

VIRTUE AND PRACTICAL REASON: TOWARD A FOUNDATION OF
NEO-ARISTOTELIAN ETHICAL NATURALISM

DISSERTATION

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor
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ABSTRACT: Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics has offered a plausible meta-normative account of human nature and human virtue where virtues are ‘natural goodness’ for creatures like us. However, disagreement remains as to whether virtue is ‘natural’ in light of our unique rational capacities or simply in light of our biological nature. For example, Philippa Foot emphasizes the objective, biological aspects of human nature while John McDowell emphasizes the intersubjective, rational aspects. Julia Annas explains that the conversation has run aground of this difficult matter because it reflects a broader perennial question about the relationship between normativity and nature, or between ethics and science.

My dissertation attempts to resolve this internecine dispute and thus render more plausible a normative virtue theory based on neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism. To this end, I systematically analyze a set of related concepts (nature, virtue, practical reason, and teleology) and defend the role of a naturalized teleology in normative ethics.

In brief, my thesis is that human beings *ought to become* practically wise because human beings are ‘practical, rational animals’. Practical wisdom (among the other virtues) defines our human life form *and* is the natural telos to be pursued. I first argue that the natural organic or biological world includes natural normative facts about what is healthy, unhealthy, desirable, undesirable for organisms. Then, I apply the notion of natural norms to human organisms to uncover natural *human* norms. These human norms include normative facts about virtue and vice. I defend a conception of virtue according to which virtuous traits are rational practices and emotions, and practical reasoning is the process of identifying the good.

Hence, my thesis sits at the intersection of both normative virtue ethics and metaethics: it is normative in that it commends a life spent acquiring character and epistemic virtues even in the face of (inevitable) death and (the possibility of) human extinction; it also analyzes normative terms and concepts such as ‘ought’ and ‘naturally good’ and ‘human being’ to find a brute natural normativity consonant with scientific naturalism. On this view of

virtue, the definitive criterion by which to judge human beings is our success or failure in acquiring virtues such as moderation and tolerance, and our overall success in the pursuit of the good life for humans.

KEYWORDS: virtue, practical reason, teleology, neo-Aristotelianism, ethical naturalism

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For Lindsay Elizabeth.

"Oh, who shall understand but you; yea, who shall understand?"

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γένει' οἷος ἐσσι μαθών. (Become what you are, having learned what that is.)

—Pindar, *Pythian* 2, line 72.

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Chapter 1

Ethics, Nature, and Ethical Naturalism

Not everything that is last claims to be an end, but only that which is best.

—Aristotle, *Physics* 194a.

1. Introduction

Philippa Foot's *Natural Goodness* is one of those philosophical monographs is also a piece of art. It bears all the marks of a modern classic; a bold thesis, the exposure of popular errors, and an initial “cool reception” by established thinkers.¹ It is worth reading, of course, not only to appreciate its style, structure, and pugnacity, but to be confronted by her incisive argument.

Natural Goodness lays the foundation for what Mark Murphy calls a “secular natural law theory.”² Building on her prior work in normative virtue ethics, *Natural Goodness*

1. John Hacker-Wright, “What Is Natural About Foot’s Ethical Naturalism?” *Ratio* 22, no. 3 (2009): 308–21.

2. Mark Murphy, “The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2011, 2011.

blends normative ethics and metaethics³ by arguing that, just as hunting in packs is natural goodness for wolves (and hunting alone a defect), being virtuous and practically wise is natural goodness for creatures like us (and cruelty or folly a defect). The obvious objection to such a thesis is that it inappropriately blends facts and values – either by “biologizing” ethics or “enchancing” science. This obvious objection (which Foot tackles head on in her monograph) rests on the common notion that nature and science are one thing, values and ethics something else entirely. This obvious objection can be leveled reflexively by someone who has not wrestled with Foot’s argument, but it cannot be leveled against Foot.

It is plain, reading the literature responding to Foot, that too few ethicists and metaethicists have come to grips with the precise details and wide-ranging implications of her case. James Barham, for instance, compares the relative difficulty of her work to the relative clarity of Rosalind Hursthouse’s *On Virtue Ethics*, as if the two were expressing differently one and the same case. I think attention to the respective prefaces of those two works reveals the truth: Hursthouse’s book is intended to render modern virtue ethics conventional; Foot’s book is intended to disrupt a hundred years of metaethical convention.

The two books are quite different, and both successful in their respective aims. But they are very different aims. Hursthouse offers an olive branch, on behalf of virtue ethics to deontological and utilitarian ethics, trading the virtue ethics’ occasionally triumphal rhetoric

3. Thus, Alan Gibbard: “Moore stressed the distinction in ethics between questions of meaning and questions of substance, and thereby gave rise to a tradition in analytic philosophy of separating the two parts of ethical theory: the metatheory and the substantive, normative part. Some philosophers have rejected the distinction; some Kantians, for instance, think that if you get the metatheory right, substantive ethical conclusions fall out as some kind of consequence, so that metaethics and substantive ethics are not really separate. Then too, anyone who rejects Sidgwick’s and Moore’s indefinability claim and thinks that ethical terms can be given analytic, naturalistic definitions thinks that the two putative subdivisions are not really separate. Those who reject any systematic distinction between questions of meaning and questions of substance might likewise reject a sharp, separate subject of metaethics.” (Allan Gibbard, “Normative Properties,” *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 41, no. S1 (2003): 141–57 320).

for mutual respect and dialogue where iron sharpens iron. Foot (like Anscombe) calls into question much of what has passed for modern moral philosophy, naming names and picking fights. Hursthouse's overview of virtue ethics is aimed at non-experts (graduate and undergraduate students) and therefore bears some of the unfortunate but necessary style of textbooks – thorough, responsible, and occasionally plodding. Foot's "crude" new beginning is aimed squarely at professional ethicists, and therefore is much more like a platonic dialogue or Humean treatise. With "a swaggering gait and roving eye", she plays the Socratic gadfly to the experts. In short, *On Virtue Ethics* helps one respect the place of virtue ethics at the table of modern moral discourse. *Natural Goodness* makes one proud to be a philosopher.

Two philosophers who *have* come to grips with the significance of Foot's case are John McDowell and Alasdair MacIntyre. For example, MacIntyre's most recent ethical monograph (which we may hope is not his last) moves a good deal closer to a Footian view than did *After Virtue*. McDowell's view is a bit harder to characterize, but ultimately comes to light as a rival to Foot's.

2. Three (or More) Sorts of Naturalism

John McDowell, like Foot, is opposed to non-naturalism but also opposed a cruder form of naturalism which he calls "bald naturalism". 'Naturalism' is a term of varying meanings. I shall explore three or four of them in some depth in subsequent chapters. As a first pass, it is worth quoting McDowell's "Two Sorts of Naturalism" essay, where he clarifies stakes of his disagreement with Foot:

Philippa Foot has long urged the attractions of ethical naturalism. I applaud the negative part of her point, which is to reject various sorts of subjectivism and supernaturalist rationalism. But I doubt whether we can understand a positive naturalism in the right way without first rectifying a constriction that the concept of nature is liable to undergo in our thinking. Without such

preliminaries, what we make of ethical naturalism will not be the radical and satisfying alternative to Mrs Foot's targets that naturalism can be. Mrs Foot's writings do not pay much attention to the concept of nature in its own right, and this leaves a risk that her naturalism may seem to belong to this less satisfying variety. I hope an attempt to explain this will be an appropriate token of friendship and admiration.⁴

What McDowell means by the "less satisfying variety" of naturalism is bald naturalism. What is 'bald naturalism'? Roughly, it is the view that nature is the complete spatio-temporal cosmos, exclusive of the same platonic forms, values, norms, and reasons along with gods, ghosts, and angels. The opposite view from bald naturalism is non-naturalism: the view there also exists, over and above nature, some or all such non-natural entities. While McDowell does not quite accuse Foot's view of slipping into bald naturalism, he is worried that it might be *mistaken* for bald naturalism.

What other alternatives might exist between non-naturalism and bald naturalism? The conceptual space is admittedly tight. McDowell's own view is one example. He calls his form of naturalism "liberal" or "relaxed naturalism". He accepts the equation of "first nature" with the spatio-temporal cosmos but defends the existence of what he calls "second nature" (Aristotle, Hegel) or "the space of reasons" (Sellars) – namely, human reason and all that comes with it. In this way, he aims to afford a place for norms and reasons in "nature" while still excluding the divine and platonic forms.

Her view (I shall call organic naturalism) is another example of a sort of naturalism that is not "bald" and so occupies the same tight conceptual space. She disagrees with McDowell, however, in that she rejects the distinction between first and second nature, arguing that norms and reasons are indeed just as natural as biological health, life. So, on one hand, McDowell's and Foot's views are rivals competing for the right to the designation of 'naturalism'; on the other, their views are allies against a pair of opposing rivals: bald naturalism

4. John McDowell, *Mind, Value, and Reality* (Harvard University Press, 1998), 167.

and non-naturalism. I believe the proper way to view the debate between McDowell and Foot is as a negotiation for rights to that conceptual space.

3. My View

This dissertation attempts to work out the details of that negotiation. In brief, I defend the thesis that some of the ethical and rational norms that provide guidance for living a good human life are ‘natural’ in a manner that is both normatively binding and a scientifically respectable. I argue that human beings are best understood as practical, rational primates with a set of natural ends, such as the acquisition of moral and intellectual virtues that actualize our nature. On my account, traditional virtues such as courage, moderation, and (especially) practical wisdom are features of ‘the human being’, where that designation is intended in both fully descriptive and fully normative senses. What is *naturally good* for human beings is, primarily, to be such a person. And everything else that is naturally good for us is the (often fragile) whirl of physical and social circumstances that enable us to become such a person, such as healthy food and clean water, healthy families, friendships, and good education.

My main theme is the relation between virtue and practical reason from the perspective of ethical naturalism. Requisite sub-themes include the human life form (or “human nature”), tradition, and the concept of nature itself. I take my account to be faithful to the Footian sort of naturalism, against McDowell’s sort of naturalism, but hope to advance her view by offering individual accounts of these concepts that are plausible in their own right and even more plausible considered as an interlocking whole. In this pursuit, I draw primarily on the overlapping themes in the writings of Foot, McDowell, Hursthouse, and Alasdair MacIntyre. When needed, I mention or discuss other historical sources (Aristotle, Aquinas, Hume), other ethicists (Bernard Williams, Bertrand Russell, Alan Gibbard) and

neo-Aristotelians (Jennifer Frey, Micah Lott, Chris Toner, James Barham, and Stephen R. Brown).

4. Outline of Chapters

Chapter 2 defends the thesis that there are such things as natural normative facts. I give two examples: normative life forms and normative functions or teleological facts. These “natural norms” may not obtain in all of nature, but they obtain in all living, organic species.

Chapter 3 considers whether there might not be *human* natural norms. I argue that human beings are best understood as “practical, rational primates” – that is their normative life form – whose natural end is to become fully formed, fully mature instances of their species who can practically reason *well*. Just as we discern what are normal or abnormal traits of oak trees, wolves, and sloth bears not by making mere generalizations but by examining *exemplary* members of the species that are fully grown, healthy, and flourishing, we can discern what are normal or abnormal traits of human beings by examining exemplary members of the species – namely virtuous and wise humans.

Chapter 4 describes in more detail what traits count as virtues of character and practical reasoning. I offer eight interlocking features that virtues have, and underscore the importance of practical reasoning within a “tradition” and culture. And I defend the notion that the acquisition of virtue is morally obligatory on all human beings against various misunderstandings and objections.

Chapter 5 returns to the notion of practical reasoning. I provide a far more detailed account of what it means to engage in practical reasoning. I critique McDowell’s equation of virtue with practical knowledge, in favor of the distinction between successful practical reasoning (which is practical wisdom) and rational practices and emotions (which are organized and managed by practical wisdom, but not identical to it). All practical reasoners

are engaged in a substantive process, not merely procedural one, the success or failure of which is the main criterion of whether one is living a virtuous or vicious human life.

Chapter 6 defends the foregoing account in light of a renewed discussion about nature and naturalism. I provide a full critique of McDowell's brand of naturalism, which, I argue, is ultimately inconsistent within itself. As alternatives, I explore two other forms of naturalism: "unrestricted naturalism" and the Footian form of "organic naturalism", and show how the accounts view of virtue and practical reason already developed are, in the end, compatible with both.

Chapter 7 provides a summary of the argument and reflections on the ethical importance of getting clear on these philosophical issues.

In my view, the Footian sort of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics is rightly enjoying a new renaissance in contemporary analytic ethics and beyond, for it is both theoretically compatible with the scientific worldview and useful in education, business, and everyday life. My account cannot pretend to address every incisive objection or cover every crucial topic. Major shortcomings include discussions of social reasoning, and the relation between virtue ethics and religious morality. Even so, my hope is that I can play some part in showing the plausibility and practicality of the notion that even "we modern knowers, we godless and anti-metaphysicians" have every reason to pursue virtue and wisdom.⁵

5. Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* section 344.

Chapter 2

Organic Normativity

Biology cannot, or at least in practice does not, eliminate functions and purposes.

—Mark Perlman, “The Modern Resurrection of Teleology in Biology,”⁶.

1. Introduction

This chapter argues that there are such things as natural norms; at least *some* normativity is discoverable in natural life forms and functions themselves, and is not projected or invented in human evaluators. These natural formal and teleological facts are just as real and familiar as other scientific facts.

The major alternatives to naturalistic normative realism are (a) non-naturalistic normative realism and (b) naturalistic normative anti-realism or reductionism. Although these major alternatives are quite different, they share one assumption in common: both accept the common belief that nature is purely descriptive.¹ If all natural facts are purely descrip-

1. The a picture of nature as a manifold of purely descriptive and non-normative facts, entities, properties, and laws is what McDowell calls “bald nature.” A better term would be “Laplacian nature,” since the notion that the cosmos is coldly factual, bald of

tive facts, then it follows necessarily that norms are either not real or not natural. If norms are not natural, we seem to be committed to a distinct, “non-natural” normative realm above and beyond the world described by science. If, on the other hand, norms are not ultimately real features of the natural world, then they must be reducible to non-normative facts (such as causation events) or else scientists, philosophers, and regular folk simply “project” normativity onto nature.

My conclusion is that there are real, natural, irreducible norms. My argument unfolds in three sections. Section II distinguishes the two kinds of is-ought gap that philosophers have taken to render ethical naturalism impossible. It explains how some notion of natural normativity makes ethical naturalism at least possible.

Section III begins with a summary of Philippa Foot and Michael Thomson’s case for natural norms of two types: formal and functional norms. This section also includes a novel case for what I call “organic normativity”, on the basis of generic propositions, that organisms have a real life form and a natural teleological process.

Section IV considers and rebuts anti-realist or reductionist interpretations of these natural phenomena. Admittedly, these phenomena can be acknowledged by both the realist and anti-realist. The anti-realist would want to offer a roundabout explanation of them, while the realist accepts the straightforward explanation.

My eventual endgame (to be explored in later chapters) is to show how human ethical norms are a special kind of instance of natural norms. Ethical naturalism has a variety of expressions. The is-ought gap is widely agreed to be *the* problem for all of them. If nature is purely descriptive, then the ‘is-ought gap’ arises necessarily. How could natural facts values, and disenchanting from any supernatural esoterica, aligns more closely with Pierre-Simon Laplace’s mathematical picture of nature. Laplace pictured nature as a set of cold, abstract, and necessary relations. Realism about natural normativity is incompatible with the Laplacian picture. But his picture is, I would dare to say, unscientific. At the very least, it is not *the only* scientific picture. Regardless, Laplacian nature emphatically does not include natural norms.

about human welfare, or laws, or consequences, entail any ethical oughts? Thankfully, if natural norms exist, then they undercut the is-ought gap. Natural norms do not “bridge” the gap; rather, they show that the putative “gap” is spurious due to a faulty assumption that nature is purely descriptive.

If there are some natural norms governing organisms, then there might be natural *human* norms governing humans. The neo-Aristotelian might be able to explain ethical norms as extensions of, or tokens of, natural norms, which are both binding on human beings as practical rational animals and not merely invented by human individuals or human cultures. These norms would be natural without being crassly biological; they would be both biological and practical.

The controversy over normativity is an old one and is not likely to be settled here. My goal, instead, is to present a case that is plausible to the undecided, and that is sensitive to the concerns of normative anti-realists (who are zealous defenders of scientific realism) and the concerns of normative non-naturalists (who are zealous defenders of moral realism).

2. The Is-Ought Gap Challenge

Rosalind Hursthouse says that ethical evaluations of humans and non-ethical evaluations of plants and animals “both depend upon our identifying what is characteristic of the species in question.”² In other words, the normative evaluation depends on the descriptive facts of the species: its activities, its life form, and so on. Evaluating things on the basis of what they are is central to the kind of neo-Aristotelian naturalism.

For example, consider a few pretty uncontroversial normative propositions: ‘*you ought to be wise*’ or ‘*It is good to be tolerant of people with different views*’ or ‘*It is bad to bring a gun to school and start shooting people*’. Supposing these are true, *why* are they

2. Rosalind Hursthouse, *On Virtue Ethics* (Oxford University Press, 1998), chap. 10, abstract.

true? The non-naturalist has a good explanation (they pick out fundamental, non-natural, moral facts) and the naturalist anti-realist also has a good explanation (express the speaker's individual and cultural norms). The ethical naturalist's explanation is a bit trickier. He or she must show how such statements relate to the *natural* facts. The most straightforward path would be to argue that "you ought to be wise" is a normative truth derivable from some other fact that is natural. In general, ethical naturalism states that some ethical facts are grounded in natural facts or are identifiable with natural facts.

Insofar as neo-Aristotelians like Hursthouse and Foot proffer a form of ethical naturalism, a challenge must be stated. Philosophers have challenged to the very possibility of such ethical naturalism in this form:

Is-Ought Gap Challenge

1. If ethical naturalism is possibly true, then descriptive statements can serve as premises in arguments with normative conclusions.
2. But descriptive statements cannot serve as premises in arguments with normative conclusions.
3. Therefore, ethical naturalism is not possibly true.

If this challenge cannot be met, then ethical naturalism is futile. And it is difficult to imagine how the challenge could be met. Consider, for example, a candidate natural fact, such as the apparent goodness of pleasure. Perhaps, if pleasure *is* universally pursued, pleasure *ought* to be pursued. Hume is often credited with (or blamed for) insisting that an 'ought' can never be derived from an 'is.'³ He says:

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that

3. Arnhart and MacIntyre argue that Hume himself allows for a kind of inference from "is" to "ought" in other places. (Cf. Larry Arnhart, "The New Darwinian Naturalism in Political Theory," *American Political Science Review* 89, no. 02 (1995): 389–400; Alasdair MacIntyre, "Hume on Is and Ought," *The Philosophical Review*, 1959, 451–68) I think Moore deserves more of the blame (or the credit).

instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence.⁴

The point is that when it comes to human evaluations, ‘is’ statements may be interesting but they seem useless for practical purposes. So the first premise of the is-ought challenge sets out a criterion for ethical naturalism: the normative propositions that features as conclusions of ethical arguments must be derived from descriptive premises. The second premise seems to render hopeless the thought that we can evaluate things on the basis of what they are. Is neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism a non-starter?

The is-ought gap is fatal to *some* forms of ethical naturalism. Namely, those that assume the bald picture of nature as purely descriptive. There is, however a second path.

The is-ought gap can be undercut in a different way by neo-Aristotelians. We can deny the assumption that nature is purely descriptive. For example, it might be that some normative propositions such as “you ought to be wise” are brutally normative *natural* facts. It sounds rather odd to say that an ‘ought’ can be a brutally normative natural fact. In a later chapter, I shall more fully explain how the purely descriptive concept of nature is problematic.

The point for now is to understand how, in general, one might undercut the is-ought gap: start with basic, scientifically respectable natural norms. From these, derive further ethical norms. If these were possible, the result would be both ethical and naturalistic.

In order to explicate this option, begin with Philippa Foot’s notion of “natural normativity.” Some features of nature are properties, she says, are instances of ‘natural goodness’ or ‘natural defect.’ About such qualities, she says:

...we might equally have been thinking in terms of, say, strength and weakness or health and disease, or again about an individual plant or animal being

4. *A Treatise of Human Nature* book III, part I, section I.

or not being as it should be, or ought to be, in this respect or that. Let us call the conceptual patterns found there, patterns of natural normativity.⁵

Natural normativity is an indeterminate concept. It might include a variety of different kinds of normativity that are not obviously moral normativity, such as the proper, the healthy, the advantageous, the adaptive, the mature, and so on. This indeterminacy is a strength rather than a weakness. When Foot uses the term ‘natural normativity’ she means that normativity exists wherever organic life is found. Wherever evaluative properties like health and disease appear, there are real instances of natural goodness and natural defect, then some evaluative properties are *primary qualities of nature* just like weight, color, size, relations of time and space, and so on.

There is another sense in which ‘natural normativity’ is used by neo-Aristotelians like John McDowell. The neo-Aristotelians are of two minds about which sense is a more promising foundation for ethics. Where they agree, though, is in thinking that natural norms overcome or rather undercut the is-ought gap. Call this the **Bald Nature Challenge**:

1. If ethical naturalism is possibly true, then some natural facts are genuinely both normative and natural – there are natural norms.
2. But there are no facts that are genuinely both normative and natural – there are no natural norms.
3. Therefore, ethical naturalism is not possibly true.

This argument like the first one sets out a criterion that ethical naturalism must satisfy. Namely, ethical naturalism must offer an account of some natural norms that are both real and brutally natural, not derived from other (descriptive) facts. The second premise says that all norms are non-natural and all nature is non-normative. So it seems to be impossible to be an ethical naturalist.

Everything depends on whether or not nature consists of merely non-normative facts. It costs nothing to concede that nature consists of merely *natural* facts: that nature consists

5. Philippa Foot, *Natural Goodness* (Oxford University Press, 2001), 38.

of no non-natural facts is, of course, a tautology. I do not concede, without argument, that all such facts are descriptive and not normative; that would be to allow my opponent to beg the question. My opponent might likewise complain that if he or she allows me to stipulate that there *are* natural norms, this stipulation would beg the question in my favor. The only thing for it is for me to *argue* from agreed upon premises that there are such things as natural norms. Having done so, it is fair of me to request an argument to the contrary. If the critic merely insists on reaffirming that all nature is non-normative, that would be mere question-begging.

So our first task is to supply an adequate defense of the existence of natural norms. Even if such a notion can be defended philosophically and scientifically, we should remember that all that logically follows is that ethical naturalism is possibly true. What we need, beyond mere possibility, is to defend in general natural normativity and then to apply patterns of natural normativity and how these form binding ethical normative structures.

3. The Case for Natural, Organic Norms

The burden of proof is on the neo-Aristotelian to furnish examples of natural norms that would undercut the is-ought gap. As it turns out, there are several plausible ones. The two candidates for natural normative facts I shall defend are life forms or natural kinds, and teleological facts or natural function. Although these two kinds of facts are related, it is helpful to distinguish between formal and teleological normativity, between morphology and physiology, between structures and their functions – between what things *are* and what they *do*.

Nature is full of kinds; sunflowers are not oxygen; stars are not organisms; lead is not gold; water is not soil; and so on. Kind concepts allow us to both distinguish x from y and to gather together all the x's. Zebras and horses are both Equidae; lead and gold are both

elements; ice and the sea and steam are all water. Thinking in kind categories is intuitive and natural.⁶ Thinking in categories is probably a constitutive feature of thought.

Nature is also full of end-directed activity. Each thing does its own thing: sunflowers grow toward the sun, wolves hunt deer and deer flee wolves; hearts pump blood and eyes see; the sun warms the planet; phytoplankton oxygenates the atmosphere. Such processes are non-intentional end-directed processes. Non-intentional processes are sometimes called ‘teleonomic.’⁷ Teleonomic phenomena do not have a *director* but they do have a *direction*.

Kinds and their ends can be conceptually distinguished but not very far. Forms and functions, structures and activities, are two aspects of one thing. Is the hip bone shape adaptive for a purpose or is the purpose conducive to the development of such-and-such shape? It is better to allow that the structure and function of natural organisms and at least some of their parts are an inseparable whole. Indeed, philosopher of science Tim Lewens summarizes the folk biological conception of a “kind” by mashing together the concept of a life form or “essence” with the concept of a function or “telos”: a kind is a “teleo-essence”, a thing with an end.

My initial hypothesis, which will be explicated further, is that formal facts (natural kinds and their natural properties) and teleological facts (natural functions) are both instances of natural norms. We have not yet said anything about human ethical norms, which is our ultimate aim. Human ethical norms, if they can be said to be natural, will turn out to be formal and teleological facts about our life form identifiable as instances of a broader pattern of natural normativity. But the argument must proceed in stages; the goal for now is simply to defend natural normativity.

6. Susan A Gelman and Lawrence A Hirschfeld, “How Biological Is Essentialism,” *Folkbiology* 9 (1999): 403–46; Stefan Linquist et al., “Exploring the Folkbiological Conception of Human Nature,” *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences* 366, no. 1563 (2011): 444–53.

7. Ernst Mayr, “The Idea of Teleology,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 53, no. 1 (1992): pp. 117–35.

What are we to make of kinds and their teleonomic behaviors? The explanations may be either realist, reductionist, or anti-realist. Realist explanations argue that kinds and their ends are what they seem to be: fundamental facts of nature. Reductionist or anti-realist explanations argue that kinds and their ends are not what they seem. The nihilist argues that kinds and ends don't exist, there are only concrete particulars and only mechanical processes. The reductionist argues that *some* kinds exist, but they do not correspond to our initial scientific categorization; and *some* end-directed teleonomic processes are real but it is reducible to non-end-directed processes. Before discussing these options in full, let's explore the neo-Aristotelian treatment of natural normativity in more detail.

3.1 Foot's Case for Natural Normativity

Philippa Foot argues that human virtues are instances of a broader class of natural properties: 'natural goodness.'⁸ Foot is well aware that her offering is likely to offend the ears of some listeners. Her defense is the thought (drawn from Wittgenstein) that crude beginnings are often a necessary first step on the way to something refined. To earn an audience for her argument, her first chapter (which she call a "fresh start") clears away some shaky assumptions inherited from Hume and Moore. Many modern ethicists treat human valuations as unprecedented, almost miraculous, new appearance in the cosmos. Instead, we should expand the scope of our inquiry to examine the status of humans as natural entities.

Moore assumed that, in philosophical ethics, 'good' is the ultimate predicate under review. This is one of the "shaky assumptions" Foot wishes to clear. She argues that statements like "pleasure is good" are not good paradigms for philosophical reflection. Evaluation of human creatures and evaluation of plants and animals follow *the same logical pattern*. In such evaluations, good is good *for*. Contrast 'good' with other predicates like

8. Foot, *Natural Goodness*; cf. Sanford Levy, "Philippa Foot's Theory of Natural Goodness," in *Forum Philosophicum*, vol. 14, 1, 2009, 1–15.

‘red’ or ‘beautiful.’ In a statement such as ‘the house is beautiful’, the predicate ‘beautiful’ doesn’t need a complement. The house is *beautiful* – full stop. But ‘good’ has a different logical function. ‘Good’ is more like ‘useful.’ The phrase ‘The house is useful’ *does* need a complement. When we say ‘the house is useful’ we must specify what it is useful for – *for a mom of six, or useful for an artist*, or what have you. Likewise, ‘good’ always means *good for someone or for something*. In reference to organisms and other natural objects, ‘good’ always needs a complement.⁹ If this crude beginning is anywhere near to correct, we can distance ourselves from Moore’s starting point and build on another starting point: the life-form of human beings.

In this Foot agrees with Thompson’s groundbreaking work.¹⁰ Thompson argues that the concept of “life” is not, as it may seem to some, a property of some beings where *being* is the fundamental concept; rather “life” is a fundamental concept.¹¹ He says, “Vital description of individual organisms is itself the primitive expression of a conception of things in terms of ‘life-form’ or ‘species’, and if we want to understand these categories in philosophy we must bring them back to that form of description.”¹² When we observe and examine living things we rightly employ some shared categories and our conclusions rightly share a logical structure.

What is that common structure? Thompson reviews and refutes a variety of crude

9. One might say that some things – God or people or platonic forms – are *good full stop*. I shall concede that God, say, would not have a complement like this. But is any creature good simpliciter? Even so, calling God *good full stop* is a way of indicating that he is good *for everyone and everything*. He is the unqualifiedly desirable, or rather, he is desirable *to anything capable of desiring*. The Psalmist says “let everything that has breath praise the Lord.” Presumably, objects without breath are relieved of the obligation, even if their authorship and grounding is in him.

10. Michael Thompson, “The Representation of Life,” in *Virtues and Reasons*, ed. Lawrence Hursthouse Rosalind and Warren Quinn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 247–96. Thompson works out the arguments of this article more fully in his 2008 monograph.

11. Michael Thompson, *Life and Action* (Harvard University Press, 2008), chapter 1.

12. *Ibid.*, 57.

definitions of life such as that anything that is alive reproduces, grows, metabolizes, etc. Such properties may be co-extensive with the property of being alive, but they are wildly insufficient for the task of *defining* life because such properties depend on a prior understanding of life. Thompson's alternative is that life is a fundamental concept. We recognize things as alive before we learn about their shared traits; indeed, we can only ascribe a set of traits *living things* share if we are already in possession (absent that set of traits) of a concept of living things under which we gather a sample.

On these considerations, it is most reasonable to hypothesize that life is a fundamental concept, along with 'being', 'quantity' and others. Once we accept that intuitive conclusion, then the argument gets interesting. For every individual living being is a member of a species or life-form. And living beings are not just *acted upon*; they *act*. Species have characteristic actions. Thompson says "action in this sense is a specific form of *life process*."¹³ Since each particular species engages in its own characteristic activities: beavers build dams, and robins build nests. There are, then, life-form specific *successes* and *failures* to act. Each life-form is subject to its own normative appraisals: something would be wrong with beaver that built a tiny nest or a robin that tried to build a massive dam.

By introducing the term 'natural normativity', Foot is insisting on a point that is both interesting and controversial. If evaluative properties like health and disease are really instances of natural goodness and natural defect, then some evaluative properties are *primary qualities of nature*.

McDowell and others will object to this characterization of natural normativity. They think it "queer" that nature should exhibit such properties, and they find it easier to judge that human beings are the only evaluators. It might be that terms like 'good' and 'bad' are sui generis evaluative terms, and that evaluative properties are "in people's heads" as it were. But Foot's analysis of language about plants and animals indicates that such a

13. Ibid., 27.

conclusion is not the natural presumption.

A much more natural starting point is that to assume that such terms are used relative to natural kinds – and especially life-forms and their activities or functions. The natural goodness under discussion is not just a human ascription but seems to be something humans *recognize* in all living things. Certainly, some properties are human ascriptions only. Other properties are in the world and only show up in human ascriptions insofar as we accurately reflect the facts. Foot's point is that *some* instances of natural goodness seem much more plausibly instances of this latter kind. For, there is “no change in the meaning of ‘good’ between the word as it appears in ‘good roots’ and as it appears in ‘good dispositions of the human will.’”¹⁴ The identification of what is *good for* a non-human organism is sometimes identical to the identification of what is *good for* a human being. Foot's theory explains this in the simplest way. Foot concludes that this point holds about “goodness and badness”, and therefore about evaluation in its most general form.”

By contrast, McDowell and those who would draw a sharp contrast between “moral” and “non-moral” uses of the term must give long and sophisticated explanations for why it makes sense to describe a healthy plant and a moral person both as “doing well.” The plant is not just doing well *for my garden* but doing well as itself. It is doing what such plants are supposed to live. The human being is not just living well *for a westerner* or *for a Californian* but doing well as what human beings are supposed to live. Rosalind Hursthouse articulates Foot's insight in this way:

The starting point is an idea that she has never lost sight of, and which figures in her early attack on Hare. It is the idea that ‘good’, like ‘small’, is an attributive adjective. What that entails is that, although you can evaluate and choose things according to almost any criteria you like, you must select the noun or noun phrase you use to describe the thing you are calling good advisedly, for it determines the criteria of goodness that are appropriate. Hare can call a cactus a good one on the grounds that it is diseased and dying, and

14. Foot, *Natural Goodness*, 39.

choose it for that reason, but what he must not do is describe it as a good cactus, for a cactus is a living thing. He can describe it as a good ‘decorative object for my windowsill’ or ‘present to give my detestable mother-in-law’, but not as a good cactus.¹⁵

There are two qualifications I should make about the scope of my thesis here. First, the ‘good’ in question here is a good-of-a-kind, the way that typical robins are blue-of-a-kind. The good-of-a-kind analysis works for all organisms and all biological species, which are most plausibly understood as natural kinds, rather than social groups, which are not. Folk ontology does tend to group nationalities and ethnicities as natural kinds along with leopards and bears; but my analysis trades on the concepts used in biology. Secondly, it would be a natural leap to assume that the good-for-us is an instance of the good simpliciter, but this is a different question altogether. Blackman argues that there *is* no good other than goods of kinds.¹⁶ Others would argue that the good-of-a-kind is an instance of the good simpliciter. I wish to remain agnostic on this issue. While my thesis identifies what is good for us as an instance of something *truly good*, it remains agnostic about the broader metaphysical or cosmic significance of the fact. These are both interesting and important questions but they would take us too far afield of the main point.

3.2 A Novel Case

A defense of natural normativity would render ethical naturalism possible. A defense of natural normativity would have to furnish instances of natural norms from widely agreed upon premises from common sense and science. My case for natural normativity depends

15. Hursthouse, *On Virtue Ethics*, 195.

16. Reid D. Blackman, “Meta-Ethical Realism with Good of a Kind,” *European Journal of Philosophy* 23, no. 2 (2015): 273–92. Blackman also disputes the kind of biological foundation of ethics I am trying to defend here. Nevertheless, his article is a good introduction into the sort of “kindism” being discussed.

on two notions: the first is a minimal scientific realism.¹⁷ The second basic notion is a little-utilized feature of language called “generic propositions,” which I shall explain below. The case in brief is this:

1. If some generic statements describing natural entities are true, then some facts are both genuinely natural and normative – there are “natural norms.”
2. Some generic statements describing natural entities are true.
3. Therefore, some facts are genuinely both natural and normative – there are “natural norms.”

3.3 The Special Logic of Generics

Michael Thompson is one of the first to work out “the special logic of judgments we make about living things, and then to indicate its application to ethics.” Such judgments have a variety of names in the recent neo-Aristotelian literature: the most common are “Aristotelian categoricals”¹⁸ and “natural-historical judgments”;¹⁹ Less common are references to “norms”²⁰ or “bare plurals.”²¹ I prefer the shorter and less adorned term ‘*generic*.’²²

17. While scientific realism is not uncontroversial per se, my intended audience are committed scientific realists or sympathetic to realism. McDowell, as a sort of idealist, will dispute even my modest scientific realism, as we shall see in chapter 6.

18. Foot, *Natural Goodness*.

19. Thompson, “The Representation of Life”; Thompson, *Life and Action*.

20. Elizabeth Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” *Philosophy* 33, no. 124 (1958): 1–19

21. Greg N Carlson, “A Unified Analysis of the English Bare Plural,” *Linguistics and Philosophy* 1, no. 3 (1977): 413–57. Carlson’s essay is an early attempt to account for a variety of linguistic forms under one concept of reference to kinds

22. Cf. Francis Jeffry Pelletier and Greg N Carlson, *The Generic Book* (University of Chicago Press, 1995); Sarah-Jane Leslie, “Generics: Cognition and Acquisition,” *Philosophical Review* 117, no. 1 (2008): 1–47; Andrew M Bailey, “Animalism,” *Philosophy Compass* 10, no. 12 (2015): 867–83 for a discussion of a specific generic: “we are animals” in metaphysics and philosophical anthropology; Andrei Cimpian, Amanda C Brandone, and Susan A Gelman, “Generic Statements Require Little Evidence for Acceptance but Have Powerful Implications,” *Cognitive Science* 34, no. 8 (2010): 1452–82 for an experiment in cognitive psychology that seeks to quantify the prevalence levels at which subjects tend to agree to generics, i.e., how many birds have to lay eggs before we agree to the assertion that “birds lay eggs”? Manfred Krifka, “Bare NPs: Kind-Referring, Indefinites, Both, or

My postulate is this: **some generics about human beings are true.** If this is true then, I shall suggest, we have good hope of cutting up nature at the joints. When combined with a moderate scientific realism, generic truths from sciences such as biology, physics, and anthropology (and perhaps others) support a modest natural normativity which will be further articulated (in a later chapter) to indicate which traits are virtues or vices for human beings.

3.4 Generics are Neither Universal nor Particular

Now, what are generics? “A fine question, but a difficult one,” Andrew Bailey says. His recent paper provides a helpful (and humorous) introduction to the topic of generic statements:

Start with this sentence: ‘Buddhists are way into meditation’. This first sentence is, let us suppose, true. So far so good. But is it equivalent to ‘for every x, if x is a Buddhist, x is way into meditation’? It does not appear to be. For the second sentence might be false (some Buddhists might not be way into meditation) even if the first sentence is, as we have supposed, true. The first sentence could be true, somehow, even if not all Buddhists are way into meditation (similarly, ‘ducks lay eggs’ may be true even if not all ducks lay eggs, ‘mosquitoes carry dengue fever’ may be true even if only a very few mosquitoes carry that virus, and so on). We are now positioned to observe one curious property of generics: they admit of exceptions.²³

Thus, generics are statements of the form “S is F” or “S has or does F” where S is not an individual but a class or natural kind. The logical form of “all S’s ϕ ” does not predicate ϕ -ing to all members of the category S without exception, nor does it simply assert that some “S’s ϕ ”, which is true but uninteresting. For example, consider the true statement, “wolves hunt in packs” as opposed to the clearly false statements “every particular wolf that has ever existed has hunted or will hunt in a pack.” Rabid wolves hunt alone, and injured, or very

Neither?” in *Semantics and Linguistic Theory*, vol. 13, 2003, 180–203; Ariel Cohen, “On the Generic Use of Indefinite Singulars,” *Journal of Semantics* 18, no. 3 (2001): 183–209.

23. Bailey, “Animalism,” 869.

old wolves don't hunt at all. Furthermore, it is true but trivial that *a large number of wolves hunt in packs*. The generic proposition is a unique logical expression, neither universal nor particular.

A generic is interesting because it is, or we treat it as, a truth about forms, or species. The subject of the statement is not all S's nor merely some S's, but the "infima species."²⁴ In this way, generics pick out what we might call formal facts, facts about the life form in question. Thus Sarah Leslie: "It is widely accepted that [definite] generics are singular statements which predicate properties directly of kinds. For example, "tigers are extinct" predicates the property of being extinct directly of the kind *Panthera tigris*, and would be true just in case *Panthera tigris* had the property of being extinct."²⁵

McDowell thinks that such exceptions are a "logical weakness" in deriving ethical conclusions from generics about human beings. He cites the example from Anscombe (and Aristotle) that "humans have 32 teeth", saying "there is a truth we can state in those terms, but from that truth, together with the fact that I am a human being, it does not follow that I have 32 teeth. (In fact it is false)."²⁶ McDowell accepts that generics are generally true. His objection to their application seems to be that the relation between a normative expectation and reality fails to reach deductive certainty. If this is his objection, it rather misses the point. Aristotelian-categoricals are not half-hearted universal judgments; they are not universes with widely-acknowledge counterexamples. They are judgments of a logically different kind. Far from being a logical weakness, generics are what enable us to capture truths about natural kinds that help explain statistical variation and inconsistency.

