to Augustine*, 214; Rist, *Augustine*, 148–49.

[48] See Kent's excellent remarks on virtue as rooted in other-regarding charity and hence incompatible with being motivated chiefly by one's fear or desire for reward, while at the same time God (not virtue) must remain "as the sole good to be loved purely for its own sake and without reference to any higher good" ("Augustine's Ethics," 215). Augustine's Letter 145 states: "He . . . is an enemy to righteousness who refrains from sin only through fear of punishment; but he will become the friend of righteousness if through love of it he avoids sin, for then he will be really afraid of sin. For the person who only fears the flames of hell is afraid not of sinning but of burning" (quoted in Kent, "Augustine's Ethics," 219; cf. Kant, *MM* 6:430, *R* 6:22n). However, Augustine by no means eschews the use of these lesser motivations for spiritual and political purposes (Letter 153.15, in Atkins and Dodaro, *Political Writings*, 90; Rist, *Augustine*, 226, 182 n. 80, 274; similarly Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* [*ST*], trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province [1920; Allen, TX: Christian Classics, 1981], I–II 95.1, 100.9, 107.1 ad 2). In the biblical writers, the fear of the Lord is famously said to be the beginning of wisdom (Prov. 1:7), but it is also maintained that *perfect* love drives out all fear (1 John 4:18). It seems that Kant believes something like this perfect love is attainable for human beings at a much earlier stage of development; cf. nn. 40 above and 121 below.

claim it as the sole efficient cause would be to fail to understand that 'delights' in any particular case vary qualitatively with their intentional objects: another piece of Platonic analysis. Thus man's goal is not to secure delight, but to be able to know God—which is experientially delightful."[49] Nevertheless, the radical religiosity of Augustine's focus allowed for complete convergence between ordered, other-motivated loving and ultimate fulfillment, thereby leaving to his followers the task of fully examining the structure of the good moral act and its relation to eudaemonism.[50]

Although Anselm's ethical reflections are brief, he undertook such an examination with striking acuity. In his work *On the Fall of the Devil* Anselm pursues the question of how that spirit may have fallen, and of course no recourse can be made to the common moralist's explanation (scapegoat?) of the body and its sensory desires. He proposes a thought experiment of God creating an amoral angel, being given only the will for happiness (*affectio commodi*). Such a being would will happiness successfully "to the degree that he knows it" and without concern for his means except in relation to that happiness; he may mistakenly will to be like God, but an act willed through mere incapacity to do otherwise could not be called just or unjust.[51] The salient moral point appears to be that, although there are no passions potentially blocking or distorting reason, the Angel seems to lack rational agency altogether in the sense in which we experience it. Anselm circumvents this implication by distinguishing between two kinds of good and evil—a moral good, "justice," to which the evil of injustice is opposed, and another good, the "useful," to which the harmful is opposed.[52] If, at the opposite hypothetical extreme, an angel were given only "the will for justice" (*affectio iustitiae*),[53] he would certainly will what is fitting, but there is a sense in which we cannot call him just. It

[49] Rist, *Augustine*, 158, describing the turning point in *Replies to Simplicianus* (ca. AD 396); cf. 174.

[50] For some links with his followers, see Jeffrey Brower, "Anselm on Ethics," in *The Cambridge Companion to Anselm*, ed. B. Davies and B. Leftow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 251 n. 5; John Boler, "Reflections on John Duns Scotus on the Will," in *Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes*, ed. Henrik Lagerlund and Mikko Yrjönsuuri (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002), 296; John Hare, "Scotus on Morality and Nature," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 9 (2000), 15; Kent, "Rethinking Moral Dispositions," 353.

[51] Anselm, *On the Fall of the Devil*, in *The Major Works*, ed. Brian Davies and G. R. Evans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 13. All Anselm references follow this edition and are cited by section number. Even if the amoral angel calculated correctly, he could never be "perfectly and worthily happy," since he lacks "a morally good will" (ibid).

[52] Ibid. 12. Kant makes a similar distinction (*CPR* 5:59–60). Standard medieval eudaemonism distinguished between two kinds of being but not two kinds of good (see Brower, "Anselm on Ethics," 225–33).

[53] For the philosophical senses of "will" in Anselm, see *De concordia* 3.11–12.

is only in a being possessing both wills that meaningful moral conflict can occur—and thus our own experience, wherein we find that every creature capable of sensation tends to the useful and avoids the harmful, but among rational and free creatures, only some want justice and flee from injustice, willing happiness only when it can be willed justly.[54] During the fall itself, all the angels knew nothing of the consequences of rectitude and its lack, while one set freely abandoned this rectitude and the other persevered.[55] Even after this fallout we find within ourselves the beautiful traces of that "quasi absolute good" of justice, whose "natural dignity" reveals our previous adornment and continued indebtedness.[56]

Anselm's thought experiment thus made possible a novel moral clarity.[57] Just as it is blasphemous to seek reward from the supreme goodness other than that goodness itself—which is not to love it at all[58]—so the seeking of rectitude is justice only insofar as it is sought for its own sake.[59] For Anselm, justice is "maintaining rectitude for its own sake," freedom of will is the power given for maintaining this justice,[60] and indeed truth, justice and rectitude mutually define one another.[61] He also shares Kant's projects of attributing a supreme and inviolable

[54] Anselm *On the Fall of the Devil* 12, 14, cf. 15.

[55] Ibid. 4, 23, 25, 27. In *Why God Became Man* 1.17 Anselm also points out the different degree of praiseworthiness of two individuals who remain steadfast, the one being unacquainted with the punishment of sin and the other "who looks all the time upon eternal punishment."

[56] Anselm *On the Fall of the Devil* 16.

[57] Kent (*Virtues of the Will*, 198) comments on Anselm's two affections: "As the agent's ability to will something other than what is advantageous to himself helps to explain the Christian conception of love, so the ability to will what is advantageous at the expense of what is morally good helps to explain the Christian conception of sin."

[58] Anselm *Monologion* 70. The two affections are asymmetrical: "the disposition to will the advantageous is not itself what it 'wills,' whereas the one to will uprightness is uprightness" (*De Concordia* 3.12), and "Now the will to be just is actually justice itself, but the will to be happy is not happiness itself because not everyone who wills it has it" (3.13). For connections with the love of God, see Brower, "Anselm on Ethics," 241–42.

[59] Anselm *On Truth* 12. In his exhaustive study of truth and freedom in Anselm, Bernd Goebel concludes after refuting various contenders that, for Anselm, moral goodness is rightness of the will, willed for the sake of rightness of the will (*Rectitudo: Wahrheit und Freiheit bei Anselm von Canterbury* [Münster: Aschendorff, 2001], 421–24).

[60] Anselm *On Free Will* 3, 10. Anselm's position seems to be that it is creaturely freedom that requires alternative possibilities and that these are required only once. In this manner he can consistently maintain that freedom in its fullest and truest sense is the inability not to choose rightly, as in the cases of God and the righteous angels; see *Why God Became Man* 1.12; Thomas Williams and Sandra Visser, "Anselm's Account of Freedom," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 31 (2001): 234–35, 243–44.

[61] See Anselm *On Truth* 12, *Why God Became Man* 1.12. *On Truth* 12 and *De Concordia* 3.2 both define justice as rectitude of will preserved for its own sake. Compare Kant, *MM* 6:429. Anselm *On Truth* 4 cites John 8:44 in connection with rectitude—a favorite passage of Kant's for this very reason (*R* 6:42n, *MM* 6:42; cf. *A* 7:295).

value to rectitude (a morally good will),[62] and of distinguishing moral goodness from mere natural goodness.[63] He wishes, like Kant, to draw attention to the remarkable distinctiveness of rational nature: that it is able to distinguish between just and unjust, true and untrue, good and not good, and greater and lesser goods.[64] Given that the mere ability so to judge is "quite pointless and superfluous," the human vocation must be "to love or spurn (with appropriate intensity) the object judged," and so increasingly to actualize the potential of the Image impressed upon it.[65] Anselm's endorsement of moral behavior being unqualifiedly done for its own sake refutes the idea that the "moral ought" arose in the voluntaristic, skeptical fourteenth century, while Anselm's Platonic and Augustinian focus upon the experienced nature of love and justice undermines dismissal of the moral ought as coherent only in terms of divine command.[66]

However, Anselm used his distinction between the *affectio commodi* and the *affectio iustitiae* in a limited manner, since he thought our fallen nature had reduced the latter to such an extent that rectitude could only be possible as a theological virtue.[67] In Scotus the *affectio*

[62] "You can see that there is nothing freer than a right will since no alien power can take away its rectitude" (Anselm *On Free Will* 9). Augustine had defined "good will" as "a will by which we desire to live upright and honorable lives and to attain the highest wisdom" (*On Free Choice of the Will*, trans. Thomas Williams [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993], 1.12, 19; cf. 2.13–14, 57, and *Confessions* 13.9.10). See also n. 51 above.

[63] Anselm *On Free Will* 13: "By saying that it is 'for the sake of rectitude itself' it is distinguished from the power of preserving rectitude for some other reason, for example for money, or just naturally. A dog preserves rectitude of will naturally when it loves its young or the master who cares for it" (cf. Kant's characteristic reference to a "morally (not naturally) good state of mind" in TP 8:283).