24. Christopher Toner, "Sorts of Naturalism: Requirements for a Successful Theory," *Metaphilosophy* 39, no. 2 (2008): 222. "Infima species" is the narrowest cut in a genus-species tree, or the most determinate determinable.

25. Leslie, "Generics," sec. 1.

26. John McDowell, "Two Sorts of Naturalism," in *Mind, Value, and Reality* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 171–2.

Prasada says that, “Much of our conceptual knowledge consists of generic knowledge – knowledge about kinds of things and their properties.”²⁷ We can approach generics through a “formal, quantificational” semantics or through “principled connections.” Principled connections support formal explanations, normative expectations, and a statistical expectation of prevalence. In other words, we explain that the dog has four legs *because* it is a dog (formal explanation); we expect that Fido should have four legs *unless something is wrong* (normative expectations); and we expect that if we counted up a population of dogs, *most* dogs would in fact turn out to have four legs (statistical expectation).

Generic truths, once discovered, set a normative expectation by which we evaluate individual members on how well or badly they exemplify their life form.²⁸ The normative expectation cannot, it seems, be reduced to statistical correlations. Rather, statistical correlations can be a sign of (or can be an illusion of) a principled connection.

There is much to be learned about the linguistic features of generics, but none of the unexplored frontiers render generics useless for applications in neo-Aristotelian ethics. A few examples of what needs to be learned include the correlation between statistical prevalence and normative identity; many generic truths describe what is statistically prevalent but not all. What is the difference? Is one reducible to the other? Furthermore, Leslie distinguishes between indefinite generics such as “tigers are striped” which admits of the specification “that tiger over there is striped” and definite generics such as “domestic cats are common” which does not admit of specification, “that domestic cat is common.” What is the difference here? Finally, indefinite generics are trickier: “Ducks lay eggs” is a true generic while “ducks are female” is false one, even though only female ducks lay eggs. And “mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus” is true even though less than one percent of mosquitoes carry the virus while “books are paperbacks” is false even though more than

27. Sandeep Prasada et al., “Conceptual Distinctions Amongst Generics,” *Cognition* 126, no. 3 (2013): 405.

28. *Ibid.*, 3.

eighty percent of books are paper backs.²⁹ How do we sort through these correlations between generic connection and statistical prevalence?

These unexplored frontiers represent fascinating puzzles but do not render generics unsuitable for use in normative and ethical arguments. Nor should the presence of outstanding questions lead one to believe generic propositions are confusing or confused. Rather, their normal acquisition and usage is a very familiar, and perhaps inevitable.

Generic truths are acquired via a normal scientific means of empirical observation, rational reflection, and discussion. This familiar process is certainly revisable. For example, an ethologist who discovers a wolf hunting alone may have a normative expectation that the wolf is not healthy. But she cannot know certainly in advance that this is so. She must test the hypothesis. A few reasonable interpretations are available: perhaps the lone wolf is unhealthy; perhaps the initial generic that ‘wolves hunt in packs’ was false; or perhaps this wolf is actually a new species of wolf. As it happens, in the case of wolves, no known species of wolf hunts alone so there is very strong reason to conclude that a lone wolf is rabid. But the point more generally is that generics are acquired and modified by a familiar, if complicated, process of scientific reasoning. Michael Thompson points out that: there is a “general and thoroughgoing reciprocal mutual interdependence of vital description of the individual and natural historical judgment about the form or kind.”³⁰ Put differently, Micah Lott says:

At each stage of an empirical investigation, our observations are mediated by our current understanding of the life form whose members we are observing. At the same time, our observations of those individual members will in turn improve our understanding of the life form itself, which then makes possible even more accurate and extensive future observations.³¹

29. Leslie, “Generics.”

30. Michael Thompson, “Apprehending Human Form,” *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement* 54 (2004): 52.

31. Micah Lott, “Moral Virtue as Knowledge of Human Form,” *Social Theory and Practice* 38, no. 3 (2012): 414.

Again, the fact that generic truths are revisable is not a weakness but a strength of the case I am building. It may be, for all we know, that penguins can fly (in the air), that some species of penguin can fly, or that all penguins are really just defective birds. But the most reasonable belief thus far is the generic truth that penguins don't fly. A penguin is not a defective flyer but an excellent swimmer. These truths hold of penguins *as a kind* – a biologist or zoologist who discovered the first flying penguin would become (justifiably) famous because we would all be (justifiably) surprised. The surprise would not originate merely from something out of the ordinary – new and extraordinary creatures, both living and extinct, are discovered every year. The surprise would originate from the upending of a firmly established scientific fact.

3.5 Generics are Teleological

The first kind of natural normativity I am defending is the mere idea of a life-form. Knowing what a thing is, knowing about its species or life-form, is to know something descriptive and something normative about any member of that species. Knowing what a thing is, furthermore, licenses a range of normative expectations. But we can make the case for natural normativity stronger. There is another, related kind of normativity in the natural teleological features of life-forms. Such natural teleology can also be captured in generic propositions.

To see this second kind of natural normativity, begin with the concept of a function. Eyes perform the function (in an organism) of seeing, hemlock trees perform the function (in an ecosystem) of shading rivers, and so on. Thompson, for example, cites the scientific observation that “flowers have blossoms of such-and-such type in order that such-and-such insects should be attracted and spread their pollen about.”³²

While some philosophers of science have thought that teleological normativity could

32. Thompson, *Life and Action*, 293–94.

be explained in terms of function, I would suggest that the reverse is rather true: the structure of a function is teleological. There are many senses of the term ‘function’, but the kind of biological functions under review are teleological, or least teleonomic, in that it is an arrangement of parts toward a particular purpose or end.

A functional process is not necessarily *willfully* undertaken. But it does have a beginning, an end (in time), and an end (telos). Clarifying that functions need not be intentional, we can understand the natural functions of organisms and organic systems as instances of natural teleology. James Barham explains the notion of natural teleology in this way:

By “teleology,” I have in mind such words and concepts as “purpose,” “end,” “goal,” “function,” “control,” and “regulation,” as well as the real-world biological phenomena to which these words and concepts refer. This means that the word “teleology” should always be construed here in its internal or “immanent” sense – purposiveness existing in living beings themselves – and never in its external or “transcendent” sense of an overarching cosmic principle.³³

Ernst Mayr (following Colin Pittendrigh) calls a process “teleonomic” if it is not a process of intentional purposes.³⁴ He says, “I have therefore refrained from using anthropomorphic language, Particularly the terms of purpose and intention, when explaining teleonomic phenomena in animals and plants.”³⁵

Mayr further distinguishes between teleological (purpose-driven end-directed processes), teleonomical (non-intentional end-directed processes in living things) and “teleomatic” (non-intentional processes in non-living things). A teleomatic process is an “automatic” process governed by natural law:

33. James Barham, “Teleological Realism in Biology” (PhD thesis, University of Notre Dame; Web, 2011), 1.

34. Mayr, “The Idea of Teleology.” Cf. Colin S. Pittendrigh, “Adaptation, Natural Selection, and Behavior” in Anne Roe and George Gaylord Simpons (eds.), *Behavior and Evolution* (New Haven, 1958), 390-416.

35. Ibid., 123.

All objects of the physical world are endowed with the capacity to change their state, and these changes strictly obey natural laws. They are end-directed only in a passive, automatic way, regulated by external forces or conditions... All teleomatic processes come to an end when the potential is used up (as in the cooling of a heated piece of iron) or when the process is stopped by encountering an external impediment (as when a falling object hits the ground). The law of gravity and the second law of thermodynamics are among the natural laws which most frequently govern teleomatic processes.³⁶

For my purposes, however, even teleonomic programs would count as instances of natural normativity insofar as the development of an organism at one time is incomplete but will be complete in future. As Waddington puts it, “the end state of the process is determined by its properties at the beginning.”³⁷ Normative, in my sense, is not the antonym of “descriptive”; normative is the antonym of descriptive *at present*. “The egg is not a chicken” is true at present. But “chickens start their life as eggs” is also generically true. Hence “the egg is a chicken” is a kind of teleological judgment about what it may, under proper conditions, become. As Chris Toner says, “natural-historical judgments readily admit of combination into teleological judgments.”³⁸

Taken broadly, then, the first point is to realize that talk about functions and ends is just as scientific as talk about life-forms, species, and natural health or disease. Mayr quickly rebuts many of the common objections (I should rather say prejudices) against teleonomic processes. For instance, teleological statements and explanations, he says, do not “imply the endorsement of unverifiable theological or metaphysical doctrines in science.”³⁹ Rather, as Mark Perlman says:

Many objects in the world have functions. Some of the objects with functions are organs or parts of living organisms... Hearts are for pumping blood.

36. Ibid., 125.

37. Conrad Hal Waddington and others, *The Strategy of the Genes. a Discussion of Some Aspects of Theoretical Biology*. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1957).

38. Toner, “Sorts of Naturalism,” 222.

39. Mayr, “The Idea of Teleology,” 122.

Eyes are for seeing. Countless works in biology explain the “Form, Function, and Evolution of ...” everything from bee dances to elephant tusks to pandas’ ‘thumbs.’ Many scientific explanations, in areas as diverse as psychology, sociology, economics, medical research, and neuroscience, rest on appeals to the function and/or malfunction of things or systems.⁴⁰

Mayr’s highly suggestive alternative to conscious purposes is natural “programs.” A program is “coded or prearranged information” that regulates an organism’s behavior or development up to a pre-defined end-point.⁴¹ Mayr’s examples include the development of bones, organs, and shapes that come with physiological maturity, migration. Programs are “the result of natural selection.” However, they contain information: “not only blueprints of the goal but also the instructions of how to use the information of the blue print.”⁴² The concept of a program, he assures us, is similar to concepts deployed by geneticists and computer programmers. The point is that the telos is not some mysterious spirit hovering above the organism, beckoning it to reach its full potential but coded into the organism from the beginning.

Regardless of the details of Mayr’s proposal for explaining teleonomic processes, the mere fact that natural processes occur is indisputable. And (to return to the main point) such behaviors are expressed in generic propositions.

Generic propositions usefully capture the functional or teleological properties of natural organisms. As Chris Toner says, “natural-historical judgments readily admit of combination into teleological judgments.”⁴³ This kind of combination of generic truths is very familiar. No sooner have I learned the formal facts about a penguin (that it is a bird, that it can swim, that it has a countershaded white belly and dark back etc.) do I learn that

40. Mark Perlman, “The Modern Philosophical Resurrection of Teleology,” *The Monist* 87, no. 1 (2004): 1–4.

41. Mayr, “The Idea of Teleology,” 127–8.

42. *Ibid.*, 128.

43. Toner, “Sorts of Naturalism,” 222.

*penguins are countershaded in order to avoid predators from above and below.*⁴⁴ Since an individual penguin may fail to be countershaded in the way that expresses its form, it would be defective. This defect is not a judgment made by scientists and “imposed” as it were, from the outside, on the penguin. It is rather a normative fact about the penguin. As Hursthouse says, “Wolves hunt in packs; a ‘free-rider’ wolf that doesn’t join in the hunt fails to act well and is thereby defective.”⁴⁵

There is one objection that is easy to forestall. Someone might point out that genetic drift results in species evolving every which way, including the emergence of adaptive, maladaptive, and adaptation-neutral traits. This is true, so far as it goes, but not really an objection. Two replies are, I think, sufficient. First, it is an inextricable part of the scientific process to reason out which traits are instances of natural goodness and which are not. Just because one hundred percent of organisms eventually die doesn’t mean that death is naturally good for them. Just because a high statistical number of organisms have a particular feature – a stripe or a scale or what have you – doesn’t necessarily mean that the feature is a formal one of the species. Rather, one must keep an eye open to larger samples, possible counterexamples, and one must keep one’s generics tentative until they are very well grounded. Similarly, part of the scientific process is reasoning out which traits are *adaptive*. Even the way the objection is phrased assumes that some traits are adaptive – that is adaptive *survival and reproduction*. Allowing even this minimal sense of normativity concedes my point that the normativity is discovered by the scientist rather than purely ascribed by him or her. A second response is that the generics under discussion are not about species-qua-fluid-across-millennia but about species-qua-fixed or apparently fixed within a given period. The fluidity of species over time, like a slow-motion film with

44. A shark looking up may miss a penguin, because its white belly blends in with the sunlight surface waters; a shark looking down may miss a penguin, because it blends in with the pitch dark waters of the abyss.

45. Hursthouse, *On Virtue Ethics*, 201.

thousands of frames, requires countless generations. For all we can observe of most species in the course of a human lifetime (say) or even since the birth of modern science in the 16th century, the species-at-present are fixed enough.

In my overall argument, generic truths are intended to serve as counterexamples to premise 2 of the **Bald Nature Challenge** above. That challenge asserted that no facts are genuinely both natural and normative. Generics are both genuinely natural and normative: natural, in that a large percentage of scientific knowledge consists of scientists predicating generic truths of natural kinds; normative, in that the life-form in question is one which an individual may or may not “live up” to, and in that *some* generics pick out natural functional or teleological facts about life forms (that penguins are counter-shaded *to avoid* predators, that hearts are *for* pumping blood, etc.). On my view, accepting the straightforward, generic truths delivered by such sciences about forms and functions is quite simply the respectable thing to do.

4. Three Paths Forward

I have made a case for normative realism that identifies some normative properties (such as formal and teleological properties of organisms) as respectable natural properties. I call this normativity ‘organic normativity’ and the resulting naturalism ‘organic naturalism.’ This label distinguishes organic naturalism from an “enchanted” view of nature wherein even rocks, chemicals, and stars instantiate normative properties.⁴⁶

While my case is disputable, the natural phenomena in question are indisputable:

46. The proponent of a view of nature in which all material objects instantiate normative properties would reject the label “enchanted”. The term ‘enchantment’ presumes that an object has no intrinsic evaluative properties but receives them, like a spell, from the evaluator. We cannot settle the issue by presumption. Nevertheless, I am attempting to articulate the issue in terms sympathetic to my reader who is willing to consider the possibility that normative properties are intrinsic to living organisms.

first, that organisms *very strongly appear* to exist in natural kinds (birds are not bacteria and crystals are not organisms at all); secondly that organisms exhibit “teleonomic” or *apparently teleological* phenomena such as striving to reproduce.

My point has been that realism about kinds and teleological phenomena is the simplest explanation of these phenomena. There are three paths forward. The first, and most plausible, path is that we can simply accept normative realism.

4.1 Reject

The second, and least plausible, path is that we could embrace full-scale normative anti-realism and deny the objective reality of any such norms in nature (and indeed, even in human beings). This path requires us to explain away not only natural kinds and teleonomic phenomena in nature, but the apparently teleological actions of human beings.

For example, we would have to deny that animals, plants, insects, all living things (and even ecosystems) exhibit end-directed or teleonomic behavior: eyes see, hemlock trees offer shade to fish, stomachs digest, deer leap to avoid predators. This denial is almost incredible. If all generics are false (or only conventionally true) then it is in some important sense false that ‘wolves hunt in packs’ and false even that ‘penguins are birds.’ It is false not only that “eyes see” but even that “humans are primates.” Such denials are, I think, absurdities.⁴⁷ Even when Kant denies natural teleology – the biological theory that the form of an organism causes the parts to grow and relate to each other in a particular way – he admits we *cannot help thinking so*.⁴⁸ To categorically reject *all truths* about natural kinds

47. That is not to say that the denial is not worth considering. It might well be true. My point in calling the denial ‘absurd’ is to say that if it is true, an absurdity is true. If it is true, then the truth is absurd. And reality itself might well be absurd. I don’t believe it is, but there have been many philosophers who have thought so. To pursue the matter is beyond my scope.

48. Philippe Huneman, “Naturalising Purpose: From Comparative Anatomy to the ‘Adventure of Reason’,” *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences* 37, no. 4 (2006): 649–74.

and natural functions, I contend, is untenable. And some generics are, it seems, necessarily normative propositions.

If we accept the truth of at least some generics, then Perlman's surprise is well founded: "It is surprising that analytic philosophers, with their strong focus on science, would reject a notion that is so central to some areas of science, most notably, biology and engineering sciences... Biology cannot, or at least in practice does not, eliminate functions and purposes."⁴⁹ One might suppose that Perlman's qualification "or at least in practice does not" leaves open space for the normative anti-realist. I welcome the critic who would try to show that biology *can* eliminate functions; what I have tried to suggest, and what Barham argues in great detail, is that the attempt has been made and has failed. A few failed attempts at reduction does not prove that reduction is impossible. But it does make the more plausible view, teleological realism, a better candidate for the default view.

Despite my inability to see the plausibility of global normative anti-realism, I must acknowledge that it has impressive defenders who deserve a fuller response than I can give here. Since anti-realism is not likely to appeal to the scientific naturalists in my intended audience, I must let these comments suffice.

4.2 Reduce

The third path, and the most plausible rival to realism, is to develop a reductionist account of apparently natural norms. This path accepts the appearance of such things as natural kinds, natural teleology, natural functions, etc., but *reduces* these phenomena to less spooky (read: more mechanistic) phenomena consistent with a conception of bald nature. For this section, I ignore natural kinds and focus simply on teleological normativity. So we can call reductionism of such natural norms "teleological reductionism" or "teleoreduction",

49. Perlman, "The Modern Philosophical Resurrection of Teleology. 6.

following James Barham.⁵⁰ Arguing for or against teleoreductionism has become a cottage industry.⁵¹

I do not think that the appeal of teleological reductionism is due to its intrinsic plausibility; its appeal is due, mainly, to the mistaken assumption that it is the only scientifically respectable option. When compared with another view that is equally scientifically respectable and more plausible, that appeal wanes. Nevertheless, the arguments for teleoreductionism are sophisticated, and some proponents hold out hope for even better arguments to come. More to the point, some of its proponents affirm reductionism because of an operating background belief that, globally, reductive physicalism is a victorious view, despite ongoing local skirmishes.

My objections to teleological reductionism amount to the accusation of a non-sequitur. But these objections are unlikely, by themselves, to overturn someone's background beliefs. Barham's summary of the dialectic seems to me correct:

If someone were comfortable with a purely physicalist worldview that had no place in it anywhere for teleology in any form, then nothing I will say here would do much to discomfort that individual. All I claim is that, if one is already convinced of the rationality of taking at face value at least some of the teleological concepts that we employ both in everyday life and in biological discourse, then one is not required to relinquish that conviction on the basis of the notion that molecular biology and the theory of natural selection, either severally or jointly, have already settled the matter by providing us with a successful means of eliminating such concepts from biology.⁵²

I am content to defend the claim that naturalistic teleological realism (and more broadly normative realism) is a live option even for the non-reductive scientific naturalist. Hence, the remainder of this chapter will examine some reasons for preferring realism to reduction-

50. Barham, "Teleological Realism in Biology." chapter 3. My discussion will closely follow this chapter; however, Barham's discussion is far too rich to be condensed into the space available here.

51. Cf. Perlman, "The Modern Philosophical Resurrection of Teleology., section III; and Barham, "Teleological Realism in Biology., chapter 3.

52. Ibid., 110.

ism when considering normative realism in isolation, even if these reasons are not enough to overcome someone's background commitment to the contrary.

First, what does it mean to "reduce" teleology? Barham's definition of teleoreduction, which I find adequate to my purpose, is this:

To reduce a putative teleological phenomenon is to give an account of the phenomenon that is both empirically and theoretically adequate and that neither employs any teleological concepts nor presupposes any other teleological phenomena.⁵³

The two primary candidates for teleoreduction are causal-role reductions and natural selection reductions.

4.3 Causal-Role Reduction

Causal-role or causal-contribution explanations (endorsed by Donald Davidson, Robert Cummins and others) reduce teleological relations such as "in order to" and "for" and "to the end of" to bare cause-effect relations. For example, the function of the heart is defined in reference to its role in the oxygenation of a vertebrate's blood.

Barham summarizes the causal-role positions in the recent literature on teleological and natural functions:

The first position, stemming from a seminal article by Cummins (1975), views being a function fundamentally as making a causal contribution (in the efficient-causal sense) to the maintenance of a larger system of which the function in question is a component part.⁵⁴

In that seminal article, Cummins attacks the assumptions that "(A) The point of functional characterization in science is to explain the presence of the item (organ, mechanism, process or whatever) that is functionally characterized" and "(B) For something to perform its function is for it to have certain effects on a containing system, which effects contribute to

53. Ibid., 109.

54. Ibid., 111.

the performance of some activity of, or the maintenance of some condition in, that containing system.”⁵⁵ Essentially, this path explains a natural function as a relation between parts and wholes.

The natural function is not reducible to just any relation, nor even to any *causal* relation, for there are many part-whole relations that are obviously not functions. For example, the heart is not just the heart pumping part of the human body; it may also be correctly described as the “thumping sound” part of the human body. Obviously, making thumping sounds is not the function of the heart (it is at best a side-effect of its performing its function). Yet “heartsounds” and circulation are both effects of the heart’s beat. So the question is how one can determine *before identifying the function* exactly which part-whole relation is the functional one?

It does no good to assert that part A has a causal role within organism B *after one has already presupposed an irreducibly functional analysis*. The teleoreductionist is obliged rather to show how one can distinguish teleological and non-teleological part-whole relations in absence of or prior to such presuppositions. The teleological realist also affirms that hearts, say, play a causal role in the vertebrate’s body. The teleological realist’s point is that the heart is a part of the body with an irreducibly functional part – it pumps *in order to* circulate blood. It is *the blood pump* of the body. The teleological realist is free to identify the function of a particular body part, and then to characterize the part-whole relation in irreducibly functional terms; the teleological reductionist cannot do likewise. Relatedly, we should note that the notion of a “role” seems to be teleological. The proposition that ‘the heart plays a role within the organism’s circulatory system’ seems, on the face, synonymous with the proposition that ‘the heart *has a function* within the circulatory system.’

55. Robert Cummins, “Functional Analysis,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 72, no. 20 (1975): 741.

4.4 Natural Selection Reduction

The other alternative (or perhaps supplement) to the causal-role answer is by appealing to the historical genesis of the organ in question. Natural selection stories (endorsed by Ruth Millikan and others) provide a causal-history explanation of a present day teleonomic function. Similarly, purely mechanistic natural selection pressures may result in the construction of a genetic “program” or action that has some adaptive or useful outcome without consisting of teleological process.

One natural selection reduction strategy is to show how natural selection itself is a teleonomic or quasi-teleological process that can produce organisms with functional properties. On this strategy, we first define survival and reproduction as the goal-state of organisms (however this came to be); then, we distinguish effects that tend toward the organism’s survival and reproduction from those that do not or those that are irrelevant to that end. Circulation contributes to survival and hence is a more plausible candidate for the heart’s function than making heartsounds. Simply put, we can describe the present state of the heart (including its causal-role in bodies) by referring to its historical genesis: the heart evolved *because* it tended to the survival of certain kinds of organisms.

The question is whether natural selection is even the right kind of explanation for a phenomenon the pumping of the heart. Natural selection is not a *selection* in the sense that *some agent* is “selecting”. It is a scientific description of a process wherein generations of populations are either extinguished or preserved. Natural selection comes in to show how the organism varies, passes on heritable traits, and gives rise to new phenotypes. Thus Barham says:

...the functionally coordinated organism must already exist before it can be selected. On this view, we assume that the functional coordination of the organism is *prima facie* evidence of teleological determination, and since that functional coordination is presupposed by the theory of natural selection, the theory is in no position to reduce the apparent teleology in biology to

mechanism.⁵⁶

So much is clear in outline, but the details matter. Specifically, natural selection explains heritable traits that (i) varied in the past and which (ii) played a role in the reproductive rates of the population.⁵⁷ Natural selection is not supposed to and does not explain the bare existence of an initial population. Rather, the initial organism or population – with a complete set of reproductive and other traits – is taken for granted. So the worry is that the process natural selection is not the *right kind* of explanation to serve as a candidate for the reduction of apparently teleological activity within individual organisms.

When we are wondering how or why it is that the heart seems to have a definite function (to circulate blood) that is discernible from other side-effects (to make heartsounds), the question is about organismic behavior in general. Chemicals and compounds do not grow and develop and perform characteristic activities in the structured way that organisms do. My answer is that such normativity is a fundamental natural feature of organic life, a kind of brute natural law discovered a posteriori by the scientific method. The natural selection reductionist's answer is that the teleonomic function of hearts emerged out of a long history of phenotypic variation. My question is: so what? Mechanistic forces that are taking place between a population and its environment (droughts, famines) or within a population's genetics (genetic drift, normal reproduction) are compatible with a parallel teleological forces. Indeed, Barham suggests that the burgeoning field of evolutionary developmental biology might be able to supply some of the connections between these two kinds of process. He

56. Barham, "Teleological Realism in Biology.", 125.

57. Thus Godfrey-Smith's summary: Evolution by natural selection is change in a population due to: (i) variation in the characteristics of members of the population, (ii) which causes different rates of reproduction, and (iii) which is inherited. (Peter Godfrey-Smith, "Conditions for Evolution by Natural Selection," *The Journal of Philosophy* 104, no. 10 (2007): 489–516 515). This is only one of Godfrey-Smith's two descriptions: the more general description excludes particular real organisms in exchange for a useful degree of generality.

calls “phenotypic accommodation” the distinct process of “inherent compensatory or adaptive capacity of organisms” – or simply homeostasis.⁵⁸ The scientific hypothesis some are investigating⁵⁹ seems to be that these two processes are separately necessary but only jointly sufficient causes to explain the presence of a trait (like pumping hearts) in a population.

Another proponent of natural selection reduction strategies is Ruth Millikan.⁶⁰ Millikan’s famous concept of “proper function” essentially references an object’s empirical history. She says that “definition of ‘proper function’ looks to history rather than merely to present properties or dispositions to determine function.”⁶¹ A function is a “recursive” concept, since the function of a present day organ is defined in reference to ancestor’s functions; and “non-historical analyses” fail in important ways. Barham’s summary of Millikan’s historical view is this: “a present trait’s being a function to be equivalent to its having been naturally selected due to the fitness advantage conferred on an organism by the physical effects of the ancestral trait of the same type from which the present trait-token is descended.”⁶²

The idea here is that ancestral organisms had such-and-such phenotypes which, after many generations of reproduction, conferred hearts upon present-day vertebrates. A consequence of Millikan’s view is that an organism’s “proper function” simply cannot be read off its present capacities; we can’t just observe that hearts *seem to be for circulating blood* and infer from this observation that they are, indeed, for circulating blood. Rather, the proper function of a (present-day) heart can only be identified by its empirical history.

The implausible corollary is this: if we discovered two heart-like organisms (suppose one is extraterrestrial) with distinct evolutionary parentages, then they would have to

58. Barham, “Teleological Realism in Biology,” 131.

59. James A Shapiro, “Revisiting the Central Dogma in the 21st Century,” *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 1178, no. 1 (2009): 6–28.

60. Ruth Garrett Millikan, *Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism* (MIT press, 1984).

61. Ruth Garrett Millikan, “In Defense of Proper Functions,” *Philosophy of Science*, 1989, 289.

62. Barham, “Teleological Realism in Biology,” 9.

be classified as having different functions despite both circulating blood. More hypothetically, “Swampman” arguments press a similar point. Suppose an exact material replica of Donald Davidson spontaneously emerged from a swamp; on Millikan’s theory, even though the Swampman is equipped with a heart and lungs and legs and eyelids, none of these has *any* “proper function.” Millikan bites the bullet on both of these implausible corollaries:

Take any object, then, that has a proper function or functions, a purpose or purposes, and consider a double of it, molecule for molecule exactly the same. Now suppose that this double has just come into being through a cosmic accident resulting in the sudden spontaneous convergence of molecules which, until a moment ago, had been scattered about in random motion. Such a double has no proper functions because its history is not right. It is not a reproduction of anything, nor has it been produced by anything having proper functions.⁶³

Millikan bolsters her case by offering an account of just what kind of definition she aims to provide and defending her view against wild hypothetical counterexamples. Nevertheless, it still seems to me that the concept of a function employed when we use terms and phrases such as ‘function’ and ‘purpose’ and ‘in order to’ is different from the concept of that function having been produced in such-and-such a way. These concepts come apart in several ways: Useless vestigial organs have an empirical history but no present day functional capacity; spandrels have a present-day functional capacity with no direct, primary selection history; the language capacities in say, the right hemisphere of the brain *can* be taken over by the left hemisphere in the case of injury or lobotomy, presumably because the brain is (present-day) adaptable and not because the brain function redundancy was selected for in every individual case. These counterexamples demonstrate *at least* that function and history conceptually can come apart.

What is the alternative? In Barham’s view, functions are “essentially modal, not historical, concepts”⁶⁴. He quotes Fodor’s vivid statement that: “my heart’s function has

63. Millikan, “In Defense of Proper Functions,” 292.

64. Barham, “Teleological Realism in Biology,” 139.

less to do with its evolutionary origins than with the current truth of such counterfactuals as that if it were to stop pumping my blood, I'd be dead."⁶⁵ If we made contact with extraterrestrials whose blood-like liquid was circulated by a pump-like organ, how could we discern whether it was a heart? We could query about the historical genesis of the organ on that planet, but we would first rightly query: *what would happen if that organ stopped pumping?* If the Alpha Centaurians, too, would die without the beating of that organ, we would justifiably call the organ a 'heart' even though it had a very different history.

Barham cautions against "imagining that 'selection history' could confer normative value on a biological function in the same way that pedigree confers value on a horse, or provenance on a painting."⁶⁶ "History" is not a special power but is simply the set of physical interactions over time. The question about which set of physical interactions over time produced X might be (and I think is) intimately related to questions about the function of X; the point is that they are two different questions. Michael Thompson, too, insists that judgments about natural teleology are made true from the form of life under question, not from "hypotheses about the past."⁶⁷ This seems right to me. It does not matter for present purposes *how* the function came to be, just whether or not it really *is* at present. Barham is right to point out that the problem with Aristotle's views of biology (say, believing that the seat of perception was not in the brain) was not that he lacked knowledge of evolution, but that he lacked an adequate knowledge of physiology.

I can only conclude from this brief discussion that these reductionist strategies are not very promising. 'Not very promising' is a far cry from 'hopeless.' There may be a

65. Jerry A Fodor, *The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology* (MIT press, 2001), 86-7; cited in Barham, "Teleological Realism in Biology," 138.

66. Ibid., 140.

67. Cf. Thompson, "The Representation of Life. 293. Christopher Toner adds that judgments about natural teleological facts are made true regardless of the origin of the facts, "whether about creation or natural selection." (Toner, "Sorts of Naturalism. 223.)

successful reduction *one day*. Teleonomic phenomena “that is both empirically and theoretically adequate and that neither employs any teleological concepts nor presupposes any other teleological phenomena.” But today is not that day. The scientific perspective of empirical biology conforms most closely to the commonsense perspective that hearts are for pumping blood.

Despite deeply-rooted anxiety about the prospect of accepting naturalistic normative realism whole cloth, appeal to natural normativity is a live *scientific* appeal. Teleological realism in biology fell into disfavor about the same time as Francis Bacon declared that the search for final causes corrupted science.^[24] The proper reply to Bacon is that the teleological nihilism hypothesis has been tried and found wanting. Modern science is no less teleological than it was in the 16th century; perhaps even more so. Arnhart persuasively argues that teleology is an irreplaceable assumption in medicine.⁶⁸ Zammito clarifies its ongoing relevance in biology, since organisms seem to be intrinsically purposeful.⁶⁹ Fitzpatrick says that, “While neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory does soundly reject any appeal to teleology in the process of evolution itself, there is a large literature in contemporary philosophy of biology defending the legitimacy of employing teleological concepts in connection with adaptations.”⁷⁰ Darwin himself might have been a teleologist.⁷¹ Whether Darwin’s theory of natural selection *undermines* and debunks or *underwrites* and justifies the teleological view at least debatable. Thomas Nagel took a lot of heat for his recent philosophical defense

68. Larry Arnhart, “Aristotle’s Biopolitics: A Defense of Biological Teleology Against Biological Nihilism,” *Politics and the Life Sciences* 6, no. 2 (1988): pp. 173–229.

69. John Zammito, “Teleology Then and Now: The Question of Kant’s Relevance for Contemporary Controversies over Function in Biology,” *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part 37*, no. 4 (2006): 748–70.

70. William FitzPatrick, “Morality and Evolutionary Biology,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2016, 2016.

71. James G Lennox, “Darwin Was a Teleologist,” *Biology and Philosophy* 8, no. 4 (1993): 409–21; James G Lennox, “Teleology,” *Keywords in Evolutionary Biology*, 1992, 324–33.

of scientific, Darwinian, natural teleology.⁷² However, Michael Chorost does not accuse Nagel of defending obvious falsehoods, he chastises him for *failing to cite the existing scientific literature considering the same thesis. He says:

Natural teleology is unorthodox, but it has a long and honorable history. For example, in 1953 the evolutionary biologist Julian Huxley argued that it's in the nature of nature to get more advanced over time. "If we take a snapshot view, improvement eludes us," he wrote. "But as soon as we introduce time, we see trends of improvement..."⁷³

While natural teleological realism is still controversial, it is not a controversy between science and philosophy but a controversy *within science*.

4.5 Coming to Terms with Teleology

The goal of this chapter was to argue that there are such things as natural norms. Realism about natural normativity does not *bridge* the much vaunted is-ought gap but rather undercuts it. The is-ought gap might simply turn out to derive from an obsolete view of science. Hence, it is at least possible that ethical naturalism can derive normative human 'oughts' from natural normative facts.

In my broader argument, natural norms serve as counterexamples to the common belief that all natural facts are descriptive (non-normative) facts. Despite their disagreement about normativity and morality, the naturalistic normative anti-realist and the non-naturalistic normative grant this common belief that all natural facts are non-normative facts. This gives rise to the is-ought gap arises as a matter of logical necessity. However, there is good reason to push back on this common belief. Instances of natural normativity include familiar scientific facts about organisms, such as that they have a life form and display natural teleological properties. The three possible responses to such putative natural

72. Thomas Nagel, *Mind and Cosmos* (Oxford University Press, 2012).

73. Michael Chorost, "Where Thomas Nagel Went Wrong," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 2013.

norms are to accept them (as I have recommended), reject them, or reduce them. Going in for global normative anti-realism would require adopting scientific anti-realism as well, which is a formidable philosophical view I have not even attempted to consider here. Scientific realists tend to choose a reductive strategy, but I have given reasons to think reduction has not yet been accomplished and is not likely to. In the mean time, it seems clear that naturalistic normative realism is not only the view commended by best philosophical reflection but also, interestingly, the view assumed in normal scientific inquiry.

Chapter 3

Practical Primates

When we are investigating what the good life is... and how living virtuously might achieve it, we are aided by investigating our human nature. This in turn we do by seeing how we humans are a part, though a distinctive part, to the world that the sciences tell us about.

—Julia Annas, “Virtue Ethics: What Kind of Naturalism?”, 11.

1. Introduction

The last chapter defended the very possibility of ethical naturalism; this chapter must defend its plausibility. We first had to consider the notion of natural normativity in general; this chapter extends that notion to a particular species of natural norms, namely, human norms.

The strategy for identifying natural human norms is fairly simple: uncover generic propositions about human beings that are both scientifically true *and* normatively or ethically significant. For example, we need Aristotelian Categoricals or generics that answer questions like these: what is a human being? All else depends on the life form of our species. Also, what kinds of activities does “the human” being do? What kind of life does it live? What is its natural end, if it has one – or what are they? The answers would be both de-

scriptive and normative. Human norms would provide *prima facie* normative bindingness; if I am a human being by nature, it would be initially binding upon me to *do what humans do* and *become what humans become*. These human norms, I shall suggest, give us insight into the concepts of virtue, excellence, wisdom, and flourishing.

Section 2 the observation that human beings are natural organisms. That is, humans are primates who enjoy the properties common to the entire tree of life, including natural norms such as pursuing life and survival and reproduction. Nevertheless, humans also enjoy other, more peculiar, properties relating to our speaking, innovating, deliberating, and so on.

Section 3 supplements the notion of being a primate with the notion of being ‘practically rational.’ What cluster of activities constitute the activity of ‘practical reasoning’? I argue that there are at least four: speaking, rational practicing, social living, and innovating. Hence, the human being is a primate (animal) who engages in such practices: a practical primate. This conception of human nature is seamlessly both normative and descriptive. Human beings find themselves in a nexus of normativity that is both “natural” (i.e., automatic, default, not created by us) and normative (i.e., binding, non-optional). This conception is also knowable both from “within” and “outside” the human point of view allows us to see what is unique about human beings, their capacities, and ends. If, even with these differences, humans fit the larger pattern of natural normativity defended in chapter 2, then evaluation of individual human beings is possible by comparison to the human life form.

Section 4 attempts to sympathetically articulate and respond to a few critical objections philosophers have had about the neo-Aristotelian project of grounding ethical evaluations in a normatively loaded conception of human nature. For example, some think that there are no such thing as a “nature”, as I have deployed that concept; others think that there are natures but that there is no *human nature*; others think that human nature exists but it has no teleological boundaries; others think that human nature has *some* teleological

boundaries, but only reproduction and survival. Each of these receives an initial rebuttal, though a few of them will require further comment in chapter 6. I concede that human norms are only a beginning, however. Because humans are in control of their actions, the generic truths about “the human” seems to be variable. Perhaps human norms are irrelevant to how you or I or any individual *ought* to live. If so, more work is needed to justify even putatively universal natural human norms.

Section 5 begins to apply the foregoing account of human nature and natural human norms to ethics. Specifically, I shall argue that as practical, rational animals, a basic human norm is that one *is to become a fully mature human being*. Practical primates have prima facie normative obligation to be what they are (to respect the conditions and criteria of their life form) and a prima facie obligation to become fully mature practical primates.

2. Animals of a Peculiar Sort

The previous chapter drew substantially from Philippa Foot to argue that *any* animal exists within a nexus of natural normativity. Since humans are animals, it would seem to follow that humans are subject to natural norms. Foot is well aware that the derivation of normativity from brute nature is likely to seem absurd, especially when it comes to human beings. She says:

The idea that any features and operations of humans could be evaluated in the same way as those of plants and animals may provoke instant opposition. For to say that this is possible is to imply that some at least of our judgements of goodness and badness in human beings are given truth or falsity by the conditions of human life. And even if it is allowed that certain evaluations of this kind are possible – those vaguely thought of perhaps as ‘merely biological’ – there is bound to be skepticism about the possibility that ‘moral evaluation’ could be like this.¹

1. Foot, *Natural Goodness* 38.

Despite such legitimate worries, we have followed Foot in trying to earn a hearing for this notion by arguing that the “meaning of ‘good’ in so-called ‘moral contexts’ ” does not have a special logic of its own. Rather, ‘good’ and ‘defective’ pick out natural properties of living things. The goodness of a cactus is relative to its cactus nature; likewise, we should expect that the goodness of human beings is relative to their human nature.

Are human beings natural organisms? On its face, calling human beings organisms or animals or primates appears to be an innocent truism. *Of course* humans share properties in common with every other organism: they enjoy a particular evolutionary history; they move about the earth engaging in activities such as reproducing, sleeping, feeding, dying, and so on. But some have objected to the suggestion that human beings are *mere* animals. We are different from other animals, and the significance of this difference is a matter of some controversy. Certainly, humans exhibit a range of actions such as language and complex social systems that other animals do not. As Hursthouse summarizes:

When we moved from the evaluations of other social animals to ethical evaluations of ourselves, there was an obvious addition to the list of aspects which are evaluated. The other animals act [as opposed to chemicals which are only acted upon.]. So do we occasionally, but mostly we act from reason, as they do not, and it is primarily in virtue of our actions from reason that we are ethically good or bad human beings. So that is one difference that our being rational makes.²

In light of the difference of being rational, the task in discovering true generics about human beings is capturing what is common, and what is unique, about humans.