[64] See Anselm *Why God Became Man* 2.1: "For the reason why it [i.e., a rational being] is rational is in order that it may distinguish between right and wrong, and between the greater good and the lesser good. . . . Rational nature was created to the end that it should love and choose, above all, the highest good, and that it should do this, not because of something else, but because of the highest good itself. For if the loving were for the sake of something else, it would have as its object not the highest good itself but the other thing."

[65] Anselm *Monologion* 67–68; cf. Kant, *G* 4:395–96, *CPR* 5:61–62. For Anselm's idea of virtue, see *De Concordia* 3.13: "Now God so ordained these two 'wills' or 'affectivities' in order that the will as a tool would employ the will to justice for commanding and ruling under the tutelage of the spirit, that is, the mind or reason, and the second one for obeying without any difficulty." More generally, see Brower, "Anselm on Ethics," 247–49, 252 n. 5, for Anselm's successful integration of elements of eudaemonist theory.

[66] Brower ("Anselm on Ethics," 223) argues that "at bottom . . . Anselm's theory is deontological in nature: unlike the eudaemonism characteristic of this period, it separates morality from happiness (at least conceptually) and emphasizes the need for agents to be motivated by justice rather than happiness."

[67] See, e.g., Anselm *De Concordia* 3.13. Scotus maintains that since we are commanded to love the infinite good above all, "the will can do this by its natural endowments, for the intellect could not rightly dictate something to the will that the natural will could not tend towards or carry out naturally." The virtue of charity, which perfects the affection for justice, is a theological virtue for Scotus (see *Ordinatio* 3, suppl., dist. 27, in *Duns Scotus on the Will*

iustitiae[68] is seen as innate and as the seat of the will's freedom, even if we are initially saddled with a fundamental disharmony between the two *affectiones* due to the fall.[69] It is this move that allows Scotus to make the will itself a foundation of morality and so of the judgment of all human actions.[70] For Scotus, any act is immoral unless we allow the justice within us to bridle and temper our *affectio commodi* in accordance with the intrinsic value of the object and without needing to approve of its orientation to my own perfection or happiness.[71] Moral

and Morality, trans. Allan Wolter [Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1997], 281), but he maintains that evidence of love among the nonreligious makes this not demonstrable by reason (see Kent, "Rethinking Moral Dispositions," 363–66, 370). All references to Scotus follow the Wolter edition.

[68] *Affectio* is variously translated as "affection" or sometimes "inclination" by Scotus scholars; *commodi* is translated as "the advantageous" and "possession"; *iustitiae* is standardly "justice." Wolter defines *affectio commodi* as "a rational or intellectual appetite that seeks what the intellect shows is advantageous to the creature, particularly what makes it happy" ("Introduction" in *Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality*, 11), or what perfects it or actualizes it (39). Compare Thomas Williams, "How Scotus Separates Morality from Happiness," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 69 (1995): 431; and Boler, "Reflections on John Duns Scotus on the Will," 149 n. 55: "Anselm probably does mean by '*commodus*' something like self-interest; Scotus is contrasting *affectio justitiae* with the whole eudaemonist moral theory." *Affectio iustitiae* is "an inclination for something intrinsically good (*bonum honestum*)," inviting the will to love God for his own sake as a supreme value, and all other goods "honestly," in accord with right reason (Wolter, "Introduction," 12, 40). Compare Kant, *MM* 6:481.

[69] See Mary Beth Ingham, *The Harmony of Goodness: Mutuality and Moral Living According to John Duns Scotus* (Quincy, IL: Franciscan, 1996), 35.

[70] Wolter ("Introduction," 23) says the affection for justice grounds the moral law in Scotus, rather than the impersonal "eternal law" that Augustine inherited from the Stoics. The two affections, with one having clear moral priority, also differentiate Scotus from Ockham, who emphasizes "the power of the will to posit whatever end for itself" (Lagerlund and Yrjönsuuri, "Introduction" to their *Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes*, 20). John Davenport ("Towards an Existential Virtue Ethics: Kierkegaard and MacIntyre," in *Kierkegaard after MacIntyre*, ed. John Davenport and Anthony Rudd [Chicago: Open Court, 2001], 314–15 n. 42) directly challenges MacIntyre on this front: "in assigning 'primacy' to the will, Scotus is neither implying that intellect is 'inert' in relation to will nor that the will can be good only by obedience to revealed divine command, as MacIntyre claims (*Three Rival Versions*, 154–55). He is rather opening up the possibility that a virtuous will may not be best construed as a will toward the agent's *eudaimonia*. . . . With this goes the notion that what makes a will vicious is not simply its misapprehension of or deviation from its own true good. We cannot assume that if *eudaimonia* as a natural *telos* is not the sole criterion, then only revealed divine command can take its place. There are alternatives, and for Scotus the *natural* duty of love for others illustrates this." The role of divine command is a vexed issue of Scotus interpretation. Specifically on the rationality of the divine will, see esp. Mary Beth Ingham, "Letting Scotus Speak for Himself," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 10 (2001): 174–87; Hannes Möhle, "Scotus's Theory of Natural Law," in Williams, *Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, 314–18; Hare, "Scotus on Morality and Nature," 30, and John Hare, *God's Call* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 73. For Scotus, "God is to be loved" and whatever deductively follows from it is "natural law in the strict sense," whereas the neighbor-love commands are looser in application and within the realm of (rational) divine discretion, hence "natural law in a secondary sense."

[71] That is, to seek or value things relative to the good-in-itself (*bonum in se*) of things, rather than relative to the nature of the willer (*bonum sibi*: John Boler, "Transcending the Natural:

goodness derives from conformity to what right reason dictates, understood as finding the "most suitable" and "exceedingly fitting" mode of participating in divine love.[72] And this love, when perfected in us, "tends to the object for its own sake, and would do so even if, to assume the impossible, all benefit for the lover were excluded."[73] Citing Anselm's *On the Fall of the Devil*, Scotus posits that Lucifer's initial disorder was coveting happiness immoderately, abandoning that "first checkrein" on the affection for the beneficial and thus being ruled by nothing else than an "inordinate, immoderate appetite for the greatest beneficial good, namely, perfect happiness." The lesson learned is not the wickedness of self-interest, since *affectio commodi* is God given, but rather that we need not actually seek its preferred object, nor seek the beneficial all the time, nor above all else—and that we should use our liberty to wish for happiness less than, say, wishing God well, and not when it conflicts with loving our neighbor.[74]

At the same time, Scotus is theoretically concerned with showing how well-ordered loving is secondarily ordered to perfection and self-fulfillment and, thus, how one's happiness can become a sort of reflex object of well-ordered love.[75] Accordingly, his libertarianism about the human will is qualified by his teaching that freedom is perfected by virtuous habits.[76] These habits incline (but do not determine) the sense

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Duns Scotus on the Two Affections of the Will," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 67 [1993]: 111).

[72] Wolter, "Introduction," 20, xiii; cf. Ingham, *Harmony of Goodness*, 64.

[73] Scotus *Ordinatio* 3, suppl., dist. 27, art. 1, 277. A number of biblical figures express similar counterfactuals: see Rom. 9:3, Matt. 27:46, Exod. 32:32, Job 13:15, Phil. 2:5 (cited by Hare, *God's Call*, 59, "Scotus on Morality and Nature," 18, 36). For Scotus, this strictly nonpossessive charity is the first-level, legitimating condition of moral action, the second motive being the love we have because the object communally unites with us, and the third being the satisfaction of happiness (on proper love of God, see Wolter, "Introduction," 91; and Scotus *Ordinatio* 3, suppl., dist. 27, art. 2, 277–79; Hare, *God's Call*, 71).

[74] Scotus *Ordinatio* 2, dist. 6, q. 2, 295–302. Compare Scotus's rejection of Aquinas's and Henry of Ghent's views of free will—for Scotus, the pilgrim does "for the most part" want happiness, and the will cannot recoil "from that object in which there is no aspect of evil or defect of good. . . . Nevertheless, [the will] does not of necessity will happiness either in general or in particular" (*Ordinatio* 3, dist. 17, 154–62). For Aquinas's view, see n. 122 below.

[75] Wolter, "Introduction," 13, cf. 40. Scotus claims that the supernatural virtue of hope perfects the affection for advantage, which is interesting in connection with Kant's greater subordination of advantage coupled with his reduced religiosity. For Kant's religious views, see n. 40 above.

[76] For Scotus's inclusion of compatibilist elements (e.g., about grace and freedom) within a broadly libertarian system, see Boler, "Reflections on John Duns Scotus on the Will," 131–33; and Ingham, "Letting Scotus Speak for Himself." His view of freedom and virtue closely parallels Anselm's, except that Anselm *defines* true freedom in terms of rectitude, whereas, for Scotus, "a free will is more perfect to the degree that it follows right reason and remains steadfast in this pursuit. But this is a perfection of freedom and is not to be identified with it" (Douglas Langston, "Did Scotus Embrace Anselm's Notion of Freedom?" *Medieval Philosophy*

appetites and (especially) the will toward the just act;[77] and whenever a virtuous habit inclines one to what reason independently discerns as just, the act is more intensely meritorious than if the will acted alone.[78]

B. Kant's Moderate Morality

If the previous section shows that Plato and some medieval Augustinians may be underexplored resources for Kantians in their reflections on duty, happiness, and virtue, the current section intends to show followers of Plato or Augustine—and perhaps of Aristotle as well—that if Kant's approach to duty in the moral life is mistaken, it must be so in a manner considerably more subtle and limited than is commonly alleged. For Kant points to genuine practical concerns (often shared by MacIntyre's Aristotle) on the limits of interest as a guide to ethics, maintaining that in cases of conflict, duty must prevail over interest, and that in order to secure this one must trust the objective determination of justice rather than one's inclinations.[79]

A prevalent misreading of Kant would have his most basic, formal-level principles be obedience to the Categorical Imperative in both its Formula of Universal Law and Formula of Humanity versions, along with the requirement that every act be performed for the sake of duty. A far more helpful formulation would be that, *whenever duty is at stake*,

and Theology 5 [1996]: 159; cf. 156–59). See Ingham on virtue as the continual development of (rational and orderly) love, and the need for revelation as chiefly based on revealing God's loving nature rather than the Decalogue's commands ("Letting Scotus Speak for Himself," 187; *Harmony of Goodness*, 151).