My view is that human beings are animals of a peculiar sort where the peculiarities do not erase the commonalities. The traditional formula that humans are “rational animals” is close to correct. As such, both the *animal* part of that formula is essential and the *rational* part. To see why, let’s first consider in a bit more detail what it means to be an animal, and why it matters. Then we shall look at what it means to be the peculiar sort of animal we are.

2. Hursthouse, *On Virtue Ethics* 217.

To be an animal is to belong to the “tree of life” – and to have a location in the broader story of life on earth.³ That story begins 3.5 billion years ago with the first living organisms, and our own part begins about 200,000 years ago with the emergence of anatomically modern humans. In contemporary classificatory scheme, we can locate humans within the phylum chordata, the class mammalia, the order of primates, the suborder haplorhini, the family hominidae, the genus homo, the species homo sapiens.

Does this matter ethically? I think it can be demonstrated that the common history of living organisms (including humans) is not ethically irrelevant. At the very least, the bundle of properties intrinsic to our animality serves as a condition of our ethical life. At the most, our animality is (sometimes) a *criterion* of our ethical life.

One example that will suffice to illustrate the point is mortality. As a matter of plain scientific fact, we are finite and mortal like every other living organism or species. All life on earth undergoes a process from a humble beginnings in a single cell through infancy, maturation, and adulthood, at which point it may reproduce itself before dying. All of these phases we notice in human animals as well. The human life cycle is characterized by various phases, including growth, language acquisition, puberty, physical maturity and characteristic activities, aging, and death.

Now, all that is good in life depends on the prior state of being alive at all. Although death is “normal” at the end of the life cycle, it is a very basic normative fact that being alive is a good. This is a plausible candidate to explain, in part, what is so morally horrendous about murder. Where theft robs one of this or that particular good, murder robs one of life

3. As Michael Mautner explains, all living things (on earth at least) share common ancestors and even share genetic material: “.phylogenetic trees indicate that all terrestrial life can be traced to a common ancestor. Organisms as different from us as yeasts share half; mice, over 90%, chimpanzees, over 95%, and different human individuals share over 99% of our genome. These scientific insights give a deeper meaning to the unity of all Life. Our complex molecular patterns are common to all organic gene/protein life and distinguish us from any other phenomena of nature.” Michael N Mautner, “Life-Centered Ethics, and the Human Future in Space,” *Bioethics* 23, no. 8 (2009): 433–40 434-5.

which is the condition of all other goods. In this way, mortality is a condition of ethical life; *prima facie*, one ought not behave in such a way as to make others die (or to put others at risk of dying) before their life cycle is complete.

My point is not that the status of mortality is uncontroversial. Whether mortality is condition or criterion of ethical life is a live controversy in bioethics: should we attempt (if possible) to overcome mortality?⁴ Would doing so be a morally innocent intervention like body-building or a morally loaded intervention like genetically modifying embryos? My point is that being mortal creatures whose very life is a fragile homeostasis is *at least* a condition that must be taken into account when living life or constructing an ethical theory.

What other conditions of animality are possible criteria of ethics? The whole range of facts that characterize a human being and a human pattern of life. When I say “pattern of life” I do not just mean the crudely biological features of life; I mean the whole range of biological and neurophysiological facts by which a human being undergoes the process of living from birth to death.

We cannot, except via abstraction, describe the human species adequately without describing biology, ethology, psychology, and sociology. For example, it might seem a purely descriptive biological trivium that humans have 23 chromosomes in each somatic cell. But genetic defects in a person have enormous effects on that person’s quality of life and on the community in which he or she lives. Apparently innocent “descriptions” of human animals are inseparable from ethological and anthropological descriptions, which which are both descriptive *and* normative.

Furthermore, a scientific account of humanity cannot leave out that humans have large brains relative to other primates, with a neocortex and prefrontal cortex that correlate with abstract thinking, problem solving, society, and culture. A scientific account cannot

4. Nick Bostrom, “Transhumanist Values,” *Journal of Philosophical Research* 30 (2005): 3–14; Nick Bostrom, “In Defense of Posthuman Dignity,” *Bioethics* 19, no. 3 (2005): 202–14.

leave out that humans don't just suffer physiological responses like fear and excitement or arousal, they willfully seek out such emotions for themselves through art and entertainment and willfully cause them in others. Presumably, even an alien anthropologist who knew nothing of human language or "what it is like to be a human" would be able to notice, upon examination, that a human's laugh or cry is different from a hyena's laugh or a crocodile's tears. Part of the alien anthropologist's examination would be to examine the body, brain, and hands of human beings. One of the first things we can imagine they would notice is that humans live in cultures and societies. They are not merely "social animals" like apes; they are language-users, communicating in signs and symbols. Their language is an extremely complex, open-ended system which is both recursive (able to nest propositions within propositions) and productive (able to create sentences by potentially limitless combinations of words). In virtue of language and their opposable thumbs, they are creative; they don't just live on the ground or under ground, but build houses and shelters, sometimes in new places, such as caves, trees, hills, mountains, etc. Also, they are self-reflective. They establish social relations upon biological grounds (some children growing up with natural parents) and upon normative grounds (some orphans growing up in orphanages created by philanthropists). Even before introducing the "human" point of view, we can describe "the human" form of life in some detail. My hope is that these generics are plausibly knowable from an "objective" or third-person point of view of scientific exploration, data gathering, inductive generalization. They seem to have at least *potential* ethical significance; even so, the most ethically significant fact about us is the peculiar differentia of our species: practical rationality.

2.1 Peculiarities

This section attempts to explain what it means to ascribe ‘practical rationality’ of an organism.⁵ Practical reason occupies a place of importance in the theories of many virtue ethicists. For example, Foot, McDowell, and MacIntyre have each treated the theme.⁶ Chapter 5 focuses on the neo-Aristotelian accounts of practical reasoning in some detail. For now, I shall only offer an initial exploration. Jay Wallace gives an adequate general definition of practical reason: “Practical reason is the general human capacity for resolving, through reflection, the question of what one is to do.”⁷

When we take a wide view and observe human behavior in context of other animal behavior, observing ourselves both “from inside” and “from outside” the human perspective, we notice a range of properties not shared by other mammals: grammar and language, fire-making, cooking, sexual union for pleasure, abstract reasoning, science, philosophy, religion, mythology, agriculture. Is there any way to collect these idiosyncrasies into one or a few generic categories? All of them depend, in one way or another, on activities we call “rational.”

Predicating rationality is not just based, as Russell flippantly suggests, on the fact that “some people can do sums.”⁸ Rather, we predicate rationality on the basis of observing a range of activities such as: to observe, reflect, and perceive; to remember, predict, and

5. I shall use ‘practical rationality’ and ‘practical reason’ as synonymous. Warren Quinn uses ‘practical reason’ to mean the faculty and ‘practical rationality’ to mean the excellence use of the faculty. In a later chapter, I shall contrast the faculty with ‘practical wisdom’, which is the excellence thereof. Cf. Warren Quinn, “Rationality and the Human Good,” *Social Philosophy and Policy* 9, no. 02 (1992): 81–95.

6. Cf. Foot, *Natural Goodness*, chapter 4; McDowell, “Virtue and Reason”; Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1988).

7. R. Jay Wallace, “Practical Reason,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 2014.

8. Bertrand Russell, *The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell, 1903-1959* (Psychology Press, 1992), 73.

categorize; to decide, determine, and pursue; to abstract, explain, and infer; to criticize, blame, and praise; to admonish, prohibit, and command; and so on. Abstracting to what all these disparate activities have in common gives us a sense of what the generic activity of practical reasoning is.

Practical reasoning is the process of self-determining, of taking our actions “into our own hands” so to speak. Some of the above rational activities are intrinsically aimed at action, while others are not. But even the theoretical activities (like reflection) can be and are put to use in practice. Hence, on my view, practical reason is constituted by at least four capacities that in turn constitute human nature: the capacity to speak, to live in society, to engage in rational practices, and to create or innovate. Let’s consider each of these four properties in turn.

First, take speech. Aristotle observed that, “Man alone of the animals possesses speech.”⁹ Nothing in modern science has superseded or contradicted the observation (obvious to anyone) that human speech is different from other animal noises. Other animals have speech and communication. The difference between non-human and human speech is not obvious to infant humans, who learn words by imitation just as well as they learn tweets, barks, and growls. Upon reflection, researchers have observed that animals communicate with non-grammatical closed systems with a small, finite set of symbols. Communication systems used by other animals such as bees or apes are closed systems that consist of a finite, usually very limited, number of possible ideas that can be expressed. In contrast, human language is open-ended and productive, meaning that it allows humans to produce a vast range of utterances from a finite set of elements, and to create new words and sentences. Our language is unique: it is grammatical, open-ended, recursive, and productive. We are animals who use signs and symbols to communicate self-reflective and abstract thought.¹⁰

9. *Politics*, 1.1253a. Obviously, Aristotle and the translator use ‘man’ in the gender inclusive sense.

10. Terrence W Deacon, *The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language and*

Speech is inseparable from self-reflectivity and sociality. Through our animal senses comes a sensitivity to our surroundings, the ability to see the world, ourselves, the sun and stars, to hear our fellow creatures, and to take the whole cosmos into consciousness. But through speech comes a whole second cosmos of culture. Through speech comes intentionality in all its forms. Through speech comes communication (“pass the salt”), distinct languages and cultures (about 5,000 distinct languages), self-consciousness (“who am I?”), abstraction (“all grass is green”), science, philosophy, religion, mythology, technology and more. Perhaps even art and music arise from the rational capacity to direct our actions to create not only what instinct demands but whatever the imagination can invent.¹¹

The second constitutive feature of practical reason is sociality. When Aristotle asserted that “Man is by nature a political animal,” he did not mean the facile point that human beings prefer to reside in groups. Rather, I suggest, we can interpret his assertion as a generic truth. ‘The human being’ is formally constituted by being an animal that exists not only in a family setting but in a political setting. Just as ‘the human being’ is a creature produced by the sexual union of two other human gametes, so ‘the human being’ is able to speak, and to be enculturated in a particular natural language in a time in human history and a place on the globe.

The third feature of practical reason is the ability to engage in rational practices. All organisms initiate *action* in the most general sense that they move about and do things. And all higher mammals engage in complex (and often social) practices, such as communal hunting, grooming, and building. Humans exhibit unique behaviors: We do not act merely, but act *on reasons*. We are the only creatures that set goals, on purpose, far in advance of their fulfillment. We are the only creatures who undertake long, complicated sets of actions

the Brain (WW Norton & Company, 1998).

11. Gordon H. Orians, “Nature & Human Nature,” *Daedalus* 137, no. 2 (2008): 39–48. Orians says that “Americans spend more money on music than on sex or prescription drugs.”

in order to achieve those goals. Micah Lott summarizes the specific point about the human life form: “Human form is characterized by *practical reason*. This is the capacity to act in light of an awareness of the ground of our actions, to recognize and respond to practical reasons.”¹² Goal-setting and recognizing practical reasons are inextricably tied. Practical reasons include our assessments of what is worthwhile. We also reflect on past actions and evaluate them to decide whether it is advisable to do the same thing again or try something else. Practical reasoning includes not just deliberating about what to do but weighing the apparent reasons for and against a particular course of action. Hence, as I shall explain later, it is under the category of ‘rational practice’ that I shall include everything unique about humans having to do with morality.

The fourth feature is rational creation or innovation. Innovative creation is intrinsically related, I think, to speech, sociality, and rational practice. That is, one of the forms practical reasoning takes is that we *innovate* – we create and design and plan actions, new behaviors, new games, new languages, new activities, and so on. The structural features of our grammatical system allows us to create new propositions from a finite set of words, without which we could not tell stories or write philosophy papers. Furthermore, living within a social order, practical primates create living spaces, utensils, farming implements, and so on. We even create new social orders.

The human differentia of ‘practical rationality’ entails not only abstract reasoning but speech, sociality, rational practice, and creation. Such norms are not *only* accessible to us, but would be accessible to an “alien anthropologist” observing humanity from the “outside.” The alien anthropologist, if indeed it had enough of its own rationality to be able to have anthropological science, could observe these actions and infer the existence of the property of rationality.

12. Lott, “Moral Virtue as Knowledge of Human Form,” 415. Original emphasis.

3. Objections

I must now clear up a few possible misunderstandings and address a few objections. The first misunderstanding that we should avoid is a misunderstanding about the concept of a nature. Chris Toner's epigraph states that *human nature is normative*. I don't insist on the term 'nature', as some object to it on aesthetic grounds; we could equally say that genetically modern homo sapiens sapiens are potentially practical, rational primates. The important thing is not the term 'nature' or 'human nature' but the concept of a nature. What do I mean by a nature or life form?

In the old classificatory schemes, philosophers provided a genus and a differentia to pick out the unique "nature" of any life form or natural kind. Not every kind-concept corresponds to a real nature: *the set of medium sized objects immediately to my left* is not a natural kind, nor is *All human beings born in Ireland*. The kind-concepts under review are not just any generalizations but scientific and biological kinds that arise from inquiry and on which inquiry depends. We start out knowing nothing about an organism (say, some species of beetle) and come to discover not only that they exist but a whole set of properties: their genetic traits, their evolutionary history, their natural habitats, diet, predators, lifespans, and so on. In this way, a nature is a species, or a homeostatic set of properties, or a natural kind.

When such a kind-concept corresponds to a real natural kind or "nature", that nature is potentially discernible both by contrasting it with other kinds of things and by comparing it with instances of the same kind. Hans Fink explains:

The nature of x is both what is special about this x and what makes this x one of the x's as opposed to the y's. When x is defined per genus et differentia both the genus and the differentiating characteristic and their combination could be taken to express what is the nature of x.... Human nature is what differentiates us from the animals and the plants. By nature we are rational beings. Our human nature, however, is also that in virtue of which we belong to the animal kingdom and to the living organisms. By nature we are

mammals. We may thus use the concept of nature to differentiate rather than include, but also to include rather than differentiate. And we may use the concept of nature to express that differentiation and inclusion should not be seen as incompatible.¹³

As Fink points out, the concept of a nature gathers and divides. It gathers up all the members or putative members of a kind and divides the kind from other kinds. With this definition in view, we can see what the point of the old formula was, that man was a rational animal, or a featherless biped. There are many animals, but few (if any) other rational ones. There may even be other rational creatures who are not animals (artificial intelligences, gods, intelligent Alpha Centurions, or what have you), but so far as we know, we are the only rational animals in the cosmos.

Hence, I think this formula, slightly modified, is still the best way of reflecting on ourselves as members of the organic kingdom, as organisms within the evolutionary tree of life, and as physical objects in the cosmos: a human being is (potentially) a practical, rational primate. This simple, generic proposition is astonishingly rich. It captures the facts of our life form and can be demonstrated to be true from within the human point of view, and from outside it; an alien anthropologist studying human beings from its own non-human point of view could discover that humans are practical, rational primates.

A second misunderstanding has to do with the predication of ‘rationality.’ Humans engage in demonstrative reasoning and practical reasoning. While both are recognizably modes of *reasoning*, they should not be conflated with each other.

There is indeed a linguistic parity in the way we talk about π -type reasons and Q-type reasons.¹⁴ Both are a species of “*reasons*”, though they differ in their use. For example, Philippa Foot says that reasons of type (A) are “Reasons for acting, which we may call

13. Hans Fink, “Three Sorts of Naturalism,” *European Journal of Philosophy* 14, no. 2 (August 2006): 207.

14. R. Edgley, “Practical Reason,” *Mind* 74, no. 294 (1965): 174–91.

practical reasons” and type (B) are “Reasons for believing, which we may call evidential or demonstrative reasons.” She continues:

As philosophers, and therefore theoreticians, our job is of course to give the second type of reason, arguing for or against the truth of a variety of propositions that seem to involve special problems—like those, for instance, about personal identity or the existence of an external world. But among these many ‘philosophical’ subjects we find that of the nature of practical reasons, and in this special case we shall have to give reasons of type B for theses about reasons of type A.¹⁵

Some unwittingly interpret “rationality” to mean only speculative reasoning – i.e., mathematical, logical, or otherwise abstract thinking. This kind of abstract thinking Aristotle would call *theoria* or contemplative science. I do not think the best way to understand the old formula of “rational animals” is to take “rational” to mean “abstract thought” because a nature should capture *all* non-dysfunctional members of a species and only a relatively small minority of humans engage in that kind of abstract reflection that characterizes science, theology, mathematics, metaphysics, ethics, and so on.

Practical reasoning is a better candidate for the single defining feature because all normal, functioning adult humans, regardless of cultures, intelligence quotients, or walk of life, engage in practical reasoning and deliberation. I want to make it indelibly clear that I am not supposing human nature to be rationality per se but practical rationality. It is not merely *thought* but *thoughtful action* that I would like to emphasize. (That practical reasoning is indeed a form of reasoning, and the difference, if any, between theoretical and speculative reasoning, is a theme of chapter 5.)

I am *not* saying that only practical reasoning is *active*. Both theoretical and practical reasoning are active in the sense that both require intentional effort and both light up the brain on an MRI scan. The difference between theoretical and practical reasoning is that where theoretical reasoning results in belief, judgment, speculation, and so on, practical

15. Foot, *Natural Goodness*, 64–65.

reasoning *results in action*. And, I would suggest, this distinction must be built in to our definition of practical reasoning.

That said, the capacity for abstract or “theoretical reason” is certainly an important feature of human nature and stands out from the capacities of other organisms. While other members of the animal kingdom “think” in one sense of that term, as far as we know, no other animal constructs theories about, say, the cognitive capacities of the animal kingdom. My only point is to challenge the unwitting interpretation of “rationality” to mean abstract reasoning to the exclusion of any other capacity.

A third possible misunderstanding has to do with exceptions to the truth that human beings are practical rational primates. Bertrand Russell quipped that “Man is a rational animal – so at least I have been told. Throughout a long life I have been looked diligently for evidence in favour of this statement, but so far I have not had the good fortune to come across it.”¹⁶ The humor of his misanthropic jab turns on an ambiguity in the predication of ‘rationality.’ Certainly, many of us are forgetful, neglectful, and driven by emotion or desire, and our thinking is riddled with fallacies. If by ‘rational’ we mean the reliability habit of thinking well, then the possession of rationality would be rare indeed. Children, the uneducated, the foolish, and many philosophers are not rational by this high standard. If, however, by ‘rational’ we simply mean the *potential* to become successfully rational, then every normal human possesses rationality.

A second misunderstanding, more dangerous than the first, is to think that someone who cannot successfully think rationally is not even human. What about anencephalic babies, the genetically defective, the comatose, the mentally ill? Are they not really human? An uncharitable critic might accuse me of insinuating so. I deny the charge. In fact, it is a strength of my argument that I can make sense of exceptions.

Generics describe a life form well only when the sample includes exemplary in-

16. Russell, *The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell, 1903-1959*, 72.

stances of the species – not the young, immature, ill, injured, genetically defective, radiation poisoned, comatose, mentally ill, and so on. However, such are still recognizably members of the species. Humans are “bipedal” by nature even when someone (say, a war veteran) is no longer bipedal. Anencephalic babies who lack the subvenient brain structure necessary for rational consciousness are “rational” by nature even though they will never exemplify their potential for practical reasoning. Abnormal members of our species are recognizably *human* – they are not eagles or moonrocks or dandelions. We have a clean explanation for this, for generic truths are compatible with individual exceptions. Indeed, without well-grounded knowledge of the life form expressed in generic propositions, it would be impossible to describe any individual as abnormal, immature, ill or injured.

A final possible misunderstanding needs a response here. Someone might observe that terms such as “exemplary” or “normal” or “mature” are normative terms and hence charge that I am “smuggling” evaluations in to a process of objective, scientific description. I welcome the observation, but deny the charge. The discernment between ordinary, unusual (but not defective), and abnormal (and defective) is certainly an evaluative discernment. My point has been that such evaluative discernment is part and parcel of objective, scientific generic predication.

Researchers do not judge the characteristics of a newly discovered species of beetle by examining its young. They might, at first, mistake the initial specimen for a fully mature adult; but the correction would come from a further application of scientific methods. The capture of a larger beetle that appears to be *of the same kind* would suggest that the initial specimen was either a child or a runt. After collecting a sufficient sample of specimens (say, a dozen or preferably more) the researchers would be in the position to make justifiable fundamentally normative judgments about *which of these individual beetles is exemplary of the species*.

We can draw the same conclusion with a hypothetical situation in which humans

are the newly discovered species. Suppose an alien anthropologist were to stumble across earth and study humans. Suppose that the initial specimen was a 12-year-old boy or girl. If that was the anthropologist's *only* sample, the alien race would come to all sorts of incorrect conclusions about humanity in general. If, instead, they studied mature, healthy, human beings of both sexes, in the "prime" of life, they would be closer to identifying "the human." My contention is that they would be best served not by examining foolish humans but practically wise ones.

I conclude that the ascription of practical reason to human beings is indeed true generically of the human life form, species, or nature. The rarity of successful realization of a capacity for practical reasoning does not tell against the truth of the generic, and neither does the existence of persons who may never actualize the capacity. Such exceptions rather support the thesis, for how else could we judge that there is a *genetic defect* except by reference to the genetic norm?

3.1 No Organic Natures

There are a few other objections a reader might have at this juncture. The first objection is simply that we cannot identify "human nature" with any scientific accuracy because there is no human nature. This objection has three iterations.

The first sort of critic might deny that there is any such thing as a human life form because there are no life forms at all. This is an objection to the very concept of a nature. Perhaps, instead of real life forms and natural kinds, we should be nominalists about divisions between various branches of the tree of life.

One iteration of this criticism is an alleged tension between the flexibility of species (as represented in evolutionary biology) and a fixed notion of human nature. In a seminal paper on natural teleology, Ernst Mayr says:

The concepts of unchanging essences and of complete discontinuities between every *eidos* (type) and all others make genuine evolutionary thinking impossible. I agree with those who claim that the essentialist philosophies of Aristotle and Plato are incompatible with evolutionary thinking.¹⁷

Arthur Ward is a recent critic who agrees with Mayr on this point. Ward argues that “naturalists should reject the idea of ‘human nature,’ and indeed should reject that any organism or its parts or operations has a nature, purpose, proper function, or the like.”¹⁸ I have already pointed out that rejecting all organic natures and purposes is not necessarily the only rational, scientific option; indeed, such a rejection seems to me to be motivated by philosophical materialism far more than it is motivated by any respect for actual biological science.

Nevertheless, I cannot insist that accepting organic natures and purposes is the *only* rational, scientific option. Rather, to the idea that there are no natural kinds, I can only give a general and unsatisfactory response. This dissertation cannot chase down the (justifiably important) dispute about the status of natural kinds. However, the arguments of the previous chapter, built on the assumption of a minimal scientific realism, is enough to secure a fairly solid grounding for the notion of natural kinds.

3.2 No Natural Teleology

A second sort of critic accepts natural kinds but denies that these kinds have teleological features. For example, Bernard Williams asserts that: “The first and hardest lesson of Darwinism, that there is no such teleology at all, and that there is no orchestral score provided from anywhere according to which human beings have a special part to play, still has to find its way into ethical thought.”¹⁹

17. Ernst Mayr, *Populations, Species, and Evolution: An Abridgment of Animal Species and Evolution* (Harvard University Press, 1970), 4.

18. Arthur Ward, “Against Natural Teleology and Its Application in Ethical Theory” (PhD thesis, Bowling Green State University, 2013), 1.

19. Bernard Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (Taylor & Francis, 2011), 44.

He says elsewhere:

The idea of a naturalistic ethics was born of a deeply teleological outlook, and its best expression, in many ways, is still to be found in Aristotle's philosophy, a philosophy according to which there is inherent in each natural kind of thing an appropriate way for things of that kind to behave.²⁰

This sort of critic thinks that there are natures or natural kinds and stable species with objective properties, but does accept the notion that functional or teleological properties feature in purely biological descriptions of organisms.

My response is this: Williams voices a common opinion when he alleges an incompatibility between Darwinism and teleological realism. The response of Hursthouse, Foot, Brown, etc., is that natural teleology is indeed compatible with Darwinism and does indeed provide a "an appropriate way to behave" (or we might add, *ways*) that is "inherent in each natural kind of thing." Such a view is not incompatible with evolutionary theory.

Strictly speaking, evolutionary theory is a set of theses explaining the current multiplicity and shape of terrestrial life. It says absolutely nothing about teleological causes or properties.²¹ There is room, in other words, within evolutionary theory for discussions about the evidence for or against non-mechanical teleological causation. Thomas Nagel is one who recently presented such a naturalistic theory of Darwinian natural selection com-

20. Cf. Bernard Williams, "Evolution Ethics and the Representation Problem," in *Making Sense of Humanity: And Other Philosophical Papers 1982-1993* (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 109.

21. The biological claims include the following: The earth, which is very old, has given rise to simple life forms which have become over slow and gradual changes given rise to myriad life forms, some of which are very complex. The driving mechanism of this process is natural selecting acting on the genetic mutations of a given population. All of life originated from one original place and species. A philosophical claim, often appended to the biological ones, is that the process of natural selection is *unguided by any causes but material-efficient mechanical ones*. But this claim is a philosophical belief, not a biological one. Polemicists will sometimes cite the popularity of the philosophical belief among biologists as proof that it is a "biological" claim. But we do not determine truth by vote. If belief in God was popular among biologists of a certain era, it does not follow that theological claims are strictly biological claims.

bined with teleological causation.²² I do not wish here to defend Nagel's view so much as to point out that teleological realism is compatible with evolutionary theory. Asserting that teleological realism about biology is incompatible with Darwinism does not make it so. Naturalistic teleological realism is certainly incompatible with a teleological nihilism distinctive of (certain brands) of metaphysical reductionism. If our knowledge of natural teleology is well-grounded enough then so much the worse for metaphysical reductionism.

There is another point to make. Williams despairs of finding human nature, including a human telos, because he thinks that modern biological science somehow demands such despair. Rosalind Hursthouse correctly points out that Williams' worry is not actually rooted in the progress of modern science. Williams himself admits that "many of course have come to that conclusion before... that human beings are to some degree a mess... for whom no form of life is likely to prove entirely satisfactory, either individually or socially."²³ If many have come to that (philosophical) conclusion before, without the benefit of modern science, why would we think modern science is definitive for this philosophical conclusion? If modern science provides additional warrant for rational despair that was unavailable to our ancestors, what exactly is that evidence? It is not enough to gesture. According to Hursthouse, Williams' worry is not an argument at all but an expression of moral nihilism. It may be a rational despair, but the rationality or irrationality cannot simply be read off the biological facts; it must be settled by philosophical argument. To amass scientific evidence for p and then to assert the philosophical conclusion that q is a non sequitur.

22. Nagel, *Mind and Cosmos*. Briefly, he suggests that while physical laws work impersonally on entities at a given time, teleological laws might work impersonally on the same entities over time.

23. Hursthouse, *On Virtue Ethics*, 261, quoting from Williams.

3.3 Only Biological Nature

A third iteration of the “no human nature” objection is that if there is such thing as “human nature”, it is nothing more or less than our biological and physiological makeup. Tim Lewens argues that “the only biologically respectable notion of human nature that remains is an extremely permissive one that names the reliable dispositions of the human species as a whole. This conception offers no ethical guidance...”²⁴

On Lewens’ view, the only talk about our “nature” that would be scientific would be an indeterminate series of complicated stories about our genetics, evolutionary history, and neurophysiology, perhaps even including cultural, geographical, and ecological settings. The problem, as we have seen, is that an empirical “scientific” conception of human nature has nothing to do with *ethics*. All of the complicated stories we could tell – if they are genuinely scientific – would be purely *descriptive*.²⁵

Bernard Williams expresses a similar point. He says that nature has bestowed upon us an “ill-sorted bricolage of powers and instincts”:

[the problem] lies not in the particular ways in which human beings may have evolved, but simply in the fact that they have evolved, and by natural selection... On that [evolutionary] view it must be the deepest desire – need? – purpose? – satisfaction? – of human beings to live in the way that is in this objective sense appropriate to them (the fact that modern words break up into these alternatives expresses the modern break-up of Aristotle’s view).

Williams objects that norms bestowed by the process of evolution would be those that lead us to survive and reproduce. Along similar lines, Fitzpatrick articulates a worry that evolution

24. Tim Lewens, “Human Nature: The Very Idea,” *Philosophy & Technology* 25, no. 4 (2012): 459–74.

25. This worry is developed in detail by Hursthouse (*On Virtue Ethics* Chapter 10) and Stephen Brown (*Moral Virtue and Nature* chapter 5) and Ward, “Against Natural Teleology and Its Application in Ethical Theory.. All three think that ethics is not ultimately scientific.

has bestowed upon us a very specific, ordered power but it is not the power to flourish but the power to reproduce. He says:

If, however, natural functions and ends in living things are structured by special relations established through the process of evolution through natural selection, i.e., non-incidental relations between traits and a special subset of their effects that figured into the selection process, then natural teleology will not ultimately or generally be about the welfare or flourishing of organisms.²⁶

On Fitzpatrick's worry, the fact that there might exist natural human norms to reproduce is irrelevant to whether or not willfully conforming to such norms would contribute to our welfare.

A third proponent of this worry is Stephen R. Brown. Brown's defense of virtue ethics is ambivalent. He seems to *wish* he could make the account genuinely normative but concedes that it is, in the end, merely descriptive discipline.²⁷ Even virtue ethics, after being appropriately "naturalized", does not *commend* the virtues so much as *detail* the traits which happen to be adaptive for creatures like us to survive and propagate our genotype.²⁸ Brown thinks that human beings do have a characteristic form of life involving highly rarefied neurological and cognitive processes we do not observe in other animals; but, nevertheless, he thinks that biology reveals that species are the only natural kinds, and species aim to survive and reproduce.

This objection is certainly relevant. Despite the varying details, what Lewens, Fitzpatrick, and Brown agree upon is that if such a thing as human nature or the human life form exists, and if such a thing as a natural teleological norm for humanity exists, then it is the norm to reproduce and propagate one's genotype.

26. FitzPatrick, "Morality and Evolutionary Biology." Cf. William Joseph FitzPatrick, *Teleology and the Norms of Nature* (Taylor & Francis, 2000).

27. R. Stephen Brown, *Moral Virtue and Nature: A Defense of Ethical Naturalism* (Continuum, 2008).

28. Stephen Brown, "Really Naturalizing Virtue," *Ethica* 4 (2005): 7–22.

3.4 Responses

Three comments are required to untangle this objection.

First, even granting that reproduction is the only natural end of non-human organisms, Lewens et. al., assume that human beings are *merely* animals. This can be queried. Above, I asked the innocuous question: ‘Are human beings natural organisms?’ There are really three possible answers: non-naturalist would answer ‘yes, humans are natural plus something more than natural’;²⁹ the non-reductive naturalist would answer ‘yes’; the reductive naturalist would answer ‘yes and nothing more’.

My view is that humans are *at least* natural organisms. Hence, my view can accommodate non-naturalism and non-reductive naturalism. The only position *incompatible* with mine is the crassly reductive one that asserts that human beings are not even practically rational. I can agree that human beings as a species are endowed by their history with a natural norm that leads them, absent countervailing factors, to reproduce. I simply deny that *that is all*. The only way these authors can sneak in the view that *that is all* is by begging the question in favor of a reductive view of humanity.

The reductive naturalist would insist that “human beings are natural”, meaning that humans are merely machines made of meat, “heaps of glorified clockwork.”³⁰ Smuggled into this assertion is an assumed picture of nature – the Laplacian picture – as a heap of glorified clockwork where all its myriad variegated objects are just parts of the heap. I have tried to argue above that even bacteria and plants give the lie to this picture. Furthermore, the irony is that if human beings were *merely* animals, and subject to *merely animal* natural

29. For example, a non-naturalist or religious philosopher could concede that humans are *partly* natural but would argue that human beings are exceptional in some way – in virtue of being endowed by God with the *Imago Dei*, or enjoying unique cognitive faculties such as practical reasoning. I am laying aside this possibility.

30. Steven Pinker, *The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature* (Penguin, 2003).

norms such as instinctual survival and reproduction, we could not *know* ourselves as such. Yet the objection Lewens et. al. are posing depends on knowing ourselves as both animals and as self-aware practical reasoners.

My view, by contrast, is based on the empirical observations that humans are the only primate to engage in recursive, grammatical speaking; to associate in such complex societies; to plan their actions; and to innovate and create. Those observations are enough to render it plain, I think, that our natural telos will not likely to be restricted to only the animal nature we share with the rest of the living world but is will include our distinctive capacities for rational reflection – including rational reflection about whether or not to reproduce.

Secondly, Lewens et. al. assume that the only natural end of organismic life is reproduction. But this can be queried as well. Certainly, living things sustain their own health and life and animals propagate their genes; living things *sustain* their life form and *transmit* their life form. But which is for the sake of which? Do organisms live in order to reproduce or reproduce in order to live? I do not see how one can assume this to be true without further argumentation. Empirically, we observe *both* that each species propagates its genotype *and* that each species lives its own particular form of life aiming at the development of its own good. My view is that reproduction is *one* of the natural ends of organic life, but that each species has other natural goods, such as health, survival, and the living of a characteristic life. Reproduction is a minimal good without which the other goods (which may or may not have anything to do with reproduction) could never come to be. Above, I defended two kinds of natural normativity: the mere existence of creatures bearing life forms as well as their teleological development into fully matured instantiations thereof. An embryonic mammal *is to become* a fully grown mammal. Hence, a human is a practical primate and a practical primate *is to become* a fully mature practical primate. In other words, one of the “norms” of practical rationality, we can venture, is that we *ought to be successfully practically rational*. Practical rational activity and success is part of what it means to be a health

human being living our characteristic sort of life.

Thirdly, I would try to accommodate the insights of Lewens et. al. by conceding that reproduction is *one* of our natural ends. However, we need not jump to the conclusion that it is the *only* natural end or the only fundamental natural end. “Human beings reproduce” is an instance of a broader natural generic truth we can articulate by saying: “organisms survive and reproduce.” Human reproduction as a generic pattern is compatible with exceptions: The celibate, the pre-pubescent, the single, the infertile couple, the homosexual couple, and others do not themselves reproduce. Nevertheless it may be true that humans reproduce (like every other organism). That *any particular individual* does not reproduce is not an automatic sign of defect. It seems to me that if, *as a species*, we ceased to reproduce, something would have gone wrong.³¹

Saying this requires making distinction between the individual member of the species and the species itself. Is the human norm to become virtuous merely species-specific and not specific to the individual? This surfaces other issues we cannot fully delve into here. Suffice it to say that virtues that are required for the health of the community or species are distinct from individual virtues. What is required for *every* practical primate is that we become fully mature reasoners and hence practically wise.

3.5 Knowing from Inside

There is one further objection that requires full treatment in a later chapter, but that deserves a mention here. The objection that human nature is *merely* animal and hence the human telos

31. The “Voluntary Human Extinction Movement” is an example of a group who find the reasons for reproduction *as a species* to be on balance outweighed by the reasons for ceasing to reproduce. Two comments: first, on first impression, VHEMT strikes most people as satire. It is a laughable movement. It is not necessarily mistaken, but it is certainly laughable. Secondly, VHEMT acknowledges the *prima facie* force of the need to reproduce. They argue that that need is outweighed. So in that they think species-wide reproduction is a default natural norm, we agree.

is *merely* survival and propagation of the genotype was supposed to tell against the organic teleology I have been defending. My response is that, in practical rational creatures like us, our biological norms are joined with other norms.

In one sense, these critics agree with me, because they think it is “obvious” that reproduction is not our *only* norm and so the merely “natural” or “biological” norm must be supplemented with the practical point of view – the point of view from within human subjectivity. Their worry is that once we introduce the practical point of view we are leaving biological naturalism behind. This is sometimes called “the Irrelevance Objection.” I offer a fuller response to the Irrelevance Objection in chapter 6.

3.6 Our Nature is Unknown

A final objection might come from someone who simply urged that human nature is mysterious. For all we can tell without the benefit of divine revelation, humanity is an anomaly. Our origin is shrouded in mystery, our destiny undecided.

I concede the point. My thesis is not that we already know everything about humanity that we ever will know or need to know. My thesis is that observing our nature as practical primates is a minimal starting point of knowledge upon which to build. Knowing that snakes are legless reptiles is not an end to scientific inquiry about them, but a beginning. Indeed, one cannot begin to learn more about ‘snakes’ unless one apprehends that ‘snakes’ exist and roughly what they are. So capturing the genus and differentia of a kind of organism is in fact necessary for creating a conceptual placeholder *on which to attach new knowledge*. Knowing what human beings are, however roughly, gives us a concept-category within which to fill in the depth and breadth of facts and information.

The main thesis of this chapter has been that the following generic is true: “human beings are practical, rational primates.” This generic, I have argued, is defensible both philosophically and scientifically. It is discoverable both by humans examining our species

from “within” the human point of view and by alien anthropologists examining our species from “outside” the human point of view (so long as they too were intelligent and rational). This generic picks out a property or set of properties we might describe as ‘human nature.’ If this is anywhere near to correct, then human nature is not a complete mystery. We know *enough* about it to build a neo-Aristotelian theory of ethics grounded in evaluations of human beings by reference to the human life form.

4. Natural Norms, Human Norms

If the argument has been successful thus far, then, the best evidence suggests that human beings are practical, rational primates. This generic captures a set of truths about the human life form and natural telos in the same manner as other respectable scientific statements, such as ‘the platypus is an egg-laying mammal’ and ‘the baby chick becomes a rooster.’ What is the ethical significance of this proposition? The remainder of the chapter fills out the details of the picture.

As natural organisms, humans pursue certain basic goods: food, water, rest, shelter, comfort, survival, reproduction. There is every reason to affirm the truth of generics such as “human beings eat food” or “human beings sleep daily.” We should hypothesize that deviation from these *prima facie* norms would be *prima facie* defective. And that turns out to be the case. Anorexia, starvation, insomnia, and so on are disorders. Importantly, such disorders would plausibly be recognizable by an alien anthropologist. Just as a scientist may evaluate a particular wolf by reference to its life form, an alien anthropologist could evaluate a particular human’s life and actions by reference to its life form. So much applies to both humans and other organisms.

Things get really interesting – and much more tricky – when we consider humans as reasoners. I have used the term ‘practical primate’ to encompass all the ways in which

human beings distinguish themselves by being scientists, moral agents, planners, creative writers, deliberators, speakers, political agents, and so on. As mammals, human beings pursue mammalian goods. As practical rational agents, human beings also pursue practical rational goods: wisdom, friendship, world travel, education, entertainment. These seem categorically different. Are they so different as to ruin the pattern of naturalistic evaluation?

Michael Thompson thinks not:

... will and practical reason are on the face of it just two more faculties or powers a living being may bear, on a level with the powers of sight and hearing and memory. The second crucial thought is that an individual instance of any of the latter powers – sight, hearing, memory – is intuitively to be judged as defective or sound, good or bad, well-working or ill-working, by reference to its bearer's life-form or kind or species.³²

Naturalistic evaluation of human beings on the basis of practical rational activities follows the same pattern as before. Every animal's nature or life form has genus and differentia. For human beings, our differentia is that we can engage in practical reasoning. Hence, our animality and our rationality both count. Being a primate entails that we are alive and share properties in common with all organic nature. Being a practical reasoning primate includes a set of capacities, including abstract thought but also more: speech, sociality, rational practice, and creativity. I also argued that the generic truth about humanity holds good in the face of important objections to the effect that we have no nature, or that our only nature is biological.