[77] For subtle remarks on virtue as an aptitude inclining the will to correct acts promptly and with delight, and the more qualified sense in which such habits in the sense appetite can also be called virtues, see Scotus *Ordinatio* 3, suppl., 33, 227–31. For Scotus within the context of medieval debates on the locus of Aristotelian virtues, see Kent, *Virtues of the Will*, esp. chap. 5, and "Rethinking Moral Dispositions," 353.

[78] Scotus's high valuation of choice prevents him from understanding virtue straightforwardly as Aristotelian "second nature." He maintains that no natural inclination nor practical habit can ever replace the importance of deliberation and choice within the virtuous act—and so (in a favorite example of Kant's), a habitual disposition to give alms is not the virtue that conscious reflection brings. He also maintains that "no virtue acts with absolutely no deliberation" and that the dictum of "the Philosopher" ought to be understood to mean that the deliberation of the moral expert becomes "imperceptibly short" because of "the rapidity with which the practical inference is made" (*Ordinatio* 3, suppl., dist. 33, 236; see Ingham, *Harmony of Goodness*, 78–86, 127–28, and "Letting Scotus Speak for Himself," 189–90). Kent offers a thought experiment indicating that few would find someone virtuous if it were in fact true that she "simply cannot tell a lie" and that such sayings are mere harmless exaggerations whenever they denote true virtue ("Rethinking Moral Dispositions," 357).

[79] See, e.g., n. 83 below. The many ways in which Kant and Aristotle agree on substantive moral issues and disagree more on terminology and conceptualization are discussed at length in several of the essays in Engstrom and Whiting, *Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics*, esp. Stephen Engstrom, "Happiness and the Highest Good in Aristotle and Kant," 102–38.

one ought to act in accordance with duty and on the basis of duty but that considerable latitude for permissible pursuits of happiness still exists within these bounds.[80]

Kant's understanding of the place of happiness in the *Groundwork* (1785) and the second *Critique* (1788) is clearly stated in the 1793 essay, "On the Common Saying: That May Be True in Theory, But It Is of No Use in Practice." Against a (still familiar) caricature of his theory presented by Christian Garve, Kant writes that the maxim of duty does not eliminate concern for happiness, except in cases of a "collision" of one's ends of happiness with the moral law of duty (TP 8:282–83). It "quite contradicts" his claims to say that the virtuous person will have no concern for his happiness "even when it is not a matter of duty and there would be no conflict with it" (TP 8:281). This had indeed been clear in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, where Kant denounces "self-conceit," understood as the state in which "self-love makes itself law-giving and the unconditional practical principle." Mere "self-love," by contrast, is only "infringed upon," being restricted to the conditions of the rational law and thereupon becoming worthy of the title "rational self-love" (*CPR* 5:73–74). Thus the claims of the "dear self" must be denied only insofar as its aspirations cannot be universalized by autonomous rationality (*G* 4:439, 407, *CPR* 5:73). Moral reason does limit the conditions of the value of happiness (*A* 7:326), and so a distinction between the principle of happiness and that of morality is necessary; but an opposition between them is not thereby required, since claims to happiness are not renounced but only not taken account of "as soon as duty is in question" (*CPR* 5:93, cf. 72, 118; *MM* 6: 400).

If such collisions are possible, the prioritization of duty over interest is morally necessary, and Kant emphasizes this hierarchical approach in *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*. Since a finite being's maxims can never exclude the material incentive of self-love in favor of the law alone, the contrast between the good and evil person must come in the form of the maxim: whether self-love or the law is made the condition of the other, or, otherwise put, which is made subordinate (*R* 6:36; cf. *A* 7:277). It is not the inclinations themselves but rather the reversal of this order that constitutes evil.[81] A proper order

[80] The Stoics, by contrast, applied the notion of duty to "the whole of one's life and virtually everything one does, if one is truly virtuous" (John Cooper, "Eudaimonism, the Appeal to Nature, and 'Moral Duty' in Stoicism," in Engstrom and Whiting, *Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics*, 277, cf. 262; similarly, Annas, "Prudence and Morality," 252).

[81] See too the remarks that the Stoics—despite their sound understanding of virtue as a battle against an enemy within—were mistaken in seeing the inclinations as the chief enemy,

and a nonhypocritical profession of reverence for the moral law must make that law the "supreme condition" of the satisfaction of self-interest, and in this sense the law must be one's "self-sufficient" and "sole" incentive (*R* 6:36, 42n; cf. *CPR* 5:62). The proclivity to incorporate lower incentives in our maxims and make them supreme is what Kant calls the "tendency to evil" (*R* 6:43).

It is important not to soften Kant's insistence on the purity needed to properly decipher duty in view of his concession that "counterweights" are frequently necessary for motivation. Kant indeed writes that the principle of the physical good and that of the moral good are unavoidably mixed in practice (*A* 7:277) and that the prospects of a cheerful enjoyment of a disciplined life (à la Epicurus) might be needed to offset our bias toward the allurements of vice.[82] But this subjective necessity ought not to prejudice objective moral truths, and thus advantage must be "separated and washed" by reason before it can serve as a reliable ally (*CPR* 5:93).[83] The precise determination of duty is possible only through abstracting from empirical ends altogether, allowing no incentive of happiness to get "mixed, unnoticed, into the determination of duty" (TP 8:278–79; cf. *R* 6:4). Every volition may require a matter, and inclinations may always affect our desire, but we can nonetheless remain free from having such motives as the determining ground and condition of our maxims (*CPR* 5:34, 117, *R* 6:6–8n). Kant's central theoretical appeal to such a purified conception of advantage is his idea of the supreme good, wherein one hopes for one's happiness in a universalizable fashion (*MM* 6:481): only in proportion to her virtue and worthiness, and so with an end that already includes the moral law as determining ground (*CPR* 5:109, 130). Since advancing this supreme good is an end that is also a duty, to be performed for duty's sake, one also avoids the impure, cultic religious idea that falsely imputes to God "the principle of happiness as the supreme condition of his commands" (*R* 6:51, cf. 139).[84] It is within this framework that we must understand Kant's more extreme claims, such as that the doctrine of happiness has its "whole foundation" in empirical

rather than the malice of the human heart in its tendency to adopt "soul-corrupting principles" (Kant, *R* 6:57).

[82] Kant, *CPR* 5:88, *MM* 6:216; cf. *R* 6:161, 135. Compare *CPR* 5:115 on Epicurus and n. 106 below for Kant's endorsement of cultivated self-enjoyment.

[83] For such reasons Kantian "deontology" insists that the concept of good and evil can only be determined after the moral law and by means of it (*CPR* 5:62–63, 109). Interestingly, MacIntyre makes a similar point against sophistic and utilitarian approaches to ethics—see *Whose Justice?* 77, *Three Rival Versions*, 97.

[84] For Kant and Augustine on religion, sanctions, and moral motivation, see nn. 48 and 40 above; for qualified criticisms of religious eudaemonism, see n. 121 below.

principles, whereas in the doctrine of morals "they do not make even the smallest addition to it" (*CPR* 5:92).

Understanding the conditional "whenever duty is at stake" also provides insight into Kant's controversial claim that we are to act "for the sake of" or "from" duty (*aus Pflicht*). For, given that there is a great deal of overlap between legal moral choices and enlightened self-interest, it is tempting to reduce morality to such interest and thereby to open oneself up to a ground-level principle that in other cases is precisely the principle of evil (*MM* 6:447; cf. *G* 4:442).[85] But one cannot have faith that one's prereflective, innocent kindliness or generosity will last, for it is easily seduced, contingent, and precarious just insofar as it is dependent on subjective satisfaction rather than objective dedication to dutiful behavior.[86]

> The same human being can . . . leave an intellectual conversation, such as he otherwise values highly, in order to take his place at the gaming table; he can even repulse a poor man whom at other times it is a joy for him to benefit because he now has only enough money in his pocket to pay for his admission to the theater. If the determination of his will rests on the feeling of agreeableness or disagreeableness that he expects from some cause, it is all the same to him by what kind of representation he is affected. The only thing that concerns him, in order to decide upon a choice, is how intense, how long, how easily acquired, and how often repeated this agreeableness is. (*CPR* 5:23)[87]

Thus, even kindly inclinations are "blind and servile," and, whenever morality is in question, consideration of duty must have precedent and become one's determining ground in order to provide freedom for clear direction amidst the full spectrum of situations and novel temptations (*CPR* 5:118, *MM* 6:383–84).

When we add to this Kant's more famous arguments that the only thing of intrinsic and incomparable worth is a good will, it becomes far more difficult not to respect his position that morality—as opposed to mere legality—requires us to act from duty.[88] The relentless focus

[85] Kant depicts the biblical narrative of the fall as the daily decision of each of us, as we turn away from acting out of duty alone, preferring an obedience that is merely conditional because it is a means to self-love, until finally—through the triumph of sensory inducements over the incentive of the law—sin comes to be (*R* 6:42, cf. 42n).

[86] Compare Kant, *G* 4:390, 404–5, *CPR* 5:25–26, TP 8:286–87.

[87] Note the parallel with Anselm's solely happiness-seeking angel.

[88] Kant, *CPR* 5:71, 81, *MM* 6:18–20, *R* 6:14. See also Allen Wood's remarks on acting *aus Pflicht* as only a subset of those acts done out of good will, as well as the idea that any act in accordance with duty (*pflichtmäßig*) does have moral worth as dutiful, just not the *special sort* of moral worth of acts from duty (*Kant's Ethical Thought* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 26–35). For Anselm and Augustine on "good will," see n. 62 above and context.

of Kantian ethics is to show that the fundamental basis of the moral life is something quite different than optimal calculation—that goodness and enjoyment have different organizing principles, possessing independent laws and courts.[89] This focus makes the thrust of his moral philosophy corrective rather than balanced; but it seems to me that, if he were constructing a scholastic or Hegelian system, and were freed from the bête noire of a historically preeminent moral theory he believed crucially mistaken, then his embrace of the pursuit of happiness (in its place) would have been unmistakable. As his teaching stands, he may indeed have overreacted by defining prudential concerns to be altogether outside of the doctrine of morals, strictly speaking (*CPR* 5: 130). He bars prudence from the majestic title "moral" partly because the pursuit of happiness is innate and unavoidable,[90] partly because of the limitations and dangers of happiness as a practical guide, and partly because counsels appealing to our contingent preferences and receptivity to happiness can only yield hypothetical imperatives—however wise (TP 8:286–87). But though we may question the practical impact of Kant's demotion here, it is equally important to understand that Kant does not leave dedication to one's own happiness as a merely permitted indulgence. For Kant maintains that we have in certain respects an indirect duty to seek happiness, "partly because happiness (to which belong skill, health, wealth) contains means for the fulfillment of one's duty, and partly because lack of it (e.g., poverty) contains temptations to transgress one's duty."[91] And here Kant may perhaps save many of the moral appearances supporting Aristotelian eudaemonism, even while almost perfectly reversing Aristotle's heavy prioritization of happiness over ethics.[92]

[89] See, e.g., Kant, *G* 4:442, *CPR* 5:37, 59–61, 89, 111–13.

[90] Kant, *G* 4:399, 415–16, *CPR* 5:37, *MM* 6:386.

[91] Kant, *CPR* 5:93; cf. *G* 4:399, *CPR* 5:20, *MM* 6:388. Similarly Scotus (*Ordinatio* II, dist. 6, 2, 302): "And thus the good [angels] could have wanted happiness so that, by having it, they could love the highest good more perfectly."

[92] For Aristotle, happiness is the only good we seek for its own sake *alone* (White, *Individual and Conflict*, 234–35, 330; and T. H. Irwin, review of *Individual and Conflict*, *Ethics* 114, no. 4 [2004]: 856). Aristotle calls *eudaimonia* an end "complete without qualification" because we always choose it for itself but never for the sake of something else, whereas various other goods and excellences we may indeed choose for themselves (even if nothing else resulted), but we may also choose them for the sake of *eudaimonia* (*NE* 1.7, 1097a33-b7). Contrast the stronger eudaemonism of 1.12, 1102a2-4, asserting that we all do "everything else" for the sake of this one thing. See also the (un-Kantian and questionable) greater praise for happiness than justice (1101b25–26). For one Stoicizing possibility of reconciling this eudaemonism with extensive apparent altruism, see n. 118 below.

C. Costly Moral Freedom

In this section, we will contextualize Kant's subordination of happiness to ideal moral ends within his broader theory of freedom and practical reason. Along with his Platonic and Augustinian predecessors, Kant aimed to give a fundamental theoretical explanation and justification of highly demanding moral acts—something that may be a weak point of MacIntyre's common Aristotelian model of the practical syllogism.

For Kant, nature has given us a choice not only of means but also of the ordering of ends that differ in kind, which allows the major premise of our practical syllogism to be a distinctively moral one whenever reason so demands, rather than a hard-wired constitution seeking well-being only.[93] The human being is "not so completely an animal" that she sees happiness as the only thing that counts, inevitably using reason as a tool for the merely natural ends that instinct alone would probably be adequate or even superior in attaining.[94] Similar observations suggest that although Kant famously did not ground his normative theory on human nature (*G* 4:460, *CPR* 5:80), he is singularly intrigued by the moral possibilities and inclinations present in human nature.[95] For Kant, the true value and status of the person comes not from mere rationality or the ability to set oneself ends[96] but rather from what he refers to as the noumenal or intelligible self, the "original moral predisposition in us" (*R* 6:49) or the humanity or personality within us.[97] "The most rational being of this world might still need incentives"; but the human being, in its personality, has the capacity

[93] See Kant, *CPR* 5:90, *G* 4:395–96, TP 8:282, with the distinction between *das Gute* and *das Wohl* (well-being), alleging an ambiguity in the Aristotelian idea that we pursue everything under the form of the good (*CPR* 5:59–60).

[94] See Kant, *CPR* 5:61–62, *G* 4:395–96. Scotus too considers eudaemonistic reduction a form of animalization. According to Boler ("Transcending the Natural," 122, cf. 110), Scotus offers an implicit but far-reaching critique of the entire eudaemonistic project, maintaining that "it is only the (mistaken) assumption that a rational agent is simply a higher form of natural agent that makes a self-realization scheme seem plausible in the first place."

[95] Kant refers to "personality" as "freedom and independence from the mechanism of the whole of nature" (*CPR* 5:86–87). But the "whole of nature" from which one is free is qualified, since one "is bound only to act in conformity with his own will, which, however, in accordance with nature's end is a will giving universal law" (*G* 4:432).

[96] See esp. *MM* 6:434–35. This limited value is commonly claimed as perhaps the highest human value by contemporary appropriators of Kant; see, e.g., Wood, *Kant's Ethical Thought*, 5; and especially the jarring misuse of *CPR* 5:161–62 in Martha Nussbaum, *Sex and Social Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 79, cf. 384 n. 9. Compare the contrast of Scotus and Ockham in n. 70 above.

[97] The disposition to personality makes each human a rational "and at the same time *responsible* being," with a "susceptibility to respect for the moral law *as of itself a sufficient incentive to the power of choice*" (Kant, *R* 6:26–27; cf. *MM* 6:223, 434–35).

to find the moral law itself an incentive.[98] Here, Kant distinguishes freedom of the power of choice (*Willkür*) from his central moral concept of "will" (*Wille*), with the latter grounding our freedom from determination by sensible impulses, in favor of determination by the moral law alone.[99]

The disposition, personality, or "humanity that dwells within" each person aims to draw us into a greater reverence for that second, highest, and true vocation that it reveals, urging us to overcome passive abandonment to ease and comfort in favor of duties to virtue and self-perfection.[100] In view of this it should come as no surprise that it is no longer disputed among serious students of Kant whether virtue plays a central role in his ethics;[101] and, while he has a more harshly dichotomous approach to habitual inclination, custom, and the emotions than many find acceptable,[102] his attempt to combine libertarian freedom, natural moral ends, and virtuous habituation does have Augustinian precedents.[103] For Kant, true virtue is a firmly grounded, non-

[98] See Kant, *R* 6:26n, 26–27; cf. TP 8:287, *CPR* 5:99, 107–8, and *MM* 6:449 on the role of the noumenal self and the immutable order which it perceives. On the speculative impenetrability of the practical influence of "a mere intellectual idea," see *G* 4:461, *CPR* 5:79–80, *R* 6:59n; cf. *G* 4:438–39, 459. For the Platonic character of Kantian reason, see Wood, *Kant's Ethical Thought*, 121–22; and Karl Ameriks, "Introduction," in *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism*, ed. Karl Ameriks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 8–9; but for the sense in which Kant is a subjective rather than an objective idealist, see Frederick Beiser, "The Enlightenment and Idealism," in Ameriks, *Cambridge Companion to German Idealism*, 25, 33–34; and Vittorio Hösle, *Objective Idealism, Ethics, and Politics* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 28–29.

[99] See esp. Kant, *MM* 6:213–14. Compare Stephen Engstrom, "The Inner Freedom of Virtue," in *Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretive Essays*, ed. Mark Timmons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 294–95. See Kant, *G* 4:446, 459 for more definitions of will, and *CPR* 5:33, 117, for the contrast of "negative" and "positive" freedom.

[100] Compare Kant, *CPR* 5:87, TP 8:287, *A* 7:324–25, and esp. *MM* 6:387.

[101] For the basic outlines of current scholarship, see Wood, *Kant's Ethical Thought*, 329–33; Lara Denis, "Kant's Conception of Virtue," in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy*, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 505–37. For more extensive discussion, see Nancy Sherman, *Making a Necessity of Virtue: Aristotle and Kant on Virtue* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and G. Felicitas Munzel, *Kant's Conception of Moral Character* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), with the former emphasizing Kant's similarities with Aristotle, and the latter their differences.

[102] See, e.g., Kant, *MM* 6:407, 409, 383–84, *A* 7:147; Hösle, *Morals and Politics*, 101–2.