Some might object that the thesis, as it stands, is vague: do natural norms bind all individuals or only some? Does practical rationality free us from natural norms in certain cases? Thus far, I have argued that there is good reason to affirm a kind of *prima facie* natural normativity binding on anyone who belongs to our human species. I concede that I have not yet fully articulated what effect rationality has on our animal nature and rebutted

32. Thompson, *Life and Action*, 29.

the objection that it renders irrelevant all the *prima facie* natural norms arising from our animal or biological nature. Rendering this more clear is a task for the next two chapters on practical rationality.

Here, I shall only point out that even the objection cites our ability to practically reason about our life form and its attendant natural norms, which reinforces the thought that humans are obligated to practically reason *well*. The new natural criteria by which to judge the human organism include reference to the practical rationality of its life form. For example, consider generics such as these: “The human being acts upon reflection”; “the human being speaks a language”; “the human being lives in society”, and so on. These natural human norms are well on the way to being genuinely ethical. Deviations from them represent genuinely *human* defects. Folk morality recognizes something wrong with the jolly fool who willfully acts before deliberating, or the blowhard who willfully speaks without restraint, or a paranoid hermit who willfully avoids all human society. Naturalistic evaluation explains *what exactly* is wrong. Such persons are not living up to their own human life form.

Nothing I have said should be taken to suggest that conventional morality captures all the nuances and limits of morality. It is possible that persons of extreme practical wisdom are able to determine, correctly, when acting contrary to received social norms, or speaking without restraint, or living in solitude are the thing to do. For example, Larissa MacFarquhar details cases wherein donors offer kidneys to strangers and foster parents adopt dozens of children.³³ And it is possible that persons of extreme practical folly are able to convince themselves that the “rules do not apply” to them in their quest for political power and personal gain. Hitler and Stalin were all the worse for their possession of competence and certain conventional virtues, which they directed toward heinous ends. Thus far, my thesis has a more modest aim: to articulate what is true about the vast majority of

33. ??

humanity, bracketing extreme outliers.

There is a second ethical upshot. If acorns are (potential) oak trees, then it seems to follow that an acorn *is to become* an oak tree. I won't insist on using the word 'ought' (the acorn *ought to become* an oak) because 'ought' strongly suggests agency, which is absurd. But I do insist on the *natural normativity* of that statement. The individual acorn that fails to become an oak *never* fully realized its nature. Likewise, if human beings are practical rational primates then it follows that human beings *are to become practical rational primates*. This normative generic proposition is rooted in the thought that humans *are* practical rational primates. But it goes further to suggest a teleological end: we are to become fully what we already are.

If becoming fully mature or fully actualized practical rational primates requires the actualization not only of our animal nature (through growth, maturity, reproduction) but our rational potential (through intellectual growth and knowledge, and practical wisdom that sublimates all of one's emotions and bodily desires and physical settings into a good life). In other words: Humans are to become practical, rational animals.

I should clarify that I do not intend to suggest that there is something inherently morally praiseworthy about the acquisition of factual knowledge, understood in terms of institutional education or advanced degrees. There is nothing inherently morally defective about a person or culture who lives in, for example, in ignorance of advanced knowledge about biology, chemistry, astronomy, and mathematics. Rather, every person from every walk of life at every stage of life stands in need of *practical wisdom*. One of the recursive aims of practical reasoning is to determine just how far and in what areas one needs to advance one's knowledge: a lawyer who does not spend years studying case history would be just as unwise as a farmer who does do so. Both would benefit from reflection on more universal human tasks such as making and maintaining friendships, dispatching familial and social commitments, and so on.

If our nature is to be practical, rational primates, then we have some general notion of our natural “function.” I shall not go in for the Aristotelian view that the natural work (Greek: *ergon*) of human beings is contemplative science, an activity by reference to which success and failure may be judged. Rather, I shall be more ecumenical: the telos of every life form is, at the very least, to do all the activities that constitute its mature flourishing. So we should predict quite generally that the human telos is to become *fully mature* practical, rational primates. The conceptions of human nature (as practical reasoning animals) must be defined in relation to virtue (the excellences of rational practice and practical reason) and to human nature as it could be, our natural telos (to be excellent and mature practical, rational primates).

The third ethical upshot has to do with excellence. Suppose that the excellence of species X is a quality that both constitutes being an X and enables an individual to realize X-hood. Having a bill or being able to swim is both constitutive of being a penguin and also enables the young penguin to develop into maturity and realize its nature. Now apply that same pattern of evaluation to a human being. What are the excellences that are both intrinsic goods-of-a-kind for creatures like us and also instrumental to realizing our natural telos? The answer is: the virtues.

Virtues enable one to be a practical, rational primate, but they are more than instrumentally valuable. Virtues on my account will turn out to be *constitutive* of humanity in the sense that having them is both a path to realizing one’s life form and also part of the definition of expressing that life form. It may seem to odd to categorize essential properties of humanity as morally praiseworthy traits. But the point is essential to my case. Virtues are not just “morally praiseworthy” qualities; they are *the human* qualities. Virtues are examples of *humanness* in its exemplary form.

I grant that the notion that virtues are “the human” qualities is a reversal on the all-too-common mistake that “human” qualities are neutral with respect to moral praise or

blame. The reason for this reversal is, as I tried to argue above, that all life forms discovered by scientific investigation and articulated in generic propositions are inherently normative. Hence, the concept of human nature cannot and should not be value-neutral. Rather, as Micah Lott points out, the concept of human nature:

...must embody a normatively significant understanding of human life and action. For any conception of human form is a natural-historical account of 'how the human lives.' As with 'the tiger' or 'the mayfly,' a natural-history of 'the human' provides an interpretation of the characteristic and non-defective life-cycle of the species.³⁴

Virtues on my account will turn out to be qualities that enable one to fully become a primate (and animal and organism more generally): as mortal creatures and animals, our biological life consists of a process of maturation, nutrition, rest, exercise, homeostatic maturity, reproduction, characteristic activities, aging, and death. Many human goods enable this process, from oxygen, food, sleep, and so on. Virtues may not be material things but are likely to relate to such material and emotional parts of a normal human life.

Human virtues would also be those qualities that enable one to perform characteristically rational activities such as speaking, socializing, thoughtful acting, and creating. By nature, we are inherently self-aware language-users who grow up and live in a language-community with a history and tradition, and who are curious to know what is true about ourselves and our world. We are also extravagantly innovative, creating myriad tools, forms of art, and other products for our use and enjoyment. We are inherently conscious and self-conscious beings who speak, interpret, and create in the context of a linguistic community such as a family, society, and culture. And as *practical* rational animals, we are inherently goal-oriented and self-determining beings who are to some degree able to acquire new traits or lose them, able to achieve our natural ends or fail to achieve them, able to become aware of the "givenness" of our biology and work with or against it, and are able to treat an entire

34. Lott, "Moral Virtue as Knowledge of Human Form," 770–1.

biological life not only as an event but as a project. Although we are pushed about by our biological instincts and by social pressures, we do not *simply* stumble around through life; at times we also act on *reasons*. That is, we deliberate about future actions, and reflect on past actions, and become puzzled about what is called for in the present. The success of our actions is not guaranteed, and the reasonableness of our justifications is not guaranteed. Rather, we muddle through on the best evidence we have.

The criteria of a definition of virtue, then, is that the excellences intrinsic to our life form are those traits that practical rational primates per se *need* to be what they are and to live life in such a way as to become what they can potentially become. Prima facie, a basic set of virtuous traits such as courage, moderation, and practical wisdom are incumbent upon every member of the species. There is room, even so, for further reflection and specification of virtues needed – more here, less there – by individuals belonging to varying social roles and in various stages of life. I shall attempt to provide a bit more specification in the following chapters.

Just as important as specifying the basic set of virtues that constitute natural goodness is identifying the basic set of vices that constitute natural defects. *Natural badness* would be include all those traits that practical rational primates as such *need to avoid*. Vices would be those acquirable traits over which one has some measure of control, rather than just any natural evil such as hunger, exposure to predators or extreme temperatures, disease, accidental injury, and premature death. Non-moral natural evils such as these do indeed tend to frustrate one's development toward the natural end of being a fully mature practical reasoner and hence each one partly constitutes species-specific misery. We should expect that moral vices (such as cruelty) at least partially contribute to other natural evils (such as premature death). But we ought not confuse the two. Even a virtue such as commendable generosity with ones resources might lead to hunger, and commendable courage might lead one to premature death. However, the acquisition of a vice is the voluntary infliction of a

natural, moral evil upon oneself and, potential, on others as well.

5. Conclusion

This chapter has argued that human beings are practical, rational animals. I addressed and responded to several objections, and tried to bridge the connection between the descriptive/normative generic that sets the standard for our life form, and also show how specific ethical obligations fall out of that normative foundation: there is a *prima facie* obligation to eat or sleep and keep oneself alive, or to become fully practically rational over time.

And, as I shall argue more fully in the next chapter, I sketched how the specific qualities of excellence for practical rational primates are moral and intellectual virtues, including moderation and immoderation, justice and injustice, practical wisdom and foolishness, and so on.

The hypothesis is that virtues are a specific type of quality belonging to creatures like us. Virtues are the human specific goods-of-a-kind. The virtues constitute a set of normative constraints on what one can/should be and can/should become arising from one's nature as a practical primate. The acquisition, then, of virtues both causes and constitutes the actualization of our life form as practical rational primates. Truly exemplifying our life form constitutes our species-specific flourishing. Virtues are commonly supposed to be "excellences" of human beings. Relative to what is such a quality excellent? The answer can only be that virtues are excellences relative to our nature or life form. They are the traits or qualities that enable us to actualize our life form, to fully express in a life what we are by nature. If what we are by nature is practical, rational primates, then virtues (we can further predict) will be traits pertaining to practical reason and animality.

Chapter 4

Virtue and Vice

Human nature is normative, such that to be morally good is to fulfill one's nature.

—Christopher Toner, “Sorts of Naturalism”, 221.

1. Introduction: Virtue as the Human Norm

My thesis in this chapter is a normative one: virtues for practical rational primates are excellent rational practices and practical reasoning – while irrational practices and practical irrationality are natural vices.

The previous chapter laid out the criteria a naturalistic account of virtue would have to satisfy. Just as excellent specimens of any natural organism reflect an inherent natural normativity, excellent human beings would reflect an inherent “human” normativity that arises from our nature as practical, rational primates. Human norms must be *animal* since we are primates but human norms cannot be *merely* animal since we are practical primates with a peculiar form of life. My goal here is to explain how the normative virtue theories of Foot, McDowell, and MacIntyre partially satisfy these criteria.¹ I state and discuss each

1. I derive their views from a variety of sources. Foot's concept of virtue and practi-

writer's stance on virtue and reason to show how it is possible to evaluate the kind of life someone lives by comparing that with the normatively human. I then criticize their views and offer my own synthesis.

In section 2, I draw from Foot, McDowell, and MacIntyre to show that virtues have (at least) eight properties in common: namely, they are almost always beneficial for their possessor; they are beneficial to all of the species (not just their possessor) and so break down the assumed divide between altruistic or other-regarding virtues and egoistic or self-regarding virtues; virtues constitute excellent human *functioning*; they are especially beneficial in that they are corrective of tempting vices; virtues are not just any positive traits such as those given by luck, nor are they necessarily even *acquired* at all – rather, virtues are *acquirable*; some virtues are excellences of “rational practicing”; others are excellences of practical reasoning about one's whole life; finally, virtues are excellences of “social reasoning” in that they enable the health and progress of societies and traditions.

In section 3, I shall compare and synthesize these accounts into a new and coherent account that satisfies the criteria of ethical naturalism already articulated. My aim is to endorse a single, unified view according to which virtues are excellences of rational practice and practical reasoning, while vices are constituted by irrational practices and defective practical reasoning.

In section 4, I address a few objections that challenge my account or that demand further clarification.

cal reason I derive not only from *Natural Goodness* but from her “Virtues and Vices” essay. For MacIntyre, I draw from *After Virtue*, where he builds his three stage account of virtue (relating to practice, then life, then tradition) from a careful study of the history of the concept within the broader western tradition. But I also draw from *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry*, and *Dependent Rational Animals*. McDowell's writings on virtue and reason span several essays and books, such as *Mind, Value and Reality*. I especially draw from “Virtue and Reason” and “Values as Secondary Qualities.”

2. Virtue and Vice

Foot, MacIntyre, and McDowell each offer detailed accounts of virtue and its relation to reason and nature. For example, Philippa Foot argues that virtues are the acquirable, beneficial, corrective excellences of practical reason.² Alasdair MacIntyre argues that virtues are “acquired human qualities” that enable the virtuous person to succeed in individual practices, in life, and in traditions.³ MacIntyre’s robust concepts of virtue and practical reason overlap nicely with Foot’s. John McDowell argues that virtue is a kind of perceptual sensitivity to what is required to live well.⁴

McDowell’s theses are that: (1) “The point of engaging in ethical reflection... lies in the interest of the question ‘How should one live?’” (2) Virtues are kinds of knowledge and *virtue* is a kind of knowledge; and (3) The question of how to live must be approached from “within” a moral outlook and approached “*via* the notion of a virtuous person.”⁵

My goal in this section is to articulate a fairly comprehensive treatment of virtue, drawn what these three three writers agree on, but sensitive to what they disagree on. I first state eight points about virtue and the virtues that bring these ethical concepts into clear light.

2. Her exact words are that virtue is excellence of “the rational will.” After expanding the concept of ‘will’ beyond its typical meaning to include intentions, it is clear her ‘rational will’ is identical to my ‘practical rationality.’ I want to avoid the word will because it might be a narrowly western way of viewing the capacity for practical reasoning. David Bradshaw distinguishes the cluster of concepts such as heart, mind, and will, and shows that Aristotle and others did not have a concept of a distinct, sub-rational faculty for choosing. Cf. David Bradshaw, “The Mind and the Heart in the Christian East and West,” *Faith and Philosophy* 26, no. 5 (2009): 576–98.

3. Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 191.

4. John McDowell, “Virtue and Reason,” *The Monist* 62, no. 3 (1979): 331.

5. *Ibid.*, 331.

2.1 Virtues Benefit; Vices Harm

The first point about virtue is that virtues are beneficial to their possessor. Hursthouse calls this “Plato’s requirement” on the virtues: “The concept of a virtue is the concept of something that makes its possessor good: a virtuous person is a morally good, excellent or admirable person who acts and feels well, rightly, as she should. These are commonly accepted truisms.”⁶ While virtues may come with a cost, there is something counterintuitive about the notion that X is a virtue that could, in the end, ultimately be a detriment its possessor.

As we have seen, this requirement fits Foot’s account of natural normativity. As some traits make a ‘good oak’ or a ‘good wolf,’ a good person exemplifies those good-making traits shared by all exemplary members of a natural species. Virtues are good-of-a-kind for creatures like us, namely, practical rational primates.

MacIntyre agrees. For MacIntyre, virtues are acquired *human* qualities. Presumably, the point of specifying that virtues are *human* qualities here is to contrast human excellence with analogous formal or functional biological features that enable non-human animals to survive and thrive (e.g., the flexible flagellum of a bacterium, the swiftness of a deer. For MacIntyre’s initial formulation here, such biological features are excluded from the class of virtues by definition; his later *Dependent Rational Animals* retracts the assumed divide between human and non-human animals.

Virtues enable their possessor to achieve particular *goods*. This clause assumes that virtues are beneficial. For MacIntyre, a virtuous trait *cannot* be directed at achieving ills. Assuming that virtues cannot go bad will bring some trouble for MacIntyre’s initial definition in *After Virtue*. As we saw with Foot, it seems quite possible that people who have particular virtues can be, overall, wicked. Can’t the thief be courageous, the dictator mag-

6. Rosalind Hursthouse, “Virtue Ethics,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 2013.

nanimous, the glutton affable? MacIntyre indexes virtues to the *goods* internal to practices, but can't practices themselves be wicked? We might say this is the problem of *when virtues go bad*.

There are two possible responses to this problem. The first response is to allow that virtues can go bad under certain conditions; and so individual virtues although *usually* or *typically* operating toward good ends *can* be corrupted in the absence of a higher-order executive virtue that coordinates virtues toward their proper ends and recognizes if and when a particular virtue has limits. That executive virtue is taken to be practical wisdom. An example of this second response is John McDowell's "Virtue and Reason." The problem of *virtues going bad* does not arise for McDowell, since he builds *practical wisdom* into his definition of virtue; virtues benefit their possessor since they enable one (by definition) to live a good life.

The second response is to stipulate that virtues are always good, such that if a particular action or trait turns out to be bad, then it must not be a virtuous action or trait. The danger of this response is that it seems like a No True Scotsman fallacy. Nevertheless, the beneficialness of virtue *does* seem to be part of the definition of 'virtue.' And to assume that *no traits* are always good would be to beg the question in favor of moral nihilism or relativism. Hence, it seems to me safe to insist on the minimal stipulation: almost all virtues almost always benefit their possessor. Any theory of virtue according to which virtues turn out to harm their possessor *overall* is simply ruled out by this hypothesis. This hedge allows me to concede the intuitive objection that some virtues (honesty) might be corruptible by the presence of overwhelming vices (such as cruelty) or that individual virtues (such as courage) may be *costly* and so cause their possessor pain or discomfort – many a just politician has passed up personal wealth by refusing bribes. However, this minimal stipulation leaves room for me to defend that some virtues (such as practical wisdom) are *always* operative to good ends and that all virtues, if they are truly virtues, are *typically* beneficial.

2.2 Beneficial to Humankind

Plato's requirement is that virtues benefit their possessor. I have allowed that they may cause their possessor to lose out on money, fame, or comfort. A natural follow-up question is whether virtues benefit others or only their possessor. Are virtuous persons beneficial to society or only to themselves? For some virtues, the answer is more clearly *both*. Virtues, by hypothesis, are beneficial to humans as a kind, not just this or that individual. Who is benefited more?

The answer is difficult to state systematically. This difficulty does not cause trouble for the account. By hypothesis, virtues are beneficial to *human beings*. One can approach the thesis that virtues are beneficial to human beings qua human from two angles. Consider moderation with respect alcohol. Such moderation benefits one's family, one's community and so on. The ravages of alcoholism on marriages, children, and extended families are widely known. So it would seem to be altruistic not to over-drink. Nevertheless, moderation with alcohol also benefits oneself. Indeed, parsing up the benefit seems foolhardy. (Who benefits more, your children or your liver?)

For virtues such as justice or charity, the answer might be less clear, but the lack of clarity does not damage the account. Foot says, "It is a reasonable opinion that on the whole a man is better off for being charitable and just, but this is not to say that circumstances may not arise in which he will have to sacrifice everything for charity or justice."⁷ Even so, she finds the alleged paradox between what we might wish to call "selfish" and "altruistic" virtues overblown.

Certainly, sometimes life presents us with the opportunity to pursue only one of two contradicting or apparently irreconcilable goods; my own good *versus* your good. Sometimes, however, the cases in which virtuous deeds necessitate the loss of other goods are

7. Philippa Foot, *Virtues and Vices: And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy* (Oxford University Press, 2002), 3.

not so devastating as they might appear. It might be that, on occasion, it is better (say) for my family that I sacrifice my health in working hard to earn higher wages; while on other occasions it is better for my family that I sacrifice higher wages to keep myself healthy. Even when there is a clear, irresolvable tension between my good and the good of the group (as when, say, I must sacrifice my life), we can make sense of the demand of morality by appealing to what is necessary *for humans* in general. As Geach says: “Men need virtues as bees need stings. An individual bee may perish from stinging, all the same bees need stings; an individual man may perish by being brave or justice, but all the same, men need courage and justice.”⁸ Geach further points out that the clear contrast between my “inclinations” (e.g., to self preservation) is largely an artifact of philosophical thinking; many people are *inclined* both to preserve themselves *and* to obey the moral law.

Some critics have posed an objection to the effect that virtues are what Kant would call “hypothetical imperatives” – that we only need virtue *if* we want to be happy. On the contrary, the acquisition of virtue is a formal necessity for all members of the human race. As the gestating bee needs to develop its sting in order even to be what it is, we need virtues *to be human*. If this is right, then everyone has an obligation to develop virtuous traits such as being moderate, tolerant, and wise. Consider only practical wisdom for the moment: the obligation to become practically wise stems not from the agent’s prior commitment to happiness but simply from one’s finding oneself to be a human, and hence subject to a particular form of practical life which, as it turns out, is perfected or realized by practical wisdom.

A somewhat different critic might accept the analogy between human virtues and bee stings but point out that, in fact, some bees *don’t* need stings. For example, considering the common honey bee, only females, including the queen, have stings; male drones do not. By the same analogy, could there be humans that don’t need some virtues? This objection

8. Peter Geach, *The Virtues* (Cambridge University Press, 1977), 17.

brings out an important distinction between ‘the human’ qua a biological species bearing a common life form and humans qua members of society playing various social roles. I cannot fully explore the distinction here. Suffice it to say that the existence of various social roles with accompanying, role-specific virtues is compatible with virtues accompanying a universally distributed life form. As Foot argues: “Human beings do not get on well without [virtues]. Nobody can get on well if he lacks courage, and does not have some measure of temperance and wisdom, while communities where justice and charity are lacking are apt to be wretched places to live, as Russia was under the Stalinist terror.”⁹ Notice the generic form of her statements: “humans” do not get on well. This is compatible with saying that courage is *especially* necessary for a soldier or a firefighter. Even so, plumbers, parents, and professors need a basic level of human courage. And, again, practical wisdom is needed by all who are physically and mentally capable of acquiring it.

Another critic might accept all this and ask: if people *need* the virtues, and if even “altruistic” or other-regarding virtues benefit their possessor, is it then egoistic and “selfish” to pursue virtue? Not at all. Acquiring one’s own virtue is no more selfish than eating one’s own food and getting one’s own sleep. The pursuit of virtue is beneficial to the self, but not selfish in the pejorative sense that usually implies neglect of proper sensitivity to the needs of others. Furthermore, the charge of egoism assumes that in every case what is *good for me* is ipso facto *bad for someone else*. We need not assume this. It may be established, upon reflection, that in some cases what might be good for me turns out to be bad for someone else, or for humanity in general, but this must be established case by case. For it may turn out that what is good for humanity in general is ipso facto good for me as a human. Take an example: I would argue that various simple pleasures of life arising from cooking and eating good food, or strolling through natural beauty, chatting with an old friend, are on balance good parts of life. But they are not *the only* goods. If they were the only goods,

9. Foot, *Virtues and Vices*, 2–3.

one might go in for those pleasures and those pleasures alone. One might construct one's whole life around them. But having moderation is a good as well. So a person who enjoys both the moderate pleasures of life and the moderation of pleasure and pain is both a better fellow and better person.

In this connection, we should recall the brief argument above that virtues are intrinsic goods. They are not just traits that *lead to good consequences* for organisms like us (that too). The recent revival of virtue consequentialism defines virtues as instrumental goods useful because they secure other, intrinsic goods.¹⁰ Rather, virtues are themselves good for us. Alasdair MacIntyre is careful to distinguish between intrinsic and instrumental goods; he says that virtues “enable their possessor to achieve ... goods” of practices, which might sound as if he means virtues are mere *instruments* to goods. but they are not *merely* instrumental. They are both instrumental (to the achievement of certain goods) and also *partly constitutive of those goods*. I end up agreeing with Hurka's later view that virtues have “recursive” value; they are both good as means to (other) intrinsically good ends, and also have some intrinsic goodness in themselves.¹¹

To use a well-worn example, is fairly uncontroversial that friendship is a good for practically rational, social animals. Suppose that one's *having friends* depends, in part, on one's *being friendly*. What does it mean to ‘be friendly’? Being affable is not enough; one must have some of the traits that make one a good friend: e.g., being a good listener, showing genuine concern for others, rejoicing when a friend's life is going well, empathizing when it is not. Such traits are not commendable *merely* because they happen to help one to have friends. Rather, they are commendable because such traits, in part, make one a good human being. It so happens that, when two people have such traits, they will be good friends to each other. Good humans make good friends. And it is better, on balance, to have those

10. Thomas Hurka, *Virtue, Vice, and Value* (Oxford University Press, 2003).

11. *Ibid.*, chap. 1.

traits whether or not friends are forthcoming. Fortune may place one in a lonely setting: military posts, solitary jobs, and so on. But as Judith Thomson says, a virtue is a trait such that, “whatever else is true of those among whom we live, it is better if they have it.”¹² Likewise, Philippa Foot says: “let us say then, leaving unsolved problems behind us, that virtues are in general beneficial characteristics, and indeed ones that a human being needs to have, for his own sake and that of his fellows.”¹³

While we cannot pretend to have settled the notorious tensions between altruism and egoism, we must move on in the pursuit of a definition of virtue.

2.3 Excellent Functioning

The third point about virtue is that virtues cause and partly constitute the excellent functioning of a human being. What is ‘excellence’? The concept of excellence is relative to an object’s nature and function. The common example is that the function of a knife is to cut, so an excellent knife *cuts well*. More complex beings have more complex functions and therefore a more complex kind of excellence. An excellent guard dog is one that barks loudly, is hostile to strangers, but remains gentle with friends, and so on. Artifacts receive their function by design, but even a natural entity such as a dog receives an artificial function (guarding) by design. It is tempting to jump to the conclusion that *all* functions are artificial objects of human invention. On this view, natural organisms (trees, dogs, humans) have no *inherent* function, and no function at all unless one is imposed upon it by an agent from the outside.

As I have argued, however, natural organisms have natural functions, namely to develop fully into what they are. Even without knowing the full details of its origin, we can empirically discover the telos of an organism by observing it grow in proper conditions,

12. Judith Jarvis Thomson, “The Right and the Good,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 94, no. 6 (1997): 273–98.

13. Foot, *Virtues and Vices*, 4.

and discerning between exemplary and non-exemplary members of the kind. That is, we can learn that an acorn is a *Quercus alba* (white oak) only by observing and reflecting upon its development from embryonic stages to maturity, and by observing the characteristic activities exhibited by mature, typical members of the species.

A natural inference to draw would be that human beings have a “function”, however complex, and that a detailed knowledge of this function is necessary for defining human excellence. I do not think it is necessary to know in great detail our function. We can hypothesize a quite general function in accord with the pattern above. The function of a practical rational primate is, at least, to become a fully mature practical rational primate.

Just as we cannot define a priori how tall redwoods grow or the lifespan of a red-toothed shrew, we should not expect that we could define, a priori, how wise a human specimen can become. Instead, we should preserve a healthy agnosticism that is open to new possibilities. Wisdom, like knowledge, is expansive; how many languages can one person learn? 10 – 25 – 100? How widespread can competence with the basics of quantum physics become? Similarly, how much practical wisdom can one person acquire in a lifetime? How much practical wisdom can a society accumulate in a hundred generations? It seems to me that these questions admit of no obvious, in principle limits.

That said, we have an easier time spotting weak and sickly specimens of a species. In plants, a well-trained botanist can diagnose *something wrong* with even an unfamiliar species via tell-tale signs such as spots, colors, and sickly shapes. Similarly, a competent adult can diagnose *something wrong* with a hopelessly addicted drug-user whose habit is ruining his or her life, or with an incorrigible fool whose life is tragically cut short by his or her own recklessness.

What details can we expect to find? When we find fully mature rational animals, we are likely to observe that they do not just sit around “being human” all day; they perform “characteristic action” typical of the species, whatever that turns out to be. Aristotle

famously concluded that the human function was discernible: the theoretical or speculative activity of the intellect was that characteristic action. I only insist that we do not need to specify at the outset what activities are characteristic actions of practical rational primates; we can keep the notion indeterminate: our characteristic actions will involve practical reasoning and rational acting.

2.4 Corrective

The fourth point in our account of virtue is that virtues are corrective – that is, virtues become urgent in life at the same moment as common, tempting, human evils. As Foot says, each virtue stands “at a point at which there is some temptation to be resisted or deficiency of motivation to be made good.”¹⁴

It might seem odd that “evil” could be tempting. But examples are all too easy to supply. Obesity and malnutrition or starvation are both bad for human beings. The obvious difference is that malnutrition is usually involuntary while obesity is usually voluntary – few people (though some) starve themselves but many people (though not all) gain weight by electing to eat too much when the high calorie foods are available. Habitually going in for overeating is an example of immoderation. Immoderation with respect to eating is bad for oneself. So at the point where the temptation to embrace the bad comes in, the possibility of virtue comes in as well.

Foot’s discussion of Kant on this point is instructive here. She paradoxically objects to a statement of Kant that *only* “actions done out of a sense of duty” have moral worth and at the same time agrees with Aristotle that “virtues are about what is difficult for men.” How can we make sense of this paradox?

Consider Kant’s problem of the happy philanthropist. This problem is the troubling and dissonant conclusion that if a very generous philanthropist gets great pleasure out of

14. Ibid., 8.

helping others then such actions display no moral worth. Surely a commonsense moral judgment would accord moral worth to the very fact that the philanthropist *enjoys* doing what is good. The philanthropist doesn't grit his teeth and do good. Gritting one's teeth and doing good is what Aristotle would call mere *continence*; the virtuous philanthropist enjoys the activity in accord with virtue. Ease or fluency in performing virtuous activity is baked in to the definition of the virtuous person.

Kant's error, according to Foot, is in failing to distinguish that which is "in accord" with virtue from that which is *virtuous* full stop. It may be, for example, that a novice tennis player makes an expert shot while remaining merely a novice. The hit is "in accord" with excellence but is not, in this case, an instance of excellence – only beginner's luck. In her self-love example, Foot points out that there is no virtue required to eat one's breakfast and avoid life-threatening danger, but there may sometimes be cases where self-love is a duty – even a difficult, painful duty. She says, "sometimes it is what is owed to others that should keep a man from destroying himself, and then he may act out of a sense of duty."¹⁵ So the solution to the happy philanthropist problem is that if he really does have such a character as to be delighted helping others, he is morally praiseworthy *because he has worked to achieve that character*. As Foot says:

For charity is, as we said, a virtue of attachment as well as action, and the sympathy that makes it easier to act with charity is part of the virtue. The man who acts charitably out of a sense of duty is not to be undervalued, but it is the other who most shows virtue and therefore to the other that most moral worth is attributed.¹⁶

Since charity is a "virtue of attachment" (I should say "affection"), the feelings of the philanthropist count in favor of proving the presence of a virtue.

Commonsense would judge that a philanthropist who persists in virtue even when he does not enjoy giving is also praiseworthy. Foot explains this too. She allows that it

15. Ibid., 13.

16. Ibid., 14.

may take greater virtue for a man to *persist* in his philanthropy *even when* it brings him no delight.

Only a detail of Kant's presentation of the case of the dutiful philanthropist tells on the other side. For what he actually said was that this man felt no sympathy and took no pleasure in the good of others because 'his mind was clouded by some sorrow of his own', and this is the kind of circumstance that increases the virtue that is needed if a man is to act well.¹⁷

For someone who has acquired a kind of immunity to some kinds of temptation is through sustained effort and in many small victories is, ipso facto, especially admirable. Virtues are indeed corrective of tempting vices and tempting moral errors. However, the presence of temptation is not a necessary condition for the presence of a virtue.

2.5 Two Objections Thus Far

Before stating the next part of my account of virtue, I must pause to address two objections to what we have said so far. The first worry is that defining virtue as "beneficial" or "positive" by definition is circular and therefore empty. Suppose we define "boldness" as *doing hard things* and "courage" as doing hard things when it is good. Boldness is, so to speak, value neutral. One can be bold in wrongdoing or bold in doing well. If courage is just boldness in doing good, then affirmation that 'courage (doing hard things when it is good) is good' would appear to amount to the trivial revelation that 'good things are good.' And most (if not all) tautologies are trivial.

This is an important objection, but it misses the point. These ethical propositions are not tautologous but are so widely and commonly accepted as to be easily mistaken for tautologies. If we define "kindness" simply as "a disposition of treating others *in a good way*" then it appears that "it is good to be kind" amounts to the same tautologous proposition "it is good to be good." But kindness is *not* best defined simply as *something good*.

17. Ibid., 14.

Instead, we must realize that some ethical propositions are synthetic, yet so widely believed and so widely affirmed that they appear to be tautologous. Some philosophers argue that this widespread, near universal belief is a sign that these propositions are self-evidently true. For instance, Russ Shafer-Landau says:

It seems to me self-evident that, other things equal, it is wrong to take pleasure in another's pain, to taunt and threaten the vulnerable, to prosecute and punish those known to be innocent...¹⁸

We can furnish more examples: It is good to be kind; and cruelty is bad. Pleasure is a good. Wise people make good leaders. Pursue good and avoid evil. Another way of putting what is perhaps the same point is to call these propositions "quasi-analytic":

Indeed, many fundamental scientific laws (as well as some scientific truisms) and many fundamental moral principles have the property which we might call quasi-analyticity (see, e.g., Putnam 1962). Because of their conceptual and methodological centrality, even when we know that their justification is a posteriori rather than a priori, we find it extremely difficult to envision circumstances under which they would be disconfirmed. For as long as they occupy so central a conceptual and methodological role, they are immune from empirical revision, and principles incompatible with them are ineligible for empirical confirmation (let's call them quasi-analytically ineligible). As Putnam indicates, quasi-analyticity and quasi-analytic ineligibility can be altered only by pretty serious conceptual and theoretical "revolutions," whose directions are all but impossible to anticipate prior to the innovations or crises which precipitate them. The principle that torturing children is wicked and the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics are both candidates for quasi-analyticity.¹⁹

These ethical propositions do not seem to be tautologies. Call these non-tautologous but basic ethical propositions Platitudes. "It is polite to say please" is a Platitude. Some Platitudes are small, others great. For example, "treat others as you would wish to be treated" is a Great

18. Russ Shafer-Landau, *Moral Realism: A Defence*, 4 (Oxford University Press, 2003), chap. 11.

19. Richard Boyd, "Finite Beings, Finite Goods: The Semantics, Metaphysics and Ethics of Naturalist Consequentialism," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 66, no. 3 (2003): 520.

Platitude. The core principles of “common morality” that have achieved an astonishingly wide consensus in bioethical discussions are good examples of Great Platitudes.²⁰

The Great Platitudes are basic, common, and hardly disputable. But that does not mean they are tautologous. Peter Geach argues that just because an ethical conclusion is virtually un-revisable doesn’t mean it is content-less.²¹ Great Platitudes are rather hard-won insights. It is only by reflection that it can be known that humans have a nature, a species-specific kind of flourishing, and that some character traits are conducive to the realization of our life form while others are conducive to its stultification.

A second worry that needs addressing is this: Can virtue enable the more efficient achievement of ignoble aims? On the one hand, examples are easy to furnish: a prude might display moderation; a thief might display courage. It seems commonsensical that whatever attributes we designate as ‘courageous’ can be found in agents pursuing bad ends. On the other hand, the Aristotelian line excludes such a possibility by definition. Jonathan Sanford’s recent monograph, *Before Virtue*, argues that Aristotle’s doctrine is “ethics insists it is impossible to exercise any virtue, with the exception of technical skill, wrongly.”²² Foot attempts to do justice to both these concerns. The analogy is to poisons or solvents:

It is quite natural to say on occasion ‘P does not act as a poison here’ though P is a poison and it is P that is acting here. Similarly courage is not operating as a virtue when the murderer turns his courage, which is a virtue, to bad ends. Not surprisingly the resistance that some of us registered was not to the expression ‘the courage of the murderer’ or to the assertion that what he did ‘took courage’ but rather to the description of that action as an act of courage or a courageous act. It is not that the action could not be so described, but that the fact that courage does not here have its characteristic operation is a reason for finding the description strange.²³

20. Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, *Principles of Biomedical Ethics* (Oxford University Press, 2001).

21. Geach, *The Virtues*, Chapter 1.

22. Jonathan Sanford, *Before Virtue: Assessing Contemporary Virtue Ethics* (The Catholic University of American Press, 2015), 163.

23. Foot, *Virtues and Vices*, 16.

An agent's commission of an otherwise virtuous action may be a mistake *for that agent* at that time. This may seem ad hoc, but we must remember that Foot is attempting to make space for the "commonsense" observation that some good traits operate to bad ends *within* the philosophically rigorous definition of virtue as beneficial.

One objection Foot responds to is the worry some might have that she is saying *only* those who are completely virtuous are virtuous at all. She has two responses. The first response is that there is one virtue, at least, that always operates as a virtue, namely, wisdom. While it might make some sense to speak of "foolish courage" (recklessness) or "foolish moderation" (prudishness) it makes no sense to speak of "foolish wisdom." Knowledge may and does contribute to wicked actions, but wisdom (by definition) entails a proper application of knowledge. Since wisdom always operates as a virtue, we admire wisdom perhaps most of all. As we shall see in John McDowell's discussion of the virtuous person's perceptual capacities, it might be that when we admire a person's courage or moderation, we are often admiring the wisdom *in* the courage and the wisdom *in* the moderation.

A second response to the worry that one must be completely virtuous to be virtuous at all is that we do admire virtues when they all appear in a remarkably virtuous person and when only one or two appear in a partially virtuous person. Foot says:

There are some people who do possess all these virtues and who are loved and admired by all the world, as Pope John XXIII was loved and admired. Yet the fact is that many of us look up to some people whose chaotic lives contain rather little of wisdom or temperance, rather than to some others who possess these virtues. And while it may be that this is just romantic nonsense I suspect that it is not.²⁴

Foot believes that even those whose overall life is a mishmash of virtues and vices are admirable. My interpretation of this sentiment is that such are admirable insofar as they demonstrate some excellent qualities.

24. Ibid., 17.

This objection is a formidable one. I do not think these brief comments are sufficient to fully quell the worry. However, as I shall return to the overriding importance of practical wisdom in a later chapter, I shall continue with the remaining points in my account of virtue.

2.6 Acquirable

The fifth attribute of virtues is that they are acquirable. *How* virtue is to be acquired is an age-old theme.²⁵ Even without stating *how* virtues are acquired, it is still essential to see that they must be *acquirable*.

There are two misunderstandings on this issue we must resolve. The first is to mistake *any* positive or beneficial trait as a moral virtue. Even supposing that a virtue is natural excellence for practical primates, are traits such as physical strength, keen eyesight, and a reliable memory virtues? Is a contractor who excels at hammering 16d nails into wooden frames to be admired for his *virtue*? Is the quarterback who can make accurate throws under pressure virtuous? Homer's list of virtues included such items. Homeric virtues included beauty, skill in war, and other socially valuable traits. As MacIntyre says, "The word *arete*, which later comes to be translated as 'virtue', is in the Homeric poems used for excellence of any kind; a fast runner displays the arete of his feet (*Iliad* 20. 411) and a son excels his father in every kind of arete-as athlete, as soldier and in mind (*Iliad* 15. 642)."²⁶ Even if we grant that such traits are goods-of-a-kind (and they seem open to dispute), they do not seem to us particularly *moral*.²⁷

25. In the first line of Plato's *Meno*, Meno asks Socrates a question "whether virtue is acquired by teaching or by practice; or if neither by teaching nor practice, then whether it comes to man by nature, or in what other way?", John Cooper, *Complete Works of Plato* (Hackett, 1997), *Meno* 70a. While Plato gives hints as to his answer, Socrates himself punts on the question of how virtue is acquired and directs Meno to what virtue is. Moral philosophers have continued to try to answer this question for the last 2,400 years. That said, my goal here is not to address *how* virtue is acquired. My only goal here is to argue that a trait must be *acquirable* to be a virtue.

26. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 122.

27. Julia Annas's argument that virtues are skills of a particular type takes advan-

I think categorizing strength and good memory as virtues is a mistake, but it is an understandable mistake. Virtues are *in principle* acquirable, and hence distinct from traits that might be inborn, even if such traits are beneficial for practical primates.