[103] The importance of contingency for Plato is not clear and seems to be frequently denied (e.g., *Timaeus* 86d-87b, *Laws* 5.731c; but cf. *Republic* 10.617de, 619ab). For Augustine its importance is a key argument of *On Free Choice of the Will* (2.1, 30, 3.1, 70, 3.17, 105), which he later claims (disputably) to have never repudiated (*Retractiones* 1.9.2–6). For Anselm, see n. 60 above. For Scotus, see n. 76 above. For "freedom" understood in terms of habitual, natural, or divine moral perfection, see Augustine's views in *City of God* 22.30; Rist, *Augustine*, 133–35 with n. 105; and *Real Ethics*, 105. For Plotinus's "freedom" see Rist, *Plotinus*, 77–80, 136–37; and for Anselm, see n. 60 above. Scotus and Kant are distinctive in their resistance to full habituation to virtue; for Scotus, see nn. 76 and 78 above; for Kant, see n. 102 above. For

sensual disposition and aptitude to fulfill one's duty arising from "considered, firm, and continually purified principles" (*MM* 6:383, *R* 6:23n). Each case should bring forth self-conscious reflection, but thereupon the possibility of deviating from internal lawgiving should make the healthy soul shudder, and freedom is revealed in direct proportion to one's *inability* to resist morality's call to duty.[104] And, although Kant never saw such a complete possibility of internal moral harmony as Aristotle seemed to,[105] he makes it clear (at least in his later writings) that proper habits increase one's capacities for pleasures[106] as well as one's affective delight in doing one's duties, notably including beneficence.[107]

Kant's model of human nature and freedom supports not only a substantive virtue theory but also a theory of the possibility and rationality of distinctively demanding moral behavior. For it is the Kantian

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Rist's excellent treatment of the relation of moral freedom and libertarian freedom, see *Real Ethics*, 69–70, 201–3, and "Democracy and Religious Values," 17.

[104] See Kant, *MM* 6:226–27, 382n–384, 406. For an interpretation of Kant's suggestion "that the greatest capacity to be morally compelled is the height of freedom," see Engstrom, "Inner Freedom of Virtue," esp. 293, 313–14.

[105] Kant's departure from Aristotle on temperance is not merely a result of different concepts of human nature (as is emphasized by Allen Wood, "Kant versus Eudaimonism," in *Kant's Legacy: Essays in Honor of Lewis White Beck*, ed. Predrag Cicovacki [Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2001], 261–81) but also of a sense of the scope of ethical demands. For Kant, no creature could ever come to thoroughly like fulfilling all moral laws, precluding any possibility of contrary desire, and hence self-constraint and sacrifice remain necessary (*CPR* 5:83–84; cf. *MM* 6:386). Similarly, the Stoics could not have portrayed their sage as beyond temptation "if they had represented the law in all its purity and strictness, as the precept of the Gospel does" (*CPR* 5:127n). If Aristotle has a more optimistic concept of temperance (see n. 37 above), it may be in large part because of his unduly lax sense of justice, outstandingly in relation to foreigners and those considered natural slaves (see n. 142 below).

[106] See the decisive *A* 7:236–37, distinguishing a cultivating sort of self-gratification from a debilitating sort and encouraging his audience to deny themselves pleasures for the sake of increasing them. Kant also regularly evidences a strong theory of the insatiability and destructiveness of vicious indulgence (*G* 4:396, *CPR* 5:118, *MM* 6:427, *A* 7:233, "On a Conjectural Beginning of Human History" [CB] 8:111, in *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*). For Kant's subtle attempts to maintain virtue as preeminently its own reward despite the benefits conferred by it and self-consciousness of it, see *MM* 6:387–88, 396, 399, and 438.

[107] For a helpful summary of three morally important roles feeling can play, see Denis, "Kant's Conception of Virtue," 516–18. See esp. Kant, *MM* 6:484: "But what is not done with pleasure but merely as compulsory virtue has no inner worth for one who attends to his duty in this way and such service is not loved by him; instead, he shirks as much as possible occasions for practicing virtue" (see also *MM* 6:456, *R* 6:145). For Schiller's parody of Kant—that one must seek to despise one's friends so that he can serve them with repugnance—and Kant's reply, see Wood, *Kant's Ethical Thought*, 28, and *R* 6:23n. For delight in beneficence, see Kant's progressively more favorable response to the biblical commandment to love one's neighbor, about which he finally comes to believe that one is commanded to act beneficently and thereby develop one's aptitude to it (*G* 4:399, *CPR* 5:83, and *MM* 6:402; contrast Kant's views on "moral apathy" in n. 35 above). Scotus offers a similar rationale in interpreting Deut. 6:5 as a full-fledged precept, not a mere ideal to which we strive (*Ordinatio* 3, suppl., dist. 27, 283–84).

"will" that uniquely allows rational beings to act simply in accordance with the representation of a universal "law of freedom" regardless of and even in clear opposition to the laws of nature and interest.[108] Such freedom reveals itself to be all the more sacred and incomprehensible in proportion to the strength of the sensory assailants it overcomes (*MM* 6:483). Kant argues that even a slavish man, convinced he could never forgo gratifying his lusts, would do so without hesitation on pain of execution for them; by contrast, through the distinct power of the ought he would know that he at least could and should accept that same execution to avoid perjuring himself on behalf of political murder (*CPR* 5:30).[109] Later Kant argues extensively that it is only philosophers who could so muddle the question of what "*pure* morality" is. This simple truth is revealed in depicting to a ten-year-old boy the travail of an honest man, being induced to join the calumniators of an innocent man, who never wavers in his resolve despite bribes and threats of increasingly horrible penalties (*CPR* 5:155–56). The boy would be raised step by step from approval to admiration and veneration, wishing that he might become such a man (though in different circumstances) and discovering that virtue is here worth so much precisely because of its costliness, not its profitableness (*CPR* 5:156).[110] Elsewhere Kant marvels at the original moral predisposition in us, making reason's commands so compelling—despite not promising or threatening anything—that even if the enjoyment of nature in defiance of the moral law could "alone make our life desirable," such enjoyment would make us seem "unworthy of existence," and we can instead "hold the whole of nature as nothing" (*R* 6:49).

Some antecedents to Kant here include Plato's depiction of Socrates' final hours, insisting on the causal priority of the mind's perception of the honorable path over the impulse of his "sinews and bones" to

[108] Kant, *G* 4:412–13, 447, *CPR* 5:29, 65, *R* 6:59n.

[109] The critique of the slavish man here echoes Rousseau (see *Emile; or, On Education*, trans. Allan Bloom [New York: Basic Books, 1979], 325; cf. *Julie; or, The New Heloise*, trans. Philip Stewart and Jean Vaché [Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1997], appendix, 613; see also the echo of *Emile*, 290, at *CPR* 5:86). Rousseau and his precursor Fénelon play key (albeit convoluted) roles in the broad tradition that I am depicting; for reflections on the links between Augustine, Fénelon, Rousseau, and the ethics of self-interest, see Pierre Force, *Self-Interest before Adam Smith* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 183–200; Christopher Brooke, "Rousseau's Political Philosophy: Stoic and Augustinian Origins," 94–123; Patrick Riley, "Rousseau, Fénelon, and the Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns," 78–93, both in *The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau*, ed. Patrick Riley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Helena Rosenblatt, *Rousseau and Geneva: From the "First Discourse" to the "Social Contract"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chap. 3. For English predecessors, see Stephen Darwall, *The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought': 1640–1740* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

[110] Such examples are central in Kant's moral pedagogy; for the latter, see n. 40 above.

seek self-preservation through flight.[111] Augustine's *City of God*, despite its withering criticisms of pagan "virtue" and Roman glory mongering,[112] singles out Marcus Regulus as an "entirely great man" who willingly subjected himself to torture at the hands of the Carthaginians for the sake of the Roman good and the religious inviolability of his oath.[113] Anselm very closely parallels Kant in maintaining that, if someone were threatened with death unless he told a lie, no necessity would prevent him from using his "power to maintain the uprightness of will purely for the sake of its uprightness."[114]

It is with Scotus, however—our Augustinian postdating the reemergence of Aristotle's ethical writings—that we find the most searching criticism of Aristotle's approach to such issues. Although in his discussion in *Nicomachean Ethics* 3 Aristotle focuses on how the courageous soldier is motivated by "the noble" (*to kalon*), Scotus picks up on other passages wherein Aristotle apparently attempts to show how such motivations cohere with his eudaemonism. He notes that the Aristotelian soldier could not be looking forward to compensation in the afterlife (since he does not believe in such things) but instead seeks his eudaemonistic good through honors or the "short period of intense pleasure" that precedes a noble death.[115] Scotus answers with an alternative rationale: "On the contrary, here I simply love more what I want to save and shield from evil. I am willing to lose something else rather than this other, for whose sake I am willing to surrender my very existence. But brave persons of this sort are willing that both themselves and their act of virtue should cease to exist rather than that evil befall their state or country. Therefore, they simply love the public good,

[111] See Plato *Phaedo* 98e-99a; Rist, "Moral Motivation," 269.

[112] See Augustine *City of God* 5.12–20, 19.21, 25, and Letter 138.17 (in *Political Writings*, 40–41).

[113] For Augustine's judgments on Regulus (who is no longer believed to be a historical figure), see *City of God* 3.18, 124, 1.24, 37. See the account of Regulus's sacrificial acts at *City of God* 1.15, 24.

[114] Anselm *De Concordia* 1.6, 446. *Why God Became Man* 2.14 maintains that one should rather that the whole universe would perish, or that one take upon oneself all the sins of the universe, than to follow someone's command to kill the Christ; cf. 1.9, 277, on the voluntary motivation behind Christ's death.

[115] Scotus mentions directly Aristotle *NE* 9.8 (1169a16–32); cf. also *NE* 3.8–9 (see 1116b35–1117b21, which notes the courageous man's concern with receiving honors and concedes that the exercise of some excellences is not pleasant "except in so far as it reaches its end") and Aristotle's noneudaemonistic *Rhetoric* 1.9, 1366b37-67a6. See Mary Keys on the magnanimous man's tension between his wish to see virtue as its own reward and his concern with external honors and personal preeminence (*Aquinas, Aristotle, and the Promise of the Common Good* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006], 144–47, 175–76 n. 4).

which they wish to preserve, more than they love themselves."[116] Scotus plausibly alleges that Aristotle is (on the one hand) attributing a motivation to such moral behavior far more self-interested than is likely[117] and (on the other hand) must accordingly claim virtue to be far more self-rewarding than most any honest analysis could conclude.[118] By contrast, Kant and his predecessors can clearly explain both the possibility and the morality of undeniably and knowingly subordinating one's interests to a higher justice or good—and here one ought to think of a broad range of dangerous political or social dissidence just as much as the military defense of the state.

D. Snapping the Elastic Self

Although it is doubtful that any authentically Aristotelian theory would deny that one should pursue the nobler rather than the pleasanter route in such cases, it remains the case that Aristotle avoids sustained discussions of them, and it is not clear to me that his model of practical reason can effectively account for them.[119] In what follows I will take

[116] Scotus *Ordinatio* 3, suppl., dist. 27, art. 3, 282. Compare Carneades' allegation of a contradiction between the Stoics' eudaemonistic foundation and their ideals of justice (Annas, "Prudence and Morality," 254).

[117] In this vein, Tocqueville finds early nineteenth-century Americans constantly and "complacently" explaining how their sacrifices of time and money for others are actually explained by enlightened self-love. He finds that the Americans here "do honor to their philosophy rather than themselves," for one often finds them "abandoning themselves to the disinterested and unreflective sparks that are natural to man" (see *Democracy in America*, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000], vol. 2, pt. 2, chap. 8, 500–502; this eudaemonism is contrasted with the aristocratic ethos praising virtues of duty, sacrifice, and self-forgetfulness). For similar criticisms of egoistically explaining apparently altruistic behavior, see James Rachels, *The Elements of Moral Philosophy*, 3rd ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1999), 75–76; Hösle, *Morals and Politics*, 98 n. 29; Christine Korsgaard, "From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble: Kant and Aristotle on Morally Good Action," in Engstrom and Whiting, *Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics*, 236 n. 28; contrast Broadie, *Ethics with Aristotle*, 115.

[118] For this Stoicizing strand in Aristotle, see Erik Wielenberg, "Egoism and *Eudaimonia*-Maximization in the *Nicomachean Ethics*," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 26 (2004): 277–95. Taking Aristotle *NE* 9.8 as his chief basis, Wielenberg shows that the person following *noûs* will always choose what is best for himself (1169a15, 281–82), which is done through always choosing to maximize his overall virtuousness, something conceptually distinct from acting to maximize his happiness (284–86). He thus assigns the greater good to himself even by choosing apparently sacrificial actions (282–83), but this would not include sacrificing one's own *eudaimonia* for that of others (277). For Augustine and Kant's replies, see n. 34 above. For a thorough attempt to understand Aristotle's eudaemonistic justification of dangerous courage, see Szaif, "Aristotle on the Benefits of Virtue," 190–91, 182–87.

[119] See Rist's argument that Aristotle's acting "for the sake of the noble" (*to kalon*) "bypasses foundational issues in evoking Plato's ghosts" (*Real Ethics*, 86–87, 146–50). "Unlike Plato, Aristotle *assumes* some sort of objectivist . . . aspect to morality . . . , and he *assumes* a general knowledge of what the best society and the best upbringing 'for the sake of the noble' would

issue, not necessarily with Aristotle or Aquinas themselves,[120] but with a standard Aristotelian account, which is crystallized in Thomistic accounts such as MacIntyre's—insofar as they do not vindicate irreducible this-worldly sacrifice by otherworldly appeals.[121] In this view, the human end of well-being is naturally grafted upon the psyche as the final basis for all choice (or at least rational choice), the practical intellect's designation of one's good properly gives rise to choice, and free acts are understood as the rational self-determination of practical reason, which are sometimes interfered with by the revolt of appetite or will.[122] But the self's well-being is enlarged, refined, and indeed con-

be like, concerning himself not with justifying such assumptions" (29). Compare White, *Individual and Conflict*, 238–44.

[120] For a more Kantian interpretation of Aristotle, in which "the good" without essential link to one's own ultimate good is taken as sufficient reason for action, see Korsgaard, "From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble," 214–19. This is Rousseau's own approach to the practical syllogism (see *Emile*, 289).

[121] We will focus on Aristotelian and Thomistic attempts to justify Aristotelian this-worldly eudaemonism, although Aquinas of course has otherworldly resources to appeal to as well. In this light, his differences here with the traditions I am depicting would be subtle and chiefly concern his greater emphasis on eudaemonism in motivation; see nn. 122, 132, 133, and 136 below for Aquinas, which parallel what is questionable in Augustine in n. 39 above; contrast nn. 31, 48, 73. See also Tocqueville's sensible objections (*Democracy in America*, vol. 2, pt. 2, chap. 9, 504–5) to interpreting admirable religious devotion in eudaemonistic terms: "I have encountered zealous Christians who constantly forget themselves in order to work with more ardor for the happiness of all, and I have heard them claim that they were only acting this way in order to merit the goods of the other world; but I cannot prevent myself from thinking that they deceive themselves. I respect them too much to believe them. It is true that Christianity tells us that one must prefer others to oneself to gain Heaven; but Christianity tells us as well that one ought to do good to those like oneself out of love of God. . . . I therefore do not believe that the sole motive of religious men is interest; but I think that interest is the principal means religions themselves make use of to guide men, and I do not doubt that it is only from this side that they take hold of the crowd and become popular." Merold Westphal (*God, Guilt, and Death: An Existential Phenomenology of Religion* [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984], chaps. 7–8) argues that the experience of nonutilitarian self-transcendence is a basic element of most religious pieties, even if more mundane self-interest is not excluded.

[122] For MacIntyre, see n. 5 above; for Aristotle, see n. 92 above, and for Aquinas, *On Evil*, trans. Richard Regan and ed. Brian Davies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), chap. 6, *ST* I 82.1–2. For introductions to Aquinas on the will, see Norman Kretzmann, *The Metaphysics of Theism* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 208–12; Brian Davies, "Introduction" to Aquinas, *On Evil*, 23–32; and Eleonore Stump, "Intellect, Will, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities," in *Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy*, ed. Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 266–70. It is disputed whether or in what sense Aquinas affirms freedom of contingency, but it is clear that the formal makeup of the soul is eudaemonistically determined: "as the intellect of necessity adheres to the first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness" (*ST* I 82.1). Freedom of choice is "rooted in intellect's ability to determine (1) what the human good or ultimate end consists in and (2) alternative specifications of and means for attaining that good" (Scott MacDonald, "Egoistic Rationalism: Aquinas's Basis for Christian Morality," in Beaty, *Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy*, 337; cf. Boler, "Reflections on John Duns Scotus on the Will," 123). For Boethius's Aristotelian approach to happiness as sole end of the will, see Calvin Normore, "Goodness and Rational Choice in the Early Middle Ages," in Lagerlund and Yrjönsuuri,

stituted by its sociopolitical community and its virtues. Aristotle, Aquinas, and MacIntyre all argue that no person can flourish outside of a flourishing community, their interests being so closely interwoven.[123] And although the tradition aims for balance here, insisting against (Aristotle's interpretation of) Plato that the whole cannot be happy if none of its parts are happy,[124] it is clear that, if the very existence of the political community were at stake, the part should be sacrificed for the whole.[125]

However, if we ask why some part would believe this—rather than simply the whole and all the nonimplicated parts—some of the rationale seems to be based upon an ambiguity built into the major premise of Aristotelian eudaemonism. Whereas the typical statement of the agent's major premise is to pursue "my good,"[126] the assumption of harmony between self and community at times makes the major premise appear as "my good and the good."[127] Then, at a time when some higher good certainly appears to require me to sacrifice "my good," one can see "the good" alone slip in as the major premise.[128] But it

Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes, 31–33. For Scotus's rejection of this approach, see n. 74 above.

[123] See, e.g., Aristotle *Politics* (*Pol.*) 1.2, 1253a2-28; Aquinas *ST* II-II 47.10 ad 2.

[124] See Aristotle *Pol.* 2.5, 1264b15-23. For the mysteriousness of Aristotle's objection here—given that in Plato's account the various parts are said to be happy—see Trevor Saunders's commentary, *Politics: Books I and II* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 125–26. But more generally we should agree with Hösle that Aristotle's critique of Plato's utopian collectivism is one respect in which he has made a major advancement over Plato (see *Morals and Politics*, 14–16).