One cause of this understandable mistake is an ambiguity in the term ‘moral virtue.’ Foot cautions about terminological misunderstanding: *ἀρετή* for the Greeks refers “also to arts, and even to excellences of the speculative intellect whose domain is theory rather than practice”²⁸. We should like to distinguish beauty, raw talent, strength, and other excellences that are only under our control in that we can voluntarily lose or destroy them from virtues which are under our control, either partially or completely, in that we must attain them by sustained intentional effort. Furthermore, even their list of “moral virtues” (*arete ethikai* or *virtues morales*) do not correspond precisely to *our* “moral virtues.” The traditional list of cardinal “moral virtues” (including courage, moderation, practical wisdom, and justice) includes positive traits we might classify as “self-regarding” (e.g., moderation) as well as “other-regarding” (e.g., justice), and includes practical wisdom (*phronesis/prudentia*) which, if we mentioned it at all, we would be inclined to classify as an intellectual virtue. Finally, not all of the items on a comprehensive list of positive qualities (e.g., unselfishness) obviously correspond to one of the classical virtues. So, we ought not to assume that the terms ‘excellence’ or even ‘moral excellence’ can be a short-cut for understanding the concept of virtue.

So how can we pick out moral excellence from other expressions of human excellence? At first glance, the answer seems to be something about practical reasoning. Foot thinks virtues are revealed not only by a person’s abilities but by his or her *intentions*. What are intentions? She argues that the ‘will’ or practical reason must be understood in its broad-

tage of the intuitive similarity between virtue and skill. Cf. Julia Annas, *Intelligent Virtue* (Oxford University Press, 2011).

28. Foot, *Virtues and Vices*, 2; Cf. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy.”

est sense, “to cover what is wished for as well as what is sought.”²⁹ Intentions are not the *only* thing we judge, for we do not judge a person to be virtuous even if they are a well-intentioned nincompoop who always harms when “helping”. Neither do we only judge the result of a person’s action, for we sometimes exculpate a failing performance in part because the person *meant well* – the exculpation might be called for when circumstances were not favorable, chances of success were low, etc.

Instead, a virtuous action is one that aims at the right thing in the right way, and flows out of a person’s acquired character. Foot attempts to capture the point that we admire someone who not only does the right thing but who has conditioned himself to do the right thing fluently and almost instantly. She quotes from John Hersey’s novel *A Single Pebble* in which the narrator relates watching a man save a boy from drowning:

It was the head tracker’s marvelous swift response that captured my admiration at first, his split second solicitousness when he heard a cry of pain, his finding in mid-air, as it were, the only way to save the injured boy. But there was more to it than that. His action, which could not have been mulled over in his mind, showed a deep, instinctive love of life, a compassion, an optimism, which made me feel very good.

Foot’s comment is this:

What this suggests is that a man’s virtue may be judged by his innermost desires as well as by his intentions; and this fits with our idea that a virtue such as generosity lies as much in someone’s attitudes as in his actions. Pleasure in the good fortune of others is, one thinks, the sign of a generous spirit; and small reactions of pleasure and displeasure are often the surest signs of a man’s moral disposition.³⁰

I find this analysis convincing. The outward behavior (the swift response) discloses not only the savior’s intentions and attitudes, but something even deeper; settled dispositions that can be betrayed in the smallest facial expressions or the most “instinctive” gut reactions.

29. Foot, *Virtues and Vices*, 5.

30. *Ibid.*, 5.

To capture a similar point in a slightly different way, consider Hursthouse's argument that virtuous dispositions are "multi-track" dispositions. She says:

A virtue such as honesty or generosity is not just a tendency to do what is honest or generous, nor is it to be helpfully specified as a "desirable" or "morally valuable" character trait. It is, indeed a character trait – that is, a disposition which is well entrenched in its possessor, something that, as we say "goes all the way down", unlike a habit such as being a tea-drinker – but the disposition in question, far from being a single track disposition to do honest actions, or even honest actions for certain reasons, is multi-track. It is concerned with many other actions as well, with emotions and emotional reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, interests, expectations and sensibilities. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset. (Hence the extreme recklessness of attributing a virtue on the basis of a single action.)³¹

There is a clear similarity, I think, between Hursthouse's notion of a multi-track disposition and McDowell's notion of perceptual sensitivity. To be sensitive to a range of requirements for action involves one's emotions, beliefs, habits, and so on. Virtue is the excellence of rational practice and practical reasoning. Practical reasoning is the process of acquiring new traits one does not have but potentially can have (or of shedding old traits one has but can potentially lose).

2.7 Acquirable to Whom?

A second misunderstanding in defining virtues as acquirable pertains to the scope of possibility. The point of the above reflections was to argue that virtues are *in principle* acquirable by creatures like us. It is not necessarily the case that every person can acquire every virtue. For example, dump dwelling untouchables in India do not enjoy access to enough food to make immoderation a real danger and hence lack the conditions necessary for acquiring self-control with food and drink.

31. Hursthouse, *On Virtue Ethics*.

MacIntyre, for his part, also argues that virtues are *acquired* human qualities. (I would only modify this definition to “acquirable”, because not everyone has all the virtues and some people never acquire some virtues.) He does argue, with Aristotle, that virtues are “natural” for humans. More exactly, Aristotle taught that virtue is *in accordance with* nature but not *by nature*. That is, virtues are not *natural* in the sense that natural attributes such as hair color are ‘automatic’ but they are natural in the sense that they are *proper* to human beings, they are formal features of practical, rational animals. Virtuous traits are a “normal” psychological outgrowth of cultivating excellence within particular human practices.

There is more to be said about this point. I shall return to it in an objection below. For now, I must complete the account of virtue.

2.8 Rational practice

My definition of virtue alluded to *rational practice* as well as *practical reasoning*. The remainder of the account focuses on the concept of “practice” and to practical reasoning. The sixth point about virtue is that virtues enable excellence in rational practices. To defend this claim, I shall first summarize MacIntyre’s notion of “practice.” Not only is this term of art an interesting concept in its own right, it is crucial to MacIntyre’s account in *After Virtue*.

What is a practice, for MacIntyre? A practice is a social activity aimed at defined ends. For example, MacIntyre mentions farming, chess, and political activity, among other examples. (We commonly speak of “practicing” medicine in this sense.) A practice is not merely a reflexive action such as scratching an itch, nor merely a single, discrete, intelligible action such as pulling a weed. It is, rather, an intelligible set of actions undertaken in pursuit of a pre-determined end. Practices not only have pre-determined ends, but embodied histories. Leading MacIntyre scholar, Christopher Lutz, highlights four aspects of MacIntyre’s famous definition of practice. A practice is:

[1] a complex social activity that [2] enables participants to gain goods internal to the practice. [3] Participants achieve excellence in practices by gaining the internal goods. When participants achieve excellence, [4] the social understandings of excellence in the practice, of the goods of the practice, and of the possibility of achieving excellence in the practice are systematically extended.³²

We could use any number of illustrations of practices to unpack these four aspects. I shall use a practice in which I have personal experience: secondary school education. The practice of educating young people a complex social activity, aimed at certain goods, with a particular history and standards of excellence. A secondary school teacher is engaged in a series of activities aimed at giving children a body of knowledge and skills they need to become functional adults in society, whether by getting a job, starting a business, or advancing to higher stages of education. Secondary education might have other *de facto* purposes as well. Many parents send their children to school to socialize them in a community of peers and authorities, or to afford them opportunities for recreation, art, clubs, or simply to get a break from parenting. For the sake of simplicity, I shall focus on what seems to me the primary goal of education, which is education (in knowledge) and training (in skills) needed for becoming a functional, legal adult.

Secondary education in the U.S. is a practice with a history (or a set of histories) from the present time back to when for an American to complete high school (rather than to begin farm work by the age of 16) was the exception rather than the rule. It has standards, both legal standards and “best practices” passed from mentor to student teacher. It pretty obviously has standards of excellence according to which most educators are average, some poor, and some excellent. An educator who wants to join that profession will be enculturated with that history, taught those standards, and given a chance (usually by trial and error) to become a good teacher.

32. Christopher Lutz, “Alasdair MacIntyre” (Web; Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2015).

Lutz' first condition is met, since [1] teaching is an inherently complex *social* activity, in that teachers cannot be teachers without students, and (usually) do not teach in isolation but in community with colleagues and administrators and parents. [2] Secondary education qua practice enables teachers to gain the goods "internal to the practice", namely students who are educated enough to be ready for legal adulthood – for a job or college. [3] Good teachers are those that demonstrate the ability reliably to produce educated students, sometimes in the face of incredible obstacles. And [4] good schools and good teachers usually have a *history* and social context that is being "extended" across generations. Good schools recruit and train good teachers, good teachers train the next generation of good teachers, and so on.

One other feature of MacIntyre's concept of practice deserves comment. He defined virtues with reference to goods "*internal to*" practices, and later refashions the contrast between 'internal' and 'external' goods into one between 'goods of excellence' and 'goods of effectiveness.'³³ What is the point of this distinction?

The "goods of excellence" of a practice are those that *necessarily* contribute to success within a given practice. In secondary education, success is defined by, say, graduation rates, retention of information, high test scores, acceptance to good colleges, low drug use, and so on. The profession-specific virtues needed include understanding (to stay patient with struggling students), affability (to keep rapport), articulateness (to present material effectively), and so on. More general virtues needed include honesty, integrity, courage, faithfulness, and so on. Without these, *teaching* may be possible but *teaching well* is impossible.

By contrast, goods of effectiveness are those that might fit with the practice but are not *necessary* for achieving the end of that practice: high pay, an excellent teacher lounge, a

33. Alasdair MacIntyre, *Macintyre Reader*, ed. Kelvin Knight (University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 55.

short commute to work, and so on. Mere efficiency in attaining such external goods does not entail the presence of a virtue. In fact, the desire to pursue such goods *instead of* the goods of excellence is not a neutral desire — it is a *temptation*. Virtues are needed to overcome those temptations and to succeed according to the standards of the practice itself.³⁴

2.9 Practical Reasoning Through Life

McDowell argued that *all* of virtue is by definition a kind of practical knowledge or disposition. I would suggest that this is a mistake. I agree that *some* virtues are excellences in practical reasoning but others are excellences in rational practice. (I offer a full critique of McDowell's conception of moral and practical reasoning in a later chapter.) Nevertheless, the two cannot be conceptually divided. Practical reasoning is not a simple process different from other kinds of reasoning or practice; it is the whole complex process by which we undertake to direct our own lives.

My seventh point about virtue is that some virtues are excellences of practical reasoning that enable one to live a good life. The presence of a sufficient number of virtues results in a good life. Hursthouse points out that we do not just admire those who survive, but those who exemplify a *human* form of life: "The human virtues make their possessor good qua human being, one who is as ordinarily well fitted as a human being can be in not merely physical respects to live well, to flourish — in a characteristically human way."³⁵

Turning again to *After Virtue*, MacIntyre's first stage defined virtue in relation to practices. His second stage goes further to include the whole of life.³⁶ He says that "without an overriding conception of the telos of a whole human life, conceived as a unity, our

34. To illustrate the temptation goods of effectiveness might pose, we need only think about political activity. Some (I suppose) become politicians *in order to bring about* the survival, security, and prosperity of the *polis*; others engage in order merely to satisfy their own ambition or achieve fame. Often we see American politicians running for office only one apparent aim: book sales.

35. Hursthouse, *On Virtue Ethics*, 208.

36. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, chap. 15.

conception of certain individual virtues has to remain partial and incomplete.”³⁷ MacIntyre undermines the notion that the virtues which enable success in practices can be sufficient for an account of virtue in general. He argues that we need to “envisage each human life as a whole, as a unity, whose character provides the virtues with an adequate telos.”³⁸

Envisaging human life in this way faces serious obstacles. Answering them requires doing a bit of philosophy of action. The two kinds of obstacles MacIntyre cites are (a) social and (b) philosophical. The social obstacle is the fragmentation of modern life: “work is divided from leisure, private life from public, the corporate from the personal. So both childhood and old age have been wrenched away from the rest of human life and made over into distinct realms.”³⁹ Just as the temporal segments of life are fragmented into bits (one thinks of the inherently patronizing talk of “senior citizens” compared from the older, inherently reverent talk of “elders”), so also the various projects and pursuits of life are partitioned, labeled, and cordoned off. On this fragmented view of life, the self’s social roles are so many conventions masking the “true” underlying nature of the self. This presents a puzzle: how could virtues arise to the level of excellent dispositions for *humans as such*? They would have to be dispositions applicable in personal, private, business, spheres, in young and middle and old age, etc.

The philosophical obstacle is the tendency to atomize “complex actions... in terms of simple components.”⁴⁰ MacIntyre’s argument here is highly significant. He begins by analyzing the way we might answer a simple question such as: “what is he doing?”

One and the same segment of human behavior may be correctly characterized in a number of different ways. To the question ‘What is he doing?’ the answers may with equal truth and appropriateness be ‘Digging’, ‘Gardening’, ‘Taking exercise’, ‘Preparing for winter’ or ‘Pleasing his wife.’⁴¹

37. Ibid., 202.

38. Ibid., 204.

39. Ibid., 204.

40. Ibid., 204.

41. Ibid., 206.

The first fact to notice is that each of these answers picks out different aspects of the agent's action: intentions, intended consequences, unintended consequences, etc. And, importantly, each of these answers places the simple atomic action within a narrative history: situated in an "annual cycle of domestic activity", in a hobby, in a marriage, and so on – each with its own history and "setting."

The second fact to notice is that the answers to a similarly simple question "Why is he writing a sentence?" might be situated in different time horizons: immediately, he is writing to finish his book; but also he is contributing to a philosophical debate; but also he is trying to get tenure.⁴² The upshot of these reflections is that individual actions abstracted from their context are only intelligible if they are "ordered both causally and temporally... the correct identification of the agent's beliefs will be an essential constituent of this task."⁴³ MacIntyre's astonishing conclusion from these innocuous premises is this: "there is no such thing as 'behavior', to be identified prior to and independently of intentions, beliefs and settings... Narrative history of a certain kind turns out to be the basic and essential genre for the characterization of human actions."⁴⁴ MacIntyre scholar Stanley Hauerwas argues that the central point in *After Virtue* is "the concept of an intelligible action is a more fundamental concept than that of an action."⁴⁵ This is such a significant insight because it shows how individual actions, like individual words, are intelligible in the context of larger discrete units of action, such as practices and projects. And, in some sense, the actions one performs within a practice find their intelligibility not only in practices but in the narrative of a whole human life. The same is true for verbal contributions to a conversation: Each word and sentence and speech within the conversation contributes to an unfolding narrative with a history and a telos, without which statements are random and unintelligible. MacIntyre

42. Ibid., 207.

43. Ibid., 208.

44. Ibid., 208.

45. Stanley Hauerwas, "The Virtues of Alasdair MacIntyre," *First Things*, (2007). Web. The quotation is from citing MacIntyre, *After Virtue* 209.

continues:

But if this is true of conversations, it is true also *mutatis mutandis* of battles, chess games, courtships, philosophy seminars, families at the dinner table, businessmen negotiating contracts- that is, of human transactions in general. For conversation, understood widely enough, is the form of human transactions in general. Conversational behavior is not a special sort or aspect of human behavior, even though the forms of language-using and of human life are such that the deeds of others speak for them as much as do their words. For that is possible only because they are the deeds of those who have words.⁴⁶

Clearly these are weighty matters. Though more could be said, we have arrived at a the supports needed for building the second stage of his account of virtue: the unity of many practices into a single whole. He says: “The unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest.”⁴⁷

Naturally, to be on a quest is to strive for a goal, even if one fails to reach the goal. The goal, he says, is to quest for “*the* good” (as one understands it at the beginning of the quest). But the conception of *the* good can grow or morph along the way. How do the virtues relate to this quest?

The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions which will not only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices. but which will also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good by enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we encounter, and which will furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good. The catalog of the virtues will therefore include the virtues required to sustain the kind of households and the kind of political communities in which men and women can seek for the good together and the virtues necessary for philosophical enquiry about the character of the good.⁴⁸

The virtuous person is sustained by his or her virtues on the quest toward the good. Vices

46. Ibid., 211.

47. Ibid., 219.

48. Ibid., 220.

not only render difficult or impossible the achievement of the good; vices can obscure one's assessment of what is good and what is evil.

I can concede that the "quest" of a Stalin or a bin Ladin began with good intentions. It is even important to note that the wicked tyrant cannot achieve the most horrifying evils could not come about without the presence of auxiliary virtues, such as courage and resolve. Just as a den of thieves cannot survive without at least some honor, a wicked regime cannot survive without at least some loyalty and patriotism. Socrates says that the same foolishness and vice that is laughable in the weak is dreadful in the powerful. The more thoroughly vicious characters cause less damage because their evil remains petty.

2.10 Social Reasoning

Virtues are personal but not individualistic; virtues are inherently human and humanity is inherently social. This is just what we should expect if, as I argued in chapter 3, the practical rationality that characterizes the human primate is defined in part by sociality: humans are born into families and learn to speak the language of their society.

The eighth and final point about virtue is that virtues enable the health and progress of whole social traditions. MacIntyre captures the point in the crucial third stage of his account, which situates what has come before in a broader social and historical context. For MacIntyre, a tradition is, roughly, a "historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition."⁴⁹ I have argued that practical rationality is the differentia of human nature. Insofar as virtues all depend for their effective operation on the coordinating management of practical reason, it is of utmost importance that an individual learn how to practically reason well. This happens, or fails to happen, in traditions.

Human beings develop their capacity to recognize practical reasons within a fam-

49. Ibid., 222.

ily and society with its own idiosyncratic political, religious, and philosophical worldview. So, quite plausibly, our initial de facto set of beliefs, desires, and dispositions reflect the substantive commitments of our group. As MacIntyre says:

We, whoever we are, can only begin enquiry from the vantage point afforded by our relationship to some specific social and intellectual past through which we have affiliated ourselves to some particular tradition of enquiry, extending the history of that enquiry into the present ...”⁵⁰

The tradition of enquiry we inhabit gives us not only abstract standards of reasoning but also facts, connections, concepts, and the very language we speak. Rationality, for MacIntyre, is inclusive of all the resources by which we judge true and false. Rationality itself as tradition-constituted and tradition-constituting. The resources I receive from my tradition are resources I may prune, discard, modify, or add to. What tradition we are a part of makes a great deal of difference to how we conduct moral inquiry.

We can make initial sense of the notion that virtues enable the health and progress of traditions by saying that vices weigh down a whole tradition and virtues correct and potentially elevate it. MacIntyre says:

Lack of justice, lack of truthfulness, lack of courage, lack of the relevant intellectual virtues – these corrupt traditions, just as they do those institutions and practices which derive their life from the traditions of which they are the contemporary embodiments.⁵¹

That's said, even if we accept, in outline, the thesis that virtues sustain and even correct traditions, the problem of relativism rises. What counts as virtuous is at least partially related to one's culture, for every culture purports to provide for its members some minimal goods. The correct identification of these goods requires practical wisdom. In *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, MacIntyre explicitly retracts his earlier belief that virtues exist

50. MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, 401.

51. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 223.

without a unity under prudence or practical wisdom.⁵² Christopher Lutz argues that the consequences of this retraction are crucial to refuting the charge of relativism. If virtues are unified, then even though virtues exist only in the context of practices, “no genuine practice can be inherently evil.”⁵³ Rather, we can make practical rational mistakes in judging *apparent goods* as genuine goods. The qualities needed for achieving the spurious goods internal to that “practice” would not be virtues but only *apparent virtues*.

Eugenics provides a persuasive illustration. Eugenics certainly seems to bear the markings of a genuine practice. Its apparent good is the purification of the gene pool for future generations. However, genuine virtues militate *against* the achievement of that goal. For example, Lutz cites a story of a doctor who had the virtue of compassion found himself unable to pursue the program of euthanizing mentally-disabled children.⁵⁴ We might also recall Huck Finn’s internal struggle with his “conscience” in Twain’s *Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*. Huck decides to turn Jim in to the slave owners. He writes a letter outing Jim, and says: “I felt good and all washed clean of sin for the first time I had ever felt so in my life, and I knowed I could pray now.” Yet for all that, after vividly confronting Jim’s humanity and goodness, he feels the loyalty of their friendship and wavers:

It was a difficult situation. I picked up the letter, and held it in my hand. I was trembling, because I knew had to make a choice between two things, and the outcome of my decision would last forever. I thought about it a minute while I held my breath. And then I said to myself: “All right, then, I’ll GO to hell”—and tore it up.⁵⁵

The humor of this passage stems from the tension between the *apparent good* of treating Jim as legal property and the *actual good* of treating Jim as an end in himself, as a free man

52. MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* preface, p. x.

53. Christopher Lutz, *Tradition in the Ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre* (Lexington Books, 2004), 102.

54. Léon Poliakov, *Harvest of Hate: The Nazi Program for the Destruction of the Jews of Europe* (Schocken Books, 1979), 186–7.

55. Mark Twain, *Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* (Lathifa, 2014), Chapter 31.

just like any other. Huck's virtue (in this case, loyalty or friendship) *cannot* be put to use in the service of a corrupting practice like slave-trading. Just as vice subverts institutions and their worthy practices, virtue "subverts" vicious institutions and unworthy practices. Virtue marks the difference between the coward who disobeys his commanding officer's orders because the obedience would put him at risk of painful death and the courageous person who disobeys his commanding officer's order because obedience would require wrongdoing. Without prudence to discriminate between the two cases, we lack any resources by which to discriminate courage and cowardice, between a virtuous resistance and vicious resistance.

Still, the threat of cultural relativism is not fully absolved by arguing that individual virtues and subvert the errors in a tradition. What if one's tradition is deeply flawed? What if one's tradition is fundamentally mistaken that its vices and errors undermine the possibility that individual virtues can get a foothold?

2.11 Traditional Reasoning

This question requires more reflection on the notion of practical reasoning. In the next chapter, I offer a full account. Here, I must dispense with one common view that I believe is mistaken. That common view sets up an opposition between tradition and rational, critical reflection. On this view, one is either a conventionalist or a subversive. (Define a subversive as one who goes against (a particular society's) standard, traditional, ideology – the "default" view.) The danger of militating against one's tradition is that the default view is plausible to most people, excluding a minority who maintain objections to the consensus of the tradition. On this opposition between tradition and critical reflection, philosophers are often stereotyped as the subversive type. Philosophers are not necessarily all subversives; but many subversives have been philosophers. Nevertheless, I think this whole way of considering the matter is a mistake.

The first reason is that a tradition is not opposed to rational or critical reflection –

rather a member of a tradition cannot reason without the resources of that tradition. When we criticize our own tradition from within, we use what good we enjoy to increase the good. Secondly, it is idle to speak being “for tradition” or “against tradition”, for tradition says contradictory things. Social Group Alpha passes along belief A from generation to generation. If A is false, then rational reflection will turn a philosopher into an anti-traditional subversive; but if successful, the philosopher might persuade Group Alpha to believe B instead, and culturally unify with Social Group Beta. In this case, B will be passed along from one generation to the next. So the very same philosopher will become a traditionalist. These labels are about as helpful as asserting that one is a “newspaperist” who believes whatever is written “in the newspaper.” The question is, *which one*? Traditions, like newspapers, are a medium, not a message. The only thing to do, then, is to examine the message — the content of the tradition.

Still, how is it possible that virtues can sustain what is good in tradition and enable the successful pruning and improving of the same? MacIntyre’s answer is that we can rationally adjudicate between traditions (from within a tradition). We can rationally criticize our own tradition with the resources available to us. The result may be that we endorse the truth of the fundamentals thereof, or “switch” from our primary tradition to a rival.

The means we have of “switching” traditions are these: first, one undergoes an epistemological crisis in which one identifies the inadequacies of a primary tradition. MacIntyre derived this lesson from his own experience. As a member of the modern tradition of inquiry, he reflected on it. He gradually discovered its inadequacies and searched for resources from his rivals. His attempt to trace the root of the mistake about moral judgments led him to a mistake at the heart of Enlightenment modernity. As a social, political, and moral project, the Enlightenment has been, MacIntyre argues, a failure by its own standards. Not only is moral discourse largely devoted to moral disagreement, but it is largely soaked in despair of ever reaching agreement. Moral discourse with its interminable moral disagree-

ment retains the rhetorical *trappings* of rationality and objectivity while denying rationality and objectivity. Neither side wants to give up the *appearance* of having a dialectical case for its value theory.

One of his most memorable and oft-cited images compares modern moral discourse to the hypothetical state of scientific discourse in a post-apocalyptic catastrophe where decaying fragments of intelligible moral discourse survive, none of which (in isolation) suffices for the rebuilding of the original, vital discourse.

There are many modern philosophers who have gone into similar crises and become distrustful thought, language, and rationality itself; they join the “masters of suspicion.” The term comes, I believe, from Ricoeur, who said: “Three masters, seemingly mutually exclusive, dominate the school of suspicion: Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud.”⁵⁶ Rather than join the school of suspicion, MacIntyre took a surprising course. Moved by Thomas Kuhn’s influential work on the structure of revolution between various paradigms in the natural sciences⁵⁷ he speculated that a similar structure might obtain in moral revolutions?⁵⁸

After recognizing the failures of one’s own tradition, MacIntyre points to a second step: to “exercise... a capacity for philosophical imagination”⁵⁹ and identify the resources of a rival tradition. We must empathetically engage with our rivals as if we are learning a “second first language.” He says:

For each of us, therefore, the question now is: To what issues does that particular history bring us in contemporary debate? What resources does our particular tradition afford in this situation? Can we by means of those

56. Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy*, trans. D. Savage (Yale University Press, 1970).

57. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (University of Chicago Press, 1975).

58. His 1977 essay on epistemological crises was his own version of Kuhn’s *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* – we might call this essay MacIntyre’s “Structure of Ethical Revolutions.” Cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, “Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of Science,” *The Monist*, 1977, 453–72

59. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*.

resources understand the achievements and successes, and the failures and sterilities, of rival traditions more adequately than their own adherents can? More adequately by our own standards? More adequately also by theirs?⁶⁰

This step of learning a second tradition as a “second first language” in turn lead MacIntyre to recover the tradition of virtues. But virtues are not free-floating moral concepts; they are embedded in a specific, living, moral tradition – the Aristotelian tradition. And the Aristotelian tradition includes a particular notion of practical rationality.

MacIntyre argues that we should “return” to the Aristotelian tradition of virtue and practical reason because it is more adequate than its rivals. We must beware one misunderstanding. Any talk of “returning” is liable to sound nostalgic. Martha Nussbaum misunderstands MacIntyre’s argument along these lines.⁶¹ In her review of *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, she cites with an age-old dilemma between the social stability afforded by tradition and critical reflection:

In the second book of the *Politics*, Aristotle asks whether it is a good thing to encourage changes in society. Should people be offered rewards for inventing some change in the traditional laws? No, he writes, because this would lead to instability and unnecessary tampering with what is working well. Should we, on the other hand, listen to those who wish to keep ancestral traditions fixed and immune from criticism? No again – for if we reason well we can make progress in lawmaking, just as we do in other arts and sciences.⁶²

Aristotle’s solution is that it should be *hard but not impossible* to change societal structures. Strangely, Nussbaum takes MacIntyre to be reversing Aristotle’s balance. She thinks MacIntyre is emphasizing social stability at the cost of “recoiling from reason”. But MacIntyre is emphatically not defending “traditionalism” per se. His definition of tradition is *progressive*. Tradition is an ongoing, socially-embedded argument over time, which necessarily

60. MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, 402.

61. Martha Nussbaum, “Recoiling from Reason,” *The New York Review of Books* 36, no. 19 (1989): 36–41.

62. *Ibid.*

entails that moral enquiry is dynamic – even *modern*. To be traditional is not to be past-oriented; to be traditional is to be staunchly future-oriented, since the business of life is not only the pursuit of our telos but the transmission of everything valuable and precious to the next generation.

MacIntyre elevates the ability to critical reflect on one's own tradition and make necessary changes to the level of a virtue, the importance of which "is perhaps most obvious when it is least present." What is that virtue?

[It is] the virtue of having an adequate sense of the traditions to which one belongs or which confront one. This virtue is not to be confused with any form of conservative antiquarianism; I am not praising those who choose the conventional conservative role of *laudator temporis acti*. It is rather the case that an adequate sense of tradition manifests itself in a grasp of those future possibilities which the past has made available to the present. Living traditions, just because they continue a not-yet-completed narrative, confront a future whose determinate and determinable character, so far as it possesses any, derives from the past.⁶³

None of this so far has gone to answer the question: what if one's tradition is wrong? How could I, a member of an embodied tradition, ever get far enough "outside" it to criticize it? This question is notoriously difficult. The explanation for the difficulty, if not the solution, is this: We can only think *about* rationality *with* rationality. We can only reflection upon our thinking process by observing rationality *from outside* from *within* rationality. The matter is so complicated because any argument is self-referential or iterative. When two parties share an identical conception of rationality, then arduous debate is unnecessary; when two parties do not share identical conceptions, arduous debate about a particular issue is liable to shipwreck on the rocks of metaphilosophical disagreement. As the Greek proverb asks, "if we choke on food, we drink water to wash it down. If water chokes us, what shall we drink?"

63. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 223.

There can be no quick, ready-made answer to the question of how to acquire practical wisdom. Answering it is inextricably bound up in the slow and dangerous process of acquiring the virtue of practical wisdom. We must be alert to the contours of our own tradition and bold in considering its weaknesses and failures. We must also exercise philosophical imagination in learning the contours of rival traditions. Success is not impossible, but neither is it guaranteed. The only hope is to practically reason, and take care to do it well. I shall return to the theme of practical reasoning in the next chapter.

3. Summary and Objections

The first stage of my account of virtue has been to endorse eight basic truths about virtue, and flag some issues to which we must return. Now, I must synthesize what has been said and respond to a few objections.

Thus far, a virtue have come to light as an excellent trait belonging to a fully mature and exemplary practical, rational primate. Such a person does not necessarily enjoy all the blessings of good fortune, but he or she does take up all that is given in one's fate and put it to the best possible use. He or she avoids the common and tempting traps one faces along the way of a normal human life, taking up all the intrinsic and natural urges of animality (hunger, thirst, the sexual drive, desires for shelter, comfort, and companionship) into practices that make sense. He or she works to acquire those traits that benefit human beings, both oneself and others, and that enable him or her to engage in such practices as make sense for human beings. He or she also satisfies the requirements of the community, as far as possible pro-actively cultivating virtues in others when appropriate but without unduly short circuiting their own practical reasoning.

The definition of "making sense" is admittedly variable according a person or tradition's conception of practical reason. And the notorious difficulty of adjudicating conflict-

ing conceptions has been briefly noted. While I do not pretend to have offered a resolution of that difficulty, I have offered two responses: first, an explanation of why it is difficult; and second, a formula from MacIntyre that might promise to help a practical reasoner resolve it by carefully working out a comparison between one's own conception (with its resources and flaws) and a rival conception (with *its* resources and flaws).

Virtuous people's lives are remarkable not for what they are given: any celebrity or cad might be born wealthy or physically attractive or talented. Virtuous people's lives are remarkable for what they do with what they are given.

Insofar as one cannot but sleep sometimes, the question of whether or not to sleep at all is not an ethical question. It is simply not in my control. Insofar as one can either stay or go, pursue or avoid, harm or help, such decisions are ethical decisions and the question of how to live is an ethical question. One must decide which larger, longer-term projects to pursue and which objects are worthwhile to obtain; and one must, along the way of these long-term pursuits, decide rather extemporaneously how to react to the vicissitudes of circumstance. Each of us must decide how to react to the "slings and arrows of outrageous fortune."⁶⁴

While we may admire "winners" of the natural lottery for their extraordinary talent or beauty, we admire more the person who uses the attributes they were given well, who makes an investment of them that pays dividends. Compare, for example, the crowds cheering for Olympic runner Derek Redmond when he is winning the gold medal with the crowds cheering for Derek Redmond finishing last after his hamstring tore and his father helped him to cross the finish line. There have been many gold medal winning races that millions of people have witnessed and forgotten. But this race, when an otherwise naturally talented and well-trained athlete finished *last* that remains forever etched in the memory of millions more. It's not just the unbridled emotion Redmond displayed in that moment

64. *Hamlet* III.1

which so touches viewers; it's the obvious love from his father shown in supporting his son's commitment to finish the race, even dead last.

The same principle applies to the various aspects of being a practical, rational animal we can mention. Aristotle taught that "affability" was a virtue. Some of us might chuckle to imagine that naturally sanguine people are somehow *morally* better than their melancholic counterparts. Surely something so little under one's control is not a basis for evaluation?

Aristotle is not completely wrong that sociable traits (which can to some extent be cultivated) are beneficial. But we must remember that the "moral" virtues are not, for Aristotle, obedience to categorical imperatives or divine commands but simply ways of developing one's emotions into the likeness of a true human being. Consider two person's who willfully cultivate two quite different social attitudes: one is cold, unfeeling, humorless, or self-absorbed, while the other is warm-hearted, empathetic, cheerful, and outwardly-focused. Social interactions are an optional part of most human lives. Hence, insofar as such attitudes might but under one's control rather than the result of natural lottery, we do judge (and we do seem *rightly* to judge) that the second set of attitudes are more optimal. Not everyone needs to be entertaining or well-connected, but basic skills in relating well to other persons in family and social situations are generically good. Like Derek Redmond, someone who is naturally disposed to be solidarity, melancholic, cynical, bitter, or otherwise negative is all the more admirable when he or she becomes and remains affable against the odds.

My account endorses certain fundamental moral and intellectual virtues as obligatory on all adequately mature and functional human adults – those given emphasis by the Aristotelian tradition, such as courage, justice, moderation or self-control, and practical wisdom. But my account makes space for the commonsense thought that not *all* conceivable virtues (such as affability) are obligatory for *everyone* to acquire. It may very well be that particular virtues are especially necessary (or especially optional) for people in particular

social roles or stages of life. Nevertheless, practical wisdom is one virtue that is especially important, because (a) it is obligatory on all potentially practical rational primates – namely, all human beings – and (b) practical wisdom enables one to adjudicate which and to what extent the other virtues are needful in one's own case.

This point brings us back to a couple of needed clarifications about the above point that virtues are acquirable. Are all virtues acquirable by all? As a matter of fact, few, if any, acquire some measure of all the virtues. But all can and must acquire some. How many and how much? I think it is an adequate start to suggest that the proper amount is *as many and as much as possible*. No one should take adverse circumstances as an excuse not to acquire any particular virtues. At the same time, practical wisdom demands that we not become neurotic.

A second clarification: I am not saying that all human goods are acquirable – even some that one enjoys might be inborn, automatic, or given. Call the large portion of the features of one's life and character that are not under the control of a normal, functional, adult human being their "fortune." One's fortune is simply given. Each human being is given a practical rational primate nature by fortune. Each child is given a genetic identity, a time and place in history, a culture and tradition, and parents or guardians. If virtues are first inculcated in a child by tradition and only later acquired by an individual's own initiative, then it seems the dichotomy breaks down. It seems, in short, that the virtues one acquires or fails to acquire are part of fortune. If Jim and Jane grow up in very different cultures with very different kinds of parents and very different opportunities, it would each be given his or her virtues and vices "up front", with little to no chance for acquiring new virtues or shedding vices.

Furthermore, some of our attributes and actions may fail to be excellent without being our *fault*. So our account must allow us distinguish between various kinds of excellence. Consider the broadest set of things labeled 'good for humans.' All of the good things of

human life enable the realization of a fully human life. But not all good things are subject to our control. The virtues are among those good things under our control – good dispositions we each choose to cultivate or fail to cultivate. Unlike other goods (say, wealth), virtues become *what we are*.

A related worry might be that the account thus far does nothing to correct the suggestion that those who are natively intelligent are *morally* superior to those who are natively unintelligent; and it does nothing to correct the suggestion that those who are trained and educated in various excellences are morally superior to those who lack such good fortune. I think such corrections can be made, however; we are still remaining true to Anscombe's directive of avoiding the concepts of "moral fault" and "moral superiority" for now. And while even after such corrections, there may be natural differences between people's excellence and imperfection there is nothing about the *very facts* of the human life form that is elitist or unjustly hierarchical – nature produces people with a wide diversity of physical attributes (height, weight, size, color) and will continue to do so.

A partial answer is that the cardinal virtues are especially important because they are necessary for success in any worthwhile human endeavor. Jim and Jane do not need the same professional skills since they do not perform the same social function; but they both need the "moral skills" of relating to their friends and family, cultivating their talents, and striving self-actualization. Most people in the world will not write books or even read many books; however, every human being in the world has biological parents and hence has family. Every living human being belongs to a community; even orphans and street urchins live in a community. These traits are indeed acquirable and obligatory.

3.1 Not Obligatory

A related worry is that acquiring virtues might be good but is not obligatory. They are not "perfect duties" in Kant's sense. Since clearly not all ethicists are virtue ethicists, it would

seem a bit overreaching to assert that the pursuit of virtue is obligatory on every ethicist. Also, since not all people are westerners or neo-Aristotelians, it would seem cultural imperialism to assert that the pursuit of virtue is obligatory on everyone in the world. Nevertheless, if it is possible to discover human virtues (like moderation and practical wisdom), then it is possible to discover virtues the acquisition of which is incumbent upon everyone regardless of their level of academic knowledge or the content of their metaphysical commitments.

Having said that, some might object that not everyone has equal opportunity to acquire even the cardinal virtues. For if moral education, virtuous parents and teachers, and proper social conditions (wherein vice will not be gratuitously rewarded or virtues gratuitously punished) are helpful then some people are better situated than others. This is not, strictly speaking, a problem with the account of virtue. It is a problem with life. Though every human being has equal responsibility to acquire them.

Since, for the first decade or two of life, we are not primarily responsible for our own traits, the first corollary is high importance of moral and intellectual education. In many respects, our individuality depends on fate and luck. But in some very key respects, the acquisition of virtues and vices with which we begin adult life depends upon our education.⁶⁵ The beginning of human life, like the beginning of any organic life, is the foundation for all that follows. When a mother drinks heavily or uses cocaine while pregnant, the child is going to suffer the negative consequences for the remainder of his life. When a child is abused – emotionally, verbally, physically, or sexually – by her parents, the psychological cost is meted out across the entire life and across generations. By the same token, when a mother eats healthily and takes her vitamins while pregnant, the child is going to reap the positive consequences for the remainder of his life. When a child is given love, approval, empowerment, discipline, by her parents, the psychological gains are meted out across the

65. W. Jay Wood, “Prudence,” in *Virtues and Their Vices*, ed. Kevin Timpe and Craig A Boyd (Oxford University Press, 2014).

entire life and across generations. The original source of most people's life maxims are not their ethics professors, favorite novels, Holy Bibles, or therapists, but their parents or other guardians. This corollary might be obvious but we must never forget it. It is important to the argument because we should never give into the temptation to think that the cultivation of virtue is simply a business for adults (least of all adult professional academics) to argue for and against. It is the business of societies and families to do or fail to do every day.

4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that virtue is the excellence of rational practice and practical reasoning. Virtues benefit their possessor but not egoistically; they are good for humans as a kind. Vices, by contrast, are corruptions of life that are all too common. They are irrational traits and practices that do not make sense, since they harm oneself and others. They are negative or destructive traits to which one is tempted somewhere in the common course of human life. (Pleasures tempt us to immoderation; the urges to do favors for friends or to slight enemies tempt us to injustice; danger, difficulty, and other kinds of resistance tempt us to cowardice and *acedia*; laziness, arrogance, and culpable ignorance tempt us to practical foolishness, and so on.) By correcting for tempting vices and common errors, virtues enable individuals to actualize their life form and become excellent specimens of the human race.