[125] The question of whether it is rational to give one's life for the benefit of society (barring appeal to religious motivation) was an ongoing debate at the University of Paris beginning in the late thirteenth century. Godfrey of Fontaines (ca. 1250–1306) is representative of the Aristotelian position in arguing for its self-interested rationality, since "a part is sacrificed for the whole" (see Lagerlund and Yrjönsuuri, "Introduction," 16–17).

[126] See n. 5 above.

[127] See, e.g., MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, 72. Although MacIntyre explicitly distinguishes himself from an "organic-harmonic picture" (see Alasdair MacIntyre, "Once More on Kierkegaard," in Davenport and Rudd, *Kierkegaard after MacIntyre*, 352), this picture is apparent in his full reconciliation of the interests of the self and its whole. Indeed, several passages from MacIntyre make him serve as White's leading contemporary figure espousing the "hegelian" model of "Hellenic Harmony" (see White, *Individual and Conflict*, 40, 56, 134, 160, 162, 273–74).

[128] In a very important passage, MacIntyre argues that in the seventeenth and eighteenth-centuries humans came to be thought of "as in some dangerous measure egoistic by nature; and it is only once we think of mankind as by nature dangerously egoistic that altruism becomes at once socially necessary and yet apparently impossible. . . . On the traditional Aristotelian view such problems do not arise. For what education in the virtues teaches me is that my good as a man is one and the same as the good of those others with whom I am bound up in human community. There is no way of pursuing my good which is necessarily antagonistic to you pursuing yours because *the* good is neither mine peculiarly nor yours peculiarly—goods are not private property" (*After Virtue*, 229). While rightly pointing out that vicious egoisms are mistaken on their own grounds, MacIntyre revealingly does not mention

seems that such cases should call into question the simple identification of "my good and the good," for if one can at times choose the clear and known subordination of the former to the latter, it would be difficult to distinguish this from the "distinctively moral" motivation spurned by MacIntyre, and such behavior would need to be defended rather than derided.

To this the Aristotelian may appeal to a broader theory of virtue. For we have noted MacIntyre's insistence that the virtuous agent is one who has come to value virtue for its own sake and regardless of negative consequences that may come up in particular cases.[129] The purpose of proper education and habituation is to lead us from a childish and adolescent state, in which we indeed feel a division and clash between self-regarding and other-regarding inclinations, toward an integrated state in which our "passions and inclinations are directed to what is both our good and the good of others."[130] Such a person has recognized that she cannot achieve her good without virtues such as "just generosity," since these are required for participation in a flourishing community.[131] Having reasoned from her human good to the need for such virtues, those habits themselves will teach her that finding another in "gross and urgent need" is itself a sufficient reason to meet that need, not requiring reference to the self-interested chain of reasoning.[132] It is in this context that MacIntyre concludes that self-sacrifice is "as much [a] vice, as much a sign of inadequate moral development, as selfishness."[133]

whether I might be called to pursue another's good in a way antagonistic to my own; if so, then an egoism-altruism dichotomy would have some place in the moral life.

[129] See n. 11 above.

[130] MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, 160.

[131] Ibid., esp. 108, 119, and n. 128 above.

[132] MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, 159. Compare Gallagher's excellent exposition and defense of Aquinas: "For Thomas, one does not, in loving God and loving other creatures in God as ordered to God, cease loving himself or creatures on other bases. . . . The natural self-love one has for oneself remains; it is part of one's nature. What does happen, however, [is] that this love tends to be less and less actual; that is to say, the person adverts less and less to his good in these terms" (David M. Gallagher, "Thomas Aquinas on Self-Love as the Basis for Love of Others," *Acta Philosophica* 8 [1999]: 43). For an exposition along similar lines but with less direct defense of Aquinas's egoistic foundations, see MacDonald, "Egoistic Rationalism."

[133] MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, 160. Compare Gallagher: "There seems to be no place for the 'altruism' of the modern sort by which one pursues the interests of another person that are in no way one's own. Rather, for Thomas, one loves and seeks the good of another person only when that other person's good becomes his own. And that good becomes his own precisely when he loves the other person" ("Aquinas on Self-Love," 30, cf. 35). And similarly the Thomist Etienne Gilson: "Loving another with one's whole soul does not mean disowning or sacrificing oneself; it means loving another as oneself, on a basis of perfect equality. . . . All charity for another's person seeks its own good as well. This is self-evident because the definition of love implies desire for a good we want to possess, and if a person

MacIntyre offers here a mature statement of Aristotelian eudaemonism, and I do not expect a decisive refutation of this view would be possible. Nevertheless, it may be instructive that MacIntyre features generosity rather than courage. For it is certainly plausible that Aristotelian sociability can be cultivated to the extent that giving to any particular person without serious hope of recompense could become "second nature" and be seen as contributing to a larger and necessary whole at little if any real cost. But in many instances of courage, even the most well-cultivated individual would recognize the probable clash between common and individual good. MacIntyre's account of how she has come to practice virtue for its own sake could indeed explain, psychologically, why she would choose courageous behavior in such cases; but it is far from clear on what rational, eudaemonistic basis she could justify her action.[134] Such eudaemonism may provide an adequate foundation for virtues precisely insofar as they incline us toward what is "both our good and the good of others" but is left with ungrounded appeals to the noble, virtue, or the priority of the whole wherever this harmony does not hold.

On the relation of self and other more generally, the non-Aristotelian traditions outlined above seem to offer a number of advantages. Whereas MacIntyre alleges that contrasts between self-interested and altruistic behavior obscure from view the many goods that are genuinely common and "mine insofar as they are also those of others,"[135] I contend that Kantian duty, Scotist love of justice, and Anselmian rectitude do no such thing. They contrast a self-interest qualified and limited by a sincere love of justice with a self-optimization unqualified by such a principle, and such justice is clearly understood as contributing often to harmonious, shared happiness but explains just as well the many cases where irreducibly and seriously painful acts are required. By asserting the "elastic self" relating to "another self" as the sole moral foundation, it is in fact MacIntyre who contracts and ob-

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sacrificed himself in favour of the object of his love, he would possess nothing" (*The Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine*, quoted in O'Donovan, *Self-Love in St. Augustine*, 143–44). See also Kelly Rogers's rejection of an altruistic interpretation of Aristotle and endorsement of Aristotle's view that "altruism is unnecessary for virtue" ("Aristotle's Conception of *To Kalon*," in *Aristotle: Critical Assessments*, vol. 3, *Psychology and Ethics*, ed. Lloyd Gerson [London: Routledge, 1999], 350–51).

[134] Wood (*Kant's Ethical Thought*, 41–42) objects to J. S. Mill's relevantly similar account: "Even if we accept this as a *psychological* explanation of the way people come to value virtue for its own sake, it still provides no satisfactory account of the *value* ascribed to virtue. On the contrary, it encourages the suspicion that like money, virtue really has *no value at all* considered in itself, but is valued *rationally* only when it is valued as a means. . . . Mill even seems to be giving us an *error theory* of valuing virtue for its own sake." Compare Szaif's justification of Aristotle's account of courage ("Aristotle on the Benefits of Virtue," esp. 191).

[135] MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals*, 19.

scures our moral horizon—teaching us to downplay and reductively explain our independent obligations to the other as other.[136]

Conversely, in seeing the other chiefly as other—more than as a part of my whole—these traditions may be more theoretically equipped to avoid the excessive or unwarranted forms of self-sacrifice to which the Aristotelian tradition has a practical tendency, due to its foundational need to teach every eudaemonistic part its need for, and inferiority to, its whole. For the Kantian or Augustinian, the establishment and maintenance of a stable, decent, functioning state would be seen as a great good, for which certain sacrifices are appropriate;[137] and acknowledging happiness within moral bounds to be a legitimate motivation, the appeal to one's need for a broader whole can certainly be a motivational factor. But one should limit and qualify considerations of the individual's place as part within any local political whole,[138] and the

[136] Kierkegaard offers a relevant example, likely based on his own experience: that true love requires even the man "aflame with erotic love" to give up his beloved if this were best for her (Søren Kierkegaard, *Works of Love*, trans. H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995], 21, 273–74). Conversely, one may be obligated to faithfully care for someone even when eudaemonistic explanations would ring hollow—as when one's spouse has become fatally and protractedly ill or one has (or is predicted to give birth to) a child with serious defects. Contrast the approach of Aquinas (see n. 133 above) and Gallagher's reasoning in his behalf: "There is no logical inconsistency nor any psychological impossibility in choosing to love another person for his own sake and even more than oneself as what is best for oneself. . . . As Thomas points out . . . , as free beings we must will to will whatever we will. *If we will to seek the good for others, we shall do so because in some way it is better for ourselves. I as an individual must be better off for entering the friendship (e.g., marriage) or the organization or the community than if I do not do so; otherwise it does not seem that I would do so*" ("Aquinas on Self-Love," 42–43, emphasis added). Hare would reply, "But if a good is secondary, although we can indeed pursue it for its own sake, we cannot without self-deception make it central. So if another person's welfare is constitutive of my happiness, but my happiness is central, the commitment I have to that person's welfare is always conditional on its constituting my happiness" ("Scotus on Morality and Nature," 38; cf. *God's Call*, 83–84). So Gallagher may provide an adequate explanation for entering marriage, but he has little justification for remaining in one under the many circumstances in which one's own happiness (most reasonably understood) would point away from the moral reasons for fidelity.