Furthermore, virtues are distinguished from other forms of excellence in that they are acquirable. Acquiring them is a matter I did not discuss, but presumably it involves education. Insofar as virtue is a kind of practical knowledge — a disposition or sensitivity — it can be taught and learned. And finally, virtues enable societies to flourish (especially when it helps a society to successfully produce more virtuous, practical reasoners).

Several problems remain. The problems we flagged but which remain to be addressed are these: (1) What, if anything, is the human function (*ergon*)? (2) What is the

relation between practical reasoning and rational practice? I said McDowell mistakes the relation between virtue qua knowledge and virtue qua rational organization of one's psychology – including emotions, bodily urges, physical situation, unthinking habits, and so on? (3) Can virtue go bad? It seems that, without further guidance, otherwise virtuous traits might operate towards wicked ends, or co-exist with vices inside an (overall) miserable and vicious person. (4) Secondly, when we pay attention to the social context of humanity, we realize that certain virtues and vices can be given to one by "fortune."

The solution to several of these problems is to argue that excellent practical reasoning in community is the guide to the execution of virtuous activity. That is our next task.

Chapter 5

Practical Reasoning

There could be no reasons unless a rational animal has a general conception of its own good, and thus a general sense of how to live.

—Jennifer Frey, *The Will to Do Good* 79.

1. Introduction: How Should One Live?

“How should one live?” This question is central to neo-Aristotelian writers such as Bernard Williams, Philippa Foot, Alasdair MacIntyre, John McDowell, and others. The question is so important, I think, for at least four reasons.

First, the question implies that the questioner is aware of a dichotomy or distinction between *one one is in fact living* and *how one might live*. As a matter of fact, every capable adult is already living in a particular way. I take it for granted that most people learn to live in a particular way from their culture and family of origin, while also trying to satisfy more or less their own idiosyncratic preferences. But a normal part of human life is pausing to reflect on one’s own motives, methods, means, and ends. A crisis can trigger such reflection: what is wrong with my way of life, my values, my choices? And exposure to other people –

be they friends, fictional characters, or historical figures – who seem extraordinarily happy can trigger such reflection: what do they know that I do not? What are they doing that I am not?

Secondly, the “how should one live?” question assumes that there are good human lives and bad human lives. I hope that it is uncontroversial to point out that some of the members of our race are fools. (I leave it to the reader to supply illustrations.) If there are ways one *definitely should not live*, then there is at least way or set of ways one *should* live. Even if it is difficult to answer the question of how one should live, we should not be fully skeptical that there is an answer (or a set of answers).

Thirdly, the question implies that the questioner is at the age of reflection. Young children do not wonder how to live. And, according to my account, practical reasoning is an essential part of maturation from child, to competent adult, to practically wise human being.

Fourthly, the question calls for a *certain kind of answer*, namely, a practically reasonable answer. Recall Jay Wallace’s general definition of practical reasoning as “the general human capacity for resolving, through reflection, the question of what one is to do.”¹ Although sometimes we reflexively act without thinking, and other times contemplate without acting, (“four and four makes eight”), it seems obvious, on the face, that deliberation and resolute action are not like this. One resolves what to do by considering practical reasons. When a child asks a “how?” question about, say, how to open a jar, we offer a practical instruction: (“grip the base tightly, twist the lid to the left.”) As adults, we ask “how?” questions about large, multifaceted projects: how to complete a company merger?; how to save for retirement?; how to raise a child? The “instructions” for such answers will be complex. The “how should I live?” question is simply our most complex long-term project. The answer or answers cannot be an overly vague resolution (e.g., “help to improve the world”),

1. Wallace, “Practical Reason.”

nor mere specific platitudes (e.g., “do no harm”). Rather, a good answer will distinguish between overall good ways and overall bad ways to live and include a set of practical reasons, some general enough to give a trajectory to one’s whole life, others specific enough to provide guidance through the day-to-day matters of human life.

In short, an answer to the “how should one live?” question requires practical wisdom. Practical wisdom is unique among virtues in several ways. First, it is perhaps the one *clearly non-optional* virtue. Everyone has the obligation to become practically wise, regardless of circumstances, social roles, aptitudes, cultures, and so on. The universality of the obligation arises from the mere fact that one is a practical, rational primate. Secondly, practical wisdom is also unique in that it enables one to acquire other virtues, such as courage or moderation, by providing its possessor with the insight and moral skill to develop specific good habits in the varied circumstances of normal life. Thirdly, practical wisdom is recursive: the practically wise person is the most well-equipped to root out folly and become more practically wise.

The neo-Aristotelian framework for doing ethics views ethical reasoning as a holistic process that must be sensitive to the whole range of practical reasons. According to such thinkers, there can be no adequate theory of ethics without a theory of practical rationality. According to the arguments of the last chapter, virtues are traits that enable one to live a distinctly human life, and that partly constitute that life. In this chapter, I shall argue that the practically wise person is engaged in “mapping the landscape of value”² – that is, developing the knowledge and good intentions needed to pursue what is truly worthwhile and avoid what may seem worthwhile but is actually worthless. If successful, I shall be lending support to age-old view that the skill of engaging practical reasoning – reliably and successfully – is the virtue of practical wisdom. The practically wise person is one who *knows* the answer or answers, if there are any such answers. The one who answers this question

2. Ibid.

poorly lives foolishly and, ipso facto, badly. He or she acts on bad reasons and fails to act on good reasons. The one who answers it well lives wisely, and ipso facto, well. Hence, it is essential to virtue that one be practically wise. Or so I shall argue.

Serious objections exist to this way of framing ethical reasoning. For example, how, exactly, is a *rational* calculative process central to *moral* virtue? Three challenges need a response. Each one challenges the notion that successful practical reasoning is essential to human virtue. I shall briefly state them here and respond below.

1. Procedural Reasoning: One challenge is the familiar notion that practical reasoning is a value-neutral procedure by which we line up means to our ends. On this view, moral reasoning is about the morally good and bad while practical reasoning is about something else entirely, such as the prudent or imprudent, the advisable or ill-advised. So how could an *intellectual* exercise be essential to *moral* virtue?

2. Reason, Practice, and Motivation: Another challenge comes from non-cognitivism (especially expressivism).³ The worry is that practical reasons by themselves can't motivate us to act (without complementary psychological attitudes such as desires), while motivations to act cannot be rationally evaluated as true or false. This is really a pair of twin challenges: Is practical reasoning really *rational*? And if so, is it really *practical*? It seems to be either one or the other.

3. Overriding Reasons: A third challenge is a familiar distinction between "moral reasons" on the one hand and "prudential reasons" on the other, where moral reasons are overriding reasons. One is immoral if one fails to act on overriding moral reasons. But one is merely foolish if one fails to act on prudential reasons. If practical reasoning is a process of identifying or inventing what is advisable or ill-advised (but not ultimately binding), then how does this process relate to an appropriate sensitivity to what is morally permissible or

3. Non-cognitivism is motivated by metaphysical naturalism, which objects to normative realism about practical reasons. I shall address that objection in chapter 6.

impermissible (which is ultimately binding)?

My entry point on this complex matter is a sustained discussion of John McDowell's "Virtue and Reason" essay. Section 2 offers a qualified defense of his thesis that virtue is a form of practical knowledge, including an initial perceptual sensitivity to the salient facts of a situation with the skill to do what is required by those facts.

Section 3 highlights an ambiguity in McDowell's contrast between 'moral' and 'practical' reasons. He confuses the genus 'practical reasoning' for one species, 'moral reasoning' about one's obligations to others. I attempt to remedy this confusion by putting in historical context the relationship between 'moral' and 'practical' reasons. McDowell confuses two frameworks for approaching ethics: the 'quandary frame' and the 'character frame.'

Section 4 offers a more coherent alternative. It reprises the argument that human beings are practical reasoning animals by placing our distinctive activity in context of the general inclination of all living things to their own life and health. In this light, practical reasoning is a necessarily substantive form of reasoning about ends, rather than a merely instrumental one about means, because in order to have any reasons at all one must have a first principle of practical reason, namely, a general evaluative conception of what is to be pursued and hence how to live.

Section 5 returns to the challenges listed above, and discusses McDowell's responses as well as my own.

2. Virtue as Practical Reasoning

John McDowell's "Virtue and Reason" argues, among other things, that virtue is a particular kind of practical knowledge. Practical reasoning is both a rational process and also an initial, perceptual sensitivity that makes visible to us practical reasons. Even though he allows that

practical reasons are ultimately intersubjective features of our social world, he argues that they are no more and no less objective than theoretical reasons. In this section, I trace his discussion in some detail, including his statements of various objections and responses to them.

What kind of knowledge is virtue, according to McDowell? It is a practical and dispositional *what to do*. It is not simply propositional. Rather, it is a non-codifiable perceptual sensitivity to salient facts along with a disposition that leads the virtuous knower to act properly – so long as no countervailing psychological factors interfere. Some objections to his thesis will be addressed as we proceed.

How does it make sense to conceive of virtue as practical knowledge? Consider a platitudinous value such as kindness. Suppose kindness is really a virtue. What does it mean to predicate kindness of someone? We cannot ascribe a virtue when one acts kindly once or twice, or does so consistently by pure luck. Justifying the ascription of a *virtue* requires that a person “has a reliable sensitivity to a certain sort of requirement which situations impose on behavior” and such “deliverances of a reliable sensitivity are cases of knowledge.”⁴ McDowell is gesturing toward three or four plausible criteria for the ascription of a virtue: *reliability* means the kind person must be *regularly* or *habitually* disposed to kind thoughts, feelings, and behaviors; *sensitivity* means that the kind person demonstrates an alertness to the fact that a friend is in need, a child is sad, an elderly parent is lonely; *practical knowledge* means the kind person knows what to do in such situations; and *intentional behavior* means that the person correctly feels the imposition to avoid cruel and indifferent behavior and to act on what the situation requires.

McDowell has made it plausible that sensitivity to reasons for behavior is at least necessary for virtue. But is it sufficient? He offers two answers: The first is that the presence of a virtue in someone exhaustively explains his or her behavior. For example, when the

4. McDowell, “Virtue and Reason,” 332.

kind person sees that a situation requires kindness, “requirement imposed by the situation” must “exhaust his reason for acting as he does.”⁵ An ulterior interest (say, in a mercenary reward) would disqualify the action as an example of kindness. The kind person’s action is explained by the simple fact that it would be a kind action.

Now, the kindness is not the only reason for action. There are many reasons for action and many situations where no single overriding reason is obvious. Rather, the question of what to do seems to generalize into a question of what is good or advisable, all things considered. McDowell concedes the point. He illustrates it with the example of a parent who is overly indulgent to a child out of kindness. Certainly, the parent is sensitive to what kindness requires but not *sensitive enough* to fairness or to considerations of the child’s health, and so on.

To accommodate this observation, McDowell generalizes this point to encompass all of virtue:

Thus the particular virtues are not a batch of independent sensitivities. Rather, we use the concepts of the particular virtues to mark similarities and dissimilarities among the manifestations of a single sensitivity which is what virtue, in general, is: an ability to recognize requirements which situations impose on one’s behavior. It is a single complex sensitivity of the sort which we are aiming to instill when we aim to inculcate a moral outlook.⁶

McDowell is saying that if the kind person’s behavior arises from a response to the salient facts he is sensitive to, then the virtuous person’s behavior *in general* is explained by just the fact that it is virtuous. The virtuous person’s behavior, then, arises from a general sensitivity to *what situations require*. Virtue is a “single complex sensitivity” that constitutes “a moral outlook” seems to require a meta-cognitive capacity to reflect upon the various requirements imposed by a situation, to rank and order them, and act accordingly.

5. Ibid., 332.

6. Ibid., 333.

I have a complaint about McDowell's clarification here, which I shall explain in full below. In brief, it seems wrong to call the single sensitivity "virtue" when it includes considerations that do not seem intuitively moral at all, such as prudential considerations. For now, I must examine McDowell's response to the non-cognitivist critic who challenges the notion that practical reasoning can, by itself, motivate one to action.

3. Reason, Practice, and Motivation

The first challenge to his own thesis that McDowell addresses comes from moral anti-realism, specifically, expressivism. Expressivists are among the chief contemporary proponents of an alternative, Humean, model of practical reasoning.

Broadly construed, anti-realism comes in a variety of forms: non-cognitivist subjectivism, cognitivist subjectivism, constructivism, and so on. What each of these quite disparate views share in common is a denial of robust realism. Jay Wallace explains such realism as follows:

The basic commitment of realism in this domain is the idea that there are facts of the matter about what we have reason to do that are prior to and independent of our deliberations, to which those deliberations are ultimately answerable. Realists picture practical reason as a capacity for reflection about an objective body of normative truths regarding action.⁷

Thus far, it is fairly clear that I have been assuming a kind of realism. While defending the assumption would take us too far afield, I should point out that it is not viciously circular. Realism about practical reasons is what Nagel calls a "defeasible presumption."⁸ That is, most of us have no pre-analytic objection to the seeming fact that some reasons for acting are good reasons, and others bad. Some brute norms (such that it is wrong torture animals, or

7. Wallace, "Practical Reason," sec. 2. Wallace cites Parfit (2011) and Scanlon (2014).

8. Thomas Nagel, *The View from Nowhere* (Oxford University Press, 1989), 143.

that one is not to use ineffective means to achieve one's ends) have a quasi-analytic force to them. And even anti-realism's most sophisticated advocates concede the that realism is the default view. For example, John Mackie admits that "the main tradition of European moral philosophy" accepts objective values. He even admits that moral thought and language assumes it: the notion of objective value has "a firm basis in ordinary thought, and even in the meanings of moral terms."⁹ Alan Gibbard likewise says, "Normative language does involve claims to objectivity in some sense—that seems clear enough."¹⁰ Gibbard goes so far as to say that Platonism about reasons is common sense.¹¹

Nevertheless, anti-realism has a serious challenge to the defeasible presumption. Subjectivism is motivated by considering a problem about the status of practical reasons within (a broadly-construed) naturalism. As Simon Blackburn summarizes, naturalism asks:

... No more of the world than we already know is there—the ordinary features of things on the basis of which we make decisions about them, like or dislike them, fear them and avoid them, desire them and seek them out. It asks no more than this: a natural world, and patterns of reaction to it.¹²

The anti-realist worries that the "defeasible presumption" lying at the center of "the main tradition of European moral philosophy" commits one to non-natural norms and a corresponding non-naturalistic human capacity to intuit them. Philosophers such as Gibbard

9. Compare with Terence Cuneo, *Speech and Morality* (Oxford University Press, 2014).

10. Allan Gibbard, *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment* (Harvard University Press, 1992), 154.

11. "It might be thought that ordinary conceptions of rationality are Platonistic or intuitionistic. On the Platonistic picture, among the facts of the world are facts of what is rational and what is not. A person of normal mental powers can discern these facts. Judgments of rationality are thus straightforward apprehensions of fact, not through sense perception but through a mental faculty analogous to sense perception. When a person claims authority to pronounce on what is rational, he must base his claim on this power of apprehension."

12. Simon Blackburn, *Spreading the Word* (Oxford University Press, 1985).

insists: “Nothing in a plausible, naturalistic picture of our place in the universe requires ... non-natural facts and these powers of non-sensory apprehension.”¹³

The anti-realist alternatives aim either to debunk the objective purport of moral reasoning or to reclaim it within the confines of a respectable naturalism. One such alternative is non-cognitivist (or non-descriptivist) expressivism:

Expressivism in this form suggests a naturalistic interpretation of practical reason, one that may seem appropriate to the enlightened commitments of the modern scientific world view. It is naturalistic metaphysically, insofar as it makes no commitment to the objective existence in the world of such allegedly questionable entities as values, norms, or reasons for action.¹⁴

The Humean model of practical reasoning asserts that “cognition and volition are distinct.” Practical reasons cannot motivate, at least not by themselves.¹⁵ If this were so, moral reasoning could not satisfy the “practical requirement” – it could neither move us to action nor explain *why* we acted. Indeed, a large part of the appeal of expressivism is that it can satisfy the *practical* dimension of practical reason (though at the cost of the “rational” rational dimension).

Hence, non-cognitivist critic would be quick to respond to McDowell with a counterexample of two persons in the same situation who are sensitive to an identical range of reasons for action but respond differently. If such a situation were to obtain, it would disconfirm McDowell’s thesis that virtue is practical knowledge.

The expressivist has a neat explanation of reasoning, action, and motivation. If reasons cannot motivate by themselves, then practical reasoners act when reasons co-exist with a conative mental state (such as a desire, interest, or attraction).¹⁶ practical reasoners

13. Gibbard, *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings*, 154.

14. Wallace, “Practical Reason.”

15. He says: “Reason is the discovery of truth and falsehood.” (*Treatise of Human Nature*, Part I.1.)

16. We all exhibit various dispositions to act in certain ways, to rank and organize our various motivations, to pursue certain things, or to make certain decisions rather than

do not simply enjoy a “single complex sensitivity” to what situations require. Instead, the cognitive bit judges an object, while the conative state provides the movement toward the object. For example, one is aware that one’s friend is in trouble and that the friend is able to be comforted (the cognitive bit) and a desire (or motivation or inclination or settled passion) for helping one’s friends (the non-cognitive bit). The expressivist would say that surely these two *together* – and neither in isolation – explains the behavior.

This challenge presents a pair of twin challenges: First, is virtue-knowledge *practical* – and if so, wouldn’t it be impossible for an agent to perceive what a situation requires and still do wrong? Secondly, is virtue-knowledge *rational* – and if so, mustn’t it be codifiable and consistent? The very notion of a unitary “practical reasoning” is a paradox.

3.1 Is Practical Reasoning *Practical*?

McDowell’s response to the expressivist critic is this: one must already be sensitive to a particular range of requirements for action in order to even notice the salient facts (e.g., that one’s friend is in trouble). It is quite plausible to interpret the difference between the vicious and virtuous person as lying not just in their psychological reactions to what they notice about the world but *in the noticing itself*.¹⁷ The morally calloused person does not notice the fact that his or her actions are causing others pain. Better, the morally calloused person does not notice the fact *as morally salient*.

This response from McDowell is not conclusive, but it is a good start. It highlights, but does not alleviate, the deep disagreement between the Humean and the Aristotelian

others. Such dispositions are clearly practical. They have the right kind of action-guiding force to explain why we act the way we do. On the other hand, there are dispositions. The term ‘disposition’ gets used in various ways: one can be disposed (say) to repay one’s debts (a moral commitment), or disposed to shout when angry (a temperament), or disposed to travel abroad every summer (an interest). But is a “disposition” a form of knowledge?

17. Margaret Olivia Little, “Seeing and Caring: The Role of Affect in Feminist Moral Epistemology,” *Hypatia* 10, no. 3 (1995): 117–37.

camp. He concedes the conditional that *if* two people are identically sensitive to a morally salient fact but act differently *then* virtue cannot simply be a sensitivity. But, for McDowell, one person's *modus ponens* is another's *modus tollens*. So if virtue is to be identified with a single complex sensitivity, then a supposed situation in which two persons perceive a situation and its practical requirements identically but act differently cannot obtain.¹⁸ Is there anyway to bridge the divide without begging the question in either direction? McDowell suggests we look to Aristotle.

Aristotle allowed that sometimes the "appreciation of what [a virtuous person] observes is clouded, or unfocused, by the impact of a desire to do otherwise."¹⁹ It is possible that a virtuous person correctly perceives what a situation requires but fails to act correctly due to interference from psychological factors. Desires, fears, etc. might cause a "distortion in one's appreciation" of the relevant reasons.²⁰

This Aristotelian reply is also not conclusive. McDowell cites an objection from Donald Davidson to the effect that a person might fail to perform the resultant right action *even without such clouded appreciation*. McDowell concedes. But Davidson's move changes the subject slightly, from virtue to continence. For Aristotle, continence (or self-control) is not a virtue. If one can only do the right thing by gritting one's teeth and bearing it, one has not fully attained the relevant virtue. Continence is still *comparatively better* than incontinence, but not as good as virtue.

The continent person is able to perform the right action because he recognizes it as right, *despite* countervailing pressures (from desires, say) to do the wrong action. Since the possession of a full virtue includes possession of the proper motivation as well, continence is only needed in the absence of a fully developed virtue. Put differently, the virtuous person is not just one who "balances" reasons to ϕ against countervailing reasons to π . The virtuous

18. McDowell, "Virtue and Reason," 333.

19. Ibid., 334.

20. Ibid., 334.

person is the one for whom simply identifying an overriding reason silences countervailing reasons. For example, *in this situation, courage requires that I run into danger*. The virtuous person sees the danger (and feels rightly apprehensive) but also sees that courage in the face of this danger is required; the latter perception, according to McDowell, “silences” other pressures.²¹ The merely continent person has to “weigh” reasons; the virtuous person fluently *acts* on the best reason.

So the response to Davidson’s objection is to suggest that when a continent person sees what is to be done but fails to do it (even absent interfering factors), the failure can be explained as a lack of virtue – that is, as a lack of a fully developed sensitivity to what is required. The virtuous person, unlike the continent person, would not have to stop and “weigh”. The virtuous person sees what is required and acts. (I shall comment a bit more on moral motivation below.)

3.2 Is Practical Reasoning *Rational*?

McDowell’s case that practical knowledge can motivate the virtuous person required addressing twin challenges. The other side of the paradox above challenged the *rational* credentials of the practical knowledge that is virtue. Pretty clearly, the paradigmatic case of knowledge is theoretical knowledge, i.e., *knowledge that p*. Such knowledge is categorical, propositional, and codifiable into a deductive logical system. McDowell’s critic then poses the following argument: knowledge is codifiable. Virtue is a kind of knowledge. Therefore, virtue-knowledge is codifiable. However, virtue-knowledge is practical knowledge or ‘knowing-what-to-do’, which is not codifiable. Therefore, virtue must not be knowledge.

The error in this objection, McDowell thinks, is not an error in moral theory but a “deep-rooted prejudice” that rationality is a rule-following procedure. If rationality is a rule-following procedure, then it follows that *either* practical rationality and morality

21. Ibid., 335.

are likewise rule-following procedures *or* that practical rationality and morality is not, ultimately, sufficiently *rational*. Some Humean philosophers (but not necessarily Hume) think that morality is a not rational domain but a domain of sentiments, desires, commitments, approvals, and so on. Other Kantian philosophers (but not necessarily Kant) think that morality is a rational domain and hence must be a matter of identifying first principles and “applying” them to particular situations. But what they share in common is a belief that “rationality must be explicable in terms of being guided by a formulable universal principle.”²² This common belief McDowell wishes to refute.

McDowell’s discussion here (drawing on Wittgenstein and others) is hard to follow. The point seems to be that even apparently obvious cases where the rational thing to do seems to require following an objective rule turn out to be cases of a much messier process in which there is no such objective rule we can appeal to. For example, take the objective rule of extending a series of numbers two at a time. Suppose Smith instructs Jones to “add 2” to a number and continue applying the rule indefinitely. We tend to be confident Jones will “churn out the appropriate behavior with the sort of reliability which a physical mechanism, say a piece of clockwork, might have.” We tend to expect that Jones will produce “2, 4, 6, 8,” etc. McDowell thinks this confidence is based on postulating a “psychological mechanism, underlying his behavior, by an inference analogous to that whereby one might hypothesize a physical structure underlying the observable motions of some inanimate object.”²³ The “ground and nature of our confidence” that we shall reliably apply rules is not but a common form of life.

McDowell’s term ‘form of life’ is a term of art drawn from Wittgenstein (and quoted with approval from Stanley Cavell). The term seems to refer to that difficult-to-define pro-

22. *ibid.*, 337. MacIntyre, similarly, denies the assumption that normative ethical rules can be derived from universal ethical principles the way we “apply” universal logical truths to particular logical conclusions via a middle term. Cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, “Does Applied Ethics Rest on a Mistake?” *The Monist* 67, no. 4 (1984): 498–513.

23. McDowell, “Virtue and Reason,” 337.

cess of acculturation or formation. For example, how do we learn reliably to use words and expressions in our native language? There is no clear mechanistic process that explains how a child learns to make exclamations – such as a pained “ow!” or an excited “ooh!”. There is no clear mechanistic process by which we learn when to laugh at jokes or when to cry in pity. Instead of a mechanistic process, McDowell suggests that we children learn words and behaviors by “bildung” or formation. Similarly, he suggests, our shared rationality is not grounded in “external” objective rules but in a shared form of life or what he calls a “congruence of subjectivities.”²⁴

It is disconcerting to many to consider that nothing keeps rationality “on the rails” but a congruence of subjectivities. McDowell admits this is a disconcerting hypothesis; it induces “vertigo.” But, he says, our response to such vertigo should not be to embrace a “consoling myth”. That “consoling myth” is two notions: (a) that rational rule-following is enabled by a psychological mechanism that guarantees consistency; and (b) that there exist objective facts of the matter over and above the congruence of subjectivities. If we abandon these two notions and embrace the model of deductive rationality as grounded only in our intersubjective form of life, then the corresponding model of practical rationality will become tenable.

I suspect McDowell concedes too much here. I don’t go in for his intersubjective account of rationality. Regardless, my purpose here is to defend the view that both forms of rationality – the practical and the theoretical – are on par and stand or fall together. Hence, the practical knowledge that is virtue may not be codifiable, but it just as much a form of knowledge as the more codifiable deductive reasoning.

A related query McDowell poses is this: what, if anything, guarantees that the moral person’s behavior is intelligibly the same from case to case? If moral knowledge were rational, then it would be consistent from case to case and situation to situation; but if,

24. Ibid., 339.

as McDowell has been arguing, both deductive reasoning and practical reasoning are not rule-following mechanisms, then how do we explain the virtuous person's reliably correct behavior?

His answer invokes Aristotle's notion of a practical syllogism. The 'practical syllogism' takes the following shape:

1. X is good to do, desirable, worthwhile, etc. (E.g., it is good to instantiate justice in the classroom).
2. Z would be X. (E.g., giving everyone a chance to re-take a quiz that was unavailable due to technical problems would instantiate justice in my classroom.)
3. Therefore, Z would be good to do, desirable, worthwhile, etc.

On the strictly deductive logical model, the role of the major premise is to provide solid universal ethical principles from which to derive particular moral duties. McDowell resists this model. On the strictly non-cognitivist model, there are no universal principles but only universal psychological states, such as consistent desires, plans, values, or norms. McDowell also resists this. Instead, the role of the major premise is to articulate a "certain conception of how to live... [namely] the *virtuous person's conception* of the sort of life a human being should lead."²⁵ What kind of life should a human being lead? The answer "cannot be definitively written down."²⁶

If the kind of conception of a good life that the virtuous person has is approximate and non-codifiable, it becomes hard to see why we are bothering to fit moral reasoning into syllogistic pattern at all. McDowell's response is that understanding virtue-knowledge within a the practical syllogism *does* a good job of providing a plausible explanation of moral motivation (reasons one might act in some way) and moral behavior (reasons one acted that way). To paraphrase McDowell: "Explanations of judgments about what to do are also explanations of actions."²⁷ I can explain your behavior by understanding that you

25. Ibid., 343. Emphasis added.

26. Ibid., 343.

27. Ibid., 342. Verbatim: "The explanations, so far treated as explanations of judg-

were concerned for your friend's welfare and so offered to help. Likewise, you can explain your decision to help simply by citing the fact that your friend was in need. So the general structure of the practical syllogism is useful.

What's more, McDowell concedes that there is a kind of circularity to his account: "the rationality of virtue... is not demonstrable from an external standpoint." (ibid.²⁸ 346.) And: "Any attempt to capture it in words will recapitulate the character of the teaching whereby it might be instilled: generalizations will be approximate at best..."²⁹ The virtuous person's conception of how to live is itself conditioned by the moral outlook. That conception of how to live, in turn, conditions what particular saliences are noticed (what minor premises) and generates practical conclusions about what is to be done. The upshot of the combination of non-codifiability with a practical syllogistic form is that the virtuous person takes for a rule of life some conception of how to live but that this conception is part of what it means to be a virtuous person – and thus ensues the vertigo.

While McDowell bites the bullet on the incorrigible intersubjectivity of theoretical and practical reasoning, I think he does so because he fails to grasp Foot's insight that objective, natural, normative facts are able to "keep us on the rails". I shall return to this issue in the next chapter.

In sum, McDowell thinks virtue is a kind of knowledge or sensitivity to salient facts which call for a certain response and which – absent interfering passions – intrinsically motivates the virtuous person to respond in that way. The hypothetical counterexample presented by his Humean critic is one wherein two agents are "sensitive to" or "notice" identical reasons for action but do not act identically. McDowell's response is that while noticing a requirement for action is necessarily motivating *to some extent*, other psychological factors may interfere with the resulting correct action. Furthermore, the kind of "knowledge" that

ments about what to do, are equally explanations of actions."

28.

29. Ibid., 343.

virtue amounts to is uncodifiable, but that does no harm to the account. Virtue-knowledge is rather a broad conception of how to live and a series of specific sensitivities to a range of specific practical reasons. Practical reasoning is *consistent*, moreover, but not by being “objective” (in the sense that even McDowell admits would be desirable) but by being rooted in our communal form of life – precisely the same way in which logical reasoning is. Both are “intersubjective” and rooted in our form of life, but both are as objective as need be.

3.3 Moral and Practical Reasoning

While I shall discuss what I think McDowell gets wrong below, on my view, he gets this much right: practical reasoning is indeed by definition a form of *reasoning*. It is like theoretical reasoning in that it is normative.

Broadly, we can say that theoretical reasoning is a process by which I aim to determine *what to believe* – to answer the question “What should I believe?” When I assess evidence for and against some proposition *p*, I am looking for *reasons* to believe *p* is true or false. The successful conclusion of a rational argument is the judgment that *p* or not-*p*. (Or I may not have enough evidence to judge either way, in which case I may withhold judgment.) Similarly, when I consider a scientific hypothesis, I suppose that *p* and then conduct an experiment that will reveal reasons that confirm or disconfirm the supposition. To fail to believe *p* upon coming to know good evidence for it, or to believe *p* in spite of good evidence against it, is to make an intellectual error. If *q* entails *p* and I already know and affirm that *q*, then I *ought* to affirm that *p*. Similarly, if some reason to π entails a reason to ϕ , and I already know and am committed to π , then I ought to ϕ .

So far as we know, all theoretical reasoners are also practical reasoners. We can imagine creatures such as angels, Artificial Intelligences, and intelligent aliens who might think without acting; but so far as we know, to be a reasoner at all is to be responsive to what Sellars called the “space of reasons”, including both practical and theoretical reasons. This

consideration is part of the reason why, in chapter 3, I insisted that practical reasoning, and *not* abstract theoretical reasoning, defines human nature. If this is right, then the burden of proof lies with those who would artificially separate the *knowing* and the *practicing*.

That said, my complaint with McDowell's account is that he confuses moral and practical reasons. Suppose I have a friend who can pretty well diagnose a car engine by listening to the way it whines or hums or clicks. All I hear is noise. By McDowell's lights, my friend is "sensitive to a range of requirements for action" and knows what to do – e.g., a new timing belt – and so my friend is "virtuous". Even if we introduce a requirement that practical knowledge must be concerned with requirements pertaining to other people, similar analogies arise in other contexts. An American football quarterback is sensitive to the salient facts of what his teammate requires to catch a good pass; a general contractor is sensitive to the salient facts of what is required to build an up-to-code structure, and so on. It strains common sense to call any and all such sensitivities "virtues."

Relatedly, McDowell admits that one might potentially need to rank, order, and weigh a dozen different kinds of reasons (kindness, fairness, appropriateness, prudence, etc.) before one resolved what to do. He seems to switch from talking about moral reasons to talking about *any* practical reason without any mention of the switch. By failing to render a clear distinction between moral and other practical reasons, I believe McDowell falls prey to a habitual way of framing moral discussions that is a subtle mistake.

Call this habitual way of framing moral discussions the "quandary frame." I borrow the term 'quandary' from a classic article by Edmund Pincoff. Pincoff contrasts "quandary ethics" with another way of framing ethical discussions which he calls "character" ethics. On this frame, 'moral' considerations contrast with prudence and any other kind of practical consideration. 'Moral' considerations most commonly refer to "other-regarding" considera-

tions (opposed to self-regarding ones),³⁰ altruistic (as opposed to egoistic),³¹ considerations of benevolence (as opposed to selfishness),³² or conscience (as opposed to self-love).³³

The contrast between moral and all other practical reasons gives rise to a distinctive way of approaching ethics. On quandary ethics:

The business of ethics is to clarify and solve “problems”, i.e. situations in which it is difficult to know what one should do; that the ultimate beneficiary of ethical analysis is the person who, in one of these situations, seeks rational ground for the decision he must make; that ethics is therefore primarily concerned to find such grounds, often conceived of as moral rules and the principles from which they can be derived; and that meta-ethics consists in the analysis of the terms, claims, and arguments which come into play in moral disputation, deliberation, and justification in problematic contexts.³⁴

According to Philippa Foot, the quandary frame is the most way most modern philosophers approach ethics. She says:

Many if not most moral philosophers in modern times see their subject as having to do exclusively with relations between individuals or between an individual and society, and so with such things as obligations, duties, and charitable acts... ‘moral’ and ‘prudential’ considerations [are] contrasted in a way that was alien to Plato or Aristotle.³⁵

Relatedly, Martha Nussbaum says:

30. Michael Slote, “Agent-Based Virtue Ethics,” *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 20, no. 1 (1995): 83–101.

31. Thomas Nagel, *The Possibility of Altruism* (Princeton University Press, 1978); Alasdair MacIntyre, “Egoism and Altruism,” in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards (New York, Macmillan, 1967), 462; Julia Annas, “Virtue Ethics and the Charge of Egoism,” in *Morality and Self Interest*, ed. Paul Bloomfield (Oxford University Press, 2009), 205–21.

32. Paul Bloomfield, “Eudaimonia and Practical Rationality,” in *Virtue and Happiness*, ed. Rachana Kamtekar, 2012.

33. Yong Huang, “The Self-Centeredness Objection to Virtue Ethics,” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 84, no. 4 (2010): 651–92.

34. Edmund Pincoffs, “Quandary Ethics,” *Mind*, 1971, 552. Pincoffs cites Hare, Toulon, and Brandt as quandary ethicists. MacIntyre offers a similar criticism to Pincoffs in his MacIntyre, “Does Applied Ethics Rest on a Mistake?”

35. Foot, *Natural Goodness*, 68.

This question [of how ‘moral’ ends figure among other ends] is posed in a characteristically modern way, presupposing a distinction between the moral and the non-moral that is not drawn, as such, by the Greek thinkers. But if one objects to that characterization, one can rephrase it: for example, What role does concern for others for their own sake play in her scheme of ends? What role does political justice play in her scheme of ends? And so forth.”³⁶

Kant and Hume agree on the quandary frame, despite their significant substantive disagreements. They both present morality as a kind of crisis strategy. On any given normal day, agents are free to pursue their own self-interested inclinations – get a good job, save for retirement, eat healthy foods, exercise, make friends, and so on – so long as they commit no wrong. So long as life presents no moral dilemmas, moral reasoning is idle.

The alternative type of ethics is what Pincoff calls “character” ethics (of which I take neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics to be a token). Such ethics is focused on the long-term project of living well by executing worthwhile goals in every day life. Aristotle is the premiere example of a character ethicist because he thought of ethics as a branch the whole practical enterprise:

...[ethics and politics] is a very wide-ranging subject having to do generally with the planning of human life so that it could be lived as well as possible. Moral problems are given their due but are by no means stage-centre. The question is not so much how we should resolve perplexities as how we should live.³⁷

The Greek way of framing moral questions viewed *all* practical ends as ‘moral.’ MacIntyre provides the clearest summary of the older use of ‘moral’:

‘Moral’ is the etymological descendant of ‘moralis’. But ‘moralis’, like its Greek predecessor *ethikos* – Cicero invented ‘moralis’ to translate the Greek word in the *De Fato* – means ‘pertaining to character’ where a man’s character is nothing other than his set dispositions to behave systematically in one way rather than another, to lead on particular kind of life... The early uses of

36. Martha Nussbaum, “Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category?” *The Journal of Ethics* 3, no. 3 (1999): 174.

37. Pincoffs, “Quandary Ethics,” 553–4.

‘moral’ did not contrast with ‘prudential’ or ‘self interested’” nor with ‘legal or ‘religious’... The word to which it is closest in meaning is perhaps most simply ‘practical.’³⁸

MacIntyre is analyzing etymology of the term ‘moral’, but his point is not merely etymological; it is conceptual. When quondary ethicists conceive of ‘moral reasons’ as a special overriding type of practical reason concerned with duties to others (contrasted with self-regarding prudential reasons), they fall under the illusion that moral reasons may not be practical and that practical reasons may not be moral. By contrast, the character ethicist views life as presenting the variety of possible ends that could clash or harmonize that all need to be accounted for.

It is helpful to observe that, at some point in the history of western moral philosophy, the topic of the “moral” began to separate off from the broader topic of the practical. Foot cites Mill as an early proponent of the distinction:

J. S. Mill, for instance, expresses this modern point of view quite explicitly, saying in his essay *On Liberty* that ‘A person who shows rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit . . . who cannot restrain himself from harmful indulgences’ shows faults (Mill calls them ‘self-regarding faults’) which ‘are not properly immoralities’ and while they ‘may be proofs of any amount of folly . . . are only a subject of moral reprobation when they involve a breach of duty to others, for whose sake the individual is bound to have care for himself.’³⁹

Mill distinguishes folly from immorality by treating folly as a failure to provide goods for oneself. He treats imprudence as “bad” but not *morally bad*.

While I don’t intend to suggest that there is something automatically laudable about the older Aristotelian emphasis, my contention is that the modern emphasis on “relations between individuals or between an individual and society” fails to capture much of what is interesting about the “how should one live?” question. The modern distinction obscures the real ethical situation.

38. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 38.

39. Foot, *Natural Goodness*, 68.

To return to McDowell, I can now put my complaint in clearer relief: is he a quandary ethicist or character ethicist? In my view, McDowell's view represents a mixture (indeed, a confusion) of the two. Like the character ethicist, he emphasizes the "how should I live?" question and invokes practical knowledge as an important part of the answer. However, like the quandary ethicist, he represents moral considerations pertaining to the rights, obligations, or duties to others (such as kindness) as a special, perhaps overriding, kind of reason. He does not seem to notice that broadening the virtuous person's perceptual sensitivity to what a *any* situation requires renders his account ambiguous. Are moral reasons are *one type* of practical reason, or can any practical reason count as a "moral" reason (broadly construed).⁴⁰

4. Practical Reasoning as Pursuing the Good

The remedy for this confusion is to return to and defend a more consistent account of practical reasons. Gladly, this account will reinforce what we have argued above about the natural normativity in the human life form and all organic life. This section builds on the work of Philippa Foot and on Jennifer Frey's recent discussions of Anscombe and Aquinas.⁴¹

On the Aristotelian account, as developed by Aquinas, practical reasoning is by definition an end-oriented activity that aims at the perceived good of one's form of life. The primary question is not "why should one respond to moral reasons instead of prudential ones?" but "why do we act at all?" and "how can we act well?" Asking this question, and answering it, is a practically rational activity that defines the human life form. Certainly, as

40. Foot, *Virtues and Vices* chapter 13, "Are Moral Reasons Overriding?"; Cf. also John McDowell and IG McFetridge, "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?" *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes* 52 (1978): 13–42

41. Foot says: "It is my opinion that the *Summa Theologica* is one of the best sources we have for moral philosophy, and moreover that St. Thomas's ethical writings are as useful to the atheist as to the Catholic or other Christian believer." (*Virtues and Vices*, 2.)