[137] Compare Hösle's justification (*Morals and Politics*, e.g., 87–88, 627–31) of the state on grounds of its unique moral achievement, rather than its conduciveness to happiness, and Kant on the moral obligation of leaving the state of nature (*MM* 6:312–16; cf. I 8:23, *Toward Perpetual Peace* (*PP*), in *Practical Philosophy*, 8:349n). For fine discussions of Augustine on the value of the state in upholding a modicum of peace and order, as distinguished from Aristotelian views, see Markus, *Saeculum*, apps. B and C.

[138] The traditions defended here appeal to the whole-part paradigm most prominently in the metaphysical sphere—concerning the realization that the universe was not created chiefly to serve the interest of the self—rather than in the (morally contingent) political sphere (see n. 30 above; White, *Individual and Conflict*, 286–89). Contrast, for instance, Aquinas's use of Augustine in *ST* II-II 47.10 ad 2 with the original context of the passage, *Confessions* 3.8, 46. The resistance to seeing the part as paradigmatically harmonious within its political whole is partly rooted in Augustine and Kant's idea that humans are naturally social but are in practice "unsociably" so and have strong tendencies against political justice (cf. *City of God* 12.28, 539,

justifiability of any sacrifice should be determined on an independent basis and made psychologically possible and morally obligatory chiefly by the human potential and call to serve each good for its own sake, insofar as it is good.[139] Such an agent would tend to have clearer vision for asserting the rights of an individual against a community,[140] for compromising her own prospects for happiness in behalf of a more just future community,[141] and for recognizing that the claims of the political whole of which her happiness is chiefly a part must themselves be inscribed within the requirements of cosmopolitan justice.[142]

19.5; Deane, *Political and Social Ideas*, chap. 4; Rist, *Augustine*, 291; Kant, I 8:20–21, CB 8:110, 119, TP 8:312, *A* 7:322–25, *R* 6:26, *PP* 8:355, 375n; also contrast Aquinas *ST* I 96.4 with the original context of the *City of God* passages he cites). See n. 141 below.

[139] Cf. Kant's ambivalence about cases of near-certain sacrifice of oneself in saving others from a shipwreck, to preserve one's country, or to serve the good of humanity, due to the countervailing duty to self-preservation (see *CPR* 5:158, *MM* 6:423, *A* 7:259; cf. the remarks on courage in *PP* 8:365). The case of political perjury, considered above, is a perfect and essential duty, so self-preservation has no countervailing weight there (*CPR* 5:158).

[140] Aristotle's teaching on natural slavery (*Pol.* 1.5–7) and on the justifiability for deviant regimes of ostracizing the innocent (3.13, 1284a3–84b34) should probably not be read as simply external to and easily omitted from his broader theory of the subordination of whole to part (*Pol.* 1.2, 1253a18–28, 8.1, 1337a27–29, *NE* 1.2, 1094b7-12). For example, he argues for the ideality of an enslaved farming class (*Pol.* 7.10, 1330a24-24), and he assumes a naive degree of harmony of interest in parental and master relations (see *NE* 5.6, 1134b9–12, cf. *Pol.* 3.6, 1278b33–37, 1.6, 1255b11–15). Richard Kraut (*Aristotle: Political Philosophy* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002], chap. 7) offers a sympathetic reading of Aristotle on civic priority that concludes: "Should circumstances require an individual to choose between the good of his household or his own good and that of the larger political community to which he belongs, it is the latter that must be given priority. . . . No doubt he is right that a single part of the body should be sacrificed to save the whole" (275–76, cf. 266, 270–71). The problem, as Kraut's agreeable treatment of ostracism (272, cf. 273) also suggests, is that this principle appeals to warranted cases of individual sacrifice without capacity to distinguish them from, for example, sweeping property confiscations or false convictions (reasonably) made in behalf of deterrence or public safety.

[141] If service of the common good is based on perceiving and experiencing it as harmonious with one's own good, pursuits of the common good that are likely to bring rejection, scorn, threats and even violence will appear unnatural and irrational. This may be linked with the Aristotelian tendency to assume the fundamental goodness of one's given community—note, for instance, his strong respect for the *endoxa* (e.g., the "majority rules" standard of the good at *Rhetoric* 1.7, 1364b38-65a2), his close association of well-being with the stability and maintenance of the established regime (*Rhetoric* 1.8, 1365b25–26, cf. *Pol.* 4–5), and the extent to which he defines virtue and justice in terms of existing laws, presupposed to be basically just, rather than by a higher, separate concept of justice (*NE* 5, e.g., 1129b14–19, 1130b22–27; cf. *Pol.* 3.4; C. C. W. Taylor, "Ethics and Politics in Aristotle: A Discussion of Richard Kraut, *Aristotle*," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 23 [2002]: 269, 273).

[142] Although MacIntyre on occasion comes close to acknowledging a universalistic concept of rights (*Three Rival Versions*, 76, *Whose Justice?* 146, Alasdair MacIntyre, "Is Patriotism a Virtue?" in *Patriotism*, ed. Igor Primoratz [Amherst, MA: Humanity, 2002], 54), for the most part he is concerned with undermining the universalistic cosmopolitanism characteristic of liberal modernity and the disengaged reason linked with it (see Alasdair MacIntyre, "A Partial Response to My Critics," in Horton and Mendus, *After MacIntyre*, 286–89, *Whose Justice?* 3–4, and esp. "Is Patriotism a Virtue?"). This would constitute a grave ethical regress insofar as Aristotle's

III. CONCLUSION

I hope to have offered the broad outlines of a tradition that since Plato has tapped into various insights—such as the nature of love and the fundamental contrast between moral dedication and self-interested calculation—that would develop, at the latest with Anselm, into an independent foundation of ethics. This was in part the result of a moral ethos of divine commands, but it was also the natural product of examining test cases of pursuing virtue for its own sake. These cases showed, on the one hand, the tragic yet evident implausibility of strictly identifying virtuous behavior with happiness (as was attempted in certain strands of Plato and Aristotle and in the Stoics consistently).[143] On the other hand, there was found to be an undue exclusion of pagan virtues, as well as a certain reductive ignobility, in primarily focusing upon divine compensation for virtue's misfortunes (as was attempted in Augustine predominately).[144] But by formulating ethical systems in which happiness was fundamental yet subordinated to a higher dedication, these thinkers avoided the crippling Aristotelian commitment to the full harmonization of happiness with virtue. For the latter commitment quite naturally gives rise to a reduction of Aristotle's noble prescriptions in order to shield each individual's happiness, or to superficial underacknowledgement of the many virtuous activities and social situations in which such harmony does not hold,[145] or to some such acknowledgment combined with a prescription that one follow one's virtuous habits even when reflection would show that they are contrary to self-interest—the sole avowed rational foundation of the moral life.[146] Far better that people be taught to develop a ground-level realization that their self and its happiness are not the true center of the moral universe[147] and that to show dedication and even love to some other or greater reality—tragically but especially when self-interested justifications are unsound, convoluted, or require a "noble risk"

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frighteningly inhumane views on just warfare (see *Pol.* 7.2, 1324b32–41, 7.14, 1333b38-34a2, cf. 1.5–7, esp. 1255b37–39) may be seen as a natural outgrowth of an ethic primarily or exclusively based on seeking happiness for the self and the whole to which it is linked.

[143] See the above nn. 22 for Plato, 118 for Aristotle, and esp. 34 for the Stoics.

[144] Motivational purity has not been our focus here, but see nn. 122, 132, 133, and 136 above for Aquinas on motivation, which parallel what is questionable in Augustine in n. 39; contrast nn. 31, 48, 73, and esp. 121.

[145] I think here of Aristotle's insistence on luck and wealth over a whole life as necessary for happiness, as well as his treatment of courage. For a criticism of the Aristotelian and Thomistic explaining away of altruism, see esp. n. 136 above.

[146] See n. 134 above. The underlying problem is the Aristotelian's justification of virtue in terms of happiness, while avoiding the amendment of commonsense virtue in view of experienced happiness by claiming interest only in the happiness of the good person (cf. Hösle, *Morals and Politics*, 16).

[147] See nn. 30, 142, and esp. 138 above.

of faith—reflects its own rationality, of which the philosophical egoist knows only imitations. The rational justification of such a principle may take many forms,[148] and I have focused here on the similar structures and convictions of Kant, Plato, and the Augustinians rather than on their evidently differing foundations.[149] Whether ultimately superior to Aristotelianism in these respects or not, these related traditions pursue appealing alternatives to neo-Aristotelian dichotomies of either exclusively eudaemonistic foundations or the eclipsing of happiness and virtue.

[148] Rist's Augustinian Platonism appeals to divine and psychological realities to answer the egoist while not attempting to base all moral norms directly on self-interest (see *Real Ethics* and n. 31 above); Hare's Scotism and Christianizing Kantianism pursue a similar objective (see *God's Call*, esp. chap. 2, and *Moral Gap*, esp. chap. 3). Hösle's Platonic reading of Kantian reason, by contrast, would appeal to divine rationality and transcendental, performative reason without foundational appeal to self-interest (see *Objective Idealism*, chaps. 1–3; *Morals and Politics*, 89–92, 153–55). For Annas, as well as most contemporary Kantians, human reason is independently sufficient to ground objective moral norms. All these approaches, it is true, require more difficult grounding than pure eudaemonism, but if (as this essay contends) human ethical requirements and moral freedom are not best explained eudaemonistically, then these more difficult foundations are worth seeking—or at least respecting.

[149] For observations on Kant's differences from Plato and the Augustinians, particularly on matters of religion and moral motivation, see the above nn. 14, 35, 48, and esp. 40.