Foot says, some practical reasons have to do with “obligations, duties, and charitable acts” to others; but others pertain to what is required for oneself and even for third-person objects such as the environment, possessions, and perhaps even abstract objects.

Considered thus broadly, the normativity of practical reasoning is clear: some reasons for acting are good while others are bad. Errors of morality, then, belong to a wider class of practical errors. As Foot says: “I want to show that judgments usually considered to be the special subject of moral philosophy should really be seen as belonging to a wider class of evaluations of conduct with which they share a common conceptual structure.”⁴² On this frame, any reason to ϕ or not to ϕ is a practical reason, and successfully sorting through all such reasons is a virtue, namely practical wisdom. Unsuccessfully doing so is the vice of imprudence or practical folly, which inhibits one’s ability to live a human life.

Defending the Aristotelian account requires us to revisit in more detail some of what was argued above in chapter 2. Recall the observation that all organisms act toward ends, with or without reflection. Frey summarizes Aquinas in this way:

All living things are a self-sustaining system of powers that functions to bring the living thing into being and to sustain its being. The movement of any part of a living thing, at any particular moment, is necessarily explained by reference to the movement of the whole thing towards a single end: the coming to be, maintenance, or reproduction of that very form of life.⁴³

As I argued above, all living things exhibit teleological movement. In proper circumstances, they grow into maturity, which is the exemplification of their form of life. This form of life is what Aquinas calls a thing’s “nature”: wolf hunts in packs by nature, trees extend roots into the ground by nature, reptiles warm themselves in the sun by nature, and so on.

The sunflower has no conscious sense with which to incline toward sunlight. But,

42. Foot, *Natural Goodness*, 66–67.

43. Jennifer Ann Frey, “The Will and the Good” (PhD thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 2012), 68.

to quote John Haldane, “things are specified by their power.”⁴⁴ When it comes to higher organisms, insects and mammals and so on, organisms have “appetite”. They demonstrate the capacity to sense and to move consciously toward or away from certain objects: The antelope pursues healthy grass and flees a lion. The animal can only experience what is good or bad for it as a particular object.

While natural norms are features of all living beings, human beings are distinct in being also aware of such norms. Humans grow, reproduce, and enjoy conscious experiences like other animals and also *know* that they do so. Obviously, plants and animals do not “naturally incline” toward their good by reflecting or choosing it. Frey points out:

Aquinas would agree with us that it is a category mistake to say that a sunflower wants to grow towards the light, if by this we mean that the flower somehow registers a positive feeling or has an inner impression towards the light, which “causes” it to move toward the light. The plant does not apprehend or desire anything; thus Aquinas is very careful to say that it does not have a power of appetite. In fact, Aquinas is at pains to note that a plant has no window onto the world at all – it just has conditions in which it characteristically comes into being, maintains, and reproduces itself.⁴⁵

Lower organisms naturally incline toward their own good. Higher organisms perceive objects but do not perceive them *as* falling under universal categories. By contrast, a human being can recognize universals. Human beings are specified by their “power” – their capacity to engage in cognitive and deliberative activities. While animals can not only sense but *perceive*, humans have the capacity of “intellection,” the power of abstracting formal properties from what is perceived. An animal can *sense* an informed, organized object; an animal can be affected by the object. But the human animal can *acquire information* from the organized object. Animals may perceive something *as* dangerous or *as* desirable.

44. John Haldane, “A Return to Form in the Philosophy of Mind,” *Ratio* 11, no. 3 (1998): 262.

45. Frey, “The Will and the Good,” 69–70.

Human beings perceive *that* a the dangerous thing is a predator or the desirable thing *is food*.⁴⁶

The extra ability to perceive under universal categories brings with it the human capacity for taking up natural inclinations or aversions in a deliberative act. Natural inclinations may be underwritten or overridden. Confronted with a delicious and healthy salad sitting on someone else's plate, I recognize it *as not mine* and hence choose not to reach for it. Confronted with a lion in a zoo, I choose not to flee, for I recognize it *as not dangerous*. Frey summarizes:

Rational animals, like any animal, have a natural inclination towards their good as a whole, and like lower animals this power is actualized through their apprehension of things in the world. But Aquinas argues that a rational animal relates to the world through the application of universal concepts, and thus it is inclined to pursue or avoid things under an intellectual, universal apprehension of them. Thus, Aquinas says that the will is inclined towards its objects under the formality of the "universal good," rather than the particular good.⁴⁷

We have been speaking of the human capacity for recognizing and pursuing particular ends as good. As we saw in chapter 4, a full conception of virtue demands that we expand our scope to include the whole of life, the conception of our human good that constitutes the answer to the "how to live?" question. McDowell gets this part right in his discussion of the practical syllogism. Every rational practice is undertaking in pursuit of some particular end *in context* of a total conception of what is good in general. Frey continues:

Consequently, we can say that rational animals have an understanding of different levels of ends, and at least a vague sense of how they are supposed to hang together as a whole. This conception of how it all hangs together is what Aquinas calls the ultimate end – a rational animal's general, conceptual understanding of how to live or go on. Aquinas thinks that any sane, mature adult will necessarily have cobbled together some such conception. Aquinas

46. John Haldane, "On Coming Home to (Metaphysical) Realism," *Philosophy* 71, no. 276 (1996): 287–96.

47. Frey, "The Will and the Good," 75.

calls this conception “the universal good”, and he argues that it is the will’s proper object. Everything that is willed is willed under this rational aspect of good, as to be pursued because *in accord with my general conception of the good*. In fact, Aquinas thinks there could be no reasons unless a rational animal has a general conception of its own good, and thus a general sense of how to live.⁴⁸

Frey’s argument here is that the question of ‘how to live’ is a question about my good as a human being; answering that question requires the human activity of practically reasoning. And since every “sane, mature adult” engages in this activity, every sane mature adult has a general notion about the answer. The crucial insight is that without such a general notion, *we would not engage in rational action at all*. Frey continues:

No human action is intelligible without attributing to the agent herself some conception of this end, no matter how inarticulate, unsystematic, or unreflective it might be. Aquinas takes it for granted that in coming to be a human being—i.e., being raised in a community of other human beings, coming into the possession of concepts, a language, and coming to have a world—one comes into some such conception, and thus comes to act voluntarily.⁴⁹

Where does the process of rational action begin? We can again compare practical reasoning with demonstrative or theoretical reasoning. Aquinas puts the comparison this way:

...as “being” is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so “good” is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good. Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that “good is that which all things seek after.” Hence this is the first precept of practical reason, that “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.”⁵⁰

Aquinas points out that the first thing human beings apprehend as theoretical reasoners is simply “existence” or “being” – infants perceive that some things are there and others not

48. Ibid., 78–79, italics in original.

49. Ibid., 87.

50. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, n.d. IIa. Q.94. Art. 2.

there. They eventually come to perceive objects *as* objects, as individual objects, and to name and categorize them with language acquired in a social setting. Likewise, the first thing human beings apprehend as practical reasoners is simply the “good” or “desirable”. The use of ‘good’ here, it bears repeating, is not a special moral sense of good, but simply means ‘desirable’ or ‘to be pursued.’ An entity is ‘good’ when it is considered as an object of inclination. Hence, infants perceive that some things are to be pursued and others avoided. To be *theoretically* rational is to judge a proposition *p* as true or false, as best one can, according to the rational assessment of the reasons for affirming or denying *p*. Similarly, to be *practically* rationally is to judge a practical reason ϕ to be pursued or avoided, in accord with the rational assessment of the reasons for pursuing or avoiding ϕ . Without a general principle in either case, practical reasoning and rational practice are unintelligible.

Given this basic and abstract formulation of the structure of practical reasoning, we can further specify good ends. Just as the basic structure of reasoning begins with the apprehension of being in general and then on to particular beings, concepts, and categories, practical reason begins with the apprehension of good in general and then determines particular goods.

Practical reason is the movement of thought towards, rather than away from, material particulars.... practical reasoning is a movement from general knowledge of what is good and how to live, towards the production of the kind of life that is essentially characterized by such knowledge. When it is done well, what is understood is the same as what is produced: human form or human life.⁵¹

Such basic goods are apprehended as contributing to a distinctively human life form.

For practical reason, the starting points are the most primitive human goods that the will is naturally inclined to seek: life, knowledge, family, friendship, play, political community, and so on. These are the ends that all human beings want for their own sake, as intrinsically valuable to them. And they

51. Frey, “The Will and the Good,” 2.

want these things in a rational way—viz., because they have a conceptual apprehension that they are constitutive of their general good.⁵²

To sum up the account thus far, all organisms incline toward the good of their life form, including those basic goods that enable the full actualization thereof. Various organisms express this inclination in various ways. For lower organisms, consciousness plays no part in this process; for higher organisms, consciousness does play a part. For humans, the essential difference is a sensitivity to the space of reasons, both evidential and practical. ‘Practical reasoning’ is the name for the whole complex process of perceiving certain salient facts as reasons to pursue or avoid some course of action, and comparing and ranking competing reasons in light of an overall conception of a good human life, and acting accordingly. None of this is intended to deny that evaluative practical reasoning arises in a the normal process of socialization. Rather, that our conception of how to live would arise that way is what we would predict for rational primates who speak and live in society.

5. Objections

We are now in a position to respond to the challenges stated above.

5.1 On Procedural Reasoning

According to the **Procedural Reasoning** challenge, reasoning is not about ends but only about means. Practical reasoning is a procedural or instrumental process.⁵³ The critic alleges that one may criticize only criticize Smith as “irrational” when he fails to use the necessary means to his or her own ends, but one may not criticize Smith’s *ends themselves* as irrational. For example, if we define practical reasoning as the process by which one

52. Ibid., 88.

53. For a discussion of this distinction, see: Brad Hooker and Bart Streumer, “Procedural and Substantive Practical Rationality,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Rationality* (Oxford University Press, 2004), 57–74.

adjudicates the means to *one's own health*, then *any* unhealthy action (e.g., eating delicious but less-than-healthy food) would be ipso facto irrational. Isn't it problematic to build into the definition of rationality any specific, ready-made ends?

The first response to this challenge is that, even on the procedural view, practical reasoning *must necessarily have a certain intelligible structure*. The advocate of the procedural view, no less than the advocate of the substantive view, needs a sufficiently general starting point for procedural reasoning to even get off the ground. Frey's candidate for that starting point is the maximally general conception that "good is to be done and evil avoided", or that "one must pursue the human good." Her argument was that by definition when practical reasoners act at all, they act in pursuit of a particular object falling under a universal category. In order to construct *any* practical syllogisms as we do, one needs a sufficiently broad "major premise."

A second response is that Frey's view does not build in very *specific* ends. The built-in end is quite general: it is some conception of how to live in a way that is good for practical, rational primates like us. This substantive good is general enough to accommodate a variety of controversial details about what one ought to do or not do. In other words, the substantive view of practical reasoning allows for the possibility that, in a disagreement, one party may be reasoning more accurately than the other in identifying what is to be pursued or avoided, while both parties are basically rational.

Foot offers two additional considerations that support this Aristotelian account. When she wrote her famous "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives", she argued that moral reasons are not overriding, categorical imperatives contrasted with every other kind of reason. She explains that, at the time, she had not discovered a way of showing "the rationality of acting, even against desire and self-interest, on the a demand of morality."⁵⁴ What changed her mind was an argument from Warren Quinn to the effect that if practical

54. Foot, *Natural Goodness*, 63.

reasoning is to be important at all it must be *by definition* the pursuit of some good. Quinn says:

Practical thought, like any other thought, requires a subject matter. And for human beings the subject matter that distinguishes thought as practical is, in the first instance, human ends and action insofar as they are good or bad in themselves... Practical thought deploys a master set of non-instrumental evaluative notions: that of a good or bad human act, a good or bad human life, a good or bad human agent, and a good or bad human action. Practical reason is, on this view, the faculty that applies these fundamental evaluative concepts.⁵⁵

What Foot found so compelling is the change to “seeing goodness as setting a necessary condition of practical rationality and therefore as at least a part-determinant of the thing itself.” To one who objects, she points out that:

Many of us are willing to reject a ‘present desire’ theory of reasons for action because we think that someone who knowingly puts his future health at risk for a trivial pleasure is behaving foolishly, and therefore not well. Seeing his will as defective, we therefore say that he is doing what he has reason not to do. Being unable to fit the supposed ‘reason’ into some preconceived present-desire-based theory of reasons for action, we do not query whether it really is a foolish way to behave, but rather hang on to the evaluation and shape our theory of reasons accordingly. And it is exactly a generalization of this presumption about the direction of the argument on which I am now insisting. For what, we may ask, is so special about prudence that it alone among the virtues should be reasonably thought to relate to practical rationality in such a way?⁵⁶

Foot and Frey are arguing that goodness is a “necessary condition of practical rationality.” Rational action is action in pursuit of some end. And “some end” is something pursued as desirable or something to be avoided as undesirable. But pursuing something *as desirable or undesirable* is already a substantive evaluative judgment. Therefore, any rational action necessarily includes a substantive evaluative judgment.

55. Warren Quinn and Philippa Foot, *Morality and Action* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 223.

56. Foot, *Natural Goodness*, 63.

If we accept this point, and I do not see how to avoid it, then we are already committed to a minimally substantive view of practical reason, rather than a merely procedural one. The alternative to aiming at the apparent good is not aiming at some value-neutral “end” or goal; the alternative to aiming at the apparent good is *not acting at all*.

5.2 On Motivation

While I gave McDowell’s reply above to the Humean critic, I would like to return to the subject of motivation here. While I cannot adequately engage the vast body of literature here, it will be useful to briefly situate my neo-Aristotelian account within the debate between motivational internalists and externalists.

In brief, the motivational internalist argues that any practical reasons “out there” must necessarily connect up with my motivational structure if they are to move me to action.⁵⁷ The motivational externalist, by contrast, argues that there might be practical reasons “out there” such that I *ought* to be motivated by them, even if I am currently not.

The danger of internalism is that it seems to allow that the amoralist who is *not motivated* to be moral is off the hook. By contrast, the externalist argues that the immoralist has *reasons* to ϕ even if he or she has no (current) *motivation* to ϕ .

On my view, motivational internalism gets this much right: one is motivated to pursue something that falls under a category that, within the existing motivational structure, one *already judges* to be desirable. However, the internalist too narrowly defines a “motivational structure”. If by “motivational structure” we mean my present set of broad psychological inclinations, then it is possible that we may not have the right motivational structure that would lead to moral action. But if by that we simply mean *my overall practical disposition toward the worthwhile, desirable, and good*, then it is quite uncontroversial

57. Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” in *Ethical Theory: An Anthology*, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau, 2007, 292–98.

to assert that one only goes in for ϕ -ing when ϕ -ing seems to be worthwhile, because to be a practical agent just means to be oriented to pursue the good and avoid the bad. Whatever may appear to me to fall under the description of ‘good’ I will, ipso facto, be oriented toward (whether I pursue it or merely approve of it and admire it). Whatever may appear to me to fall under the description ‘bad’ I will, ipso facto, oriented away from it (whether I avoid it or merely disapprove of it).

What motivational externalism gets right is that there might be reasons to ϕ that I am not aware of and (hence) am not motivated by. For example, perhaps it is true that one ought to save for retirement, but I may fail to do so because I am unaware of that reason or am ignoring it in my attention to other reasons.

Seen in this light, it is obvious that on my neo-Aristotelian account practical reasons can and do motivate us. We can put the matter more strongly: According to Frey’s argument above, practical reasons are the *primary* meaning of the term ‘motive.’ Motivation is (I argue) a fundamentally rational state. It is true that sub-rational animals, plants, and insects are moved about by impulses such as hungers, thirsts, loves, fears, etc. And it is true that human animals are likewise moved about by such impulses. But for rational animals, there is an additional source of motion, namely practical reasons.

In this connection, Aquinas makes a helpful distinction between the “actions of a human” and “human actions.” The action of a human is any motion, such as mumbling in your sleep, scratching an itch, or idly tapping a foot. But a human action is by definition an action in pursuit of a goal which is perceived as a good. A human being without any practical reasons would not do immoral deeds; he or she would not do anything at all. Like Melville’s *Bartleby the Scrivener*, the person who does not engage in practical reasoning or identify any practical reasons would simply waste away and die.⁵⁸

Hence, my contention is that our default view of practical reasoning creatures ought

58. Herman Melville, *Bartleby, the Scrivener* (Best Classic Books, 1966).

to be that practical reason is intrinsically capable of motivating. The process satisfies the practicality requirement by definition. Practical reasoning is not something one does *before* resolving what to do, as one picks up an item in a store *before* purchasing it. Practical reasoning is the name we give to the process of *resolving what to do*, as checking out from the store is the process of purchasing it. If there is no gap between the conclusion of a deliberation and a decision, then (to co-opt Gibbard's unforgettable phrasing) practical reasoning is "thinking how to live."⁵⁹

5.3 On Overriding Reasons

A final challenge that needs a response is this: moral reasons are sometimes treated as "overriding" or "verdictive" reasons that settle the question of what to do. Given the choice between, say, making a bit of easy money by fraud or making the same amount through honest but hard work, the prohibition against fraud is supposed to settle the matter. On my account, do prudential practical reasons weigh just as heavily moral ones?

My answer is that the practical consideration that one ought never commit fraud is, in such a case, certainly overriding. However, sometimes prudential considerations are overriding, too. To take a different example, suppose Smith comes into a bit of money from an inheritance, and thus has a choice between spending it (innocently) on world travels or allocating it to a solid retirement plan. Even if Smith clearly needs more money in his retirement, the quandary ethicist would have no *moral* recommendation, because neither choice is obviously immoral in the sense that it violates one's duties to others. The character ethicist would: the practically wise person takes the longer-term benefit of saving over the short-term benefit of traveling to be overriding.

A normal human life presents practical reasoners with many situations in which reasons pertaining to moral virtue (narrowly defined) play little or no part. One must be

59. Allan Gibbard, *Thinking How to Live* (Harvard University Press, 2009).

sensitive not only to such reasons but to the broad range of practical reasons. All practical reasons must be ranked and weighed before a final, verdictive reason emerges. Any *reason to ϕ* is a practical reason that can feature in an overall account of *what to do*. What Anscombe calls “the verdictive ought” is simply what Foot calls the thing to do “all things considered.”⁶⁰ It often happens that one’s individual practical reasons conflict. McDowell is incorrect to persist in labeling the broader process of adjudicating such conflicts as “virtue.” He ought to call it practical wisdom. The practically wise person is the one who coordinates all other virtues and executes them to good ends.

Finally, some might object that the neo-Aristotelian view of practical reason defines away the possibility of immorality. If everyone who acts is “aiming at the good”, doesn’t this exculpate an agent’s apparently immoral motives or ends? For example, someone might say, ‘It’s ridiculous to think that I always pursue the good, because I sometimes do wrong.’ This objection misses the point. Of course practical reasoners sometimes do the wrong thing. The proper response is that we perceive the bad *as good*. If the immoral person acts wrongly, then he or she has misjudged the good. On the neo-Aristotelian view I am developing, immoral acts are rational mistakes.

But it remains true that if the immoral person *acts at all* then, according to the argument, he or she must by definition be pursuing some apparent good. To be practical rational necessarily means to pursue something *as good*, as desirable. Just as an epistemic agent might hold a false belief *p* without affirming the false *as false*, a practical agent might pursue a bad thing without pursuing it *as bad*. Rather, the immoral person fails in their practical reasoning to correctly rank and order specific goods. The imprudent person, for example, judges that it would be better to eat, drink, and be merry today rather than plan to avoid future ills. The cruel person judges that it would be better to cause suffering than to be kind.

60. Foot, *Natural Goodness*, 57.

Someone might say, “But sometimes I perceive the bad *as bad* and pursue it anyway.” My view is that we are able to sometimes include an end we know to be bad into an overall set of practical reasons, which we still judge is the thing to do, all things considered. One might judge, for example, that smoking cigarettes is bad and still do it because one judges (with some regret) that the gains outweigh the risks.

I do not wish to suggest that identifying the thing to do is a smooth and easy project. It is no more or less difficult than the project of identifying what to believe is true.

The defendant of the procedural view is liable to point out, reasoning about ends is even messier than such theoretical reasoning. Indeed it is. But we must do it. People regularly argue, debate, and reason about ultimate ends. Suppose Smith says to Jones, “I’m concerned about you. You haven’t returned my calls. You lost your job, and you are not eating. What’s wrong?” It would be no consolation for Jones to respond, “Nothing’s *wrong*. I’m destitute, alone, and unhealthy, but that is what I am *aiming* for.” Smith would rightly judge that something had gone wrong such that Jones adopt such unhealthy and ridiculous aims.

McDowell cited a feeling of ‘vertigo’ we feel when we do not perceive any objective basis for our rationality. Similarly, Wiggins suggests that there are psychological, not philosophical, reasons behind the attempt to reduce the process of practical reasoning to something mathematical and formal:

I entertain the unfriendly suspicion that those who feel they must seek more than [the Aristotelian view of practical reason] provides want a scientific theory of rationality not so much for a passion for science, even where there can be no science, but because they hope and desire, by some conceptual alchemy, to turn such a theory into a regulative or normative discipline, or into a system of rules by which to spare themselves some of the agony of thinking and all the torment of feeling and understanding that is actually involved in reasoned deliberation.⁶¹

61. David Wiggins, “Deliberation and Practical Reason,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 76 (1975): 29–51.

Any attempt to configure the process by subjecting to a set of ready-made rules or criteria will make it easier to understand only at the cost of falsifying it.

Even if we accept that practical reasoning is non-codifiable, it can be done well or poorly. We are morally responsible for doing it well. Jack Weinstein explains that:

The term practical rationality is derived from Aristotle's *phronesis*. It is to be distinguished from *sophia*, a more technical form of reasoning. Practical rationality leads to more approximate conclusions; it takes context and relative facts into account, and it usually leads to moral or political conclusions.⁶²

Phronesis guides one in providing a range of answers to the question "How should one live?"

The upshot is that the foolish person – the habitually, incorrigibly foolish person responsible for his or her own folly – is, ipso facto, a bad practical rational primate. He or she is failing to do *the thing to do*.

6. Conclusion

This chapter has defended in detail a neo-Aristotelian conception of practical reasoning where practical wisdom an essential part of living a fully virtuous life. The process of practically reasoning defines the life form of practical, rational primates, and hence, successful or failure in this activity determines one's level of virtue or vice.

I defended McDowell's thesis that virtue is a form of practical knowledge that includes a sensitivity to the salient facts of a given situation, and that practical reasons are intrinsically capable of motivating. Nevertheless, I took issue with McDowell's clarification that the virtuous person is sensitive not only to what is kind (or just, etc.) but to the whole range of practical reasons. I criticized the quandary frame and defended an alternative framing ethical discussions.

62. Jack Russell Weinstein, *On MacIntyre* (Wadsworth, 2003), 60–61.

On my account, the structure of practical reasoning is akin to theoretical reasoning. Where theoretical reasoning is by definition a normative process where the true is to be believed and the false to be disbelieved, practical reasoning is by definition a normative process in which good is to be pursued while evil is to be avoided. These “first principles” are known by all functioning human adults. And while particular rational inquiries aim at identifying good reasons to believe or disbelieve a claim, particular practical inquiries are aimed at identifying basic goods intrinsic to human life. I argued that the procedural view of practical reasoning is itself committed to certain substantive normative judgments, such as that one ought to do whatever will bring about one’s chosen ends; but more to the point, I argued that the substantive view of practical reasoning is more plausible: we reason about apparent goods and bads and act accordingly. Nevertheless, my account leaves room for the commonsense insight that success in practical reasoning (like theoretical reasoning) is by no means guaranteed.

Success in identifying how to live and what to do requires a complex process of adjudicating between all the available goods known to one, sorting them, ranking them with care and wisdom, and forming them into a complete life plan. The virtuous person knows what to do. Hence, virtue is a kind of knowledge, namely *practical knowledge* (a “disposition to act well”). When practical reasoning is well-functioning, it constitutes part of the natural excellence of creatures like us. The vicious person is hindered by practical error — or perhaps ignorance — of what to do.

A good answer to the question “how should one live?” will be not just a proposition but a plan. Even more exactly, the virtuous person does not simply *have a good plan* but enacts a good life plan. The answer to the “how should one live?” question is not just a philosophy but a life.

Chapter 6

Natural Reasoning

The most striking occurrence in the history of thought between Aristotle and ourselves is the rise of modern science.

—John McDowell, “Two Sorts of Naturalism ”174.

1. Introduction

Either humans are just another instance of biological organisms, like chimpanzees and dolphins, subject to evaluation by the same patterns of normativity or they are a different type of organism on account of exemplifying sui generis powers of rational practice and practical reasoning.

Deciding between these two requires giving an account of nature and human reason. To put it mildly, the relation between nature and reason is an almost intractable problem. Every major philosophical tradition – from Platonic rationalism, to Humean empiricism, to Hegelian objective idealism – has an important and sophisticated stance on this relation.

And it gives trouble not only to philosophers but to natural scientists, social scientists, and others.

Recent Neo-Aristotelians are of two minds about the relation between nature and reason.¹ Organic naturalists such as Foot admit a fundamental distinction between living and non-living entities, where humankind shares with other living species a distinctive set of rational potentialities that constitute natural normativity. Social naturalists such as McDowell draw a similar fundamental distinction elsewhere – namely, between non-rational entities (even living organisms) and human beings, where humankind’s distinctive rational potentialities are the root of all “second nature” natural normativity.

The last chapter gave a detailed account of practical reasoning as the defining feature of practical rational primates. If the account was successful, then it surfaces a remaining problem: Even if one cannot be a good human being without exercising fully the potential for practical reasoning, I must still show the genuinely *natural* position of reasoning within naturalism.

This chapter amounts to a criticism of some features of McDowell’s sort of naturalism and a defense of Foot’s, with a few crucial additions to the account. While there is no consensus as to *the* neo-Aristotelian solution to these problems, I shall add to some recent work from Micah Lott, Jennifer Frey, and Christopher Toner which has revealed a potentially satisfying solution.

Section 2 explains the “Irrelevance” objection, posed by John McDowell and others. The objection plainly arises in response to the emphasis on the normative importance of practical reasoning, so this section lays out four requirements that successful answer must satisfy.

Section 3 presents in detail McDowell’s account of “first” and “second nature” and

1. Some neo-Aristotelians go in for non-naturalism; I am speaking for the moment only about neo-Aristotelian naturalists.

offers a new criticism: namely, his account contains a contradiction in that he denies dualism at one moment but affirms it at another.

Section 4 presents for an alternative solution that escapes the pincer. That solution consists of two interrelated claims, one about what “natures” are and another about how such natures can be discerned. The first claim is that nature refers in an unrestricted way to anything that is, rather than in a restricted way to only a subset of things that are (such as spatio-temporal material objects). The second claim is that we can discern the very same formal nature of a thing in two complementary ways; both from “within” the practical point of view of rational reflection and from “outside” such a view, in a more external, objective sense. Both kinds of knowledge lay hold of identical facts. And both kinds of knowledge are broadly scientific, unless we employ an unjustly narrow concept of science that excludes formal disciplines such as mathematics, logic, computer science, and so on.

2. The Problem and its Requirements

The Irrelevance problem (hereafter “Irrelevance”) states that the natural norms are *ethically* irrelevant or at least not definitive. Irrelevance entertains the hypothesis that there are natural human norms, but objects that such norms are irrelevant to how we should live because, as practical reasoners, we can pick and choose which natural norms to follow.

Jennifer Frey places this objection in context of the is-ought gap: “The irrelevancy objection is a more sophisticated presentation of the so-called ‘naturalistic fallacy.’ But rather than crudely rejecting any move from ‘is’ to ‘ought’, it merely blocks the inference at one crucial juncture—the inference from the ‘is’ of the species, to the ‘ought’ that governs the rational will.”²

McDowell is one philosopher who articulates the Irrelevance objection. For Mc-

2. Frey, “The Will and the Good,” 14.

Dowell, the 'is-ought' gap is a real problem insofar as biology seems irrelevant to particular moral obligation. McDowell concedes, if only hypothetically, the existence of the sort of natural norms posited by the organic naturalist. Each organism pursues its own species specific goods, such as food, shelter, comfort, survival, and reproduction. But when it comes to rational animals like us, such norms are not binding. As animals, people find themselves subject to hunger, thirst. These merely biological urges are morally neutral with respect to the question of whether I should eat or not. Morality impinges on me to eat certain things at certain times and in ways. A vegetarian might feel an ethical obligation not to eat meat even if the look and smell of it is appetizing; a glutton might feel an ethical obligation not to snack between meals even if he or she feels hungry. His discussion of the "rational wolf" illustrates this point. A wolf is "supposed to" hunt in packs because that is a formal property of its life form or nature. But a rational wolf, a wolf endowed with *logos*, would be just as free as human beings are to step back from such natural norms and either endorse or reject them.

The organic naturalist's attempt to collapse genuinely normative obligations into natural norms seems to him a commitment to "philistine scientism", that is, an over-zealous application of empirical methods to ethical matters. He would strenuously object to sentiments like that expressed by E.O. Wilson: "the time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologicized" (Wilson 1975, 562). Instead of such crass scientism, what McDowell thinks is needed is the kind of self-reflection discussed above. We must understand the good of human life, commit to pursuing it, and resist temptations to deviate from that pursuit. This self-reflective practical reasoning may not stay within the lines of orthodox "empiricism" but, McDowell would say, so much the worse for empiricism.

A related problem is what Elijah Millgram calls the "Pollyanna problem," which states that any honest, empirical assessment of human natural norms would include vicious

norms as well as virtuous ones because justice and injustice are both statistically “normal.”[⁸⁶] On this objection, the critic might argue that I was winking at the dark side of human nature when I built my inductive case for the generic that “the human being” is a practical rational primate. After all, politicians lie, criminals murder, businesses cheat, criminals steal, countries wage unjust war, parents abuse their children, and so on. If we gather a robust sample of such behaviors and count them all as natural norms. Are we obligated to fulfill all such norms? Just some? Anscombe anticipates this worry when she says:

The search for “norms” might lead someone to look for laws of nature, as if the universe were a legislator; but in the present day this is not likely to lead to good results: it might lead one to eat the weaker according to the laws of nature, but would hardly lead anyone nowadays to notions of justice.³

Expanding the scope of observation to include plants and non-human animals makes matters even worse: Empirically, some acorns become fully grown, mature oaks, but other acorns become stultified, sickly specimens. Most acorns never become anything other than acorns before they disintegrate into dust in the soil. Some animals protect their young while other animals abandon or even consume their young. Are we supposed to allow, then, that “Human beings abandon their young” is a generic truth, indicative of the human life form?

The force of Pollyanna is similar to Irrelevance. In both problems, putative human norms that were supposed to indicate what a virtuous human being is and does, such norms appear either irrelevant or vicious. One can only ignore all instances of human vileness if one has a prior bias in favor of the light and sweet and sympathetic side of humanity. And where would this bias come from? It could only come from prior *ethical* beliefs, beliefs that are already normatively loaded instead of scientific, objective, and open.

Selfish traits such as cruelty and deception sometimes secure good outcomes for their possessors: the unjust person may “play a crucial role in human survival and repro-

3. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 14.

duction.”⁴ So some traits that are clearly vices from an ethical standpoint would turn out to be instances of natural goodness. After all, my presentation of human nature was supposed to provide an objective basis for showing how instances of natural goodness are virtues. If some putative vices are instances of natural goodness, then, absurdly, they too would be virtues.

These objections together constitute pincer problem. On the one hand, the teleology of life (organic teleology) compels us to categorize injustice as a virtue or else to appeal to the practical, evaluative point of view; but the teleology of rational choice (social teleology) seems to force us to abandon the relevance of the teleology of life. Caught in this pincer, neo-Aristotelians must either bite the bullet and abandon organic naturalism, or embrace the absurd (or patently immoral) conclusion that some vices are good for us. Is there any way to escape the dilemma, or reconcile it?

The attempt to reconcile the two forms of teleology can twist one into knots: Rosalind Hursthouse seems to vacillate between the two. She explicitly endorses Foot’s naturalism (of first nature) but also seems to endorse McDowell’s “naturalism of second nature.” She says, “Ethical naturalism is not to be construed as the attempt to ground ethical evaluations in a scientific account of human nature.”⁵ She claims that her account is, like McDowell’s, still loosely naturalistic. She still bases ethical considerations on our nature as rational agents, i.e., “human nature” or “second nature.” But then hasn’t she thereby rejected Foot’s view? Jennifer Frey also observes:

On this issue, Hursthouse seems to be speaking out of both sides of her mouth. She wants to acknowledge to Aristotelian critics like John McDowell that naturalistic considerations do not convince anyone to change their basic moral beliefs or motivate them to action. But at the same time, she thinks that she can approach the Humean or the Kantian and argue for “the rational credentials” of our moral beliefs based upon a “scientific” and “ob-

4. Chrisoula Andreou, “Getting on in a Varied World,” *Social Theory and Practice* 32, no. 1 (2006): 71.

5. Hursthouse, *On Virtue Ethics* especially chapter 10.

jective” naturalistic account. It is unclear how she is supposed to satisfy both parties at once, and the tension remains unresolved in her own work.⁶

It seems that the pincer forces us to give up what is “so helpful for ethics” about Foot’s naturalism and either take recourse to McDowell’s sort or else give up on naturalism altogether.

2.1 Requirements for an Answer

In his (2008) article,⁷ Chris Toner argues that those neo-Aristotelians who agree with Foot and Thompson have not yet adequately responded to McDowell’s objections and satisfied four requirements “naturalism must deliver if it is to support a revived Aristotelian virtue ethics...”⁸ Gladly, our account thus far has satisfied three of the four. Let us list the four criteria for a successful neo-Aristotelian naturalism and comment on each one.

First, *natural norms must be intrinsically able to motivate the bearer of the nature*. The natural human norms pertaining to our nature are examples of practical reasons. And I have already presented an argument above that practical reasons are, by definition, able to motivate us. The process of practical reasoning (about practical reasons) is the process of adjudicating between various norms, desires, inclinations, urges, and so on.

Secondly, *natural norms must be intrinsically able to justify themselves to the bearer of the nature*. The natural norm must be something that justifies itself, either to all rational agents as such or to all moral agents. The norm need not, Toner admits, automatically persuade a Callicles to repent of his wickedness. However, it must be able to motivate. He says:

...I say “intrinsically able to motivate or justify” rather than “intrinsically motivating or justifying”: the natural norm is such that it can motivate or convince persons, provided they are not in too dysfunctional a state. In the same way a rose is such as to be intrinsically able to convince us of its being

6. Cf. Frey, “The Will and the Good. 44, footnote 55.

7. Toner, “Sorts of Naturalism.”

8. Ibid., 222.

red. Its failure actually to do so in my case because I am color-blind or jaundiced does not impugn this intrinsic ability. Natural norms can motivate and convince because they are neither “mere facts” about the way a given species does go on nor “brute desires” a given species happens to have as a result of its evolutionary history.⁹

It is true that mere general descriptive facts do not motivate and that simple brute desires to behave in a certain way are not necessarily overriding motivators. However, as I have argued in chapters 2 and 3, natural norms are not reducible to either mere facts or brute desires. Rather, natural norms both characterize what traits count as virtues for practical rational creatures like us, and are intrinsically able to justify themselves to the bearer of that nature. Toner mentions that “The requirements of the virtues can be articulated into what Hursthouse calls v-rules (do what is just, what is courageous, and so forth).”¹⁰

Thirdly, *natural norms must be anchored in and express universal human nature*. In chapter 3 I defended a definition of “universal human nature,” that we are practical rational primates. And I argued that the natural norm that one ought to become a fully mature practical rational primate (whatever that turns out to mean) is an example of a norm “anchored in” and expressing this nature. More specifically, all the virtues of rational practice and practical reasoning are examples of such norms. For, as Toner says:

... the possession and exercise of the virtues is essential to human flourishing as dependent rational animals. Thus natural norms or the requirements of the virtues, in articulating what we need (to have, to be, to do) to flourish, are anchored in and express universal human nature.¹¹

Fourthly, *first and second nature must be related so that the second is a natural outgrowth of the first, and so that that in our given makeup is (first) natural which does tend toward an ethically mature second nature*. Satisfying this fourth criterion is the aim here.

9. Ibid., 235.

10. Ibid., 242.

11. Ibid., 242.

Even though McDowell is critical of Foot's biological or organic naturalism, he does not wish to fall into a dualism between biology and rationality. Rather, he believes that it is possible to "formulate a conception of reason that is, in one sense, naturalistic: a formed state of practical reason is one's second nature, not something that dictates to one's nature from outside."¹² Note that he links the epistemological point with the metaphysical one: the dictates of practical reason come from "inside" one's rational point of view; yet reason is "naturalistic" in the sense that it expresses one's nature.

My objection to McDowell's view is not just that it fails to be "naturalistic", as some have alleged. Rather, my objection is that McDowell oscillates between contradictory concepts of 'nature'. First, I will show how McDowell plays a game of ball and cup with his account of 'the natural'. Secondly, McDowell's account will be shown to depend on contradictory accounts of scientific inquiry. Thirdly, I will challenge his assumptions about restricting primary qualities to the non-normative.

3. McDowell's First and Second Natures

In this section, my purpose is to summarize McDowell's view of the relation between reason and nature in his ethical and other writings. McDowell's paradoxical views have caused some consternation among his philosophical readers, so I shall not only try to summarize McDowell's view of nature, practical reason, and the scientific picture of the world, but explain why it is so beguiling. In short, McDowell agrees with non-naturalist realists, naturalistic subjectivists, and moral anti-realists that practical reasons, norms, or instances of natural goodness are not "out there" in the objective world. On the other hand, as we shall see, he shares with Foot an opinion that practical reasons are not supernatural nor merely subjective.

12. McDowell, "Two Sorts of Naturalism."

An initial quotation from McDowell expresses his precise objection to Foot's organic naturalism:

Philippa Foot has long urged the attractions of ethical naturalism. I applaud the negative part of her point, which is to reject various sorts of subjectivism and supernaturalist rationalism. But I doubt whether we can understand a positive naturalism in the right way without first rectifying a constriction that the concept of nature is liable to undergo in our thinking. Without such preliminaries, what we make of ethical naturalism will not be the radical and satisfying alternative to Mrs Foot's targets that naturalism can be. Mrs Foot's writings do not pay much attention to the concept of nature in its own right, and this leaves a risk that her naturalism may seem to belong to this less satisfying variety. I hope an attempt to explain this will be an appropriate token of friendship and admiration.¹³

As this quotation makes clear, McDowell shares Foot's rejection of "subjectivism and supernaturalist rationalism." The key point is that he disputes her "concept of nature." McDowell's classifies his own view as a "sort of naturalism" – namely "relaxed naturalism."¹⁴ McDowell invokes Aristotle's notion of ethics, by which he hopes to rethink our conception of human nature and nature as a whole. He says, "the rethinking requires a different conception of actualizations of our nature."¹⁵ Second nature is that space in which human beings are initiated into particularly rational ways of thinking and behaving. McDowell accepts that human reasoning is irreducibly normative, but he does not accept the designation of such reasoning as "unnatural" or "non-natural." Instead, his "different conception" promises to show how such reasoning is an actualization of our primary nature.

13. McDowell, *Mind, Value, and Reality*, 167.

14. A few of McDowell's other names for his view: 'liberal' naturalism' (*Mind and World*, Harvard 1996, 89, 98); 'acceptable naturalism' (*Mind, Value, and Reality* 197). Like Thomas Nagel, he also finds friends in Plato and Aristotle, calling his view 'Greek naturalism' (*Mind and World* 174), 'Aristotelian naturalism' (*Mind and World* 196), 'naturalism of second nature' (*Mind and World* 86), or 'naturalized platonism' (John McDowell, *Mind and World* (Harvard University Press, 1996) 91). For further comments on these distinctions, see Fink, "Three Sorts of Naturalism. 204. Goetz and Taliaferro refer to "strict" and "relaxed" naturalism: Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro, *Naturalism* (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2008).

15. McDowell, *Mind and World*, 77.

For McDowell, nature consists of Lockean primary qualities, which are response-independent as well as dispositional properties which are response-dependent. "Values" are the latter sort. There is no such thing as "to-be-pursuedness" existing as a Lockean primary quality in first nature. Whereas Foot thinks that normative facts are response-independent features of (first) nature, McDowell finds this view impossible to entertain. He says that naive realism about value is "impossible – at least on reflection – to take seriously..."¹⁶ The first reason McDowell can't take naive realism seriously is the impossibility of explaining "how something that is brutally *there* could nevertheless stand in an internal relation to some exercise of human sensibility."¹⁷ In this McDowell agrees with Mackie: the "central doctrine of European moral philosophy" is a mistake;¹⁸ it is wrong to think that some things *merit* certain responses by virtue of what they are and what we are. A second worry is that the doctrine of objective value, where normative facts are primary qualities of nature, has been discredited or outmoded by modern science. The modern scientific picture of nature is "disenchanted" from such intrinsic values as meaning and morality. He says, "The most striking occurrence in the history of thought between Aristotle and ourselves is the rise of modern science."¹⁹

If McDowell is right that the modern scientific worldview prohibits believing that values are objective primary qualities, a natural move would be to embrace a form of error theory or expressivism or subjectivism. Subjectivists of the sort discussed above (such as Mackie, Alan Gibbard, and Simon Blackburn) believe that normativity is "projected" by philosophers and scientists onto the natural facts. But McDowell resists this move. He says that Mackie's error theory gets right the common sense view that "ordinary evaluative thought [is] a matter of sensitivity to aspects of the world."²⁰ Secondary qualities are

16. Russ Shaffer-Landeau and Terence Cuneo, eds. (Blackwell, 2007), 137.

17. Ibid., 143.

18. John Mackie, *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong* (Penguin UK, 1977).

19. McDowell, "Two Sorts of Naturalism," 174.

20. Shaffer-Landeau and Cuneo, 137.

“subjective” in that they cannot be adequately conceived “except in terms of certain subjective states”²¹ but not in that they are therefore illusory. A secondary quality is not “a mere figment of the subjective state that purports to be an experience of it.”²²

What is the alternative to the apparently exhaustive dualism of seeing values (or norms) as *either* facts of nature like primary qualities *or* unreal, illusory, and purely subjective. His answer is that values are “secondary qualities” or “dispositional properties” of nature. His essay “Values and Secondary Qualities” argues that values are like colors and unlike shapes.²³ We might paraphrase this thesis by saying that natural norms are qualities *in the world* (not just in our heads) but they are not Lockean “primary qualities.” They are, rather, Lockean secondary qualities. Knowledge of such qualities is intersubjective, grounded in a form of life, grounded in our communal rationality itself. He says a secondary property ascription is true “in virtue of the object’s disposition to present a certain sort of perceptual appearance.”²⁴ Experience of secondary qualities is a (sense) perceptual experience. This is a Lockean doctrine. Redness is not *merely* a microscopic texture property (say, the texture that scatters all light waves except red ones) because microscopic textures don’t *look red* and things that *look red* appear so to observers with no knowledge of such textures.

Colors are response-dependent, while other properties (say, squareness) are response-independent. Color-properties must be defined partly by their “objective” or response-independent aspects and partly phenomenologically. Shape-properties, by contrast, can be defined by their objective or mind-independent aspects. It makes no sense to speak of

21. Ibid., 139.

22. Ibid., 139.

23. John McDowell, “Values and Secondary Qualities,” in *Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology*, ed. Russ Shaffer-Landeau and Terence Cuneo (Blackwell, 2007), 137–45. I shall cite this anthology. The essay is also printed in McDowell, *Mind, Value, and Reality*, chapter 7.

24. Shaffer-Landeau and Cuneo, 138.

what *redness is* apart from perceptions of red *in perceivers*. Similarly, it makes no sense to speak of “dangerousness” apart from a subject who is potentially vulnerable. So, perhaps, it also makes no sense to speak of “rightness” apart from a subject who potentially judges the value of a thing.

Yet by the same token right and wrong are not *purely* invented. The property of “being such as to look red” may or may not *have ever been perceived as red* by any observer (if, for example, the appropriate conditions have never obtained). So a Lockean secondary quality may be response-independent in some sense, but it is not *redness as such*. It is the dispositional property that is disposed to present us with an appearance of a particular phenomenal character. So values (like colors) are dispositional properties.

Goodness, badness, and other values are therefore grounded in “second nature.”²⁵ The space of reasons in which our rational capacities operate makes us sensible to those dispositional properties of primary nature which become, for us, values such as goodness and badness. We shall explore McDowell's view of second nature a bit more in a later chapter. Suffice it for now that “second nature” is a distinctly human phenomenon. We partially re-enchant nature by bringing primary facts into the space of reasons when they weren't there before.

3.1 Discursus on McDowell's project

McDowell's anti-dualist position is liable to puzzle or frustrate some philosophers here. He is neither a *realist nor an anti-realist* – what else is there?

To make his view here more comprehensible, it is advisable to briefly give some context on McDowell's metaphilosophy. McDowell is a proponent of “therapeutic philosophy.” He says he is influenced by two main sources: the “Socratic tradition” and Wittgenstein.²⁶

25. McDowell, “Two Sorts of Naturalism,” 188 and following.

26. McDowell, *Mind, Value, and Reality*, preface.

From the Socratic tradition he draws a way of thinking in which dualisms do not even arise. And from the later Wittgenstein he draws a way of doing “therapeutic” philosophy²⁷ – philosophy that ‘leaves everything as it is’²⁸. That is, McDowell believes many philosophical puzzles arise not from puzzling reality but from errors in *our own thinking*, so we need “therapy”: dualisms need to be *exorcised*. He is an “anti-anti-realist.” He is always fighting on two fronts, attacking a position without thereby supporting its apparent opposite.

With this in mind, we can more readily see how his objection to Foot and his quasi-subjectivist alternative is consistent with his solution to the mind-body problem. In *Mind and World* he attempts to dissolve the “vacillation” between naive empirical realism and “Rampant Platonism” by arguing that even primary qualities are not given to us in experience without the involvement of spontaneous conceptual capacities. He wants to accept the modern scientific picture of nature as “bald nature”, a mechanical “realm of law”, disenchanted from values, teloi, and other esoterica. But he does not want to accept that human rationality is likewise mechanical. Instead, he argues that humanity exists in a space of reasons where we recognize reasons for belief and reasons for action.

McDowell here invokes Aristotle’s notion of ethics, by which he hopes to rethink our conception of human nature and nature as a whole. He says, “the rethinking requires a different conception of actualizations of our nature.”²⁹ Second nature is that space in which human beings are initiated into particular ways of behaving and knowing by *Bildung* — that is, by education, formation, or cultivation.³⁰ Practical wisdom is one example of a virtue that the young human being does not have but that may be developed by formation. At first, the ethical demands of practical wisdom are not even perceptible to the young. They have the natural potential to become aware of, and answerable to, the demands of practical

27. Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald, *McDowell and His Critics* (John Wiley & Sons, 2008).

28. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*. Section 124.

29. McDowell, *Mind and World*, 77.

30. Bildung=formation, education; bild=form, image.

wisdom. Slowly, that potential is actualized or inculcated and a moral outlook is attained. Human beings are initiated into this stretch of the space of reasons by ethical upbringing (Bildung) which instills the appropriate shape in their lives.

So initiated, practically wise behavior is not just a new kind of behavior but the maturation and development of a new kind of faculty in the human animal. That moral outlook may be later examined, but only from within the moral outlook. The circularity of this inculcation and new second natural faculty is not accidental: Since practical wisdom is responsive to reasons, it becomes a prototype “for the...faculty that enables us to recognize and create ... intelligibility.”³¹ “[The ethical demands of reason] are essentially within reach of human beings. So practical wisdom is second nature to its possessors.”³² In this sense, mature human being can be rightly described as “doing what comes naturally” when he or she engages in certain rational activities that have been deeply habituated.

McDowell's view in *Mind and World*, I think, illuminates his discussion of secondary values or dispositional properties. And his position is comprehensible. Indeed, we should expect that he would dispute both Foot's brand of moral realism and also its apparent opposite, subjectivism and anti-realism. But it is vulnerable to a couple of criticisms.

3.2 Objections to McDowell's Solution

Some have objected to McDowell's view of mind and world as being insufficiently naturalistic. James Lenman is one example: “McDowell is certainly pervasively inspired by Aristotle and he describes himself as a naturalist. See especially his 1995. But I suspect many philosophers would find his use of the term ‘naturalist’ here somewhat Pickwickian.”³³ I think McDowell's ingenious alternative to “strict naturalism” is flawed, but the flaw is not

31. Ibid., 79.

32. Ibid., 84.

33. James Lenman, “Moral Naturalism,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 2014.

an idiosyncratic definition of naturalism. The flaw is a contradiction by sleight of hand. This section attempts to demonstrate that the problems with McDowell's ingenious alternative to empirical naturalism is not that it ends up being a form of non-naturalistic idealism but that it incoherently both affirms and denies empirical naturalism.

Fink³⁴ expertly exposes McDowell's move here. To see the dilemma McDowell faces, consider that there are at least two kinds of conceptions of nature: (1) "Restricted nature" picks out some subset of all things that are natural, leaving everything else 'non-natural', unnatural, or supernatural. Fink provides a list of eight different intuitive ways of contrasting (a restricted conception of) nature with what is non-natural. For instance, 'nature' could mean the world unaffected by intelligent intervention (e.g., the arrangement of trees in the Yukon is natural where the rows of trees in the Huntington Library is not) or "the empirical world as opposed to the intelligible world of the abstract, logical, or mathematical" (natural sciences of physics and biology are natural where formal sciences such as calculus and geometry are not).

In short, the first eight conceptions of nature distinguish the natural from everything else. Fink's ninth conception of 'nature' leaves nothing out. He explains the unrestricted conception in this way:

It would express the idea that there is one world only, and that that world is the realm of nature, which is taken to include the cultural, artificial, mental, abstract and whatever else there may prove to be. There are no realms above or beyond nature. To be is to be in nature and to be in continuity with everything else in nature. Even the greatest and deepest differences are differences within nature rather than differences between nature and something else.³⁵

The question for McDowell is whether nature is best understood as some subset of reality or reality itself. Now, 'nature' is ambiguous and some will insist that we can clear up this

34. "Three Sorts of Naturalism."

35. *Ibid.*, 206.

mare's nest by stipulation. But Fink disagrees:

This is a terminological issue, but it is not easy to resolve simply by choosing one's definition of 'nature' and then sticking to it. No account of naturalism should forget the fact that 'nature' is, as Raymond Williams puts it, 'perhaps the most complex word in the language' (Williams 1981: 184), or as Hume puts it, a word 'than which there is none more ambiguous and equivocal' (THN: III.I.II.). In this section I shall try to give a somewhat systematic overview of some of this complexity that simply cannot be reduced by philosophical fiat...Indeed, it is a deep root of ambiguity that we can talk about the nature of art, law, language, culture, morality, normativity, history, civilization, spirit, mind, God, or nothingness even if we otherwise regard these as non-natural, that is, as not belonging to nature as a realm. There is no contradiction in talking about the nature of the unnatural, the super-natural, or the non-natural, just as it is an open question what the nature of the natural is.³⁶

Both idealism and empiricism are forms of restricted naturalism. Calling idealism a form of naturalism may sound outrageous to the more empirically minded. But the argument is sound.

To explain the issue in more detail, Fink discusses a passage from Plato's *Laws*. There, Plato draws a trichotomy between three kinds of events that come about by nature (*physis*), by chance, and by art. 'Nature' and 'chance' explain why plants grow, why the sun moves, and so on. 'Art' explains why houses have roofs, why humans wear clothes, and anything else that we do and that nature and chance could *not* have done. The "natural" pair in this trichotomy consists of the first two: that which comes about, so to speak, on its own, *prior to* and *independent of* intelligent intervention from humans or gods. This conception of nature excludes not only the supernatural but also the cultural, the fictional or imaginative, and so on. The Athenian does not accept this "dangerous" conception of nature. Rather, he argues that "soul is necessarily prior in origin to things which belong to body, seeing that soul is older than body."³⁷ Fink comments on this passage:

36. Ibid., 206.

37. Cooper, *Complete Works of Plato*, *Laws* 891cff.

The Athenian doesn't just leave the concept *physis* to the 'men of science'. He does not first accept their conception of nature and then confront them with the claim that there is something extra-natural—the soul or the gods—which they have disregarded and which is in fact prior to nature. No. Like McDowell the Athenian is eager to have nature on his side. He therefore challenges the scientists' right to restrict the term 'nature' to the soulless, partly necessary and partly accidental combinations of the elements.

It is highly interesting that the Athenian stranger rejects this definition of nature. He tries to prove that soul is "older than" and prior to body – by first defining 'soul' as self-movement, and the cause of motion in other things. Regardless of the merits of the Athenian's argument, Fink explains that both sides are grabbing for the rights to the conception of nature. He says: "This, I take it, is pretty rampant Platonism but clearly presented as an account of the soul as natural because primary in existence... mind is prior to world."³⁸ If soul is the primary sense of nature, then body is "second nature." Mind is the primary thing, the first thing, the paradigmatic thing, against which mere body is contrasted.

As Fink points out, Aristotle confirms that the issue between materialists and idealists is a disagreement about nature. Aristotle says: "Some identify the nature or substance of a natural object with the immediate constituent... e.g., wood is the 'nature' of the bed... [others] that 'nature' is the shape or form."³⁹ Fink's comment is:

Like in Plato, we find here both a definition of the word 'nature' (an inner source or cause of being moved and being at rest) and two competing conceptions of what that source is, namely matter and form (the material and the formal cause in Aristotle's sense). Aristotle himself finds it most satisfying to regard the formal (and the teleological or final) cause as the nature of x.⁴⁰

We can now see the crucial point about a term like 'naturalism.' Whatever one claims is the "inner source or cause" of a thing, the immediate constituent matter or the shape, one can

38. Fink, "Three Sorts of Naturalism," 215.

39. Ibid., 216, quoting from Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (Princeton University Press, 2014) *Physics*: 2, 1 (192b7ff).

40. Fink, "Three Sorts of Naturalism," 216.

be a 'naturalist.' Each account lays claim to the title 'naturalism', and impugns its rival as 'non-naturalistic'.

Classical materialism is one paradigmatic form of 'naturalism.'⁴¹ By Fink's lights, classical materialism is a form of restricted naturalism for it affirms that whatever is material is part of nature, and so that the label 'not-natural' applies to whatever is not material (or not obviously material, such as ghosts, souls, and fairies). But *the idealist, too, can rightly lay claim to the title of naturalism* – and not in a "Pickwickian" sense. Idealism and materialism turn out to be *identical* in one respect: they offer a "restricted conception of nature" and relegate to a "secondary" status everything that is not "natural" in the privileged sense. Idealism and materialism of course *contrast* – indeed, *compete* – in that they fight each other for the right to call *their* preferred side of the matter-form divide the *first* and *natural* side. No single philosophical view has automatic copyright on the terms 'nature' and 'naturalism.' Indeed, the age-old ideological struggle between materialism and idealism is a struggle over such a copyright.

Though the struggle clearly cannot be settled by presumption, it seems that the temptation is overwhelming, on both sides, to presume their own view and hence to accuse the other side 'non-naturalism.' Some restricted naturalists beg the question by defining nature as material, spatio-temporal, causal system studied by (natural) science. The materialist presumption is what McDowell calls "philistine scientism."⁴² Fink says, "McDowell has convincingly shown that what Bernard Williams calls the absolute conception of reality is merely restricted, bald naturalism ideologically presented as absolute (MVR: 112–31, esp. sect. 5)."⁴³ Wilfred Sellars provides a pure specimen of such question-begging: "I mean that naturalism takes nature in a definite way as identical with reality, as self-sufficient and

41. Roy Wood Sellars, "Why Naturalism and Not Materialism?" *The Philosophical Review* 36, no. 3 (1927): 216–25.

42. McDowell, "Virtue and Reason," 346.

43. Fink, "Three Sorts of Naturalism," 219.

as the whole of reality. And by nature is meant the space-time-causal system which is studied by science and in which our lives are passed.”⁴⁴ Note that the first sentence explicitly endorses an unrestricted conception of nature while the next sentence secretly slides the ball into the other cup, explicitly endorsing an incompatible restricted conception of nature. The second sentence overtly stipulates that the “space-time-causal system which is studied by science and in which our lives are passed” is “identical with reality.” Whether that stipulation is true is the very question at hand. One cannot assert one’s answer with exclamation points (“nature is the space-time-causal-system!”) and pretend to have delivered an argument. Or rather, one cannot assert an answer that, so phrased, idealists and supernaturalists would accept just as easily. No one disputes that unrestricted nature is all there is; but some do dispute the implicit assumption that the space-time-causal-system is all there is.

Other restricted naturalists beg the question by defining nature as the formal, immaterial, ideal world. My point here is not to endorse one or the other view; my point is that the unrestricted conception has the advantage that it does not try, in advance, to stipulate what is natural. As Fink puts it, “Nothing less than a naturalism that deserves to be presented as absolute could help break the spell of bald naturalism without merely replacing one restricted sort of naturalism with another and thus keeping the oscillations going.”⁴⁵ Culture, art, rationality, intelligent intervention, and so on are part of the all. Fink quotes John Dewey:

Mountain peaks do not float unsupported; they do not even just rest upon the earth. They *are* the earth in one of its manifest operations. It is the business of those who are concerned with the theory of the earth, geographers and geologists, to make this fact evident, in its various implications. The theorist who would deal philosophically with fine art has a like task to accomplish. (Dewey 1958: 3–4, italics in original)

Fink’s comment on Dewey’s passage:

44. Sellars, “Why Naturalism and Not Materialism?” 217.

45. Fink, “Three Sorts of Naturalism,” 219.

On this conception the aesthetical (and the ethical) are not independent of nature, but they are not somehow based on nature or supervening on it either; rather, they simply are nature in some of its manifest operations. To think otherwise is both to mystify the aesthetical (and ethical) and to trivialize nature. The man-made, the artificial, the cultural, the historical, the ethical, the normative, the mental, the logical, the abstract, the mysterious, the extraordinary, are all examples of ways of being natural rather than examples of ways of being non-natural. Nature is never *mere* nature. That which is *more* than *mere* is nature, too.⁴⁶

Where the materialist and idealist are fighting over the definition of primary nature, the unrestricted conception refuses to fight. Instead, it embraces both body and mind, brain and consciousness, matter and form, as existing on a single continuum. That continuum is, ex hypothesis, neither material nor formal, neither mental nor physical.

Unrestricted naturalism has this great attraction, that one can bow out of the materialist/idealist struggle over the conception of nature. The unrestricted conception has the disadvantage of being tautologous: one can no longer use the accusation of “non-naturalism” as a weapon against one’s opponents. While such triumphalist rhetoric makes sense within philistine materialism, it will not do when we have expanded our conceptions of nature and science to mean all of knowledge about all that is real. It makes no sense to criticize opponents for positing something real “over and above” nature when we have defined “natural” as “real” and hence “non-natural” as unreal by definition.

McDowell does reject the restricted conceptions of nature offered him by the philistine scientism and by Kantian idealism.⁴⁷ He even rejects the equation of this picture with “science”, allowing that the practical point of view of humans in the space of reasons can and does feature in the scientific worldview. Therefore, it seems he has chosen the unrestricted definition of nature by default. Nevertheless, he is of two minds. Like the materialist, he still wants to wield “supernaturalism” as a rhetorical weapon against some opponents; like

46. Ibid., 217.

47. Cf. McDowell, *Mind and World*.

the idealist, he wants to wield “philistine scientism” as a rhetorical weapon against others. McDowellian relaxed naturalism is compatible with agnosticism or with theism, but not with dogmatic atheism.

Instead of explicitly admitting that he embraces the unrestricted conception without qualification, he puts the ball in one cup and then moves it around to the other side, pretending the ball was in the other cup all along. He keeps his conception of nature restricted (anti-supernatural) while *calling* in unrestricted (neither idealist nor physicalist). McDowell as a hero of anti-dualism has allowed himself merely to *claim* he is using an unrestricted conception of nature while fully endorsing a restricted conception of nature. He has not earned the conceptual rights to his definition of nature. McDowellian nature is both restricted and unrestricted. It is, in a word, incoherent.

Perhaps I am being too hard on McDowell, when what he wants to do is show the inadequacies of each view and not replace them. Perhaps he means, in a sense, that ‘nature’ is an indefinable mystery. Nature is like an enormous box and we don’t know its contents. Even then, we cannot exclude *in advance* any hypotheses about what will or will not appear in the box.

3.3 Practical Reasons as Primary Qualities

The second problem facing McDowell’s alternative is that even by McDowell’s lights, there *do* seem to be primary qualities of nature such as “danger” and “safe” that are relational and actionable like natural goodness and natural defect.

McDowell summarizes a common worry as to how “something that is brutally *there* could nevertheless stand in an internal relation to some exercise of human sensibility.” But is this really so hard to imagine? For the rabbit, there is an internal relation between the simple fact of the presence of a wolf with sharp teeth and fast feet and an exercise of its sensibility: It had better run.

Indeed, McDowell himself supplies this example. Elsewhere in his article, he playfully presents an “epistemology of danger” or a “theory of danger.”⁴⁸ This moral epistemology helps explain why his view is not a variant of “projectivism.”

His theory of “danger” is this: Just as there is *something* about red things *themselves* that makes them give us redness experiences, likewise there is something about the dangerous animal itself that gives us fear experiences. That quality may not be *the form of red* or *the form of danger*, but it is also not *nothing*. The “theory of danger” is intended to capture this “something” with the important notion of *merit*. Red objects *just appear as red* to us under the proper circumstances. They *just do* dispose us to have red experiences. But dangerous objects *merit* appearing fearful and dangerous. They *merit* that we have a fear experience. To describe a bear (say) as “dangerous” to rabbits is to say something about bears and about rabbits in their context on planet earth. The rabbit need not engage in concept-use or perceptual judgment – seeing the bear *as dangerous* – rather the rabbit merely needs the instincts and perceptual capacities to see the bear. His response is not reducible to a response to the bear’s size or fur or any other obvious empirical quality; the rabbit is simply responding to danger – or perhaps it is responding to the bear-as-dangerous. Likewise, when we see certain kinds of food (say, rotten fruit) as “disgusting” we need not assume that we are projecting disgust onto the food; it is more plausible, by McDowell’s own lights, that we are coming to discover an internal relation that certain kinds of decaying substances stand in to animals like us. This is McDowell’s own example but he does not seem to notice that it can be used against his thesis. If “danger” is a Lockean primary quality, then “desirable” might be as well. Practical reasons for human beings include facts such as human natural norms and also relational facts obtaining.

He might object that his example doesn’t commit him to as much as I am suggesting. The rabbit has a perception of danger and automatically reacts to it in service of its natural

48. Shaffer-Landeau and Cuneo, 142–3.

end of survival. Clearly, the rabbit does not reflect on its perception or reflect on possible courses of action, as humans do. But McDowell's use of the term 'merit' seems correct. The presence of a predator does not simply *cause* fleeing but *merits* fleeing. Something would be defective if a small prey ought to flee but doesn't. With humans, the pattern holds, even with the differences. When a human being perceives danger, *some* automatic impulses arise. Practical reason enables us to abide by or override these impulses. The ability to practically reason allows us to receive automatic impulses to act into the space of reasons as reasons to act, and hence as reasons that can be weighed against other reasons. When a human being perceives some good as enabling one to learn some valuable information, say, the perceived good does not merely cause a motivation but constitutes a reason to learn it.

3.4 Science and Secondary qualities

A third problem corresponds to the first; McDowell's concept of science is too restrictive. Or rather, it is inconsistent. Call the two conceptions of science "restricted" and "unrestricted." Restricted science is what McDowell calls "philistine scientism", an overzealous attachment to the empirical methods of inquiry that ignores or denies the formal methods (logical, mathematically, computational, etc.).

McDowell wants to denigrate one kind of scientific realism (say, realism about evaluative judgments of health and sickness) while endorsing another kind of scientific realism (about shapes, sizes, weights, and other primary qualities.) That is, he denigrates the desire to find goodness in (primary) nature as a kind of neurosis or anxiety arising from the philosophical vertigo we experience upon becoming inculcated with "the scientific worldview."

I would suggest that "the scientific worldview" is capacious, including the best deliverances of our best sciences, including both material sciences (biology, chemistry) and formal sciences (mathematics, logic). It is hard to be asked to reject scientific knowledge from biology on behalf of knowledge from physics. One begins to suspect, as John Dupre

argues, that the request is that we reject genuinely scientific hypothesis from biology on behalf of philosophical materialism.⁴⁹ Just because such materialism “dresses itself in the mantle of science” does not mean that a restricted conception of science can enjoy, undisputed, trademark on the concept.

James Barham captures the dualism into which McDowell unwittingly falls:

...the philosophical literature tends to work with a scientifically outdated image of living things as rigid “machines.” This results in a picture in which only human beings (or at most the higher animals) can be properly ascribed purposes and agency in the full normative sense. From this perspective, we appear to be faced with an unappealing choice between eliminating teleology and normativity from our picture of nature altogether and understanding these phenomena as they are manifested in our own human form of life as floating free from any grounding in the natural world.⁵⁰

Neither of these unappealing choices should be taken. Rather, we should take Foot’s lead in allowing normativity into our picture of nature at the organic level as a whole, with human beings included as natural organisms.

4. An Alternative Solution

So far, I have defended an unrestricted conception of both ‘nature’ and its corresponding concept ‘science.’ How does this solve the Irrelevance and Pollyanna problems?

Recall that Irrelevance states that natural norms exist but do not matter for practical rational primates because we are free to reflect upon them and either endorse or reject them according to moral norms, which would not be natural norms. Relatedly, Pollyanna states that a total set of natural norms includes both good and bad norms. So either we have to accept that some natural defects are also virtues, or we stand in need of specifically moral

49. John Dupré, “The Miracle of Monism,” in *Naturalism in Question*, ed. Mario De Caro and David Macarthur (Harvard University Press, 2004), 36–58.

50. Barham, “Teleological Realism in Biology,” 1.

normativity to sift out vices, which again raises the problem of the irrelevance of natural norms.

Frey puts the dilemma succinctly: “The problem our dilemma poses is how we can reconcile what on the surface appear to be quite different sorts of teleology: natural and practical.”⁵¹ The solution, in brief, relies on the account of practical reason defended above. Frey provides a summary:

...the ethical naturalist must be able to show how these two seemingly opposed teleologies (the natural teleology of life and the practical teleology of action) and these two seemingly different senses of good (the good we can derive from an account of what simply is and the good as practical goal) can be unified into one and the same account. That is, we need an account of natural normativity that will show us how the relation between a general judgment articulating some fact about a life form (a judgment about a fact that is potentially known from the outside) and a judgment concerning a particular bearer of that form in a particular situation, can take the form of a practical inference whose conclusion is an action that exemplifies that very same form of life.⁵²

My account of practical reasoning shows us how general judgments about a life form unite with practical inferences that are to be acted upon. Practical reasoning allows us to apprehend one and the same identical object apprehended in two different ways. That is, our natural human life form as practical rational primates, including the natural norms binding on us, can be apprehended both “externally” by the alien anthropologist who does not bear that life form and “internally” by human beings who do bear that life form.

If both forms of knowledge grasp the same object, then the dilemma between reason and nature is solved. Since practical reasoning does contribute to the process of deciding on a course of action, we can see how norms which are perceived as objective and external become recognized as relevant and binding.

51. Frey, “The Will and the Good,” 63.

52. Ibid., 65.

When we examine the behaviors of organisms, we make generalizations. As we sift through these generalizations, some remain mere generalizations about how some creatures happen to behave, while others are classified as essential or natural to how that creature behaves. The latter are natural norms. And this sifting process is one and the same, whether in scientific or ethical accounts. Indeed, part of having a properly-formed mind is that one distinguish between natural norms and mere generalizations.

For example, a sloth bear in Washington D.C. gave birth in captivity to three cubs. The first one was immediately killed and eaten by the mother, but the second were nurtured and cared for. The zookeepers were appalled, and when, after a week of caring for the remaining cubs, the mother killed and ate another, they intervened to save the third.⁵³ This event posed the question: is something wrong with the mother bear? First, the zookeepers observe the facts: the mother ate one cub and nurtured (temporarily) the other two. The generalizations to be made of this observation are both that (1) a mother cares for her young, and (2) a mother sometimes kills her young. Secondly, they sift these norms to identify which is the natural norm. University of Southern California primatologist Craig Stanford points out that the consensus among biologists is to affirm the generic truth: a mother cares for her young. As a normative generic, we can say without a change in meaning that a mother bear is *supposed* to care for her young, and that infanticide is pathological. New data can confirm or disconfirm this evaluative judgment. For instance, the third cub of the sloth bear whom the zookeepers intervened to save turned out to suffer an elevated white blood cell count. It is possible that the other cubs were sick as well. The zookeepers speculated that the mother somehow knew this and so killed the ailing cubs. If this were true, it would give rise to a new generic: a mother cares for her healthy young. If it turned

53. Virginia Morell (2014, March 28). "Why Do Animals Sometimes Kill Their Babies?". *National Geographic* (March 28, 2014). Accessed online. <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/03/140328-sloth-bear-zoo-infanticide-chimps-bonobos-animals/>

out that the two other cubs were *not* in fact ailing, the mother's behavior would be classified as pathological.

Similarly for humans and other primates.⁵⁴ Psychologist Christine Lawson narrates how a mother drowned her two young children in order to ingratiate herself to a man she was dating who said, offhandedly, that he did not want children.⁵⁵ Although her behavior was criminal, it was also pathological. Statistically, the vast majority of human mothers indeed care for their children adequately. We do not posit "mothers care for their children" as a mere statistical likelihood that admits of exceptions. Rather, psychologists correctly judge such exceptional cases of parental indifference and cruelty as normative errors. Parents are *supposed to* care for their young, even when doing so is difficult or costly. There is *good reason* to take care of one's child. To take a significant others' offhand comment about not wanting children *as a reason* to murder one's own is a devastating error in practical reasoning. This particular mother was not merely a statistical anomaly but an example of a psychological disorder (in this case, Borderline Personality Disorder).

I argued above that practical reasoning is not one of many ways of being motivated but is the very capacity to be motivated by reasons. Plants and animals are inclined or motivated to their good by instinct or irrational appetite. They cannot pause to reflect on whether they should follow through on the instinctual flight from predators or pursuit of food and shelter. Humans are inclined by their good *both* by instinct (and emotion, desire, etc.) *and* by reason.

I also argued above that the object of human practical reasoning is a quite general conception of what is good. By 'good' we don't mean a non-natural property apprehended theoretically but the something intrinsically practical: the choiceworthy, the desirable, the to-be-pursued. As Frey clarifies:

54. ??

55. ??

Although natural inclinations depend upon conceptual apprehension, we should not be tempted to think that they are objects of contemplation. These goods, as first principles of practical reason, are apprehended as ends—as objects of pursuit rather than as objects of contemplative knowledge.⁵⁶

What is good in this sense for human beings is specific to our species. The primary good of a kind for us is the human life form. The derivative goods for us are any and all things necessarily related to the human life form. In virtue of what we are, it is good for us to achieve humanity, to become fully human. We aim to become what we are. That is, we aim to become in actuality what we we already are potentially. Some of these goods are basic human goods toward which we are naturally inclined: food, shelter, companionship, knowledge, etc. They are starting points without which human beings would not be motivated to do anything at all.

I should clarify that a thing's status as a basic good is revisable. The normal process of practical reasoning about what to do can and sometimes does overrule the basic inclination toward a basic good in pursuit of some alternative good. The point is that this overruling judgment is not something over-and-above the practical pursuit toward the good but another expression of the same pursuit. For example, some people overrule their inclination toward the basic good of human companionship by becoming a solitary monastic but they only do so in pursuit of *other* goods judged to be *better*.

As Frey says:

all practical reasoning is ultimately reasoning for the sake of attaining or maintaining these ends. Consequently, all practical reasoning is ultimately for the sake of living the sort of life that pertains to man. Indeed for Aquinas, there could be no practical teleology without natural teleology, since there would be nothing to reason towards if the will were not by nature inclined towards the exemplification of human form.⁵⁷

56. Frey, "The Will and the Good," 88.

57. Ibid., 66.

Practical reasoning is the process whereby we determine the “sort of life that pertains” to creatures like us, then all particular practical reasonings about what to do in a given situation come to light as parts of this whole. This fits with the account of virtue defended above. There we saw that excellence in practical reasoning and rational practice aims at doing well with one’s whole life. In other words, every short-term choice fits into a broader context of life projects such as what career to pursue, whether or not to marry, what friendships to maintain, and so on. And every long-term project fits into a broader context of one’s answer to the maximally general question “how should one live?”

The remaining task is to explain, contra McDowell, how such practical norms are naturalistic even in the same way as other organic, natural norms. McDowell aims for the proper conception of practical reason when he says it is possible to “formulate a conception of reason that is, in one sense, naturalistic: a formed state of practical reason is one’s second nature, not something that dictates to one’s nature from outside.”⁵⁸ But, as I have argued, that he does not quite succeed in his aim.

My objection is that McDowell shares with non-cognitivists an implicit nature/human dualism whereby human rationality (in the space of reasons) is entirely of a different order than organic and inorganic nature (in the realm of law). The alternative I have been defending dissolves this dualism. Toner says: “the virtues are seen as acquired traits that fit human beings for the exercise of practical rationality toward which their shared nature directs them (thereby rejecting McDowell’s sharp separation of first and second natures).”⁵⁹ This view is more adequate because, as Toner explains:

The acquisition of the virtues not only prevents emotions from interfering with practical reasoning but also, in McDowellian terms, “opens our eyes” to new sorts of reasons for action, not visible to the immature, that make the good of others part of our good. So... MacIntyre links first and second

58. McDowell, “Two Sorts of Naturalism.”

59. Toner, “Sorts of Naturalism,” 243.

natures much more closely than does McDowell.⁶⁰

Human beings are *animals* after all, with animal sensations and emotions and urges, the “sharp separation” between biology and rationality not only cuts humans apart from the rest of the cosmos, but cuts human beings down the middle. McDowell’s concept of human nature is not that we are practical rational *primates*; his unwitting concept of human nature is we are *practical reasoners* full stop. This error infects his definition of virtue as well. He believes that all virtues pertain to practical reasoning (or “sensitivity”) where I argued that some virtues pertaining to practical *reasoning* while others pertain to rational *practice*.

This form of ethical naturalism is satisfyingly adequate to the task. It captures the normativity of ethical reasons and aligns these reasons with the facts of nature.

If my view needs an epithet, I should like to call it Recursive Naturalism. It is recursive in two ways: first, the normativity of human rationality is both an *instance* of nature and is *about* nature, including about itself. Second, the object of practical reason is both to discover *the thing to do* and, recursively, to become more practically reasonable. Practical reasoning, when successful, sifts between excellent and defective expressions of our life form and correctly judges the kind of person one ought to become.

5. Summary

My account of virtue, thus far, argued that virtue is excellence in rational practice and practical reasoning. Insofar as virtue is necessarily related to practical rationality, an account of practical reason was needed. I argued that practical reasoning is the capacity for identifying and acting on practical reasons. As practical reasoners, we observe some facts as practical reasons. I briefly argued that “practical reasons” are simply facts viewed by practical reasoners as desirable or undesirable, as good or bad. Just as speculative reason is by

60. Ibid., 243.

definition the faculty for judging true and false, practical reason by definition judges worth or its absence. A practical reason can and does motivate one, all by itself; in conjunction with or absent other immediate inclinations or desires. Practical reason, furthermore, motivates when one judges that a course of action or an outcome is good in itself, that it is *desirable* in the sense that it is to be desired whether one presently desires it or not.

I also, briefly argued that this capacity *really* gets at worth, at what some call “objective value.” (While I do not think this term expresses my view charitably, it is a common term.) A better way of phrasing it would be to ask whether there is any reason to do anything at all. Put this way, it is more clear that every sufficiently matured human organism naturally has reasons to do some things, to pursue some ends, and reasons not to do some things, to avoid other ends. I also defended the defeasible presumption that practical reason is *important*. For human beings, practical reasoning is natural reasoning; for human beings, reasoning well is natural goodness.

Chapter 7

Conclusions

For about a hundred years we have so concentrated on one of the virtues—“kindness” or mercy—that most of us do not feel anything except kindness to be really good or anything but cruelty to be really bad. Such lopsided ethical developments are not uncommon, and other ages too have had their pet virtues and curious insensibilities.

—C.S. Lewis, *The Problem of Pain* 43.

This dissertation has defended the claim that human beings are practical rational primates and hence *ought* to become fully practically wise.

The potential for wisdom is part of who and what we are. Actualizing that potential is both *natural* (according to the sense of ‘natural’ I have defended) and *ethically* obligatory.

As Julia Annas summarizes, non-reductive naturalisms risk trivializing moral or normative facts by implausibly cordoning them within humans: “Non-naturalistic accounts of ethical terms assume that their function, prominently their normativity, is something that arises with humans, or is produced by humans, in a way which owes nothing to the nature which we share with other living things.”¹ That link is supplied by Foot (and Thompson et.

1. Julia Annas, “Virtue Ethics: What Kind of Naturalism?” in *Virtue Ethics, Old and New*, ed. Stephen Gardiner (Cornell University Press, 2005), 12.

al.) As Annas continues:

What is so helpful for ethics from this kind of biological naturalism is that we find that the normativity of our ethical discourse is not something which emerges mysteriously with humans and can only be projected back, in an anthropomorphic way, onto trees and their roots. Rather, we find normativity in the realm of living things, plants and animals, already. It is part of the great merit of the work of Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse to have stressed this point. Like many important philosophical points, it is obvious once pointed out...²

Virtue ethics is, on my view, a very useful guide to action, in personal life, political life, bioethics,³ business,⁴ and education.⁵ It would be an improvement to almost any area of human life if we were aware of our own vices and worked to expunge them, and if we understood the virtues and pursued them. Yet many obstacles from philosophical and social tradition stand in the way. My dissertation is part of an attempt to remove such obstacles and, in their absence, render not only palatable but desirable a pursuit of virtues.

Virtue, practical reason, and flourishing are age-old themes. Nevertheless, they are significant themes. Treating them adequately requires more work than I can claim to have done here. As Glaucon said to Socrates, “The measure of listening to such discussions is the whole of life.”⁶

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appendix, bibliography, and vita in that order.

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2. Ibid.

3. Beauchamp and Childress, *Principles of Biomedical Ethics*.

4. Ron Beadle, “MacIntyre’s Influence on Business Ethics,” in *Handbook of Virtue Ethics in Business and Management* (Springer, Dordrecht, 2015), 1–9.

5. David Carr and Jan Steutel, *Virtue Ethics and Moral Education* (Routledge, 2005).

6. Cooper, *Complete Works of Plato Republic* 450 b.

0.1 Bibliography

0.2 CURRICULUM VITAE

Insert with appropriate sub-headings.